

German Foreign and Defense Policy Handbook: Personnel Changes, Institutional Dynamics, and New Directions in the Third Merkel Government (AICGS)

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
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German Foreign and Defense Policy Handbook: Personnel Changes, Institutional Dynamics, and New Directions in the Third Merkel Government	1
Federal Chancellery	5
Foreign Office.....	8
Ministry of Defense.....	15
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development	19
Bundestag Committees.....	23
Foreign and Defense Policy Initiatives and Priorities	27
Contributions to Crisis and Conflict Resolution	28
Status of foreign Deployments.....	30
Ukraine Crisis Threatens to Derail German Ostpolitik	35
European Integration and the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy.....	38
Transatlantic Relations	41
Public Support for the Government's Foreign and Defense Policy	43
Executive Summary	43

The September 2013 Bundestag election resulted in a third term for Chancellor Angela Merkel, and her second Grand Coalition. On the eve of Chancellor Merkel’s visit to Washington, AICGS is pleased to provide this handbook on Germany’s foreign and defense policy, highlighting the changes to personnel and policy in the new CDU-CSU-SPD government.

The September 2013 Bundestag election gave Chancellor Angela Merkel’s center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian affiliate Christian Social Union (CSU) their best result since 1990, but it also eliminated their Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition partner from the next parliament. The CDU/CSU fell just short of an absolute majority of seats and were forced to turn to either the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) or the environmentalist Alliance 90/Greens to form a new government.[1] Despite some sympathy within the CDU for the Greens option, the CSU and most within the CDU preferred to renew their old coalition with the SPD, which had functioned comparatively well during Merkel’s first government from 2005 to 2009.[2] The parties began official negotiations on 23 October and by mid-December had reached agreement on the new government platform, operating principles, and division of ministries and cabinet posts.

Seat Distribution in the German Bundestag



The coalition agreement signed on 27 November by CDU Chairman Merkel, SPD Chairman Sigmar Gabriel, and CSU Chairman Horst Seehofer defines the new government’s principles and priorities, as well as the partners’ commitment to work together until the next scheduled election. The coalition partners agreed to operate on the basis of consensus and to present a united front in the Bundestag and its various committees and working groups. They pledged that none of the governing parties will attempt to find a new majority by working with the opposition parties.[3]

The CDU received five ministries in addition to the positions of Chancellor and Chancellery Chief of Staff/Minister for Special Affairs. The SPD controls six ministries and the CSU three. Although the CSU received a disproportionate share of ministries relative to its weight in the Bundestag, the six most powerful ministries were divided equally between the CDU

and the SPD: the CDU controls the ministries for finance, internal affairs, and defense, while the SPD controls the ministries for foreign affairs, economics and energy, and justice and consumer protection.[4]

Each of the coalition partners has a ministerial role in Germany's foreign and security policy—the CDU through its control of the Chancellery and Defense Ministry, the SPD through its control of the Foreign Office, and the CSU through its control of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.[5] The coalition partners also divided control of the associated Bundestag committees, placing the Foreign Affairs Committee under CDU chairmanship, the Defense Committee under SPD chairmanship, and the Committee for Economic Cooperation and Development under CSU chairmanship.[6]

- Under the terms of the coalition agreement, each of the coalition parties has the right to nominate its own candidates to fill the ministerial posts and other offices assigned to it. The ministers have the right to nominate their own state secretaries and ministers of state.[7]

Article 65 of the Basic Law, which serves as Germany's constitution, gives the Chancellor responsibility for setting the general guidelines of policy (*Richtlinienkompetenz*). In practice, this prerogative is constrained by factors such as coalition agreements,* internal party pressures, and responsibilities assigned by the Basic Law to specific ministries.[8]

- Article 65a vests peacetime command of the armed forces in the Minister of Defense.
- Article 96 states that the Justice Ministry will have responsibility for military courts exercising criminal jurisdiction during a state of defense or jurisdiction over members of the armed forces serving abroad or on warships.
- Article 112 requires the Finance Minister to consent to any expenditures in excess of appropriations or for purposes not contemplated by the budget.

Article 65 of the Basic Law also states that within the general policy guidelines set by the Chancellor, each minister shall conduct the affairs of his or her ministry independently and on his or her own responsibility, and that the government as a whole, not just the Chancellor, shall resolve differences of opinion between ministers (cabinet principle). The Chancellor's control over government policy is further constrained in areas requiring cabinet decisions, such as, for example, foreign military deployments. These decisions are taken by majority vote and the Chancellor's vote is only decisive in case of a tie.[9] Moreover, the coalition agreement provides that none of the governing parties may be outvoted in the cabinet on a matter that is of fundamental importance to it.[10] Such matters will therefore require a consensus.

SPD foreign policy spokesman Dr. Rolf Mützenich reported that the CDU/CSU made a failed attempt during the coalition negotiations to centralize the direction of security policy in the Chancellery by creating a national security council (*Gemeinsame Lagezentrum*) at the expense of the ministries. Mützenich claims the SPD was able to block this proposal, as well as another CDU/CSU proposal to weaken the requirements for Bundestag approval of foreign military deployments.[11] The CDU/CSU and the SPD were unable to agree on the latter issue and called for a commission to develop ideas by the end of 2014 on ways to bring the requirement for parliamentary approval in line with the need to reassure allies and partners that German military forces assigned to multinational formations can be counted on to fulfill their obligations in a timely manner.[12]

Germany's system of coalition governments and divided responsibilities across ministries hinders the development of centralized control over foreign and security policy found in strong presidential systems like France or the United States. This increases the importance of developing contacts throughout Germany's foreign, defense, and development assistance establishment to maintain situational awareness of German policies and activities and to maximize opportunities for international cooperation.

**During her meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan 4 February 2014, Chancellor Merkel used language from the coalition agreement to describe her government's position on Turkey's EU membership aspirations. Although Merkel noted her personal skepticism, she refrained from repeating her well known position—and that of the CDU/CSU—opposing full Turkish membership in the EU.*

[1] [CDU/CSU bleibt größte Fraktion im Bundestag](#), Deutscher Bundestag, September 2013.

[2] ["Seehofer lehnt Gespräche mit Grünen ab,"](#) *Die Zeit-Online*, 24 September 2013.

[3] [Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten – Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 18. Legislaturperiode](#), CDU, 27 November 2013.

[4] [Pressemitteilung von CDU, CSU und SPD über die Ressortverteilung](#), CDU, 14 December 2013.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Severin Weiland and Christina Hebel, ["Die Koalition kontrolliert sich selbst,"](#) *Spiegel Online*, 15 January 2014.

[7] [Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten – Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 18. Legislaturperiode](#), CDU, 27 November 2013.

[8] Marin Limpert, ["Richtlinienkompetenz des Bundeskanzlers,"](#) *Deutscher Bundestag Aktueller Begriff* Nr. 15/09, 19 February 2009.

[9] Ibid.

[10] [Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten – Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 18. Legislaturperiode](#), CDU, 27 November 2013.

[11] Rolf Mützenich, ["Außenpolitik mit sozialdemokratischer Handschrift!"](#) 25 November 2013.

[12] [*Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten – Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 18. Legislaturperiode*](#), CDU, 27 November 2013.

Federal Chancellery


The Bundestag elected CDU Chairman [Dr. Angela Merkel](#) to her third term as Chancellor on 17 December 2013. Merkel received 462 votes, 42 less than the total of all coalition deputies in the Bundestag but well above the absolute majority of 316 votes required for election.[1]

At the beginning of her third term, Merkel has emerged as Europe's dominant political leader, a situation resulting as much from the comparatively weak positions of other national leaders as from Merkel's own governing skills and Germany's dominant economic and financial position in the EU. Despite some grumbling from CDU conservatives about her appropriation of SPD and Greens positions in an effort to dominate the center of German politics, Merkel faces no serious challenges from within her party and continues to enjoy strong public support.

By her own admission, Merkel is cautious and takes her time to weigh all the risks before making decisions. She is determined to move forward on long-term goals but lacks a sense of urgency and is willing to accept incremental progress. Merkel also is reluctant to get too far in front of the German electorate and has been criticized by some political observers as more of a follower than a shaper of public opinion.[2]

Merkel is an intensely private leader and reveals few details about her personal and family life. Her office in the Chancellery contains few personal items. One notable exception is a small portrait of Russian Empress Catherine the Great, whom Merkel reportedly views as an inspirational role model.[3]

*Foreign and security policy leadership positions in the Federal Chancellery
(changes shown in blue text).*



Peter Altmaier (CDU) is the new Chief of Staff and Minister for Special Affairs in the Chancellery. He replaced Ronald Pofalla, who left to take a position on the supervisory board of the German national railway, Deutsche Bahn. Altmaier, who holds the rank of a cabinet minister, leads the work of the Federal Chancellery and is responsible for coordinating the work of the other ministries and maintaining relations with parliament and the German states (*Länder*).

Altmaier served in the previous cabinet as Minister for Environmental Protection and Nuclear Reactor Safety from May 2012 to December 2013 and was First Parliamentary Whip for the CDU/CSU Bundestag group from 2009 to 2012. He served as Parliamentary State Secretary in the Interior Ministry during Merkel's first grand coalition government.[4]

Altmaier worked for the European Commission from 1990 to 1994, when he was first elected to the Bundestag. He later served as President of Europa-Union Deutschland, the German affiliate of the Union of European Federalists, from 2006 to 2011 and has described himself as a "convinced European" who supports the goal of a European federal state.[5]

Dr. Christoph Heusgen (CDU) remains in place as Merkel's foreign and security policy advisor and head of the Chancellery directorate responsible for foreign and security policy and international development policy. He has held the job since late 2005, when Merkel recruited Heusgen away from his position as Director of the EU's Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, the precursor to today's External Action Service, under then EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana. Heusgen was instrumental in building the unit for Solana, with whom he reportedly worked very well despite their different personalities. Solana spokeswoman Cristina Gallach said Heusgen was one of Solana's closest collaborators and that he excelled because of his dedication, loyalty, and a profound sense of the importance of building a new pillar of European cooperation.[6]

Since returning to Germany, Heusgen has become Merkel's most trusted advisor on foreign and security policy—the one who explains the world to her and through whom most foreign governments communicate with the Chancellor.[7]

Heusgen reportedly prefers his role as advisor and has no ambitions to become a high-profile foreign policy actor. He almost always is with the Chancellor when she travels or meets with foreign leaders, but keeps a low profile. According to a recent article in *Rheinische Post*, Heusgen does not give interviews and speaks only “on background.”[8]

Dr. Lars-Hendrik Röller has headed the Chancellery's Directorate 4, which is responsible for economic and finance policy, since July 2011. He serves as Merkel's chief economic advisor and sherpa for the annual G8 and G20 summits. Röller's team in the Chancellery also coordinates German positions for negotiations on a transatlantic free trade and investment partnership (TTIP) with the United States. According to government spokesman Steffen Seibert, Röller combines a strong understanding of economic theory with an unusual grasp of practical economic workings within the European Union. He worked as chief economist for the EU's Directorate-General for Competition from 2003 to 2006 before becoming president of the European School for Management and Technology, a private Berlin business school that gave Röller the opportunity to build contacts with German business leaders.[9] A more critical article in the daily *Die Welt* argued that Röller, at least initially, clung too much to his academic style and was slow to adapt to the political requirements of his new position in the Chancellery.[10]

Dr. Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut has headed the Chancellery's directorate for EU policy since February 2011, when he was promoted from within the same directorate to replace Uwe Corsepius. Since 2006, Meyer-Landrut had worked as Corsepius' deputy, responsible for basic EU policy, relations with EU member states, and the EU's foreign relations (external policy). Before coming to the Chancellery, Meyer-Landrut worked from 2002 to 2003 as spokesman for President of the EU Constitutional Convention Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.[11]

Klaus-Dieter Fritsche (CSU) returns to the Chancellery to take on the newly created post of State Secretary for Intelligence Services, which was established in response to the higher profile and greater sensitivity of intelligence issues in the wake of Edward Snowden's revelations about NSA and GCHQ surveillance activities. Coordination and direction of the intelligence services had previously been assigned to a directorate chief, although the Chancellery Chief of Staff had ultimate responsibility for this area. Fritsche, who had served as State Secretary in the Interior Ministry since November 2009, has a strong background in intelligence. He served as Vice President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) from 1996 to 2005 and as head of the Chancellery's directorate for coordination of Germany's intelligence services from December 2005 to December 2009. Before moving to the federal level, Fritsche worked as office director for then Bavarian Interior Minister Günther Beckstein from 1993 to 1996.[12]


- [1] [“Eindeutiges Votum für dritte Amtszeit – Bundestag macht Merkel zur Kanzlerin,”](#) *N-TV*, 17 December 2013.
- [2] [“Want to be a successful world leader? Do it the Angela Merkel way,”](#) *Guardian* (UK), 24 September 2013; Sara Miller Llana, [“The mind of Angela Merkel,”](#) *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 September 2013;
- [3] [“Virtueller Rundgang durch das Kanzleramt,”](#) Bundeskanzleramt/Bundeskanzlerin; Kerstin Holm, [“Verwandte Seele: Eine Zarin für die Kanzlerin,”](#) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*; 24 October 2005.
- [4] [“Peter Altmaier Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes und Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben – Lebenslauf,”](#) “Bundesregierung, December 2013.
- [5] Ibid.; Peter Altmaier, [“Antwort von Peter Altmaier,”](#) Abgeordnetenwatch.de, 31 May 2011.
- [6] Karen Carstens, [“Multilateral Man,”](#) 18 November 2004, *European Voice*; Judy Dempsey, [“A Staunch European Guides Merkel Policy,”](#) *New York Times*, 21 November 2005.
- [7] Ludger Baten, [“Ein Neusser erklärt Merkel die Welt,”](#) *RP-Online (Rheinische Post)*, 11 January 2014.
- [8] Ibid.
- [9] [“Berliner Ökonom wird Merkes Chefberater,”](#) *Handelsblatt*, 6 June 2011; [“Lars-Hendrik Röller Neuer Wirtschaftsberater für Merkel,”](#) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 June 2011; Jennifer Werner, [“Besuch im Kanzleramt: Lars-Hendrik Röller zieht positive Bilanz deutscher Wirtschaftspolitik,”](#) *Saguntum*, 6 July 2013.
- [10] [“Merkels Wirtschaftsberater als Professor Ratlos,”](#) *Die Welt*, 16 October 2011;
- [11] Albrecht Meier, [“Ein Stabilier Euro ist unsere größte Aufgabe. Porträt Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut, Merkels Europa-Berater,”](#) *Der Tagesspiegel*, 17 February 2011; [“Bundeskanzleramt: Wechsel der Abteilungsleiter,”](#) *Politik und Kommunikation*, February 2011..
- [12] [“Der Chef der Spione,”](#) *Die Tageszeitung*, 28 December 2013; [“Der neue Geheimdienst-Kontrolleur,”](#) *ARD Tagesschau*, 16 December 2013; [“Fritsche wird Geheimdienst-Staatssekretär im Kanzleramt,”](#) *Spiegel Online*, 16 December 2013.

Foreign Office

The Foreign Office appears likely to regain some of the ground it lost to the Chancellery during the last government. Foreign Minister Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier is more effective

and much better respected than his predecessor, and personnel changes in the ministry's leadership are likely to strengthen its position vis à vis the Chancellery. One of the most significant changes was the unexpected move of State Secretary Emily Haber from the Foreign Office to the Interior Ministry. Haber is close to the CDU and to Chancellor Merkel, who reportedly values her independent views. Haber also worked closely with Merkel's foreign and security policy advisor, Dr. Christoph Heusgen, providing him a channel for direct contact with the Foreign Office bureaucracy.[1]

Select leadership positions in the Foreign Office (changes shown in blue text).



Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) returns from his opposition role as head of the SPD parliamentary group to take on a second term as Foreign Minister, a post he held during Merkel's first grand coalition government from 2005 to 2009. Steinmeier acknowledges that he cannot simply take up where he left off four years ago and points to changes in the world, such as the conflict in Syria and increased instability in the Middle East, Africa, and eastern Europe, that have brought crises closer to Europe's borders. He has argued, often together with new Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, that Germany needs to assume greater international responsibility and be willing to increase its level of engagement with these problem areas.[2]

Steinmeier is a foreign policy realist who argues the necessity of engaging with difficult leaders and accepting that there are regions of the world that operate on different principles than those of western democracies. In a recent interview with the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, he criticized the practice of making strong statements of indignation or moral outrage without a clear appreciation of the possibilities—or lack thereof—for influencing developments in a positive direction. He also complained that the time cycles of modern media coverage, which fuel demands for immediate action, are ill-suited to effective diplomacy, which can take years or decades to produce results.[3]

Steinmeier is assisted by two ministers of state—the term used for parliamentary state secretaries in the Foreign Office—and by two civil service state secretaries, all four of whom are new to their office. The state secretaries hold daily discussions with the heads of the ministry's various directorates on important developments in the world and the operational consequences for German foreign and security policy.[4] New coordinators (*Beauftragter*) also have been appointed for transatlantic relations with the United States and relations with Russia, Central Asia, and the EU's Eastern Partnership countries. The selection of these coordinators was made jointly by the Chancellor and Foreign Minister.

Michael Roth (SPD) replaced the FDP's Michael Georg Link as Minister of State for Europe and also serves as the government's coordinator for Franco-German cooperation. His areas of responsibility include security policy, Europe, Eurasia, arms control, regional issues in the Middle East and North Africa, and the countries of East Asia. He previously served as European policy spokesman for the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, where he worked closely with parliamentary group leader Steinmeier.[5] As coordinator for Franco-German relations, Roth works with his French counterpart Harlem Désir to develop close consultations and intergovernmental cooperation between France and Germany and to promote cross border cooperation between civil societies.[6] He accompanied Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier to Paris for the new government's first meetings with French leaders on 18 December.[7]

Roth claims a strong personal as well as professional commitment to the European idea (*“Europa ist mein Herz- und Magenthema”*) and hopes to use his new office to help build a better Europe in cooperation with Germany's EU partners.[8] He is a member of the Europa-Union Parliamentary Group in the Bundestag, a non-partisan group associated with the European federalist organization Europa-Union Deutschland. In a speech during the Bundestag's debate on the EU Commission's work program for 2014, Roth stressed the importance of working with all EU member states—small, medium, and large—to bring forward the European integration project, but he also insisted that especially close cooperation with France and Poland is essential to the project's success.[9]

Dr. Maria Böhmer (CDU) is the other Minister of State in the Foreign Office, replacing Cornelia Piepers of the FDP. Böhmer served in the Federal Chancellery as Minister of State and coordinator for migration, refugees, and integration (of foreign residents) from 2005 to 2013, and reportedly was brought into the Foreign Office because that position was given to the SPD's Aydan Özoğuz as a consequence of the coalition negotiations.[10] Böhmer's primary responsibility reportedly will be foreign cultural and education policy—promoting Germany's image in the world. This involves coordinating the work of organizations like the Goethe Institut, Humboldt-Stiftung, and Deutsche Welle.[11] Other areas of responsibility include the UN and global issues, economic and development issues, international law, and protocol. Böhmer is a close confidant of Chancellor Merkel and has been Chairman of the

CDU women's organization *Frauen Union* since 2001, as well as a member of the CDU's national executive committee (*Bundesvorstand*), since 1994.[12]

State Secretary **Stephan Steinlein** has assisted Steinmeier for the past 14 years and had served as his office director since 2002, moving with Steinmeier from the Chancellery to the Foreign Office and from there to the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag.[13] As state secretary, his area of responsibility mirrors that of Minister of State Böhmer—UN and global issues, economic and development issues, international law, and protocol. Steinmeier noted that Steinlein will be responsible for large themes associated with globalization, energy and the environment, climate change, and resource scarcity. He also asked Steinlein to focus on the Foreign Office's involvement with government policy as well as the ministry's structure and resources.[14]

State Secretary **Dr. Markus Ederer** is a professional diplomat who served as head of the Foreign Office's Planning Staff during Steinmeier's first term as Foreign Minister from 2005 to 2009. From 2002 to 2005, he headed the sub-directorate for political and economic analysis at the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), and his most recent assignment was EU Ambassador to China and Mongolia from 2011 to 2013.[15] Steinmeier said that Ederer will deal with a number of international hotspots, including the conflict in Syria, Iran, the Near and Middle East, and Central Africa, but that his most important task will be the future of transatlantic relations with the United States.[16]

Foreign Office Political Director **Hans-Dieter Lucas** remains in place for now. As political director, Lucas represents the Foreign Office in bilateral and multilateral contacts at his level with other countries and international organizations and advises the Foreign Minister on foreign and security policy issues covered by his directorate.[17] The directorate headed by Lucas analyzes, plans, develops, and coordinates German foreign and security policy positions, including those pursued within the EU, NATO, and OSCE. It is also responsible for relations with the United States and Canada; Russia, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; and non-EU states in Europe, including the western Balkans and Turkey.[18]

Despite his close association with the FDP, Lucas enjoys the trust and confidence of Steinmeier, who in 2006 recruited him away from his position as chief Russia expert in the Chancellery to work in the Foreign Office.[19] During the Georgia-Russia conflict of 2008, Steinmeier sent Lucas to Georgia as Germany's special envoy working within the delegation of EU and OSCE representatives to mediate an end to the conflict.[20]

Finance Minister Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble's chief spokesman **Martin Kotthaus** reportedly will take over the Foreign Office's Europe Directorate, which is responsible for the European Union and relations with EU member states, as well as matters related to the EU's external relations. During his time at the Finance Ministry (2011-2014), Kotthaus dealt mainly with the European debt crisis and efforts to shore up the euro zone. He previously served as the spokesman for Germany's Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels from 2005 to 2011.[21]

New Coordinators and Commissioners

Gernot Erler (SPD) replaced the CDU's Andreas Schockenhoff as Germany's Coordinator for Cooperation with Russia and was given additional responsibilities for cooperation with the countries of Central Asia and the EU's Eastern Partnership (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the South Caucasus). Erler is a close confidant of Foreign Minister Steinmeier. He served as

Minister of State in the Foreign Office from 2005 to 2009 and as deputy chief of the SPD parliamentary group from 2009 to 2013.[22] A Slavacist and fluent Russian speaker, Erler is comfortable with all elements of Russian society, both in the government and among civil society and human rights groups.[23] However, in contrast to Schockenhoff, whose public criticism and calls for a more confrontational approach toward the Kremlin strained bilateral relations, Erler argues the need to take Russian interests into account and work cooperatively with Moscow.[24]

Philipp Mißfelder (CDU) replaced the FDP's Harald Leibrecht as Germany's coordinator for transatlantic cooperation with the United States and Canada, but he gave up the position in early April after only three months and will be replaced by **Jürgen Hardt**. Mißfelder serves as foreign policy spokesman for the CDU/CSU parliamentary group and is chairman of the parties' youth organization *Junge Union*. As coordinator for transatlantic cooperation, he reportedly had planned to focus primarily on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and building relations with Jewish organizations in the United States. Mißfelder had expressed concerns about the damage to mutual trust in U.S.-German relations caused by revelations of NSA surveillance activities and was critical of Washington's refusal to negotiate a no-spy agreement with Berlin. Mißfelder is a committed transatlanticist. In 2013, he was named to the board of directors of *Atlantik-Brücke*, an association dedicated to building trust and mutual understanding on both sides of the Atlantic. He also believes it is necessary to improve relations with Russia and find ways to cooperate with Moscow on international problems. In 2011, Mißfelder took the entire 30-member executive committee of the *Junge Union* to Moscow in an effort to build ties with the next generation of Russian leaders. [25]

Christoph Strässer (SPD) became Commissioner for Human Rights and Humanitarian Assistance on 29 January, replacing Markus Löning of the FDP. His task is to monitor political developments and advise the Foreign Minister. He also serves as liaison with institutions active in this field, including other ministries, the Bundestag, and non-governmental organizations, as well as international organizations such as the OSCE, Council of Europe, and United Nations.[26] Strässer has served as human rights spokesman for the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag since 2005 and was a special rapporteur on political prisoners in Azerbaijan for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He has demonstrated a strong commitment to speaking out on human rights issues throughout his political career.[27]

Brandenburg's Minister-President **Dr. Dietmar Woidke** (SPD) also serves as the new Coordinator for relations with Poland, a position previously held by FDP General-Secretary Cornelia Pieper. The position was created in 2004 at the suggestion of Woidke's predecessor Matthias Platzeck, who resigned his position as Brandenburg's Minister-President for health reasons in July 2013. Although Woidke said he views the 29 January appointment mainly as an honorary title, he already had engaged in talks on 25 February with Polish Foreign Ministry officials on ways to unlock the potential of German-Polish border areas and promote bilateral cooperation. Woidke's priorities reportedly include transportation infrastructure and youth cooperation.[28]

Reassignment of Key Ambassadors

After naming most of the new leadership at the top of the Ministry, Steinmeier announced a shuffling of Germany's ambassadors at key posts abroad. Ambassador to the United States

Dr. Peter Ammon will become the new Ambassador to the United Kingdom. He will be replaced in Washington by **Dr. Peter Wittig**, currently Germany's Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. Former Foreign Office State Secretary **Harald Braun** will take over the UN post.[29]

Former Ambassador to Poland **Rüdiger Freiherr von Fritsch-Seerhausen**, who served as Vice President of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) from 2004 to 2007, has moved to Moscow as the new Ambassador to Russia. He will be replaced in Warsaw by **Rolf Nickel**, currently Germany's Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament and former deputy foreign and security policy adviser to Chancellor Merkel in the Federal Chancellery from 2006 to 2011.[30] Nickel's assignment to Warsaw is an indication of the growing importance the German government attaches to its relations with Poland, and is a sign that it intends to work closely with Warsaw on important foreign and security policy matters.

[1] Majid Sattar, "[Steinmeier und das Auswärtige Amt – Eine kurze Unterbrechung namens Westerwelle](#)," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 December 2013; Majid Sattar, "[Emily Haber – Kleine Revolution am Werderschen Markt](#)," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 28 May 2011; Ralf Neukirch, "[Schämen für Westerwelle](#)," *Der Spiegel*, 23 April 2011.

[2] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, "Es wird zu Recht von uns erwartet, dass wir uns einmischen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 30 January 2014; interview with Foreign Minister Steinmeier conducted by Stefan Braun and Stefan Kornelius, reprinted by the [German Foreign Office](#).

[3] Ibid.; Stefan Braun and Stefan Kornelius, "[Einmischen statt zurückhalten – Steinmeier über deutsche Außenpolitik](#)," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 30 January 2014.

[4] "[Leitung: Minister, Staatsminister, Staatssekretäre](#)," Auswärtiges Amt, 21 January 2014.

[5] Stefan Von Borstel, Jan Dams, Claudia Ehrenstein, Martin Greive, and Daniel Friedrich, "[Dies sind Merkels einflussreichste Nebe-Minister](#)," *Die Welt*, 2 January 2014.

[6] "[Staatsminister Michael Roth zum Beauftragten für die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit ernannt](#)," Franco-German Internet Portal, 10 January 2014.

[7] Ibid.

[8] "[Michael Roth wird Staatsminister für Europa](#)," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 16 December 2013.

[9] Michael Roth, [Rede von Staatminister Michael Roth in der Bundestagsdebatte zum Arbeitsprogramm der EU-Kommission 2014](#), Auswärtiges Amt, 17 January 2014.

[10] Hans Monath, "[Politik im Gefolge des Ministers](#)," *Der Tagesspiegel*, 19 December 2013.

- [11] [“Maria Böhmer künftig Staatsministerin im Auswärtigen Amt,”](#) Frauen Union der CDU, 16 December 2013.
- [12] [“Böhmer wird Staatsministerin im Auswärtigen Amt,”](#) *Die Welt*, 15 December 2013; [“Prof. Dr. Maria Böhmer, Staatsministerin im Auswärtigen Amt,”](#) Auswärtiges Amt, December 2013.
- [13] [“Stephan Steinlein, Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen Amts,”](#) Auswärtiges Amt, January 2014.
- [14] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, [“Rede von Außenminister Steinmeier bei der Amtsübergabe der Staatssekretäre,”](#) Auswärtiges Amt, 23 January 2014.
- [15] [“Dr. Markus Ederer, Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen Amts,”](#) Auswärtiges Amt, January 2014.
- [16] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, *Rede von Außenminister Steinmeier bei der Amtsübergabe der Staatssekretäre*
- [17] [“Politischer Abteilung 2,”](#) *Abteilungen*, Auswärtiges Amt.
- [18] Ibid.
- [19] Ralf Beste, [“Operation Ost,”](#) *Der Spiegel* 36/2006, 4 September 2006.
- [20] Florian Hassel, [“Auf dem Vormarsch,”](#) *Berliner Zeitung*, 12 August 2008.
- [21] [“Schäuble-Sprecher wechselt zu Steinmeier,”](#) *Handelsblatt*, 3 January 2014.
- [22] [“SPD Politiker Erler wird Russland-Beauftragter,”](#) *Die Zeit*, 9 January 2014.
- [23] Benjamin Bidder and Matthias Schepp, [“Liebesgrüße nach Moskau,”](#) *Spiegel On-line*, 10 January 2014.
- [24] Majid Sattar, [“Ost-West-Konfliktlösung,”](#) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13 January 2014; Gernot Erler, [“In Sachen Ukraine gibt es in der EU zu viele Fehleinschätzungen,”](#) *Internationale Politik* (interview), 12 December 2013.
- [25] [“Der Koordinator für die Transatlantische Zusammenarbeit, Auswärtiges Amt,”](#) January 2014; Hans Monath, [“Sollen wir mit den USA in Genf treffen?”](#) *Der Tagesspiegel*, 17 January 2014; [“Philipp Mißfelder bleibt außenpolitischer CDU-sprecher,”](#) *Westdeutscher Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 January 2014; Philipp Mißfelder, [“No-Spy-Abkommen und Konsequenzen,”](#) Interview mit Philipp Mißfelder (CDU), *DW Journal*, 15 January 2014; Philipp Mißfelder, [“AICGS At Issue Interview Series: Philipp Mißfelder,”](#) 12 July 2012; repeated in [“Mißfelder Named Coordinator for Transatlantic Cooperation,”](#) AICGS, 9 January 2014; Philipp Mißfelder, [“Wir brauchen Russland,”](#) *WDR 2* (interview) 24 Dec 2013; [“Deutsch-Russische Beziehungen: Neue Entwicklungen und Perspektiven,”](#) Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 27 June 2011; [“Mißfelder gibt Amt als Amerika-Beauftragter auf,”](#) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 April 2014.

[26] [“Beauftragter für Menschenrechtspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe,”](#) Auswärtiges Amt, January 2014.

[27] [“Christoph Strässer, SPD,”](#) Deutscher Bundestag; Daniel Friedrich Sturm, [“Beauftragter für Menschenrechter kritisiert Moskau,”](#) *Die Welt*, 7 February 14.

[28] [“Woidke soll die Polen-Beziehungen verbessern,”](#) rbb (Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg), 21 January 2014; [“Talks on Polish-German cross-border cooperation,”](#) Press Office, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 February 2014.

[29] [“Außenminister Steinmeier sortiert wichtige Posten um – Deutschland wechselt Botschafter in USA,”](#) n-tv, 15 January 2014; [“Wechsel auf Diplomatenposten,”](#) *Spiegel Online*, 15 January 2014.

[30] Ibid.

Ministry of Defense


[Dr. Ursula von der Leyen](#) took over leadership of the Ministry of Defense on 17 December 2013. She replaced Thomas de Maizière, who returns to the post of Interior Minister, a position he held during the first years of Merkel’s second cabinet before becoming Defense Minister in March 2011 following the resignation of Karl-Theodore zu Guttenberg. Von der Leyen served previously as Minister for Family, Seniors, Women, and Youth in Merkel’s first cabinet (2005-09) and as Minister for Labor and Social Affairs in the second Merkel government (2009-13). In December 2010, she was elected a deputy chairwoman of the CDU at the party’s 23rd Congress in Karlsruhe. Although von der Leyen entered politics at the comparatively late age of 43—after beginning a career in medicine and raising a family of seven children—she quickly became one of the CDU’s most accomplished and successful stars and developed an ambition for higher office. Von der Leyen was considered a front-runner in the German presidential race of 2010 before losing out to Christian Wulff and is now regarded as a likely successor to Chancellor Merkel if she can successfully manage her term as Defense Minister. This will be no easy task, as the position has destroyed the political careers of many rising stars in the past. [1]

Von der Leyen is committed to the ideal of deeper European integration and stated during an August 2011 interview for the German weekly *Der Spiegel* that her goal is a “United States of Europe patterned after federal states such as Switzerland, Germany, or the USA.”[2] She was born in Brussels in 1958 and spent the first 13 years of her life there as the daughter of Ernst Albrecht, a senior German “Eurocrat” at the Commission of the then European Economic Community who went on to have a successful political career as Minister-President of Lower Saxony from 1976 to 1990. Von der Leyen attended the European School in Brussels where she became fluent in French and English and practiced in dealing with other Europeans.[3]

In her early speeches as Defense Minister—at de Maizière’s farewell ceremony 9 January and before the Bundestag on 16 January—von der Leyen said she will build on the work begun by de Maizière with regard to defense reforms and restructuring the Bundeswehr, as well as

expanding the pooling and sharing of military capabilities with close allies and partners in the EU and NATO. She insisted that “there will be no reform of the reform” but announced plans to improve morale in the armed forces, in particular by introducing more “family-friendly” practices, such as more flexible working hours when possible and longer intervals between foreign deployments.[4]

Select defense and security policy leadership positions in the Ministry of Defense (changes shown in blue text).



Although von der Leyen brought her own leadership team into the ministry, she initially retained State Secretary Stéphane Beemelmans on the recommendation of former Defense Minister de Maizière because of his key role in the defense reform effort. Beemelmans continued his responsibility for the Staff Organization and Revision (Bundeswehr structural reform) and the Directorate for Armaments, but also took over new responsibilities for the Directorate for Policy and the Directorates under the Chief of the Armed Forces (Defense Planning, Forces Policy, and Strategy and Operations).[5] Beemelmans’ position became untenable when a new armaments board created to provide more insight into problems with major weapons programs failed to deliver credible assessments in its first report. Von der Leyen refused to sign off on the report, claiming it overstated the programs’ potential while playing down the risks of more cost overruns, time delays, and underperformance. In an effort to instill accountability, she dismissed Beemelmans and reassigned Detlef Selhausen, the

directorship chief for armaments, information technology, and operations (AIN), to other duties.[6]

- Armed Forces Chief General Volker Wieker assumed Beemelmans' responsibilities for armaments, and Selhausen's AIN directorship has been temporarily assigned to Vice Admiral Joachim Rühle, who heads the Directorate for Defense Planning. State Secretary Gerd Hoofe took on responsibility for the Staff Organization and Revision, as well as Beemelmans' other duties.[7]

BND Vice President **Dr. Géza Andreas Freiherr von Geyr** took over the Directorate for Policy from Dr. Ulrich Schlie on 17 March.[8] The directorship shapes and coordinates defense and security policy, including military and armaments policy. The directorship chief also serves as the Political Director for the Defense Ministry, representing the ministry in inter-ministry discussions and in contacts with foreign counterparts.[9] Von Geyr served as a member of the German foreign service from 1991 to 2001, when he took a position with the CDU/CSU parliamentary group's foreign policy working group and the office of its then Deputy Chairman for Foreign, Security, and European Policy, Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble. In 2006 von Geyr joined the Federal Chancellery's Directorate for Foreign and Security Policy, and in 2010 he was named Vice President of the BND.[10]

Parliamentary State Secretary **Dr. Ralph Brauksiepe** (CDU) focuses on the areas covered by the directorships for policy, defense planning, forces policy, and strategy and operations, as well as those covered by the budget directorship. One of his most important tasks is representing the ministry before the Bundestag appropriations committee.[11] Brauksiepe has experience working on Bundestag committees, having been a member of the EU Affairs Committee from 1998-2002 and the senior CDU representative on the Committee for Economic Cooperation and Development from 2002 to 2005. From October 2009 to December 2013, he served as Parliamentary State Secretary in the Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs under von der Leyen.[12]

Parliamentary State Secretary **Markus Grübel** (CDU) focuses on the areas covered by the directorships for equipment, information technology, and in-service support; legal affairs; personnel; and infrastructure, environmental protection, and services. He deals with most procurement issues and represents the ministry before the Bundestag committees, especially the Defense Committee.[13] Chancellor Merkel reportedly chose Grübel for the post because of his successful political work for the CDU as a local and regional politician in Baden-Württemberg as well as for his familiarity with defense issues. Grübel is a lieutenant in the Naval Reserve and was a member of the Defense Committee in the previous Bundestag. In June 2013, Merkel chose him to be the CDU's senior representative on the special investigative committee looking into the Euro Hawk procurement scandal.[14]

Von der Leyen's long-time lieutenant **Gerd Hoofe** replaced Rüdiger Wolf in the other State Secretary position, which is responsible for the budget, legal, and personnel directorships, as well as the directorship for infrastructure, environmental protection, and services.[15] Hoofe has served under von der Leyen as a State Secretary since 2003, beginning in Lower Saxony's Ministry for Social Affairs, Women, Family, and Health (2003-2005) and then moving with von der Leyen to the Federal Ministry for Family, Seniors, Women, and Youth (2005-2009) and the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs (2009-2013).[16]

Chief of the Armed Forces (*Generalinspekteur*) **General Volker Wieker** is the senior military officer in the armed forces and military adviser to the federal government since January 2010. He previously served as First Deputy Commander (2007-2008) and then Commanding General (2008-2010) of the 1st German-Netherlands Corps, after having served as Chief of Staff of the Army Staff (2004-2007).[17] Within the ministry, Wieker is responsible for the overall military defense concept, military operations, and military planning. The ministry's directorates for defense planning, forces policy, and strategy and operations report through him to the ministry's senior civilian leadership.[18]

- The Directorate for Planning under **Vice Admiral Joachim Rühle** is responsible for devising conceptual guidelines for the future development of the armed forces, translating concepts into specific plans, and managing military capabilities. [19]
- The Directorate for Forces Policy under **Vice Admiral Heinrich Lange** is responsible for maintaining the operational readiness of the armed forces.[20]
- The Directorate for Strategy and Operations under **Lieutenant General Markus Kneip** develops the strategic directives issued to the Bundeswehr's Joint Forces Operations Command and provides strategic plans, operational doctrine, and military proposals for decisions on concepts for cross-government operations. It also provides input to support government decisions and parliamentary consent for the deployment of German military forces, and issues directives to the German Military Representative on the NATO and EU Military Committees.[21]

[1] Christine Bach, "[Ursula von der Leyen \(geb. Albrecht\)](#)," biography posted on the internet site of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, January 2014; "[Ursula von der Leyen – Ministerin mit Ambitionen](#)," *Saarbrücker Zeitung*, 12 Jan 2014; Judy Dempsey, "[Merkel's Favorite for German President Loses Out](#)," *New York Times*, 3 June 2010.

[2] "[Von der Leyen fordert die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa](#)," *Der Spiegel*, 27 August 2011.

[3] Christine Bach, "[Ursula von der Leyen \(geb. Albrecht\)](#)," biography posted on the internet site of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, January 2014

[4] Ursula von der Leyen, [Rede der Verteidigungsministerin von der Leyen zum Abschied von Thomas de Maizière](#) (MP3), BMVg, 9 January 2014; Ursula von der Leyen, [Speech before the Bundestag](#) (video file), Deutscher Bundestag, 16 January 2014.

[5] Thomas Wiegold, "[vdL-Personalie: Beemelmans zuständig für Politik und den GI](#)," *Augen Geradeaus*, 10 January 2014; "[Die Verantwortungsbereiche der Staatssekretäre](#)," BMVg, 13 January 2010.

[6] "[Ministerin zieht strukturelle und personelle Konsequenzen nach dem ersten Rüstungsboard](#)," BMVg, 20 February 2014; Lorenz Hemicker, "[Von der Leyen traut ihrem eigenen Haus nicht](#)," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 February 2014.

[7] "[Rüstungsboard – Ein Instrument der Transparenz](#)," BMVg, 20 February 2014.


- [8] Stephan-Andreas Casdorff, "[Leyen baut um](#)," *Agenda* (Beilage) / *Der Tagesspiegel*, 18 February 2014; "[Personalveränderungen in zivilen Spitzenstellen](#)," BMVg, 11 March 2014.
- [9] "[Die Abteilung Politik](#)," BMVg, 3 December 2013; "[Die Neuorganisation des Verteidigungsministeriums beginnt](#)," BMVg, 2 April 2012.
- [10] "[Vizepräsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes](#)," BND, 2014.
- [11] Thomas Wiegold, "[vdL-Personalie: Beemelmans zuständig für Politik und den GI](#)," *Die Verantwortungsbereiche der Staatssekretäre*, BMVg, 2014.
- [12] "[Dr. Ralf Brauksiepe – Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär bei der Bundeministerin der Verteidigung](#)," BMVg, 23 January 2014.
- [13] Thomas Wiegold, "[vdL-Personalie: Beemelmans zuständig für Politik und den GI](#)," *Die Verantwortungsbereiche der Staatssekretäre*, BMVg, 2014.
- [14] Kai Holoch, "[Der neue Mann an Ursula von der Leyens Seite](#)," *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, 15 December 2013;
- [15] Thomas Wiegold, "[vdL-Personalie: Beemelmans zuständig für Politik und den GI](#)," *Die Verantwortungsbereiche der Staatssekretäre*, BMVg, 2014.
- [16] Zentral Redaktion der Bundeswehr, "[Gerd Hoofe – Staatssekretär im Bundesministerium der Verteidigung](#)," BMVg, 6 January 2014.
- [17] "[General Volker Wieker Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr](#)," BMVg, 11 December 2013.
- [18] Ibid.
- [19] "[Die Abteilung Planung](#)," BMVg, 3 December 2013; "[Die Neuorganisation des Verteidigungsministeriums beginnt](#)," BMVg, 2012.
- [20] Ibid.
- [21] "[Die Abteilung Strategie und Einsatz](#)," BMVg, 3 December 2013; "[Die Neuorganisation des Verteidigungsministeriums beginnt](#)," BMVg, 2012.

Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

German development policy is an independent area of German foreign policy formulated by the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). However, aid to developing

countries is increasingly linked to crisis prevention and conflict resolution strategies, especially in fragile or failed states, such as Afghanistan and Mali. As the ministry stated in its latest development policy white paper, “there can be no development without security and no security without development.”[1]

Select foreign and security policy leadership positions in the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development



Dr. Gerd Müller (CSU) is the new Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, taking over the ministry led by Free Democrat Dirk Niebel in the previous government. Müller served as Parliamentary State Secretary in the Agriculture Ministry from 2005 to 2013, and was responsible for international relations, third-world development projects, and world food aid programs, among other issues. As a member of the Bundestag since 1994, he served on the committees for foreign and defense policy and was the spokesman on Europe, foreign, and development policy for the CSU deputies group.[2] In this position, he challenged the Finance Minister’s defense of Greece’s participation in the euro zone during a speech to the Bundestag in 2000, warning that the country was over-indebted and unprepared and that its participation in the euro zone would undermine trust in the common currency.[3]

- Soon after taking office, Müller called for a fundamental reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which he said has put too much emphasis on free trade and not enough on enforcing international social, ecological, and conservation standards necessary for sustainable economic and human development.[4]

- Müller also announced in late January that his ministry will be developing a new policy concept for Africa over the next few months as part of a larger effort to address challenges to security and stability in places like Mali and the Central African Republic. He noted that German development assistance personnel and military troops are pursuing the same goals, only with different though complementary instruments.[5]

Thomas Silberhorn (CSU) became Parliamentary State Secretary on 17 February after the CSU tapped its initial choice, Christian Schmidt, to replace Hans-Peter Friedrich as Minister of Agriculture. Schmidt had brought useful experience and contacts from his eight years as Parliamentary State Secretary in the Defense Ministry and quickly introduced ideas for greater cooperation between the military and foreign assistance workers.[6] Silberhorn is unlikely to have the same commitment to these plans and is less well positioned to carry them out. He served as foreign, defense, and development policy spokesman for the CSU deputies group in the Bundestag from 2005 to January 2014, when he was named a vice chairman of the CDU/CSU deputies group, responsible for internal affairs, justice, and consumer protection issues. Although his main focus during the previous two governments was on European policy, Silberhorn claims he also followed economic cooperation and development issues.[7]

Hans-Joachim Fuchtel (CDU), the other Parliamentary State Secretary in the ministry, held the same position in the Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs under von der Leyen during the previous government. Since 2011, he also served as Chancellor Merkel's special envoy for strengthening regional and communal relations between Germany and Greece during a time of strong anti-German sentiments aroused by the EU's austerity program.[8] In November 2012, Fuchtel provoked an angry demonstration in Thessalonica with his remark that 3,000 Greek public employees were needed to do the same work performed by 1,000 in Germany. He later claimed his remarks had been taken out of context and said he was trying to draw attention to the unproductive structure of Greece's local administration and its public services in general.[9]

Dr. Friedrich Kitschelt is the new civil service State Secretary in the ministry, having been promoted in January 2014 from his previous position as the ministry's Ministerial Director for Africa and Latin America Policy, Global and Sectoral Issues. Between 2008 and 2010, he worked as the ministry's coordinator for Asia and special coordinator for Afghanistan and headed the subdirectorate for Asia and Southeast Europe. Before coming to the ministry, Kitschelt gained experience and contacts as an expert on development policy at the German Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels. He also served as leader of the section on north-south relations and human rights policy in the Federal Chancellery.[10]

The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has its main office in Bonn, where about 75 percent of its personnel are employed. Most of the rest work at a secondary office in Berlin, although some are on rotation to other German agencies, embassies abroad, or field work with international organizations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Although the Bonn location may make it more difficult for BMZ personnel to coordinate with their counterparts in other ministries, it facilitates cooperation with the more than 150 international organizations and NGOs based in Bonn, including 18 UN organizations, programs, and offices engaged in international development and assistance activities. These include the UN Climate Change Secretariat, Secretariat of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, UN

Volunteers program, UN Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response, UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, and the World Health Organization-Europe. Bonn also is home to the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), which carries out development, assistance, and education programs in more than 130 countries, and to the German Development Institute (DIE), which is ranked one of the 10 most influential think tanks dealing with international development policy.[11]

[1] [The German Government's 14th Development Policy Report](#), BMZ, April 2013.

[2] ["Dr. Gerd Müller, Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung,"](#) Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, December 2013.

[3] Kersten Augustin, ["Entwicklungsminister: Nein, nicht DER Gerd Müller,"](#) *Die Zeit*, 18 December 2013.

[4] Michael Bauchmüller, ["Neuer Entwicklungsminister Müller fordert Reform des Welthandels,"](#) *Süddeutscher Zeitung*, 27 December 2013.

[5] Angelika Hellemann and Martin Lambeck, ["Das wird mindestens zehn Jahre dauern,"](#) *Bild am Sonntag*, 26 January 2014; ["Von der Leyen will Einsätze im Ausland ausweiten,"](#) *Die Welt*, 27 January 2014; ["Mehr Verantwortung für Afrika,"](#) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 January 14.

[6] Florian Gathmann and Peter Müller, ["Endlich Minister,"](#) *Spiegel On-line*, 17 February 2014.

[7] Thomas Silberhorn, ["Kurier-Interview mit dem designierten Staatssekretär Thomas Silberhorn \(CSU\),"](#) *Nordbayerischer Kurier*, interview conducted by Elmar Schatz, 17 February 2014.

[8] ["Hans-Joachim Fuchtel, Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär beim Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung,"](#) Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, December 2013.

[9] Georgios Christidis, ["Merkels Gesandter erzürnte Griechen,"](#) *Der Spiegel*, November 2012.

[10] ["Dr. Friedrich Kitschelt, Staatssekretär im Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung,"](#) Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, January 2014; ["Dr. Kitschelt, Friedrich K. Leiter der Abteilung Afrika- und Lateinamerikapolitik, globale und sektorale Aufgaben Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung – Kurzbiographie,"](#) Urbantec Conference speakers profile.

[11] [“Dienststutz Bonn,”](#)BMZ; [“Aufbau und Organisation,”](#) BMZ; [“UN in Bonn – working towards sustainable development worldwide,”](#) UNESCO/UNEVOC brochure, 2011.

Bundestag Committees

The Bundestag plays a role in German foreign and defense policy through the oversight of government ministries, budget appropriations, and the requirement that it approve foreign military operations. The work of the Bundestag is conducted primarily through the permanent committees, which are reestablished at the beginning of each new parliament following federal elections. Three of the Bundestag committees dealing with foreign and defense policy—the committees for Foreign Affairs, Defense, and EU Affairs—are constitutionally mandated by the Basic Law. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees usually conduct their business in closed sessions because of the sensitive and often classified nature of the information they discuss.[1]

Members of the committees are selected by the respective parliamentary group leaders of the parties represented in the Bundestag. The parties are entitled to seats on the committees in proportion to their representation in the Bundestag. Committee chairs are determined in accordance with a formula agreed by the parliamentary groups that sets the order in which each group lays claim to a chairmanship. Each parliamentary group also names a senior representative to serve as its leader and primary spokesman on the committee. These senior representatives play a key role in negotiations to resolve differences or conflicts among committee members.[2]

Members of committees addressing foreign or defense issues in the Bundestag.

Committee chairs and leaders for the party groups on the committees are shown in bold type.

(Source: Deutscher Bundestag)

Foreign Affairs Committee

Chairman: Norbert Röttgen (CDU)

Christoph Bergner (CDU)	Elisabeth Motschmann (CDU)	Edelgard Bulmahn (SPD)	Franz Thönnies (SPD)
Peter Beyer (CDU)	Dr. Andreas Nick (CDU)	Gernot Erler (SPD)	Marieluise Beck (Greens)
Klaus Brähmig (CDU)	Michael Vietz (CDU)	Ute Fincke-Krämer (SPD)	Omid Nouripour (Greens)
Thorsten Frei (CDU)	Johann Wadephul (CDU)	Dagmar Freitag (SPD)	Frithjof Schmidt (Greens)
Manfred Grund (CDU)	Karl-Georg Wellmann (CDU)	Josip Juratovic (SPD)	Jürgen Trittin (Greens)
Dr. Egon Jüttner (CDU)	Peter Gauweiler (CSU)	Dr. Bärbel Kofler (SPD)	Jan van Aken (Left)
Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU)	Alexander Radwan (CSU)	Dietmar Nietan (SPD)	Sevim Dagdelen (Left)
Jürgen Klimke (CDU)	Dr. Hans-Peter Uhl (CSU)	Achim Post (SPD)	Wolfgang Gehrcke (Left)
Philipp Mißfelder (CDU)	Niels Annen (SPD)	Peer Steinbrück (SPD)	Stefan Liebich (Left)

Defense Committee

Chairman: Dr. Hans-Peter Bartels (SPD)

Michael Brand (CDU)	Michaela Noll (CDU)	Rainer Arnold (SPD)	Gabi Weber (SPD)
Ingo Gädechens (CDU)	Henning Otte (CDU)	Dr. Karl-Heinz Brunner (SPD)	Agnieszka Brugger (Greens)
Jürgen Hardt (CDU)	Anita Schäfer (CDU)	Dr. Fritz Felgentreu (SPD)	Dr. Tobias Lindner (Greens)
Jörg Hellmuth (CDU)	Bernd Siebert (CDU)	Wolfgang Hellmich (SPD)	Doris Wagner (Greens)
Robert Hochbaum (CDU)	Karin Strenz (CDU)	Heidtrud Henn (SPD)	Christine Buchholz (Left)
Dr. Karl A. Lamers (CDU)	Julia Bartz (CSU)	Thomas Hitschler (SPD)	Katrin Kunert (Left)
Wilfried Lorenz (CDU)	Dr. Reinhard Brandl (CSU)	Lars Klingbeil (SPD)	Dr. Alexander S. Neu (Left)
Giesela Manderla (CDU)	Florian Hahn (CSU)	Dirk Vöpel (SPD)	

EU Affairs Committee

Chairman: Gunther Krichbaum (CDU)

Mark Beermann (CDU)	Matern von Marschall (CDU)	Sabine Bätzing-Lichtenhäger (SPD)	Dirk Vöpel (SPD)
Dr. Christoph Bergner (CDU)	Dr. Martin Pätzold (CDU)	Dr. Lars Castellucci (SPD)	Annalena Baerbock (Gr.)
Thomas Dörflinger (CDU)	Detlef Seif (CDU)	Christina Kampmann (SPD)	Manuel Sarrazin (Greens)
Uwe Feiler (CDU)	Michael Stübgen (CDU)	Christian Petry (SPD)	Dr. Wolfgang
Thorsten Frei (CDU)	Katrin Albsteiger (CSU)	Joachim Poß (SPD)	Strengmann-Kuhn (Gr.)
Ursula Groden-Kranich (CDU)	Dr. Bernd Fabritius (CSU)	Dr. Dorothee Schlegel (SPD)	Dr. Diether Dehm (Left)
Astrid Grotelüschen (CDU)	Andrea Lindholz (CSU)	Norbert Spinrath (SPD)	Andrej Hunko (Left)
Jürgen Hardt (CDU)	Heinz-Joachim Barchmann (SPD)	Claudia Tausend (SPD)	Alexander Ulrich (Left)
Dr. Heribert Hirte (CDU)	Dr. Katarina Barley (SPD)		

Economic Cooperation and Development Committee

Chairman: Dagmar G. Wöhl (CSU)

Frank Heinrich (CDU)	Dr. Annette Schavan (CDU)	Gabriela Heinrich (SPD)	Gabi Weber (SPD)
Karl-Heinz Huber (CDU)	Johannes Selle (CDU)	Josip Juratovic (SPD)	Uwe Kekeritz (Greens)
Dr. Georg Kippels (CDU)	Peter Stein (CDU)	Dr. Bärbel Kofler (SPD)	Claudia Roth (Greens)
Jürgen Klimke (CDU)	Tobias Zech (CSU)	Dr. Sascha Raabe (SPD)	Heike Hänsel (Left)
Sibylle Pfeiffer (CDU)	Michaela Engelmeier-Heite (SPD)	Stefan Rebmann (SPD)	Niema Movassat (Left)

Committee Chairs

Norbert Röttgen (CDU) chairs the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee. Röttgen turned to foreign policy in mid-2012 in an effort to restart his political career after leading the CDU to a humiliating defeat in the 13 May 2012 state elections in North Rhine-Westphalia and subsequently losing his post as Environment Minister in the federal government.[3] In a

recent interview with *Deutschlandfunk*, Röttgen supported moves toward greater German engagement in efforts to resolve international problems, including the willingness to use military force when necessary. He also insisted that greater European unity is necessary for European powers to remain influential in world affairs.[4]

[Dr. Hans-Peter Bartels](#) (SPD) chairs the Bundestag Defense Committee. The SPD deputy from Kiel has been a member of the committee since 2000 and is one of his party's leading defense experts. He supports greater German military engagement in Africa, especially as part of a larger European security effort. Bartels is a strong supporter of greater EU military integration and lists "the step-by-step development of the EU's European Security and Defense Policy in the direction of a European Army" as one of his biggest challenges for the next four years. In a recent interview with Germany's *Die Welt*, he emphasized the need for the EU to have its own operational headquarters.[5]

[Gunther Krichbaum](#) (CDU) retains the Chairmanship of the Bundestag Committee for EU Affairs, which he has held since 2007. Krichbaum has been a member of the committee since 2002. The committee deals with fundamental questions of European integration, including institutional matters and EU enlargement. Krichbaum has sharply criticized UK Prime Minister David Cameron's plans to hold a referendum on the future of Britain's EU membership and warned London of the risk the referendum would become "less about the question asked and more about the person who's asking it." [6]

[Dagmar Wöhrl](#) (CSU) retains the chairmanship of the Bundestag Committee for Economic Cooperation and Development, which she has held since 2009. Wöhrl previously served as a Parliamentary State Secretary in the Economics Ministry from 2005 to 2009. She has focused her efforts on finance and budget issues, education projects, and anti-poverty programs, and also pushed for greater use of information technology in support of development programs. In a recent interview with *Deutsche Welle*, Wöhrl said the main focus of Germany's development assistance will continue to be in sub-Saharan Africa and the southern and eastern Mediterranean.[7]

[1] "[Funktion und Aufgabe der ständigen Ausschüsse](#)," Deutscher Bundestag; "[Auswärtiger Ausschuss](#)," Deutscher Bundestag; "[Verteidigungsausschuss](#)," Deutscher Bundestag.

[2] "[Funktion und Aufgabe der ständigen Ausschüsse](#)," Deutscher Bundestag.

[3] Matthias Geis, "[Er ist dann mal wieder da](#)," *Die Zeit*, 21 Nov 2013; "[Neuer Job für Röttgen](#)," *Süddeutscher Zeitung*, 13 June 2012.

[4] Norbert Röttgen, "[Wir brauchen eine Kultur des Engagements](#)," *Deutschlandfunk* (interview with Klaus Remme), 26 January 2014.

[5] Hans-Peter Bartels, "[Mehr Selbstbewusstsein in Sicherheitsfragen](#)," *Deutschlandradio Kultur* (interview with Nana Brink), 26 February 2014; "[Hans-Peter Bartels neuer Vorsitzender der Verteidigungsausschusses](#)," Hans-Peter Bartels SPD, January 2014; Hans-Peter Bartels, "[Wir können in Afrika nicht nur Zuschauer sein](#)," *Die Welt*, 21 January 2014.

[6] Patrick Wintour, "[Germany tells Cameron: don't blackmail the EU](#)," *Guardian* (UK), 10 January 2013.

[7] Dagmar Wöhr, "[Internationale Zusammenarbeit statt Entwicklungszusammenarbeit](#)," *Deutsche Welle* (interview with Mirjam Gehrke), 16 Jan 2014; Cordula Eubel, "[Über ihre Welt](#)," *Der Tagesspiegel*, 11 February 2014.

Foreign and Defense Policy Initiatives and Priorities

The opening paragraphs of the foreign policy section in the coalition agreement emphasize Germany's willingness to assume greater international responsibility and contribute reliably to crisis and conflict resolution in partnership with its allies and partners. [1] The new direction expressed in the coalition agreement and the subsequent statements and actions by the German government comes in response to calls from allies and partners for Germany to assume a greater leadership role and become more engaged in international efforts to address challenges to peace and stability, especially in the unstable regions on Europe's periphery. [2]

- Foreign Minister Steinmeier stated in an interview with the weekly *Der Spiegel* that he wants to change Berlin's habit of commenting from the sidelines about how the British, French, and Americans are pursuing the wrong course without being prepared to do more itself to address international problems. [3]
- In one of her first speeches after becoming Defense Minister, von der Leyen highlighted the importance of Germany's ability to win support from other allies for its positions at NATO, and praised former Defense Minister de Maizière for demonstrating that leadership in NATO does not have to come only from the United States. [4]

[1] [Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten – Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD](#), 18. Legislaturperiode, 27 November 2013.

[2] Radoslaw Sikorski, "[I fear Germany's power less than her inactivity](#)," *Financial Times*, 28 November 2011; "[The reluctant hegemon](#)," *The Economist*, 15 June 2013.

[3] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, "[Ukraine: 'Alles kann noch scheitern.'](#)" Auswärtiges Amt (reprint of article from *Der Spiegel*), 23 February 2014.

[4] Ursula von der Leyen, "[Rede der Verteidigungsministerin Ursula von der Leyen zum Abschied von Thomas de Maizière](#)," (MP3, 12.4MB), BMVg, 9 January 2014.

Contributions to Crisis and Conflict Resolution

Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Defense Minister von der Leyen emphasized Germany's responsibility to support international crisis prevention and conflict resolution efforts during statements laying out the government's policy priorities to the Bundestag in late January and again in remarks to an international audience at the Munich Security Conference in early February, where they were supported by President Joachim Gauck. Their remarks signaled a departure from the anti-interventionist stance embraced by former Foreign Minister Westerwelle with respect to military engagement in international crises. [1]

Several subsequent measures have given practical expression to the new policy direction. [2]

- Steinmeier and von der Leyen sought and received cabinet approval to reverse Germany's decision not to participate in the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. The cabinet agreed to accept hazardous waste products from the initial breakdown of mustard agents aboard a U.S. ship in the Mediterranean and neutralize them at a German facility in Münster. [3]
- Von der Leyen announced that she, Steinmeier, and Development Minister Müller would together develop a new Africa strategy combining military security, diplomatic initiatives, and humanitarian and economic assistance in an effort to create more stability. [4]
- The cabinet agreed 5 February to extend and expand the mandate for German military participation in the EU Training Mission in Mali, raising the ceiling for German troops from 180 to 250, [5] and to increase its development assistance program in Mali in cooperation with France.[6] The Defense Ministry also plans to send MEDEVAC aircraft to the Central African Republic and provide troops to the EU training mission in Somalia. [7]
- Steinmeier and French Foreign Minister Fabius announced a Franco-German cooperative project to secure loose weapons and munitions in Libya that pose a threat to regional stability. [8]

Resistance within the coalition to more active German military engagement, especially in Africa, has come primarily from the ranks of the CDU/CSU. Some of the opposition comes from conservative anti-interventionist elements that have a narrow, near-isolationist view of German security interests. Others are unhappy that von der Leyen has not, in their view, sufficiently informed and consulted party and parliamentary group colleagues on these new initiatives before announcing them in public. [9]

- Populist CSU Deputy Chairman Dr. Peter Gauweiler, known for his opposition to Western military interventions in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, criticized the new direction presented at the Munich Security Conference and told the party's traditional Ash Wednesday rally in Passau that "Germany will be defended in the Munich subway, not on the Hindu Kush." [10]
- CSU General Secretary Andreas Scheuer warned that his party is "very reserved" with respect to any expansion of German military engagements abroad.[11]

- CDU/CSU parliamentary group chairman Volker Kauder, foreign policy spokesman Philipp Mißfelder, and other senior party officials sharply criticized von der Leyen at a meeting of the parliamentary group leadership on 10 February after they learned of Defense Ministry planning for operations in the Central African Republic and Somalia from media sources.[12]

In response to these criticisms, the government sought to reassure both internal critics and the public that Germany is not embarking on a more militaristic approach to foreign policy. Government ministers said the media had overemphasized military aspects of the new engagement strategy and insisted the use of military force is still a measure of last resort. Comments by Foreign Minister Steinmeier indicate Germany is no more likely than before to participate in coercive military actions against rogue states.

- Von der Leyen noted that only three of the current missions in which German troops are participating (the missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and the Horn of Africa) authorize the use of military force to accomplish their mission. In most cases, German troops are used to provide training, support, and security. She further promised that German troops would never be used on a unilateral basis or even bilaterally with France, but only as part of multinational efforts.[13]
- Günter Nooke, Chancellor Merkel's personal advisor for Africa policy, said critics were wrong to focus on the military aspects of engagement and that the main focus would be on development assistance.[14]
- Steinmeier said he still believes Berlin made the right decision when it chose not to participate in military action against Libya and stated that he is "not very impressed with what those who dropped the bombs on Libya left behind." [15]

[1] Guido Westerwelle, ["Die Kultur der militärischen Zurückhaltung ist zeitgemäßer denn je."](#) Auswärtiges Amt, 30 March 2012.

[2] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ["Regierungserklärung von Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier zur Außen-, Europa- und Menschenrechtspolitik vor dem Deutschen Bundestag,"](#) Auswärtiges Amt, 29 January 2014; Ursula von der Leyen, video attachment to: Florian Manthey, ["Ministerin von der Leyen: 'Eine familienfreundliche Bundeswehr wird stärker,'" \(speech to the Bundestag 29 January\),](#) BMVg, 30 January 2014; Ursula von der Leyen, ["Rede der Bundesministerin der Verteidigung, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, anlässlich der 50. Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz,"](#) Munich Security Conference, 31 January 2014; Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ["Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier anlässlich der 50. Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz,"](#) Auswärtiges Amt, 1 February 2014.

[3] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ["Regierungserklärung von Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier zur Außen-, Europa- und Menschenrechtspolitik vor dem Deutschen Bundestag,"](#) Auswärtiges Amt, 29 January 2014; ["Germany pledges further help in destruction of Syrian chemical weapons,"](#) *Deutsche Welle*, 9 January 2014.

- [4] Ursula von der Leyen, video attachment to: Florian Manthey, “[Ministerin von der Leyen: ‘Eine familienfreundliche Bundeswehr wird stärker,’](#)” (speech to the Bundestag 29 January), BMVg, 30 January 2014; “[Auslandseinsätze – Von der Leyen verteidigt stärkeres Engagement,](#)” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 January 2014.
- [5] “[Bundeskabinett beschließt Mandatsverlängerung für die Einsätze ISAF and EUTM Mali,](#)” BMVg, 5 February 2014.
- [6] “[Kabinett verlängert Einsätze in Afghanistan und Mali,](#)” *Spiegel On-line*, 5 February 2014.
- [7] “[Bundeswehr mit 20 Soldaten nach Somalia,](#)” *Der Tagesspiegel*, 4 March 2014.
- [8] “[Deutsche-Französisches Engagement für Stabilität und Sicherheit in Libyen und der Region: Gemeinsames Project zur Sicherstellung von Waffenbeständen in Libyen,](#)” Auswärtiges Amt, 6 March 2014.
- [9] Robert Birnbaum and Antje Sirleschtov, “[Ursula von der Leyen – Ministerin im Alleingang,](#)” *Der Tagesspiegel*, 12 February 2014.
- [10] Peter Gauweiler, “[Rede von Peter Gauweiler – Politischer Aschermittwoch der CSU am 05.03.2014,](#)” *YouTube*, 5 March 2014; Reinhard Bingener, “[Politischer Aschermittwoch der CSU, Mit Franz Josef Strauß Richtung Moskau,](#)” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 March 2014.
- [11] Robert Birnbaum and Antje Sirleschtov, “[Ursula von der Leyen – Ministerin im Alleingang,](#)” *Der Tagesspiegel*, 12 February 2014.
- [12] Ibid.
- [13] “[Von der Leyen: Kein Kampfeinsatz in Zentralafrika,](#)” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 February 2014.
- [14] Ulrike Scheffer and Michel Penke, “[Es geht um unsere Interessen und Werte,](#)” *Der Tagesspiegel* (interview with Günther Nooke), 15 February 2014.
- [15] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “[Ukraine: ‘Alles kann noch scheitern,’](#)” Auswärtiges Amt (reprint of interview published in *Der Spiegel*, 23 February 2014).

Status of foreign Deployments

Germany has about 4,900 military personnel deployed in multinational peace support operations. Mandates for these deployments must be approved by the Bundestag and are usually limited to a period of 12 months, after which the Bundestag must approve an

extension if the mission is to continue. As of 5 March. Troop levels are the number of troops present for duty, which can fluctuate daily.^[1]

German Military Participation in Multinational Missions				
Mission	Location	Troop Level	Troop Ceiling	Mandate Ends
ISAF	Afghanistan	3,025	3,300	31 Dec 2014
KFOR	Kosovo	696	1,850	08 Jun 2014
EUFOR ATALANTA	Horn of Africa/Indian Ocean	330	1,400	31 May 2014
ACTIVE FENCE	Turkey	284	400	31 Jan 2015
UNIFIL	Eastern Mediterranean/Lebanon	159	300	30 Jun 2014
OAE	Mediterranean Sea	113	500	31 Dec 2015
EUTM Mali	Mali	109	250	28 Feb 2015
MINUSMA	Senegal, Mali	78	150	30 Jun 2014
UNAMID	Sudan	10	50	31 Dec 2014
UNMISS	South Sudan	14	50	31 Dec 2014
EUSEC RD Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo	3		30 Sep 2014
EUCAP NESTOR	Horn of Africa	3	5	Sep 2014
MINURSO	Western Sahara	2	4	30 Apr 2014
UNAMA	Afghanistan	1		Mar 2014

As of 5 March. Troop levels are the number of troops present for duty, which can fluctuate daily.¹

Extension of the ISAF Mandate in Afghanistan. On 5 February, the cabinet approved an extension of the mandate for German military contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan through the end of 2014, when the current UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the mission and the NATO approved operations plan expire. The extended mandate, which was approved by the Bundestag 20 February by a vote of 498 to 84, reduced the ceiling for German troop levels in Afghanistan from 4,400 to 3,300 and included additional logistics personnel assigned to pack up and return material and supplies to Germany.[2]

The German government plans to contribute to a post-ISAF NATO-led training and advisory mission in Afghanistan, provided the United States and Afghanistan are able to conclude a new security cooperation agreement that will provide a suitable legal basis for the continued presence of NATO forces. [3] The German military would provide between 600 and 800 troops to the new mission, which is not expected to involve combat operations. In talks with President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan on 9 February, Steinmeier stressed the importance of quickly signing a new security cooperation agreement, both for planning and to convince the German public and parliament to support the mission.[4]

As the ISAF mission winds down, Germany and its NATO allies will focus more on civilian assistance and reconstruction operations intended to enhance Afghanistan's social, economic, and political stability. The German government has announced plans to invest up to €430 million annually in economic cooperation and development projects through at least 2016.[5] In early March, Germany's Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development presented a new development policy strategy for cooperation with Afghanistan during the period 2014-2017.[6] It calls for more focus on good government and measures to promote employment, especially in rural agricultural areas. More effort also will be devoted to education and professional development.[7]

Extension of Mandates for Operations ACTIVE FENCE and ACTIVE ENDEAVOR. In its first meeting on 8 January, the new cabinet agreed on extensions for Germany's deployment of Patriot air and missile defense systems along Turkey's border with Syria (NATO Operation ACTIVE FENCE) and for German participation in NATO's maritime security and counterterrorism patrols in the Mediterranean Sea as part of Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR (OAE). The Bundestag approved both decisions 29 January, voting 523 to 71 to extend the Patriot deployment, and 467 to 129 to extend German participation in OAE. The extended mandates allow the Bundeswehr to maintain two Patriot air and missile defense batteries with up to 400 troops in southeastern Turkey and a naval force with up to 500 troops in OAE. [8]

Foreign Minister Steinmeier acknowledged during the Bundestag's first reading of the OAE mandate extension on 16 January that the operational reality of the mission no longer corresponds to the original NATO Article 5 basis on which it was launched following the 9/11 attacks on the United States. He said it has evolved from a counterterrorism operation into a surveillance and observation mission for maintaining situational awareness and promoting cooperation in the Mediterranean. Steinmeier argued that the 11-month mandate extension and reduced troop ceiling (from 700 to 500) will provide a bridging solution to allow time for negotiations with NATO allies on a new legal basis for the mission. He claimed to have broad support from other NATO members for the change, but said it is still necessary to convince two NATO members that have a different opinion.[9]

Continuing Support to Counterpiracy Operation ATALANTA. German representatives at the 4 March force generation conference in Brussels announced plans to continue their contribution to the EU's counterpiracy operation off the Horn of Africa, contingent on the Bundestag's extension of the mandate that expires on 31 May. Germany currently provides a frigate and a P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft as part of its 330-member contingent, which operates out of French facilities in Djibouti. The main area of operations is the Gulf of Aden and the waters of the Indian Ocean off the east coast of Somalia.[10]

UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. Germany supports the Maritime Task Force of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with two guided-missile fast patrol boats operating from the port of Limassol in southern Cyprus. The Maritime Task Force patrols the waters off the coast of Lebanon to interdict shipments of weapons intended for Hezbollah. The German contingent also trains members of the Lebanese Navy. The current mandate for the mission expires at the end of June, when it likely will be extended for another year by the Bundestag.[11]

The German Navy also rotates its three Oste-Class electronic surveillance ships on deployments to the eastern Mediterranean. Although deployed as national assets, they collect information to support the UNIFIL mission as well as fulfill national intelligence tasks such as monitoring the situation inside Syria. The electronic surveillance ship *Alster* departed its home port of Eckernförde 24 February for a 4-month deployment to the eastern Mediterranean and is expected to return at the end of June.[12]

- German Navy LCDR Frédéric Strauch, deputy commander of the squadron operating the electronic surveillance ships, said the information they collect allows Germany to make its own independent assessments of the situation free of any foreign influences.[13]

Maintaining Stability in Kosovo. Germany's contribution to the NATO-led peace support operation in Kosovo (KFOR) numbers about 700 troops. Its main elements include KFOR headquarters support in Pristina, medical and logistics units in Prizren, and a maneuver company in Novo Selo tasked with maintaining order and freedom of movement in northern Kosovo.[14] Defense Ministry Parliamentary State Secretary Brauksiepe visited the German contingent in early March to make a personal assessment of the situation and of the contributions made by German troops to peace and stability in Kosovo. He reiterated that Germany will continue to support the mission at the current level until NATO members decide the political and security criteria for further reductions in KFOR force levels have been met.[15] KFOR is currently holding the second phase of its planned three-phase drawdown of forces in Kosovo but does not believe the situation is stable enough to move forward with phase three. The third phase would see a reduction in force levels from about 4,900 troops to fewer than 2,500.[16]

Expanding Commitments in Africa. Germany will increase its military contributions to multinational operations in Africa in response to unrest in Mali and the Central African Republic, French calls for more assistance from its European allies, and Germany's interest in developing the EU's common defense and security policy. Defense Minister von der Leyen emphasized in an interview with the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that the Bundeswehr will provide advice, training, transportation, and medical support but has no plans to engage in combat operations.[17]

- The Bundestag has approved an increase the size of Germany's contribution the EU Training Mission in Mali in an effort to relieve the burden on French troops there. Germany and France also agreed at their joint ministerial meeting 19 February in Paris to deploy elements of the Franco-German brigade for the first time to support this effort.[18]
- Germany has offered medical evacuation aircraft and headquarters staff to support the EU stabilization mission in the Central African Republic.[19]
- The Bundeswehr plans to join the EU training mission in Somalia in April and send up to 20 troops to Mogadishu, according to a Defense Ministry spokesman.[20]

[1] "[Einsatzzahlen – Die Stärke der deutsche Einsatzkontingente](#)," BMVg, 7 February 2014; "[ÜBERSICHT ÜBER BESTEHENDE AUSLANDSMANDATE DER BUNDESWEHR](#)," Deutscher Bundestag, 26 February 2014.

[2] "[Bundeswehr weiter in Afghanistan](#)," Bundesregierung, 5 February 2014; "[ISAF-Mandat letztmalig vom Deutschen Bundestag verlängert](#)," BMVg, 20 February 2013.

[3] *Bundeswehr weiter in Afghanistan*, German Government.

[4] "[Außenminister Steinmeier in Afghanistan](#)," Auswärtiges Amt, 9 Feb 2014.

[5] "[Bundeswehr weiter in Afghanistan](#)," Bundesregierung, 5 February 2014

- [6] [“Verlässliche Partnerschaft in Zeiten des Umbruchs – Neue entwicklungspolitische Strategie für die Zusammenarbeit mit Afghanistan im Zeitraum 2014-2017,”](#) BMZ, 3 March 2014
- [7] [“Verlässliche Partnerschaft in Zeiten des Umbruchs – Neue entwicklungspolitische Strategie für die Zusammenarbeit mit Afghanistan im Zeitraum 2014-2017,”](#) BMZ, 3 March 2014; [“Neue Afghanistan-Länderstrategie: Verlässliche Partner in Zeiten des Umbruchs,”](#) BMZ, 12 March 2014.
- [8] [“Bundestag stimmt Einsätzen der Bundeswehr in der Türkei und im Mittelmeer zu,”](#) Auswärtiges Amt, 29 January 2014.
- [9] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, [“Rede von Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in der ersten Lesung zur Verlängerung des Mandats für die Fortsetzung der deutschen Beteiligung an der Operation Active Endeavor \(OAE\) am 16. Januar 2014 im Deutschen Bundestag,”](#) Auswärtiges Amt.
- [10] [“Aktuelle Lage in den Einsatzgebieten der Bundeswehr,”](#) BMVg Presse- und Informationsstab, 7 March 2014.
- [11] Ibid.
- [12] Dana Schubert, [“Mit Schutzengel auf Fahrt – Flottendienstboot ‘Alster’ ausgelaufen,”](#) German Navy, 27 February 2014; Kai Pörksen, [“Lauschen im Mittelmeer,”](#) *Kieler Nachrichten*, 24 February 2014.
- [13] Kai Pörksen, [“Lauschen im Mittelmeer,”](#) *Kieler Nachrichten*, 24 February 2014.
- [14] Stephan Nakszynski, [“Die Kosovo Force heute,”](#) BMVg, 15 January 2014.
- [15] Dethold Webschach, [“Aller Ehren wert,”](#) BMVg, 5 March 2014.
- [16] Stephan Nakszynski, [“Die Kosovo Force heute,”](#) BMVg, 15 January 2014.
- [17] Ursula von der Leyen, [“Ursula von der Leyen im Gespräch ‘Alleingänge mit deutschen Soldaten wird es nich geben,’”](#) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 February 2014.
- [18] [“Mehr Ausbildung in Mali,”](#) Bundesregierung; 20 February 2014; [“Erklärung des Rates des Deutsch-französischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrats \(DFVSR\),”](#) Auswärtiges Amt, 19 February 2014.
- [19] Matthias Gebauer, [“Bundeswehr will doch Soldaten nach Bangui schicken,”](#) *Spiegel Online*, 25 February 2014.
- [20] [“Bundeswehr mit 20 Soldaten nach Somalia,”](#) *Der Tagesspiegel*, 4 March 2014.

Ukraine Crisis Threatens to Derail German Ostpolitik

The new government made improving relations with Russia one of its foreign policy priorities. The coalition agreement devoted an entire page to this theme and put it immediately after the section stressing the importance of NATO and transatlantic relations. [1] The government also replaced Kremlin critic Andreas Schockenhoff with the more Russia-friendly Gernot Erler as its Coordinator for Relations with Russia, Central Asia, and the EU's Eastern Partnership countries. [2] The coalition working group on foreign and security policy had already rejected attempts by Schockenhoff to insert tough language toward Russia in the coalition agreement along with language explicitly supporting pro-democracy movements in Russia. [3]

- The coalition agreement contains the assertion that “security in and for Europe can only be achieved with Russia, not against it.” [4] This phrase was often repeated by Foreign Minister Steinmeier during and after his term in the previous grand coalition government. [5]

Steinmeier made a two-day visit to Moscow on 13-14 February in an effort to put relations with Russia on a more positive track. In an interview with the Russian daily *Kommersant*, Steinmeier said it was important to him at the beginning of his new term as Foreign Minister to offer “a trusting and cooperative relationship with Moscow.” The centerpiece of his visit was an extensive series of discussions with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov addressing a full range of global issues such as the situation in Syria and nuclear talks with Iran, but focusing mainly on German-Russian relations and relations between Russia and the European Union. Steinmeier said he remained convinced that cooperation with Russia is indispensable to resolving the major conflicts threatening global stability, and that “we need each other” to make progress on these issues. [6]

At the joint press conference following their meetings, Lavrov said Moscow is ready to further develop relations in the strategic partnership format and believes the new coalition government in Germany has demonstrated the same intention. He claimed the two countries have close positions on the majority of international issues and need to work more closely “to advance general European processes and regulate key foreign policy problems.” However, with respect to human rights and civil society issues, Lavrov suggested progress is possible only so long as one group of states does not attempt to impose its concept of universal values on others. Lavrov also criticized the EU for trying to expand its sphere of influence into Ukraine at Russia's expense and warned Steinmeier that the EU was playing a divisive geopolitical game that could damage Ukraine if not abandoned immediately. [7]

When the confrontation between Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and anti-Yanukovich protesters in Kiev escalated into deadly violence in mid-February, Berlin responded to the worsening situation with a major diplomatic effort to defuse the crisis. Foreign Minister Steinmeier traveled with French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius and Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski to Kiev, where the trio mediated an agreement between Yanukovich and the opposition leaders providing for a unity government, restoration of the 2004 constitution, and early presidential elections in 2014. [8] Chancellor Merkel reportedly convinced Russian President Vladimir Putin to send moderate Vladimir Lukin as his envoy to the talks. Lukin initialed the proposed agreement, although he did not sign it. [9]

This brief opportunity to deescalate the crisis quickly unraveled when protesters in the streets of Kiev refused to accept the agreement and Yanukovich fled the country after losing the protection of his security forces. Instead of the proposed unity government, an interim government was formed that included anti-Russian right-wing nationalists, some of whom were given senior positions in control of Ukraine's security and defense sectors. [10] Moscow denounced the development as a coup, refused to accept the legitimacy of the new government, and sent military forces into Crimea, ostensibly to protect the region's ethnic-Russian majority. Crimea's regional parliament organized a referendum to break away from Ukraine and become part of the Russian Federation.

As the crisis worsened, the German government took a leading role in diplomatic efforts to deescalate the situation. Chancellor Merkel made repeated calls to Russian President Putin, U.S. President Obama, and European leaders, while Foreign Minister Steinmeier engaged in a series of meetings with Russian officials in Brussels, Paris, Geneva, and Bern in an effort to find a solution. [11] Simultaneously, Berlin began to make preparations with its EU partners for the phased implementation of political, financial, and economic sanctions against Russia. In an address to the Bundestag on 13 March, Chancellor Merkel said, "None of us wishes that it comes to such measures, but we are all prepared and committed in case it becomes unavoidable." [12]

Although Berlin is under pressure, especially from allies in central and eastern Europe, to take a harder line toward Moscow and make it pay a high cost for its violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity, it is uncertain how far Berlin is prepared to go in enacting and sustaining sanctions that will impose a heavy cost on the German and European economies as well as on Russia. More than 6,200 German companies have a presence in Russia, and many exporters of heavy industrial and consumer goods rely on sales to Russia paid for by the revenues generated from Russia's oil and gas exports to Europe.

- According to a Politbarometer poll taken in mid-March by *Forschungsgruppe Wahlen*, only 26 percent of Germans support economic sanctions against Russia. Another 44 percent believe sanctions should be limited to political measures, and 25 percent believe the EU should stay out of the conflict entirely. [13]
- A survey conducted by the German polling firm *Infratest dimap* in early March found little support among Germans for political efforts to isolate Russia. Only 19 percent supported excluding Russia from the G8, and only 7 percent favored breaking off all political relations with Moscow. [14]

Germany's response to the crisis in Ukraine has demonstrated a close and effective working relationship between Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier. They have remained in constant contact throughout the crisis, and officials around the duo claim they are completely in accord about the course of action. [15]

[1] Benjamin Bidder and Oliver Bilger, "[Moskau setzt auf einen Außenminister Steinmeier](#)," *Spiegel On-line*, 4 December 2013.

- [2] [“Richtungsentscheidung – Bundesregierung streitet über Russlandpolitik,”](#) *Spiegel Online*, 20 December 2013.
- [3] Rolf Mützenich, [“Außenpolitik mit sozialdemokratischer Handschrift!”](#), 25 November 2013;
- [4] [“Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten – Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD](#), 18. Legislaturperiode, CDU, 27 November 2013.
- [5] [“Germany’s Steinmeier warns against isolating Russia,”](#) *Reuters*, 31 August 2008; Frank-Walter Steinmeier, [“Speech at the Department of International Relations of the Urals State University in Yekaterinburg,”](#) Auswärtiges Amt, 13 May 2008.
- [6] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, [“An einer gemeinsamen Zukunft mit Russland arbeiten,”](#) Auswärtiges Amt –(German text of interview with *Kommersant*), 14 February 2014; [“Ausführliche Gespräche in Moskau,”](#) Auswärtiges Amt, 14 February 2014.
- [7] Sergey Lavrov, [“Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, during the press conference summarising the results of the negotiations with the German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Moscow, 14 February 2014,”](#) Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 February 2014; Thomas Maron, [“Steinmeier bleibt ganz cool,”](#) *Stuttgarter-Zeitung*, 14 February 2014; [“Lawrow greift EU wegen Konflikt in Ukraine an,”](#) *Spiegel On-Line*, 14 February 2014; Matthew Bodner, [“Lavrov Has Harsh Words for EU,”](#) *The Moscow Times*, 17 February 2014.
- [8] [“Krisen-Diplomatie in der Ukraine,”](#) Auswärtiges Amt, 21 February 2014; [“Vereinbarung zur Lösung der Krise in der Ukraine unterzeichnet,”](#) Auswärtiges Amt, 21 February 2014.
- [9] Antje Sirleschtov, [“Merkel/Steinmeier: Ein eingespieltes Team,”](#) *Der Tagesspiegel*, 5 March 2014.
- [10] Reinhard Veser, [“Alte Minister und neue Helden,”](#) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 March 2014.
- [11] Majid Sattar, [“Strategische Mehrdeutigkeit,”](#) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 March 2014.
- [12] Angela Merkel, [“Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel,”](#) Bundeskanzleramt/Bundeskanzlerin, 13 March 2014.
- [13] Ruth Ciesinger, [“Mehrheit der Deutschen will keine Sanktionen gegenüber Russland,”](#) *Der Tagesspiegel*, 14 March 2014.
- [14] Jörg Schönenbom, [“Solidarität mit der Ukraine,”](#) *ARD-Deutschland Trend* (results of poll conducted by Infratest dimap), 6 March 2014.
- [15] Antje Sirleschtov, [“Merkel/Steinmeier: Ein eingespieltes Team,”](#) *Der Tagesspiegel*, 5 March 2014.

European Integration and the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy

With the election behind her, Chancellor Merkel has been more outspoken in support of further European integration. In the new government's declaration to the Bundestag on 29 January, she said Europe's future requires further integration, including strengthening of European institutions, the creation of a genuine economic union, and a willingness for Europe to "bundle its forces" to meet the challenges ahead. [1] Following talks with Luxembourg's Prime Minister Xavier Bettel on 6 February, Merkel called for moving ahead with banking union and for closer cooperation among euro zone members. She also said that in a world of seven billion persons, the Europeans will have to act together and speak with one voice if they are to play a role in shaping the future. [2]

Thorsten Benner, Director of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, noted last December that Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Defense Minister von der Leyen "are very much in favor of greater EU integration," in particular with regard to the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). He added that Chancellery Chief of Staff Altmaier and Finance Minister Schäuble share similar aspirations and likely would support a "smart plan" for driving forward European security and defense integration. [3]

- During the NATO defense ministerial in Brussels 26-27 February, von der Leyen reiterated Germany's support for the concept of "framework nations" in which larger allies with a broad spectrum of capabilities create force structures capable of integrating the niche capabilities of smaller allies in order to preserve capabilities that otherwise might be lost in times of tight budgets. [4]

Armed Forces chief General Wieker focused on German efforts to promote greater European defense integration in his address to the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) 12 February. Wieker said the Bundeswehr wants to expand and further develop the concept of pooling and sharing and will support this process through its own structural reforms. The Bundeswehr will maintain a broad spectrum of capabilities—even at the expense of depth and sustainability—so that Germany can serve as a framework nation capable of integrating the contributions of smaller allies. Wieker noted that the process also requires building mutual trust among allies as well as strengthening the mechanisms of European institutions in order to build complementary capabilities, close capability gaps, and reduce redundancies. [5]

Germany has found willing partners for its European defense integration goals in the BENELUX countries and also increasingly in Poland. Dutch Defense Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert and Belgian Defense Minister Pieter de Crem have supported Germany's framework nation concept and are pursuing a wide range of cooperative projects with Germany, with each other, and with other European partners.[6] Poland and Germany are exploring possibilities for enhanced naval cooperation; they continued their discussions on this initiative during Defense Minister von der Leyen's visit to Warsaw 6 March. [7]

- Hennis-Plasschaert and former German Defense Minister de Mazière signed a declaration of intent on further enhancement of bilateral defense cooperation 28 May 2013, in which they agreed that "all possibilities for bilateral cooperation will be

exploited, within all areas of concept and capability development, command and control, combat as well as combat support and combat service support.” An annex to the agreement identifies a long list of projects that includes integration of the Netherlands 11th Airmobile Brigade in the German Army’s Rapid Reaction Division (*Division Schnelle Kräfte - DSK*), development of a German-Netherlands fire support (artillery) unit, development of a sea-based missile defense capability, and intensified bilateral cooperation on ground-based air and missile defense. [8]

- De Mazière and his Polish counterpart Tomasz Siemoniak signed a declaration of intent on enhanced maritime cooperation 27 May 2013. Among the list of 28 opportunities for potential projects are cooperation in the field of submarines, common development/procurement and manning of Joint Support Ships and new tankers, and embarkation of helicopter detachments on each other’s ships. They also agreed to cooperate on maritime situational awareness in the Baltic Sea area.[9]
- Germany and its BENELUX partners also point to the European Air Transport Command (EATC), a multinational command exercising operational control and air tasking authority over the air transport fleets of Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, as a prime example of the benefits of pooling and sharing military assets and capabilities.[10]

The results of a Eurobarometer poll published in February 2014 revealed strong public support for more concerted European action in foreign and security policy. According to the poll, 75 percent of Germans and 63 percent of all EU respondents are in favor of a common EU foreign policy, while 82 percent of Germans and 73 percent of all EU respondents would like a common defense and security policy. The poll, conducted in all 28 member states of the EU from 2 to 17 November 2013, also showed a preference for deepening rather than widening the European Union: 69 percent of Germans and 52 percent of all EU respondents rejected further enlargement. [11]

Turkey’s EU Aspirations. The CDU/CSU and SPD were unable to resolve their differences over Turkey’s bid for full membership in the European Union. The CDU/CSU remain opposed to, and the SPD continues to support, eventual Turkish membership. According to SPD foreign policy spokesman Dr. Rolf Mützenich, the CDU and CSU tried but failed to include language in the coalition agreement rejecting Turkey’s EU membership on the grounds that Turkey does not fulfill the conditions for membership. [12] The final text of the coalition agreement skirts the membership issue, describing Turkey’s negotiations with the EU as an open-ended process with no automaticity or guarantee of the outcome. It states that if the EU proves incapable of integrating Turkey or Turkey is unable to meet the obligations of membership, a way must be found to closely tie Turkey to EU structures, including strategic cooperation in foreign and security policy questions. [13] Former Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, wrote in December that the coalition’s lack of unity on this issue will hinder Germany from playing a more proactive role internationally. [14]

- On the eve of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Germany in early February, Foreign Minister Steinmeier called for the acceleration of Turkey’s EU membership negotiations following a meeting in Berlin with his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu. Steinmeier said the door must remain open to Turkish membership, despite growing concerns within the EU about the Turkish government’s lack of respect for the rule of law and the independence of the Turkish judiciary. [15]

- Chancellor Merkel was much less supportive of Turkey's membership aspirations during her meeting with Erdogan on 4 February. In response to Erdogan's request for German support of Turkey's membership bid, Merkel repeated the agreed coalition position that the negotiations are an open-ended process but said she remains skeptical about Turkey's full membership in the EU. [16] Moreover, Germany's *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* reported that the CDU's draft program for elections to the European Parliament contains language expressly rejecting Turkish membership. [17]

[1] Angela Merkel, "[Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel](#)," Bundeskanzleramt/Bundeskanzlerin, 29 January 2014.

[2] Angela Merkel, "[Statements von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und dem luxemburgischen Premierminister Bettel im Bundeskanzleramt](#)," Bundeskanzleramt/Bundeskanzlerin, 6 February 2014; "[Merkel: Europa muss mit einer Stimme sprechen, Bundesregierung](#)," 6 February 2014.

[3] Thorsten Benner, "[European defense policy needs new impetus](#)," *Deutsche Welle*, 19 December 2013.

[4] Ursula von der Leyen, "[Ministerin im DLF-Interview: NATO-Staaten müssen sich 'miteinander modern aufstellen'](#)," *Deutschlandfunk/Deutschlandradio*, 27 February 2014.

[5] "[Generalinspekteur: Sicherheitspolitik geht alle an](#)," BMVg, 13 February 2014; "[Deutschland hat keinen Grund, sich zu verstecken](#)," DGAP, 12 February 2014.

[6] "[Minister Hennis-Plasschaert eist politieke moed van bondgenoten](#)," Netherlands Ministry of Defense, 31 January 2014; J.A. Hennis-Plasschaert, [Speech at the Munich Security Conference](#), 2 February 2013; "[Kamerbrief over de internationale militaire samenwerking](#)," Netherlands Ministry of Defense BS2014002622, 13 February 2014; Pieter De Crem, [Speech to the Atlantic Treaty Association](#), 10 December 2013.

[7] Florian Manthey, "[Vertrauensvolle Kooperation: Ministerin von der Leyen besucht ihren polnischen Amtskollegen](#)," BMVg, 7 March 2014.

[8] [Declaration of Intent between the Federal Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the further Enhancement of Bilateral Relations in the Field of Defence](#), Netherlands Ministry of Defense, 28 May 2013.

[9] [Declaration of Intent between the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland on Enhanced Maritime Cooperation](#), 27 May 2013; Thomas Wiegold, "[Deutsche und Polen: Gemeinsam aufs Joint Support Ship](#)," *Augen Geradeaus!*, 28 May 2013; "[Vertiefung der deutsch-polnischen Zusammenarbeit](#)," German Navy Press and Information Center, 27 May 2013.

[10] Norbert Thomas, "[Multinationale Effektivität – EATC](#)," German Air Force, 22 February 2013; Nicholas Fiorenza, "[Belgium Sees Savings in EATC](#)," *Aviation Week*, 11 March 2013.

[11] [Eurobarometer: Deutsche verlangen koordinierteres Vorgehen der EU-Staaten, EU Commission Representation in Germany](#), 11 February 2014.

[12] Rolf Mützenich, "[Außenpolitik mit sozialdemokratischer Handschrift!](#)," December 2013.

[13] [Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten – Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD](#), 18. Legislaturperiode, 27 November 2013.

[14] Wolfgang Ischinger, "[Deutsche Außenpolitik in der 'Großen Koalition': Nichts Neues?](#)" *Munich Security Conference – Monthly Mind*, December 2013.

[15] "[Steinmeier: Tür zur EU muss offen bleiben](#)," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 February 2014.

[16] "[Merkel zeigt Ergogan die kalte Schulter](#)," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 February 2014;

[17] "[Europa-Wahlprogramm CDU will EU-Vollmitgliedschaft der Türkei verhindern](#)," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 February 2014.

Transatlantic Relations

A report posted by Chancellor Merkel's office on the occasion of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Berlin in late January stressed that the transatlantic partnership with the United States is one of the most important pillars of German foreign and security policy, along with European integration. The report described the United States as "Germany's closest ally outside of Europe." The talks between Merkel and Kerry addressed important international issues such as the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria, Iran's nuclear program, and the deteriorating situation in Ukraine, as well as significant challenges to the bilateral relationship posed by negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and revelations about NSA surveillance activities in Germany. [1]

In the new government's declaration to the Bundestag 29 January, Chancellor Merkel devoted most of her comments on U.S.-German relations (11 of 13 paragraphs) to the strains resulting from revelations about NSA surveillance activities and the subsequent inability to reach a bilateral understanding on the way forward. Merkel said the revelations reveal a sharp difference of opinion in the two countries over the proper balance between personal privacy and national security but stressed the most serious aspect of the issue is that it undermines trust that forms the foundation for cooperative relations among allies. She acknowledged the possibility that U.S. and German differences on this issue may be impossible to bridge but said she will continue to argue Germany's position in discussions with Washington. [2]

- Merkel rejected calls from some in her government to suspend talks or cooperation in other areas—such as the SWIFT agreement giving U.S. agencies access to data on terrorist financing—in an effort to leverage concessions from Washington. [3]
- The Chancellor emphasized that despite conflicts, disappointments, and divergence of interests, Germany could not wish for a better partner than the United States and she insisted the transatlantic relationship would remain of paramount importance. [4]

Philipp Mißfelder, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group’s foreign policy spokesman, summarized the state of German-U.S. relations in an interview with the German foreign broadcast service *Deutsche Welle*.

“America treats us as a friend and we are still friends and nothing will change that. ... The fact is: the U.S. is very helpful to us in many things, such as Germany’s domestic and international security—in the fight against terror, or in regard to cooperation in such things as international military operations. ... We remain good friends and want to remain good friends. But the friendship has been damaged by the fact that the agencies have taken what they wanted without asking.” [5]

Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement. With negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership set to resume this spring, Berlin is concerned about flagging support for the effort on both sides of the Atlantic. The coalition agreement describes TTIP as a project of central importance for deepening transatlantic relations,[6] and Germany—as one of the world’s leading exporters—stands to benefit greatly from reducing trade barriers. However, the EU side reportedly has been disappointed that Washington is not willing to go as far as the EU would like in reducing tariffs or in addressing the financial services sector. Moreover, many in Europe are concerned about growing public opposition based on fears the agreement will undermine European standards for safety, consumer protection, and data security. The fact that the U.S. administration has not obtained fast track trade authority from Congress also has lowered expectations for rapid progress in the negotiations. [7]

[1] [“Merkel: Gemeinsam Lösungen finden,”](#) Bundeskanzleramt/Bundeskanzlerin, 31 January 2014; Günter Bannas, [“Kerry über die NSA-Affäre ‘Die vergangenen Monate waren rauh,’”](#) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31 January 2014.

[2] Angela Merkel, [“Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel,”](#) Bundeskanzleramt/Bundeskanzlerin, 29 January 2014.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Philipp Mißfelder, [“No-Spy deal is no cure-all,”](#) *Deutsche Welle* (interview), 15 January 2014.

[6] [Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten – Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD](#), 18. Legislaturperiode, CDU, 27 November 2013.

[7] Gregor Peter Schmitz, "[Freihandelsabkommen zwischen EU und USA wackelt](#)," *Spiegel On-line*, 6 March 2014; Matthew Dalton, "[Europe Grumbles as Trade Talks with U.S. Falter](#)," *Wall Street Journal*, 6 March 2014.

Public Support for the Government's Foreign and Defense Policy

A public opinion poll conducted by Infratest dimap for *ARD-Deutschlandtrend* in early March gave the government its best marks in foreign and defense policy. According to the poll, 67 percent of respondents said they were satisfied with the government's conduct of foreign policy, and only 28 percent said they were dissatisfied. A slight majority of 51 percent also said they were satisfied with the government's conduct of defense policy, compared to 41 percent who said they were dissatisfied. The government's work across all areas was viewed positively by only 47 percent of respondents, while 51 percent said they were dissatisfied. The government received poor marks for its domestic policy, especially its social and energy policies, which were viewed negatively by 68 and 73 percent of the public respectively. [1]

[1] Jörg Schönenbom, "[Solidarität mit der Ukraine](#)," *ARD-Deutschland Trend* (results of poll conducted by Infratest dimap), 6 March 2014.

Executive Summary

- Chancellor Angela Merkel's new grand coalition government is supported by an overwhelming parliamentary majority in the Bundestag, enabling it to pursue its foreign and defense policies without any serious interference from the opposition.
- All three coalition partners—Merkel's center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian affiliate Christian Social Union (CSU), and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD)—have a major role in implementing the government's foreign and security policy.
- Most of the ministers and senior government officials dealing with foreign and defense policy are committed to the goal of further European integration, and many support the eventual creation of a European federal state. They believe Europe must learn to speak with one voice in global affairs if it is to continue to have a role in shaping the world's future.

- The Foreign Office and Defense Ministry have stronger and more effective leadership and as a result are likely to regain some of the clout lost to the Chancellery during the previous government. Early indications point to close and effective coordination rather than divisions and rivalry among the major players.
- The Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development will play an increasingly important role in support of efforts to ensure security and stability in Afghanistan and Africa, in keeping with its motto that “there can be no development without security, and no security without development.”
- The new government has embraced the idea that Germany must accept greater international responsibility and contribute reliably to crisis and conflict resolution in partnership with its allies and partners. However, it remains reluctant to engage in combat operations and probably is no more willing than before to participate in coercive military actions against rogue states.
- The government’s plans to put relations with Russia on a more positive track have been undermined by the crisis in Ukraine, which threatens to send relations between Russia and the West back to the Cold War. German foreign and security policy officials nonetheless remain committed to engagement with Russia and will resist efforts to completely isolate the Kremlin.
- The reorientation of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) emphasizes Germany’s role as a framework nation capable of integrating contributions from smaller allies and partners, such as the incorporation of the Netherlands’ air mobile brigade into the new German rapid reaction division. Germany is a leading supporter of NATO Smart Defense and EU Pooling and Sharing initiatives, which seek to maintain military capabilities through greater integration of forces.
- The government continues to view transatlantic partnership with the United States as a key pillar of its foreign and security policy, despite strain introduced by revelations of NSA surveillance activities in Germany.

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