

Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation

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In today's world, claims for social justice seem increasingly to divide into two types. First, and most familiar, are redistributive claims, which seek a more just distribution of resources and wealth. Examples include claims for redistribution from the North to the South, from the rich to the poor, and (not so long ago) from the owners to the workers. To be sure, the recent resurgence of free-market thinking has put proponents of redistribution on the defensive. Nevertheless, egalitarian redistributive claims have supplied the paradigm case for most theorizing about social justice for the past 150 years.¹

Today, however, we increasingly encounter a second type of social-justice claim in the "politics of recognition." Here the goal, in its most plausible form, is a difference-friendly world, where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural norms is no longer the price of equal respect. Examples include claims for the recognition of the distinctive perspectives of ethnic, "racial," and sexual minorities, as well as of gender difference. This type of claim has recently attracted the interest of political philosophers, moreover, some of whom are seeking to develop a new paradigm of justice that puts recognition at its center.

In general, then, we are confronted with a new constellation. The discourse of social justice, once centered on distribution,

is now increasingly divided between claims for redistribution, on the one hand, and claims for recognition, on the other. Increasingly, too, recognition claims tend to predominate. The demise of communism, the surge of free-market ideology, the rise of "identity politics" in both its fundamentalist and progressive forms – all these developments have conspired to decenter, if not to extinguish, claims for egalitarian redistribution.

In this new constellation, the two kinds of justice claims are often dissociated from one another – both practically and intellectually. Within social movements such as feminism, for example, activist tendencies that look to redistribution as the remedy for male domination are increasingly dissociated from tendencies that look instead to recognition of gender difference. And the same is largely true in the intellectual sphere. In the academy, to continue with feminism, scholars who understand gender as a social relation maintain an uneasy arms-length coexistence with those who construe it as an identity or a cultural code. This situation exemplifies a broader phenomenon: the widespread decoupling of cultural politics from social politics, of the politics of difference from the politics of equality.²

In some cases, moreover, the dissociation has become a polarization. Some proponents of egalitarian redistribution reject the politics of recognition outright; citing global increases in inequality recently documented by the United Nations, they see claims for the recognition of difference as "false consciousness," a hindrance to the pursuit of social justice.³ Conversely, some proponents of recognition disdain the politics of redistribution; citing the failure of difference-blind economic egalitarianism to assure justice for minorities and women, they see distributive politics as an outmoded materialism that can neither articulate nor challenge key experiences of injustice. In such cases, we are effectively presented with an either/or choice: redistribution or recognition? Class politics or identity politics? Multiculturalism or social democracy?

These, I maintain, are false antitheses. It is my general thesis that justice today requires *both* redistribution *and* recognition. Neither alone is sufficient. As soon as one embraces this thesis, however, the question of how to combine them becomes paramount. I shall argue that the emancipatory aspects of the two problematics should be integrated in a single comprehensive framework. Theoretically, the task is to devise a two-dimensional conception of justice that can accommodate both defensible claims for social equality and defensible claims for the recognition of difference. Practically, the task is to devise a programmatic political orientation that can integrate the best of the politics of redistribution with the best of the politics of recognition.

My discussion divides into four parts. In part I, I shall argue that neither redistribution alone nor recognition alone can suffice to overcome injustice today; thus, they need somehow to be reconciled and combined. In parts II and III, I shall examine some issues in moral philosophy and social theory that arise when we contemplate integrating redistribution and recognition in a single comprehensive account of social justice. In part IV, finally, I shall consider some political problems that arise when we seek to institutionalize such an integrated perspective in reforms aimed at remedying injustice.

I. Redistribution or Recognition? A Critique of Justice Truncated

I begin with a terminological point. The terms "redistribution" and "recognition," as I use them here, have both a philosophical and a political reference. Philosophically, they refer to normative paradigms developed by political theorists and moral philosophers. Politically, they refer to families of claims raised by political actors and social movements in the public sphere. Each of these references merits some clarification.

As philosophical terms, "redistribution" and "recognition"

have divergent provenances. "Redistribution" comes from the liberal tradition, especially its late-twentieth-century Anglo-American branch. In the 1970s and 80s this tradition was richly extended as "analytic" philosophers such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin developed sophisticated theories of distributive justice. Seeking to synthesize the traditional liberal emphasis on individual liberty with the egalitarianism of social democracy, they propounded new conceptions of justice that could justify socio-economic redistribution.⁴

The term "recognition," in contrast, comes from Hegelian philosophy, specifically the phenomenology of consciousness. In this tradition, recognition designates an ideal reciprocal relation between subjects in which each sees the other as its equal and also as separate from it. This relation is deemed constitutive for subjectivity; one becomes an individual subject only in virtue of recognizing, and being recognized by, another subject. Thus, "recognition" implies the Hegelian thesis, often deemed at odds with liberal individualism, that social relations are prior to individuals and intersubjectivity is prior to subjectivity. Unlike redistribution, moreover, recognition is usually seen as belonging to "ethics" as opposed to "morality," that is, as promoting substantive ends of self-realization and the good life, as opposed to the "rightness" of procedural justice. Richly elaborated by existentialist thinkers at mid-century, recognition theory is currently undergoing a renaissance, as neo-Hegelian philosophers such as Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth are making it the centerpiece of normative social philosophies aimed at vindicating "the politics of difference."⁵

Philosophically, therefore, the terms "redistribution" and "recognition" make an odd couple. Each is likely to be rejected by proponents of the other. Many liberal theorists of distributive justice contend that recognition theory carries unacceptable communitarian baggage, while some philosophers of recognition deem distributive theory individualizing and consumerist. Moreover, each of these notions elicits criticism from farther afield. Thinkers who identify with the Marxian tradition main-

tain that the category of distribution fails to capture the full depths of capitalist injustice because it neglects the relations of production and fails to problematize exploitation, domination, and commodification.⁶ Likewise, those who embrace poststructuralist thought insist that the idea of recognition carries normalizing assumptions of centered subjectivity, which impede a more radical critique.⁷

In what follows, I shall try to show that redistribution and recognition *can* go together, despite their divergent philosophical provenances. And I shall also suggest that both notions can be conceived in ways that escape their respective critics' objections.

I propose to begin, however, by temporarily bracketing these philosophical disputes. I shall start instead by considering "redistribution" and "recognition" in their political reference. I shall consider them, that is, as ideal-typical constellations of claims that are currently contested in public spheres. From this perspective, the terms "redistribution" and "recognition" refer not to philosophical paradigms but rather to *folk paradigms of justice*, which inform present-day struggles in civil society. Tacitly presupposed by social movements and political actors, folk paradigms are sets of linked assumptions about the causes of and remedies for injustice. By reconstructing the folk paradigms of redistribution and recognition, I seek to clarify why and how these perspectives have been cast as mutually antithetical in current political debates.

1. *Anatomy of a false antithesis*

As folk paradigms, redistribution and recognition are often associated with specific social movements. Thus, the politics of redistribution is commonly equated with class politics, while the politics of recognition is assimilated to "identity politics," which is equated in turn with struggles over gender, sexuality, nationality, ethnicity, and "race." As we shall see, however, these common associations are misleading. For one thing, they

treat recognition-oriented currents within feminist, anti-heterosexualist, and anti-racist movements as the whole story, rendering invisible alternative currents dedicated to righting gender-specific, "race"-specific, and sex-specific forms of economic injustice that traditional class movements ignored. For another, they obscure the recognition dimensions of class struggles, which have never aimed solely at redistributing wealth. Finally, the equation of recognition politics with identity politics reduces what we shall see is actually a plurality of different kinds of recognition claims to a single type, namely, claims for the affirmation of group specificity.

In what follows, accordingly, I shall suspend these common associations. Instead of aligning redistribution and recognition with class politics and identity politics respectively, I shall treat each folk paradigm as expressing a *distinctive perspective on social justice*, which can be applied in principle to the situation of *any* social movement.

Viewed in this way, the paradigm of redistribution can encompass not only class-centered political orientations, such as New Deal liberalism, social democracy, and socialism, but also those forms of feminism and anti-racism that look to socioeconomic transformation or reform as the remedy for gender and racial-ethnic injustice. Thus, it is broader than class politics in the conventional sense. The paradigm of recognition, likewise, can encompass not only movements aiming to revalue unjustly devalued identities – for example, cultural feminism, black cultural nationalism, and gay identity politics – but also deconstructive tendencies, such as queer politics, critical "race" politics, and deconstructive feminism, which reject the "essentialism" of traditional identity politics. Thus, it is broader than identity politics in the conventional sense.

Understood in this way, the folk paradigm of redistribution and the folk paradigm of recognition can be contrasted in four key respects. First, the two paradigms assume different conceptions of injustice. The redistribution paradigm focuses on

injustices it defines as socio-economic and presumes to be rooted in the economic structure of society. Examples include exploitation (having the fruits of one's labor appropriated for the benefit of others); economic marginalization (being confined to undesirable or poorly-paid work or being denied access to income-generating labor altogether), and deprivation (being denied an adequate material standard of living). The recognition paradigm, in contrast, targets injustices it understands as cultural, which it presumes to be rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication. Examples include cultural domination (being subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and are alien and/or hostile to one's own); nonrecognition (being rendered invisible via the authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretative practices of one's own culture); and disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public cultural representations and/or in everyday life interactions).

Second, the two folk paradigms propose different sorts of remedies for injustice. In the redistribution paradigm, the remedy for injustice is economic restructuring of some sort. This might involve redistributing income and/or wealth, reorganizing the division of labor, changing the structure of property ownership, democratizing the procedures by which investment decisions are made, or transforming other basic economic structures. (Although these various remedies differ importantly from one another, I take this paradigm to encompass to the whole group of them under the generic term "redistribution."⁸) In the recognition paradigm, in contrast, the remedy for injustice is cultural or symbolic change. This could involve upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups; recognizing and positively valorizing cultural diversity; or transforming wholesale societal patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication in ways that would change everyone's social identity. (Although

these remedies, too, differ importantly from one another, I take this paradigm, too, to encompass the whole group of them under the generic term "recognition."⁹

Third, the two folk paradigms assume different conceptions of the collectivities that suffer injustice. In the redistribution paradigm, the collective subjects of injustice are classes or class-like collectivities, which are defined economically by a distinctive relation to the market or the means of production.¹⁰ The classic case in the Marxian paradigm is the exploited working class, whose members must sell their labor power in order to receive the means of subsistence.¹¹ But the conception can cover other cases as well. Also included are racialized groups of immigrants or ethnic minorities that can be economically defined, whether as a pool of low-paid menial laborers or as an "underclass" largely excluded from regular waged work, deemed "superfluous" and not worth exploiting. When the concept of the economy is broadened to encompass unwaged labor, moreover, women are included here too – as the gender burdened with the lion's share of unwaged carework and consequently disadvantaged in employment. Also included, finally, are the complexly defined groupings that result when we theorize the political economy in terms of the intersection of class, "race," and gender.

In the folk paradigm of recognition, in contrast, the victims of injustice are more like Weberian status groups than Marxian classes. Defined not by the relations of production, but rather by the relations of recognition, they are distinguished by the lesser respect, esteem, and prestige they enjoy relative to other groups in society. The classic case in the Weberian paradigm is the low-status ethnic group, whom dominant patterns of cultural value mark as different and less worthy, to the detriment of group members' social standing and their chances of winning social esteem.¹² But the conception can cover other cases as well. In the current political conjuncture, it has been extended to gays and lesbians, who suffer pervasive effects of institutionalized stigma; to racialized groups, who are marked as different

and lesser; and to women, who are trivialized, sexually objectified, and disrespected in myriad ways. It is also being extended, finally, to encompass the complexly defined groupings that result when we theorize the relations of recognition in terms of "race," gender, and sexuality simultaneously, as intersecting cultural codes.

It follows, and this is the fourth point, that the two folk paradigms assume different understandings of group differences. The redistribution paradigm treats such differences as unjust differentials. Far from being intrinsic properties of groups, they are the socially constructed results of an unjust political economy. From this perspective, accordingly, we should strive to abolish, not recognize, group differences. The recognition paradigm, in contrast, treats differences in either of two ways. In one version, they are benign, pre-existing cultural variations, which an unjust interpretative schema has maliciously transformed into a value hierarchy. In another version, group differences do not pre-exist their hierarchical transvaluation, but are constructed contemporaneously with it. For the first version, justice requires that we revalue devalued traits; thus, we should celebrate, not eliminate, group differences. For the second version, however, celebration is counterproductive; rather, we should deconstruct the terms in which differences are currently elaborated.

Increasingly, as I noted at the outset, redistribution and recognition are portrayed as mutually exclusive alternatives. Some proponents of the former, such as Richard Rorty, Brian Barry, and Todd Gitlin, insist that identity politics is a counterproductive diversion from the real economic issues, one that balkanizes groups and rejects universalist moral norms.¹³ For them, the sole proper object of political struggle is the economy. Conversely, some proponents of recognition, such as Iris Marion Young, insist that a difference-blind politics of redistribution can reinforce injustice by falsely universalizing dominant group norms, requiring subordinate groups to assimilate to them, and misrecognizing the latter's distinctiveness.¹⁴ For

them, the privileged political objective is cultural transformation.

With their charges and countercharges, these antagonists portray redistribution and recognition as mutually exclusive alternatives. Thus, they seem to present us with an either/or choice. Should we opt for a politics of redistribution that aims to abolish class differentials? Or should we embrace a politics of recognition that seeks to celebrate or deconstruct group differences? Apparently we cannot support both.

This, however, is a false antithesis.

2. *Exploited classes, despised sexualities, and two-dimensional categories*

To see why, let's engage in a thought experiment. Imagine a conceptual spectrum of different kinds of social divisions. At one extreme are divisions that fit the folk paradigm of redistribution. At the other extreme are divisions that fit the folk paradigm of recognition. In between are cases that prove difficult because they fit both paradigms of justice simultaneously.¹⁵

Consider, first, the redistribution end of the spectrum. At this end let us posit an ideal-typical social division rooted in the economic structure of society. By definition, then, any structural injustices attaching to this division will be traceable to the political economy. The core of the injustice will be socio-economic maldistribution, while any attendant cultural injustices will derive ultimately from the economic structure. At bottom, therefore, the remedy required to redress the injustice will be redistribution, as opposed to recognition.

An example that appears to approximate this ideal type is class differentiation, as understood in orthodox, economic Marxism. (Let us leave aside the question of whether this interpretation of Marxism is adequate. And let us also bracket for the time being the question of whether this view of class fits the actual historical collectivities that have struggled for

justice in the real world in the name of the working class.¹⁶) In this conception, class differentiation is rooted in the economic structure of capitalist society. The working class is the body of persons who must sell their labor power under arrangements that authorize the capitalist class to appropriate surplus productivity for its private benefit. The core injustice of these arrangements is exploitation, an especially deep form of maldistribution in which the proletariat's own energies are turned against it, usurped to sustain a system that benefits others. To be sure, proletarians also suffer serious cultural injustices, the "hidden injuries of class."¹⁷ But far from being rooted directly in an autonomously unjust status order, these derive from the economic structure, as ideologies of class inferiority proliferate to justify exploitation. The remedy for the injustice, accordingly, is redistribution, not recognition. Overcoming class exploitation requires restructuring the political economy so as to alter the class distribution of benefits and burdens. In the Marxian view, such restructuring takes the radical form of abolishing the class structure as such. The task of the proletariat, therefore, is not simply to cut itself a better deal, but "to abolish itself as a class." The last thing it needs is recognition of its difference. On the contrary, the only way to remedy the injustice is to put the proletariat out of business as a distinctive group.¹⁸

Now consider the other end of the conceptual spectrum. At this end let us posit an ideal-typical social division that fits the folk paradigm of recognition. A division of this type is rooted in the status order of society, as opposed to in the economic structure. Thus, any structural injustices attaching to it will be traceable to the society's institutionalized patterns of cultural value. The core of the injustice will be misrecognition, while any attendant economic injustices will derive ultimately from the status order. The remedy required to redress the injustice will be recognition, as opposed to redistribution.

An example that appears to approximate this ideal type is sexual differentiation, understood through the prism of the Weberian conception of status. (As before, let us bracket for

the time being the question of whether this view of sexuality fits the actually existing collectivities that have mobilized against heterosexism in the real world.¹⁹ According to this conception, the social division between heterosexuals and homosexuals is not grounded in the political economy, as homosexuals are distributed throughout the entire class structure of capitalist society, occupy no distinctive position in the division of labor, and do not constitute an exploited class. The division is rooted, rather, in the status order of society, as institutionalized patterns of cultural value construct heterosexuality as natural and normative, homosexuality as perverse and despised. Pervasively institutionalized, such heteronormative value patterns structure broad swaths of social interaction. Expressly codified in many areas of law (including family law and criminal law), they inform legal constructions of family, intimacy, privacy, and equality. They are also entrenched in many areas of government policy (including immigration, naturalization and asylum policy) and in standard professional practices (including medicine and psychotherapy). Heteronormative value patterns also pervade popular culture and everyday interaction. The effect is to construct gays and lesbians as a *despised sexuality*, subject to sexually specific forms of *status subordination*. The latter include shaming and assault, exclusion from the rights and privileges of marriage and parenthood, curbs on rights of expression and association, demeaning stereotypical depictions in the media, harassment and disparagement in everyday life, and denial of the full rights and equal protections of citizenship. These harms are injustices of misrecognition.

To be sure, gays and lesbians also suffer serious economic injustices: they can be summarily dismissed from civilian employment and military service, are denied a broad range of family-based social-welfare benefits, and face major tax and inheritance liabilities. But far from being rooted directly in the economic structure of society, these derive instead from the status order, as the institutionalization of heterosexist norms produces a category of despised persons who incur economic

disadvantages as a consequence of their subordinate status. The remedy for the injustice, accordingly, is recognition, not redistribution. Change the relations of recognition, that is, and the maldistribution will disappear. In general, then, overcoming homophobia and heterosexism requires changing the sexual status order, deinstitutionalizing heteronormative value patterns and replacing them with patterns that express equal respect for gays and lesbians.²⁰

Matters are thus fairly straightforward at the two extremes of our conceptual spectrum. When we deal with social groups that approach the ideal type of the exploited working class, we face distributive injustices requiring redistributive remedies. What is needed is a politics of redistribution. When we deal with social groups that approach the ideal type of the despised sexuality, in contrast, we face injustices of misrecognition. What is needed *here* is a politics of recognition.

Matters become murkier, however, once we move away from these extremes. When we posit a type of social division located in the middle of the conceptual spectrum, we encounter a hybrid form that combines features of the exploited class with features of the despised sexuality. I will call such divisions "two-dimensional." Rooted at once in the economic structure and the status order of society, they involve injustices that are traceable to both. Two-dimensionally subordinated groups suffer both maldistribution and misrecognition *in forms where neither of these injustices is an indirect effect of the other, but where both are primary and co-original*. In their case, accordingly, neither a politics of redistribution alone nor a politics of recognition alone will suffice. Two-dimensionally subordinated groups need both.

Gender, I contend, is a two-dimensional social differentiation. Neither simply a class nor simply a status group, gender is a hybrid category rooted simultaneously in the economic structure and the status order of society. Understanding and redressing gender injustice, therefore, requires attending to both distribution and recognition.

From the distributive perspective, gender serves as a basic organizing principle of the economic structure of capitalist society. On the one hand, it structures the fundamental division between paid "productive" labor and unpaid "reproductive" and domestic labor, assigning women primary responsibility for the latter. On the other hand, gender also structures the division within paid labor between higher-paid, male-dominated manufacturing and professional occupations and lower-paid, female-dominated "pink collar" and domestic service occupations. The result is an economic structure that generates gender-specific forms of distributive injustice, including gender-based exploitation, economic marginalization, and deprivation.

Here, gender appears as a class-like differentiation that is rooted in the economic structure of society. When viewed under this aspect, gender injustice appears as a species of distributive injustice that cries out for redistributive redress. Much like class, gender justice requires transforming the economy so as to eliminate its gender structuring. Eliminating gender-specific maldistribution requires abolishing the gender division of labor — both the gendered division between paid and unpaid labor and the gender divisions within paid labor. The logic of the remedy is akin to the logic with respect to class: it aims to put gender out of business as such. If gender were nothing but a class-like differentiation, in sum, justice would require its abolition.

That, however, is only half the story. In fact, gender is not only a class-like division, but a status differentiation as well. As such, it also encompasses elements more reminiscent of sexuality than class, which bring it squarely within the problematic of recognition. Gender codes pervasive cultural patterns of interpretation and evaluation, which are central to the status order as a whole. As a result, not just women but all low-status groups risk feminization and thus depreciation.

Thus, a major feature of gender injustice is androcentrism: an institutionalized pattern of cultural value that privileges traits associated with masculinity, while devaluing everything coded

as "feminine," paradigmatically — but not only — women. Pervasively institutionalized, androcentric value patterns structure broad swaths of social interaction. Expressly codified in many areas of law (including family law and criminal law), they inform legal constructions of privacy, autonomy, self-defense, and equality. They are also entrenched in many areas of government policy (including reproductive, immigration, and asylum policy) and in standard professional practices (including medicine and psychotherapy). Androcentric value patterns also pervade popular culture and everyday interaction. As a result, women suffer gender-specific forms of *status subordination*, including sexual assault and domestic violence; trivializing, objectifying, and demeaning stereotypical depictions in the media; harassment and disparagement in everyday life; exclusion or marginalization in public spheres and deliberative bodies; and denial of the full rights and equal protections of citizenship. These harms are injustices of recognition. They are relatively independent of political economy and are not merely "superstructural." Thus, they cannot be overcome by redistribution alone but require additional, independent remedies of recognition.

Here, gender appears as a status differentiation endowed with sexuality-like characteristics. When viewed under this aspect, gender injustice appears as a species of misrecognition that cries out for redress via recognition. Much like heterosexism, overcoming androcentrism requires changing the gender status order, deinstitutionalizing sexist value patterns and replacing them with patterns that express equal respect for women. Thus, the logic of the remedy here is akin to that concerning sexuality: it aims to dismantle androcentrism by restructuring the relations of recognition.²¹

Gender, in sum, is a two-dimensional social differentiation. It combines a class-like dimension, which brings it within the ambit of redistribution, with a status dimension, which brings it simultaneously within the ambit of recognition. It is an open question whether the two dimensions are of equal weight. But

redressing gender injustice, in any case, requires changing both the economic structure and the status order of society.

The two-dimensional character of gender wreaks havoc on the idea of an either/or choice between the paradigm of redistribution and the paradigm of recognition. That construction assumes that the collective subjects of injustice are either classes or status groups, but not both; that the injustice they suffer is either maldistribution or misrecognition, but not both; that the group differences at issue are either unjust differentials or unjustly devalued variations, but not both; that the remedy for injustice is either redistribution or recognition, but not both. Gender, we can now see, explodes this whole series of false antitheses. Here we have a category that is a compound of both status and class. Here difference is constructed from both economic differentials and institutionalized patterns of cultural value. Here both maldistribution and misrecognition are fundamental. Gender injustice can only be remedied, therefore, by an approach that encompasses both a politics of redistribution and a politics of recognition.

3. *Two-dimensionality: Exception or norm?*

How unusual is gender in this regard? Are we dealing here with a unique or rare case of two-dimensionality in an otherwise one-dimensional world? Or is two-dimensionality, rather, the norm?

"Race," it is clear, is also a two-dimensional social division, a compound of status and class. Rooted simultaneously in the economic structure and the status order of capitalist society, racism's injustices include both maldistribution and misrecognition. In the economy, "race" organizes structural divisions between menial and non-menial paid jobs, on the one hand, and between exploitable and "superfluous" labor power, on the other. As a result, the economic structure generates racially specific forms of maldistribution. Racialized immigrants and/or ethnic minorities suffer disproportionately high rates of unem-

ployment and poverty and over-representation in low-paying menial work. These distributive injustices can only be remedied by a politics of redistribution.

In the status order, meanwhile, Eurocentric patterns of cultural value privilege traits associated with "whiteness," while stigmatizing everything coded as "black," "brown," and "yellow," paradigmatically – but not only – people of color. As a result, racialized immigrants and/or ethnic minorities are constructed as deficient and inferior others who cannot be full members of society. Pervasively institutionalized, Eurocentric norms generate racially specific forms of status subordination, including stigmatization and physical assault; cultural devaluation, social exclusion, and political marginalization; harassment and disparagement in everyday life; and denial of the full rights and equal protections of citizenship. Quintessential harms of misrecognition, these injustices can only be remedied by a politics of recognition.

Neither dimension of racism is wholly an indirect effect of the other, moreover. To be sure, the distributive and recognition dimensions interact with one another. But racist maldistribution is not simply a by-product of status hierarchy; nor is racist misrecognition wholly a by-product of economic structure. Rather, each dimension has some relative independence from the other. Neither can be redressed indirectly, therefore, through remedies addressed exclusively to the other. Overcoming the injustices of racism, in sum, requires both redistribution and recognition. Neither alone will suffice.

Class, too, can be understood as two-dimensional, in spite of the previous discussion. In fact, the economist ideal type I invoked for heuristic purposes occludes some significant real-world complexities. To be sure, the ultimate cause of class injustice is the economic structure of capitalist society.²² But the resulting harms include misrecognition as well as maldistribution; and status harms that originated as by-products of economic structure may have since developed a life of their own. Today, the misrecognition dimensions of class may be

sufficiently autonomous in their operation to require independent remedies of recognition. Left unattended, moreover, class misrecognition can impede the capacity to mobilize against maldistribution. To build broad support for economic transformation today requires challenging cultural attitudes that demean poor and working people, for example, "culture-of-poverty" ideologies that suggest they simply get what they deserve. Likewise, poor and working people may need a recognition politics to support their struggles for economic justice; they may need, that is, to build class communities and cultures in order to neutralize the hidden injuries of class and forge the confidence to stand up for themselves. Thus, a politics of class recognition may be needed both in itself and to help get a politics of redistribution off the ground.²³

In general, then, even such an apparently one-dimensional economic category as class has a status component. To be sure, this component is subordinate, less weighty than the economic component. Nevertheless, overcoming class injustice may well require joining a politics of recognition to a politics of redistribution.²⁴ At the very least, it will be necessary to attend carefully to the recognition dynamics of class struggles in the process of fighting for redistribution.

What, then, of sexuality? Is it also a two-dimensional category? Here, too, the ideal type I sketched earlier for heuristic purposes may be inadequate to the real-world complexities. To be sure, the ultimate cause of heterosexual injustice is the status order, not the economic structure of capitalist society.²⁵ But the resulting harms include maldistribution as well as misrecognition; and economic harms that originated as by-products of the status order have an undeniable weight of their own. Left unattended, moreover, they can impede the capacity to mobilize against misrecognition. Insofar as coming out poses economic risks for gays and lesbians, their capacity to fight status subordination is diminished; so too is the capacity of their heterosexual allies, who must likewise fear the economic consequences of being (mis)identified as gay if they openly defend

homosexual rights. In addition, maldistribution may be the "weak link" in the chain of heterosexual oppression. In the current climate, it may be easier to challenge the distributive inequities faced by gays and lesbians than to confront head on the deep-seated status anxieties that fuel homophobia.²⁶ In sum, building support for transforming the sexual status order may require fighting for economic equity. Thus, a politics of sexual redistribution may be needed both in itself and to help get a politics of recognition off the ground.

In general, then, even such an apparently one-dimensional status category as sexuality has a distributive component. To be sure, this component is subordinate, less weighty than the status component. Nevertheless, overcoming sexual injustice may well require joining a politics of redistribution to a politics of recognition. At the very least, it will be necessary to attend carefully to the distributive dynamics of sexual struggles in the process of fighting for recognition.

For practical purposes, then, virtually all real-world axes of subordination can be treated as two-dimensional. Virtually all implicate both maldistribution and misrecognition in forms where each of those injustices has some independent weight, whatever its ultimate roots. To be sure, not all axes of subordination are two-dimensional in the same way, nor to the same degree. Some, such as class, tilt more heavily toward the distribution end of the spectrum; others, such as sexuality, incline more to the recognition end; while still others, such as gender and "race," cluster closer to the center. The precise proportion of economic disadvantage and status subordination must be determined empirically in every case. Nevertheless, in virtually every case, the harms at issue comprise both maldistribution and misrecognition in forms where neither of those injustices can be redressed entirely indirectly but where each requires some independent practical attention. As a practical matter, therefore, overcoming injustice in virtually every case requires both redistribution and recognition.

The need for a two-pronged approach becomes more press-

ing, moreover, as soon as one ceases considering axes of subordination singly and begins considering them together. After all, gender, "race," sexuality, and class are not neatly cordoned off from one another. Rather, all these axes of subordination intersect one another in ways that affect everyone's interests and identities. No one is a member of only one such collectivity. And individuals who are subordinated along one axis of social division may well be dominant along another. Viewed in this light, the need for a two-pronged politics of redistribution and recognition does not only arise endogenously, as it were, within a single two-dimensional social division. It also arises exogenously, so to speak, across intersecting differentiations. For example, anyone who is both gay and working-class will need both redistribution and recognition, regardless of what one makes of those two categories taken singly. Seen this way, moreover, nearly every individual who suffers injustice needs to integrate those two kinds of claims. And so, furthermore, will anyone who cares about social justice, regardless of their own personal social location.

In general, then, one should roundly reject the construction of redistribution and recognition as mutually exclusive alternatives. The goal should be, rather, to develop an integrated approach that can encompass, and harmonize, both dimensions of social justice.

II. Integrating Redistribution and Recognition: Problems in Moral Philosophy

Integrating redistribution and recognition in a single comprehensive paradigm is no simple matter, however. To contemplate such a project is to be plunged immediately into deep and difficult problems spanning several major fields of inquiry. In moral philosophy, for example, the task is to devise an overarching conception of justice that can accommodate both defensible claims for social equality and defensible claims for

the recognition of difference. In social theory, as we shall see, the task is to devise an account of contemporary society that can accommodate both the differentiation of class from status and also their mutual imbrication. In political theory, meanwhile, the task is to envision a set of institutional arrangements and policy reforms that can remedy both maldistribution and misrecognition, while minimizing the mutual interferences likely to arise when the two sorts of redress are sought simultaneously. In practical politics, finally, the task is to foster democratic engagement across current divides in order to build a broad-based programmatic orientation that integrates the best of the politics of redistribution with the best of the politics of recognition.

In the present section, I shall examine some of the moral-philosophical dimensions of this project. Here, accordingly, I leave behind the political understandings of redistribution and recognition as folk paradigms of justice. In their place I now consider redistribution and recognition as *normative philosophical categories*.

1. *Justice or self-realization?*

Any attempt to integrate redistribution and recognition must address four crucial questions in moral philosophy. First, is recognition really a matter of justice, or is it a matter of self-realization? Second, do distributive justice and recognition constitute two distinct, *sui generis*, normative paradigms, or can either of them be subsumed within the other? Third, how can we distinguish justified from unjustified claims for recognition? And fourth, does justice require the recognition of what is distinctive about individuals or groups, or is recognition of our common humanity sufficient?

The first question arises given some standard distinctions in moral philosophy. In this field, questions of justice are usually understood to be matters of "the right," which belong squarely on the terrain of "morality." Questions of self-realization, in