

## *Neil Kinnock and Robert Maxwell: how Kinnock changed his perception when Maxwell looked to the Mirror*

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In 1984, the leader of the UK's Labour Party, Neil Kinnock, was caught in a dilemma. He supported the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, a Left pressure group committed to press democracy. But he knew he needed the backing of the one daily title that had provided consistent support and representation of the views of the Labour Party, the *Daily Mirror*. And now his closest political allies were telling him that for this to continue he had to support Robert Maxwell, the latest would-be media autocrat who was bidding to take over the paper. What was he to do?

This article discusses how the British Labour Party's leadership opposed and then reluctantly welcomed the takeover in 1984 of the *Daily Mirror* and its sister papers. It considers the significance of this decision by detailing the history of the *Mirror's* ownership and the particular importance of the paper not having a single proprietor for 50 years. It briefly outlines the position of Kinnock and Labour on journalistic autonomy in the press prior to the Maxwell takeover. By outlining evidence from Neil Kinnock's private papers, it details the secret negotiations held between Kinnock and the *Mirror* staff in their bid to oppose Maxwell. It also considers how Maxwell intervened and why Kinnock had limited choice but to welcome this 'monster', in order to maintain newspaper support for the Labour Party.

### **Maxwell and the Previous 50 Years**

The influence of Maxwell on Labour Party policy has been a matter of controversy. Some of the biographers closest to him have regarded his effect on the party as negligible. Maxwell's former editor Roy Greenslade is typical. Greenslade distanced the Labour leadership from Maxwell in his biography written after the publisher's apparent suicide. Generally, Greenslade makes Maxwell out to be a Walter Mitty figure—a posturing buffoon. He disputes claims that the former Labour MP was a party paymaster; a prestigious figure; or a backroom wielder of influence. Indeed, Greenslade notes that the personal relations between Maxwell and the Kinnocks were not warm. His relationship with Neil Kinnock was one of '... polite cordiality in public ...', which Kinnock's wife Glenys found hard to maintain. She detested the Maxwell 'monster'. Also, having Joe Haines as Maxwell's political advisor did not help relations, as Haines's role as press secretary to the out-of-favour former Labour leader, Harold Wilson, meant he was not regarded well in Kinnock circles [1]. Implicitly questioning Greenslade's assessment, the socialist writer Freedman argues that Maxwell was notable among media owners in his influence on the Labour leadership. But, as Freedman's is a study of television policies, in which Maxwell was far

less involved, he provides little supporting evidence regarding this [2]. So, which argument can be supported? Well, to some extent, both. There is evidence to suggest that Maxwell was a ridiculous figure who was personally disliked. James Thomas has shown that Maxwell had misplaced illusions regarding his influence over the *Mirror* [3].

Yet, there is some evidence to suggest that in the process of getting hold of the newspaper group, Maxwell's *very existence* forced Kinnock to change commitments to journalistic autonomy from proprietor control that the leader had held—in order to gain Labour representation. Evidence suggests Maxwell's pressure on Kinnock meant that the Labour leader was prepared to consciously revise his own position after initially demanding that no single proprietor could own the *Daily Mirror*.

Why was this important? For many businesses, including some press firms, it can be argued that the demand for a single proprietor would not be effectively vital. In large corporations, even where there are a huge number of shareholders, a concentrated minority can have control. A small number of shareholders can combine with managers and directors, often with significant shareholdings, to control companies [4]. As Ralph Negrine argues with regard to newspapers, even if there is not the basis for a generalized statement of a relationship, ownership does give the potential for control [5].

Nevertheless, the notion that the diffusion of shareholding gave the potential for autonomy of control from majority shareholders was a well-known one in the Labour Party. The view that professional managerial control had become divorced from ownership was associated with the post-war revisionist wave and identified with Tony Crosland. Crosland argued that such managers had different interests than the profit-seeking owner of old [6]. This *Managerial Revolution* saw managers as a separate class, from the 'capitalists proper', not dependent on private ownership [7]. In newspaper businesses, there are examples of chief executives who have acted like proprietors without having a controlling interest [8]. There was, also, at least the potential that editors and even senior journalists could maintain a level of autonomy from majority shareholder control.

In the case of the *Daily Mirror*, for 50 years before the Maxwell takeover, there had been no single proprietor. Lord Northcliffe (Alfred Harmsworth) had launched the paper in 1903 and he sold his holdings to his brother, Harold, Lord Rothermere in 1914 [9]. In 1931, Lord Rothermere traded his shares in the *Daily Mirror* to individual shareholders [10]. As Winston Churchill found out when he had the title's ownership investigated in 1942, this entailed a sizeable number of investors [11].

Henry Bartholomew was appointed editorial director in 1934 and later became Mirror Group chairman [12]. However, the Harmsworth link continued through Rothermere's nephew, Cecil King. He became chairman of Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd in 1951, after Bartholomew was forced out [13]. One of the reasons why it was possible to oust Bartholomew was that he had no personal shareholdings—he was not the owner [14].

It is true that Cecil King operated as an old-style press baron. King made clear to the 1961 Royal Commission on the Press that policy decisions were made by himself and editorial director Hugh Cudlipp, as two of the directors. Cudlipp then conveyed the line to the editors [15]. King became chairman of the new holding company, the International Publishing Company (IPC), after the buy-out of Odhams Press [16].

Yet, in May 1968, King famously penned an editorial calling for Harold Wilson's resignation. This fatal act encapsulated both sides of the position he held. His power meant that the editors were only asked their opinion of the article after its publication. But King's weakness was that, again, he was not the owner, but the chairman, responsible to directors, who sacked him [17]. In 1968, Cudlipp replaced him.

In 1970, IPC merged with Reed to form Reed International [18]. After Cudlipp quit,

Alex Jarratt became the new head of IPC and then Reed International [19]. Tony Miles moved from being the *Daily Mirror*'s editor to become editorial director and later became Mirror Group chairman [20].

There was a large level of autonomy from Reed. The chairman did not solely take policy decisions. As the Royal Commission on the Press was told in 1975: 'There was a time when the Group's central policy was imposed by the Chairman. This is no longer the case. The Chairman behaves towards editors like a constitutional monarch. He may encourage and warn' [21]. Instead, a five-person team including senior journalists, Miles and the editor Mike Molloy decided political policy. This was '... engrained in the character of the paper', according to one of the five, industrial editor Geoffrey Goodman [22]. The editor's job was '... more of a consensus position than an arbitrary dictatorship ...' where the paper's political stance came '... more from editorial consensus than any single person's directive', the Mirror Group informed the Royal commission [23].

This was very far from journalistic control or democratic control. Yet, it was a degree of autonomy, which went beyond being held by a single editor, leading to some collective decision making. As Goodman indicated: 'It was a more democratic situation, which led to informed discussion and debate' [24]. The late Marxist *Daily Mirror* columnist Paul Foot agreed with the assessment that there was a measure of journalistic autonomy at this time. It was believed that not having a single proprietor would protect this: 'The argument was that if there was a single buyer it would be damaging to the freedom of the press' [25].

### **Kinnock and Labour on Journalistic Autonomy and Press Representation**

Within a year of taking over the party leadership in 1983, Neil Kinnock rejoined the media trade union and activist movement, the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom (CPBF) [26]. This was a public act, yet one which was seemingly little publicized. The campaign's main thrust was to increase media diversity. Nonetheless, one freedom that the group had campaigned for, in its short history, was the autonomy of media employees from their employers. A movement for increased democratic control by employees, the Institute for Workers' Control, had help spawn the campaign. The CPBF had battled for press accountability to its employees as well as the wider reading public. When Kinnock rejoined, he explicitly and robustly endorsed the organization's aims, writing: 'I strongly believe that Britain's press needs to be more open, more diverse and more accountable' [27].

In writing this, Kinnock was reflecting a body of thought within the Labour Party at the time, which had been translated into policy. It broadly reflected the CPBF's somewhat more radical position, in going beyond calling for journalist autonomy to demand press accountability to its workers and the wider public.

The broader question of employees' democratic involvement in industry had excited some Western European social democratic parties in the 1970s, as part of the New Left upsurge [28]. This had been reflected in British Labour Party policy [29]. There was generalized support for journalist democratic involvement in the press in Labour's groundbreaking study *People and the Media* in 1974 [30]. Support for workforce participation in new newspaper initiatives became Labour Party policy as early as 1975 [31]. The Labour *government* effectively shelved the demands for journalist autonomy made by a 1977 Royal Commission on the Press [32]. But the Labour *Party* promoted the commission's Minority Report, co-written by the senior *Daily Mirror* journalist, Goodman, which went further than the commission in its demands for journalistic control [33]. Out of office in 1979, Labour had backed participation by media workers in the press,

although this had not translated into manifesto policy by 1983 [34]. However, after the election defeat, the party conference again agreed to push this demand [35].

The policy commitments on autonomy were very generalized, nevertheless. Internal discussion on the question of media worker control and its relationship to wider public press accountability, let alone that of journalist autonomy, had been unspecific [36]. The discussions, as they stood, reflected the tensions that New Left ideas had had on social democratic public service conceptions in the party's thinking on press democratic control [37]. But a more particular tension in implementing policy was between the party's press ownership policy and Labour Party representation in the press. The motivation for many in the party in pursuing an interventionist policy was that the press was 'biased against Labour'—it was not fairly represented in the press. Speakers addressing the 1983 party conference resolution repeatedly voiced this concern, referring to the treatment the party had received in the election. It was reflected in the policy agreed that went far further than the election manifesto to attempt to restructure the press [38].

Yet, in this period, those at the highest level were also concerned that any action would provoke even further press owner hostility [39]. In seeking to maintain any sort of Labour representation in the press, the role of the one Labour-supporting national daily, the *Daily Mirror* was key.

Labour had already experienced Maxwell's challenge to journalistic control and autonomy, in its one foray into implementing practically the policy of journalist democracy it had adopted. The previous Labour government had given financial backing to a '... Britain's first worker-controlled, mass circulation daily newspaper ...'—the ill-fated *Scottish Daily News*, in 1974 [40]. This was financed under the auspices of the Department of Industry and the National Enterprise Board, presided over at the time by Left leader Tony Benn [41]. The rest of the cash came from the workers' own redundancy money, public subscription and from Maxwell [42]. For the first 2 months, the *News* ran on cooperative lines. It was a beacon of light for those who saw most British newspapers as being dominated by autocratic management. But after this short interlude, the former Labour MP-turned business magnate came to dominate the inexperienced cooperative, despite some opposition. After the project encountered financial difficulties, he took control [43]. The paper limped on, but, within months, it had ceased production [44].

Although Maxwell's domination was not the only reason the venture failed, his management compounded mistakes already made [45]. When problems worsened, despite claiming he would save the title, Maxwell instead offered to buy the building and plant in order to set up his own non-cooperative newspaper [46]. As a book which chronicled the newspaper's demise put it:

... [O]ne thing at least can be said with utter confidence—the intervention of Maxwell in the *Scottish Daily News* effectively ruined the project as a test-bed for new industrial relations in the newspaper industry, or in industry in general. [47]

So, Labour had bitter experience of Maxwell's newspaper ownership, which its new leader in 1983 seemed to wish not to repeat.

### **Maxwell in the *Mirror*: the takeover**

The circumstances surrounding the Labour Party's involvement in the takeover of MGN are generally well known. According to Tom Bower, Maxwell's most famous biographer, the former MP had seduced the Labour leadership in July 1984 [48]. To assess this further, however, we need to start 9 months earlier. Reed International announced in

October 1983 around the time Kinnock became leader, that it wished to float independently the company that possessed the *Daily Mirror*, and its sister papers the *Sunday Mirror*, *Daily Record* and *Sunday Mail*. Reed originally accepted refusing to sell to a single owner and affirmed that the paper would stay Labour-supporting. As Bower suggests, it was crucial for Maxwell to get the Labour leader's support if Reed was to break the first part of this pledge [49].

Within weeks of his election, Kinnock had secret discussions with the title's then editor Mike Molloy. The outcome was that the contents of a then confidential letter were approved. This, it was agreed, would only appear in the *Daily Mirror* at the time when the new chairman of MGN was known. It appears to have never been published anywhere. The letter was much more hard-hitting than what was eventually Kinnock's public position. It underlined his original determination to preserve both journalistic autonomy within the *Daily Mirror* and also concerns about business diversification into newspaper ownership [50]. After 1979, Labour had strongly reiterated anxieties expressed in Labour Party documents, going back as far as 1922, about diversified ownership by corporations. Businesses were diversifying into newspaper ownership and Labour members saw this as one more barrier to the democratic functioning of society. The fear was that ownership by wider business interests could threaten editorial inquiry into those broader areas [51].

In Kinnock's remarkable letter, he wrote of his '... concern over the proposed sale'. He feared the sale would lead to one single owner with other business interests taking over control—just the sort of figure Maxwell was. He noted that: 'Without a free and fearless press, there can be no true democracy. But a free press is no abstract idea. It means freedom, every day, from an owner's interference.' In heated tones, he announced:

It would be an outrage if the proposed sale left the *Mirror* open—if not today, then in future years—to a takeover by those who would curb your independence and try to make you obedient to the discipline of some big business vested interest. [52]

This was not a one-off gesture by Kinnock, who had strongly expressed his concerns to others that he was unhappy about a Maxwell buyout. According to Paul Foot: 'He really was unhappy about Maxwell. I met Kinnock and Glenys and we discussed it and he saw Maxwell as disastrous. Neil was upset and disturbed' [53]. In the interim, negotiations had taken place about securing the papers as a trust with union backing, organized by Clive Thornton, who Reed had originally appointed to oversee the sale. However, Reed scuppered these talks [54]. At another meeting arranged in July 1984, after Maxwell made approaches to buy, Kinnock's private papers indicate he again committed the party to blocking any single proprietor. Sole ownership was what Maxwell wanted.

Kinnock told the *Mirror's* editor Mike Molloy and chairman Miles that he was committed to opposing having a single owner as the best way of safeguarding the paper's independence. According to notes made by Kinnock's press secretary, Patricia Hewitt, he told the *Mirror* men: 'We want to see a diverse ownership. That's the best way of safeguarding your independence' [55]. By now, however, he had not closed the door to accepting Maxwell as one among a number of shareholders. But this was a position Maxwell was unlikely to accept. As Goodman, who worked under Maxwell, suggested, the businessman wanted to take over as a single proprietor, not one of a number of shareholders: 'It was all or nothing' [56]. In response, the newspapermen were pleased with this seemingly unambiguous assurance, according to the notes. Miles told Kinnock: 'We couldn't ask for more, that would be fine ... Maxwell will be entirely unpredictable' [57].

Backbench Labour MPs also shared these fears about *Mirror* journalists losing their autonomy in the event of one person purchasing the paper. One thrusting, newly elected, MP put it thus: ‘... [O]ne must be concerned when newspapers are to be owned by an individual who gives unenforceable guarantees of independence’ [58]. That MP was the future Labour leader Tony Blair, who would later deal with proprietors, while ignoring calls for journalist autonomy legislation.

Nevertheless, this call for autonomy and independence appeared to dovetail with the narrower demand that the *Daily Mirror* remain a party-supporting paper. Kinnock’s original letter had a subtext, which reflected the tension between policies on ownership and concerns for Labour representation. Kinnock stated that one aspect of independence that should be protected was freedom ‘... from slavish devotion to a party line ...’ [59]. Yet, ‘... independence from big business ...’ could well also be taken as code for traditional Labour Party concerns about the pro-Tory bias of the national press. In other words, it should stick to its stance as a pro-Labour paper, as Reed had pledged [60].

This also reflected concerns of the senior, pro-Labour, *Mirror* people. At a later secret meeting, the *Mirror* men outlined their fears that support for Labour would wane if Maxwell took charge. Maxwell had recently praised Thatcher and they feared that, with his arrival, the Labour-supporting policy-making team, would exit. Mike Molloy told Kinnock: ‘We won’t turn somersaults. Maxwell could tell me to write an article saying Mrs Thatcher is the best Prime Minister. I won’t do that’ [61].

At the same time as this, Maxwell was mounting a counter-operation to persuade Kinnock. A trump card was his historical commitment, as a former Labour MP, to the party—satisfying the question of Labour representation. The former Labour leader, Michael Foot, was one go-between. Paul Foot suggested to the author that: ‘He was gung-ho about it. I think Uncle Michael was influenced by previously having Beaverbrook as a strong proprietor. He thought the *Mirror* had drifted’ [62]. Michael Foot later said that a motivation was that Maxwell ‘... promised that the papers would continue to support the party’. Fearing that in other hands the paper’s support for Labour would wither, Foot backed Maxwell [63]. Maxwell also enlisted the support of Roy Hattersley, now Labour’s deputy leader [64].

Yet, it is now clear that Maxwell also engaged in secret negotiations with Kinnock. Maxwell played on fears that Labour support would wither without him; assuring him that the paper would carry on supporting Labour. They spoke on the phone and, on 9 July 1984, Maxwell wrote a private letter telling Kinnock that if he did not have the leader’s backing, the papers’ ownership could be ‘... either wholly dispersed among City institutions or invested in some predator whose political sympathies are elsewhere’. Kinnock’s handwritten notes outline a conversation where it is said: ‘If you turn against me it will be widely interp. [interpreted?] in the country as an opp’y [opportunity?] missed.’ The same notes indicate that Maxwell was a party member, unlike the other ‘... proprietors—all Tories’ [65].

Kinnock now had an unenviable choice. He could maintain Labour’s support in Fleet Street, albeit on Maxwell’s terms as a single owner. Or he could provide some partial protection for the limited autonomy of the Labour-supporting senior journalists by siding with the *Mirror* journalists’ representatives’ opposition to the buyout. This second option had no guarantee of success and could end up scuppering the backing of Labour’s only long-term Fleet Street supporter. The requirement for Labour representation meant that despite the leader’s deep unease, he chose the former option [66].

Instead of intervening to stop the newspaper becoming a one-man band, he adopted a hands-off approach. He abandoned a press release implicitly critical of Maxwell [67].

When Maxwell took over, Kinnock's response was measured. On Friday the 13 July, with some understatement, Kinnock noted: 'The history of single-proprietor ownership of newspapers in Britain is not a happy one. Mr Maxwell could be the exception to the rule. Many people will join me in hoping that he will be' [68]. Maxwell had offered a guarantee that he would not interfere in the editorial judgement of the newspaper [69]. Yet, he ignored this commitment subsequently [70].

### Representation and *Realpolitik*

The shift in Kinnock's stance was clear. The existence of the millionaire businessman and the pressure of *realpolitik* had dictated the Labour leadership's policy, and had overridden Kinnock's principles on journalist autonomy. Labour representation was key. As Philip Graf, the retiring Chief Executive of Trinity Mirror, owners of the *Daily Mirror*, put it more recently: '... Maxwell would not have been a good enemy for the Labour leader to have made' [71]. In 1989, facing a Labour conference motion supporting the 'Pergamon 23'—employees Maxwell had sacked who had engaged in a legal one-day strike—Labour's general secretary Larry Whitty pleaded unsuccessfully for remittal. He implored reluctant delegates to recognize that Maxwell '... controlled a newspaper whose support the Labour Party is often grateful for ...' [72]. As Whitty had suggested and Hattersley wrote after Maxwell's death, to not have the *Daily Mirror*'s support for Labour would be a '... an intolerable psychological handicap' [73].

Contrary to the belief that Maxwell's influence on Labour was negligible, we have seen that Maxwell *directly* influenced the leader's press policy in the course of the takeover. The need to maintain a foothold in Fleet Street—ensuring that Labour was represented—meant that commitments were sacrificed. In this case, the pressure for Labour representation provided a tension with policies providing for journalistic autonomy. This was a tension that also operated in the Labour Party with regard to policies providing for structural reform of press ownership. It was a strain that had existed in relatively disguised form from at least the post-war period onwards. Renewed emphasis on political communications in the 1980s only exacerbated this tension.

Moreover, a general problem for Labour, as the case of the Maxwell takeover shows, is that the power of ownership in a market economy meant that even the Labour leader had limited choice and little control over the nature of Labour representation. There was no democratic control over that representation. Despite Kinnock's reluctance to accept Maxwell's ownership, Maxwell held all the cards and the Labour leader knew this. Paul Foot described Kinnock's dilemma well: 'There is no democratic process ... The only newspaper that supports Labour is sold on the marketplace and he is stuck' [74].

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### NOTES

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- [45] For different reasons see McKay and Barr; Neal Ascherson, *Newspapers and Internal Democracy* (London: Macmillan for the Acton Society Press Group, 1978), 135–36; Advertising Association, *Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Press* (27 October 1975), 8–10; Tony Benn, *Against the Tide: diaries, 1973–76* (London: Arrow Books, 1990), 226; *Labour Weekly* (2 August 1974); Stephen Kelly, 'Outlook is Grim for the "Miracle" Paper that Glasgow Workers Started', *Tribune* (17 October 1975); John Hodgman, 'A New Paper is Born' and 'NEC Ban on £200 Cheque Bounces', *Journalist* (April 1975).
- [46] Tom Gopsill, 'SDN Sinks', *Journalist* (October 1975); McKay and Barr, 155.

- [47] McKay and Barr, 120.
- [48] Tom Bower, *Maxwell: the final verdict* (London: HarperCollins, 1996), 371–72.
- [49] Tom Bower, *Maxwell: the outsider* (London: Aurum, 1998), 288.
- [50] Patricia Hewitt, Letter to Neil Kinnock (17 October 1983), Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives.
- [51] Labour Research Department, *The Press* (London: Labour Party, 1922), 47; Labour Party Conference, *Report of the Seventy-eighth Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Brighton, 1979, October 1–5* (London: The Party, 1979), 384; Labour Party, *Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party* (London: Labour Party, 1982), 240–42, RD 816; Tom Baistow, *Media Study Group Right of Reply Draft* (April 1981), RD 1027; Home Policy Committee Press and Publicity Committee, *The Right of Reply Draft NEC Statement* (August 1981), RD 1112; *Home Policy Committee Draft NEC Statement* (October 1981); National Executive Committee, *Statement by the National Executive Committee: the right of reply* (March 1982). For claims of this relating to the USA, see Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992) and S. Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: the political economy of the mass media* (London: Vintage, 1994), 4–14. For Britain, see James Curran and Jean Seaton, *Power without Responsibility: the press and broadcasting in Britain* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 82–83, and Graham Murdock and Peter Golding, 'Culture, Communications, and Political Economy', in James Curran and Michael Gurevitch, eds, *Mass Media and Society* (London: Arnold, 1996), 19–21.
- [52] Neil Kinnock, Letter to the editor of the *Daily Mirror* (17 October 1983), Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives.
- [53] Author interview with Paul Foot (6 January 2003). Geoffrey Goodman also told the author: 'Kinnock was very sceptical. He questioned having Maxwell' (author interview with Geoffrey Goodman, 2 January 2003).
- [54] Author interview with Geoffrey Goodman (2 January 2003); Tom Bower, *Maxwell: the final verdict* (London: HarperCollins, 1996), 364. 'Those committed to a diverse media were very horrified; there was a concern that Thornton wasn't given a chance. There was all this string-pulling by Maxwell' (author interview with Mike Power, then of the CPBF, now TUC campaigns officer, 6 January 2003).
- [55] Patricia Hewitt, Notes of meeting between Neil Kinnock and Tony Miles and Mike Molloy (5 July 1984), Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives. Patricia Hewitt was Kinnock's press secretary and then policy coordinator for the leader's office. She became Trade and Industry Minister in the Blair government (2002). *Who's Who 2002: an annual biographical dictionary* (London: A. & C. Black, 2002), 988.
- [56] Author interview with Geoffrey Goodman (2 January 2003).
- [57] Patricia Hewitt, Notes of meeting between Neil Kinnock and Tony Miles and Mike Molloy (5 July 1984), Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives.
- [58] HOC (13 July 1984), col. 1468.
- [59] Neil Kinnock, Letter to the editor of the *Daily Mirror* (17 October 1983), Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives.
- [60] Tom Bower, *Maxwell: the outsider* (London: Aurum, 1998), 281.
- [61] Patricia Hewitt, Notes of meeting between Neil Kinnock and Tony Miles and Mike Molloy (5 July 1984), Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives. As it happened, the fears of a Thatcherite agenda being imposed were largely unfounded (Thomas, 'The "Max Factor"', 213–14).
- [62] Author interview with Paul Foot (6 January 2003).
- [63] Quoted in Tom Bower, *Maxwell: the final verdict* (London: HarperCollins, 1996), 372. Foot also had discussions with Hattersley, Molloy and Geoffrey Goodman (Geoffrey Goodman, private correspondence with the author, 28 September 2002).
- [64] Tom Bower, *Maxwell: the final verdict* (London: HarperCollins, 1996), 371–72; *Free Press* 26 (November/December 1984); Greenslade, *Maxwell*, 63.
- [65] Handwritten note, no date, Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives.
- [66] Paul Foot put it: 'The instinct would be that Kinnock would have sold out ... and be first to go along with Maxwell. But he didn't. Then he was in a difficult position' (author interview with Paul Foot, 6 January 2003).
- [67] Neil Kinnock's Office, Press release (9 July 1984), Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives.
- [68] Neil Kinnock's Office, Press release (13 July 1984), Neil Kinnock's personal papers, Churchill Archives.
- [69] Tom Bower, *Maxwell: the outsider* (London: Aurum, 1998), 382; Thomas, 201.
- [70] How much effect this interference had is a subject of debate. As indicated, James Thomas suggests that Maxwell's political influence on the *Daily Mirror* was limited (Thomas, 201–26). Nevertheless, insider accounts indicate his interference was real enough. Greenslade identifies that leaders were even written in the paper without his knowledge as editor. And *Mirror* journalists Geoffrey Goodman and Paul Foot have both written of Maxwell's editorial interference. Greenslade has described Maxwell as '... the world's most

intrusive proprietor' who '... attempted to play engine driver, signaller and stationmaster'. Roy Greenslade, 'Sorry Arthur', *The Guardian* (27 May 2002); Roy Greenslade, *Press Gang* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2003), 512. See also Greenslade, *Maxwell*; Paul Foot, *Articles of Resistance* (London: Bookmarks, 2000), 222–23; Geoffrey Goodman, 'Pimps or Pimpernels', *British Journalism Review*, 11 (2000), 3–6.

- [71] Philip Graf, *The Government and the Press: an uneasy relationship* (Annual Livery Lecture, The Society of Editors, 3 April 2001).
- [72] Labour Party Conference, *Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party* (London: Labour Party, 1991), 91–92.
- [73] Roy Hattersley, 'Reflections on the Mirror', *Financial Times* (16 November 1991).
- [74] Author interview with Paul Foot (6 January 2003).

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