

Politics in Mexico

The Democratic Consolidation

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4

Political Attitudes and Their Origins: Partisanship, Alienation, and Tolerance

Support for democracy is seen as a cultural matter. . . . support for democracy is also a matter of information, cognition, and belief systems. The way people think about democracy is based on cognitive and informational skills and resources. The concept of democracy varies depending on society's belief systems, and mass belief systems depend on individual characteristics such as education, informational background, cognitive skills, degrees of political "sophistication," and so on.

ALEJANDRO MORENO, *Democracy and Mass Belief Systems in Latin America*

Many experiences have a bearing on the formation of beliefs in general, and political beliefs specifically. Attitudes are general orientations toward basic aspects of life: abstract principles that guide behavior.¹ Children, for example, are affected by the attitudes and values of their parents, and most chil-

Attitudes: general orientations toward basic aspects of life, abstract principles that guide behavior.

dren carry the consequences with them for years.² Other persons have reported the influence of education and the specific role of teachers and professors.³ Experiences other than those within the family and in school contribute to the formative years of many citizens, especially when the experiences are broad and deep, permeating the environment of an entire nation. The Great Depression, for example, tremendously affected Americans, their political and social values, and their voting behavior.⁴ Undoubtedly, although

we have no surveys to prove it empirically, the revolution exerted a similar influence in Mexico.⁵ In the mid-1990s, Mexicans identified liberty and justice most strongly with the Revolution.⁶ A small exploratory study of workers in three cities in 1978 revealed surprisingly strong memories of the revolution among third-generation Mexicans. The size of the sample makes it impossible to generalize about the data, nevertheless 45 percent reported family participation in the event, and 25 percent reported lost property or injury of a family member. Family involvement was associated with fears of renewed violence and has helped discourage political protests in the present period.⁷ Some individuals, generally as young adults, consciously or unconsciously take on the attitudes of their peers or of their working environment.

Surprisingly (in the last two decades), social scientists have largely ignored how citizens learn their political attitudes.⁸ In Mexico, for example, no broad studies of this phenomenon exist. Fortunately, the Hewlett Foundation survey in September 2000, for the first time explored this issue in considerable detail. In the previous chapter we noted that Mexicans and Americans both expressed considerable confidence and trust in religion, school, and the family. Therefore, one might expect these institutions to play significant roles in influencing citizen beliefs generally, and political attitudes specifically.

Interestingly, when citizens from both countries were asked to identify which sources influenced the formation of their political attitudes, a correlation did not necessarily emerge between institutions receiving strong levels of trust and their perceived impact on individual beliefs (Table 4-1). For example, among Americans, religion is a significant source of political attitudes. Mexicans, who ranked religion at the very top of trusted institutions,

Table 4-1 Sources of Political Socialization in Mexico and the United States

| Source of Political Socialization | Group (percentages) | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|----------|
| | Americans | Mexicans |
| Religion | 69 | 26 |
| Family | 77 | 48 |
| School | 78 | 40 |
| Television | 59 | 40 |
| Friends | 71 | 28 |
| Work | 58 | 32 |

Note: Question: For each of the following . . . please tell me how strongly each one has influenced your way of thinking with respect to politics. "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," Grant, Hewlett Foundation, September 2000.

rank it at the bottom of sources of political beliefs. In fact, nearly half of all Mexicans considered religion to play no role whatsoever in molding their political attitudes. On one hand, this is not a surprising finding, given the fact that the role of Catholicism outside of its narrow spiritual boundaries was denigrated by post-revolutionary governments. On the other hand, since the Catholic Church was a vocal and pro-active actor in laying the groundwork for electoral democracy since the late 1980s, it is surprising how few Mexicans attribute any influence to that institution.

Another highly ranked institution among Americans and Mexicans both is school. The general literature has always considered schools a primary source of attitudes and values. Again, as Table 4-1 reveals, schools are the number one source of American political values. Although not as important to Mexicans comparatively speaking, schools tie for second as an important source of political beliefs.

The third and the single most revered institution among both Mexicans and Americans is the family. Family produces the strongest correlation between trust and socialization, ranking at the top as the source of Mexican political attitudes and essentially tied with schools as Americans' primary source of political attitudes. What is remarkable, however, is that given the importance of family in the Mexican culture, only half of all Mexicans attribute their political beliefs to that institution. In fact, a third of all Mexicans say the family plays no role in determining their political attitudes. A strong explanation for this divergence might be that only half as many Mexican compared with American families actually discuss politics at home.⁹

Studies from other countries suggest a number of variables that affect the political attitudes and values of ordinary citizens. They typically include race, ethnicity, socioeconomic background, level of education, occupation, region, and religion. Mexico has an Indian population, but Indians account for only approximately 8 percent of the population, depending on the definition of *Indian*. Indians, however, are a minor political and economic presence and hence have not been treated as a separate group in national political surveys. The typical Mexican thinks of himself or herself as, and is, mestizo, thereby minimizing race or ethnicity as a significant variable in voting behavior. According to Miguel Basáñez and Pablo Páras, some evidence now exists to suggest that ethnicity in Mexico does affect political beliefs, including Mexicans' receptivity to democracy.¹⁰

As elections become more competitive and, more important, if Indians in certain states or regions were to organize themselves politically, ethnicity may become a more significant variable. The consequences of this on a national level can be seen as a result of the Zapatista National Liberation Army's (EZLN) uprising in Chiapas in January 1994, which affected the

larger political context through 1995, and again in 2000–2001. This is particularly the case because the EZLN has demanded indigenous autonomy in its negotiations with the Mexican government, rejecting a government bill in 2001.

Because of sharp social-class divisions, Mexican values are likely to be influenced by income level. Furthermore, the origins of Mexico's leaders, particularly political and economic, set them apart from the ordinary citizen. Consequently, it is important to ascertain differences between mass and elite political opinion. And because political knowledge has much to do with education, and disparities in schooling are substantial in Mexico, education is a way of distinguishing one Mexican from another and is strongly related to social class and occupation.¹¹ Historically, as suggested in Chapter 2, regionalism played an important role in national politics. It declined in prominence by the 1960s, yet it continues to exert an influence over some values, in the same way that it does in the United States. As different political movements strengthen their representation at the local and state levels, dominating specific regions politically, and as regional–ethnic groups such as the Zapatistas focus on local social and economic issues, geography will reassert its influence. As suggested earlier, Mexico ranks high among geographically fragmented countries in the world, and those divisions have been found to have cultural consequences. Religion is often still another determinant of political behavior and in many societies, plays a role in the formation of social and political values, especially when religious diversity is present. In Mexico, however, the predominance of Catholicism has obviated sharp religious differences. Most of the disharmony historically related to religion can be described as a battle between secularism and religion, not among religions. Nonetheless, the rise of evangelical Protestantism throughout Latin America since the 1960s, although not yet as greatly felt in Mexico, and the presence of a small proportion of nonbelievers and atheists, render religious beliefs deserving of consideration, too.

INCOME AND POLITICS

The confidence people have in a political system and in their ability to influence the outcome of political decisions—level of political efficacy—depends on many things. One is income level. People who have achieved economic success not only perceive the system as fairer and more beneficial to their own interests but also believe they can change aspects of it that they dislike. When Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba published the first results

of their multicountry study in the 1960s, they declared that Mexicans had a much lower sense of political efficacy than did Americans or the English but was equivalent to that of the Germans.¹² In the late 1960s Rafael Segovia replicated the research on political efficacy among school-children and found that Mexican children were characterized by low levels of political efficacy. He also found that the parents' socioeconomic background had something to do with those levels; as the parents' income increased, so did the children's political efficacy and confidence in the system.¹³

In 1989, in a national survey, half of Mexican respondents with high incomes believed they could do something about electoral fraud. By contrast, only one in four low-income respondents agreed with that statement.¹⁴ Regardless of income, only slightly more than a third of all Mexicans thought they could alter this particular problem in their country. During this same period, over half of all Americans thought they could affect government policies.¹⁵ In 2000, after President Fox was elected, Mexican responses to a different question measuring political efficacy reflect a dramatic increase. When asked if their vote would make a difference in improving conditions in the future, two-thirds believed that was true. As democratic influences affected the outcome of elections, and parties other than PRI began winning state and local elections and congressional seats in large numbers in the 1990s, Mexicans became convinced that their votes could affect governmental leadership and, therefore, policy outcomes. Income levels, as we suggested, significantly affect perceptions of efficacy, with only six out of ten Mexicans in lower income brackets believing they can change conditions by voting, compared with nearly 80 percent of wealthier Mexicans (Table 4-2).

Another explanation for why Mexicans increased their political efficacy in the 1980s and 1990s is related to their increased participation in civic organizations. As Ann Craig and Wayne Cornelius argue, even low-income

Table 4-2 Mexicans' Political Efficacy, by Socioeconomic Status

| Response to the Statement "Voting can make things better in future" | Income Level | | | All Respondents (%) |
|---|--------------|------------|----------|---------------------|
| | Low (%) | Middle (%) | High (%) | |
| Can make a difference | 61 | 74 | 77 | 66 |
| Will not make a difference | 32 | 23 | 23 | 29 |
| Don't know/No answer | 7 | 3 | 0 | 5 |

Question: Some people say that the way a person votes could make things better in the future. Others say that regardless of how people vote, they will not make things better in the future. With which statement are you most in agreement?

Source: "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," Grant, Hewlett Foundation, September 2000.

Table 4-3 Mexicans' Risk-taking, by Socioeconomic Status

| Response to Statement "Nothing ventured, nothing gained" | Income Level | | | All Respondents (%) |
|---|--------------|---------------|-------------|------------------------|
| | Low (%) | Middle (%) | High (%) | |
| Agree | 58 | 67 | 78 | 62 |
| Disagree | 39 | 30 | 21 | 35 |
| Don't know/No answer | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 |

Source: "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

people who become active in nongovernmental organizations and make demands on the system collectively develop a stronger sense of efficacy.¹⁶ The growing numbers of such groups and their greater involvement has raised the level of participation.¹⁷ Over time, an increase in middle- and higher-income groups would also contribute to an increased level of political efficacy, but a redistribution of the population among income groups in Mexico was not significant in the 1990s.

A variable as important as political efficacy in the 1990s, and perhaps the most influential in bringing about the defeat of PRI in the 2000 presidential race, is the willingness of individual Mexicans to risk a political change. Survey researchers have long asked citizens questions about their level of political risk-taking. In Mexico, naturally, as suggested in the previous chapter, this is a particularly significant issue among a citizenry that had not witnessed a change in partisan control over the executive branch for seventy years.¹⁸ When Mexicans were asked if they agreed with the statement "nothing ventured, nothing gained," or "stick to the devil you know," nearly two-thirds expressed a general philosophical position favoring risk and change. In the United States, the figure was over 80 percent. Again, however, if we break those responses down by income levels, they reveal an even greater difference than is the case for income differences and political efficacy. As the data in Table 4-3 illustrate, Mexicans with high incomes are much more willing to risk change. In fact, high-income Mexicans differ very little from the average response among all Americans, illustrating the importance of income in leveling cultural differences on certain political attitudes between two groups of citizens. Nearly twice as many poorer Mexicans as higher-income groups opted for the status quo statement "stick with the devil you know."

Analysts of Americans' voting behavior have always been attentive to variables affecting political sympathies for the Republicans and Democrats. Their studies suggest that among the most important of these variables is

Table 4-4 Mexicans' Partisan Sympathies, by Socioeconomic Status

| | Income Level | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|--------------|------|---------------|------|-------------|------|------------------------|------|
| | Low (%) | | Middle (%) | | High (%) | | All Respondents (%) | |
| Sympathy for Party | 1989 | 2000 | 1989 | 2000 | 1989 | 2000 | 1989 | 2000 |
| PAN | 12 | 28 | 13 | 40 | 21 | 35 | 13 | 31 |
| PRI | 26 | 32 | 38 | 21 | 44 | 19 | 31 | 29 |
| PRD | 17 | 9 | 16 | 10 | 5 | 15 | 16 | 10 |
| Other | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| None | 32 | 27 | 23 | 25 | 21 | 25 | 28 | 27 |
| Don't know/No answer | 10 | 4 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 9 | 2 |

Source: *Los Angeles Times* poll, August 1989; "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

personal income. This was also true in the case of Mexicans. Over the last decade, some dramatic changes in partisan sympathy have taken place on the basis of income. Traditionally, the PRI obtained its strongest support among higher income groups, illustrated in the data for 1989 in Table 4-4. In fact, 44 percent of Mexicans in the upper income brackets expressed a preference for PRI in 1989. By 2000, however, that figure had changed dramatically, falling by more than half to only 19 percent of adult citizens. Among middle-income groups, the same pattern, with almost the same percentage of change, took place. Only among lower-income groups did PRI retain considerable support during the 1990s. The PAN, which won the presidency in 2000, attracted most of those middle- and upper-income voters who abandoned the PRI. For example, middle-income voters increased their support for PAN in just eleven years by more than 200 percent. PAN also was able to more than double its support among lower-income groups. The PRD, which was the second-strongest party in 1989, lost more than a third of its partisan supporters by 2000. The only party that increased its partisan support from 1989 to 2000 was PAN. However since many voters may have temporarily altered their partisan preferences to oust the PRI from the presidency, it remains to be seen if these trends persist.¹⁹

The consequences of the changing face of partisan sympathies over the last decade can be seen in data reporting actual voter intentions shortly before the 2000 presidential race. When Mexicans were asked who they intended to vote for in May 2000, 40 percent of Mexico's poorest citizens planned to vote for Francisco Labastida, the PRI candidate. As voter income increased, voter support for Labastida declined. Only 26 percent of the wealthiest Mexicans supported Labastida. Fox, on the other hand, received

the support of one-third of Mexico's poor, slightly less than Labastida; but the four other income categories supported him by large margins. In fact, more than half of the voters in the highest three of five income categories reported they would vote for Fox. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the PRD's candidate, garnered only a fifth of the poorest voters, and his supporters declined as income levels increased.

EDUCATION AND POLITICS

A variable closely related to income in determining political preferences is education. Access to education, especially in a country like Mexico where opportunities are fewer than in the United States, is strongly related to parental income; the higher the income, the more likely a person will attend and *complete* higher education. For example, of the students at the National University in the early 1990s, more than 90 percent were from families with incomes in the upper 15 percent.²⁰ Many Mexicans attend public universities, which charge minimal fees, but most low-income students do not complete their degree requirements. Students with higher education obtain the necessary credentials to pursue the most prestigious professions, just as they do elsewhere, and thus on the whole earn more.

With education come knowledge, social prestige, economic success, and greater self-confidence. Consequently, when Mexicans were asked whether they could change conditions by voting, 75 percent of those with higher education believed they could (Table 4-5). In contrast, only slightly more than half who had received a primary education believed they could alter political conditions. In the United States, education affects responses in the same direction, although anyone with a secondary education or higher

Table 4-5 Mexicans' Political Efficacy, by Level of Education

| Response to the Statement that "Voting can make things better in future" | Educational Level | | | |
|---|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| | Primary (%) | Secondary (%) | Preparatory (%) | University (%) |
| Can make a difference | 58 | 66 | 76 | 75 |
| Will not make a difference | 33 | 31 | 23 | 24 |
| Don't know/No answer | 9 | 3 | 1 | 2 |

Source: "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

Table 4-6 Mexicans' Risk-taking, by level of Education

| Response to Statement "Nothing ventured, nothing gained" | Level of Education | | | | All |
|---|--------------------|-----------|-------------|------------|-----|
| | Primary | Secondary | Preparatory | University | |
| Agree | 50 | 57 | 79 | 76 | 62 |
| Disagree | 46 | 41 | 20 | 21 | 35 |
| Don't know/No answer | 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 |

Source: "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

believes in the efficacy of voting.²¹ If efficacy is taken to the next logical step, participation measured in terms of voting, a strong relationship exists between higher education and actual voter turnout. For example, 46 percent of the population has a primary education, but those with a primary education accounted for only 36 percent of the ballots cast in 1994. Mexicans with college degrees (only 8 percent of the population) accounted for twice as many (16 percent) of the actual voters.²² This larger turnout among educated voters helped Vicente Fox in 2000.

Education not only affects citizen confidence and knowledge about the political system but also determines to some extent citizens' acceptance of certain attitudes. One of the most influential Mexican political attitudes in the 1990s was, as we have witnessed, the willingness of the average voter to risk change. Education, as is the case with political efficacy, does play a significant role; indeed, it has more influence on risk-taking than on efficacy among Mexicans. As recent survey data illustrate (Table 4-6), only a third of all Mexicans preferred the status quo over the possibility that risking something new might alter their lives for the better. Among Mexicans with only an elementary school education, 25 percent fewer were willing to take such a chance. The better educated voters, who opted for change in large numbers, also voted more frequently for Vicente Fox, whose electoral alliance, in the minds of most voters, represented change.

In the United States, education as a single variable does not have a dramatic effect,²³ but because Mexico also is characterized by sharper class divisions, the relationship is stronger. Even in the United States, citizens with only a sixth grade education differ from the rest of the population on measures of political efficacy and risk-taking.

Educational achievement played an important role in determining partisan preferences in Mexico during the 1990s. The evolution of this pattern is clearly illustrated in the data comparing partisan responses in 1989,

Table 4-7 Mexicans' Party Preference, by Level of Education

| Preferred Party | Education Level | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|-----------------|------|---------------|------|-----------------|------|----------------|------|---------------------|------|
| | Primary (%) | | Secondary (%) | | Preparatory (%) | | University (%) | | All Respondents (%) | |
| | 1989 | 2000 | 1989 | 2000 | 1989 | 2000 | 1989 | 2000 | 1989 | 2000 |
| PRI | 27 | 39 | 34 | 24 | 33 | 18 | 38 | 19 | 31 | 29 |
| PAN | 10 | 25 | 13 | 33 | 14 | 40 | 24 | 36 | 13 | 31 |
| PRD | 15 | 9 | 17 | 8 | 17 | 9 | 12 | 15 | 16 | 10 |
| Other | 3 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| None | 35 | 24 | 24 | 32 | 24 | 27 | 18 | 27 | 28 | 27 |
| Don't know/ No answer | 11 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 9 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 9 | 2 |

Source: Los Angeles Times poll, August 1989; "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

shortly after the benchmark Mexican election, in which viable national options became a reality, and 2000, following Vicente Fox's victory (see Table 4-7). Since the late 1990s, voters consider the PRI to be the far-right party, the PAN center right, and the PRD center left. The comparative data between 1989 and 2000 support several significant trends. PRI, which has traditionally done well among less-educated voters, retains its appeal among that group. PAN, which has done poorly among such voters, increases its support dramatically, by 150 percent. The PRD, which relied heavily on these voters in the 1988 election, lost their support. The second trend revealed that among Mexican voters, educational level determines the dramatic decline in support for PRI. About the same percentage of voters preferred PRI in 2000 as in 1989, but only half as many college-educated voters expressed that same preference in 2000 as in 1989, a significant decline. PAN, on the other hand, more than doubled its partisan support among all citizens. Whereas PRI led in all educational categories in 1989, PAN replaced it among the three most well-educated groups, increasing its support 150 to 200 percent among secondary and preparatory educated voters.

Just three years later, in the 2003 congressional elections, frustrated with the failures of the Fox administration to pass and implement major reforms, voters sympathetic to PAN in 2000 began to shift their support back to PRI and PRD. Whereas PAN continued to dominate among high school- and college-educated voters, its margin over PRI declined dramatically, in the case of secondary students, to only 1 percent. Among professional people and business owners, PRI outpolled PAN.

RELIGION AND POLITICS

Students of the Catholic heritage in Mexico identify it as an important contributor to values within the family and within the culture generally. When ranking the role of God in their lives, Mexicans and Americans give it equal importance; only one in four Canadians consider God important.²⁴ Religion's potential for influencing the formation of societal norms is enhanced by the fact that most Mexicans consider themselves religious (see Table 4-8), and 85 percent declare they received a religious education in their homes.²⁵ Although it is true that the number of Mexicans who attend church services has fallen since the turn of the century, the number who attend regularly is higher than is typically believed. Throughout the 1990s, 44 percent of all Catholics went to church weekly or more often, and 20 percent monthly.²⁶ In 1994, three-quarters of all Mexicans described themselves as practicing Catholics.

Given the overwhelming dominance of Catholicism, it would be useful to measure its effect on political attitudes according to the intensity of belief. For example, when Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba completed their classic study, which largely ignored religion, they discovered that the more religious a person was, regardless of faith, the more intolerant of others' political beliefs he or she would be.²⁷ I will offer some observations regarding the variable of intensity, but for comparative purposes, it is helpful to identify the potential influence of religion on some of the major political attitudes discussed.

How does religion affect political efficacy? Table 4-9 presents responses according to religious belief. Because Catholics account for the overwhelm-

Table 4-8 Mexicans' Religious Affiliations

| Affiliation | Percentage of All Respondents | |
|-------------|-------------------------------|------|
| | 1989 | 2000 |
| Catholic | 92 | 85 |
| Protestant | 5 | 4 |
| Other | 1 | 4 |
| None | 1.7 | 6 |
| No answer | .3 | 1 |

Source: Los Angeles Times poll, August 1989; "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000; Roberto Blancarte, "Religiones y creencias en México," *Este País* (April 2002), 49, uses the following figures: 88 percent Catholic, 7.27 percent Protestant, and 3.52 percent none.

Table 4-9 Mexicans' Political Efficacy, by Religion

| Response to Statement "Voting can make things better in the future" | Religion (percentages) | | | All Respondents |
|---|------------------------|-------------|------|-----------------|
| | Catholic | Protestant* | None | |
| Can make a difference | 67 | 70 | 61 | 66 |
| Will not make a difference | 28 | 23 | 32 | 29 |
| Don't know/No answer | 5 | 7 | 6 | 5 |

*Figures were used for evangelical Protestants, the largest Protestant faith in Mexico.
 Source: "Democracy Through Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

ing majority of Mexicans, their views and that of the average Mexican are likely to correspond closely. Essentially, in terms of political attitudes, religion is not a very significant variable. Differences between Catholic and Protestant responses are relatively minor. The only religious belief that produces some variation in citizen responses is among those who profess no religious beliefs. Atheists tend to be more cynical than their religious peers and are less convinced that participation will change political conditions.

The contribution of religion to Mexican attitudes is embedded in the general culture. Scholars have argued that the Catholic Church might function as an *indirect* agent of socialization (even though Mexicans suggested earlier that the Church is not an important source of their political beliefs). Analysts also have suggested that Catholicism may have encouraged deference, obedience, and respect for hierarchy in laity interactions with secular authorities because those are the norms it has conveyed in its own interactions.²⁸ Such patterns are obviously changing, and whatever impact the Church may have had in the past, its openly critical posture implicitly in favor of political change is also reflected among practicing Catholics. Most Catholics are in favor of taking a chance on change. What is noteworthy, however, is that a significantly higher percentage of Protestants and atheists favor change (Table 4-10). It is possible, therefore, that the common view of

Table 4-10 Mexicans' Risk-taking, by Religion

| Response to Statement "Nothing ventured, nothing gained" | Religion (percentages) | | | All Respondents |
|--|------------------------|------------|------|-----------------|
| | Catholic | Protestant | None | |
| Agree | 61 | 75 | 75 | 62 |
| Disagree | 37 | 21 | 22 | 35 |
| Don't know/No answer | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 |

Source: "Mexican Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

Table 4-11 Religious Partisanship in Mexico

| Response to Question "Do you sympathize with any political party? Which one?" | Religious Beliefs | | |
|---|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| | Intense Catholic (%) | Moderate Catholic (%) | General Population (%) |
| National Action Party | 18.2 | 9.5 | 11.4 |
| Democratic Revolutionary Party | 2.0 | 6.5 | 6.3 |
| Institutional Revolutionary Party | 9.2 | 25.1 | 24.8 |

Source: Miguel Basáñez, *Encuesta nacional de opinión pública, iglesia-estado*, 1990.

the Church conveying traditional attitudes has left an important residue among a certain portion of the laity to an extent not found among non-Catholics, regardless of beliefs.

What has most intrigued students of Mexican politics and religion is an assumed relationship between Catholicism and party affiliation. The reason for this assumption is that the National Action Party adopted many of the ideas of the European and Latin American Christian Democratic movements. Moreover, prominent early leaders of the party were known to be active Catholics.²⁹ Contrary to a common belief, being Catholic has little or nothing to do with party sympathy in Mexico. In fact, as I pointed out in a more comprehensive examination of the issue, all the survey data from the 1980s and 1990s indicate that the only relationship between PAN and Catholicism is between the party and a tiny group of Catholics, 3.4 percent, who attend church daily (see Table 4-11). This group does differ from the rest of the population in its intensity of support for the PAN. Because they are so small in number, they exert little influence on partisanship and electoral outcomes.

Religious and party preferences are revealing, even if a tie between the PAN and Catholicism does not exist.³⁰ Indeed, it is the Protestants and the nonreligious who deviate from the norm. Both in 1989 and 2000, Protestants gave the least support to the PAN (Table 4-12). In fact, although PAN increased its support among Protestants in the last decade, it lost ground among this group compared with Mexicans professing other religious preferences. Nearly a third of all Mexicans preferred PAN by 2000, but that was the case among only one out of ten Protestants. In fact, by 2003, PRI regained a slight edge over PAN among Catholics. On the other hand, PAN improved its support among non-Catholic Christians. PRI, on the other hand, improved its support among Protestants, the group most likely to support that party on the basis of their religious beliefs. Half again as many Mexican Protestants as Mexicans preferred the PRI. This preference among

Table 4-12 Mexicans' Partisan Sympathies, by Religion

| Sympathy for Party | Religion | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|----------|------|------------|------|------|------|-----------------|------|
| | Catholic | | Protestant | | None | | All Respondents | |
| | 1989 | 2000 | 1989 | 2000 | 1989 | 2000 | 1989 | 2000 |
| PAN | 13 | 32 | 8 | 12 | 10 | 29 | 13 | 31 |
| PRI | 32 | 29 | 27 | 44 | 21 | 19 | 31 | 29 |
| PRD | 15 | 10 | 20 | 11 | 21 | 13 | 16 | 10 |
| No Party | 28 | 25 | 35 | 29 | 28 | 37 | 28 | 27 |
| Other | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Don't know/No answer | 9 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 15 | 2 | 9 | 2 |

Source: *Los Angeles Times* poll, August 1989; "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

Protestants is also explained by the fact that most of their adherents live in rural communities, the strongest regional supporters of PRI. The most interesting group, religiously speaking, based on partisan preferences, are non-believers. They always have shown a higher level of support for the PRD, a pattern continuing into the twenty-first century. But in 2000, the nonreligious were also the group most likely to express no party preference, thus making up a larger percentage of independent voters.

Protestants illustrate differing political sympathies, indicating they may be a more heterogeneous group in terms of background characteristics. Protestants are much more diverse, however, in religious composition. From 1992 to 1994, the Secretariat of Government registered 2,010 religious associations in response to newly introduced constitutional reforms. Of those, only 21 percent were Catholic, and 77 percent were evangelical Protestant. The evangelicals could be subdivided as follows: independent groups, 48 percent; Baptists, 29 percent; Pentecostals, 21 percent; and traditional Protestants (such as Methodists), 2 percent.³¹ This level of diversity is very important to differences in partisanship, because as recent research from the United States reveals, churches do have distinctive political orientations, and the extent of theological traditionalism prevailing in a congregation moves individual members toward more conservative positions on social issues and makes them more likely to identify themselves as political conservatives.³² In short, substantial differences in religious-political orientations, if they exist, are most likely to occur within each individual religious community.

The impact of religion on Mexican partisan politics continues to be moderated by the small numbers of non-Catholics. If Protestantism's growth were to mirror that found in Central America, where numbers have risen extraordinarily in the past two decades, religion might become a sig-

nificant variable in Mexican voting behavior.³³ Recent research among Mexican evangelicals suggests that "a nascent Evangelical social and political movement is underway. . . . The evidence is fairly clear and seems to be mounting that a once reserved and almost invisible religious minority is now emerging and demanding a seat at the table."³⁴

As I stated elsewhere, and recent survey data confirm, many Mexicans are interested in redefining the church's role in society. Their redefinition has serious, long-term implications for the role of the church as both an institution and a religion in Mexicans' political life. Fewer than half of all Mexicans define the church's task as religious, whereas more than half viewed its primary activities as political, social, moral, economic, or something else. This suggests that large numbers of Mexicans do not view church activities in a narrow and traditional sense, and this same group is most critical of the church's response to social and economic needs.³⁵ In the 1990s, large numbers of Mexicans believed that the Catholic Church should become involved in social work, health, and education, and more than two-thirds believed that the government should take the church into account on important social issues.³⁶

GENDER AND POLITICS

One of the influences on values about which we have the least understanding is the role of gender in Mexico. A number of studies of Latin America examine political behavior from a female viewpoint. Research on the political behavior of women in the United States have rarely discovered sharp differences with men, but they typically note that women are not as interested in politics, have less knowledge of politics, and are somewhat more alienated from the political system than are men. In fact, one study concludes that a high level of alienation was associated with the rise of feminism and the recognition of their exclusionary treatment by the system.³⁷ Almond and Verba found the same pattern for Mexican women in the 1960s but with differences that were much more extreme.³⁸ For example, when asked if they discussed politics, 29 percent of Mexican women said yes, compared with 55 percent of Mexican men. In the United States, although fewer women than men discussed politics, the gap was relatively small: 70 versus 83 percent. Gender differences continue to remain marginally stronger in Mexico.

Differences in political attitudes and behavior attributable to gender can be explained by roles assigned to Mexican women.³⁹ Although many women today obtain an advanced education and a large percentage are in the

Table 4-13 Educational Discrepancies Among the Economically Active Population, by Gender*

| Level of Education | Women | Men |
|------------------------------------|---------------|------|
| | (percentages) | |
| Uneducated | 9.2 | 9.1 |
| 1 to 3 years of grade school | 10.6 | 13.5 |
| 4 to 5 years of grade school | 6.4 | 7.4 |
| Completed grade school | 21.2 | 21.8 |
| 1 to 2 years of junior high school | 4.1 | 6.1 |
| Completed junior high school | 13.5 | 16.1 |
| Subprofessional | 13.9 | 3.9 |
| 1 to 3 years of preparatory school | 6.9 | 9.1 |
| Mid-level professional | 1.7 | 1.2 |
| High-level professional | 12.6 | 11.8 |

Notes: *Only 35 percent of women over twelve years old were economically active, compared with 78 percent of men.

Source: *Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico*, October 1998, 398.

workforce, opportunities for women are fewer than for men (see Table 4-13). In part this is due to education, since women over the age of fifteen accounted for 63 percent of illiterate Mexicans.⁴⁰ Women who do enter the workforce have educational achievements that, on the whole, are equivalent to that of men. It is the two-thirds of women who do not participate in the economically active workforce who have fewer educational attainments. This fact helps explain why women who do household work continued to provide substantial support for PRI. Moreover, the most detailed study of their attitudes implies that most women are not yet committed to liberation and to a change in their traditional roles.⁴¹

Given these and other conditions that have restricted women's roles in society and hence in politics, it is natural that they might feel more powerless to change the political system. However, a remarkable change in political efficacy seems to have occurred since the 1960s. When Fagen and Tuohy carried out a study of Jalapa, Veracruz, in the 1970s, they found extreme differences between men and women, regardless of social class. Typically, only half as many women as men reported high levels of political efficacy.⁴² By 1989 almost no statistical difference existed between men and women on this issue, a pattern persisting to the present (see Table 4-14). This finding is similar to recent U.S. data on women and men.⁴³

As Mexicans make the transition from a more authoritarian political culture to one characterized by democratic characteristics, it is desirable to understand women's potential role. Given the traditional literature on women, it might be expected that more women than men would be unwilling

Table 4-14 Mexicans' Political Efficacy, by Gender

| Response to Statement "Voting can make things better in the future" | Gender (percentages) | | |
|---|----------------------|--------|-----------------|
| | Male | Female | All Respondents |
| Agree | 68 | 64 | 66 |
| Disagree | 27 | 31 | 29 |
| Don't know/No answer | 5 | 5 | 5 |

Source: "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

to risk political change. The data on the issue of risk-taking identify a more definitive difference between men and women in Mexico, and bear out gender-related tendencies found elsewhere. Twenty-five percent more women than men were inclined to stick with the status quo than to risk change (see Table 4-15). This also explains, in part, another more significant pattern. Where women differ most from men politically in Mexico is on political activism. Few Mexicans have actually participated in some type of political protest, but only half as many women as men have done so.⁴⁴

These data could convey the false impression that women are not politically active. In fact, recent research shows that women in urban areas are the backbone of the social and civic organizations that have flourished in Mexico in recent years. As one researcher commented, "Independent organizations are giving women a political experience which is profoundly affecting their lives, leading them to question the power relations which limit them at societal level, as well as within their personal, familial relations."⁴⁵

This active feminist presence emerged in earnest in the 1970s, especially in Mexico City. By the 1980s, a network of women's organizations existed throughout Mexico, linking together NGOs, unions, and urban poor and middle-class organizations. As was true elsewhere in the region, socioeconomic differences among women created tensions in generating a common agenda.⁴⁶ The expansion of women into different employment opportu-

Table 4-15 Mexicans' Risk-taking, by Gender

| Response to Statement "Nothing ventured, nothing gained" | Gender (percentages) | | |
|--|----------------------|--------|-----------------|
| | Male | Female | All Respondents |
| Agree | 67 | 57 | 62 |
| Disagree | 30 | 40 | 35 |
| Don't know/No answer | 3 | 3 | 3 |

Source: "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

nities, and the changing political landscape in the 1990s, encouraged the growth of women's organizations and increased the breadth and influence of a feminine political agenda. Sex crimes became the most important issue contributing to unification of a feminist agenda.

More recently, as the democratic transition in electoral politics became a reality, women fought successfully for affirmative action quotas among party candidates for political office. Members of the PRD were the first to achieve this goal, persuading the party to require 20 percent of its candidates to be women in 1990. A year later they increased that level of representation to 30 percent of the party's candidates, and the same percentage among the party's national executive committee. PAN has refused to pass such a mandate, but the PRI accepted the same percentage levels among its national congressional candidates in 1996.⁴⁷ In the fall, 2001, however PRI increased the percentage of female candidates to 40 percent, the highest level of any party. Some state party committees have also begun replicating these patterns for legislative candidates. More importantly, in 2002, the Mexican congress passed its own quota law requiring that no more than 70 percent of the candidates for single-member districts (accounting for 300 of the 500 seats in the lower house of congress) can be of the same gender. According to Lisa Baldez, who examined this issue in detail, the Federal Electoral Institute has imposed strict compliance requirements, and the Supreme Court confirmed its legality. It went into effect in the 2003 congressional elections, and as a result, women members of congress rose from 16 to 23 percent.⁴⁸

Studies of European countries have generally found women to be somewhat ideologically more conservative than men.⁴⁹ This is not the case for Mexican women today, but more of them are uncommitted or support centrist views than men do, and fewer identify with leftist political ideologies.⁵⁰ Typically, women everywhere are less interested than men in politics and hence participate less; this also is true of Mexican women.⁵¹ Ideological differences between men and women can be translated into sympathy for political parties. Some observers allege, for example, that women are more sympathetic to PAN, the center-right party, than are men. This is not the case. In fact, in a 1991 national survey, PAN received stronger support from men than women. However, women did favor PAN's presidential candidate in 2000 by a ten-point margin,⁵² but in 2003, PRI recaptured their support by three points.

However, a new study demonstrates that there are some significant differences in political attitudes between men and women, and these cross national boundaries, including Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and Americans. One of the most interesting differences is that women and men have different expectations from democracy. Among Mexicans, men were more

likely than women to see democracy as liberty, voting/elections, and type of government. These conceptualizations incorporate the three most traditional definitions of democracy, two of which, voting/elections and type of government, can be viewed as a *procedural* conceptualization, that is, defining democracy by its process. Mexican women, on the other hand, are more likely than men to view democracy as improving one's quality of life and standard of living, viewing government in productive economic and social terms. Gender does make a difference in the specific way in which a person defines expectations from democracy. Women in general are more likely than men to view democracy as a means of achieving equality, as improving the culture of law, and as producing progress.⁵³

REGION AND POLITICS

Many years ago Lesley Byrd Simpson wrote the classic *Many Mexicos*. *Many* in the title referred in large part to regionalism's influence on Mexican values. As Mexico developed and communications improved, regional differences declined, but they did not disappear. Economically speaking, the north is highly developed. It is characterized by heavy in-migration, dynamic change, industrialization, and of course, its proximity to and economic and cultural linkages with the United States. The south, on the other hand, is the least developed economically. It is rural; has a large Indian population, mainly in Oaxaca and Chiapas; and is the most isolated from the cultural mainstream. The center, which includes the Federal District, has been the traditional source of political leadership, religious infrastructure, industrialization, and intellectual activity.⁵⁴

Regional differences can be translated into political behavior. In the first place, interest in politics varies among individual citizens on the basis of many variables, and region may be prominent among them. Northern and Mexico City residents are most interested in politics, measured by its importance to their daily lives. Furthermore, their level of sophistication produces an interest in politics that leads to greater political competition. As the data in Table 4-16 show, a majority of Mexicans, typically three out of four, discuss politics. But among those who *discuss it frequently*, nearly twice as many do so in the north and in Mexico City as in the south. It is impossible to determine whether Mexicans' interest in politics has increased electoral competitiveness in both regions or whether electoral competitiveness has exaggerated their interest. It is fair to conclude, however, that interest and activity are interrelated.⁵⁵

Table 4-16 Mexicans' Interest in Politics, by Region

| Response to Statement "How often politics are discussed" | Region | | | |
|--|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------------|
| | North (%) | Center (%) | South (%) | Mexico City (%) |
| Frequently | 19 | 13 | 11 | 18 |
| Occasionally | 53 | 58 | 63 | 54 |
| Never | 25 | 26 | 24 | 27 |
| Don't know | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 |

Source: *World Values Survey*, 1990, courtesy of Miguel Basáñez.

Regional patterns also exist when measuring citizen political efficacy. The data in Table 4-17 suggest a complex pattern, not easily explained, but the regional differences are sharp. Clearly Mexicans from the center, which in terms of population would be dominated by the Federal District and the state of México, believe going to the polls has actually changed conditions for the better. This idea may be due to citizen satisfaction with two consecutive elected governors from the PRD since 1997. What is interesting about these responses to political efficacy from the west and the north is that both have witnessed selective PAN victories at the state and local levels, yet their residents remain cynical about voting producing change. It may be that while some Mexicans in these regions brought the PAN into power as an alternative to PRI, their level of expectation toward change was not actually met. Non-PRI parties will have to govern in other states in the region before clearer and more pronounced patterns of regional efficacy can be determined.

Place of residence can also affect other attitudes, including religious beliefs, which in turn, as was shown earlier, may have some effect on political preferences. Regional differences do not affect all politically related attitudes equally. In many circumstances, region is not an influential variable. On the issue of risk-taking, citizens in the north and west are more likely to stick with the status quo. Many residents from these two regions

Table 4-17 Mexicans' Political Efficacy, by Region

| Response to Statement "Voting can make things better in the future" | Region (percentages) | | | | | All Respondents |
|---|----------------------|-------|--------|------|------|-----------------|
| | North | South | Center | East | West | |
| Agree | 57 | 62 | 75 | 73 | 50 | 66 |
| Disagree | 39 | 29 | 22 | 24 | 40 | 29 |
| Don't know/No answer | 4 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 10 | 5 |

Source: "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

Table 4-18 Mexicans' Risk-taking, by Region

| Response to Statement "Nothing ventured, nothing gained" | Region (percentages) | | | | | All Respondents |
|--|----------------------|-------|--------|------|------|-----------------|
| | North | South | Center | East | West | |
| Agree | 57 | 62 | 75 | 73 | 50 | 62 |
| Disagree | 39 | 29 | 22 | 24 | 40 | 35 |
| Don't know/No answer | 4 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 10 | 3 |

Source: "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

have been supportive of the PAN. Their candidate won the national election prior to the date of the survey data reported in Table 4-18. Therefore, they may believe that what they already are experiencing represents change, and consequently they are supportive of the political status quo. This pattern is especially true in the northern states, where citizens are equally divided in supporting change versus maintaining the status quo at a time when nearly two-thirds of Mexicans nationally supported change. Mexicans from the east are the most willing to support change, which may be attributable to the fact that they have been among the least affected by electoral competition, having little experience with non-PRI governance.

The most significant consequence of region as one of the variables analyzed in this section is partisan political preferences. Traditionally, the opposition, primarily the PAN, has done well in Mexico's most dynamic regions—those showing the highest levels of economic growth. The PAN's greatest number of sympathizers, based on those economic figures, have been the north and the Federal District, including the Mexico City metropolitan area, which is found in the center region (Table 4-19). In 2003, with PRI's strong showing and the decline of support for PAN, PRI took the lead in the North, performing more strongly in that region than any party in any region. PRI also outperformed PAN among urban voters, who previously

Table 4-19 Mexicans' Partisan Sympathies, by Region

| Sympathy for Party | Region (percentages) | | | | | All Respondents |
|----------------------|----------------------|-------|--------|------|------|-----------------|
| | North | South | Center | East | West | |
| PAN | 33 | 22 | 38 | 28 | 24 | 31 |
| PRI | 32 | 34 | 22 | 31 | 36 | 29 |
| PRD | 6 | 12 | 14 | 6 | 4 | 10 |
| No Party | 27 | 28 | 22 | 32 | 32 | 27 |
| Other | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Don't know/No answer | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 |

Source: "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

supported PAN in 2000. The PAN has always done poorly in the south, Mexico's least developed and most indigenous region; consequently, the lack of partisan supporters there is not surprising. PRI, on the other hand, has relied heavily on the south and the west for support. Of the three leading parties, its partisans are the most evenly distributed by region. Their significant weakness, regionally, is in the Federal District and state of México, the country's most populous entities, and the most industrialized. PRI's regional weakness in the center is explained by PRD's strength.⁵⁶ The PRD, in 1989, counted numerous adherents in Mexico City and in several central states, notably Morelos and Michoacán. It demonstrated its strength again in these states in 1997, reaching its apex nationally, and decisively won control of Mexico City in the capital's first mayoralty race in seventy years, repeating that victory in 2000.

Higher levels of political interest, activism, and sophistication are associated with higher levels of economic development, education, and urbanization. In turn, these qualities are most likely to promote the development of alternative political views, sympathy for political parties not in power, and opposition to closed decision-making. One of the most strongly held beliefs among all Mexicans is that decision making is inaccessible and that local and state policymaking should be more autonomous and less under the thumb of the national authorities. Increasing federalism, giving greater decision-making authority and fiscal resources to state and local governments, is likely to reinforce rather than moderate regional differences. Whether the changing allocations in power will affect attitudes on specific, local issues, or whether it will influence broader political attitudes, remain to be seen.

AGE AND POLITICS

Age often determines important variations in values and, more important, indicates changes in the offing as generations reach political maturity.⁵⁷ In their significant comprehensive study, Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basáñez found that thirty-four issues had been characterized by intergenerational change in the past decade.⁵⁸ Inglehart and others had discovered in earlier studies that economic conditions during a person's preadult years were the most significant determinant of adult values. Changing economic conditions, then, are likely to alter values from one generation to the next. For example, in the first *World Values Survey*, Inglehart learned that attitudes toward authoritarian values changed for each age cohort, moving in the direction of greater freedom and autonomy. The pattern peaked in all countries in the cohort

aged twenty-five to thirty-four years old and began to reverse among the next generation.

Another consequence of generational change appears in party identification. As Inglehart reports, studies of western Europe and in the United States demonstrate that older citizens identified more strongly with political parties but that in recent decades younger voters are less likely to identify with a specific party. Although better educated than their elders and more interested in politics, younger Mexicans, like people elsewhere, no longer exhibit strong party loyalty. This phenomenon makes it difficult to predict future partisan sympathies and gives the independent or uncommitted voter considerable power to determine electoral outcomes. These voters were crucial to the outcome of Fox's victory.

Younger Mexicans, when the PRI was in power, were much more likely to be attracted to opposition parties. Specifically, in the 1990s, voters under age twenty-four showed a marked preference for the National Action Party. Before the 1994 presidential election, 19 percent of the potential voters said they would cast their ballots for the PAN, but 29 percent of the eighteen-to-twenty-four age group, a difference of 65 percent, claimed they would vote for the PAN. When the elections were held in August, 32 percent of this age group supported the PAN, and among all occupational groups, the PAN did better among students (5 percent of the voting population) than any other group, with 41 percent voting for their candidate.

Younger voters persisted in a similar pattern in 2000, providing a significant portion of Fox's supporters. After Fox won the election, 31 percent of Mexicans claimed to be partisan sympathizers of PAN. But among those individuals from age 18–24, 39 percent expressed a preference for PAN. In contrast, PRI, which had nearly the same percentage of sympathizers nationally, obtained support from only 20 percent of this age cohort, half of that received by PAN. The next age cohort, 25–39, follows a similar pattern favoring PAN, but the differences are not as dramatic. There is no question that Mexicans under the age of 39, who have witnessed the dramatic changes in Mexico since 1988 as young adults, determined the outcome of the 2000 presidential race. One of the reasons why their partisan preferences favored PAN, and why they were translated into actual votes for Fox, is the attitude of younger Mexicans toward risk-taking. As one might expect, this group, seven out of ten Mexicans, most favored a change. Over half of all Mexicans over 60 opposed change, yet those older Mexicans were PRI's strongest partisans among any age group. Twice as many older Mexicans sympathized with PRI compared with PAN.

Nevertheless, younger voters, like any other group we have analyzed in this chapter, may shift partisan preferences given certain conditions. Again,

disappointed with the performance of the Fox administration, many of those younger voters—and students—cast their ballots for PRI candidates in the 2003 elections. While PAN continued to maintain a lead among both groups, especially students, it lost considerable ground to PRI, edging PRI among the 18–29 age group by only three percentage points.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing brief analysis of just a few variables in the making of political attitudes demonstrates their complexities. Many Mexicans have gained confidence in their ability to change the political system, but large numbers, nearly a third, believe themselves powerless. Those expressing the least confidence in their ability are the uneducated, and the poor. Nevertheless, the civic attention focused on the 1994 presidential elections and the unprecedented turnout of nearly four-fifths of Mexican voters indicate that numerous citizens took their responsibilities seriously and that even many first-time voters believed that they might make a difference. Turnout was lower in the 2000 elections, but voters further strengthened opposition representation nationally, and first-time voters played a crucial role.

Mexican political attitudes are undergoing change, and support for change itself is strong among them. Younger people are contributing most to this alteration, as are those who are more highly educated, who come from affluent backgrounds, and who live in the most dynamic regions. Mexicans are religious, but their Catholicism does not impinge on their political behavior, their support for change, or their partisanship. Many of the trends in political attitudes as well as attitudes in general that are apparent in Mexico appear in other countries as well, including the United States.

NOTES

1. Joseph A. Kahl, *The Measurement of Modernism: A Study of Values in Brazil and Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974), 8.
2. K. L. Tedin, "The Influence of Parents on the Political Attitudes of Adolescents," *American Political Science Review* 68 (December 1974): 1592.
3. Alex Edelstein, "Since Bennington: Evidence of Change in Student Political Behavior," in *Learning about Politics*, ed. Roberta Sigel (New York: Random House, 1970), 397.

4. Richard Centers, "Children of the New Deal: Social Stratification and Adolescent Attitudes," in *Class, Status and Power*, ed. Richard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: Free Press, 1953), 361.
5. For example, see such memoirs as Ramón Beteta, *Jarano* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970); and Andrés Iduarte, *Niño, Child of the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1971).
6. Ulises Beltrán, *Los mexicanos de los noventa* (Mexico: UNAM, 1996), 137.
7. See Linda Stevenson and Mitchell Seligson, "Fading Memories of the Revolution: Is Stability Eroding in Mexico?" in *Polling for Democracy: Public Opinion and Political Liberalization in Mexico*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1996), 61–80.
8. Harry Eckstein, "Culture as a Foundation Concept for the Social Sciences," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 8, no. 4 (October 1966), 485.
9. Roderic Ai Camp, "Learning Democracy in Mexico and the United States," *Mexican Studies* 19, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 3–28.
10. Miguel Basáñez and Pablo Páras, "Color and Democracy in Latin America," in *Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Roderic Ai Camp (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2001), 151. The authors note that this preference exists independent of the level of education.
11. The most important variable determining the level of education that a child obtains in Mexico is the socioeconomic status of the father, according to Kahl, *The Measurement of Modernism*, 71.
12. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), 142.
13. Rafael Segovia, *La politización del niño mexicano* (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1975), 130.
14. *Los Angeles Times* poll, August 1989.
15. Michael M. Gant and Norman R. Luttbeg, *American Electoral Behavior, 1952–1988* (Itasca, N.Y.: Peacock Publishers, 1991), 140.
16. Ann Craig and Wayne Cornelius, "Political Culture in Mexico, Continuities and Revisionist Interpretations," in *The Civic Culture Revisited*, ed. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 369.
17. For evidence of these ongoing changes and their linkage to politics, see Joe Foweraker and Ann L. Craig, eds., *Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).
18. In Mexico, this was typically referred to as the "fear vote." The PRI leadership, aware of the fact that many Mexicans might be overly cautious about change, built up the image of the two major opposition parties as representing a risky choice in comparison to retaining PRI control over the executive branch. Vicente Fox raised this issue publicly early in his campaign. Shortly before the July election, in a poll conducted by the *Mund* polling service, 72 percent of respondents admitted they would support a radical change if it would produce reform of the system. That was up from only 50 percent in December 1999. See "Fox alerta sobre el peligro del 'voto del miedo,'" *Diario de Yucatán*, December 13, 1999, www.yucatan.com.mx; and "Los

antiprístas se inclinan por Fox," *Diario de Yucatán*, June 23, 2000, www.yucatan.com.mx.

19. For another way of viewing this pattern of partisan support, see Irina Alberro, "Political Competition and Empowerment of the Poor," paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, Spring 2004.

20. Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, *Triumphs and Tragedy: A History of the Mexican People* (New York: Norton, 1992), 469.

21. Gant and Luttbeg, *American Electoral Behavior*, 141, indicates that in 1988, only 25 percent of college-educated Americans reported little political efficacy, compared with 57 percent of those with less than a high school diploma.

22. Rafael Giménez-Valdés, "Las encuestas en México durante el proceso electoral federal de 1994," Paper presented at The National Latin American Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 1995.

23. William Flanigan and Nancy Zingale, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate*, 7th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991), 68.

24. Ronald Inglehart, Neil Nevitte, and Miguel Basáñez, *Convergencia en Norte América, comercio, política y cultura* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1994). Figure 3–20. Forty-six percent of citizens in the United States and 40 percent in Mexico consider God important in their lives.

25. *World Values Survey*, 1990.

26. Miguel Basáñez, *Encuesta nacional de opinión pública, iglesia y estado* (1990), 14; "Democracy Through U.S. and Mexican Lenses," September 2000.

27. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, 101.

28. Charles L. Davis, "Religion and Partisan Loyalty: The Case of Catholic Workers in Mexico," *Western Political Quarterly* 45 (March 1992): 227.

29. See Donald Mabry, *Mexico's Acción Nacional: A Catholic Alternative to Revolution* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1973), for the well-documented ideological influence. For the stereotypical allegation, without foundation, see Carlos Martínez Assad, "State Elections in Mexico," in *Electoral Patterns and Perspectives in Mexico*, ed. Arturo Alvarado (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD, 1987), 36.

30. See Roderic A. Camp, "The Cross in the Polling Booth: Religion, Politics, and the Laity in Mexico," *Latin American Research Review* 29 (1994): 89–90. Charles Davis, in an analysis of survey data of Catholic workers in 1979/80, had similar findings. See his "Religion and Partisan Loyalty," 279.

31. Rubén Ruiz Guerra, "Las verdades de las cifras," *Este País*, May 1994, 17.

32. Kenneth D. Wald, Dennis E. Owen, and Samuel D. Hill Jr., "Churches as Political Communities," *American Political Science Review* 82 (June 1988): 543–44.

33. For figures on this phenomenal growth, see David Stoll, *Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).

34. Paul J. Bonicelli, "Testing the Waters or Opening the Floodgates? Evangelicals, Politics and the 'New' Mexico," *Journal of Church and State* 39 (winter 1997): 107–30.

35. Camp, "The Cross in the Polling Booth," 92–93.

36. "Estado, élites y clerecía," a survey of 458 public, private, and social leaders, October–November 1993, 4.2 percent margin of error, reported in *Este País*, May 1994, 23–29.

37. Robert S. Gilmour and Robert B. Lamp, *Political Alienation in Contemporary America* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), 55.

38. The best study using these data for Mexico is William J. Blough, "Political Attitudes of Mexican Women: Support for the Political System Among a Newly Enfranchised Group," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 14 (May 1972): 201–24.

39. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, 327.

40. Alicia Inés Martínez, "Políticas hacia la mujer en el México moderno," paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, March 1994, 36.

41. Enrique Alduncin, *Los valores de los mexicanos, México: Entre la tradición y la modernidad* (Mexico City: Banamex, 1986), 189.

42. Richard Fagen and William Tuohy, *Politics and Privilege in a Mexican City* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 117.

43. Forty percent of men and 43 percent of women asserted a lack of political efficacy in 1988. Gant and Luttbeg, *American Electoral Behavior*, 141.

44. *World Values Survey*, 1990, courtesy of Miguel Basáñez.

45. Nikki Craske, "Women's Political Participation in Colonias Populares in Guadalajara, Mexico," in *Viva: Women and Popular Protest in Latin America*, eds. Sarah A. Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood (London: Routledge, 1993), 112.

46. Marta Lamas et al., "Building Bridges: The Growth of Popular Feminism in Mexico," in *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective*, eds. Amrita Basu and Elizabeth McGrovy (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 340–41.

47. Linda Stevenson, "Gender Politics in the Mexican Democratization Process: Sex Crimes, Affirmative Action for Women, and the 1997 Elections," Paper presented at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1997.

48. Lisa Baldez, "Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law For Legislative Candidates in Mexico," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 29 (May 2004): 231–58; and María del Carmen and Alanís Figueroa, "Women and Politics," *Voices of Mexico* 56 (July–September 2001): 7–11.

49. For perceptions of this during the revolutionary era, see Sandra McGee Deutsch, "Gender and Sociopolitical Change in Twentieth-Century Latin America," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 71 (May 1991): 270–71.

50. *World Values Survey*, 1990, courtesy of Miguel Basáñez.

51. Ivan Zavala, "Valores políticos," in *Cómo somos los mexicanos*, eds. Alberto Hernández Medina and Luis Narro Rodríguez (Mexico City: CREA, 1987), 97.

52. Alduncin y Asociados and *El Universal*, presidential 2000 poll, 1,700 respondents nationally, +/-2.5 percent margin of error, May 9–18, 2000. Women

were much more important in the presidential campaign itself, and according to one source, Fox's support among some women was based on sex appeal. See Ginger Thompson's statement that Fox's penchant for blue jeans and cowboy boots made "him just plain sexy" to many women. "Women Become the Darlings of the Candidates in Mexico," *The New York Times*, June 30, 2000.

53. Roderic Ai Camp and Keith Yanner, "Democracy Across Cultures, Does Gender Make a Difference?" in *Citizenship in Latin America*, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2006).

54. The most comprehensive historical and theoretical exploration of this issue in Mexico can be found in Eric Van Young, ed., *Mexico's Regions, Comparative History and Development* (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD, 1992).

55. See Roderic Ai Camp, "Province Versus the Center, Democratizing Mexico's Political Culture," in *Assessing Democracy in Latin America: A Tribute to Russell H. Fitzgibbon*, ed. Philip Kelly (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 76-92.

56. For some analysis of regional trends in the 1997 elections, see Joseph Klesner, who has long argued the importance of regionalism, in "Democratic Transition? The 1997 Mexican Elections," *PS* 30 (December 1997): 703-11.

57. Russell J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1988), 85ff.

58. Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basáñez, *Convergencia en Norte América*, chap. 1, 12.

5

Rising to the Top: The Recruitment of Political Leadership

One of the most critical sets of questions about any political system concerns the composition of its leadership: Who governs? Who has access to power, and what are the social conditions of rule? Such issues have direct bearing on the representativeness of political leadership, a continuing concern of democratic theorists, and on the extent to which those in power emerge from the ranks of "the people"—or from an exclusive oligarchy. These themes also relate to the role of the political system within society at large, and to the ways in which careers in public life offer meaningful opportunities for vertical (usually upward) social mobility.

PETER H. SMITH, *Labyrinths of Power*

Most citizens in a society where elections are typical participate by voting. A small number become involved in a political demonstration or join a party or organization to influence public policy actively. An even smaller number seek political office and the power to make decisions.

The structure of a political system, the relationships between institutions and citizens, and the relationships among various political institutions affect how a person arrives at a leadership post. The process by which people reach such posts is known as political recruitment.¹ An examination of

Political recruitment: the collective process by which persons reach political offices.

political recruitment from a comparative perspective is revealing for what it tells us about leadership characteristics and, equally important, what it illustrates about a society's political process.

were much more important in the presidential campaign itself, and according to one source, Fox's support among some women was based on sex appeal. See Ginger Thompson's statement that Fox's penchant for blue jeans and cowboy boots made "him just plain sexy" to many women. "Women Become the Darlings of the Candidates in Mexico," *The New York Times*, June 30, 2000.

53. Roderic Ai Camp and Keith Yanner, "Democracy Across Cultures, Does Gender Make a Difference?" in *Citizenship in Latin America*, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2006).

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political recruitment from a comparative perspective is revealing for what it tells us about leadership characteristics and, equally important, what it illustrates about a society's political process.

All political systems and all organizations are governed by rules that prescribe acceptable behavior. The rules of political behavior are both formal and informal. The formal rules are set forth in law and in a constitution. The informal rules often explain more completely the realities of the process, or how the system functions in practice as distinct from theory. The political process melds the two sets of rules, and over time each influences the other to the extent that they often become inextricably intertwined.

THE FORMAL RULES

Formally, the Mexican political system has some of the same characteristics of the U.S. system. It is republican, having three branches of government—executive, legislative, judicial—and federal, allocating certain powers and responsibilities to state and local governments and others to the national government. In practice, the Mexican system has been dominated by the executive branch, which has not shared power with another branch from the 1920s until the 1990s, and allocates few powers to state and local governments. While this pattern was the norm for nearly seventy years, political transformations are changing the structural balance of power nationally and between the federal and state governments, altering well-established recruitment patterns.

In a competitive, parliamentary system, such as that found in Britain, the legislative branch is the essential channel for a successful, national political career. The legislative branch is the seat of decision-making power and the most important institutional source of political recruitment. In the United States, decision-making power is divided among three branches of government, although in the legislative policy process both the executive branch and Congress play equally decisive roles. Not only is the structure in the United States different, measured by the actual exercise of political authority, but two parties have alternated in power.

The significance of these characteristics for recruitment is that they affect how candidates for office are chosen. The degree to which the average citizen participates effectively in the political process determines, to some extent, his or her voice in leadership selection. Of course, it is not just a choice between candidates representing one political organization or party versus another, but how specific persons initially become candidates. The possible paths followed by potential political leaders in Mexico contrasts, although undergoing significant change the last few years, with approaches in the United States. The approaches between the two countries, beginning

in 2000, began to take on more similarities. Fox's presidential victory brought an end to the dominance of a single political organization, the PRI and its antecedents, and a single leadership group within Mexico's political system. The change of parties in power have reinforced structural changes that impact on Mexico's traditional recruitment patterns.

When individual people in a small group exercise power over a long period of time, they tend to develop their own criteria for selecting their successors.² Moreover, they personally exercise the greatest influence over the

Sponsored selection: political recruitment dominated by incumbent officeholders.

selection process. Students of political recruitment call this *incumbent*, or *sponsored*, selection.³

In the formal structure, given the monopoly exercised by the PRI historically, one would expect the party itself to be crucial to the identification and recruitment of future political leaders. Until 1994, its role has been minimal. The reason is that the PRI was not created nor has it functioned as an orthodox political party, that is, to capture power. The PRI, as suggested earlier, was formed to help *keep* a leadership group in power. Yet even a tight leadership group that exercises power in an authoritarian fashion must devise channels for political recruitment. Not to do so would eventually deprive it of the fresh replacements necessary to its continued existence.

In Mexico, until the mid-1990s, most decision-making positions were obtained through sponsored selection, whether the position was appointive or elective. Beginning in 1994, however, two structural conditions began to change that ultimately affected the recruitment process. First, the incumbent party began to experiment with a more open form of selecting its candidates, especially those nominees for state governors and ultimately for president in 1999. Instead of the president of Mexico making that decision, typically the pattern in the past, President Zedillo began to withdraw from that process. In 1999, the PRI, for the first time, held an open presidential primary, in which several leading politicians competed intensely for the party's nomination, eventually won by Francisco Labastida.⁴ The National Action Party, which for some time had engaged in a closed primary in which party delegates voted for their presidential candidate, selected a party outsider, Vicente Fox, as their choice.

The second major structural change is that the electoral process itself became increasingly competitive in the 1990s. This is illustrated by the data in Table 5-1. As the data indicate, all opposition parties combined governed

Table 5-1 Growth of Party Competition in Mexico

| | Year | | | | | | |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1988 | 1990 | 1992 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 2001 |
| Percentage of Mexicans governed at the state or local level by parties other than PRI | 3 | 10 | 14 | 24 | 38 | 50 | 61 |

Source: "Notable avance de la oposición en una década," *Diario de Yucatán*, November 22, 1999, www.yucatan.com.mx, and "Consolidating a Three Party System," *Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico*, December 2001, 539-40.

only 3 percent of the population at the state or local level in 1988. In just two years time, after the strong showing by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in the 1988 presidential race, the figure tripled to over 10 percent of the population. By 1995, nearly a fourth of Mexico's citizens had leadership from the PRD and PAN, and by 1997, when these two parties won control of the national legislative branch, PRD and PAN politicians governed half of Mexico's population.

During the many decades in which the PRI dominated Mexican politics, the Mexican federal bureaucracy became the favored source of political leadership. The reason for this is that in reality, the legislative and judicial branches remained weak, and local and state governments were staffed by individuals who owed their careers to state and national leaders, respectively. Even the party's own leadership came from career bureaucrats beholden to Mexico's president.

The newness of the PRD (1989) makes it impossible to identify long-term recruitment trends, especially since many of its national leaders were former PRIistas. For most of its history, the National Action Party produced a different type of leadership, and therefore, stressed different recruitment institutions. It shared more similarities with U.S. political institutions, since its leaders competed vigorously within and outside of party ranks to be nominated and, more significantly, to defeat the PRI's candidates for various positions. Its prominent leaders have had predominantly local party careers, and have come from elective office.⁵ Many of its top officials and candidates in the 1990s had been former congressman and, since the mid-1990s, governors. Vicente Fox himself illustrates this pattern, having served as a congressman and governor of his home state.

Indeed, an analysis of governors since 1997 clearly demonstrates the impact of a democratic setting on the recruitment and selection process, foreshadowing and replicating many of the characteristics Vicente Fox represents. Since the leading presidential contenders in the 2006 race from the

PRD and the PRI are also former governors, it further confirms the importance of such patterns. As the data in Table 5-2 suggest, the majority of new governors from all parties began their careers locally, emphasizing the importance of local political origins. Moreover, two-thirds of governors remain in their home states or nearby states for their college education, thus preventing networking ties with influential national politicians from Mexico City. Second, nearly 80 percent of governors have held elective office compared to only 8 percent of most national executive branch officials in the 1990s. Third, larger numbers of governors come from more modest socioeconomic backgrounds. Fourth, if we separate PAN governors from all other parties, we discover that they are not professional politicians; they made their living in the private sector and have had extensive experience in business as owners and managers. Many have also provided leadership in business interest group organizations.⁶

As party competition has increased, the PRI itself has been forced to emulate the recruitment patterns typical of PAN. In fact, now that it has lost control of the federal executive branch, the bureaucracy is no longer a natural source of PRI leadership. Instead, because it continues to control the

Table 5-2 Background Characteristics of Recent Mexican Governors

| Characteristic | Percentage | PAN Governors Only |
|--------------------------------------|------------|--------------------|
| Precollege studies locally | 90 | 89 |
| Held elective office | 77 | 56 |
| Graduated from provincial university | 64 | 33 |
| Elected federal office | 63 | 33 |
| Middle-class origins | 63 | 50 |
| Professional politician | 55 | 0 |
| Born in small towns | 43 | 33 |
| Developmental poststate bureaucracy | 40 | 22 |
| Born in state capitals | 37 | 63 |
| State party leaders | 33 | 33 |
| Mayors | 33 | 44 |
| Nontraditional college degrees | 33 | 44 |
| Law degree | 32 | 11 |
| Business career | 29 | 56 |
| Attended private university | 21 | 30 |
| Led business organization | 20 | 44 |
| Graduate degrees | 20 | 22 |
| No college degrees | 20 | 33 |
| Working-class origins | 25 | 25 |
| Graduate work abroad | 17 | 22 |
| No government experience | 10 | 33 |

Note: Based on a survey of thirty-four governors who took office between 1997 and 2004. Only one governor is excluded from the sample, that of Tabasco (PRI), for insufficient information.

majority of state governorships, political recruitment patterns within the PRI will shift back to state elective and appointive careers, and to a lesser degree to local experience. This pattern was more common in the party's early history in the 1930s and 1940s. The important shift in recruitment patterns can be seen in the careers of the three major parties' presidential contenders in 2000. All three had been governors of their home state. In no presidential race since 1964 had more than one presidential candidate served as governor.

THE INFORMAL RULES: WHAT IS NECESSARY TO RISE TO THE TOP

Regardless of which individuals do the actual recruiting of future figures in prominent national political offices, certain institutional settings facilitate that process, making the contacts between certain persons possible. Strangely, the most important institution in the initial recruitment of Mexico's national political leaders in the twentieth century is the university.

Mexico's postrevolutionary leadership, building on the concept of a National Preparatory School introduced by the liberals in the mid-nineteenth century, used public education as a means of preparing and identifying future politicians. In the nineteenth century, many of the prerevolutionary leaders were educated at the National Preparatory School, and it continued to function in this way after 1920. Some politicians who served in national posts in the 1920s and 1930s never obtained higher education; they were self-made, largely on revolutionary battlefields from 1910 to 1920. Many continued as career military officers in the new postrevolutionary army.

A rapid shift occurred in credentials between the revolutionary generation of political leaders (holding office from 1920 to 1946) and the postrevolutionary generation (holding office from 1946 through the 1960s). The importance of higher education in political recruitment and the rapid decline of battlefield experiences are clearly illustrated by the personal experiences of presidents Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) and Miguel Alemán (1946–1952) and the persons they recruited to political office. More than half of all national officeholders from 1920 to 1934 had fought in the revolution. Cárdenas joined the revolution as a young man and rose through the ranks to become a division general, Mexico's highest-ranking officer. He had no formal education beyond primary school in his hometown. Although he pursued a political career in the 1920s, he remained in the army, eventually serving as secretary of national defense. On the other hand, Miguel Alemán, son of a prominent general, was too young to have fought in the revolution. Encour-

Table 5-3 Political Recruitment Sources for Presidents Cárdenas and Alemán

| President | Sources of Initial Recruitment | | | | | |
|-----------|--------------------------------|-----------|-----------------|-----------|------------|---------------|
| | Revolution (%) | State (%) | Bureaucracy (%) | Party (%) | School (%) | Relatives (%) |
| Cárdenas | 34 | 18 | 26 | 0 | 18 | 3 |
| Alemán | 0 | 10 | 3 | 3 | 85 | 0 |

Source: Roderic Ai Camp, *Mexico's Leaders, Their Education and Recruitment* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1980), 22.

aged by his father to obtain a good education, he was sent to Mexico City where he studied at the National Preparatory School and then the National School of Law, graduating in 1929.

The personal experiences of a president influences his sources of initial political recruitment (see Table 5-3). In the case of Cárdenas, the revolution was central. After all, men under battle conditions develop trust in one another and respect for survival skills. A third of Cárdenas's collaborators had come in contact with him through shared service in the revolution. Once Cárdenas began his political career, he met other men in the bureaucracy who accompanied him up the political ladder. Although relatively unschooled, when he was governor of his home state, he held weekly seminars for students and professors from the local university, forming close ties with people whom he brought into political life later on. Cárdenas served as president of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), an antecedent of the PRI, but did not recruit from this source. The contrast between him and Alemán could not be more remarkable. Over four-fifths of Alemán's chosen political associates had been classmates or professors at the two schools he had attended in Mexico City.

Alemán established the overwhelming value of preparatory and university education as the institutional locus of Mexican political recruitment. Its importance increased as greater numbers of future politicians began to attend the National Preparatory School and, more significant, the National University. Having attended the former reached an all-time high during the 1958–1964 administration, in which 58 percent of the politicians were graduates. Graduates of the National University reached their highest level under President de la Madrid (1964–1968), when they accounted for 56 percent of his college-educated officeholders. Midway through the Salinas administration, National University graduates continued to account for half of all national politicians. Indeed, among Zedillo's cabinet, over 70 percent were alumni.

Table 5-4 University Graduates by Presidential Administration, 1920–1991

| President | Institution | | | |
|---------------------------|---|-----------------|----------------|--------------|
| | Universidad Nacional Autónomo de México (%) | Military (%) | Private (%) | Other (%) |
| Obregón, 1920–1924 | 50 | 9 | 0 | 41 |
| Calles, 1924–1928 | 37 | 0 | 5 | 58 |
| Portes Gil, 1929–1930 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 67 |
| Ortiz Rubio, 1930–1932 | 43 | 21 | 0 | 26 |
| Rodríguez, 1932–1934 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 50 |
| Cárdenas, 1934–1930 | 27 | 7 | 3 | 74 |
| Ávila Camacho 1940–1946 | 36 | 7 | 4 | 53 |
| Alemán, 1946–1952 | 50 | 5 | 4 | 41 |
| Ruiz Cortines, 1952–1958 | 36 | 8 | 1 | 55 |
| López Mateos, 1958–1964 | 47 | 7 | 1 | 45 |
| Díaz Ordaz, 1964–1970 | 51 | 7 | 1 | 41 |
| Echeverría, 1970–1976 | 54 | 7 | 2 | 37 |
| López Portillo, 1976–1982 | 52 | 7 | 2 | 39 |
| De la Madrid, 1982–1988 | 56 | 5 | 6 | 33 |
| Salinas, 1988–1991 | 51 | 9 | 13 | 27 |

Source: Roderic Ai Camp, *Mexican Political Biography Project*, 1995.

The university and preparatory school became important sources of political recruitment for two reasons (see Table 5-4). Many future politicians taught at these two institutions, generally a single course. Three-quarters of national political figures have taught at the college level. Salinas was an adjunct professor at his alma mater, the National University, and President Zedillo taught at two of Mexico's leading institutions. Politicians use academia in part as a means to teach students intellectual and political skills, helping them get started in a public career. Typically, they place a student in a government internship or part-time job, followed by a full-time position after graduation. Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) is an excellent illustration of this, having started his career in the Bank of Mexico (Mexico's "federal reserve bank") on the recommendation of an economics professor.⁷

Vicente Fox does not continue the tradition of college teaching typical of his predecessors; he only completed his degree while campaigning for president. Nevertheless, his educational experiences at the prestigious Ibero-American University produced several influential ties to future, prominent Mexicans. More importantly, many of his cabinet members have been part- or full-time academics, including his treasury and foreign relations secretaries. What is distinctive about Fox's administration educationally is the fact that many top appointees graduated from or taught at distinguished private institutions, especially the Monterrey Technological Institute for Higher Studies (ITESM) in Nuevo León, popularly known as

"Monterrey Tech," and the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM), in the Federal District.

As suggested above, the second institution most influential in the initial recruitment of national politicians is the federal bureaucracy. Numerous prominent figures have begun their careers in lesser agency posts, sometimes as advisers or technical experts. If they decide to make politics their career, they develop contacts with other ambitious figures, typically a superior in their own agency or in a related organization. That individual, similar to the politician-teacher, initiates their rise within the national bureaucracy. In spite of the inroads made by local and state party and governmental bureaucracies, and by the PAN national party organization, the federal bureaucracy continues to rank second only to the university as a source of political recruitment. In contrast to the United States, the Democratic and Republican parties are often the source of nationally prominent politicians because they have traditionally been formative in the candidate-selection process and in the competition for offices that influence policymaking.

An examination of Mexico's most influential politicians from 1970 to 2000, reinforces this interpretation. Mexican politicians rely on informal, personal contacts to develop their ties to a politician-teacher or a superior, which sociologists call networking. Ambitious Mexicans form strong personal ties to an individual mentor and may have different mentors at various stages of their careers. These networking patterns, which are examined in some detail below, occur in three common settings (Table 5-5): educational

Table 5-5 How Mentor-Disciples Among the Mexican Elites Meet

| Type of Power Elite | Sources of Mentor-Disciple Relationships | | |
|---------------------|--|--------|--------|
| | Education | Career | Family |
| | (percentages) | | |
| Political | 45 | 42 | 13 |
| Intellectual | 76 | 15 | 9 |
| Capitalist | 1 | 5 | 94 |
| Military | 31 | 69 | 0 |
| Clergy | 63 | 25 | 11 |

Note: (N = 398) Data based on known relationships between a mentor and disciple among Mexico's power elite. *Education* refers to a mentor-disciple contact that occurred in any educational setting, typically between a student and a professor, between any two students, or between professorial peers. *Career* refers to a mentor-disciple contact that took place in an occupational setting, typically between two individuals working in an organizational bureaucracy, often in a superior-subordinate relationship. *Family* refers to mentor-disciple relationships established within the immediate family, including mentors who were grandparents, in-laws, aunts and uncles, or parents.

Source: Roderic Ai Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins, Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-first Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

institutions, career positions (primarily the bureaucracy), and within the family.

In Mexico few *national* politicians have been recruited through party channels, especially at the local and state levels, with the exception of prominent PAN party figures and, to a lesser extent, younger leaders of the PRD. Many prominent figures at the state and local levels are recruited in such fashion. Because decision making was centralized in the executive branch rather than in the legislative bodies, a career in the national bureaucracy was the foremost means of ascent.

The salience of the federal bureaucracy in the recruitment process contributes to another informal characteristic of upward political mobility in Mexico: the significance of Mexico City. Politicians who come from Mexico City, in spite of its tremendous size, are overrepresented in the national political leadership. This was true before the revolution of 1910, but those violent events introduced a leadership whose birthplaces deemphasized the importance of the capital (see Table 5-6). That remained true until the 1940s, when the presence of Mexico City in the backgrounds of national politicians increased substantially. By the presidency of Luis Echeverría (1970–1976), when fewer than one in ten citizens was born in Mexico City, one in four national political figures named it as a place of birth. In the past twenty years, that figure increased dramatically: Mexico City was the birthplace of nearly half of President Salinas's appointees who held national office for the first time, nearly four times that of the general population of the same age. The government has not provided comparable data on national politicians since 1994, but an examination of the Zedillo and Fox cabinets suggests a gradual, but important decline in the importance of the Federal District in the backgrounds of Mexico's most influential political figures (Table 5-7). In Zedillo's cabinet, more than two-thirds of his collaborators were born in the Federal District, a figure that dropped to 60 percent under Fox. The reason for this decline is clear: Fox recruited his cabinet from institutional settings other than the federal bureaucracy, thus giving greater prominence to other cities and regions. As elective office becomes more common in the background of aspiring politicians, the prominence of the Federal District is likely to continue to decline.

In all political systems, whom one knows has much to do with political recruitment and with appointment to an important political office. U.S. politics is replete with examples of prominent figures who sought out old friends to fill responsible political offices. In fact, knowing someone is often a means for obtaining employment in the private sector as well. In Mexico, whom one knows in public life is even more telling, given the fact that incumbent officeholders often decide who obtains influential posts. Mexicans with political

Table 5-6 Region of Birth of First-Time National Officeholders by Presidential Administration, 1884–1991

| Presidential Administration | Region of Birth (%) | | | | | | | Foreign |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|--------------|------|-------|-------|------|--------------|---------|
| | Federal District | East Central | West | North | South | Gulf | West Central | |
| Díaz | 15 | 13 | 15 | 15 | 12 | 18 | 11 | 1 |
| 1889– | 7 | 10 | 19 | 16 | 19 | 19 | 10 | 0 |
| 1893– | 12 | 24 | 6 | 15 | 15 | 9 | 18 | 0 |
| 1897– | 13 | 11 | 11 | 16 | 4 | 31 | 13 | 0 |
| 1901– | 22 | 5 | 5 | 24 | 8 | 22 | 11 | 3 |
| 1905 | 14 | 9 | 11 | 29 | 11 | 17 | 9 | 0 |
| 1910– | 23 | 6 | 0 | 35 | 0 | 24 | 6 | 6 |
| De la Barra | 6 | 22 | 28 | 28 | 6 | 0 | 11 | 0 |
| Madero | 13 | 13 | 20 | 18 | 6 | 20 | 9 | 0 |
| Huerta | 16 | 10 | 16 | 24 | 8 | 12 | 16 | 0 |
| Convention | 5 | 11 | 19 | 32 | 5 | 5 | 22 | 0 |
| Carranza | 4 | 17 | 16 | 26 | 10 | 13 | 12 | 1 |
| Obregón | 6 | 14 | 19 | 19 | 13 | 21 | 8 | 0 |
| Calles | 3 | 15 | 18 | 20 | 13 | 12 | 18 | 0 |
| Portes Gil | 0 | 21 | 14 | 29 | 0 | 29 | 7 | 0 |
| Ortiz Rubio | 8 | 8 | 12 | 28 | 4 | 12 | 28 | 0 |
| Rodríguez | 0 | 15 | 0 | 46 | 17 | 0 | 8 | 0 |
| Cárdenas | 6 | 20 | 15 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 20 | 1 |
| Ávila Camacho | 10 | 20 | 15 | 16 | 10 | 11 | 25 | 1 |
| Alemán | 11 | 15 | 12 | 20 | 9 | 16 | 15 | 1 |
| Ruiz Cortines | 3 | 18 | 20 | 16 | 12 | 17 | 17 | 1 |
| López Mateos | 9 | 19 | 16 | 17 | 10 | 11 | 15 | 0 |
| Díaz Ordaz | 8 | 11 | 23 | 15 | 7 | 15 | 12 | 0 |
| Echeverría | 24 | 15 | 14 | 13 | 9 | 12 | 13 | 1 |
| López Portillo | 26 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 8 | 13 | 12 | 3 |
| De la Madrid | 39 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 8 | 6 | 10 | 1 |
| Salinas | 45 | 6 | 11 | 15 | 2 | 13 | 4 | 4 |
| Total | 16 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 9 | 14 | 13 | 1 |
| 1910 Census ^a | 5 | 22 | 16 | 11 | 14 | 12 | 21 | |
| 1950 Census ^a | 12 | 18 | 14 | 15 | 13 | 12 | 17 | |

Source: Roderic A. Camp, *Mexican Political Biography Project*, 1995.

^aPercentage of general population from each region.

ambitions can enhance personal contacts at school, in the university, or during their professional and public careers through family ties (Table 5-5).

Americans have produced a few notable political families, say, the Adamses and Kennedys, and George W. Bush is the son of a president and grandson of a U.S. senator, but such families are numerous in Mexico. One reason, as studies of British and U.S. politicians have shown, is that children of political activists are more likely to see politics as a potential career than are children reared in a nonpolitical environment.⁸ It is natural that a youngster growing up in a political family would come in contact with many polit-

Table 5-7 General Characteristics of the Fox and Zedillo Cabinets

| | Place of Origin | | University Attended | | Undergraduate Degree | | | Graduate Work | | Career | | Electoral Experience | |
|---------|------------------|----------|---------------------|--------|------------------------|-----|-------|---------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------|------|
| | Federal District | Province | Private | Public | Economics ^a | Law | Other | United States | England/Europe | Private Sector | Public Sector | Elective Office | None |
| Zedillo | 68 | 32 | 18 | 82 | 36 | 32 | 32 | 50 | 32 | 0 | 100 | 23 | 77 |
| Fox | 60 | 40 | 44 | 56 | 32 | 29 | 39 | 48 | 19 | 68 | 32 | 32 | 68 |

^aEconomics includes CPAs and business administration degrees.

^bBased on a comparison of both presidents' first cabinet-level appointees.

ical figures. More than one in eight Mexican national politicians from 1970 through 1988, including President Salinas, were the children of nationally prominent political figures. Salinas's father, who served in the cabinet in the 1960s, helped his son's early career. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, PRD's leading figure, is the son of President Lázaro Cárdenas. If extended family ties are considered, between one-fifth and one-third of all politicians were related to national political figures during the same period. Numerous PAN leaders are the children of its founders and early presidential candidates. The same is true on the state level and has been documented in detail by Javier Hurtado in his examination of Jalisco, an important western state.⁹

Politically active families are not the only factor that makes family background important. Social and economic status is another. Studies of politicians worldwide, in both socialist and nonsocialist societies, reveal the importance of middle- and upper-middle-class backgrounds.¹⁰ In Third World countries without competitive political structures, family origins become even more significant to career success.

Higher socioeconomic backgrounds are helpful in political life because well-off parents provide opportunities for their children. Education is such a significant means of political recruitment that *access* to it enables making the right contacts and obtaining the necessary, informal credentials. Some Mexicans from working-class backgrounds manage to attend preparatory school and even a university, but few actually complete degree programs. Family socioeconomic status has increased in significance, as private schooling has increased its presence among all politicians, and particularly among Panistas. Scholarships to private institutions are the exception, not the norm. This explains why Mexico's youngest generation of national politicians, those born since 1940 (Presidents Salinas's, Zedillo's, and Fox's generation), are almost exclusively from middle- and upper-middle-class backgrounds. President Zedillo, however, is an exception, the first chief executive in decades to come from a working-class family of modest means. Fox, on the other hand, fits the recent pattern.

THE RISE OF WOMEN

Another informal credential universal to political leadership in all countries is gender. Politics has been, and remains, dominated by men. Nevertheless, women have made substantial inroads in national political office. On the whole, women have been far more successful politically in Mexico than in many other countries, including the United States. For example, several women served on the supreme court in Mexico, long before Sandra Day

O'Connor was appointed by President Reagan. Numerous women have held senate positions. In the 1990s, women accounted for 15 and 18 percent of Senate and congressional seats compared to only 9 and 13 percent, respectively, in the United States.¹¹ Cabinet posts have occasionally been filled by women, but men have a virtual lock on that domain, especially in the major agencies. President Zedillo increased the number of women in his cabinet to three, the highest ever, a figure equalled by president Fox. Most important, in 1998, Rosario Green became secretary of foreign relations, the first woman to hold a significant cabinet post.

Slightly different recruitment patterns have traditionally been followed by women interested in politics. This fact worked against their obtaining the higher positions because they did not come in contact with current and future political figures who could assist them up the bureaucratic ladder.¹² Typically, women politicians have been found far more frequently in party posts and in the legislative branch, and they have not had the same type or level of education (see Table 5-8). Younger women who are politically ambitious are now taking on many of the characteristics of their male peers. Among younger political figures (born after 1950) at the national level, women now

Table 5-8 Credentials of First-Time Officeholders by Gender, 1934–1991

| Credential | Women (%) | Men (%) |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Education | | |
| Primary, secondary, preparatory only | 22 | 19 |
| Normal only | 22 | 5 |
| University | 32 | 51 |
| Graduate | 26 | 25 |
| Degree earned | | |
| None | 43 | 27 |
| Law | 38 | 51 |
| Economics | 19 | 12 |
| Medicine | 6 | 9 |
| Engineering | 5 | 14 |
| Other | 32 | 15 |
| Political office | | |
| Private secretary | 3 | 9 |
| Union leader | 13 | 13 |
| Kinship ties | | |
| Relative in public office | 15 | 28 |
| Father in politics | 8 | 9 |
| Party office | | |
| President of PRI | 0 | 1 |
| Secretary of PRI | 6 | 8 |
| Federal District director | 0 | 1 |
| State director | 8 | 4 |
| Other post | 43 | 17 |
| All PRI posts combined | 50 | 22 |

Source: Roderic A. Camp, *Mexican Political Biography Project*, 1995.

Table 5-9 Women's Recruitment to National Political Office by Administration, 1935–1991

| President | Percentage of Women in Administration |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Cárdenas, 1934–1940 | 0 |
| Ávila Camacho, 1940–1946 | 1 |
| Alemán, 1946–1952 | 2 |
| Ruiz Cortines, 1952–1958 | 4 |
| López Mateos, 1958–1964 | 4 |
| Díaz Ordaz, 1964–1970 | 6 |
| Echeverría, 1970–1976 | 8 |
| López Portillo, 1976–1982 | 19 |
| De la Madrid, 1982–1988 | 17 |
| Salinas, 1988–1991 | 11 |

Source: Roderic A. Camp, *Mexican Political Biography Project*, 1995.

account for one in four. The representation of women in national political offices (cabinet, subcabinet, and top judicial and legislative posts) increased substantially after 1976, during the administration of José López Portillo (see Table 5-9). The lower figure for Salinas does not necessarily represent a decline in the representation of women, as the data are for only the first half of his administration. For example, among all officials in the Salinas administration, 12 percent of the legislative branch, 12 percent of the judicial branch, and 6 percent of the executive branch were women.¹³ In the legislative branch during the Zedillo administration (1994–2000), women accounted for 16 percent of the deputies and 9 percent of the senators. Under Fox, those figures rose again, to 20 and 20 percent, respectively. (See Table 5-10). Among the major political parties, in the National Executive Committee, women controlled 24, 13, and 11 percent, respectively, of the PRD, PRI, and PAN posts. The PRD, similar to some Scandinavian parties, began experimenting with a quota system. In 1993, they instituted a 30 percent rule, guaranteeing women that level of representation among the party's candidates for office. After the implementation of this rule, women deputies from the PRD increased from 8 to 23 percent.

In the 2003 congressional elections, after the implementation of the new federal quota legislation, the number of female deputies increased significantly (see Table 5-10). In spite of this notable improvement, the implementation of the spirit of the law varied from party to party. Party candidates chosen in direct elections for congressional and senate seats need not comply with the quota. Among the three major parties, 49 percent of their candidates were chosen through direct election. In spite of the fact that the gender quotas applied to only half of the candidates, women won 23 percent of the seats in the 2003–2006 legislature, moving Mexico's ranking of the per-

Table 5-10 Women's Recruitment to National Legislative Office by Administration, 1952–2006

| Administration | Percentage of Women in Office | |
|----------------|-------------------------------|--------|
| | Chamber of Deputies | Senate |
| 1952–1958 | 2 | 0 |
| 1958–1964 | 5 | 0 |
| 1964–1970 | 6 | 3 |
| 1970–1976 | 7 | 3 |
| 1976–1982 | 9 | 6 |
| 1982–1988 | 11 | 9 |
| 1988–1994 | 10 | 11 |
| 1994–2000 | 16 | 9 |
| 2000–2006 | 20 | 20 |

Source: Adapted from Anna M. Fernández Poncela, "The Political Participation of Women in Mexico Today," in *Changing Structure of Mexico: Political, Social and Economic Prospects* (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1996), 307–14; *Este País*, September 2000, 23; *Quién es quién en el congreso* (Mexico: IETD, 2002).

centage of women in the legislative branch worldwide from 55 to 23, equal to Switzerland.¹⁴

Women in the 1980s and 1990s began to acquire men's credentials, thus increasing their opportunities for closer contact with potential future politicians. Women traditionally have not been as well educated as men, but younger women have received much more university training, putting them on par with men holding influential posts in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1995, women were only two-tenths of a year behind men in their average number of years of schooling.¹⁵ The major difference in recruitment qualities among female and male politicians today is that women are not receiving the same level of graduate education and, more important, are attending graduate schools that are no longer considered prestigious by men. But women continue to have much broader and deeper experiences in their parties and in civic and nongovernmental organizations. These career differences, though working against female political recruitment in the past, may very well give women stronger skills in a changing, plural political context and thus an advantage in an increasingly democratic Mexico.¹⁶

THE CAMARILLA: GROUP POLITICS IN MEXICO

Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of Mexican politics, knowledge of which is essential to understanding the recruitment process, is the politi-

cal clique, the *camarilla*. It has determined prior to 2000, more than any other variable discussed, who goes to the top of the political ladder, what paths are taken, and the specific posts they are assigned. Many of the features of Mexican political culture predispose the political system to rely on *camarillas*. A *camarilla* is a group of people who have political interests in common and rely on one another to improve their chances within the political leadership (see Table 5-11).

The fundamental question that the PAN presidential victory raises for this unique, informal process of Mexican political life is: Will the *camarilla* system continue to play a crucial role? The *camarilla* system will be altered substantially by the structural changes that the PRI defeat introduces, but it is unlikely to disappear altogether. The reasons why these informal, personal linkages are unlikely to disappear altogether include the following. First, the underlying cement of the *camarilla* system is the mentor-disciple relationship. As a recent study of Mexico's most influential leaders from all professions, including the armed forces, the clergy, cultural elites, capitalists, and politicians, illustrates, prominent Mexicans have relied heavily on mentors, who often were equally influential themselves, to promote their career success.¹⁷ In fact, six out of seven influential Mexicans were known to have a

Table 5-11 Characteristics of Mexican *Camorillas* in the Twenty-first Century

1. The structural basis of the *camarilla* system is a mentor-disciple relationship, which has many similarities to the patron-client culture throughout Latin America.
2. The *camarilla* system is extremely fluid, and *camarillas* are not exclusive but overlapping, relying on networking techniques found in other societies.
3. Most successful politicians are the products of multiple mentors and *camarillas*, that is, rarely does a politician remain within a single *camarilla* from beginning to the end of his or her career.
4. The larger the *camarilla*, the more influential its leader and, likewise, his disciples.
5. Some *camarillas* are characterized by an ideological flavor, but other personal qualities determine disciple ties to a mentor.
6. Disciples often surpass the political careers of their mentors, thus reversing the benefits of the *camarilla*'s relationship and the logical order of *camarilla* influence.
7. *Camorillas* increasingly will be formed in diverse institutional environments, including state bureaucracies, the corporate world, international agencies, civic organizations, as well as federal bureaucratic agencies.
8. Superior-subordinate institutional relationships will increasingly displace the importance of educational and familial contacts.
9. Most politicians continue to carry with them membership in an educational *camarilla*, represented by their preparatory, professional, and graduate school generation.
10. The rise of the nonprofessional politician increases the potential importance of networking across influential groups and professions.

Source: Roderic Ai Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins, Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-first Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); and "Camorillas in Mexican Politics: The Case of the Salinas Cabinet," *Mexican Studies* 6 (Winter 1990), 106–7.

mentor. Among politicians, the figure is 100 percent. Second, even if *camarillas* were to disappear altogether within the federal bureaucracy, an unlikely situation, they would still function at the state level, where PRI continues to control the majority of governorships and, therefore, state patronage. Third, personal loyalties are a fact of Mexican life. Individuals are likely to rely on personal relationships to foster their career success, even if the rewards are altered by structural changes within the Mexican system.

A *camarilla* is often formed early, even while the members are still in college. The members place considerable trust in one another. Using a group of friends to accomplish professional objectives is a feature found in other sectors of Mexican society, including academia and the business community. A *camarilla* has a leader who acts as a political mentor to other members of

Camarilla: a group of persons who share political interests, and rely on one another to improve their chances in the political leadership.

the group. He typically is more successful than his peers and uses his own career as a means of furthering the careers of other group members. As the leader of a *camarilla* ascends in an institution, he places members of his group, when possible, in other influential positions either within his organization or outside it. The higher he rises, the more positions he can fill.¹⁸

All of the qualities described in Table 5-11 remain true for most national government officeholders. But the universality of these qualities will break down as PAN and PRD members acquire more posts, especially if those individuals are not career politicians, but have moved laterally into politics from other professions. *Camarillas* will not disappear, but other characteristics will increase in importance and other variables will moderate *camarillas'* influence.¹⁹

The role of the mentor and the political groups he creates take on added importance because the mentor establishes the criteria by which he chooses his disciples and because he plays a formative role in socializing his disciples. The implications for political recruitment are crucial. It has been shown that politicians, like most people, tend to recruit those with similar credentials or experience, who in many ways mirror themselves.²⁰ Over time, mentors can structure the recruitment process to favor certain credentials. In the past, the most successful *camarillas* reached the presidency. Presidents, because they exercise the most comprehensive influence over political appointments, have the greatest impact on the recruitment process, affecting the entire political system.

The demise of PRI's monopoly completely alters this pattern. The recruitment and promotion criteria will no longer be universal, but dis-

persed, depending on the political setting from which an individual emerges, for example, from state politics, the congress, the bureaucracy, or from a nonpolitical career in business and civic organizations. Furthermore, President Fox has not shown a strong tendency to appoint influential cabinet members who mirror his career and political experience. Instead, he has diversified the recruitment process by selecting a range of individuals to direct governmental agencies who differ in their career experiences. These individuals, in turn, have the greatest opportunity to fill subordinate posts with their own choices. It remains to be seen whether they too will follow the pattern of their predecessors in choosing like types for the most influential positions. In the foreseeable future, the majority of mid-to upper-level positions are still likely to be filled by individuals who have come from careers in the bureaucracy, since they have the expertise and experience necessary for many of these positions.

Significant changes in broad recruitment patterns historically, the result of preferences by leading mentors, are easily documented. For example, President Alemán surrounded himself with a new type of politician, giving his collaborators an opportunity to reinforce their same credentials. From the 1940s through the 1970s, as the *camarillas* introduced by Alemán and his generation rose to the top, certain credentials became increasingly important: a college education, preferably from the National University; an urban birthplace, preferably Mexico City; a career in national politics, preferably the federal bureaucracy; pursuit of a law degree and legal career; and entrance into public service at a young age, often while still in college.

In the 1980s, and in some instances earlier, a change began to occur in the informal credentials required of the most successful politicians. A policy setting forth these changing requirements was not established; rather, they emerged naturally as the politicians themselves changed their credentials. Those recent trends became sharper and more easily recognized under Salinas and Zedillo.

Politicians' educational and career characteristics have changed markedly in the past two decades. The most persistent change has been the constant increase in *level* of education. Not only are all national political leaders, with a few exceptions in the legislative branch, college educated, but graduate education has reached new highs. De la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo obtained graduate degrees. De la Madrid has an M.A. degree in public administration from Harvard; his disciple and successor, Salinas, has two M.A. degrees as well as a Ph.D. degree from Harvard; and Salinas' successor, Zedillo, received his M.A. and Ph.D. from Yale. President Fox does not continue the pattern established by his predecessors, having completed only an undergraduate business administration degree. Because he was not a pro-

fessional politician, nor employed in the federal bureaucracy, the broad recruitment criteria established by influential political mentors and presidents did not influence his preparation.

Fox's three predecessors reflect the importance given to advanced education in Mexican politics. Of the *new* national officeholders under de la Madrid, nearly half, like the president, had graduate degrees. Only six years later, beginning with the Salinas administration in 1988, 70 percent had received graduate training; many of them with Ph.D.s. Of Zedillo's cabinet members, 66 percent claimed such educational credentials. Graduate education has become such a preferred credential that top political figures have been known to lie about having it. For example, there was a scandal involving Zedillo's first education secretary, who never completed his B.A. or his Ph.D.²¹

De la Madrid and Salinas introduced another informal credential into the recruitment process. Their *camarilla* selections emphasized politicians who had been educated outside Mexico, particularly at the graduate level. Zedillo did likewise. It can be said that Salinas was following in the footsteps of his father, who also graduated from Harvard with an advanced degree. Zedillo followed in the footsteps of his mentor, economist Leopoldo Solís, a Yale graduate. Even Fox, although he did not earn a graduate degree, obtained a diploma in advanced management from Harvard. The point is that numerous political figures began to study abroad, generally at the most prestigious universities in the United States. In Salinas's administration Harvard and Yale graduates were the most common. These patterns have been carefully traced since the 1970s. In 1972, 58 percent of Mexico's national political figures with Ph.D.s received them from the National University, and only 13 percent from U.S. universities. By 1989, only 29 percent had graduated from an institution in their native country, compared with 48 percent from U.S. institutions.²² In the 1990s, 55 percent of national politicians received their Ph.D.s in the United States.

A third change in the educational background of contemporary politicians, and perhaps the most significant, is the discipline studied. Law, as in the United States, has always been the field of study of most future politicians, with engineering and medicine coming in second. This means that law school is the most likely place to meet future politicians and political mentors. The most remarkable change is a shift from law to economics in politicians' educational backgrounds. Salinas was the first president with that specialty, and his political generation was the first to count as many economists as lawyers among its members. Zedillo duplicated this pattern personally and among his collaborators. Fox's degree in business administration is closely linked to the emphasis on economics, and one out of three

members of his cabinet graduated in economically related disciplines, (Table 5-7).

The new emphasis on economics has led to another significant change in recruitment characteristics: the elevation of private over public education. This characteristic is less pervasive than the others but even more remarkable. Between the administration of de la Madrid and Salinas, a sixfold increase in the percentage of private-school graduates took place. Instead of the National University and public universities maintaining their level of dominance, private institutions have begun to make serious inroads. This trend is enhanced by the fact that many PAN politicians are private school graduates, and as more businesspeople choose political careers, private university graduates will increase. Vicente Fox is a case in point. His educational origins are reflected in his cabinet choices. Nearly half have graduated from private schools, with Ibero-American University, his alma mater, the Monterrey Technological Institute of Higher Studies, the Free Law School, the Autonomous Technological University of Mexico, and Anahuac University, the most important. Even more remarkable, three of his cabinet members obtained undergraduate degrees from private universities in the United States. This is significant for political recruitment because it will change not only informal credentials, but also the locations where recruitment takes place. In fact, it contributes to the diversity of the recruitment process, a process that traditionally has relied on fewer, concentrated, public educational sources.

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE TECHNOCRAT

As the recruitment process changed and the credentials of future politicians were modified, some scholars labeled the younger generation of politicians in Mexico as technocrats, *técnicos*. The rise of technocratic leadership took place throughout Latin America. A number of attributes have been associated with this class of leaders in Brazil and Chile, and many have been mistakenly applied to Mexico's leaders. This has generated some confusion about technocrats.²³

Mexico's technocratic leadership is characterized by new developments in their informal credentials. In particular, they are seen as well educated in technologically sophisticated fields; as spending most of their careers in the national bureaucracy; as having come from large urban centers, notably Mexico City; as having middle- and upper-middle-class backgrounds; and as having studied abroad (see Table 5-12). By implication, in

Table 5-12 Characteristics of Mexico's Politician-Technocrats in the 1990s

| Characteristic | Percentage Having |
|---|-------------------|
| Urban birthplace | 94 |
| Male | 87 |
| Middle-class parents | 85 |
| College educated | 83 |
| Graduate of the National University | 58 |
| Taught | 57 |
| Prior national political post | 56 |
| Born between 1920 and 1939 | 52 |
| Graduate education | 46 |
| Lawyer | 37 |
| Taught at the National University | 37 |
| Graduate of the National Preparatory School | 29 |
| Ph.D. degree | 20 |
| Graduate work in the United States | 19 |
| Economist | 16 |

Source: Roderic A. Camp, *Mexican Political Biography Project*, 1995.

contrast to the more traditional Mexican politician, they have few direct ties to the masses and, in terms of career experience, lack elective office-holding and grassroots party experience.

For some years the typical Mexican politician had been a hybrid, exhibiting characteristics found among *técnicos* and traditional politicians. The assertion by some scholars that technocrats lack political skills is incorrect and misleading. Technocrats as a group do not have an identifiable ideology. The political-technocrat, a more apt label, is primarily distinguished from the politician of the 1960s or 1970s by lack of party experience, by the fact that he or she has never held elective office, and by specialized education abroad. These characteristics, for example, are found in President Zedillo's own career (see Table 5-13). The implication of these three characteristics is that the politician-technocrat, although highly skilled, does not possess the same political bargaining skills as does the peer who has had a different career track and that such a person *may* be more receptive to political and economic strategies used in other cultures as a consequence of foreign education.

It has been convincingly argued that Salinas's economic cabinet, including Zedillo, whose members shared these technocratic characteristics, welcomed the economic liberalization philosophy of western Europe and the United States because of their economic background and education abroad. As economists, they identified with an international profession based in the United States, with tools and concepts that were believed to be

Table 5-13 Career Progression of Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, Technocrat President

| | |
|-----------|--|
| 1992–1993 | Secretary of Public Education ^a |
| 1988–1992 | Secretary of Programming and Budgeting ^b |
| 1987–1988 | Subsecretary of Programming and Budgeting |
| 1983–1987 | Director, Exchange Risks Trust Fund, Bank of Mexico |
| 1982–1983 | Assistant Manager, Treasury Research, Bank of Mexico |
| 1981–1983 | Professor, economics, El Colegio de México |
| 1978–1982 | Economist, Bank of Mexico |
| 1978–1980 | Professor, economics, National Polytechnic Institute (IPN) |
| 1974–1978 | M.A. and Ph.D., economics, Yale University |
| 1973–1974 | Professor, economics, National Polytechnic Institute (IPN) |
| 1973 | Studies, University of Bradford, England |
| 1971–1974 | Researcher, Economic and Social Planning Division, Secretariat of the Presidency |
| 1969–1971 | Accounting assistant, Bank of the Army and Navy |
| 1969–1972 | Economics studies, National Polytechnic Institute |
| 1967–1969 | Vocational School No. 5, National Polytechnic Institute (IPN), Mexico City |
| 1964–1967 | Public School No. 18, Mexicali |
| 1958–1964 | Leona Vicario and Cuauhtémoc Schools, Mexicali, Baja California |

^aZedillo became Luis Donaldo Colosio's campaign manager in 1993/1994, making him one of the few prominent figures eligible constitutionally in March 1994 to become the new PRI candidate.

^bThis secretariat was incorporated into the Treasury in 1992.

universally—and locally—transferable, and with the methodology and ideology dominant in leading Ivy League graduate programs.²⁴

Much of the dissension in the Mexican establishment political leadership in the 1990s can be attributed to a division between the technocratic leadership and traditional political figures, popularly called *los dinos*, or dinosaurs. Essentially, the argument was that the *técnicos* replaced the traditional politicians; devalued their skills and experiences, primarily their electoral and party experiences; and opposed their unprogressive authoritarian practices with modernizing political and economic alternatives. The crux of the divisions was the alleged ideological differences between the two groups. In reality, as Miguel Centeno pointed out, the central issue introduced by this technocratic elite was not "an ideology of answers or issues but . . . an ideology of method. The ideological cohesion of the new elite was not necessarily based on philosophical agreements on policy but an agreement on how such a policy ought to be pursued."²⁵

The fundamental issue dividing the technocrat from the traditional political leadership, as is so often the case, was access to power. The traditional politician did not want to give up his control over the political system and PRI leadership to a technocratic elite, regardless of different ideological preferences. The dominance of the technocrats in the 1990s introduced an

additional characteristic, a belief that the institutions they led were the undisputed arbiters of economic and political decision making. Even so, they showed an inability to listen and an intolerance of their domestic opponents. This pattern increasingly isolated the technocratic leaders from other groups, both within and outside Mexico's leadership prior to 2000. Technocrats like Zedillo had smaller and smaller *camarillas* because their relative youth afforded them less political experience, and this experience covered a narrower range of institutions and agencies.

Technocratic leadership might have remained entrenched for many years if PRI had retained its dominance over national political leadership and a technocrat had been PRI's presidential candidate. Fox's presidential victory, however, ensured the rapid decline of technocratic control over national political institutions. Fox's own career, when contrasted with that of Zedillo, makes the differences between the two men patently clear (Table 5-14). Zedillo, who moved to Mexico City to continue his education, began a career in the federal bureaucracy even before he completed his undergraduate economics degree. Fox, on the other hand, remained in León, his home town, for most of his education, and only upon graduation from college did he begin a career in the private sector. Zedillo quickly ended up in the forefront of the programming and budgeting secretariat, a crucial agency in the development of Mexican technocrats.²⁶ Fox, instead, spent his formative years working up the ladder of a multi-national corporation, Coca Cola of Mexico. Zedillo left Mexico in the 1970s to earn two graduate degrees from Yale and, like so many of his peers, began teaching part-time. Fox obtained a diploma from a short advanced management course at Harvard, but continued as a full-time employee of Coca Cola, becoming its CEO. Zedillo continued his career in the Mexican federal government in a progression of

Table 5-14 Career Progression of Vicente Fox Quesada, Democratic President

| | |
|-----------|---|
| 1997-1999 | Governor of Guanajuato |
| 1991- | PAN candidate for Governor of Guanajuato |
| 1988-1991 | Federal Deputy from Guanajuato, District 3 |
| 1988- | Secretary of Agriculture in PAN shadow cabinet (Manuel Clouthier) |
| 1988- | Joined PAN |
| 1979-1988 | Owner and CEO Grupo Fox, Frozen Vegetable Export Firm |
| 1975-1979 | CEO of Coca Cola of Mexico |
| 1969-1975 | Operations Manager, Coca Cola of Mexico |
| 1969 | Zone Manager, Coca Cola of Mexico |
| 1965-1969 | Joined Coca Cola as a route supervisor |
| 1960-1964 | Business Administration studies, Ibero-American University (Jesuit) |
| 1953-1960 | Instituto Lux (Jesuit), León, Guanajuato |
| 1947-1952 | Instituto Mayllén (La Sallists), León, Guanajuato |

posts, while Fox left Coca Cola to go into business for himself. Zedillo joined Salinas' cabinet in 1988, and Fox won election as a congressman from his home state, before becoming governor in the 1990s.

In certain respects, Fox represents some of the same trends occurring within the PRI itself. The increased pluralization of the political system, and the intense electoral competition in the 1990s, contributed to the rise of politicians from all parties who had experience in electoral politics. These structural changes also promoted the careers of politicians with broad experience, rather than a narrow range of technocratic career experience. Fox himself, and some of the collaborators he appointed, broadened the scope of these experiences further to include representatives of the private sector and even individuals with careers in international organizations (Table 5-7). For example, more than two-thirds of his cabinet had previously pursued careers in the private sector.

Fox appointed several technocrats to his cabinet, notably his treasury secretary, and another technocrat continued his term as head of the Bank of Mexico. An international technocrat was in charge of his economic development agency. Technocratic types have retained considerable influence in economic decision making, but they have lost control over the national political system. This does not mean, however, that some of the characteristics that technocrats reinforced or introduced have also disappeared. Among the characteristics that are in decline are the predominance of the Federal District in the backgrounds of national leadership, the importance of graduate work abroad, and public bureaucratic careers. Among those qualities that continue to be preeminent are the increasing importance of private university education and the growth of economics or economically related disciplines in politicians' educational backgrounds. The most dramatic changes from Zedillo's to Fox's cabinet are that nearly half of Fox's collaborators are the product of private schools, and two-thirds are businessmen contrasted to none under Zedillo, a radical shift from six years earlier.

CONCLUSION

Prior to 2000, the formal structure of Mexico's political system shed little light on how interested Mexicans pursued successful political careers. The political recruitment process was strongly affected by the centralization of political authority and the characteristics fostered by incumbent selection. Informal credentials typically replaced formal requirements as helpful or essential to the recruitment process. The PAN presidential victory, the PAN

and PRD control over the national legislative branch, and the breadth of their influence at the state and local levels introduced different leadership characteristics and legitimized new recruitment practices. Democracy does alter recruitment patterns.

Informal credentials have long been associated with generations of political leaders since the 1920s. As mentors changed their own credentials, they passed on those changes to succeeding generations of politicians. They were responsible for such trends as higher levels of education, graduate education abroad, private undergraduate education, the importance of economics, the role of university teaching, and the impact of economic agencies in the federal government. All of these qualities, with the exception of the influence of federal economic agencies, remain influential since 2000. The continuation of their influence, however, depends on the nature of leadership at all levels of the federal government. It is too soon to determine if the diversity represented in Fox's cabinet has filtered down to the department and division level in the national bureaucracy.

In the past, the political clique or *camarilla* was the essential ingredient in the recruitment process. As we have seen, it is an informal structure built on several characteristics of the general culture, a structure emphasizing the use of a group of friends to enhance career success. The political *camarilla*, as crafted prior to 2000, will decline in importance, as new leadership types take over national positions. Fox himself, and many of his collaborators, suggests the continued importance of informal processes, including networking. These new politicians elevate networking that goes beyond the formation of political groups to establishing linkages between politicians and leaders from other sectors of society, including influential businesspeople and clergy. Recent studies demonstrate unequivocally that many of Mexico's leaders in the twenty-first century have extensive ties, established through educational experiences, family, and career, with prominent figures from other leadership groups. For example, Fox went to school and became close friends with three members of Mexico's most influential capitalist families. Fox also became involved with a pro-democratic civic action organization, the San Angel Group, where he made contact with prominent intellectuals and civic leaders, including two of his future cabinet members.

Changes in the recruitment process, brought about by alterations in the political structure and type of leadership, have already introduced several important trends, particularly the importance of individuals from provincial and private sector backgrounds and the increase in private university training. These two features have several potential consequences. In the first place, the continued importance of private university education enhances the likelihood that Mexicans from business or professional backgrounds in the

private sector will pursue political careers, since many of them come from those educational institutions. On the other hand, the exclusive nature of private institution student bodies, given the socioeconomic inequalities in Mexico and the lack of scholarship opportunities, will actually narrow rather than increase the range of recruitment pools especially if they increase their dominance over most levels of national political recruitment. If having a provincial background becomes increasingly important, and the next generation of mentors have this background, then subsequent leaders are also likely to come from the provinces rather than from the Federal District. This is part of a decentralization trend arising from democratization. It remains to be seen, however, if this pattern is not just sustained, but increased. If the electoral process remains highly competitive, then mayoral, gubernatorial, and national legislative careers, all emphasizing geographic origins outside of Mexico's capital, will flourish.

NOTES

1. Lester G. Seligman, *Recruiting Political Elites* (New York: General Learning Press, 1971).
2. Kenneth Prewitt, *The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 13.
3. See Ralph Turner, "Sponsored and Contest Mobility and the School System," *American Sociological Review* 25 (December 1960): 855-56.
4. George W. Grayson, *A Guide to the November 7, 1999, PRI Presidential Primary* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1999).
5. For more detailed information about the recruitment characteristics of PAN and PRD members, see Roderic A. Camp, "The PAN's Social Bases: Implications for Leadership," in *Opposition Government in Mexico*, eds. Victoria Rodríguez and Peter M. Ward (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 65-80, and "The Opposition: An Alternative Path to Leadership?" in my *Political Recruitment Across Two Centuries, Mexico, 1884-1993* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), 194-215.
6. Roderic A. Camp, "Political Recruitment, Governance, and Leadership, Has Democracy Made a Difference," in *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*, ed. Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern (forthcoming).
7. Interview with Miguel de la Madrid, Mexico City, 1991.
8. See, for example, Richard Rose's statement that "the number of politicians from political families is disproportionately high in every Cabinet." *Politics in England: Change and Persistence*, 5th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989), 177. For the United States, see Alfred Clubok et al., "Family Relationships, Congressional

Recruitment, and Political Modernization," *Journal of Politics* 31 (November 1969): 1036.

9. See his *Familias, política y parentesco, Jalisco 1919-1991* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993).

10. Thomas R. Dye, *Who's Running America? Institutional Leadership in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 152; George K. Schueller, "The Politburo," in *World Revolutionary Elites*, ed. Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 141.

11. *México, mujeres latinoamericanas en cifras* (Santiago, Chile: Instituto de Mujeres, 1995), 93-103.

12. For excellent background information on women in Mexican national politics, see María Emilia Farías, "La participación de la mujer en la política," *México 75 años de revolución, desarrollo social* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1960), 693-816; Alicia Inés Martínez, "Políticas hacia la mujer en el México moderno," paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, 1994; Anna M. Fernández Poncela, "El reto de la política y la apuesta de las mujeres," *Este País*, January 1995, 2-4; "La mujer y el poder legislativo," *Foro Electoral* 1 (1991): 19-23; and "Participación social y política de la mujer en México," in *Participación política: Las mujeres en México al final del milenio* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1995). The best example of female recruitment from personal experience is Griselda Alvarez, *Cuesta Arriba* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992), 49.

13. *Diccionario biográfica del gobierno mexicano* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992), 1042, 1051, 1063.

14. Lisa Baldez, "Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 29 (May 2004): 249.

15. Mexico is well behind other Latin American countries in total average years of schooling, ranking among the median group at 5.0 and 4.8 years, respectively, for men and women. In some countries, such as Argentina, women are better educated than men. See *Statistics for Latin America and the Caribbean* (UNICEF, 1997), 40.

16. For an excellent discussion of women's civic participation and local government roles, see María Luisa Tarrés, "The Role of Women's Nongovernmental Organizations in Mexican Public Life," in *Women's Participation in Mexican Political Life*, ed. Victoria Rodríguez (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 131-45; and Alejandra Massolo, "Women in the Local Arena and Municipal Power," in *Women's Participation in Mexican Political Life*, ed. Victoria Rodríguez (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 193-203. Tarrés argues that if democracy becomes firmly entrenched, the prestige of NGOs, and their political importance, is likely to decline. I would argue, however, that civic participation is a significant ingredient in democratic political life, and therefore, one should witness the opposite pattern.

17. Roderic Ai Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

18. For an excellent description of this process, see Merilee S. Grindle, "Patrons and Clients in the Bureaucracy: Career Networks in Mexico," *Latin American Research Review* 12 (1977): 37-66.

19. Joy Langston, who has provided the most detailed examination of a *camarilla's* influence, reached a similar conclusion. See her "Sobrevivir y prosperar: una búsqueda de las causas de las facciones políticas intrarrégimen en México," *Política y Gobierno* 2, 2 (1995): 243-77.

20. Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone, *The Ruling Elites: Elite Theory, Power, and American Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 142.

21. This person, Fausto Alzate, was forced to resign in disgrace. He claimed to have received a Ph.D. from Harvard, where he did study but did not graduate. The same happened to José Córdoba, Salinas's chief of staff. Two other Zedillo cabinet members admitted that their master's degrees were incomplete.

22. Alfonso Galindo, "Education of Mexican Government Officials," *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, vol. 30, pt. 1 (Los Angeles: UCLA, 1992), 599.

23. See my chapter and the editors' introduction: "Technocracy a la Mexicana, Antecedent to Democracy," in *The Politics of Expertise in Latin America*, eds. Miguel Angel Centeno and Patricio Silva (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 196-213.

24. For detailed evidence of the formative role of U.S. higher education, see Roderic Ai Camp, *Mexico's Mandarins Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century*; Stephanie Golob, "Crossing the Line: Sovereignty, Integration, and the Free Trade Decisions of Mexico and Canada," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1997; and Sarab Babb, "Neoliberalism and the Rise of the New Money Doctors: The Globalization of Economic Expertise in Mexico," Paper presented at the National Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, September 1998.

25. Miguel Angel Centeno, *Democracy Within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 209; Juan D. Lindau, "Technocrats and Mexico's Political Elite," *Political Science Quarterly* 111, 2 (1996): 295-322, offers still another view.

26. Eduardo Torres Espinosa, *Bureaucracy and Politics in Mexico: the Case of the Secretariat of Programming and Budget* (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1999).