

N. S. Trubetzkoy, Vienna 1930s

Nikolai Sergeevich
Trubetzkoy

THE LEGACY OF GENGHIS KHAN
and
Other Essays on Russia's Identity

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become agents of the economic and political ambitions of a foreign power.

So Christ's precept to teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost remains unfulfilled because Christian missionary work was turned into an instrument of Europeanization, into a means for the establishment of a homogeneous, universal culture, whose godless essence we have attempted to illuminate in the foregoing discussion. The wish to level national distinctions cannot be justified by references to the need for Christian missionary work; on the contrary, this work proves fruitless and ineffectual precisely because it is a vehicle of leveling, anti-Christian interference in human culture.

8 The Legacy of Genghis Khan:

A Perspective on Russian History Not from the West but from the East*

I

A point of view generally accepted in history textbooks, namely, that the foundations of the Russian state were laid in so-called Kievan Rus', can scarcely be accepted as correct. That state, or rather that group of more or less independent principalities subsumed by the name Kievan Rus', in no way corresponds to the Russian state which we presently consider our motherland. Kievan Rus' was a group of principalities governed by the princes of the Varangian dynasty and located along those rivers that connect in an almost unbroken line the Baltic and the Black seas. The *Primary Chronicle* identifies the geographical essence of this state quite correctly as "the path from the Varangians to the Greeks." The area of Kievan Rus' did not comprise even a twentieth part of modern Russia. Kievan Rus' was not identical in its territory with so-called European Russia, nor was it the most significant part of the territory of European Russia in political and economic terms. The Khazar state (located along the lower reaches of the Volga and on the Don River) and that

*Originally as *Nasledie Chingizkhana: vzgliad na russkuiu istoriiu ne s Zapada a s Vostoka*. Berlin 1925. Translated by Kenneth Brostrom.

of the Bulgars (located on the Middle Volga and along the Kama) existed during the same era as Kievan Rus', and they were very likely more significant economically and politically. None of these principalities, whose settlements were located along and bound to one river basin or another, could become a state in the political or economic sense. Across the path to the Black and Caspian seas lay the vast steppe, and over it wandered warlike nomads whom no one could subjugate completely, and who made every effort of the settled states toward dominion and expansion impossible. This is why no powerful state could emerge from Kievan Rus'.

The notion that the present Russian state is somehow the continuation of Kievan Rus' is incorrect. Kievan Rus' could not extend its territory, nor could it strengthen the internal power of the state; although bound to a system of rivers, it was unable to control it. The lower and most important part of this system, which lay in the steppe, was forever open to attack by the nomads—the Pechenegs, the Cumans, and so on. The only path open to Kievan Rus' was that of decay, of fragmentation into petty principalities constantly warring with one another, devoid of any higher conception of the state. Any state is viable only when it can respond successfully to the challenges posed by the geographical nature of its territory. The challenge confronting Kievan Rus' was to maintain trade between the Baltic and the Black Sea, but it could not do so, and was thus nonviable. Every nonviable organism disintegrates. The only path open to the individual river towns and principalities of Kievan Rus' was that of "self-determination" and internecine strife. They were incapable of regarding themselves as parts of a single state entity, because this entity could not accomplish its geo-economic mission and was therefore devoid of meaning. It is clear that contemporary Russia did not arise and could not have arisen from Kievan Rus'. The only thing shared by Kievan Rus' and the Russia that we consider our motherland is the name "Rus'"; but the geographical and political-economic content of this name has changed completely.

II

Let us ask in the words of an ancient chronicler: "Whence cometh the Russian land, and how hath the Russian land arisen?" We will try to answer this question by investing the notion of the "Russian land" with a new, contemporary, geographic, economic, and political content.

A glance at a historical map reveals that at one time almost all the territory of the present-day U.S.S.R. constituted a part of the Mongolian empire founded by the great Genghis Khan. Several parts of prerevolutionary Russia that were incorporated during the post-Petrine period—Finland, Poland, and the Baltic provinces—never entered into the empire of Genghis Khan, and, characteristically, they have fallen away from Russia, because they have no natural, historical, or state connection with her. Other areas that by mere chance did not become parts of the Mongolian empire but that, owing to geographic or ethnographic considerations, had natural connections with this empire and were later incorporated into prerevolutionary Russia, have remained in the U.S.S.R. And if several of them (e.g., Bessarabia and the eastern borderlands of Poland) have been torn away, this is a temporary phenomenon; sooner or later nature will have its way. The incorporation into the Soviet Union of Khiva and Bukhara, which preserved an illusory independence during the reigns of the last Russian emperors, and the proclamation of a Soviet republic in Mongolia extend and strengthen the historical connections between Russia and the empire of Genghis Khan. Following the same line of reasoning, one can predict with confidence the future incorporation of Chinese Turkestan.

In historical perspective the present-day state that is called either Russia or the U.S.S.R. (its name is not the issue) was once part of the great Mongolian empire founded by Genghis Khan. But one cannot equate Russia with the empire of Genghis Khan. Almost all of Asia was incorporated into the empire of the great

Mongolian conqueror and his immediate heirs. But no matter how much Russian influence has penetrated China, Persia, and Afghanistan, these countries have not become parts of Russia, and if Russia were to incorporate them into herself, she would indeed alter her historical physiognomy. Russia's historical heritage includes only the fundamental nucleus of Genghis Khan's empire, not its entirety. This nucleus is characterized by specific geographical features that distinguish it from the remaining parts of the former Mongolian empire.

Geographically, the territory of Russia, understood as the nucleus of the Mongolian empire, can be defined in the following manner. A long, more or less uninterrupted zone of unforested plains and plateaus stretches almost from the Pacific Ocean to the mouth of the Danube. This belt can be called the "steppe system." It is bordered on the north by a broad zone of forests, beyond which lies the tundra. In the south, the steppe system is bordered by mountain ranges. Thus there are four parallel zones stretching from west to east: the tundra, the forests, the steppes, and the mountains. In the meridional direction (i.e., from north to south or south to north) this system of four zones is intersected by a system of great rivers. This then is the essence of the geographical configuration of the land mass under discussion. It lacks both access to the open sea and the ragged coastline so characteristic of Western and Central Europe and East and South Asia. With regard to climate, this land mass is distinguished from both Europe and Asia proper by a set of characteristics associated with the term "continental climate": extreme variations between summer and winter temperatures, a distinct isotherm and wind direction, and so on. This land mass differs from both Europe and Asia proper and constitutes a separate continent, a separate part of the earth, which in contrast to Europe and Asia can be called *Eurasia*.

The population of this part of the earth is not homogeneous and comprises several races. The difference between the Russians and the Buryats or the Samoyeds is very great. But a

series of intermediate, transitional links exists between these extremes. With regard to anthropological facial type and build, there are no striking differences between the Great Russian and the Mordvin or the Zyryan. Likewise, no striking transition exists between the Mordvin and Zyryan and the Cheremiss or the Votyak; as representatives of a type, the Volga-Kama Finns (the Mordvins, Votyaks, and Cheremiss) are very similar to the Volga Turks (the Chuvash, Tatars, and Meshcheryaks). The Tatar type gradates into the Bashkir and Kirghiz type, from which, by way of similar gradual transitions, we pass to what is, properly speaking, the Mongolian-Kalmyk-Buryat type.

Eurasia represents an integral whole, both geographically and anthropologically. The presence within it of geographically and economically diverse features, such as forests, steppes, and mountains, and of natural geographical connections between them makes it possible to view Eurasia as a region that is more or less self-sufficient economically. By its very nature, Eurasia is historically destined to comprise a single state entity.

From the beginning the political unification of Eurasia was a historical inevitability, and the geography of Eurasia indicated the means to achieve it. In ancient times only the rivers and steppes served as paths of communication. The forests and mountains were not suited to this, while the tundra was a region inhospitable to the development of any human activity. We have already seen that the numerous great river systems within the territory of Eurasia are oriented in a north-south direction, while the single steppe system passes across the entirety of Eurasia from east to west. Consequently, there was only one path of communication between east and west, while there were several between north and south (all the riverways between north and south intersect the steppe road between east and west at some point). Therefore, a people that gained control over one of the river systems became the master of only one specific part of Eurasia, but a people that gained control of the steppe system became the master of Eurasia. In mastering the segments of the river systems located in the steppes, they subjugated each

of these systems in its entirety. Only a state that controlled the entire steppe system could unite all Eurasia.

Within the territory of Eurasia there were originally tribes and states with a settled life style along the rivers, and steppe tribes with a nomadic life style. Conflict between river and steppe was inevitable, and it is indeed a predominant feature of the ancient history not only of Kievan Rus', but of the other Eurasian river states (e.g., the Kingdom of the Khazars and of Khorezm). In the beginning the nomads were divided into many tribes, each of which remained within a defined area of the steppe; only when some tribe penetrated an adjacent area would conflict break out between neighboring tribes. At that time the river states were able to oppose the steppe people quite successfully. The constant threat of nomadic raids on the river settlements and the never-ending danger that trade along the rivers would be interrupted made normal development impossible for the river states. But they continued to exist and to struggle with the nomads, although not always successfully.

The situation changed radically when Genghis Khan subjugated the nomadic tribes of the Eurasian steppe and transformed the Eurasian steppe system into a single, all-encompassing nomad state with a superb military organization. Nothing could resist such power. All the organized states within the territory of Eurasia lost their independence and became subject to the ruler of the steppes. Thus Genghis Khan was successful in accomplishing the historical task set by the nature of Eurasia, the task of unifying this entire area into a single state, and he accomplished this task in the only way possible—by first unifying the entire steppe under his power, and through the steppe, the rest of Eurasia.

However, Genghis Khan subjugated not only Eurasia but also most of Asia. In conquering Eurasia and unifying it into a single state Genghis Khan was accomplishing a historical task set by nature itself; but the same cannot be said about the conquest of parts of Asia proper. The conquest and unification of Eurasia was ultimately to its benefit; the conquest of parts of Asia

proper was destructive, and for them, ruinous. Neither China nor Persia stood in need of political unification from without. These were countries with ancient national, political, and cultural traditions, and with well defined spheres of cultural influence. To be sure, Genghis Khan introduced elements drawn from these old Asiatic cultures into his newly created Eurasian state. He utilized the cultural riches and influence of China, Persia, and India, not only without submitting to their political power but while making them subservient to himself. Consequently, Eurasia received certain benefits from this process. But the process was very damaging to Asia; the Mongolian conquest tore into the historical life of certain parts of Asia, deprived them of their independence, and interrupted their cultural development for a very long time. Ultimately, the Mongolian conquerors could not occupy old Asiatic states, enjoy all the benefits of their culture, and still remain culturally autonomous forever. Inevitably they were assimilated by the local populations and accepted their traditions. When the Mongolian empire disintegrated, each state again became what it had formerly been.

Although Genghis Khan apparently attached greater importance to the conquest of China and of Asia proper than he did to the subjugation of Eurasia, he fulfilled a valuable historical mission only in Eurasia. This is why, in defining the historical essence of the Russian state in terms of its occupation of all, or almost all, of the territory of Eurasia, I identified it with the nucleus of Genghis Khan's empire. Eurasia is a geographically, ethnographically, and economically integrated system whose political unification was historically inevitable. Genghis Khan was the first to accomplish this unification, and after him the consciousness of its necessity penetrated every part of Eurasia, although not always with the same degree of clarity. In time the unity of Eurasia began to break up. Instinctively the Russian state has striven and is striving to recreate this broken unity; consequently, it is the descendant of Genghis Khan, the heir and successor to his historical endeavors.

III

Genghis Khan was not only a great conqueror; he also had a genius for administration. And like all state administrators of his caliber, he was governed in his activities not only by the narrow, practical considerations of the moment, but also by certain higher principles and ideas that formed a harmonious system. As a typical representative of the Turanian race he lacked the ability to formulate this system clearly in abstract, philosophical terms; but he was fully aware of it, completely at one with it, and each of his actions, each order or decision, flowed logically from it. On the basis of the few surviving statements made by him and the general nature of all his ordinances, we can reconstruct his system and give it the theoretical formulation that Genghis Khan himself did not and could not provide.

Genghis Khan made certain moral demands upon his subjects, from the highest of the nobles and military leaders down to ordinary soldiers. The virtues he valued and encouraged most were loyalty, devotion, and steadfastness; the vices he particularly despised and hated were treachery, treason, and cowardice. These virtues and vices were the indicators he used to divide all people into two categories. For one type, material well-being and safety are more important than personal dignity and honor; this is why such people are capable of cowardice and treachery. When such a person submits to his leader or master, he does so only because he is aware of a certain force and power in this leader that could deprive him of his well-being, or even of his life; and he trembles before this power. He sees nothing beyond his master, and he is subject to him only on a personal basis and out of fear—that is, he is subject not to his master but to his own fear. In betraying his master, such a person thinks he is liberating himself from the only person who has power over him. But in doing this, always from fear or greed, he remains the slave of his fear, of his

attachment to life and to material well-being, and he becomes even more deeply mired in his slavery. Such people are base, craven, they are slaves by nature. Genghis Khan despised them and destroyed them without mercy.

On his path of conquest, Genghis Khan had to overthrow or depose a large number of kings, princes, and rulers. Among the retinues and nobles of such rulers there were almost always traitors and turncoats who facilitated the victories and successes of Genghis Khan through acts of treachery. But Genghis Khan rewarded none of them for their services. To the contrary, after every victory the great conqueror ordered the execution of the nobles and courtiers who had betrayed their masters. Their treason was a sign of their slavish psychology, and there was no place for people of this mentality in Genghis Khan's empire. This is why, after the conquest of each new kingdom or principality, Genghis Khan gave lavish rewards to all those who had remained faithful to the former ruler, even when their loyalty had become disadvantageous and dangerous, and he brought them into his own retinue. By their loyalty and courage these people had proved that they belonged to the psychological type upon which Genghis Khan wished to base his state system.

The kind of people valued by Genghis Khan placed their honor and personal dignity above safety and comfort. They did not fear a man with the power to deprive them of their lives or their wealth; they feared rather the commission of an act that could dishonor them or diminish their personal dignity in their own eyes rather than in the eyes of others (because they did not fear the censure and mockery of others, just as they did not fear others in general). They were governed in their behavior by a special code, a body of rules setting out the actions that are permissible and impermissible for any honorable, self-respecting person. They valued these rules more than anything else, and they honored them in a religious manner, as something divinely ordained and inviolate; to break them meant to despise oneself—which for such people would be worse than death. In respecting themselves, they also respected others who

adhered to the same internal set of rules, especially those who had demonstrated their unshakable loyalty to these rules in action.

In bowing down before the dictates of their inner moral code and in viewing deviations from this code as a loss of face and of personal human dignity, such people were necessarily religious. They perceived in the world an order wherein everything has a specific, divinely ordained place with attendant duties and obligations. When a man of this psychological type obeys his immediate superior, he obeys him not as a person but as part of a specific, divinely ordained hierarchy. He obeys in the person of his immediate superior a subordinate of a more highly placed superior, who is in turn a subordinate of an even higher superior, and so on, up to the supreme earthly ruler, who is also thought of as a subordinate not of a man, but of God. Thus, a man of this type always looks upon himself as part of a hierarchical system, and he is subordinate ultimately not to a man, but to God. Betrayal and treachery are psychologically impossible for him; in betraying his immediate superior, he is not liberated from the judgment of superiors more highly placed. And even if he has betrayed all his earthly superiors, he still cannot escape heavenly judgment, he still cannot escape the sanctions of the divine law that is so actively present in his consciousness. A consciousness of the impossibility of escaping the sanctions of the superhuman, divine law, a consciousness of one's own natural and inescapable legal accountability imparts to such a man the steadfastness and composure of fatalism. It is precisely to this human type that Genghis Khan himself belonged. Even after he conquered everyone and everything and became the all-powerful ruler of the largest state that ever existed on earth, he was constantly and acutely aware of his subordination to a higher will, and he looked upon himself as an instrument in the hands of God.

Having divided human beings into two psychological categories, Genghis Khan made this division the cornerstone of his state organization. He controlled those with the psychology

of slaves the only way they can be controlled, by material rewards and fear. The fact that the vast territory of Eurasia and part of Asia were unified into one state and that safety along the Eurasian and Asian trade routes and the regulation of finances were guaranteed created such beneficial economic conditions for the inhabitants of Genghis Khan's empire that their efforts to achieve material well-being could meet with complete success. On the other hand, the might of his unyielding, unconquerable army, which was unconditionally loyal to him, together with the merciless cruelty of his punitive methods, forced everyone who was preoccupied with his own physical existence to tremble before him. Thus, people with the psychology of slaves were completely under Genghis Khan's control. But he did not allow them to come near administration. The entire military and administrative apparatus consisted only of people of the second psychological type; they were organized into a well-ordered, hierarchical system, at the summit of which stood Genghis Khan himself. And if his other subjects saw only oppression and terrifying power in Genghis Khan, the people in the administrative apparatus saw him first of all as the most brilliant representative of the psychological type characteristic of them all, and they revered him as the heroic embodiment of their personal ideal.

As Genghis Khan applied his theory of the state to concrete situations, as he implemented it in the real conditions of conquered countries, he was guided by the conviction that people possessing the psychological traits valued by him were to be found primarily among nomads, while settled societies generally consisted of people with the psychology of slaves. And indeed, the nomad is far less attached to material possessions than the townsman or peasant. Being by nature averse to sustained physical labor, the nomad places little value on physical comfort and is accustomed to limiting his needs without considering this limitation an especially onerous deprivation. He is not accustomed to struggling with the forces of nature for his subsistence, and thus looks upon his own well-

being fatalistically. The nomad's wealth consists of his livestock. If this wealth is to be destroyed by disease, there is absolutely nothing he can do to prevent this misfortune. Even now it is difficult to combat epizootics, and at that time it was quite impossible. Livestock could be taken by an enemy, but by the same token one might be able to seize the enemy's livestock the next time around. Both possibilities depended upon one's prowess in battle, and also upon the existence of friendly and hostile relations governed by customary law and by a sense of decency and honor. For this reason the nomad placed special value on a man's military prowess and on his willingness to keep his word or an agreement. These factors created conditions congenial to the development of the psychology that Genghis Khan considered especially valuable.

These characteristics were reinforced among the nomad aristocracy by clan traditions and by an intense awareness not only of personal but of family honor, by a consciousness of one's responsibility to both ancestors and descendants. It is therefore not surprising that Genghis Khan drew most of the human material for his military and administrative apparatus from the ranks of the nomad aristocracy. Yet he was not guided by class prejudice; many who were appointed by him to important military positions came from the least prominent clans, and some of them were formerly "common" shepherds. What mattered to Genghis Khan was not whether a man belonged to a particular class or level of nomad society, but his psychological type. Genghis Khan found people of the psychological type necessary to him primarily among the nomads, and he understood very clearly the connection between this psychological type and the nomadic life style. Therefore, the most important instruction passed on by him to his heirs and to all the nomads was that they should preserve their nomadic life style and avoid becoming a settled society.

As regards the scorn that Genghis Khan felt for settled societies, in which he recognized people with the craven psychology of slaves, he was to some degree correct when one

considers the settled societies he had to deal with. The settled Asiatic kingdoms of that time were dominated from top to bottom by the spirit of the slave; greedy devotion to material wealth not always honorably acquired, haughty and insulting treatment of inferiors, and servile groveling before superiors characterized the social life of these states, just as unprincipled careerism and treachery characterized their political life. The division of people into two different types, a division Genghis Khan placed at the foundation of the state system he was building, could not be found in these states, since their administrative apparatus was maintained exclusively by means of physical terror and material gain. So Genghis Khan was able to locate suitable human material for the military and administrative apparatus of his state only among the nomads; in settled communities he could find only "specialists" in finance and in office management. The distinguishing feature of Genghis Khan's state, then, was the fact that it was governed by nomads.

Another important feature of Genghis Khan's state was the place given to religion. Being himself a deeply religious man who was constantly aware of his personal connection with the divine, Genghis Khan considered this kind of religious feeling an indispensable condition for the frame of mind he valued in his subjects. In order for a man to fulfill his duties fearlessly and unconditionally, he must believe firmly—not theoretically, but intuitively, with his whole being—that his personal destiny, like the destinies of others and of the entire world, is in the hands of a higher being, a being infinitely high and beyond all criticism. Such a being can only be God, not a man. A disciplined soldier who can obey a superior as willingly as he gives orders to a subordinate, who never loses his self-respect and therefore is able to respect others and to elicit their respect, is by nature capable of submitting only to the authority of an immaterial, transcendent first cause—in contrast to a slave, who submits to the authority of earthly fear, earthly prosperity, earthly vanity. And being convinced that all this was true, Genghis Khan regarded only

those people who were sincerely and deeply religious as valuable to his state.

In approaching religion from what was, in essence, a psychological perspective, Genghis Khan did not compel his subjects to accept any specific religion with a formulated dogma and liturgy. There was no official state religion in his empire, and among his soldiers, generals, and administrators could be found Shamanists, Buddhists, Moslems, and Christians (Nestorians). The only important consideration for Genghis Khan was that his subjects actively sense their complete subjugation to a transcendent, supreme being—in other words, that they be religious, that they confess some religion or other. This religious tolerance can be attributed in part to the fact that Genghis Khan was himself a Shamanist; that is, he confessed a religion that was rather primitive, lacking any dogmatic formulation, and uncommitted to proselytism. But his religious tolerance was in no way the result of passive indifference or apathy, since the identification of his subjects with some religion was of primary importance to him. He was not passive in his toleration of various religions in his state; rather he gave his active support to all of them. And this support, affirmation, and elevation of religion were as vital to Genghis Khan's state system as his affirmation of the nomadic life style and his placement of power in the hands of the nomads.

Thus, in accordance with Genghis Khan's state ideology, the power of the ruler must rest not upon some ruling class, estate, nation, or official religion, but upon people of a specific psychological type. The highest positions in his state could be occupied not only by aristocrats but by persons of humble origin. The rulers belonged to various Mongolian and Turko-Tatar tribes, and they were adherents of various religions. The important consideration was that they should belong in their personal character and manner of thinking to the psychological type described above. The practical implementation of these ideas in the countries constituting Genghis Khan's empire produced a ruling class recruited from among the nomads, each representative of which was a zealous adherent of some religion, while all religions were encouraged.

IV

I have discussed at length the ideological foundations of Genghis Khan's empire and attempted to disclose the essence of his theory of the state in order to refute the misguided view of this leader as nothing more than an oppressor, a conqueror, and a plunderer; this view has its origins in historical works influenced by the one-sided and tendentious attitudes of chroniclers who were his contemporaries and representatives of the various settled societies conquered by him. Genghis Khan was the bearer of an important, positive idea, and the desire to create and organize, not the desire to destroy, was predominant in his activities. This must be remembered when we approach Russia as the historical heir to Genghis Khan's state.

However, let us return to a question of fundamental interest to us, the origins of the Russian state. It is not enough to state that the geographical territory of Russia more or less coincides with the nucleus of Genghis Khan's empire, for it still remains unclear how the empire of the great Mongolian conqueror came to be replaced by the Russian state.

The destruction of the independent feudal principalities of Rus' by the Mongolian invasion and their incorporation into the Mongolian state undoubtedly caused a profound upheaval in the hearts and minds of the Russian people. Their anguish and their keen awareness of the humiliation suffered by Russian national pride merged with a strong new impression engendered by the grandeur of a foreign conception of the state. All Russians were disoriented, the abyss seemed to yawn before them at every step, and they began to search desperately for some solid ground. An eruption of acute spiritual tumult and turmoil was the result—complex processes whose significance is generally undervalued.

The hallmark of this period was the extraordinarily vigorous development of religious life. For ancient Rus' the period of Tatar rule was above all else an epoch of religion. The foreign

state's connection as heir apparent with the Mongolian state. Thus the transformation of the Muscovite Grand Prince into the successor of the Khan of the Golden Horde and the replacement of the Mongolian state system by the Russian were the results of two parallel psychological processes, one occurring in a Russian milieu and the other in the Tatar ruling circles.

VII

The Russian state system that arose as successor and heir to the state of Genghis Khan rested upon a strong religious cultural foundation. Every Russian, regardless of his occupation and individual circumstances, belonged to the same culture, professed the same religious convictions, the same world view, the same moral code, and was guided in his behavior by the same traditional life style. The differences between separate classes were economic rather than cultural. They signaled quantitative, not qualitative distinctions in the spiritual and material values that determined people's world view and life style; they indicated the degree to which each person had realized a single cultural ideal in his life. The boyar dressed more richly, ate better, and lived more expansively than the peasant, but the cut of his clothes, the composition of his diet, and the structure of his house were in principle the same as those of the peasant. Aesthetic tastes and intellectual interests were the same for all, but some had an opportunity to satisfy them more fully than others. The foundation of everything was religion, the "Orthodox faith." In the Russian mind this "faith" was not an aggregate of abstract dogmas, but rather an all-encompassing, internally consistent way of life. Russian faith and Russian *mores* were inseparable from one another. There was nothing in everyday life and in the culture that was morally or religiously neutral. To be an Orthodox believer meant not only confessing certain dogmas and fulfilling the moral

directives of the Church, not only repeating prescribed prayers, performing prescribed liturgical gestures, and attending religious services, but also eating prescribed food on specific days, with or without meat, wearing clothing of a specific cut, and so on. Faith entered into *mores*, *mores* into faith; the two merged into a single entity, into a coherent system of *religious living* (*bytovoe ispovednichestvo*).

The ideology of the state was also an organic part of this life style, for it, like everything else in Russian life, was inseparable from the religious world view. This ideology placed the tsar, who was viewed as the embodiment of the national will, at the head of the state. As the man embodying the will of the nation, the tsar was understood to bear moral responsibility before God for the sins of his nation; this is why his reign was viewed as a kind of heroic moral feat. In accordance with Christian teaching, such spiritual heroism is inconceivable without prayer and without God's help; this is why the tsar appeared to be the bearer of a particular kind of divine grace, for whose presence in him it was fitting to pray publicly. As every person, from the Christian point of view, is given the task of living according to God's commandments and of realizing God's will in his or her own life, so, too, is the nation. And since the life and all the actions of the national whole are shaped and directed by the tsar as the embodiment of the national will, the tsar must be the champion of God's commandments in the life of the nation. The ideal tsar was understood to be the intercessor for his people, their representative before God, and the instrument for implementing God's commandments in the life of the nation, the anointed one of God before the people.

Because the nation whose will the tsar embodied was not a supernatural entity and because the gifts of grace given the tsar through anointment and elevation to the throne freed neither him nor the nation he represented from the sinfulness inherent in human nature, it was recognized that both the tsar and his nation could stray from the one true path and fall into sin. And as each individual was warned against sin by the voice of

conscience, so, too, was the tsar obligated to guard against falling into sin by listening, in his private life and in acts affecting the entire nation, to the voice of conscience—his own conscience and the conscience of the nation embodied through the Church in the person of the patriarch. Although he stood first among the laity and was the highest embodiment of the national will, the tsar was nevertheless mortal and limited by his human nature, and he was therefore not omniscient.

Even with the best of tsars, agents of state power could be guilty of abuses outside the tsar's knowledge. The "unfaithfulness" of individual agents of state power, unavoidable from the perspective of the Christian conviction that human nature is morally imperfect and that "the world abides in evil," was not thought to contradict the principle that the tsar strives to establish "faithfulness" on earth in all his actions: the agents' abuses were explained by the natural fact that the tsar did not know about them. The elimination of such abuses could therefore be achieved only by informing the tsar about them, for he was the natural and sole earthly protector of his subjects. At the same time there was a strong belief that no matter how effective the process of informing the tsar about abuses might be, their complete and final elimination (including the possibility of their reappearance) could never be achieved, for "the world abides in evil," human nature is imperfect, and no human ingenuity can correct this imperfection. The only kingdom of perfect faithfulness was the Kingdom of Heaven; no earthly kingdom could ever achieve this ideal, it could only strive after it. And the path to the ideal was to be found not in the perfection of the external forms of life within the state but in the inner struggle of every person to achieve moral self-perfection, a struggle that was valuable and useful only to the extent that it was voluntary and not the result of external compulsion. This struggle was not possible through human effort alone; one also needed help from God gained through prayer, fasting, and everything that constituted religious living.

In looking at the life of the state from the perspective of his religious world view, the Orthodox Russian citizen did not deceive himself with idle fancies about the possibility of achieving within the state structure ideal solutions for all problems; he was fully conscious of the limited results possible in this direction. In transferring the center of gravity to ethics, he acknowledged that the basic cause of the "unfaithfulness" of the agents of the state resided in their moral imperfections; and uprooting this unfaithfulness was looked upon as an ethical problem and not as a matter of juridical or political reform. A person with a strong desire to be moral could achieve this goal if he subordinated his fleshly nature to his will, lived according to the Law of God, and called upon God for His ever-present help. Likewise, the nation could achieve the greatest victories over discord (the foundation of which is sin) if it remained committed to living according to God's Law, and if its will, embodied in the tsar and responsive to the voice of conscience embodied through the Church in the patriarch, were to have unlimited power over all the earthly activities of the nation and over the organs of government. From the perspective of Old Russian ideology, the best political order achievable on earth (less than the kingdom of perfect faithfulness possible only in Heaven) results when the tsar possesses unlimited power, when he is fully informed about everything occurring in his state, when a religious life style prevails throughout the nation, and when the tsar listens to the voice of the Church. The efforts of separate estates to limit the power of the tsar were considered sinful; they were analogous, on the level of personal life, to the efforts of the various passions to limit and subjugate the will of the individual human being.

The Russian state system and the supreme power of the Russian tsar rested upon an ideology that was inextricably linked to the Russian religious world view and the Russian way of life. The power of the tsar was supported by the nation's religious attitude toward life, just as this attitude found support in the tsar. The tsar realized most completely the Russian

religious life style in his personal life, and in this regard he served as an example, he "set the tone" for the entire nation. The tsar was the most devout of all the Russian laity, and in his private domestic life, he was the most typical Russian. The life style of the tsar was the Russian life style in a distilled and ideal form, practiced, so to speak, with all the stops out. Other members of the Russian laity measured themselves against this model, each to the limit of his abilities and his position in life.

The Russian people of this time did not separate life style and culture from faith; they perceived all three as a single, undifferentiated, religious way of living called the Orthodox faith, and they equated "Russian" with "Orthodox." They did not consider the linguistic and physical characteristics of Russians to be essential. What was essential for the Russian was his Orthodox faith, that is, his religious way of living. A person from another country or ethnic group was perceived as foreign only to the extent that he deviated in his convictions and behavior from the Russian religious life style; a person who was purely Russian in origin could evince the same kind of deviation after falling into heresy or sin. A connection was established in the Russian mind between the ideas of foreigner and sinner. "Foreign" was not an ethnographic but an ethical notion. As a result, genuine, conscious nationalism or chauvinism could not exist. No efforts were made to Russify by force the non-Russian tribes and peoples incorporated into the Muscovite state; on the contrary, all of them enjoyed a considerable degree of national autonomy.

With regard to non-Orthodox religions, the government adhered to principles that followed logically from recognition of Orthodoxy as the one true faith. The conviction that Orthodoxy was the only direct continuation of the teachings of Christ, the only true Christianity, and that Christianity was the only continuation and the consummation of the Old Testament prophecies forced Russians to look upon Judaism (which accepted the Old Testament but rejected Christianity) and upon all non-Orthodox Christian teachings that accepted Christ but

deviated from Orthodoxy as heresies. The government could not allow such religious doctrines to be practiced freely: every heresy (i.e., conscious rejection of a divine truth well known to the heretic) was a sin, a crime against divine truth; and the government was obliged to struggle against sin and crime.

Relations were quite different with religious doctrines that had no connections with Orthodoxy in their fundamental ideas and that encroached upon no part of the divine revelation whose full disclosure was present, according to Orthodox belief, only in Orthodoxy (Islam, Buddhism, and various forms of paganism). The heretic saw the light, but did not want to walk to it; this was his sin. The pagan did not see the light, and was walking in darkness because of his ignorance. If there was any sin in this (sin in the sense of capture by Satan), then it was a venial sin, excusable on grounds of ignorance. Consequently, such religions should not be subject to persecution. The obligation of the Orthodox Christian toward such religions was to convert, to enlighten those walking in darkness. But the state, the secular authority could not take this evangelical burden upon itself. This was the business of the Church, which the government should not hinder but help, and not by forceful means: the enlightenment of those walking in darkness was an undertaking motivated by love, and where there was love there was no place for force. So the attitude of the government toward religions not based upon Old and New Testament revelation was one of cautious tolerance. Such religions were not persecuted or insulted, but measures were taken to permit the voices of Orthodox preachers to reach the hearing of those "who because of ignorance are walking in darkness," so that Orthodoxy might appear in their eyes to be a religion more worthy than their own, and they might be led to a conscious recognition of its superiority. The instructions sent by Ivan the Terrible to the Most Venerable Gurii of Kazan clearly reflect this point of view; and the subsequent mass conversion of Tatars to Orthodoxy (including the ruling circles of the Tatar nation) witnesses to the correctness of this course of action.

VIII

Despite the large differences between the ideological foundations of the Muscovite and Mongolian state systems, there is an inner kinship between them. Good reasons exist for considering the Muscovite state system the successor to the Mongolian system not only with regard to territory and certain peculiarities of state organization, but in its ideological content. Both were based on a life style that was bound up with a specific psychological orientation—the nomadic life style in the empire of Genghis Khan, and the Orthodox way of living in the Muscovite state. In both, the supreme head of state was the most brilliant representative, the exemplar of the ideal form of that particular life style. In both, discipline within the state depended upon the universal subordination of all citizens and of the monarch himself to a transcendent, divine source; the subordination of one man to another and of all persons to the monarch was understood as a consequence of universal subordination to the divine source whose earthly instrument the monarch was. In both, the absence of attachment to earthly goods, freedom from the tyranny of material prosperity, together with unshakable devotion to a religiously conceived notion of duty were recognized as virtues.

The basic distinction between them has its origin in the differing contents of their religious ideas—Genghis Khan's eclectic Shamanism and the Orthodox Christianity of the Muscovite state. Because the diffuse and dogmatically unformulated Shamanism of Genghis Khan gave way in the Muscovite state to Orthodoxy with its formulated dogma, certain essential aspects of the political-ideological system had to change, for it could now be linked more closely to the religious foundation. The nomadic life style in the system of Genghis Khan (which was bound up with ethnographic and geographic rather than religious conditions) was replaced in the Muscovite state by Orthodoxy, that is, by the organic fusion of a

life style with a specific religion, the whole being essentially independent of ethnographic and geographic conditions. Instead of the complete religious tolerance that ultimately undermined the religious foundation of the ideological and political system, a limited religious tolerance was practiced in the Muscovite state; this tolerance was in harmony with the dogmas of the fundamental religious idea and with the principle that the state ideology should derive from the religious. In practice this limited religious tolerance could not harm the purely secular state system, because none of the peoples of the Eurasian world professed the religious doctrines that were excluded from toleration as heresies.

The features distinguishing the Russian ideological and political system from that of Genghis Khan are those that made the Russian state system superior to the Mongolian. As we have seen, the weakness of the Mongolian system was to be found in the absence of a strong link between the state ideology (entirely religious in nature) and the dogmas of a specific religion, in the disparity between the system's broad sweep and the primitive formlessness of Shamanism, and in the impractical dream of staking everything on the ethnographically and geographically limited, historically transitory nomadic life style. The Muscovite state system was also free from another defect of Genghis Khan's system, namely, its claim to supremacy over the old Asiatic kingdoms. Laying claim to territory that can be conquered but not controlled always weakens a state. Genghis Khan's Pan-Asiatic imperialism led to the cultural subjugation of the nucleus of his empire by the conquered territories and created disharmony between the centers of power and the centers of culture. In its subordination to Moscow, the Eurasian world achieved for the first time a cultural self-sufficiency equivalent to the self-sufficiency of the old Asiatic kingdoms, of China and of Persia. And this cultural self-sufficiency gave the state strength, stability, and the power to resist. It is remarkable that even during the period of the Time of Troubles and the

Interregnum, not one territory willingly fell away from the Muscovite state.

IX

One important problem unknown to the Mongolian Empire confronted the Muscovite state system—defense against the West. All of the Ukraine and Belorussia, which had belonged to Eurasia and Russia from time immemorial, was under the control of Catholic Poland, Europe's outpost in the East; and it was only with the greatest difficulty that a part of these lands was reunited with the Eurasian world under the control of Moscow. But Poland was not without competitors. In the northwest, there was increasing danger of a Swedish invasion, while other European countries not immediately bordering on Russia were greedily reaching out for the wealth of Russia-Eurasia through maritime trade. National defense was a necessity, but one that implied another—the need to acquire Western military and industrial technology. The situation was complex and difficult. Russia had to borrow and learn certain things from Europe but avoid falling into a state of cultural and spiritual dependence. Inasmuch as the peoples of Europe were not adherents of Orthodoxy but called themselves Christians (i.e., from the Russian point of view they were heretics), the spirit of Europe and of European civilization was perceived by Russians as heretical, sinful, anti-Christian, and satanic. Contamination by this spirit was a very great danger.

The Muscovite tsars were aware of the complexity of this situation, and they turned away from the path of technological apprenticeship. They limited themselves in this direction to half measures; they invited European specialists, craftsmen, and instructors to work in Russia, but kept them isolated and watched them closely to prevent excessive fraternization with Russians. This certainly was no solution to the problem. Sooner or later it would be necessary to begin borrowing European

technology in earnest, while taking decisive measures against contamination by the European spirit.

It was Peter I who decided to borrow European technology. But he was so carried away by this undertaking that it became almost an end in itself for him, and he took no measures against contamination by the spirit of Europe. The task was accomplished in the worst way possible, and with catastrophic results: external power was purchased at the cost of Russia's complete cultural and spiritual enslavement by Europe. In borrowing Western technology to strengthen Russia's external power, Peter I subjected Russian national sensibilities to the most terrible humiliations and destroyed the foundations on which Russia's internal power and might rested. He destroyed the patriarchate, which was so important to the ideological and political system; he destroyed the habits of religious living in the ruling class; and he terminated the tsar's role as the archetypal bearer of this ideal life style. He shook the moral foundations as well: blasphemy (the "General Synod of Wags and Drunkards") became a pastime at court, and the replacement of the chaste Old Russian style in women's clothing by European dress—shameless from the Russian point of view, with its deep décolletage—was carried out coercively, just as the Russian boyars were coerced into appearing at the notorious *assemblées* and compelled to behave there in a disgraceful manner.

The foundations of Russian life were not only overturned, but they were replaced by their opposites: in living openly with his German mistress without marrying her, in fathering children by her, and, as a finishing touch, in crowning her the "Empress Catherine," the tsar provided an example of unbridled licentiousness rather than behaving as the exemplar of the Orthodox life style. The whole of this religious life style gave way among the upper classes to one that was cosmopolitan, irreligious, European, and purely secular. The Church was now headed not by a patriarch who embodied the national conscience, but by a synod that was humiliatingly subservient to the government and prohibited from raising its voice with

authority. All of this was allegedly offset by the fact that Russia had become a great power; she was extending her borders and possessed such military might that foreigners were trembling before it. As for the people, the disreputable image of the tsar was supposedly offset by the fact that the "tsar-carpenter," the "tsar-craftsman" worked like a common laborer, cursed like one, and even beat windy, arrogant courtiers with a club.

This spectacle could awaken only disgust in any Russian in whom national, religious, and moral principles were strong. Only the foreigners invited by Peter to work in Russia or Russian opportunists—unprincipled careerists motivated by petty vanity or easy profit—could follow Peter's lead. The famous "fledglings from Peter's nest" [Pushkin] were for the most part inveterate swindlers and crooks, who stole far more than government officials in the past. The circumstance that, as Russian historians have noted with sadness, "Peter had no worthy successors" was in no way accidental: no worthy Russian could have sided with Peter.

It is true that Peter's grand design was born of patriotism, but a patriotism that was unique and unprecedented in Russian experience. He did not care about the genuine, historical Russia, because he had a passionate dream of creating from Russian material a great European power that would resemble other European countries in every way, but surpass them in territorial size and military might. His attitude toward the Russian material from which he had to create this great power reflected hostility, not love, for he had to wage a never-ending, stubborn war against this material, which naturally resisted his efforts to squeeze it into the mold of an alien ideal. This explains the paradox characteristic of all Peter's activities: his fiery, self-sacrificing love for his country ("And of Peter know that life is not dear to him, but only that Russia should be happy") was inseparable from his conscious, malicious desire to humiliate national sensibilities and to mock traditions sacred to every Russian.

The borrowing of European technology was historically inevitable because of the need for a national defense, but the forms it took during Peter's reign did not correspond to this need and even contradicted it. No foreign conquest could have destroyed the national culture of Russia to the extent that Peter's reforms did, even though they were originally intended to protect Russia from foreign conquest. The explanation for the disastrous direction taken by these reforms resides not in historical necessity but in Peter's character. His activities inevitably promoted to the highest civil and military offices the type of individual who was hostile to the genuine national element in Russian life; this corrupted the upper strata of society, making a change in course impossible even after his death. There were too many people with a personal stake in the new regime, and the military and the government were in their hands.

X

Thus, Peter set the tone for the entire course of Russia's subsequent history. He initiated a new period, the era of antinational monarchy. The bases of Russian life were radically altered. Since the ideological foundations of the former Russian state system had been overturned and trampled upon, the new state system had to depend exclusively upon power. Serfdom and military organization had existed in Russia previously, but she became a genuinely feudal and militarist nation only after the beginnings of Europeanization. The new ideology was one of unadulterated imperialism in all matters, including culture; while an alien civilization was being implanted in Russia, in foreign policy enthusiasm for foreign conquest reigned supreme. Thus, the paradox that characterized all of Peter's activities was preserved in this ideology.

Not Russians but foreigners, native Europeans, would find it most congenial to view Russia and the Russian people as

material for the creation of a powerful European state, to despise as barbaric everything that had been Russian from time immemorial, and to scorn the Russian people as half-civilized dolts who had to be taught to be Europeans with a club. So it was natural that foreigners began to enjoy the special favor of Russian monarchs; they were everywhere present in the government apparatus and the highest echelons of the army, and the official history of this period exalts the pure-blooded German, Catherine II, above every other monarch after Peter I. Since these Europeans were by their nature the most appropriate champions of the course now established in Russia, it was they who created an atmosphere to which the native Russian ruling class gradually yielded. Its essence was the loss of the feeling of organic connection with the Russian soil, with the Russian "material." In such conditions patriotism was replaced by devotion to one's career, to social position, and in the best of cases, to the person upon whom this position depended—to the monarch, to the ruling dynasty, or to individual representatives of this dynasty. The monarchs understood this and strove to surround themselves with people personally devoted to them, which caused the center of gravity to shift to court relations. The resultant situation produced intrigues, struggles among cliques at court, favoritism and, as a consequence, "palace coups." The monarchs' efforts to find support in groups of people personally devoted or obligated to them led not only to favoritism but also to a constantly growing body of privileges for the land-owning aristocracy, who constituted the personnel of the government apparatus and the military elite. And these privileges were granted at the cost of oppressing other classes, especially the peasantry.

The process of Europeanization continued unrelentingly. It came from above; that is, Europeanization originally spread only through the upper levels of society, and then it moved down the social ladder, encompassing in ever-widening circles the other strata of the nation's social structure. Destruction of the spiritual foundations of the national culture together with

engraftment of disparate, external features of European culture constituted the first stage of Europeanization; this was followed by the gradual engraftment of European spiritual culture. Between the beginning and end of this process there must have existed a long period characterized by a complete absence of spiritual culture. One after another all the strata of the Russian national social structure passed through these stages, the entire protracted process lasting several generations. The high aristocracy acquired a European veneer during the reign of Peter I, but they did not begin to assimilate the spiritual foundations of European culture until the end of the eighteenth century. The lesser aristocracy became Europeans in spirit somewhat later; and so on.

As a result, social differences within the Russian nation were deepened by differences in spiritual culture and patterns of behavior. This was not a matter of simple, hierarchical distinctions within a single culture; one culture was being replaced by another, which created a transitional stage of culturelessness. The malignancy of the ruptures between social strata was exacerbated by the legal codification of the privileged status of certain strata and the disenfranchisement of others. Moreover, "leaps" across the cultural chasms separating social strata were accomplished by individuals, not by entire social groups, so levels of culture never corresponded fully to the legally established social structure, and social privilege did not go hand in hand with the degree to which European spiritual culture had been assimilated. Finally, these circumstances gave birth to acute dissension between generations and opened up chasms of misunderstanding between the old and the young, between fathers and children. In a word, the process of Europeanization destroyed every aspect of national unity, it gouged deep wounds in the nation's body, it spread discord and hidden enmity everywhere. Deepest of all was the gulf between the common people, whose lives were shaped by the debris of the old national culture, and the strata of society that had begun to be Europeanized. In the relations between them, the social

element got mixed up with the national cultural element: for the common people, the *barin* [master] was not only a representative of the ruling class but a bearer of a foreign culture; for the person who was in some way Europeanized or at least touched by Europeanization, the *muzhik* was not only a representative of the disenfranchised class, but a benighted savage as well. In one way or another, no one living in Russia during the era of Europeanization felt entirely "at home"; some lived under a foreign yoke, as it were, while others lived as if in a land they had conquered or in a colony.

The disfigurement of the Russian led to the disfigurement of Russia. Loss of the national physiognomy led to disintegration of the national personality, to forgetting the historical essence of Russia. In such circumstances Russia could not continue along the natural path of historical development preordained by geography itself. Post-Petrine Russian history is defined in its entirety not by movement along this path but by unwarranted departures from it for the sake of mistaken ideas about Russia's destiny. In both domestic and foreign policy, the antinational Imperial Government has been guided not by Russia's own historical traditions but by European models.

When Europe was pursuing the policies of dynasticism, which viewed the territory of the state as the private property of a specific dynasty and provoked the most unnatural alliances and wars with countries that were not even neighbors, the same view of politics was adopted by Russian monarchs. Russia was drawn into this senseless foreign game and began to take part in absurd, unnecessary, and unnatural military campaigns in countries not even contiguous with her and of no possible interest to her. Natural geographical conditions in Western Europe (the mountains, the jagged coastline, the presence of the ocean, and the impossibility of feeding its population from the land alone) made the impulse toward the open sea natural, because the sea allowed Europe to develop colonial trade. In imitation of the European powers, Russia also adopted this direction in foreign policy, although her own geography was

quite different and confronted her with different historical tasks. Russia was also prepared to go to war for ideas, for abstract principles, but ideas that were always foreign, that had been created and assimilated by other major (invariably European) powers. During the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I, Russia went to war to strengthen the feudal monarchies and the principle of legitimacy in Europe; then she went to war "for the liberation and self-determination of small nations" and for the creation of small "independent" states, and in the last war, "for the overthrow of militarism and imperialism." Russia invariably accepted these ideas and slogans at face value, even though they were invented merely to conceal the greedy, predatory schemes of the European powers. Consequently, she was always finding herself in absurd situations.

Having lost altogether its sense of history, its ties with Russia's historical past, and any genuine feeling for Russia's national essence, the Imperial Government constantly tried to justify its policies by referring to historical traditions and to the national character of Russia. This led to the creation of a deceitful official ideology, a bureaucratic lie, which the Imperial Government sometimes believed quite sincerely. The drive "toward Constantinople and the straits"—strongly supported in Russia by foreign diplomats who were trying to use Russia as an instrument to weaken Turkey—was justified (aside from the theory that every European power must have "an exit to the sea") by references to the campaigns of Oleg, Igor, Sviatoslav, and Vladimir. In the process it was forgotten that Rus' at the time of Oleg was not what is now called Russia. For a state occupying the basins of the river system between the Baltic and the Black seas, for a state whose *raison d'être* was control of the waterway "from the Varangians to the Greeks," campaigns against Constantinople had a meaning altogether different than they had for a continental state extending not from north to south, but from east to west. For a long time relations between

Turkey and Russia-Eurasia, the heir of Genghis Khan, were disrupted in the name of a task supposedly bequeathed by Oleg.

Likewise, the partitioning of Poland (an episode typical of European dynastic politics, for it enlarged most advantageously the territories of two European powers bordering on Russia) was justified by references to the fact that Poland was historically Russia's enemy. But Poland had been Russia's enemy primarily as the spearhead of an invasive movement by European civilization and Catholicism. The partitioning of Poland further strengthened the two countries bordering on Russia that represented the imperialism of European civilization in its extreme form; it also caused Galicia, which comprised with its East Slavic population a natural geographic extension of Eurasian territory, to fall under the control of one of these countries; finally, it placed the Ukrainian population of Galicia under the control of the Catholics.

Pan-Slavism was an equally mendacious, supposedly nationalistic ideology which was fraught with serious consequences; it was supported, sometimes even sincerely, not only by the Imperial Government but by part of the intelligentsia. In essence this ideology was as foreign to and had as few connections with historical Russia as the ideologies of enlightened absolutism, liberalism, socialism, and so on.

The same loss of an awareness of Russia's historical essence, the same obtuseness regarding national traditions combined with an artificial, deceitful, ostensibly nationalistic pathos can be observed in domestic policies. It will suffice here to discuss two areas only—relations with the "indigenous peoples" and with the Orthodox Church. Following the example of other European states, which pursued a policy of assimilation at home and abroad in their attempts to achieve the cultural denationalization of subject peoples, the Imperial Government strove to "Russify" every region with a non-Russian population. This policy represented a complete betrayal of every Russian historical tradition: ancient Rus' never practiced forcible Russification. If various Finnic tribes that once constituted the native population

of a significant part of Great Russia became completely Russified in antiquity, this happened naturally, without force or oppression, without declaring war upon national characteristics, and without the artificial inculcation of the Russian language in the schools. If the Tatar mirzas who accepted Orthodoxy were Russified while in the Russian service, this also happened quite naturally, without force. In any case, as they merged with the Russian tribe, the Russified Turanians imparted their own characteristics to the Russian people and introduced them into the Russian national psychology, so that together with the Russification of the Turanians there occurred a simultaneous "Turanianization" of the Russians. From the organic merger of these two elements there arose a unique, new entity, the national Russian type, which is in essence not pure Slavic but Slavo-Turanian. The Russian tribe was created not through the forcible Russification of "indigenous peoples," but through the fraternization of Russians with those peoples. And whenever the Russian people have been left to their own devices, they have continued the national tradition of fraternization, even during the imperial era. Artificial, government-inspired Russification was a product of complete ignorance about the historical essence of Russia-Eurasia, the result of forgetting the spirit of her national traditions. Consequently, this apparently nationalistic policy did great damage to Russia's historical interests.

The antinationalism of the Imperial Government's policies was most evident in the relations between the government and the Russian Orthodox Church. Insofar as the voice of the nation's conscience was heard in the Church as one manifestation of the national character, the antinational Imperial Government was bound to deal with the Church in a hostile manner; policies that induced the government to ignore the individuality of the Russian nation, to view it merely as material for the creation of a great European power led in time to the conclusion that this individuality must be completely suppressed. Accordingly, the government made every effort to render the Church mute, resorting finally to persecution at the slightest manifestation of an

independent spirit. The ideals borrowed from the West (imperialism, militarism, chauvinism, and state-worship) were alien not only to the national element in historical Russia but to the Christian Church as well. For all these reasons the Church was an inconvenience for the government. However, the debris of the ideology of tsarist authority upon which pre-Petrine Rus had depended continued to exist among the people; and since this ideology was closely associated with the Church, the government did not dare to launch an open campaign against it.

The upshot was a hypocritical compromise. The Imperial Government created the impression of giving the Church its full support, and constantly emphasized its union with the Church. But because it was in essence alien to the real spirit of the Church, the government struggled implacably against every manifestation of this spirit and used every means to ensure the complete subjugation of the Church to state authority. Members of the hierarchy and the priesthood who did not wish to submit or who manifested the spirit of the Church in too independent a manner were systematically removed from office. The reestablishment of the patriarchate and the convocation of local Church councils were topics not open to discussion. The Church Synod, which consisted of bishops appointed by the government, was actually run by a secular official, the *Oberprokuror*; likewise, authority in the local dioceses was in the hands of the consistory officials, while the bishops received only *pro forma* veneration. Through its governors the government kept close watch over the activities of the bishops, archbishops, and metropolitans, and they were replaced and exiled to monasteries or to remote, "safe" dioceses for the smallest deviations from the prescribed course of action.

This enslavement of the Church was gradually killing its spirit, which continued to flicker, but only feebly, as it was hypocritically smothered by the "Orthodox" Russian government. Imitating the European powers, the government tried to infect the Church with the spirit of imperialism and chauvinism with which it was itself saturated. And when the people could no

longer find in the Church the responsive national conscience they had found there in the pre-Petrine period, and they veered off into sectarianism or the Old Belief, the government used harsh reprisals and police harassment against the sectarians and schismatics. A situation was created in which the Church found itself being defended by the police. Everything possible was done not only to bureaucratize the Church and deprive it of its spirit, but to make it unpopular among the masses. This was persecution of the Church at its most malicious, the more so because it was concealed behind a facade of piety that was supported in the highest circles.

XI

Such were the consequences of Russia's deviation from her historical path. And these consequences were logically inevitable. After setting for itself the goal of creating a great European power from Russian material, the government was certain to look upon Russia not as a living personality, but as inert material. It was certain to place itself in opposition to Russia and to do whatever was necessary to smother all manifestations of Russia's individuality, to mangle and disfigure the national physiognomy. No government could last long after it had demonstrated open hostility toward the historical essence, the living personality of Russia; and since it could infect only a very small number of Russians with ideals alien to the Russian spirit (imperialism, mindless chauvinism, militarism), it had to lie and invent deceitful official slogans and ideologies that allegedly proved the hereditary link between itself and historical Russia and justified the established direction of its policies. But official lies could not deceive the nation for long.

After it had placed itself in opposition to a Russia it viewed as inert material, the government was certain to incur universal hatred. This happened inevitably, fatefully, and could not have been otherwise. In its attempts to build a great European power

looking at things is not fixed forever. Sooner or later it will be replaced by another, more conscious, consistent, and radical repudiation not only of specific expressions, but of the very essence, the spirit of European civilization. And repudiation of this foreign spirit will allow Russia-Eurasia to find her own true nature.

XIV

No matter how strange it may seem, it is precisely now, when the Russian government is directing all its efforts toward the propagation of a world view created by typical representatives of the European spirit and toward the restructuring of Russia according to theories created by European writers—it is precisely now, despite all of this, that the elemental, national uniqueness and the non-European, half-Asiatic face of Russia-Eurasia is becoming more visible than ever. It is surfacing everywhere, despite all the internationalist and antinational bric-a-brac, despite all the pretensions of this final proclamation of a "universally human" (i.e., European) civilization—everywhere we can see the genuine Russia, historical Russia, ancient Russia, not an invented "Slavic" or "Slavo-Varangian" Russia, but the real, Russo-Turanian Russia-Eurasia, heir to the great legacy of Genghis Khan. Various Turanian peoples—the Tatars, Kirghiz, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Yakuts, Buryats, and Mongols—have begun to speak in their own languages (now recognized as official languages) and to participate on an equal footing with Russians in building a common state system. In Russian physiognomies, which formerly appeared purely Slavic, one is beginning to notice something Turanian. In the Russian language itself one is beginning to hear new sound combinations that are also "barbarous," also Turanian. It seems that once again, as if it were seven hundred years ago, one can smell everywhere in Russia the odors of burning dung, horse sweat, camel hair—the

smells of the nomad camp. And hovering over all Russia is the shade of the great Genghis Khan, unifier of Eurasia.

The legacy of Genghis Khan is inseparable from Russia. Whether Russia wants it or not, she remains forever the guardian of this legacy, and her historical destiny has been shaped by this fact. Even during the period of the antinational monarchy, when both the government and educated society strove to make a European power of Russia, and everything they did reflected a shame-filled aversion to the natural bond between Russia and Asia—even then Russia was compelled by the very nature of things to continue the historical enterprise of uniting Eurasia into one state—the enterprise of Genghis Khan. The annexations of the Crimea, the Caucasus, the Transcaspian region, and Turkestan, and the formation of closer links between Eastern Siberia and Russia were all steps along the path toward reunification of the scattered parts of the Eurasian *ulus* of Genghis Khan's empire, while the colonization and cultivation of the steppe, its transformation from a nomad camp into a tilled field, consolidated the transfer of the Eurasian state idea from the Turanians to the Russians.

Although the government, in trying to imitate the "great European powers" in all things, was prepared to implement a policy of forcible "assimilation" that would strip the newly acquired regions of their cultural identity (as Europeans do in their colonies), the Russian masses sensed instinctively the true task of Russia and adopted a policy of fraternization with non-Russian populations, borrowing various customs and practices from them. Special mixed life styles developed in the newly annexed regions, life styles that in time could have served as the basis for a whole spectrum of Eurasian cultures, variations on a single, general Eurasian type. It was the efforts of the Russian elite (both educated society and the government) to possess a culture indubitably European that interfered with this process.

The same process, Russia's instinctive return to her natural historical path, can be observed at present. Although the

communist government looks to the West, to the proletariat of "civilized countries," and cherishes ardent hopes that the European and American proletariats will recognize them as true kinsmen, Russia is still being forced, by the very nature of things, to deal more and more with Asia and to put into practice in her internal development that fraternization with the peoples of Eurasia which is an inevitable consequence of the historical mission of Russia, the political unifier of Eurasia and the heir and descendant of Genghis Khan. The gravitation of the various peoples of Eurasia toward a common state structure that unites them into a single family compels them to look upon the Russian state as their own, as theirs by birth. The plowing of the nation's entire social landscape, which has brought to the surface layers previously far below, is bringing ever closer an opportunity to create a new culture or a whole spectrum of related cultures on the basis of the customs and world view of the masses, both of which were until recently subjects fit only for ethnographic study. Once again, however, this opportunity is being frustrated by the stubborn desire of the managers of cultural life to have a European culture, perhaps not identical in every detail with the contemporary culture of the peoples of Western Europe, but still corresponding to the dreams and theories of European sociologists and writers. Consequently, it will be a culture permeated with the spirit of European civilization.

Despite the stubborn war which the ruling circles (distinctions here are unimportant: formerly the monarchists, now the communists) have waged against the essence of Russia-Eurasia for over two hundred years, Russia-Eurasia has never ceased striving to be herself, striving to reenter her natural historical path despite the long detour through Western European models and doctrines. This instinctive striving must become conscious at long last. The future Russia-Eurasia must consciously repudiate the spirit of European civilization and build its own state system and culture upon completely different, non-European foundations.

It is impossible to predict exactly what this state system and culture will be. But the legacy of Genghis Khan, which has been continuously present in Russia since it was first embraced by pre-Petrine Muscovy, will shape her future as it has her past; and this makes predictions to some degree feasible. In international relations, the future Russia, the conscious custodian of Genghis Khan's legacy, will not try to become a European power; on the contrary, she will completely dissociate herself from Europe and European civilization. Remembering the lessons of the past, she will follow developments in European technology and adopt what is needed. But she will constantly protect herself against the adoption of European ideas, the European world view, and the spirit of European culture. She will not involve herself in European affairs, she will not side with any factious party or ideology in the countries of Europe, and she will consider no European social group a loyal ally. In particular, while continuing the struggle against international capital as an important feature of European civilization, she will not consider the European proletariat a reliable ally; she will take into account the fact that, although this proletariat is also struggling against capital, it will cease to struggle when international capital yields to it a portion of the profits gained from exploiting "uncivilized" countries. The complete destruction of international capital and the interruption of its exploitation of "uncivilized" or "half-civilized" countries (precisely what Russia's goal must be) is as unprofitable and unacceptable to the European proletariat as it is to the European bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, in her relations with countries and peoples outside the boundaries of European civilization, the future Russia should be guided by a sense of solidarity, recognizing that they are natural allies who are equally interested in overcoming the imperialism of European civilization. Russia should avoid attempts to annex any country not located within the geographical boundaries of Eurasia, remembering the damage that such annexations once did to Genghis Khan's enterprise. At the same time, Russia should