JEM212/165 International Political Economy

Lecturers:

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Date & place: Lectures: Thursday 17:00 – 18:20, Jinonice, C122

Seminar sessions: selected odd weeks, Friday 14:00-15:20, Jinonice B103B

Presentations will be taking place on selected Thursday evenings.

MOODLE course name: JEM212/JEM165 International Political Economy

MOODLE link: https://dl1.cuni.cz/course/view.php?id=5158

MOODLE password: provided at the lectures (distributed by email to registered students).

1. Course Objectives

The class aims to provide students with a basic introduction to the "international political economy" (IPE) field. The course is based on the active participation of students who are required to read compulsory literature for each class and debate the papers. The course relies on two streams of literature: academic literature (papers and textbooks) and topical articles/papers covering current policy issues (e.g. The Economist, Foreign Affairs, Policy Briefs). The goal of this approach to literature is to use IPE research as guidance in real-world policy debates that help us understand actual (and often opposing) positions of policymakers.

The main "applied" or policy focus of the course is on the debates associated with recent changes in the global economy, attitudes of main actors (USA, China, EU) and possible causes of the changes. We will try to understand the economic dimensions of current global trends and their possible implications for the future of global economic governance.

Within the broad scope of traditional IPE topics we are going to focus more on issues closer to traditional economics, and rational choice approaches, i.e. the course is focused more on concepts and models rather than on memorising institutional details of current or previous global economic affairs. In line with the focus of current global affairs and with the specialisation of the lecturers, we will primarily focus on issues linked with international trade and globalization.

After passing this course, the students should be able to answer the following questions:

1) How does the IPE differ from international trade/finance, from traditional economics or from geopolitics?
2) What are the main group and individual interests which influence the formation of policies and how are the transformed/aggregated into actual policies?
3) How has the global trade framework based on GATT/WTO come into existence? What could replace it?

4) How has the relationship between states, influential companies (multinationals, national champions) developed during the last decades? Who has the actual power?
5) What do we know about the factors and interests that influence a country's decisions about their monetary arrangements (own currency or Euro, fixed or floating exchange rate)?
6) How and why we can fail to prevent significant crises (e.g. the global financial crisis of 2008/9)?

2. Literature

Each lecture will be linked with several two types of literature: compulsory and supplementary sources. There are two main textbooks which provide wider and traditional coverage of topics typical for the IPE.

- Broome A. (2014) *Issues and Actors in the Global Political Economy*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ravenhill J. (2014 or 2017) *Global Political Economy.* Oxford University Press

Alternatively, you can also try: Oatley A. (2016) *International Political Economy*

Reading the whole textbooks is not mandatory (if not otherwise explicitly stated), in fact, given relatively limited space and the plethora of IPE perspectives we will not be covering all the included topics/approaches in detail. However, the lectures are always reflecting specific textbook chapters and having access to the textbooks will be useful. Therefore, they are the main source for a better understanding of the lectures and debated topics.

Another good source of interesting papers (introductory but also advanced) is:

- Weingast, B. R. and Wittman, D. (2008). *The Oxford handbook of political economy*. Oxford University Press.

If you are interested in the history of global economic relations (and if you want to get some insight into these topics) in a rather readable form, we can recommend the following texts:

- Bernstein, W.J. (2008). *A Splendid Exchange – How Trade Shaped the World.* Atlantic Monthly Press, New York
- Frankopan P. (2015) *The Silk Roads – A New History of the World*. Bloomsbury

If you want to get an interesting insight into the geopolitical level of related arguments, we recommend:

- Marshall, T. (2016): *Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Explain Everything About the World*

These three texts are not compulsory, but individual chapters may be assigned as reading for assignments/debates.

We would also like to encourage you to read sources such as *Foreign Affairs* journal for an up-to-date introduction to current debates in international relations and IPE.

3. Requirements

a) Overview

Each student is expected to write the final exam and to actively participate in two group assignments.

Activity	Maximum amount of points
Final Exam	70
Quizzes	10
Group Assignment I	10
Group Assignment II	10
Bonus Points	10

The final grade will be determined by the sum of all points which the student has gained throughout the semester according to this scale:

A = 100- 91
B = 90-81
C = 80-71
D = 70-61
E = 60-51
F = 50-0

The overall number of points is not the only criterion, there are also some additional constraints. In order to pass the course successfully, you should also:

- Achieve at least 25 points from the final exam.
- Participate in at least one group assignment (or if the group collaboration fails, in some alternative adequate activity).
- Avoid plagiarism.

Final Exam

The final exam covers lectures (the content of the lecture, discussion during the class) and also the compulsory literature. The maximum amount of points a student can get from the final exam is 70.

Quizzes

Starting from the second lecture you are expected to fill out a quick online quiz before the beginning of each lecture.

Group Assignments

Each student is assigned to a group. Each group is expected to submit two specific assignments focused on current policy debates. The groups should demonstrate that the members are able to apply IPE concepts to real policy problems. The first assignment will be sent to all groups in the middle of the course. The last two assignments will be presented at the end of the semester. All groups will be presenting the results of their work during three special classes devoted to the debate about the assignments.

The assignments will be evaluated according to the following criteria:
a) the logical structure of the arguments and quality of the content,
b) the language of the essay and
c) complying with the citation standards and the quality of the used sources.

The sources used for the assignments should be of high quality. Groups are encouraged to use academic papers, official reports of various bodies (governments, international organizations, NGOs), respected newspaper articles (Economists, Financial Times, etc.), data or any other reliable sources. Blog discussions, Wikipedia or other commentaries can be used for inspiration but they are regarded as low-quality sources. Relying too much on such sources (without treating them with proper caution) does not guarantee a high number of points.

a) Bonus Points

Students can gain additional 10 bonus points by active participation in the debate during the lectures. That means that a student actively participates in the class debate, have read the readings and debate them in the class, etc. If anybody had a point that he wanted to say but for different reasons could not or got the idea after the lecture, he can write it in e-mail form to the lecturer to get the bonus points. A student can get maximum one activity point per class. Students are encouraged to be active during the class while the bonus points can significantly improve the grade.

b) Free-rider problem

We are well aware of the fact that issues such as free-riding can appear during your group work (e.g. non-cooperative group members doing "nothing" and receiving a grade for the work of others). If this happens, please, follow our recommended procedure that we can handle the issue effectively.

1) Inform the free-rider via email (there must be evidence of the conversation) that you demand his active cooperation. Describe the amount of work necessary for the assignment, the division of labour within the group and, therefore his duties.
2) If he still does not increase his activity to a sufficient level, please inform us and forward us your mutual communication proving his unfulfilled duties. There must be, of course, evidence about the division of labour, therefore, we recommend you always to inform each other about your mutual duties via email.
3) If the evidence is conclusive, then we take adequate action (=no points for free-rider).

4. Course structure

Short Summary

No.	Topic	Date	Lecturer
1	Introduction to IPE: Theoretical Perspectives, Main Actors and Short History of Global Economy	February 19	VS
2	The International Political Economy of Taxation: From Profit Shifting to Global Tax Reform	February 26	TB
3	Cooperation and Conflicts, New x Old Superpowers	March 5	VS
4	World Trade System, International Trade Cooperation	March 12	VS
5	Trade Regimes and Regional Cooperation, PTAs and RTAs	March 19	VS
6	Weaponized Interdependence and Economic Coercion	March 26	VS
7	Dean's day	April 2	
8	Political Economy of Development	April 9	MP
9	Globalization in Retreat? States, Multinationals, and the Return of Power Politics in the Era of Neo-Royalism	April 16	TB
10	Corruption in International Economy: Its Regulation and Natural Resource Curse	April 23	MP
11	Oligarchization and State Capture	April 30	TB
12	International Monetary Relations	May 7	VS
13	Global Financial Networks and Alternative Systems	May 14	VS
	Seminars		
1	History of global economy	February 20	VS
2	Tax Havens	March 6	TB
3	Trade policy formation	March 20	VS
	Great Friday	April 3	
4	**Assignment #1: Presentations and discussion**	**April 17**	MP/VS/TB

	Holiday	May 1	
5	**Assignment #2: Presentations and discussion**	**May 15**	MP/VS/TB

Detailed Description

1) Introduction to IPE: Theoretical Perspectives, Main Actors and Focus (February 19th)

The first lecture represents brief introduction into the IPE discipline. We cover main theoretical approaches to IPE, position of IPE within social sciences and main actors that are discussed within the discipline. The lecture will also provide a brief introduction to the historical development of global economy (this topic will be the subject of the first seminar session on February 18th).

Compulsory literature

Broome (2014), CH 1

Supplementary literature

Textbooks

Broome (2014), CH 2-6

Ravenhill (2014), CH 1-2

Papers and other sources

The Maddison-Project (https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2018, 2018 version)

Bolt, J., & Zanden, J. L. (2014). The Maddison Project: collaborative research on historical national accounts. *The Economic History Review*, *67*(3), 627-651.

Fouquin, M., & Hugot, J. (2016). Back to the Future: International Trade Costs and the Two Globalizations. *CEPII Document de travail*, (2016-13).

Harley, C. K. (1988). Ocean freight rates and productivity, 1740–1913: the primacy of mechanical invention reaffirmed. *The Journal of Economic History*, *48*(04), 851-876.

Lampe, M. (2009). Effects of Bilateralism and the MFN Clause on International Trade: Evidence for the Cobden-Chevalier Network, 1860-1875. *The Journal of Economic History*, *69*(04), 1012-1040.

Maddison, A. (1982). Economic epochs and their interpretation, Chapter 1 of Phases of Capitalist Development, Oxford University Press.

Mandeville, B. (1988). *The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Public Benefits*, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/846

2) The International Political Economy of Taxation: From Profit Shifting to Global Tax Reform (February 26th)

The ability of multinational corporations to shift profits and relocate taxable income to low-tax jurisdictions has reshaped global economic relations and intensified political conflict between developed and developing countries over who gets to tax what. This lecture examines the role of tax havens in the international system and what empirical evidence tells us about the scale and mechanisms of profit shifting. We will then move to the political economy of the current global corporate tax reforms, focusing on competing global initiatives such as the OECD/G20 BEPS process and the Global Minimum Tax (Pillar II), as well as the emerging UN agenda on international tax cooperation (UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation). Finally, we will discuss why eliminating tax havens seems very easy on paper, but politically and institutionally difficult, and how different country groups—advanced economies, developing countries, and offshore financial centres—strategically position themselves in global tax negotiations.

Compulsory literature

Dagan, T. (2024). Substantive tax sovereignty under globalization. *Tilburg Law Review*, *29*(3).

Hearson, M., Christensen, R. C., & Randriamanalina, T. (2023). Developing influence: the power of 'the rest'in global tax governance. *Review of International Political Economy*, *30*(3), 841-864.

Supplementary literature

Shaxson, N. (2018): How to crack down on tax havens. Foreign Affairs, March/April 2018.

Rixen, T. (2008) The Political Economy of International Tax Governance. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230582651.

Rixen, T. (2011) "From double tax avoidance to tax competition: Explaining the institutional trajectory of international tax governance," Review of International Political Economy, 18(2), pp. 197–227. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2010.481921.

US Treasury (2025) "G7 Statement on Global Minimum Tax." Available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0181.

Tørsløv, T., Wier, L., & Zucman, G. (2023). The missing profits of nations. The Review of Economic Studies, 90(3), 1499-1534.

Hakelberg, Lukas (2020) "The Hypocritical Hegemon: How the United States Shapes Global Rules against Tax Evasion and Avoidance." Available at: https://doi.org/10.7298/HPY3-6T90. (longer read)

3) Cooperation and Conflicts, New x Old Superpowers (March 5th)

We focus on the literature investigating the reasons behind cooperation and conflicts between actors. The establishment of international institutions (and organizations) as a potential solution of conflicting interests will be investigated.

In the area of current policy issues, we will focus on the attempts of China to revise international institutional order based on Bretton Wood. We will be also discussing historical examples of similar conflicts (ranging from the popular concept of Thucydides Trap-like interpretation of Peloponnesian

Wars to e.g. Europe and Middle East in the second half of 19th century) and compare them with current situation in global economy.

Compulsory literature

Ravenhill (2014), Chapter 3

Bell, S. R., & Long, A. G. (2016). Trade Interdependence and the Use of Force: Do Issues Matter? International Interactions, 42(5), 750-773.

Foreign Affairs (2017/2). China and the World

J. S. Nye (2017): Will the Liberal Order Survive? Foreign Affairs January/February 2017, Volume 96, Number 1

Haas, R. (2019): How a World Order Ends. And What Comes in Its Wake. Foreign Affairs, February 2019

Supplementary literature

Textbooks

Ravenhill (2014), CH 4

Papers and other sources

Kotkin, S. (2018). Realist World. The Players Change but the Game Remains. Foreign Affairs, August 2018

Deudney, D., Ikenberry, G.J. (2018). Liberal World. The Resilient Order. Foreign Affairs, August 2018

Brewster, R. (2014). The Domestic and International Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. *Chicago Journal of International Law*, *15*(1), 84–109.

Cavallo, E., Powell, A., Pedemonte, M., & Tavella, P. (2015). A new taxonomy of Sudden Stops: Which Sudden Stops should countries be most concerned about? *Journal of International Money and Finance*, *51*, 47-70.

Foreign Affairs (2017/2 and 2017/1)

Schneider, G. (2014). Peace through globalization and capitalism? Prospects of two liberal propositions. *Journal of Peace Research*, *51*(2), 173-183.

Rose, G. (2018): The Fourth Founding. The United States and the Liberal Order. Foreign Affairs, February 2019

Current policy debates

China and international institutional order. Trump´s politics to China.

4) World Trade System, International Trade Cooperation (March 12th)

The lecture will primarily investigate the rationale behind the contemporary trend of trade protectionism (probably most visible proponent is the current US president Donald Trump). We will cover the main arguments in favour of trade liberalization and also protectionism. Special attention will be devoted to the arguments of D. Rodrick. In the policy area we will discuss the revision of US trade policy done by Donald Trump.

Compulsory literature

The Economist – Special Report on Liberalization of Trade (2016)

Ostry, J. D., Loungani, P., & Furceri, D. (2016). Neoliberalism: oversold. *Finance & Development*, *53*(2), 38-41.

Rodrik, D. (2011). *The globalization paradox: democracy and the future of the world economy*. WW Norton & Company. CH 3

Supplementary literature

Broome (2014), CH 15, 16

E. Helpman: Understanding Global Trade. Belknap Press 2011

Kletzer, L. G. (1998). Job displacement. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, *12*(1), 115-136.

Kletzer, L. G. (2004). Trade-related Job Loss and Wage Insurance: a Synthetic Review. *Review of International Economics*, *12*(5), 724-748.

Krugman, P. R. (2008). Trade and wages, reconsidered. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, *2008*(1), 103-154.

Hakobyan, S., & McLaren, J. (2016). Looking for local labor market effects of NAFTA. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, *98*(4), 728-741.

Lake, J., & Millimet, D. L. (2016). An empirical analysis of trade-related redistribution and the political viability of free trade. *Journal of International Economics*, *99*, 156-178.

Current debates

Current US trade policy

5) Trade Regimes and Regional Cooperation, PTAs and RTAs (March 19th)

The lecture is devoted to the political economy of trade regime. We will investigate the economic reasons behind free trade and track the historical development of the international trade regime (from GATT to WTO). The class will compare the international regime (WTO) to the approach based on conclusions of bilateral or regional trade agreements (RTA). We will discuss economic effects of both positions. In policy debates we will discuss also the TTIP and domestic limits of the RTAs.

Compulsory literature

Rodrik (2018): What Do Trade Agreements Really Do? Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 32, Number 2—Spring 2018—Pages 73–90

Supplementary literature

Ravenhill (2014), CH 5-6

J. Bhagwati: Termites in the Trading System. A CFR Book. Oxford University, July 2008

Dürr, Baccini, Elsig (2013): The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset. Rev Int Organ (2014) 9:353–375

Current policy debates

USA and plans for special deals with China and the EU
The future of trade relations between the EU and the UK

6) Weaponized Interdependence and Economic Coercion (March 26th)

The lecture and discussion will focus on the latest trends such as rising economic nationalism, and on the use of national economic power in global affairs. We will start with more traditional trade sanctions and then we will move on the financial sanctions which has become so popular recently. We will discuss their possible side-effects on the future of international trade and monetary system too.

Compulsory literature

Drezner (2015): Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance. International Interactions, 41:755–764, 2015

Supplementary literature

Chen & Garcia (2016): Economic sanctions and trade diplomacy: Sanction-busting strategies, market distortion and efficacy of China's restrictions on Norwegian salmon imports

Compulsory literature

Will be updated.

Supplementary literature

Will be updated.

7) Dean's day (April 2nd)

8) Political Economy of Development (April 9th)

The lecture will focus on the economic theory of development elaborated by D. Acemoglu. We will debate the role of institutions and also the effectiveness of foreign aid. We will also touch the differences in approaches to foreign aid of China and EU while the foreign aid policies will be related to the work of D. Acemoglu.

Compulsory literature

Dreher, A., & Fuchs, A. (2015). Rogue aid? An empirical analysis of China's aid allocation. *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique*, *48*(3), 988-1023.

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Paths of economic and political development. In *The Oxford handbook of political economy*.

Supplementary literature

Bader, J., & Faust, J. (2014). Foreign aid, democratization, and autocratic survival. *International Studies Review*, *16*(4), 575-595.

Bigsten, A., & Tengstam, S. (2015). International coordination and the effectiveness of aid. *World Development*, *69*, 75-85.

Del Biondo, K. (2015). Donor interests or developmental performance? Explaining sanctions in EU democracy promotion in sub-Saharan Africa. *World Development*, *75*, 74-84.

Broich, T. (2017). *Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa* (No. 011). United Nations University-Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).

Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P., & Thiele, R. (2011). Are 'new'donors different? Comparing the allocation of bilateral aid between nonDAC and DAC donor countries. *World Development*, *39*(11), 1950-1968.

Koch, S. (2015). A typology of political conditionality beyond aid: conceptual horizons based on lessons from the European Union. *World Development*, *75*, 97-108.

Molenaers, N., Dellepiane, S., & Faust, J. (2015). Political conditionality and foreign aid. *World Development*, *75*, 2-12.

Yuichi Kono, D., & Montinola, G. R. (2009). Does foreign aid support autocrats, democrats, or both?. *The Journal of Politics*, *71*(2), 704-718.

Current debates

Foreign aid policies of China and EU.

9) Globalization in Retreat? States, Multinationals, and the Return of Power Politics in the Era of Neo-Royalism (April 16th)

For decades, debates in international political economy were shaped by the assumption that globalization was steadily constraining the power of nation-states, pushing the world toward deeper economic integration. Recent political shocks—from Brexit to the return of Trump-style nationalism—already challenged this narrative, but current developments suggest an even sharper turn: globalization is increasingly being reshaped by strategic rivalry, coercive diplomacy, and the weaponization of trade, finance, and technology. In this lecture, we move beyond the classic globalization debate and examine the emerging international order through the lens of "gunboat capitalism" and neo-royalism, where international politics becomes more transactional and increasingly structured by elite networks rather than stable liberal rules or purely Westphalian state competition. We will also touch upon topics of the Chinese state-owned enterprises and the similar development in the US, where we can observe growing entanglement between U.S. political

leadership and key firms in critical industries, such as semiconductors and AI (e.g., NVIDIA), illustrating how corporate power and state power are becoming deeply intertwined.

Compulsory literature

Goddard, S. E., & Newman, A. (2025). Further Back to the Future: Neo-Royalism, the Trump Administration, and the Emerging International System. *International Organization*, *79*(S1), S12-S25.

The Economist. (2026, January 15). America's gunboat capitalism will make the world poorer. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/01/15/americas-gunboat-capitalism-will-make-the-world-poorer

Ravenhill (2014), CH 10 (The story 10 years back).

Supplementary literature

The story of globalisation

Ravenhill (2014), CH 14

Selected papers from the Foreign Affairs

OECD (2015) The Labour Share in G20-Economies

Current debates

The Chinese SOEs and the connections between the U.S. companies and the U.S. political leadership.

10) Corruption in International Economy: Its Regulation and Natural Resource Curse (April 23rd)

The lecture debates two main topics: a) corruption in international transactions and its regulation and b) natural resource curse and its relation to corruption and governance quality. We focus on efficiency of anti-corruption laws against bribery abroad and debate actual intentions of contemporary US government to partially repeal one of the "anti-corruption" acts. We cover the impacts of natural resource abundance on governance indicators while also debating the position of oil countries in Middle East.

Compulsory literature

Busse, M., & Gröning, S. (2013). The resource curse revisited: governance and natural resources. *Public choice*, *154*(1-2), 1-20.

Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2008). The effectiveness of laws against bribery abroad. *Journal of International Business Studies*, *39*(4), 634-651.

Selected papers from Foreign Affairs

Supplementary literature

Egger, P., & Winner, H. (2005). Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment. *European journal of political economy*, *21*(4), 932-952.

Frankel, J. A. (2010). *The natural resource curse: a survey* (No. w15836). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Jeong, Y., & Weiner, R. J. (2012). Who bribes? Evidence from the United Nations' oil-for-food program. *Strategic Management Journal*, *33*(12), 1363-1383.

Kaufmann, D. (1997). Corruption: the facts. *Foreign policy*, 114-131.

Pérez, M. F., Brada, J. C., & Drabek, Z. (2012). Illicit money flows as motives for FDI. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, *40*(1), 108-126.

Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). The curse of natural resources. *European economic review*, *45*(4), 827-838.

Current debates

Repeal of the Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank Act by D. Trump; OECD anti-bribery convention.

11) Oligarchization and State Capture (April 30th)

This lecture examines how political and economic institutions evolve when power becomes concentrated in the hands of elites (following Lecture 8 and 9), and why institutional reform often fails to produce real change. Building on Acemoglu and Robinson's distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* political power, we will discuss why political transitions—such as democratization—do not necessarily lead to more inclusive economic institutions, and why unequal distributions of power tend to persist over time. We will then introduce the "new comparative economics" framework (Djankov et al.), focusing on the fundamental trade-off between disorder and dictatorship and how institutional choices depend on a society's broader constraints. Finally, we will explore state capture through the case of Tunisia under Ben Ali, where politically connected firms gained systematic advantages through regulation, market entry restrictions, and preferential treatment.

Current debates

Based on the lecture what should concern us about oligarchization, surveillance capitalism, and the growing entanglement between political power and large corporate actors.

Compulsory literature

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). De facto political power and institutional persistence. American economic review, 96(2), 325-330.

Rijkers, B., Baghdadi, L., & Raballand, G. (2017). Political connections and tariff evasion evidence from Tunisia. The World Bank Economic Review, 31(2), 459-482.

Supplementary literature

Johnson, S., & Acemoglu, D. (2023). Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity.

Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003). The new comparative economics. Journal of comparative economics, 31(4), 595-619.

12) International Monetary Relations (May 7th)

This lecture maps basic relationships and interests behind monetary decisions, with the focus on exchange rate regimes (should a country have own currency, and if yes, should it prefer floating or pegged exchange rates) and the logic of the development of the International Monetary System.

Compulsory literature

Ravenhill (2014), CH 7

Cecchetti, S.G. and K.L. Schoenholtz (2016). Money, banking and financial markets. New York: McGraw Hill Education. Excerpt from Chapter 19: Exchange-rate policy and central bank, pp. 536 - 547.

Broz & Frieden (2001): The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2001. 4:317–43

Supplementary literature

Eichengreen & Lombardi (2015): RMBI or RMBR? Is the Renminbi Destined to Become a Global or Regional Currency? NBER working paper 21716/2015

13) Global Financial Networks and Alternative Systems (May 14th)

Compulsory literature

Will be updated.

Supplementary literature

Will be updated.

14) Reports I: Class Debate (1st Topic) (April 17th)

The groups will present and debate the results of their first assignment.

15) Reports II: Class Debate (2nd Topic) (May 15th)

The groups will present and debate the results of their second assignment.