INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF POPULATION
IN THE POST-SOVIET TERRITORY:
TWO DECADES OF SUCCESSES, MISTAKES
AND EXPECTANCIES

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International Migration of Population in the Post-Soviet Territory:

The twenty-fifth volume of the series summarizes the results of the two decades of international migration processes in the post-Soviet countries. The book includes papers dealing with migration trends in the majority of the former USSR states written by national experts. The papers are focused on the shifts in migration trends during the recent twenty years, the vectors of migration flows, the role of international migration for development of these states, and the evolution of the national migration policies.

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Dear readers,

It is my pleasure to introduce you the current collection of 12 analytical country reports of participants of international scientific-practical conference “International migration on post-Soviet space: tendencies, consequences and perspectives”. The conference was organized by the Department of Population Studies of Economic Faculty of Moscow State University, with support of IOM, UNICEF and New Eurasia Foundations, with the purpose to represent and discuss the results of study of dynamics of migration processes, followed by the changes in economic, social and demographic character for each of the countries of former Soviet Union. The authors analyzed the dynamics of migration processes, influence of migration on countries’ development, as well as changes of migration legislation and politics on the national levels. Finally, the main question which was of interest of the researchers is what are the possibilities for coordination of countries’ migration strategies, what mechanisms could be suggested to increase the positive impact of migration for all countries, as well as for the region as a whole.

Despite the long time passed from the break-up of the Soviet Union, and dynamics of migration processes are different for each of the countries, a lot of similar observations were made by the authors and found common grounds and unified conclusions.

Thus, almost all of the authors were unanimous in the opinion, that massive in its scale migration processes, disrupted shortly after the break up of the Soviet Union, followed by economic liberalization and appearance of independent political regimes, led to significant changes in social, demographic structures of the societies. All authors identify the first period of mass migration as resettlement and involuntary, during which the main directions of contemporary migration flows started to form. High scale migration was confirmed by statistics presented by the authors. Thus, according to the author of Armenia report, about 900 000 persons left the country during 1988–2001 and did not return,
which is about 30% of total population of Armenia. From Kazakhstan, about 3,1 million of people left during 1992–2006, out which 2 million persons left forever. The main negative consequences of such massive emigration for the countries of origins were connected to the losses in human capital. Thus, the authors of each of the articles notice that the first wave of massive emigration, which appeared as a reaction to the rise of nationalist movement and inter-ethnic conflicts, led not only to ethnic homogenization of the states of the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Moldova and the Baltic, countries, but also to significant qualitative changes in social and demographic characteristics of these states.

On the edge of 21 century, as many of the authors observe, the main character of the migration has been changed. International migration on post-Soviet space started to take economic character and gradually becoming labour migration. Different countries exhibit different rates of economic stabilization and growth, which in its turn leads to the growing differences in the level of salaries and existing opportunities for employment. At the same time, continuing visa-free regime and freedom of movement facilitated more active movements of labour migrants in search of better economic and life options for themselves and their families. Thus, in the beginning of 2000s, new roles of the states started to form: sending countries and countries-recipients of foreign labour force. In one of the group – those which receives migrants are Kazakhstan (from 2004, the country shows positive migration rate and stabilization of migration movement). In 2005, Ukraine is also becoming a country which receives immigrant, her immigration losses are compensated by former compatriots arriving from CIS countries. From 2006- immigration growth was registered from immigration sources from non-CIS region. I the next years, this tendency of immigration growth stabilizes for Ukraine. On the other hand, such countries as Latvia, Belorussia and Russia, due to higher rates of economic development, with continuing structural shortage on the labour markets, start to suffer from persistent deficit of the labour force in some sectors of economies.

At the same time, Central Asian and South Caucasus states, start to suffer excessive labour force, with local economies unable to coupe
with demands for labour. As a result, countries experience the growth of social tension and unrest. These states are characterized by higher rates of unemployment, especially among the youth. Thus, in Uzbekistan, every year about 650,000 young people are entering active employment age and joining labour market. As a result, labour migration becomes a viable life strategy, being not the strategy for development but rather the strategy for survival, without any significant alternative. Thus, as the author of Kyrgyzstan report notes, from 21% to 26% of economically active population of the country engaged in labour migration. For Moldova, the number of labour migrants is equal about 600,000 persons (which is about every third citizen in active employment age). In Georgia, the number of labour migrants reaches up to 8—10% of the population.

All authors on Moldova, Kyrgyzya, Uzbekistan and republics of the South Caucasus reports name money remittances as the direct positive effect of labour migration. Total volume of remittances sent to the countries is significant for their economies. Thus, total volume of money remittances from Kazakhstan forms about 3% of GDP of the country, or about 3 bln. USD in 2007. Money remittances of labour migrants create almost 30% of GRP of Kyrgyzstan. In Georgia, in 2010, the volume of remittances is equal of 1.5 bln. USD, which is about 12.9% of GDP and 1.8 times higher than direct foreign investments into the country. According to the opinion of the researchers, money remittances allow migrants to survive and support the wellbeing of their families, which is also a significant factor of decreasing of poverty rates in the countries and the level of social tension in the region. At the same time, as noted by the authors, money remittances are used mainly on everyday household needs, internal consumption and have little practical influence on economic growth and development of the countries.

On the other hand, the authors point at the negative consequences of labour migration—disruption of demographic balance in the countries, erosion of social, family norms, as well as traditional moral values of the countries, Also, decreasing parenting role of migrants and the loss of educational influence on children is noted by some of the au-
authors as negative consequences of the labour migration. Finally, some of the authors mention negative influence of migration on the health of migrants and their families, namely, kids.

While analyzing development of migration policy and legislation of the CIS states, many of the authors note its operational and reactive character. Legislative and political reform in the area of migration was done as a reaction on the situation and attempts to cope with the situation, especially during the initial stages of development. Gradually, the states of the post-Soviet space started to transform its migration legislation, responding to the needs of time, in accord with their political goals and strategies. Latvia could become probably the most evident example of the changes in migration legislation and politics, which become actively engaged into integration processes of EC and adopting its common laws. Ukraine, Moldova and Belorussia, being transit countries for illegal migration from South East Asia and Africa, are also actively involved in migration legislation reform, especially in the area of fight against illegal migration, asylum seekers, trafficking, as well as other norms of international migration law.

At the same time, as some of the authors mention, in the last year, more active changes started to occur in migration policy reform. Gradually, the approach to the regulation of migration processes has been changing- from operational to more proactive, purpose oriented and stimulating. Thus, the most significant initiative of 2009–2011 was the creation of Customs Union and signing two Agreements in the area of labour migration- Agreement on the legal status of the labour migrants and their family members and Agreement on counteracting of illegal labour migration from the third countries. These Agreements allow to push integration processes in the region to a new qualitative level, as well as to create new dynamics on creating common economic space, changing the character of migration processes in the Common Economic Zone of CIS.

Finally, the most significant motive for each of the report and is the unanimous pinion of all of the authors is that mass migration holds a huge potential- for both countries of origin and countries of destination. Labour migration should become more than just a strategy for survival.
For the countries of origin, it should turn into strategy for development, which would allow to use money remittances and professional and qualification skills which migrants acquire – for creation of new working places, business development and entrepreneurship. For the countries of destination, labour migration should become the resource, which would allow to resolve issues of economic, social and demographic character, and not turn into the trigger for the growth of xenophobia and social tensions in the societies.

At present, the main goal is the search for human and just decisions, which would facilitate harmonization of the personal decisions to migrate with national policies of the states in the area of migration. International organization for migration is actively involved into the work in the area of recognizing the positive potential of migration, on development of orderly and human migration, which observes the rights of the migrants and we really hope for cooperation with all stakeholders involved into the process.

Sincerely yours,

Enrico Ponziani
Chief of Mission
IOM Moscow
Human mobility is an inevitable part of our increasingly globalized world and Russia is no exception. Globally it is estimated that more than 200 million people are international migrants. Most move within their own borders from rural to urban areas; others move to neighboring countries, pulled by socio-economic factors associated with a higher rating on the human development index. Very few relocate to different geographic regions. Generally migration corridors are established between countries of origin and destination and this is clearly seen in the CIS where Russia is the primary destination for many migrants from the former Soviet republics, followed to a lesser extent by Kazakhstan. As seen from the evidence presented in this publication, migration flows in the CIS are significantly impacted by the common cultural, social and linguistic ties inherited from the former Soviet Union. For example, more than 90% of migrants inside the Russian Federation come from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe drawn by employment opportunities fueled by Russia’s growth and pushed by limited job options at home. For this reason Russia becomes the focus of migration within the CIS region and acts as a magnet attracting men, women, children and families from poorer countries in the region.

Russia itself is a country of origin for migrants. It is also a country of transit and destination for many who seek a better life for themselves and are prepared to endure great hardship to achieve that. For Russia, this book comes at a time when the country stands at a demographic crossroads when both migration and declining birthrates are hotly debated. Although there has been a slight increase in the birth rate, the ROSSTAT demographic forecast indicates that the natural population decline in Russia will reach 3.5 million in the coming decade. At the same time, Russia has one of the fastest growing economies (despite the economic crisis) in the world at 4% per annum that can only be sustained by an expanding work force. It is clear that this gap can only
be addressed through large-scale labor migration. These practical needs stand in contrast to migration policies built on the premise of state sovereignty rather than real market needs. Russia, like many other nations has responded to the threat of terrorism, smuggling and human trafficking by laying the foundations for more control and greater limits on human mobility. Perceptions of risk have become closely linked to migration fueling xenophobia and social exclusion. The same risk perception has not yet been applied to freely flowing economic capital despite visible proof of the consequences of unchecked capital flows. Money continues to flow freely across borders, while millions of people struggle against restricted labor quotas for the legal right to work. Those who do not succeed in gaining legal work permits risk their health and sometimes their lives for the chance to work without proper documentation.

Although most documented migrant workers in the region are male (according to official data), the profile of migrants is changing and increasingly women make up part of the migration flows and find jobs either in households or in the service sector. According to research presented here, the majority of women migrate to join their husbands, temporarily leaving children behind, but evidence points to progressively more women migrate on their own with children or start families in Russia. The new profile of migration suggests the need to consider the social policy implications for single male and female migrants as well as that of families with children.

No longer simply migration for seasonal work, many migrants hope to settle in Russia for the long term and have placed their children in Russian schools. Those with residence and work permits are less likely to suffer exclusion; but those migrants who are in Russia without proper documentation, have seen more stringent restrictions placed on their ability to access healthcare, education and social services. As a result, migrant women and children in particular are more vulnerable to health risks and migrant children of undocumented workers are less likely to have access to education. Additionally there is mounting evidence that today’s street children are in fact the children of undocumented migrant workers, which was not the case ten years ago.
Even documented migrants are uncertain of their rights and can easily be exploited. The host population no longer feels bound to welcome their former compatriots with open arms. Economic hardship, the perceived competition with migrants for work also from within Russia, security implications and greater restrictions on migration stokes an anti-immigrant fire that has the potential to provoke widespread social unrest.

It is precisely at this point where progressive social and economic policy must be invoked to consider the wider implications of Russia’s demographic needs, regional inequities, the demand for labor and relations with its neighbors. Unless the human dimension of migration is addressed, Russia will miss an opportunity to deal productively with the consequences of population decline as well as its responsibilities as a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of Child to protect the rights of all children within its territory. The findings of the authors of this volume signal the imperative for a regional dialogue within the post-Soviet territory on migration that reaches beyond a discourse on security, border control and migration flows and instead begins by acknowledging the diversity of migration typologies, demographic realities and the importance of meeting basic health and social protection needs of the men, women and children who contribute positively to the social and economic development of their countries of origin and destination. Understanding the typology of migration and the profile of migrants in the region is a critical step towards a dialogue on migration that considers the implications for the positive human as well as economic development.

Marielle Sander Lindstrom
Deputy Representative
of UNICEF in Russia
The role of civil society institutions in migration management is widely discussed by experts, journalists, state officers, and politicians. This is not a 'season fashion' but rather a reflection of fundamental shifts in the contemporary society. Today, international relations, including their migration dimension, are no longer a sphere of political élite. In the globalized world, migration processes directly affect lives of millions of people. Quite naturally, civil society organizations and movements tend to have an influence on these processes, participate in formation the contemporary migration agenda, and contribute into solving migration-related daunting problems.

Are the civil society institutions an instrument of the state migration policy? An answer to this question is not as easy as it may seen ex facte. In the contemporary world, any State should regard civil society as an important additional resource, which could widen abilities of the State in rationalization of migration strategy. However, it is a specific instrument. Civil society institutions are not State ministries. Independent experts, journalists, academics are not State officers who could be drawn up for a concrete task and who can be ruled with administrative decrees. Shaping partnership between the State and civil society in the field of migration management is a delicate matter that calls for specific mechanisms.

For many state officers this instrument may seem inconvenient and burdensome. Civil society institutions are difficult to manage; they are unpleasant to negotiate; they themselves often fail to cooperate with each other. Civil society tends to criticize the authorities and this criticism is not always appropriate. Civil society organizations are unstable by nature – they appear and disappear, they change their priorities. In short, there are a lot of problems in attracting civil society institutions in migration management issues. But anyhow cooperation between the State and NGOs is not just important, it is essential for elaboration of effective migration policy.
The reason is: it is the non-government sphere which produces most of new ideas, approaches, alternative and original proposals on improvement of migration management. It is like in the modern economics: most of innovations, discoveries and new technologies are born not in huge corporations but in small businesses. In a similar way, innovations in migration policy can be hardly the priority of bureaucrats: they are overloaded by routine work and have no time for a luxury of intellectual exercises.

There can be an objection that ideas generated by civil society institutions are too abstract, non-professional and distanced from practice, and therefore, useless. In many cases it is really so. However, does this mean that we must abandon a dialogue between a State and society? Definitely no. On the contrary, we must create as many venues for such a dialogue as possible, including those designed to educate the Russian people on migration issues. One of such venues is the New Eurasia Foundation Project ‘Migration Barometer in the Russian Federation started in 2009. The purpose of the Project is to assist the search for optimal balance between societal activities and state practices, between the free academic views and current needs of migration policy. This venue is not the only one. the Russian universities, academic institutions, media and other stakeholders also stimulate public debate on migration issues.

However, the role of civil society in the field of migration policy is to go beyond elaboration of recommendations and criticism on existing practices. Direct participation of NGOs in solving practical migration questions is of no less importance, primarily in the spheres that a State is unable to cover. For example, the State takes responsibilities on regulation of international migrations, namely visa procedures, registration of migrants, preferences for certain categories of migrant workers, etc. However, the State cannot realize integration / adaptation policy or counteracting xenophobia and nationalism without participation of civil society institutions. Such tasks – and their number is growing over time – can be solved only by common efforts of a State and society.

Another important sphere of practical work of civil society institutions in the field of migration is development of new dimensions of
migration that are just appearing. A State is often unable to detect new migration-related challenges and opportunities, and it tends to react to the first not the second. It is natural for State organizations to regards any new phenomenon as a source of a threat and act to neutralize this threat and minimize losses. Meanwhile, NGOs value migration as a resource that can be used for the sake of the State. Presently we start several projects in the New Eurasia Foundation to promote effective partnership between the State and the society.

One of the recent initiatives of the New Eurasia Foundation is a project of step-by-step development of the Russian Association of migration-related NGOs. During the recent years numerous NGOs working with migrants appeared in the Russian regions. Most of them do not know of each other and face lack of personnel and financial resources. Lack of coordination and exchange of knowledge between these NGOs, as well as poor cooperation with authorities at the municipal and regional levels results in weakened positions of civil society in a whole.

Creation of an Association of NGOs involved in migration issues will contribute to strengthening of civil society in Russia and increase its role in supporting migrants rights and decision-making process at both municipal and regional levels. We hope that development of the Association will also assist strengthening of local communities and participation of migrants in their everyday life. This is a quite new for Russia but very promising initiative.

To conclude, I would like to stress again that a strictly regulated vertically built migration management alienated from the society cannot be effective in principle in the contemporary world. Effectiveness of migration strategy of any state is closely correlated with inclusion of a society in its elaboration and implementation. We will be doing our best to put Russia among leaders but not outsiders in this new field.

Andrei Kortunov
President
of the New Eurasia Foundation
Twenty years ago a dramatic disintegration of the Soviet Union radically changed migration situation in this area – the former external migrations between the Soviet republics that were internal migrations within the common country turned into inter-state, i.e. international migrations. This resulted in different effects and called for different migration policy.

The effect of this event was far beyond the post-Soviet territory. It resulted in appearance of a new big international migration system centered on the Russian Federation which has become one of the world biggest centers attracting international migrants. At the initial stage (1992-1998) migrations here were primarily forced. Russia had positive migration balance with all the former Soviet states except Belarus within the whole post-Soviet period. Total net migration to Russia between 1992 and 2010 was over 6.5 million.

As to the United Nation data, Russia was ranked second after the USA among countries with the biggest amounts of immigrants (13 million in the early 2000s).

It is necessary to note that there were not only forced migrations between the post-Soviet states. Since mid-1990s other forms of migration were also developing, including temporary labour migration that involved growing numbers of titular nations of the former Soviet republics since the Eurasian migration system was shaping. Disregard of the variety of forms of international migration to Russia with primary focus exclusively on forced migration was an important mistake of the Russian migration policy in the 1990s. Despite the fact that already in 1992 the Federal Migration Service of Russia was founded as an independent government body responsible for management of migration inflow in all its diversity, in fact its activities were focused on forced migrants only.

Another mistake was to regards forced migrants from new independent countries equally to other refugees; later this resulted in negative and difficult-to-correct consequences of this 'first wave' of the post-Soviet migration to Russia and many ruined lives. Regretfully, similar
mistake was repeated when in the early 2000s the totality of migration inflows to Russia was narrowed to illegal immigration. Partly this can be explained by 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, but the fact is that misunderstanding of the essence of migration processes by policymakers in fact provokes growth of the scale of illegal migration to Russia. The estimate of the number of illegal migrants in Russia varies from 1 million to 30 million. Similar spread of estimates is typical for many countries of the world.

In the recent years the Russian migration policy is losing its 'blindness' towards the diversity of migration flows. This new understanding of the necessity of multi-level and complex migration policy is to be fixed in and supported by the official Concept of the State Migration Policy. However, 10 years of debate around such a Concept gave no result till now.

During the two recent decades migration picture in the post-soviet territory is permanently changing. Joining of the Baltic states to the European Union has practically excluded them from the migration nexus with the CIS countries. Political events in Georgia has significantly complicated cross-border movements between Georgia and Russia. Closed Turkmenistan has self-isolated itself from other CIS states. Lastly, Kazakhstan has become a center of the Central-Asian migration sub-system by attracting labour migrants from the neighbouring Asian former Soviet republics as well as oralmans – ethnic Kazakhs residing in other countries.

Along with migration processes that are disjoining the post-Soviet migration space, there are opposite positive trends as well. Cooperation in the sphere of migration is developing within the frames of the CIS, EurAsEC and the Customs Union (the latter is organized by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russian Federation, with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan expressing their will to join the Union). The Customs Union has made an important step in the field of migration by signing two agreements – one on encouragement of legal labour migration between the member states; another on cooperation in counteracting illegal migration.

Migration trends in the post-Soviet territory need further studying to give grounds for development cooperation between the countries of
the region in the field of coordinated migration management. The issues of development of the common labour market and counteracting illegal migration are of particular importance.

For countries of origin which face numerous outflow of population, like Tajikistan, lack of labour resources in agriculture is becoming a burning issue. Some regions of Russia are also facing similar problem; e.g. Dagestan where local population leave the republic in search for better paid jobs in more developed regions of the Russian Federation while foreign workers arrive to Dagestan to occupy their work places.

Among the new trends in the post-Soviet area is growth of the share of women and children among labour migrants – who are an object of particular exploitation.

All these issues call for more effective migration managements that can be provided by coordinated efforts of all the interested stakeholders, including first of all countries of destination and countries of origin.

These questions are likely to be discussed at the international seminar "International Migration of Population in the Post-Soviet Area: Trends, Effects and Prospects" to be held on 2–3 December 2011 in the Moscow State Lomonosov University with the support of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and New Eurasia Foundation.

The papers by the participants of this seminar are the contents of this 25th volume of the scientific series "International Migration of Population: Russia and Contemporary World".

Vladimir Iontsev
Editor-in-Chief of the series
Numerous published works of Russian and foreign authors, including those that have been published within this series (see, for example,: Iontsev and Ivakhnyuk 2002; Iontsev 2005, 2006; Mukomel 2006; Herd and Puglisy 2003; Aleshkovskiy 2011; Zayonchekovskaya and Turiyukanova 2010; Ivakhnyuk 2009a, 2009b, 2011; Ryazantsev 2007; Papademetriou 1999; Roberts 2008), are dedicated to such issues as how the processes of international migration of the population in Russia within the post-Soviet period took place, what influence they had on the demographic and economic development of the country, how Russian migration policy was forming during these years. Some of these works are of review character, others are focused on separate aspects of international migration, third ones are dedicated to the role of migration policy in the shaping of migration flows. Anyway, all authors, apparently, agree that international migration for contemporary Russia is of so great importance as never before. This conclusion is not connected mainly with the liberalization of the in- and out-move regimes that actually had opened Russia to the rest of the world and had included it into global migration flows, but with demographic crisis that Russia experiences at the present time – the crisis that sets the task for international migration at least partially to compensate natural population loss that reaches 1 mln. people per year (figure.1).

It should be noted that in recent years there has been a quantum leap in the researches of international migration processes by Russian scholars, this leap must have been caused by the accumulation of empirical material that has allowed the possibility of a deeper, more delicate and conceptual study of the running processes. Active scientific developments are being conducted in the field of studying the trends of contemporary migration in Russia, analysis of separate migration flows, organization of data collection and processing, forecasting and modeling of migration processes, conceptualization of migration situation on the whole post-Soviet territory, formation of approaches to the united regional migration policy.
To avoid the repetition of the comprehensive analysis of international migration in Russia that was conducted by the author in her earlier works, as well as by other Russian experts, we will dwell only on the major significant results of the participation of Russia in the flows of international migration, as well as we will evaluate how migration processes can develop in future, taking into account the migration capacity of Russia, migration potential of main donor countries, as well as possible scenarios of the development of Russian migration policy.

**International migration of population in Russia: scales?**

Not to begin with the fact that quantitative evaluation of the scales of international migration of population so as into Russia, so that out of it, remains to be a difficult task, first of all because the existing sources of the data regarding migration does not give a clear understanding either about the number of migrants – temporary and permanent – are found in Russia nor about the number of emigrants that left Russia.

According to All-Russian census of the population of 2002, there lived 1,02 mln. people in Russian Federation, who were foreign citizens.
(90% of them – having the citizenship of CIS countries). Classification by place of birth indicates the fact that there were 11,98 mln. foreign-born people in Russia. However, at least, 10 mln. people from this number (we do not know where those people were born, who were listed to the category “territory of birth is not indicated”) – are people who were born “in CIS countries and Baltic states”. It is absolutely evident that the vast majority of them were born in the republics of the Soviet Union when all the republics were the parts of a single country, and migrations through interrepublican boundaries were internal migrations within the USSR. Thus, these individuals can, by no means, not be referred to “foreign-born”. Regarding 0,5 mln. people, born “in other countries”, they can much more specifically be referred to as immigrants, though the fact of being abroad itself does not always mean that this person has the migration history.¹

These considerations cast doubt on the classification by UN that persistently places Russia to the second position in the world by the number of immigrants (estimated by the data of national censuses of the population as the number of foreign-born individuals) 12,3 mln. persons – after the USA (United Nations 2009). The specific character of the countries of the post-Soviet region, in the migration analysis of which the recent existence within the united country shall be taken into account, does not allow application of standard UN criteria to them.

At the same time the statistics of the flows of international migrants confirms the enormous figure of more than 10 mln. immigrants as the total inflow of individuals arrived for permanent residence to Russia over the period from 1991 to 2010.

Emigration from Russia is more difficult for accurate quantitative evaluation phenomenon, because, according to experts, the statistics evidently underestimates the scales of emigration, because not all leaving individuals de-register. If to sum up the data about the quantity of the moved abroad people from Russian Federation over the period from 1991 to 2010, the amount will make up more than 4 mln. people.

¹ To say, children born at Russian/soviet citizens, who were on international business trips, are hardly to be referred to the category of immigrants in Russia.
There is also the data of the consular register of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, according to which, the quantity of permanently living abroad Russian residents, who are on consular register at institutions abroad of the system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, made up 1,7 mln. people at the beginning of 2011.

This data moreover does not depict completely the actual number of emigrants from Russia, who live in other countries, because, firstly, registration at consular establishments of MFA of Russia is not obligatory for emigrants, keeping Russian citizenship, and, secondly, does not give the slightest understanding about the quantity of those, who changed citizenship and refused the Russian passport.

Very promising is the evaluation of real scales of emigration from Russia through statistical data of those countries, where migrants arrive, because statistical record of immigration everywhere is more full than the record of emigration. In Russia such estimations were conducted (see, for example, Denisenko 2001), but by a limited number of entry countries and they are of episodic character.

The statistics of labour migration in Russia that in the present time makes up the overwhelming part of the arriving in Russia migrants, as well as does not depict adequately the scale of the phenomenon. Firstly, according to the estimates, admitted by researches, by practitioners, and by politicians, about 70-80% of labour migrants in Russia stay and work in Russia illegally, i.e. they do not register as migrants and do not legalize their relationships with the employer by an official contract. It means that the statistics of labour migration, based on the quantity of issued over the year work permits, i.e. that registers only those, who at least intend to work legally, does not depict a real inflow of foreign citizens, arriving in Russia for work. But there is an evident drawback in the statistics of work permits, it is connected with the fact that it does not take into account the situation that during the year one and the same individual may receive work permits more than once, that leads to the overstatement of actual inflow of legal labour migrants in Russia, according to experts, at 30–40 % (Chudinovskih 2010).

Thus, the position of the statistics of the international migration is a serious problem in Russia that interferes with the objective vision of the
We use the notion “repatriation” conventionally, understanding that initially it is not completely applied to migration movement of population on the post-Soviet territory that was ethnically coloured. Repatriation means return to the native country (patria) from the country of residence, i.e. this phenomenon is related only to international migration. At that same time the native country for the residents of the former USSR was the whole Soviet Union, so migrating from one republic to the other, they remained internal migrants. Nevertheless, this notion has become widely used in Russian migration literature.

Tendencies that are problems as well

The main tendencies in the sphere of international migration, that characterize the development of Russia during last two decades, can be summarized in the following way:

1. Change of the structure of migration flows

Over the last two decades of the post-Soviet development the structural changes of migration flows have become, probably, the most noticeable feature of migration situation. These changes concern (1) forms of migration (from forced migration to voluntary economically motivated migration); (2) types of migration (from permanent migration to temporary labour migration); (3) structure of the countries, "supplying" Russia with migrants; (4) ethnic composition of migrants (from repatriation of the ethnic Russians and other native nationalities of Russia – to immigration of titular nationalities of CIS countries; from emigration of the Jews, Germans, Greeks and other “non-native” nationalities, that historically have lived in Russia, to emigration of the ethnic Russians); (5) gender characteristics of migrants (from mainly family migration of the 1990s with a balanced quantity of men and women among migrants to the dominance of temporary labour migration of men at the beginning of the 2000s and again to the increase of the amount of women in migration flows, this time – labour). Several of the listed structural changes are shown in the charts and tables of the statistical annex herein.

These, after all natural processes of “sorting”, migration flows after the outbreak of spontaneous, panic migration at the beginning of the

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2 We use the notion “repatriation” conventionally, understanding that initially it is not completely applied to migration movement of population on the post-Soviet territory that was ethnically coloured. Repatriation means return to the native country (patria) from the country of residence, i.e. this phenomenon is related only to international migration. At that same time the native country for the residents of the former USSR was the whole Soviet Union, so migrating from one republic to the other, they remained internal migrants. Nevertheless, this notion has become widely used in Russian migration literature.
1990s, we would not call problems in any case, if Russian migration legislation depicted in time and adequately the occurred changes, even more better – if it were with the base on scientific researches – “were ahead” and formed the tendencies that would be desirable for Russia from demographic, economic and political points of view.

Thus, with evident delay and under contradiction with the existing trends the legislation was formed both in the sphere of encouragement of compatriots migration and in the sphere of labour migration from CIS countries.

Exactly because of it the innovations of migration legislation in 2006–2007 did not show the expected result: the inflow of immigrants under the State Program of the assistance to voluntary migration of compatriots tuned to be tenfold modest than the reported aims\(^3\), and the scale of illegal labour migration as before remains the most acute problem for Russia.

The observed at the present time increase of the amount of women among the arriving in Russia labour migrants is also “not noticed” by migration authorities. And it is clear: official statistics shows the relatively small and stable amount of women among the individuals who receive permits for work – 15%. However, if in 2004 in absolute figures it made up 81 thousand women – labour migrants, in 2009 already one third of a million (322 thousand) of women arrived in Russia as independent labour migrants. Apart from this, the data of sociological researches, conducted in 2009–2010, testifies the fact that in reality the part of women among labour migrants is much higher. On average, women make up 25–30% of labour migrants from CIS countries and it means that their absolute number reaches 1.5 – 2 mln. people. Approximately 35% of labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan and more than 50% of migrants from Ukraine are women. (*UNWomen-ILO 2009: 23*). The problem here is that the employment sphere of women-migrants is the sphere of services, more often individual labour at private households which is mainly a shadow sector without legally registered employment. It makes women-migrants especially vulnerable towards the situations

\(^3\) Within four years of the realization of the Program (2007-2010) 31 thousand participants and members of their families migrated to Russia, which makes only 10% of the declared purpose of migration – 310 thousands of compatriots within 2008-2010 (*FMS 2011: 8*).
of labour slavery, psychological and sexual violence, as well as it deprives them of the possibility to get social and medical services, including special services, connected with pregnancy and childbirth. For women-migrants who arrive with children, it appears to be a problem to find preschools and schools for them. The tendency of feminization of the labour inflow in Russia could have been predicted, if not to build the government policy in the migration sphere with the base on a stereotype that labour migrants are entirely men, and to create special programs and specialized services for women-migrants, with the base, in particular, on non-governmental organizations that has the experience in such work.

2. Wide field of irregular migration and inefficiency of the policy, aimed at struggling with it

The problem of irregular migration has become the most acute at the turn of the 2000s, when the migrants flows from CIS countries appeared, who went to Russia in search of work, while Russian legislation in the sphere of foreign labour force attraction appeared to be too complicated and it did not distinguish between migrants, who were coming in visa and visa-free regimes.

As the result, the possibility of “easy” legal entry to Russia under the conditions, when entry visa is not required, became for many citizens of post-Soviet territory, who did not have any possibility to find a job and adequate income in their motherland, the only chance for surviving. They became employed mainly as seasonal workers in construction, agriculture, service industry. The scale of Russian labour market, noticeable revitalization of the economy of Russia at the beginning of the 2000s, labour shortages at the national labour market, significant shadow sector of Russian economy, wide-spread practices of informal employment – all these contributed to the formation of the mass inflow of foreign labour from CIS countries, considerable part of which was in a non-registered form (see Aleshkovskiy and Iontsev 2006; Ryazantsev 2007).

Re-subordination of Federal Migration Service of Russia and its inclusion as a structural subdivision into the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation in 2002 did not improve the situation in the sphere of struggling with irregular migration (though this is the aim that has
been put before the “renewed” institution), but rather to the opposite – it led the acuteness of the problems in Russia to extremity. The activity of the new FMS lost its transparency; qualification levels of employees sharply decreased, because the majority of civil employers, working in the 1990s, had quit their jobs; the migrants became the object of extortion from the side of the police “in charge”. Inability or unwillingness of the department to develop an official migration infrastructure led to the formation of the institution of shadow mediators, spread of trafficking in people and labour slavery, numerous violations of the migrants’ rights, appearance of tension between migrants and receiving communities.

Later even a number of high-ranking Russian officials admitted the invalidation of this institutional reform. The Head of the Council of Federation, S. Mironov, declared that the transfer of the issues of migration policy to the competence of the Ministry of Interior did not solve a single problem, but it strengthened corruption manyfold (See details about it: Ivakhnyuk 2011: 65-71.).

The evaluation of the scales of irregular migration in Russia varies from 3 mln. to 15 mln. Especially high it was at the beginning of the 2000s, when the problem of irregular migration was ranked as the threat to the national security. After the implementation in 2007 of new rules of registration of migrants and receipt of work permits for the citizens of CIS countries, irregular component of labour migration evidently became to decrease. The increase of legally attracted foreign employees from the countries of the former Soviet Union from 200 thousand people in 2004 to 1,8 mln. in 2008, i.e. at 9 times (!) (see figure 3 in the annex) gives grounds to suppose that a considerable part of the migrants who worked earlier without the execution of permissive documents, entered the field of regular labour migration.

However, the acuteness of the problem of irregular migration remains. The crisis in 2008-2010 proved it with a new force. Return of the employers to shadow schemes of employment of foreign workers with the aim to save on the fund of wages and social assignments with the whole acuteness rises the questions of unrecorded employment, spread of the

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shadow sector of labour market, underuse of qualification potential of migrants, violation of their rights, violation of the principle of fair competition on the labour market. Only because of unpaid taxes by labour migrants Russian budget receives, according to our estimates, for 200–250 bln. rubles less annually (Ivakhnyuk 2008).

3. Increase of xenophobia in Russian society

Intolerance towards migrants and xenophobia in the society became the permanent background of migration policy in the post-Soviet Russia.

It is notable that during the time of the Soviet Union, with its all anti-human essence of the existing at that time regime, the enmity by ethnic criterion was not practically spreading. Internationalism was by no means a mere name for the Soviet people. How did it happen that contemporary Russian society turn to be affected by the virus of xenophobia so quickly and so mass? According to the surveys, two thirds of the Russians admit their, at least, unfriendly attitude to the migrants of non-Slavic nationalities (Mukomel 2010).

It seems that it will not to be a mistake to say that it happened when migration had become a token coin in the hands of the whole number of politicians. Making their political slogans on the accusation of migrants with the absence of work and increase of crimes turned to be easier than to offer effective programs of social and economic changes. The mass media played their destructive role by duplicating biased information and false interpreted statistics. In the conscience of Russian people migrants turned to be closely associated with danger.

On the other hand, the migration policy lacked at all such an important component as the policy of integration of migrants. It was considered that the people arriving in Russia from other CIS countries do not need integration activities, because they are historically close to Russia. The absence of the necessary infrastructure for social, cultural, language integration of migrants against the background of the imposed discussion regarding the issue, does Russia need migrants, led as the result to the situation when the society appeared to be divided into “natives” and “aliens”.
Under the general inactivity of the government regarding “bridge building” between Russian citizens and migrants, admission of their contribution to the development of Russian economy, providing them with human life and work conditions, slogans like “Russia for the Russians!” found understanding among the part of the Russian society (Mukomel 2005).

This aspect of the migration situation in Russia is the most troubled because the object of xenophobic attitude and behavior often become children of migrants. They are to live in Russia, to become a part of the Russian society, and they turn to be in the situation of alienation and self-isolation – more often as the reaction to the display of hostility from the side of the society itself.

4. Migration as a problem

Migration outbreak that fell on Russia in 1990s – the outbreak to which it turned to be not ready either economically, or institutionally, or from the legal point – led to the formation of a stable imperative that migration is a problem for Russia. Inflow of migrants – then those were mainly Russian and Russian-speaking people, distinguished by extremely high characteristics in the level of education and qualification – was treated as the phenomenon, creating additional problem for Russia, along with the economic crisis, social tension, impoverishment of the population, etc.

Impossibility for many arrived people to legalize their position and to get Russian citizenship – more often as the result of hurried escape from ethnic tension, oppressions and military conflicts – led to the formation of multi-million group of 'non-status' compatriots-immigrants (see details: Iontsev and Ivahnuk 2002), whose lot interested only human rights organizations (see Grafova 2010). Nevertheless, they contributed to the atmosphere of social uncertainty in the society.

Later, when numerous labour migrants started to arrive in Russia from other countries of post-Soviet territory, the majority of whom became employed illegally and that is why turned into irregular migrants, migration started to be associated with the thread to national security. Stable perception of migration by the authorities and officials of FMS as “the
problem to be solved”, led to the fact that Russian migration policy is constructed in the regime of emergency, distinguished by the lack of consideration and inconsistency of the decisions, deprived of strategic perspective. The examples of such unreasonable decisions are the following: the implementation of “patents” for migrant-workers employed by individuals in 2010, which had not solved in any way the problem of irregular migration and protection of labour migrants, and in 2011 the “remission” of Russian employers from social and insurance payments in respect to the hired foreign employers, that placed Russian employees in deliberately disadvantageous position on the national labour market.

The result of these decisions is the fact that misunderstanding of the role of labour migration for the development of the country prevails in the Russian society and the import of labour force is treated with disapproval. But in reality Russian labour market de facto is already the regional labour market, and by opening its labour market for migrants from CIS countries, Russia does not only solve its economic and demographic problems, but it supplies its geopolitical interests.

For Russia migration – is not mainly a problem, but a resource, without which competent usage the future of demographic and economic development of the country may turn to be questionable. And migration becomes a problem when incompetent, inconsequent management of it leads to the spread of irregular migration, non-registered employment of migrants, corrupt component, development of shadow services for migrants, organized by the same migration officials, numerous violations of the rights of migrants, growth of anti-migration moods and interethnic collisions.

Until migration in Russia is treated as the source of development its migration policy will hardly become effective, comprehensive and strategically adjusted.

Besides, with the excessive problematization of migration, the human dimension of migration policy gets out of the headlines, it fails to be taken into consideration that migrants are human beings, men, women and children who have made up their minds to migrate not as the result of good life. As a result the integration policy within the whole post-Soviet period was not stated as an important component of the Russian
migration policy. The price for which – new acute problems, occurred as the result of ineffective migration policy: growth of social tension in the Russian society, conflicts on ethnic grounds, occurrence of isolated migrants communities.

**Russia as the centre of Eurasian migration system:**

**migration interdependence**

The author has already more than once proved that at the contemporary stage of the development of the former USSR countries interact with each other as a big international migration system, connected with stable and large-scale migration flows, the base of which is a range of interconnected factors – historical, economic, political, demographic, social, ethnic, psychological, etc. Some of these factors are more significant, others are less significant, but taken together they define the systematicity of migration flows in the region and characterize it as a single Eurasian migration system (see Ivakhnyuk 2008).

Regional imbalance of the labour supply on the national labour markets is the determinative demographic and economic factor of dominance of the forms of labour migration in Eurasian migration system.

Against the background of differences in demographic tendencies, typical of the countries of the region, that are on different stages of demographic movement, the situation on national labour market is affected differently by the implementation of market relations in the sphere of employment. In labour-excessive countries of Central Asia the reduction of the state sector in economy has led to mass release of labour force, while the development of the private sector of the economy is going so far very slow and is not able to absorb annually increasing labour force. On the other hand, in Russia, that experiences the period of relative economic growth, provided by the income from the export of raw materials, the realization of investment projects is slowed down by the deficit of labour force that will only increase in the following years.

Regional “pour” of labour resources mutually provides economic interests of the post-Soviet countries, strengthening their interdepen-
Under the influence of international labour migration both in the countries-destinations and the countries of origin of migrants structural transformations of labour markets take place, which turn migration into a structural element of their economic development.

Among the receiving countries the most clearly these processes take place in Russia that receives the biggest amount of labour migrants. Despite the fact that on the whole foreign labour force makes up less than 3% from the total amount of employed people in Russian economy, a number of branches and regions turn out to be under greater dependence on the presence of foreign employees than this averaged figure. Thus, in the construction sector the share of officially attracted foreign labour force in 2008 made up more than 18% from the total amount of the employed, having increased in comparison with 2005 at more than three times.

Over the last decade a distinct segmentation of the Russian labour market took place. In number of employment sectors – construction, agriculture, private services, streets and offices cleaning – stable niches of the employment of migrants, who occupy chiefly those working places, which can not be occupied by Russian employees by this or that reason. According to Director of FMS of Russia, K.Romandovskiy, “labour migrants from CIS countries make 6–8% of GDP of Russia”. It means that the labour of migrants is already firmly “built in” the economic system of Russia, and the effectiveness of its usage directly depends on the conducted migration policy.

For post-Soviet counties of migrants’ origin the participation in Eurasian migration system means the possibility for a relatively excessive labour resources to realize their labour potential in Russia or Kazakhstan, and it means to increase the income of population and to decrease the probability of social tension.

**Conclusion: prospect view**

International migration of population – is the reality of contemporary Russia. The whole range of objective factors (globalization, growth of the dependence of national economics on the global labour market, de-
mographic crisis that Russia experiences) say about the fact that in near prospect the role of international migration for the development of Russia will be only increasing.

According to the average variant of prognostic evaluation of the Federal State Statistics Service regarding the population size at labour ages, within the near decade Russia will be losing annually on average about 1 mln. of its labour force (see figure 4 of the annex). The total loss of national labour force over the period from 2011 to 2025 will make up 10,4 mln. persons or 12% from the current level. Correspondingly the coefficient of demographic burden in Russia will increase almost at 30%.

There are several ways of solving the problems of labour resources deficit: increase of the retirement age, increase of working time duration of workers, move of the productions to labour-excessive countries, increase of labour productivity on the basis of new manufacturing technologies, encouragement of internal mobility of the population, reformation of the system of professional training, finally, the attraction of foreign labour force. Many of these ways are applied in Russia to this or that extent.

It is important to emphasize that the import of labour force is merely one of the ways for compensation of the lack of labour resources that is, however, is a prevailing one in Russia.

One of the reasons of it is that the attraction of force from former Soviet republics goes beyond the boundaries of economic and demographic plane. Maintaining visa-free area, formation of a single labour force, is a real step that was made by signing in 2011 the agreements within the Custom Union – all these contribute to the maintenance of integration tendencies on the territory of the former USSR.

Thus, the major subjective factor that defines the character of migration processes in Russia and on the whole post-Soviet territory is Russian migration policy. Its inconsistency is directly depicted in the dynamics of migration flows, aimed at Russia, and their legality. In

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5 http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/progn3.htm
6 Two agreements are meant in the filed of labour migration, concluded between Republic of Belarus, Republic of Kazakhstan and Russian Federation: "Agreement about the legal status of working migrants and members of their families" and “Agreement about cooperation against illegal labour migration from third countries “. 
particular, the running over the last two years restricting of the rules of staying and getting work permits for foreign citizens led to the decrease of foreign labour force inflow, which is depicted in table 2 of annex.

In prospect, the consistency and transparency of Russian migration policy will determine not only to which extent migration will turn for Russia from “the problem” into “a resource”, but also how intergovernmental cooperation will develop in the migration sphere over the post-Soviet territory. Coordination of migration policy of the members-countries of CIS and EurAsEC may in reality contribute to the generation of mutually acceptable optimization mechanisms of migration processes and to promote the stability of the development of the region in general.

**STATICTICAL ANNEX**

![Graph showing dynamics of permanent migration to/from Russia, 1991-2010, thousands](http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/po/po1991-2010/bd.htm)

**Fig. 2. Dynamics of permanent migration to/from Russia, 1991-2010, thousands**

Fig. 3. Numbers of foreign workers admitted to the Russian labour market, 1994-2009, thousands (according to annual numbers of issued work permits)

Sources: ROSSTAT; Federal Migration Service of Russia

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<td>(22%)</td>
<td>KAZ</td>
<td>(26%)</td>
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<td>(31%)</td>
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<td>(6%)</td>
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<td>(6%)</td>
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<td>(9%)</td>
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<td>ARM</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>(7%)</td>
<td>KYR</td>
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Table 1
Major countries of origin of immigrants to Russia

Labels: ARM - Armenia, AZE - Azerbaijan, BEL - Belarus, KAZ - Kazakhstan, KYR - Kyrgyzstan, MOL - Moldova, TAJ - Tajikistan, UZB - Uzbekistan, UKR - Ukraine
Figure 4. Decline of labour-age population in Russia, 2008-2025, thousands

Source: The ROSSTAT forecast, medium scenario

Table 2

<table>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>377.9</td>
<td>460.4</td>
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<td>1,717.1</td>
<td>2,425.9</td>
<td>2,223.6</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>from CIS states:</strong></td>
<td>186.5</td>
<td>221.2</td>
<td>343.7</td>
<td>537.7</td>
<td>1,152.8</td>
<td>1,780.0</td>
<td>1,648.2</td>
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* In 2009, Georgia withdraw the CIS, however, data on Georgian workers in Russia is included in the table to demonstrate dynamics.

Source: data of the Federal Migration Service of Russia (2-T Form, column 'worked in the reporting year')
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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION TRENDS AND MIGRATION POLICY IN THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS

Liudmila Shakhotska

Republic of Belarus has been developing as an independent state for 20 years already. Within these years the cardinal changes have occurred in volumes, intensity and direction of migration flows.

After disintegration of the former USSR into independent states the preceding inter-republican migration transferred automatically into the international migration, with all the ensuing consequences. The volumes of economic, familial and education migrations reduced dramatically, and volumes of the flows caused by stress situations increased. The migration flows inside the countries reduced significantly, the rates of ecological migration caused by sequences of the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986 slowed down abruptly. Disintegration of the USSR, economic and political crisis, occurrence of military conflicts (“hot spots”) in the territory of several former USSR republics and other reasons predetermined several new tendencies. The repatriation immigration flows were wide-spread at the beginning of the 1990s; the flows of refugees and migrants, illegal migration flows appeared, the flow of persons migrating from the republic to foreign countries both for permanent residence and for temporary job placement increased. As the social and economic situation in the country was being stabilized, the directions, volumes, structure and objects of migration flows changed.

Migration of the CIS and Baltic states

In the structure of external migration flows in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century the main migration flow, as to volume, is the exchange of Belarusian population with the CIS countries and Baltic States. Throughout the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century a larger number of migrants arrived to Belarus from the CIS countries and Baltic States than departed from Belarus. At that period Republic of Belarus – the only one country in the post-Soviet territory – has had the positive balance of migration with all CIS countries and Baltic States without exception. Moreover, the migration balance with
the CIS countries and Baltic States was positive both to cities of the
country and rural areas.

In the 1990s the persons who had went out earlier to other republics
of the former Soviet Union to work or study returned to Belarus ac-
tively. Re-emigration of Belarusians was caused by a wide range of
reasons. The most important of them were disintegration of the USSR
and processes caused by it; start of reconstruction of economic and po-
litical life accompanied by grave crisis in the social and economic de-
development of the country; harsh competition in labor markets with the
population of titular nationalities; aggravation of ethnic-based conflicts
in several former-USSR republics.

Both the forces attracting migrants to the country and the forces
ejecting them from other territories were active under the conditions
of instable political, social and economic development. Thus, the dy-
namics of migration flows with the CIS countries and Baltic States was
determined by several multidirectional factors. In the 1990s not only
economic factors (separation of currency systems, destitution of po-
pulation and resulting shortage of money for removal, absence of pos-
sibility to buy dwellings, concerns in probable difficulties with job
placement), but also administrative factors hampered movement of the
population that had moved freely in the USSR territory earlier. People
feared to change the place of residence because of problems with citi-
zenship; they were afraid to lose the possibility to keep in touch with
the relatives; they were concerned about problems with job records and
award of a pension, etc. The same forces attracted the former inhabi-
tants of the republic backwards, to Belarus.

The migration flows were activated by such reasons as fear of losing
citizenship of the country in the territory where they intended to live;
war conflicts that started in several CIS countries; unwillingness to live
in the state different from the place of residence of their relatives, as
well as changes in the ethnic and language policy in some countries
after acceptance of sovereignty. Adoption of laws on citizenship, state
language by several new independent states, new ethnic policy in those
countries alerted and ejected Belarusians by birth from other countries.
Direction and intensity of migration flows were also influenced by se-
paration of the armed forces and transfer of military men to serve under the place of conscription. In general, the migration flows directed to Belarus were caused by the same reasons that stimulated departure of Russian-speaking population from non-Slavic countries to Russia and Ukraine.

In the 1990s Belarus had the positive balance of migration in relation to not only Belarusians, but almost all other nationalities, except for the Jews who actively left the former Soviet Union at that time. As people with firm intention to leave departed, by the mid-1990s net migration started to reduce. Reduction of inflow from the CIS countries and Baltic States was fostered to some extent by termination of military actions in the main area of armed conflicts, slump in nationalist tendencies, stabilization of social and economic development and adaptation of population to new life conditions in most countries of the former USSR. In the latest decade Belarus has had the most active migration exchange with Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. However, number of newcomers from the countries of Transcaucasia, including Georgia, Central Asia and Moldova are also increasing in recent years.

The peculiarities of international migration in Belarus in the 1990s also deal with the fact that a rather large flow was directed to the rural areas of Belarus from almost all republics of the former USSR. The migration balance was positive for the rural areas of Belarus as a result of the migration exchange of population throughout the 1990s, though the intra-republican balance of migration for rural areas was negative at that time. Due to this the processes of “washing-out” of the active rural population and its aging were moderated to a certain degree. The most significant replenishment of the rural population was received from the Baltic States, Russia and Kazakhstan.

Hence, Belarus became attractive for migrants from other countries for several reasons, both objective and subjective. Firstly, people who had departed not long ago and had not lost relationship, returned. The majority of them had relatives in Belarus and they could stay with relatives, at least for a start. People especially actively left places where ethnic-based conflicts aggravated after disintegration of the USSR. In addition, the republic attracted migrants with the advantage over others:
no ethnic and nationalistic conflicts were observed there and economic recession was not as abrupt as in the majority of other republics. Undoubtedly, the fact that after the 1995 referendum, Russian language achieved the status of the state language in Belarus was of great importance. This allows easy adaptation of Russian-speaking population from any country. Availability of jobs and possibility to buy dwellings in the rural areas, including territories affected by the Chernobyl disaster, stimulated population inflow into the republic. People considered armed conflicts to be more fearsome than radionuclide contamination. With residence permits available, people without Belarusian citizenship and citizens of Belarus are almost equal in rights (for job placement, obtention of the license for entrepreneurship, for education, medical care, etc). In the 1990-ies Belarus was attractive for the youth who came to study, as the cost of education was much lower in Belarus than in neighboring states, as well as for people of retirement age, which was related to return of people who had left Belarus earlier for other CIS countries and postponed return till the end of their labour activity. In Belarus the level of the pension system was a bit higher and pensions are paid without delays. In addition, Belarusian medical provision is free of charge and is more affordable than in other states. It should be pointed that people from Russia who come to Belarus originate not from metropolitan areas but from the peripheral areas mainly, where the social sphere is developed less. Meanwhile, Moscow has always been and remains attractive for the migrants from Belarus.

**Migrations with other countries**

The processes of external migration of the Belarusian population with so called “old foreign” countries (staroye zarubejye) activated in 1986–1990 when free ethnic emigration was permitted and entrance-departure procedure was simplified. Belarus constantly lost its population in exchange with far-abroad countries. The maximal emigration flow was recorded in 1990 when the migration balance amounted to -34.1 thousand people. The increased number of would-be emigrants of different nationalities was caused by the economic recession, inflation, disorganization of consumer market, threat of unemployment, abrupt
decrease of the standard of living, political instability in the country in the 1990s. The orientation of the population to departure from the country was facilitated by the danger to live in the territory the major part of which was contaminated with radionuclides, especially at the beginning of the 1990s.

In the next years emigration scale reduced dramatically; this can be explained by the fact that the majority of the families, that was determined to departure, had left the country immediately after liberalization, as well as by adoption of stricter rules for entrance of citizens of the Republic of Belarus to other countries. Tend to orderliness of the migration inside the country was also important. One should acknowledge improvement of people’s well-being, in comparison with the 1990s, and significantly simplified possibility to enter and exit the country as one of the main reasons for reduced emigration in the recent years. Emigration from the republic is also restricted by insufficient knowledge of foreign languages, absence of professional experience of interrelations under market economy conditions, not high competitiveness of the labour force from post-socialist countries in the world labour market. The restrictive policy of a number of foreign countries in relation to migrants was obstructive as well. Various economic sanctions introduced in Belarus (increase in prices for transport, exit visas, passports, etc.) have contributed as well. In recent years most frequently departure for permanent residence has been replaced by step-by-step emigration.

Among the “old foreign” countries (staroye zarubejye), most attractive for Belorussian migrants are Germany, Israel, the USA, Italy, Canada; in certain years – also Poland and Australia. In the recent years three countries have had the most significant share in emigration volume: Germany, the USA, and Israel. Lately, the population inflow from China, Vietnam, Afghanistan and some other “old foreign” countries has increased. Emigration direction, volumes, composition, departure reasons vary under the influence of different factors (political, economic). Unlike the previous years when the reasons were of ethnic and political nature mainly, now they shift to economic and social nature. As people depart to countries with the higher standard of
living, the exit abroad may be considered as pursuit of Belorussians for better well-being and better living and work conditions for both an individual and his/her family.

Population departure from the country for permanent residence results for Belarus in a serious problem of "brain drain", “elite muscles’ drain” and “loss of highly educated brides”.

As international migration is considered an important factor that compensates natural decline of population and contributes to economic development of the country, the government of the Republic of Belarus pays much attention to regulation of international migration processes. The series of laws and state programs have been developed and are being implemented in Belarus with the aim to reduce migration problems and enhance its positive potential.
POST-SOVIEET MIGRATION TRANSITION
IN UKRAINE

Irina Pribytkova

From the passport regime to the freedom of movement

Migration doctrine of the soviet period as a system of official views and regulations, as a leading political principle was based on the passport system, labour legislation and housing policy. The soviet model of industrialization with its orientation on labour-intensive sectors of national economy, labour division between large economic regions and leveling of economical development in the republics of the USSR was accompanied by acceleration of labour resources mobility. The large-scale state programmes were spread out for regulating of the migration flows. The organized recruitment of workers and agricultural resettling of families were the most efficient ones. The system of professional and regional differentiation of wages and salaries was created for attraction of workers to regions with a lack of labour resources. But the main instrument of controlling and regulating of migration flows in the USSR remained during the soviet period without change: it was the passport system but not economic policy, human rights and civil freedoms. The freedom of residence choice was brought to naught.

The migration doctrine has radically changed in Ukraine after the dissolution of the USSR. In January 1994, the Ukranian Parliament adopted the Law "On the Procedure of Exit from and Entry into Ukraine by Citizens of Ukraine" that guaranteed the right to leave the Ukraine and to return in without restriction. This law burst the old order. With its adoption the article 11 of Law of Ukraine "On Employment" admitting the labour or undertaking activity of Ukranian citizens during their stay abroad acquired the additional force. Innovations in the sphere of migration policy were contained in the articles 24, 25, 26, 33 of the Constitution of Ukraine adopted on 26 June 1996.

And at last in December 2003 the Ukranian Parliament adopted the Law "On the freedom of movement and free choice residence in Ukraine". Propiskas does not exist any longer. It is changed by registration procedura having the notification meaning. The freedom of
movement is defined in the Law as a right of citizen of Ukraine as well as the foreigner and stateless person, staying in Ukraine on legal grounds, to move without restriction and by own wish throughout its territory in any direction, by any way, at any time, with the exception of restrictions established by Law. The Ukraine passed from passport regime to the freedom of movement and free choice of residence and working place.

In the last decade of the XX century the migration processes in Ukraine obtained a new content and dynamics; migration priorities are changed; structure of directions and intensity of migration flows are transformed, a new kinds and forms of migration mobility are appeared. At first the run of migration events does not inspire the observes with apprehension of danger. The first signs of its approach come to light in the eighties: the All-Union Census of 1989 fixed the considerable migration flows of Russian-speaking population – Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, from republics of Middle and Central Asia and Caucasus. The coming changes, for the time being vague, indistinguishable and as if unthreatening, are hardly guessed. The events that will change the world, will happen in the nearest future. The huge country will fall to pieces, the Commonwealth of Independent Countries will appear at the post-soviet space. And a new migration history will germinate here from the common migration past.

The author analyses in this article the reconfiguration of migration flows and their contribution to the forming of population potential of Ukraine on the eve and after collapse of the USSR; investigates the dominants of the migration situation at the different stages of its development in country, discusses a new forms of migration mobility of its population, arisen at the threshold of a new millennium, estimates the perspectives of their development in the near future.

The eighties: Reconfiguration of Migration Flows as Forerunner of the Soviet Union Collapse

At the end of eightieth the reconfiguration of the migration flows in the USSR become obvious. The Caucasus and Asian republics appear for the first time as migration donors and Russian Federation,
Ukrainian SSR and Baltic Republics strengthen their positions of the host countries.

The population of the Ukrainian SSR as of 12 January 1989 amounted to 51.7 million persons. For ten years expired since the preceding Census in 1979, a size of inhabitants increased here by 1949 thousands persons or by 4.0%. Just in the Ukrainian SSR the lowest rate of population growth was observed in the eighties being twice less than in the USSR on the average. While the share of population increase due to net migration constituted in 1979-1988 18% in Russian Federation, 34.2% in Lithuanian SSR, 51.4% in Estonian SSR, 58.1% in Latvian SSR, in Ukrainian SSR its portion run up to 7.8% only (table 1).

Note should be taken that net migration increase was observed only in the towns and cities of these republics. At the same time their countryside suffered losses of the rural inhabitants that resulted in a swift development of depopulation in the most of rural regions. Migration increase of urban population was formed mainly by arrived peasants from there. Latvian SSR was the only exception where the quarter of urban population increase consisted of townspeople (table 1).

Table 1

| Components of population size changes in the republics of the USSR, 1979-1989, thousands* |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Republics of the USSR            | Size of population as of 12.01.1989 | Increase in population during 1979-1989 including | 1989 in % to 1979 |
|                                 | total | natural | net migration |                    |
| USSR                            | 286717 | 24281   | 24450         | -169               | 109               |
| Russian Federation              | 147386 | 9835    | 8068          | 1767               | 107               |
| Ukrainian SSR                   | 51704  | 1949    | 1796          | 153                | 104               |
| Belarusian SSR                  | 10200  | 640     | 648           | -8                 | 107               |
| Kazakh SSR                      | 16538  | 1864    | 2638          | -784               | 113               |
| Moldovan SSR                    | 4341   | 394     | 450           | -56                | 110               |
| Republics of the Middle Asia    | 32843  | 7363    | 8213          | -850               | 129               |
| Uzbek SSR                       | 19906  | 4515    | 5022          | -507               | 129               |
| Kirghiz SSR                     | 4291   | 762     | 919           | -157               | 122               |
| Tajik SSR                       | 5112   | 1311    | 1413          | -102               | 134               |
| Turkmen SSR                     | 3534   | 775     | 859           | -84                | 128               |
| Republics of the Caucasus      | 15761  | 1687    | 2326          | -639               | 112               |
| Georgian SSR                    | 5449   | 434     | 486           | -52                | 109               |
| Azerbaijani SSR                 | 7029   | 1001    | 1267          | -266               | 117               |
| Armenian SSR                    | 3283   | 252     | 573           | -321               | 108               |
| Republics of the Baltic region  | 7944   | 559     | 311           | 248                | 108               |
| Lithuanian SSR                  | 369    | 292     | 192           | 100                | 109               |
| Latvian SSR                     | 2681   | 160     | 67            | 93                 | 106               |
| Estonian SSR                    | 1573   | 107     | 52            | 55                 | 107               |

More than a half of new-comers in the Latvian and Estonian cities (62.3% and 50.1% accordingly) came here from other Union Republics. Only in the Lithuanian SSR the share of external migration was essentially lower (29.7%) running up to the average index in the USSR. The migration increase of urban population in Ukrainian SSR was formed mainly by the internal migration and more exactly by its intro-regional component (73.2% and 55.1% accordingly). In the Russian Federation the structure of migration increase in urban population is characterized by the same proportions (70.5% and 53.2%).

Migration processes have undergone the essential changes in the Ukrainian SSR. If in the fifties and sixties migrations served as a channel of population redistribution between the union republics and economic regions, in seventies and especially eighties the "theatre of migration operations" was narrowed and the movement of rural inhabitants to the towns within of own region and from two-three neighbour provinces become the most widespread type. The main contingent both new comers in Ukranian towns and inhabitants leaving from there was represented by the indigenous population.

The most high indicators of migration mobility in eighties was immanent for Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. Migratory links were formed mainly by the principle of the nearest neighbourhood. Thus, Belarusians gravitated towards Russian Federation and Ukrainian SSR but mostly towards Baltic republics; Moldavians – towards Ukraniania SSR. One can meet Ukranians almost everywhere, but more often – in Latvian, Estonian, Belarusian republics and Russian Federation. A lot of Ukranians lived in Kazakh republic. But the most high mobility was immanent to Russians whose share in the contingent of new-comers in Latvian and Estonian republics was especially considerable. It is sizable enough in Ukrainian SSR as well. It should be noted that the indigenous population of Baltic republics didn't not practically participate in migration exchange with Russian Federation and Ukranian republic as well as with other Union republics. The migration exchange by the indigenous inhabitants between Baltic republics was extremely low, its share was minimum.
The natives predominated among settled migrants in the towns of Ukrainian and Lithuanian SSR. But their part in Latvian and Estonian SSR was extremely low: 18.6% and 9.4% accordingly. Migration increase of urban population here was formed mainly by Russians. In addition, the contribution of Ukranians and Belarusians into the net migration proved to be high enough. The share of new-comers, having Russian origin, has been sufficiently perceptible in the Ukranian SSR: in 1988 its size made up a quarter of whole migration increase of urban population here (table 2).

Increase of urban population in Ukranian SSR owing to migration proceeded with the active participation of young and able-bodied contingents. As a whole this process exerted positive influence on forming of age structure of urban population and the dynamics of its labour potential.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure of net migration</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>Ukrainian SSR</th>
<th>Lithuanian SSR</th>
<th>Latvian SSR</th>
<th>Estonian SSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migratory increase of urban population - total</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including contribution of:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New-comers from towns</td>
<td>3,6</td>
<td>6,4</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>24,9</td>
<td>7,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New-comers from countryside</td>
<td>96,4</td>
<td>93,6</td>
<td>98,9</td>
<td>75,1</td>
<td>92,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migratory increase of urban population - total</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including contribution of:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal migration -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intraregional</td>
<td>53,2</td>
<td>55,1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interregional</td>
<td>17,3</td>
<td>18,1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External migration</td>
<td>29,5</td>
<td>26,8</td>
<td>29,7</td>
<td>62,3</td>
<td>50,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migratory increase of urban population - total</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including contribution of ethnic groups:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>63,3</td>
<td>25,4</td>
<td>13,3</td>
<td>53,8</td>
<td>70,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>67,6</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>10,8</td>
<td>-2,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>11,0</td>
<td>4,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldovans</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>67,4</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>18,6</td>
<td>0,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>9,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>6,3</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>22,6</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>11,2</td>
<td>3,8</td>
<td>15,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the data of Census of population in 1899, only 84.7% of all Ukrainians lived in the Soviet Union were residents of Ukranian SSR. The rest 15.3% were residents of other Union republics. The largest in the number Ukranian contingent (4364 thousands of people) were residents of Russian Federation. About 900 thousands lived in Kazakh SSR, 600 thousands – in Moldova SSR, 290 thousands – in Belarusian SSR, 154 thousands – in Uzbek SSR, a little larger 100 thousands – in Kirgiz SSR. All these people belonged to numerous contingent of potential migrants whom the collapse of the USSR will put before a choice of vital importance in a short time. And migration expansion of Russian and Ukrainian contingents into the Baltics countries will have highly painful consequences both for themselves and for indigenous population of these republics.

The Ukraine as well as other union republics entered into period of political instability. According to the operative data of the Department of migration and refugees of the Republic Centre of employment, the total population being forced to leave their residence and displaced from the zones of military operations in the Transcaucasian and Tajik republics, as well as Russian Federation to the Ukraine, numbered to 17,6 thousands of person, from March 1988 to March 1993. In 1989–1990, after armed interethnic conflicts in the Fergana valley, more than ten thousands of meschetians were arrived at the south regions of Ukraine and Donbas. There was uneasy situation in the Baltic countries. The central powers made unavailing attempts to keep it under control by force of arms. The most far-seeing persons discuss the emigration plans and get ready for evacuation. The others are short of time and resources and become the refugees.

Migration doctrine of the soviet pattern was exhausted. Its ideological and political postulates lost its validity.

The Nineties: Migration Practices and their Reflection in the State Policy and Administration

The disintegration of the USSR became the turning-point in the development of migration history in Ukraine. It was the time to comprehend the meaning of radical changes and their irreversibility. The
varieties of a new migration practices were in need of non-standard administrative decisions supported by legislative initiatives, financial investments and at last by political will-power of a new Ukrainian leaders. There existed an urgent demand for a new migration doctrine based on the principal values of democratic societies – human rights, civil freedoms, prerogative of the Law.

A bloody conflicts and civil wars in the Central Asia and Caucasus were accompanied by mass escape of Slav and indigenous population from these regions. Many of them appeared in the Ukraine in search of shelter. An interim government commissions were created here to render them assistance on arrival. A branch departments of Government machine were charged with an important mission of their reception, accommodation and employment.

On arrival of forced migrants from Azerbaijan in April 1988 a new Department of migration and refugees was established in the structure of Republic Centre of Employment of the Ministry of Labour of Ukraine. This executive body carried out the functions of working group attached to interim Government commissions. Such approach to the decision of organizational questions proved to be the most successful: the Ministry of Labour with it branching structure of territorial bodies was able to decide efficiently the problems of reception and accommodation of shelter seekers.

The Ministry of Labour of Ukraine carried out these functions in the beginning of nineties keeping the position and emergency powers of the principal body of executive authority responsible for reception and accommodation of the asylum seekers right up to the establishment of a new Ministry for Nationalities and Migration of Ukraine in April 1993. Thus, for example, the Centre of Employment of the Crimea province (afterwards the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) carried out the organization work for assistance to return, housing and employment of formerly deported peoples. After the disintegration of the USSR and cessation of the Union bodies activity the reception and accommodation of repatriates were fulfilled by the Republican Committee of Nationalities and Deported Citizens in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC). On October 9 of 1992 ten member countries of the CIS
signed in Bishkek "The Agreement on the issues of restoration of deported persons, ethnic minorities and peoples' rights" which defined ways to solve the problems of formerly deported peoples at the international level.

The collapse of the USSR and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) led to a change in their directions, structure and intensity. New types of flows emerged, such as a short-term migration for commercial purposes to Central Europe, Turkey and China. Many Ukrainians started seeking temporary work abroad, particularly in Central Europe. Due to its long borders, Ukraine became a transit country for illegal migrants from developing countries heading towards Western Europe. Emigration of scientists, widely known as "brain drain", reached considerable proportions, seriously endangering the intellectual potential of the country. All in all, Ukraine became an emigration country: in 1994 for the first time emigration exceeded immigration, with migration losses amounting to 143,2 thousands of persons; they were of 89,9 thousands of persons in 1995 and of 117,2 thousands of persons in 1996.

As the result of these migratory processes, in 1992 Ukraine started losing its population: while at the beginning of 1993 it numbered 52244,1 thousands of persons, at the beginning of 1997 it had decreased to 50893,5 thousands of persons, with a total loss of 1350,6 thousands of persons in 1992-1996 years\(^7\). A notable trend of recent years is the decreasing intensity of migration exchanges with the CIS and Baltic states.

Still, the CIS countries – and most importantly the Russian Federation – remained Ukraine's main migration partners. Ukraine continued to lose population in its exchanges with the Russian Federation and Belarus, and the inflow of migrants from other CIS countries and the Baltic states were not sufficient to compensate these losses. Negative net migration with Belarus started in 1992 and has steadily increased since then. In 1996, it was of 3,1 thousands of persons. Negative net

migration with the Russian Federation was registered for the first time in 1994 and was continuing later, albeit at a lower intensity. In 1996, it was of 86,5 thousands of persons. Ukraine's other main migration partners were Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Moldova: their contribution into migration increase of Ukraine's population constituted correspondingly 6,8, 2,9 and 1,6 thousands of persons.

As concerns the Baltic states, in the first half on nineties Ukraine's migration balance has always been positive, although it has notably decreased from some 15,4 thousands of persons in 1992 to 1,03 thousands persons in 1996. The main protagonists of these flows were Russians and Ukrainians. As regards emigration to non-CIS countries, the traditional countries of destination at the early nineties were Israel, the USA and Germany. While emigration to Israel and the USA has been decreasing in 1992–1996, emigration to Germany was getting more and more. Emigration in Canada has also increased, reaching 1,8 thousands of persons in 1996. At the same time (1996) 20,4 thousands of persons emigrated to Israel (38,3% of the total outflows, 13,4 thousands emigrants to the USA (25,2%) and 9,7 thousands persons to Germany (18,3%). The other countries of destination were Greece, Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak Republics, Austria and Australia.

Among emigrants to Israel 50,1% were Jews, 23,8% were Ukrainians and 20,4% were Russians. The share of Jews decreased as compared to 1994, when it was of 63,9%, whereas that of Russians and Ukrainians sharply increased (it was of 16,4% and 16,1% respectively). Among emigrants to the USA, 41,8% were Ukrainians, 36,4% were Jews and 14,9% were Russians. Jewish emigration to the USA was also decreasing as compared to 1994 (it was of 53,5%), whereas that of Ukrainians increased substantially (it was of 27,6%) and that of Russians remained unchanged (it was 14,6%). Jews still hold the first place among emigrants to Germany. The share of Russians and Germans slightly decreased, from 18,2% in 1994 to 17,7% in 1996 for Germans, and from 16,3% in 1994 to 13,2% in 1996 for Russians.

The repatriation of ethnic Ukranians started in the late eighties and reached a peak in 1990, when 150,8 thousands of persons or 76,9% of all migrants to urban centers were Ukranians. Starting from 1991, this
trend was further spurred by inter-ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus and Tajikistan. In 1996, 50,0 thousands of ethnic Ukranians, representing 40,3% of the total number of immigrants, moved to Ukraine. Altogether, between 1991 and 1996 the number of repatriants was of around 1,4 million persons.

The return of formerly deported peoples to Ukraine is a new phenomenon which concerns mostly Crimean Tatars and Germans, but also Bulgarians, Greeks and Armenians. The inflow of Crimean Tatars to Crimea from other parts of the former USSR started in 1987, but picked up in the wake of the USSR Supreme Soviet declaration "On the Restoration of the Rights of Deported Peoples" of November 1989. Between 1989 and 1996, 183,4 thousands of Crimean Tatars returned to their historic homeland. As of 1 January 1997, 247,9 thousands of persons (64870 families) belonging to formerly deported peoples resided in Crimea. The overwhelming majority of the Crimean Tatars originated from Uzbekistan (72%), the Russian Federation (16%) and Tajikistan (3%), and the reminder from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and other regions of Ukraine. As concerns Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Germans, their return to Crimea began already in the 1960-s and 1970-s, albeit on a small scale. As of 1 January 1997, the share of formerly deported people in the population of Crimea was 9,6%. More than 5,5 thousands of Crimean Tatars, as well as some 4,0 thousands of Meskhetians lived in the Kherson region.

Following the catastrophe at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in April 1986, the population living in contaminated areas was evacuated and resettled. In total, between 1990 and 1996 32,05 thousands of persons were evacuated in the framework of the compulsory evacuation programme and 26,7 thousands persons were evacuated in the framework of the voluntary evacuation programme.

Ukraine's unique geographic location has made it a convenient transit country for illegal migrants, who used it as a springboard to the West. Illegal migrants originated mostly from South-East Asia and Africa, and particularly from Vietnam, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Israel, Jordan and Iran. A significant number of illegal migrants originated from CIS countries, particularly from Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Russian Federation. The most frequently used entry channels were tourism, transit travel, visa-free entrance (for CIS citizens), business or private invitations and outright violations of entrance regulations. Illegal migration has become a profitable business for criminal groups. The majority of the migrants apprehended used falsified passports and passports belonging to others or had no passports at all. Between 1991 and 1996, 30,04 thousands of illegal migrants were apprehended.

In the first half of nineties, Ukraine witnessed several inflows of refugees and persons in refugee-like situations. Following the outbreak of armed conflict in Transdnistria (Moldova), in June 1992 60,0 thousands of refugees – including more than 30,0 thousands children – sought asylum in Ukraine. A special commission on refugees from Transdnistria was established at the Cabinet of Ministers, with wide-ranging authority for refugee status determination and the coordination of measures for the reception and temporary settlement of refugees. Further inflows of CIS refugees came from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan and Chechnya (Russian Federation). In addition, growing numbers of non-CIS refugees have sought asylum in Ukraine. Asylum-seekers originate mainly from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, a number of African countries (Angola, Cameroun, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Mauritania, Rwanda, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire) and the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Syria).

As of 1 January 1997, 1,2 thousands of persons, including 482 children under 16, had been granted refugee status. The overwhelming majority (999 persons, 86% of the total) were Afghans who had close ties with the Najibullah regime and who had entered Ukraine before 1995. Since 1994, UNHCR has registered more than 6,0 thousands of refugees, half of whom however have left the country and moved to Western Europe. In addition, as of January 1997 2,6 thousands of persons had been granted the status of persons in refugee-like situations. Of these, 1,8 thousands of persons were from Chechnya (Russian Federation) and 775 persons from Abkhazia (Georgia).

The decline in migration evident in recent years continued in 1997. Ukraine's main migration partners, as in previous years, were the CIS
and Baltic states. Net emigration, combined with a low birth rate, resulted in a population decline. Most of the migration losses were borne by the urban population (81,1 thousands of persons, compared to 1,1 thousands from rural areas). The Russian Federation was the main migration partner. Among other CIS countries, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Belarus also had considerable migration exchange with Ukraine.

Migration changes with non-CIS and Baltic States has declined slightly. Emigration among Russians and Germans remained stable. For the first time in 1997, Ukrainians constituted the largest ethnic group emigrating to non-CIS and Baltic states (34,2%). Emigration was motivated by the desire to join other family members abroad and the continuing economic crisis in Ukraine characterized by a rise in unemployment and the non-payment of pensions and wages.

In 1997, 42,5 thousands of ethnic Ukrainians returned to Ukraine, a decrease of 15% from 1996. Ethnic Ukrainians thus constituted 40% (41,04 thousands of persons) of the total number of immigrants from other CIS and Baltic States. 75,6% of ethnic Ukrainians returned from the Russian Federation. Others arrived from Moldova, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Uzbekistan.

In 1998-2000 migration flows with CIS and Baltic States continued decreasing and stabilized. Emigration decreased more quickly than immigration, leading to a smaller negative migration balance. The Russian Federation remained Ukraine's principal migration partner, and Ukraine had a negative migration balance only with Russia and Belarus. Russians and Ukrainians constituted more than 80% of migrants, in roughly equal shares. The repatriation of Ukrainians slowed down: in 2000 it involved half as many Ukrainians as in 1997. Emigration of Ukrainians to CIS and Baltic States slowed down as well: in 2000 it almost equaled that of non-CIS and Baltic countries, whereas in 1997 it was almost three times higher. Migrants were primarily of working age and were highly educated.

Migration flows with countries outside the CIS and Baltic States decreased as well. Emigration continued being directed mainly at Israel, Germany and the USA. Emigrants were mostly Ukrainians,
Jewish and Russians. In addition, according to the State Committee for Labour and Social Policy, in 1998, 24,4 thousands of Ukranian citizens worked abroad with labour contracts, 28,2 thousands in 1999 and 33,8 thousands in 2000. Official statistics grossly underestimated the number of emigrants, however.

The Ukraine was routinely used as a transit country by irregular migrants on their way to Western Europe. In recent years, Ukraine has become increasingly concerned with irregular migration. The Government repeatedly expressed its willingness to improve migration management and took a number of steps in that direction; it was hampered however by a continual reshuffling of senior staff due to political instability, inadequate capacity for policy making, insufficient exposure to international practice and lack of funding. A Governmental Programme for Combating Illegal Migration in Ukraine in 1999–2000 was adopted in 1998, as was a Programme for the Prevention of Trafficking in Women and Children, in September 1999. In December 2000 Ukraine signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Much progress has been made on the legislation front, although much remains to be done.

**Millennium: a New Stage in the Development of Migration History in Ukraine**

During 2000s Ukraine experienced the diversification of interstate migrations flows. If the total number of registered movements of the population between Ukraine and other states including all migrants regardless the direction for their travels and countries of destination decreased by two times, migration exchange with the far abroad countries during the same period reduced by 2,2 and with CIS countries – by 1,9 times. Contribution of CIS countries into gross migration increased in 2002–2008 from 71,9% to 74,3%, and of the far abroad countries – decreased from 28,1% to 25,7%. Thus, the geography of interstate flows in Ukraine is gradually turning into the spatial structure for migration movements of the country existing at the beginning of the 1990s.

Changes in the size and structure of migration flows are followed by the improvement of migration situation in Ukraine. Already in 2005
Ukraine turned into the country admitting immigrants and its migration losses over 2004-2005 were compensated by former citizens from CIS countries. However, for the first time since 1990s the increase of the population due to migration exchange with the far abroad countries was recorded in 2006. Over the next years this tendency intensified. Even though the size of migration flows from abroad is small, the very fact shows the turning-point in the development of migration situation in Ukraine and its transformation from the country of emigrants into the country of destination for immigrants both from CIS and far abroad countries.

Migration Potential of Ukraine

According to the monitoring results of social changes in Ukrainian Society annually conducted by the Sociology Institute of Academy of Sciences of Ukraine since 1992, in 2000s almost every fifth Ukrainian was a potential migrant and was eager to leave its place of residence (19,3% in 2000, 21,1% in 2004, 20,1% in 2006 and 19,6% in 2000). At the same time in 2010 11,2% of those wanting to leave chose another locality in Ukraine and only 7,9% of Ukrainians intended to leave the territory of former USSR. In 2000 the number of those wishing to leave their place of residence was larger: 14,4% expressed their wish to resettle within Ukraine and 9,6% - outside the territory of former USSR. The number of potential migrants indecisive about their place of destination was the largest: in 2000 it equaled to 17,0%, and in 2010 – to 18,3%. The main reasons that could provoke the intention of Ukrainians to leave their places of residence included harmful ecology conditions and the desire to find a new job (in 2000 15,4% and 18,0% respectively and in 2010 16,7% and 19,9%). Other reasons are mentioned less often. As a rule since the beginning of 2000 Ukrainians preferred to look for new employment. Almost half of the residents see the environmental conditions in their place of residence as harmful or extremely harmful (59,2% in 2002, 46,4% in 2006, 41,1% in 2010).

Migration potential of Ukranian youth deserves special attention. According to the survey conducted by Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Ukranian Sociology Service company among young people in
Ukraine in December 2009 and January 2010 only 13.8% of young people aged 18-34 intended to leave their country forever. Much more often Ukranian youth was determined to stay temporary abroad: 29.9% of young Ukranians intended to leave for other countries for a certain period of time. However, more than half of Ukranian young people did not express the inclination to emigration (51.5%). It should be mentioned that similar survey concerning potential migration intention of the youth held in 2003 showed that the share choosing the home land was basically the same – 50.9%.

How long do potential migrants intend to stay abroad? Young Ukranians planned an average trip to foreign countries for 3–4 years. As a rule, young people do not plan to stay for more than 5 years outside their native country. The shares of those intending to stay in foreign countries for different period are about the same: for one year – 22.1%, 2 years – 23.8%, 3 years – 22.1% and finally 5 years – 21.3%. In 2003 the period for eventual stay abroad was much shorter for potential migrants. Ukranians defined the longest period for staying abroad as lasting 2 years (9.3%).

Only 6.0% of young Ukranians intended to stay abroad for 5 years. Thus, over the last 7 years the duration of staying abroad for Ukranian youth has significantly increased in their migration intentions.

Why do young people intend to go abroad? Young Ukranians mention labour migration as the main reason for travelling abroad (65.1%). 2.2 times less often Ukranian youth intends to realize its touristic interests (30.1%) and only 5.5% of them plan to study outside their country. In comparison with 2003 the number of young Ukranians wishing to work abroad has increased by 2.9 times (from 22.4% to 65.1%).

Potential migrants make the choice of the country for realizing different interests depending on their preferences, availability of information and development of migration networks. Thus, for young Ukranians Russia (19.0%), Great Britain (12.2%), Germany (11.7%), the USA (11.2%), Italy (10.2%) are priority countries. In 2003 Germany (14.1%) and the USA (12.3%) were the most desirable countries for young Ukranians. Only 5.8% of potential migrants mentioned Russia at that time. Therefore the geography of destination countries has considerably changed.
What encourages young Ukrainian people to constantly search for better life outside their own country? More often young people name three reasons influencing their migration choice: economic, financial and socio-cultural. Very seldom they point out to political or ethnical grounds.

Primarily financial reasons influence migration directions of Ukrainian Youth: they believe that they will be able to earn more abroad. 51,5% of young people adhere to such position. 48,5% of Ukrainian youth note the impact of economic reasons (lack of financing in the industry they are working in, lack of perspective for Ukrainian economy in general). Less often they mention social and cultural reasons (better living conditions, higher cultural level, etc.). 39,7% of young citizens mention such factors influencing their migration directions and plans. Another 23,5% of this age group mention the opportunities for professional/career growth and another 17,6% of young Ukrainians point to the family reasons (their relatives live abroad) in their migration choice. It should be mentioned that in 2003 young people in Ukraine were almost indifferent answering the questions about the factors influencing the formation of their migration plans: financial reasons were noted by only 8,3% of the surveyed; 6,4% mentioned economic reasons; 4,4% – social and cultural reasons; 2,3% – motivated their desire to leave the country by the lack of perspectives for carrier or professional growth.

According to the data of the migration analysis annually conducted by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, in 2007-2009 total number of registered movements in Ukraine including all migrants regardless the direction of their travels, regions and types of settlement, correspondingly amounted to 14,997, 14,066 and 12,722 thousands of people. Division of migrants according to the flows shows that intra-regional movement of people dominates in Ukraine, making up 58,1%, 57,9% and 57,7% of general number. The resettling of the population between countryside and urban settlements within regions or territorial autonomy is still the main type of migration flows. (Intra-regional migration constitutes a considerable part of migration movement in Ukraine: the scale of population movements from one region to an-
other within the country during 2007–2009 amounted to more than one third of gross migration (36.8%, 37.4% and 38.2% respectively). The smallest share of migration flows connects Ukraine with CIS countries and far abroad: interstate migratory exchange between these countries provided for only 5.1%, 4.3% and 4.1% of total migration in the country in 2007–2009. For comparison we should note that the share of external migration in 1999–2000 was 11.2% and 9.4%.

**Conclusion**

Migration situation in Ukraine is stable now. The country is in the position of the new migration balance that it has been trying to achieve for 20 years. A certain stage of transformational changes in this sphere has been completed. The development of labour migration inside of Ukraine creates a counter balance for the external migration as it moves the population from the rural areas and small towns and thus it strengthens their demographic potential. At the same time the external labour migration of Ukrainian population is the strongest movement of migrants abroad. Therefore the issue of state policy development in the sphere of migration management and ensuring the protection of the rights of Ukrainian citizens going to work abroad as labour workers remains as before.

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The Republic of Moldova is a new independent state that has been integrating into the world civilised community, including the area of migration. Over 20 years of development it experienced a variety of present-day migration forms.

**Emigration**

In Soviet times, emigration outside the USSR was practically non-existent. Privileged ethnoses in the Republic in this respect were ethnic Jews and Germans who had been returning to their historical home country after 1975.

From the end of the 1980s, emigration increased due to various political or socio-economic reasons: family reunification, return to historical or ethnic home country. Note that since the second half of the 1990s predominant causes of Moldovans’ emigration have been socio-economic, while socio-political reasons, fear of interethnic confrontation or armed conflicts have practically dwindled. Mass emigration is typical for both banks of the Dniester River. In all, over 210,000 Moldovan citizens have officially left the country to permanently reside abroad.

**Diagram 1**

*The emigrants from Moldova in 1990-2009 years (persons)*
Most attractive countries for Moldovan emigration include Germany, Israel, Russia, USA and Ukraine. They account for more than 97% of emigrants: Russia – 28.76%; Ukraine – 23.96%; Israel – 23.2%; USA – 11.61%; Germany – 8.99%.

**Repatriation**

Moldova’s establishment as an independent state started processes of repatriation of ethnic Moldovans from other countries.

![Diagram 2](image)

The number of returnees to the Republic of Moldova in 1992-2009, respectively (people)

In 1992-2009, about 65,000 persons repatriated to Moldova. Most returnees come from Russia (more than half) and Ukraine (more than one third). Together, these two states account for about 90% of the total number of returnees.

However, the returnee flows tend to decrease. This is due to persisting complex socio-economic situation in Moldova and adaptation to post-Soviet realities and integration into new states. Note that Moldova turned out to be poorly prepared to accept returnees: a repatriation program, its practical implementation policy and material and financial resources were unavailable. All this affected Moldova’s attractiveness for returnees.
Non-voluntary migration

The armed conflict in March-July 1992 led to the appearance of refugees and internally displaced persons. In all, about 800 people were killed during the armed conflict on both sides and about 100,000 refugees were registered: to Belarus (859), Russia (17,346), Ukraine (61,000, of them more than 30,000 children) and “old abroad” states (about 20,000). After the end of hostilities in the east of Moldova practically all refugees to Ukraine returned to their habitual places of residence; 51,289 persons (of them 28,746 children) were registered as internally displaced persons in the right-bank Moldova.

The end of armed hostilities and reaching an agreement through the mediation of Russia and OSCE enabled prompt solution of the IDP problem. Most people returned to their habitual places of residence. Currently, the problem of internally displaced persons as a mass social phenomenon has been practically solved.

Since 2002, Moldova has been actively participating in international refugee assistance programs. About 850 persons received refugee status; more than 700 persons were recognised as asylum-seekers. Most persons seeking international humanitarian assistance were Russian Chechens.

Diagram 3

Refugees and persons seeking asylum, registered in the Republic of Moldova in 2002-2009, respectively (people)
Immigration

Moldova has declared its openness in migration issues welcoming legal and combating illegal immigration. In 1992-2009, about 31,000 persons legally entered the country.

The number of legal immigrants in the country has been gradually increasing. As of 30 July 2011, there were 16,880 foreigners, of them 12,617 had a permanent resident status and 4,263 had a temporary resident status; of the total number of immigrants 1,481 are stateless persons. In Transdniester, there are 4,172 registered foreigners, including 1,085 stateless persons.

Most immigrants came from Ukraine, Russia, Romania and Arab countries. Immigration from CIS clearly tends to decrease.

One of unofficial illegal transit migration routes to Western Europe runs through Moldova. However, in contrast to other routes, the Moldova route is less popular. The number of illegal transit migrants is small. Largely, they come from countries of Central and South-East Asia and Africa.

Labour migration

The economic crisis in the country and globalisation gave rise to increased labour migration. Today, it is the most mass-scale form of
migration of Moldovan population. Actually, one in three able to work Moldovans (about 600,000) is involved in labour migration.

The Republic of Moldova is at the junction of the European (EU) and post-Soviet (CIS) migration systems. In CIS, the main attractor is Russia (Moscow and Moscow region), in EU – Italy. Over the last decade, the role of the European migration system has increased.

While earlier labour migration of Moldovans to CIS states, primarily Russia, was the dominant trend, now, western and south-western vectors of labour migration have appeared in addition to traditional labour migration to the east. Most attractive countries include Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Greece with their high informal sector share in the economy.

Highlighting of the western vector of labour migration was promoted by practical equidistance of Moldova from Mediterranean countries and Moscow, kinship of the Latin languages for Moldovans, Turkic languages for Gagauzes, Slavonic languages for Russian-speakers in Moldova, the established communities of acquaintances through the Jewish-Moldovan Diaspora in Germany and Israel... Wages in the West are higher than in Russia, while crime and lawlessness in
business, on the part of police and officials in EU countries are con-
siderably lower.

Recently, Russia’s role started to grow due to the liberalisation of
Russian legislation relating to migrants and wage increase. At the same
time, migration laws and practices in EU have been toughened up due
to increased illegal migration and financial and economic crisis.

In the context of stricter border control between EU and neighbour-
ing countries, illegal migration flows began to decline, with people
seeking other, safer ways and forms of labour migration, such as tourist
visas, labour contracts, reunification of families, etc.

Youth and persons of middle age (more than 70% of aged under 40
and about 40% of aged under 30) are most active labour migration par-
Participants. Labour migrant’s average age is 35-36 years. About one
fourth of migrants are females. Most commonly, males work in con-
struction (51%), females – in the services sector, trade, as household
servants, care for old people or children. Most labour migrants do not
work in their specialty.

Labour migration to Russia and EU varies by duration: Russia –
7.7 months, EU – 14-16 months. While Moldovan labour migrants
have no difficulties in getting to Russia enjoying visa-free regime, to
go to EU countries visas are required, and their unofficial cost may
reach 4,500 euros.

Labour migration enables people to survive and support their
families. Money transfers from labour migrants are the principal
positive effect. Their amounts increase every year (www.bnm.md) and
form a weighty share of Moldova’s GDP. Note that the money is largely
spent for internal consumption and purchase of real estate and in fact
does not have any impact on the national economic development.

Usually, money transfers from abroad are in hard currency. Increa-
sing money transfer amounts have a positive effect on the development
and consolidation of the national banking system.

In fact, the outflow of manpower unused in the country saves
Moldova from domestic unemployment. Cash incomes help maintain
social stability in the country and reduce social tension.
Negative effects of labour migration include the upset of the demographic balance. The outflow of people of younger ages places in question the prospects of democratic development in the country: the share and political weight of the third-generation electorate has been seriously increasing.

Labour migration contributes to family strengthening in financial terms but destroys the family morally. Family members become strangers. The number of children in the families with labour migrant
parents has been increasing. Such children form a new at-risk group, as they are to the maximum extent exposed to the influence of the street and are put at a disadvantage in terms of socio-psychological, moral and upbringing environment.

Seeking to earn as much as possible, labour migrants save on their health, so deaths of labour migrants, increased incidence rate and advanced diseases are frequent. Generally, the “health threshold” of the Moldovan society has been lowered.

Mass-scale unregulated labour migration has a negative effect on Moldova’s relations with the countries receiving our labour migrants.

What is done by Moldova to regulate migration? Moldova’s migration policy includes four stages (V. Mosneaga. 2007, p.33-48).

Stage one (1990–1994). This stage was largely characterised by regulation and control of migration processes typical for Soviet-specific or post-Soviet space.

Migration policy was regulated by the Law on Migration (December 1990) and was aimed at the maintenance of the ethno-national identity of the Republic and prevention of unregulated immigration from other ex-Soviet republics. With this end in view, the national parliament introduced the immigration quota of 0.05% of the available population of the Republic.

Regulation of migration was aimed against immigrants but did not apply to Moldovans leaving the Republic. To regulate labour migration, Moldova adopted Governmental Resolutions “On the Approval of the Regulations on Temporary Employment of Citizens of the Republic of Moldova Abroad and Foreign Nationals in the Republic of Moldova” (December 1991), “On the Approval of the Procedure for Issue of Certificates and Licenses to Individuals and Legal Entities Acting as Intermediaries in Organisation of Temporary Employment of Citizens of the Republic of Moldova Abroad” (June 1992) and others.

Seeking a civilised divorce from the disintegrated USSR and protection of the rights of Moldovan citizens who worked or were working in the CIS countries, Moldova’s Government signed the Bishkek Agreements “On Visa-Free Movement of Citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States within the Territories of the Parties Hereto” (1992),
entered into bilateral agreements on labour migration with Russia (May 1993), Ukraine (December 1993) and Belarus (May 1994). As part of CIS, Moldova signed the agreement between the CIS countries “On Guarantees of the Rights of Citizens of CIS Member-States in Pension Coverage” (March 1992) and “On Cooperation in Labour Protection and Definition of Industrial Injuries of Workers outside the Country of Residence” (December 1994). In March 1995, Moldova ratified the agreement “On Cooperation in Labour Migration and Social Protection of Migrant Workers” (April 1994) and others.

The national Constitution of 1994 secured the constitutional right of Moldova’s citizens to enter/leave the country. In 1994, Laws on Entry and Exit from the Republic of Moldova (1994) and on Legal Status of Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons (1994) were developed and enacted.

Regulation of migration processes was the responsibility of the Migration Department within the Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and Family established in the Soviet period.

**Stage two (1995–2000)** is characterised by integration of the Republic into European migration processes. Labour migration issues predominate in the state activities. Specific features of the period: labour migration of Moldovans and integration of government institutions into a common migration space are the two independent, in fact non-interacting processes. Government institutions are guided by the European priorities, adopt the experience of West European countries in labour migration regulation and try to protect legal migrants.

An attempt was made to enter into bilateral agreements on labour migration of Moldova’s citizens with 24 states. However, the initiative met with no support. In April 1997, the agreement on readmission was signed with Poland. Later, such agreements were signed with 10 other countries. Within CIS, the agreement on the fundamental principles of near-border cooperation of state parties to the Agreement on Improved Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Areas of 29 March 1996 was signed. In November 1997, the Government adopted the Resolution “On Temporary Employment of Migrant Workers” that approved the new Regulations on Temporary Employment of Migrant Workers.
Under the influence of international institutions, attention was focused on human traffic for the purposes of sexual exploitation and relevant countermeasures.

**Stage three (2001–2006):** promotion of legalisation of “illegal” labour migrants and protection of their rights in host countries. This period was characterised by intensified activities and promotion of the image of Moldova’s migration agencies among the public and in the international arena.

Institutional reform in migration regulation had been conducted. In 2001, the State Migration Service at the Government of the Republic was created, with the concentration in a single agency of all services dealing with regulation and control of migration processes, including labour migration. In 2002, it was transformed into the Migration Department of the Republic of Moldova with its status and functions determined by the national parliament. Later on, in 2005, it was renamed the National Bureau of Migration. To solve the problems of Moldovan labour migrants, the State Agency for Employment of Moldovan Citizens Abroad was established (2002).


The Republic of Moldova signed the intergovernmental agreement with Italy (2003). The practice of signing agreements on labour migra-
tion at regional and administrative unit level had been established.

As part of the Program of Action for CIS Development for the Period up to 2005 (section “Creating Conditions for Free Movement of Labour Force”), the Concept of Gradual Formation of the Common Labour Market and Regulation of Migration of Labour Force of CIS Member-States, Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers and their Family Members – Citizens of CIS Member-States, and Agreement on General Principles of Cooperation of CIS Member-States on Near-Border Labour Migration (2002) were developed. Migration was included as a priority issue in the 2005 EU/Moldova Action Plan.

**Stage four (from May 2006):** revision of conceptual approaches to regulation of migration, institutional reform, close cooperation with EU on migration, security and development.

Despite apparent stepping up of Moldovan government’s activity in regulation of migration, the main goal was not achieved. Institutional reform was caused by changed priorities in the migration policy, its development in the context of social policy and practice. To harmonise the migration regulation system with that of EU, Moldova divided the single agency and established the National Employment Agency within the Ministry of Economy and Trade (today within the Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and Family) and the National Bureau of Migration and Asylum within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The principal legislative and regulatory acts on migration and asylum include: the Law on Labour Migration (December 2008); Law on Asylum (December 2008); Law on the Status of Foreigners in the Republic of Moldova (July 2010); Second EU/Moldova Action Plan (2010); National Migration and Asylum Programs (2006, 2010). The Law on the Modification of the Law on Migration of 2002 was adopted.

In the context of Moldova’s proximity to the European Union, measures have been taken to improve border control, regulate the entry into the country of foreign nationals (the new Law on the State Border was adopted by parliament in the first reading on 22 July 2011). A computer-based integrated information system has been developed and introduced under the “Electronic Moldova” program.
Actualisation of the European integration, proximity to EU and eastern partnership problems, and their translation into specific policies and practices required further elaboration of the conceptual framework of Moldova’s migration policy. For this purpose, the National Migration and Asylum Strategy (for 2011-2020) has been developed which focuses (considering the European integration vector) on the two basic aspects: migration and development and migration and security.

While earlier migration policy focused on migrants (immigrants, legal/illegal migrants), in the period under review focus was made on the use of migration, first of all, labour migrants’ money transfers, for the socio-economic development of the Republic of Moldova. Migration policy is regarded as an element of the social policy.

Moldova has been pursuing its policy in the context of EU migration initiatives, such as global approach to migration in the eastern and south eastern regions neighbouring on EU; mobility and circular migration partnership; European neighbourhood and cooperation instrument; Individual action plans of the European Union’s neighbouring countries; European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM); Black Sea Synergy; new thematic program of cooperation with third parties in the areas of migration and asylum, establishment of a single visa centre in the European Union; agreements on simplified visa regimes and readmission (2008).

From 2010, further concretisation has taken place: Moldovan authorities see the goal of their migration policy in obtaining visa free regime for Moldovan population migration to the European Union member states. The National Action Plan to liberalise visa regime with EU was adopted. The Plan was approved by the European Commission in mid-December 2010. It relied on experience of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro in obtaining visa free regime with the European Union.

Principal directions of the present-day migration policy of Moldova.

- Work with and protection of the rights of labour migrants. Moldova proceeds from 5 principal priorities: improvement of the manpower employment policies; development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with host countries; return of mi-
grants; informing labour migrants about life, possibilities of employment and starting a business in Moldova, etc.

- The agreement on labour migration and protection of migrants’ rights was signed with Italy (2003). Currently, negotiations on joint ventures are under way. Bilateral social insurance agreements were signed with 4 EU countries (Portugal, Bulgaria, Romania and Luxembourg).

- Work with the Moldovan Diaspora. Work with the “old” and “new” Moldovan Diasporas has been intensified. The National Action Plan to manage Diaspora and involve it in the socio-economic development of Moldova developed by the National Bureau of Interethnic Relations has been introduced; from 2004, 4 Moldovan Diaspora congresses have been held. In 2010, the Governmental Program of Work with Diaspora was adopted. In cooperation with the Diaspora much attention is paid to scientific community, Moldovans working in foreign university and research centres.

- Work with immigrants, refugees and returnees, prevention of illegal and transit migration, implementation of the policy of granting asylum to refugees, etc. The Action Plan on Migration and Asylum is being implemented. In this regard the Republic of Moldova has been effectively cooperating with specialised international migration agencies (International Organization for Migration, International Labour Organization, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees).

From 1992, visa free regime has been introduced for citizens of CIS countries. From 1 January 2007, the Republic of Moldova has introduced visa free regime for immigrants from EU, USA, Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Japan.

In conclusion, we would like to note that certain efforts have been undertaken in the area of migration regularisation. Progress has been largely achieved owing to international cooperation. However, while fairly focusing on European orientation and cooperation with EU, Moldovan authorities neglect cooperation with CIS, which seems to be rather short-sighted.
Moldova is a small country with a small labour market. Acting on its own, it will be unable to become economically attractive for its population and minimise labour emigration. Hence, without a long-term policy of investment by EU and Russia, all efforts taken by Moldovan authorities to regulate migration will be ineffective.

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THE MIGRATION SITUATION IN AZERBAIJAN

Rahimova Zemfira Rahim
Mammadova Mahira Bahman

After collapse of the Soviet Union, new migration situation in Azerbaijan was formed due to changes in the political and economic life of the republic. Independence, greater integration into the global community, transition to a fundamentally different type of economic relations, the formation of national markets outlined dynamics and character of migration processes in the country. Transformation of the migration processes. Studies show that before and after independence migration flows in some years occurred in various ways.

The first wave of migrants in Azerbaijan covered 1989–1994. It began even before the Soviet Union collapse due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1988 as a result of which massive migration in terms of both foreign outflows and internal replacement started.

The complicated political situation in the republic led to a massive outflow of non-indigenous population. According to official Statistical Department of the Republic of Azerbaijan for 1990–1994, 342.3 thousand people left the country and 211.2 thousand people arrived which is resulted in the migration balance of minus 131.1 thousand people. The migration of this period was primarily ethnic in nature.

The second wave of migrants came in 1995–2002. During these years, the migration begins to shift toward the predominance of economic and social factors.

Unlike the first period, migrants moved to foreign countries for financial reasons. This move had a positive effect on mitigation of tensions in the labor market of the republic and allowed to increase the family income. Migrants were predominantly men years in active working age at the age of 20–40 which negatively affected by age and sex structure of population, marriage and fertility in general and the demographic development of the country during this period. Although in the beginning those who left country for job purposes predominantly moved to CIS countries (Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan), later on migrants started to head out to the neighboring countries – Turkey, Iran.
For example, in 1995–2002., according to Statistical Department of the Republic, those who left the country legally constituted 86.1 thousand people versus 37.9 thousand people arrived which resulted in negative migration balance of minus 48.2 thousand people. Likewise the first period, in these years, the rate of emigration exceeded immigration levels. However, one should note that migration rate of the latter period was smaller the previous one.

2003 year was the beginning of the third stage of migration processes in the country. During this period, the target orientation behavior of our fellow citizens who travel to near and far abroad as well as in the second period was dominated by socio-economic reasons, i.e., the vast majority of them linked employment outside the country to improve their material well-being, but a certain part of the same immigrants were due to the realization of their professional and business qualities. Note that since the beginning of this period, the dynamics of migration of citizens of the country has declined substantially. Today Azerbaijan turns into the country, a destination country for a number of factors. Azerbaijan is attractive for migrants because of its stability – both economically and politically. The country implemented a number of regional economic projects, and offers real jobs, there are real opportunities for employment. Investments in Azerbaijan grow annually. There is a tendency to increase the level of arrivals in this country. It can also be confirmed with the official statistics. If in 2003 the migration balance was minus 1.3 thousand people, in subsequent years the migration balance has been positive in Azerbaijan. So, in 2008 and 2009 it was respectively 1.1 and 0.9 thousand.

In Azerbaijan, there are 20 bills and regulations in effect which outline and control migration processes in the country, however not all organizations and migrants have chances to get familiar with those documents on time. That is why a new Migration code is being developed which is going to regulate all relevant provisions in this area.

In the 2000s, a series of documents such as concepts, strategies and programs were adopted and successfully implemented that aimed to enhance the positive contribution of migration to development.
In March 2007 the State Migration Service of Azerbaijan was established in order to implement state policy on migration, development management, control and prediction of migration, the coordination among relevant government agencies in this area.

The Republic of Azerbaijan closely cooperates with the United Nations, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, the International Organization for Labor, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, the Commonwealth of Independent States. In addition, the country joined the International Convention «On protection of rights of migrant workers and their families», signed an agreement in the framework of the CIS «Cooperation in the field of social protection of migrant workers,» cooperates with such leading countries as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Kingdom Netherlands, Russia and some other countries, study their experience in the field of migration. Today Azerbaijan, as a full member of the international community, has acceded up to 15 international acts and conventions.

In the field of migration, appropriate mechanisms and independent immigration database have been developed; interagency information-retrieval system «entry / exit, and registration» is being modernized. In order to gain control of migration, unified migration information system was established which provides insights into dynamics of current migration processes and helps combat illegal migration.

In order to implement the state policy on migration, eliminate the negative impact of uncontrolled migration and prevent illegal immigration into the country since 2009, the principle of «single window» has been in effect to control migration processes. All visas that were issued earlier to foreigners lost their validity. Employment quotas were established for employment of foreign nationals which toughens measures for illegal employment of migrants. The Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking was adopted as well as major changes in legislation were made to combat human trafficking.

Migration flows between Azerbaijan and the CIS countries have been quite intense in the first years after the Soviet collapse. In subse-
quent years, the number of migrants has been reduced. According to State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan Republic there has been a fall in migration from CIS countries due to decrease in both emigration and immigration. While the number of arrivals in the country within five years (1990 to 1994.) from the CIS countries equaled to 128.0 thousand people and the number of people emigrated amounted to 244.1 thousand people, then during the next eight years (1995 to 2002) those indicators constituted 28.8 thousand, or 22.5% out of 1990–1994 data, and 76.3 thousand, or 31.3% out of 1990–1994 data respectively. Over the past seven years (2003 to 2009.) the number of arrivals in the republic was 14.5 thousand people, or 11.3% out of 1990–1994 data, and the emigrated equaled to 18.5 thousand people, or 7.6% out of 1990–1994 data. Note that during the 1990 to 2007, the number of departures from the country exceeded the number of arrivals to the country, resulting in the negative migration balance for those years. In contrary, during 2008 to 2009 the total number of arrivals from the CIS countries exceeded the total number of departures to these countries, resulting in the positive migration balance. Positive balance of Azerbaijan’s population migration in the exchange with the CIS countries in 2008 amounted to 0.3 thousand people, and in 2009 – 0.8 thousand people. In these years there citizens of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have frequently visited Azerbaijan (Table 1).

As of independence of former Soviet Union states, new migration opportunities emerged outside the CIS borders. As noted earlier, since the independence, citizens of Azerbaijan emigrated to the CIS countries and beyond, particularly in Turkey, Iran, Germany, Poland and United Arab Emirates for financial purposes. The number of legal migration beyond the CIS countries was less than to the CIS countries in 1990. Their share in total number of arrivals in Azerbaijan constituted 41.6%, while the total number of departures from Azerbaijan – 29.4%. In 2009, there was a decrease in corresponding figures by 6.0% and 2.8% respectively. Among immigrants the citizens of Georgia (mostly ethnic Azerbaijanis) accounted for 49.1% in 1995, and that share had been significantly growing on average by 76% per annum for the period of 2001 to 2007, and fell to 49.0% in 2008 to 2009.
Migration process between Azerbaijan and Russia existed far back during the USSR. Migrants mainly were made up of students, as well as oil field workers most of whom settled in the new place of residence. However in the late 80s and early 90s the migration rates went up due to national conflicts, Nagorno-Karabakh war, inflation and unemployment. Nevertheless, today the Russian Federation is ranked the first amongst the countries where the majority of citizens of Azerbaijan emigrates to as well as immigrates from which can be inferred from the date represented in the table above. While the share of immigrants out of total number of arrivals from the CIS countries accounted for 62.7% of migrants from Russia in 1990, then in 2009 their share constituted 73.3%. Out of the total number of departures to the CIS countries, the proportion of migrants to the Russian Federation fell from 79.6% in 1990 to 73.6% in 2009. In total, during 1990-2009 total number of people who emigrated from Azerbaijan to the Russian Federation accounted for 276.2 thousand people while 113.5 thousand people immigrated from Russia to Azerbaijan.

The Russian Federation happens to be one of the main economic partners of Azerbaijan among the CIS countries. At present, there are

<table>
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<th>Table 1</th>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan migration exchange with the CIS countries* in 1990-2009 years. (person)</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>30857</td>
<td>77452</td>
<td>2968</td>
<td>11312</td>
<td>2710</td>
<td>8393</td>
<td>1158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>4355</td>
<td>12794</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>3190</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>7057</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1562</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>1336</td>
<td>1406</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49197</td>
<td>97333</td>
<td>4303</td>
<td>12849</td>
<td>3540</td>
<td>9378</td>
<td>1565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Demographic indicators of Azerbaijan 2002 and 2010
over than 500 companies and organizations with Russian investments registered in Russian versus 250 in 2001.

There is also active working group on migration issues formed within the framework of the Azerbaijan-Russia Interparliamentary Committee. This commission aims at the settlement of migration issues, and is considering signing the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan on cooperation in the field of labor migration.
INTERSTATE MIGRATION IN POST-SOVIET ARMENIA

Ruben Yeganyan

1. Migration situation

Since 1988, migration situation in Armenia has changed dramatically due to the integrated effect of critical events, such as Karabakh conflict, destructive earthquake, revolutionary political, economic and social transitions (disintegration of the USSR, transport and energy blockade, transition to the market economy, collapse in production and drastic structural transformations in the national economy, etc.).

At the same time, for a number of reasons migration statistics ceased to reflect the real state of affairs.\(^8\) To a large extent it was due to the fact that migration behavior lost the so-called “definiteness”. In other words, migration (even voluntary) in general is no longer a well-thought out act focused on a clearly stated objective. Now it appears to be a means of quick response to adverse reality.\(^9\) Naturally, this has affected the migration statistics. In particular, the majority of migrants leaving Armenia avoided registration of migration, as they did not want to be registered as migrants so as to have fewer problems upon potential return.

In this context sample surveys have become the only source of relatively accurate information on migration.

The first sample survey of interstate migration of population of the Republic of Armenia was conducted in 1995. It gave the first realistic assessments of volume and structural characteristics of post-Soviet emigration and immigration flows. In particular, it was found that in 1991–1995, as the result of interstate migration, Armenia lost more than 17% of its population.\(^10\) It should be noted that the 2001 population census in Armenia almost completely confirmed the results of the survey.

In subsequent years other surveys were conducted that one way or another touched upon migration problems in Armenia. Depending on

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\(^8\) According to the estimates of the National Statistics Service of RA recalculated on the basis of the 2001 population census data, in 1990-2001 the total negative balance of external migration was 631,400 persons, or about 14 times more than according to the current migration statistics for the same period. (7.13., p. 28):

\(^9\) Note that this concerns only to so-called voluntary, not forced migration.

\(^10\) See 3.2.
the scope of the phenomenon and degree of representativeness of the results they may be grouped as follows:

- Comprehensive representative migration surveys (*see References, Section 4*);
- Representative surveys of individual components of the phenomenon: returned migrants, labor migration, passenger traffic, migration transfers, etc. (*see References, Section 5*);
- Representative socio-economic surveys requiring that particular aspects of the phenomenon be included in the scope of observation (*see References, Section 5*);
- Pilot observations (*see References, Section 6*);

In the post-Soviet period, some migration surveys were also carried out and some analytical documents were published (*see References, Section 7*).

Systematic examination of all these sources and review of their periodization\(^\text{11}\) made it possible to classify migration processes in Armenia by the following 4 stages.


At this stage a decisive role was played by extraordinary factors of political and social nature (collapse of totalitarianism and disintegration of the USSR, interethnic conflicts, social tension, etc.) and Spitak earthquake. The main migration flows at this stage were:

Refugees. Inflow: about 420,000 persons (360,000 from Azerbaijan; others from other USSR regions of interethnic conflicts). Outflow: about 170,000 Azerbaijanians residing in Armenia. This was and still is the only post-Soviet flow due to which Armenia’s population increased by 250,000 persons or almost 7%. Unfortunately, subsequently a considerable part of refugees emigrated from the country (mainly, to the Russian Federation), as a result of extreme conditions prevailing in the first half of 1990s:\(^\text{12}\)

Evacuation and re-evacuation of the affected population from the Spitak earthquake area. The important thing here is not so much the

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\(^{11}\) See 2.3., 2.4, 7.3., 7.13., et seq.

\(^{12}\) See 7.13, p. 37.
results — of 200,000 evacuees (mainly, women and children) about 50,000 did not return — as that the latter, by attracting their families and other relatives, contributed to the emigration wave which in 1992-1994 grew into mass population outflow.\textsuperscript{13}

Socio-political emigration. This flow largely aimed at permanent residence (outflow: about 250,000 persons, inflow: about 30,000 persons) encompassed: (1) those willing to emigrate to the west who were denied it in the Soviet times; (2) new businessmen and highly skilled specialists leaving to do business (largely to CIS countries) or work (mainly to non-CIS countries); (3) ex-Soviet high-ranking functionaries who felt uncomfortable in the new social environment; (4) Russian-speaking population (not only national minorities, but also Armenians).\textsuperscript{14}


At this stage migration was caused by crucial events directly affecting practically everyone, such as economic collapse, mass unemployment, shock therapy, general impoverishment, paralysis of public transport and utilities, etc. As a result, the population outflow skyrocketed. During these three years 980,000-990,000 persons left the country and only about 370,000 arrived/returned.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, 610,000-620,000 persons or almost one in five residents of the country left and did not return.\textsuperscript{16}

Total emigrants and reemigrants at this stage were presented by two flows: labor migrants and the so-called social migrants (those migrating under social pressure). While the majority of emigrants were labor migrants (about 50\% as against 40\% of social ones), the majority of reemigrants were social migrants (about 60\% as against 35\% of labor migrants). As a result, the percentage of non-returned labor migrants (about 65\%) was almost 3 times as much.\textsuperscript{17}

In those years about 75-80\% of migrants left for CIS countries, primarily the Russian Federation, and others — for Europe and the USA (50/50).

\textsuperscript{13} See 7.3., p. 33.
\textsuperscript{14} See 7.13. p 38.
\textsuperscript{15} “Reemigration” — return from emigration, “reemigrant” — returned emigrant.
\textsuperscript{16} See 7.13., p. 39.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, pp. 39-40.
In contrast to the first stage, the flows of which were characterized by almost proportional age-sex patterns, men dominated in the total second stage migration flow (more than 60%), with the majority of both women and men being persons of active working and reproductive ages. The age-sex pattern of non-returned was even more disproportionate. This resulted in a considerable destruction of age-sex proportions which became one of the reasons for rapid and cardinal deterioration of the demographic situation in Armenia.

The flows at this stage had a higher level of education than for the country generally.\(^{18}\) They also comprised more people involved in the private sector, unemployed and, tellingly, people with medium income. Obviously, for the latter group financial position was both a reason for and result of high migration activity, while the absence of economic motivation and possibilities, in turn, predetermined low migration activity of population groups with higher and lower incomes, respectively.\(^{19}\)

1.3. **Weakening of the impact of extreme factors (1995-2001)**

This stage is characterized by the downswing in migration levels. Emigration: about 600,000 people in total; immigration (mainly, re-emigration): approx. 350,000 people; negative migration balance: 250,000 people or about 8% of the population.

On the one hand, this was due to a certain stabilization of the socioeconomic situation and weakening of the impact of extreme factors, and, on the other hand, to previous extremely high migration activity. The latter, firstly, to the utmost reduced emigration potential of Armenia and, secondly, contributed to the improvement of living standards of those who remained in the country by ensuring a considerable inflow of money. An impact of the “external” factor, such as countermeasures undertaken by host countries to control excessive flow of migrants and building of legislative and administrative barriers should not be ruled out either.

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\(^{18}\) According to 3.2., 46.4% of migrants at this stage had specialized secondary and higher education with the country average 37.9%. See 7.13, p. 21.

\(^{19}\) See 3.2.
The primary structural feature of this stage is an increase in the share of labor migrants both in emigration and reemigration flows to about 2/3. Another characteristic is practically absolute discontinuation of the social migrants flow and the emergence of the emigration flow aimed at family reunification, i.e., the replacement of the flow the full reemigration of which was only a matter of time by the non-return flow. While the former was caused by certain improvement of the socio-economic situation in Armenia, the latter was caused by slow rate of positive developments and unhealthy moral and psychological social climate, loss of hopes for rapid recovery, etc.

At this stage, all the structural features of migration flows mentioned above became more apparent due to increased absolute and relative labor migration figures. The only new structural alteration, lower educational level of migrants, was also determined by higher labor migration relevance.\(^{20}\)

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**External labor migration in Armenia**

Transformation of labor migration into the principal interstate migration flow should be examined separately over time.

In the late 1980s, seasonal labor migration (or seasonal work)\(^ {21}\), then an important element of external migration in Armenia, started to decrease. Some of those involved in these flows joined the famous cooperative movement (including in host countries) using experience of economic activities on a contractual basis, accumulated financial means and useful ties. Temporary migration often transformed into permanent or a long-term labor migration (for more than 12 months), a new phenomenon for Armenia.

Later, in 1989-1991, this phenomenon almost entirely ceased to exist, and almost all seasonal workers returned and took part in recovery work in the Spitak earthquake area. Unfortunately, following the disintegration of the USSR these works were frozen making most seasonal workers resume their trips in 1992. Probably, this led to the emergence of great numbers of new labor migrants (who had never made labor trips before) in the same year.

Thus, after a short break the seasonal labor migration returned

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\(^{20}\) See 3.3. and 3.4.

\(^{21}\) Over the 1980s, 30,000-40,000 residents of Armenia (mainly, rural males of active working age) left for seasonal work. In spring and summer they largely carried out building and assembling works, mostly in Russia. (See 3.1.).
Summarizing the results of these three stages we can state the following:

First, in total, about 900,000 people left and did not return to Armenia in 1988-2001. Considering the positive migration balance of refugee flows, it is obvious that the total number of Armenian citizens who stayed into Armenian life, but now merely as a part of a phenomenon much larger in scale. Thus, in 2001, of 84,100 labor migrants who left and 45,200 who returned only 23,200 and 20,400, respectively, were seasonal labor migrants.\textsuperscript{22}

In contrast to the pre-transition period, when seasonal labor trips actually had a character of a prosperity and development strategy due to high level of earnings, post-Soviet labor migration largely was and remains a strategy of survival leaving no alternative. This predetermines such features of the phenomenon as time uncertainty (high potential of transformation from seasonal into unseasonal, from short-term (up to one year) into long-term); extremely low acceptability limits in every respect (earnings, nature and conditions of labor, accommodation, etc.); increased migration risks. The travel itself is risky. In many cases, money is borrowed, property/cattle is sold, i.e. the family’s future is put in jeopardy without any guaranty of successful outcome.\textsuperscript{23} The work itself is even more risky. Largely based on verbal arrangements, it often involves durable delays in payment, partial payment and even non-payment of wages. Serious risk factors include nonobservance of legal regulations for entry and residence, negative attitude and sometimes hostility on the part of local communities, etc.

Thus, labor migration from Armenia in the 1990s in many respects was and is worse than seasonal labor migration of the 1980s. It not only inherited all negative features and consequences of the latter for the country (exceeding the limit of migrants’ vital forces because of overintensive labor; aggravation of family stability and child upbringing and socialization problems due to long-term absence of fathers, bringing in and dissemination of infectious, including sexually transmitted, diseases, etc.), but also made them more significant due to the greater immensity of the phenomenon. Moreover, in contrast to seasonal labor migration of the 1980s, post-Soviet labor migration was and is an essential factor of permanent migration growth (non-return of migrants and reunification of their families in host countries).

\textsuperscript{22} See 3.4., p. 59
\textsuperscript{23} See 5.6.
abroad was much more: 1-1.1 mln. or slightly less than 30% of the population of Armenia in the late 1980s.  

Secondly, having provided a considerable inflow of money, labor migration contributed to better financial solvency of the population that played an important role in overcoming the economic crisis and public utilities collapse.

Thirdly, labor migration and associated increase of personal incomes have indisputably played an important role in reducing social tension and averting a real danger of serious social upheavals.

On the other hand, because of this outflow a significant number of active society members was diverted from solving internal problems, which was one of the reasons for the emergence and strengthening of negative phenomena typical for political, social and economical systems of present-day Armenia.

1.4. Stabilization and return to evolutionary development (since 2002)

Realities of this stage can also be understood only on the basis of research materials, of which sources 3.5. and 7.12 contain most accurate and integral information. Since a retrospective period in both studies was the period from 2002 to 2007, valid conclusions can be made only with respect to external migration processes in Armenia over these years.

According to the first source, about 750,000 people left and 600,000 people arrived in the country in these years, hence a negative balance of 150,000 or about 5% of the country’s population. On average, 125,000 departures and 100,000 arrivals were observed annually, and 25,000 stayed abroad. Comparison of these figures with similar figures for the previous stage (86,000, 50,000 and 36,000, respectively) clearly shows increased general population mobility and allows a conclusion that due to outstripping increase in arrivals (practically double as against 45% increase of departures) it was accompanied by decreased negative balance (by more than 30%).

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25 According to expert estimations, in 2002-2007, only about 7% of those who left and less than 2% of those who arrived had their migration acts officially registered. (See 7.14., p. 16).
In all likelihood, the latter is due to the exhaustion of emigration flow of reunified families. An increase in total migration mobility (especially outstripping increase in arrivals) is exclusively due to increased absolute and relative values of labor migrants flow and acceleration of labor trips turnover.\textsuperscript{26}

This is confirmed by the fact that only 320,000 people (or 10\% of Armenia’s population) made 1,350,000 external migration travels in 2002–2007.\textsuperscript{27} The composition of this population was as follows: 150,000 reemigrants (47\%); 170,000 emigrants (53.1\%); about 9,000 immigrants (3\%). Here it should be noted that the number of immigrants obtained in the survey almost fully coincided with the official statistics on those arrived in 2002–2007\textsuperscript{28}. Considering that this flow is formed by foreigners arriving for permanent residence who mostly want to officially register their arrival, but for a variety of reasons cannot do it, it may be concluded that this coincidence is indicative of high accuracy of both survey and official data on this part of the inflow. In turn, this implies that official data on departed roughly reflect permanent emigration. The fact that by assessment of 18\% of households in emigration (about 37,000 persons) they will never return and about 22\% of them do not exclude the possibility of nonreturn (about 44,000 people) also proves that this hypothesis has at least the right to exist.\textsuperscript{29}

Naturally, these data not obtained from original sources should be treated with caution. However, one thing is unquestionable: the number of permanent emigrants cannot be less than that of those who officially registered the fact of their departure, i.e. 54,500 persons in 2002–2007.\textsuperscript{30} Therefore, the total number of emigrants who left in 2002–2007 and did not return can be tentatively divided into two groups: permanent emigrants (approx. 35\% or about 60,000 people)\textsuperscript{31} and those who may return (about 110,000 people).

\textsuperscript{26} It should be noted that, doubtless, a demographic factor played an important role here (considerably more those entering active working age than those above that age).
\textsuperscript{27} Recalculated by the author based on data in 3.5. (p. 40).
\textsuperscript{28} See 2.5., p. 113.
\textsuperscript{29} See 3.5., p. 63.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Note that the actual number of permanent migrants is undoubtedly more by the number of departed families. Source 3.5 does not provide a reliable estimate of the latter number.
Consequently, even less population – only 250,000 Armenian residents – were responsible for 92% of departures (690,000 of 750,000) and 98% of arrivals (approx. 590,000 of 600,000) in 2002–2007 (average 2.8 departures and 2.4 arrivals for 6 years). Noticeably, approximately the same data are presented in the second source.32

Judging by the data from the first source, labor migrants make the major portion of this ultramobile population – 185,000 people (or 3/4). Others are, mainly, their family members. Second source data also confirm the fact of dominating labor component.33

Structural characteristics in both sources do not appreciably differ. Thus, according to the first source data, basic structural characteristics of reemigrants and emigrants are as follows:

- 2/3 of reemigrants and about 3/4 of emigrants are males (48% of the surveyed population);
- 73.2% of the former and 82.8% of the latter are aged 20-54 (53.3% on average for the country);
- 70.6% of reemigrants and 67.5% of emigrants were married (60.3% on average for the total population);
- 41.9% of reemigrants had general secondary education, 24.8% had specialized secondary education, 21.1% had higher or advanced education; the figures for emigrants: 55.7%, 16.1% and 18.7%, respectively (40.9%, 17.5% and 21.6% in the total population in the same order) total);
- 56.7% of reemigrants working in host countries were engaged in construction, 15.3% - in trade, 10% - in production, the same proportions are observed for emigrants: 62.8%, 10.5% and 4.2%, respectively (the proportion of engaged in the service sector is also high – about 7%);
- In host countries, less than 2% of both reemigrants and emigrants were unemployed (8.5% of reemigrants were registered unemployed and 9% were unregistered unemployed);
- 80.8% of reemigrants and 76.6% of emigrants were in the Russian Federation (in other CIS countries, European countries and

32 See 7.12., p. 20.
33 Ibid., p. 11.
the USA 5% and 3.4%; 5% and 9.8%; 5% and 3.4%, respectively).³⁴

Obviously, these data also prove that the vast majority of external migrations of Armenian population are labor migrations.

The second source presents specific features of labor migration composition, in particular, a consistent increase in the share of those leaving for the Russian Federation (about 96% of the flow), dominance of men of active working ages and progressive reduction of the share of women: from 14.1% in 2002-2004 to 6.5% in 2005-2007.³⁵

Data on motivation, reasons for migration, manner of planning and organization, labor, housing and living conditions, size of wages, etc. presented in the above-mentioned sources do not differ fundamentally. It is particularly noticeable that according to assessments of labor migrants, regular work with an average monthly wage of 570 U.S. dollars would be a sufficient condition for discontinuation of labor trips.³⁶

The following aspects addressed in the second source are also worth noticing: (1) general improvement of returned labor migrants’ competitive ability on the domestic labor market; (2) extremely insignificant positive effect of the phenomenon in terms of investment, creation of new jobs and business development in Armenia, although enterprises using labor of former labor migrants benefit from their skills and technologies.³⁷

Thus, the basic features of this stage of the development of migration processes in Armenia are as follows:

First. A fairly stable corpus of labor migrants has been formed (about 15,000 annual average or 0.5% of the country’s population), which stays abroad, mostly in the Russian Federation, for indefinite periods.

Second. There also are comparatively inconsiderable flows of permanent migrants with the migration balance being steadily negative (according to official data 6,000-7,000 annual average, and half as much according to expert estimates).³⁸

³⁴ See 3.5., pp. 40-72.
³⁶ See 7.12., p. 20.
³⁷ See 7.12., p. 2.
It should be noted that so far there are no good grounds to believe that any qualitative changes took place over the last three years (2008-2010). As for quantitative changes, judging by dynamics of external passenger turnover in Armenia (stable growth of excess of the number of those leaving over the number of arrived: 23,100 in 2008, 25,000 in 2009 and 30,000 in 2010), it may be supposed that they have already taken place. However, these changes cannot be correctly estimated without a new integrated survey.

2. Interstate migration prospects

Estimating Armenia interstate migration prospects, it may safely be said that no decrease in migration activity is to be expected.

Moreover, there are some factors that can lead to growing flows of permanent and labor migrants. In particular, much will depend on further migration behavior of labor migrants who have concentrated in host countries over the last years. It is evident that nonreturn of any of them will result in resumption of a permanent emigration flow aimed at reunification of families.

Furthermore, growth of these flows will influence, to a greater or lesser degree, such phenomena as further concentration of agricultural lands in Armenia due to their market reallocation and continued monopolization of the economic sector, especially, trade and services.

Certainly, much will depend on external factors, such as socio-economic situation in host countries, changes in their migration policy, socio-psychological climate, etc. Bearing in mind that the Russian Federation is most likely to remain the main migration partner of Armenia in the foreseeable future, Russian realities will obviously be especially important in this context.

While emphasizing the latter aspect, the fact that based on some surveys most labor migrants would prefer to migrate to West European countries rather than to Russia should not be ignored. Therefore, theoretically, in case of mitigation of migration barriers in these countries, the share of Armenian emigrants in Russia could diminish to a greater or lesser degree.

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39 See 2.5.
40 See 6.2.
3. Policy and legislation

Having neither experience of pursuing an independent migration policy (especially in the context of democracy) nor the relevant regulatory framework or administrative apparatus, from the first days of independence Armenia had to promptly respond to mass-scale extreme emigration flows.

Concurrently, it began the development of relevant legislation and institutional structures.

First of all, in 1993, Armenia acceded to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. However, the logical continuation of this process, namely, the development and adoption of relevant domestic legislation, took place long after (see 1.2 and 1.3).

In 1995, the law On Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia was enacted (1.1.).

In the same year, the Committee on Refugees under the Government of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic created in Soviet times (1990) was transformed into a structural subdivision of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. However, this was of little importance, since it was not assigned functions concerning the policy development and coordination.

Thus, up to the early 2000s Armenia’s migration policy was actually limited to finding solutions for refugees.

In the following years the situation changed. The laws On Political Asylum (2001, 1.4.); On State Border (2001, 1.5.); On State Population Register (2002, 1.6.) were enacted. Later on, in 2006, the law On Foreigners (1.7.) regulating entry and exit, stay status, labor, voluntary departure and deportation of foreigners, etc. was adopted. In 2007, for the purpose of statutory registration of the right to dual citizenship, the law On Citizenship (1.8.) was amended. Finally, in 2008, the law On Refugees and Asylum (1.9.) was enacted which brought the legislative system of granting asylum to foreigners into line with international standards. With the adoption of all these laws as well as some other laws and bylaws relating to government regulation of migration processes, the legal basis necessary for pursuing the state migration policy has been actually formed.
In these years, Armenia concluded bilateral intergovernmental agreements on regulation of migration relations with more than 10 countries and acceded to a number of international conventions and agreements.\textsuperscript{41}

In 2000, the Refugees and Migration Agency under the Government of the Republic of Armenia with the powers to develop and implement the migration policy was established. However, in 2005 it was transformed into the Agency within the Ministry of Territorial Administration (hereinafter – MTA) and divested of such powers (they were delegated to MTA). As a result of the new transformation in 2009, the Agency, while remaining within the MTA, was transformed into the State Migration Service with the powers to coordinate the development of the migration policy.

To systematize and improve the efficiency of the migration policy, the Concept of the State Regulation of Migration of the Population of the Republic of Armenia (2.1.) was developed and approved in 2000. In 2004, the Concept was revised (2.3.).

However, changes in the migration situation and, to a far greater degree, intensification of negative consequences and reduced beneficial impact of migration processes due to the global financial crisis, as well as legislative and institutional changes in the migration management required serious revision of conceptual approaches to the migration policy.

In this connection, a new concept of the migration policy of the Republic of Armenia was developed and approved in 2010 (2.5.). Stating that “...the political approaches and institutional and administrative mechanisms used in the current state migration regulation system cannot effectively solve migration problems faced by Armenia”\textsuperscript{42}, this document actually declares the beginning of a new migration policy stage: “...it is necessary to move from passively contemplative, responsive policy to proactively foreseeable one. This means … improvement of legislative, institutional and administrative mechanisms…”\textsuperscript{43}


\textsuperscript{42} See 2.4, p 5.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
Currently, the following agencies are responsible, within their competence, for political and administrative decision-making in the field of interstate migration:

- Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (Labor and Employment Department): labor migration;
- MTA: development and coordination of the migration policy implementation, development of the state labor migration policy and organization of labor migration;
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Legal and Consular Directorates, Migration Department): issue of visas and passports, work with emigrants from Armenia in host countries;
- MTA State Migration Service: coordination of the migration policy development, migration management, development and implementation of programs focused on refugees solutions;
- Frontier Service of the National Security Service of the Republic of Armenia: border control and management;
- Visa and Passport Department of Armenian Police: unregulated migration, issue of visas at the border, registration of foreigners in the territory of the country, issue of exit permissions to Armenian citizens;
- Presidential Administration: conferment of Armenian citizenship.

According to the authors of the 2008 special evaluation survey, the basic weaknesses of the current system of state migration regulation in Armenia are as follows:

“....- General trend weakness, limited possibilities for policy development and implementation;

Imperfect legal framework and absence of clear entry and stay criteria;

Absence of a single state administration body responsible for coordination of migration management, absence of a clear partition of responsibilities between different agencies dealing with migration issues;

Absence of interrelated system of migration data collection and analysis, weak system of data sharing between bodies dealing with migration”.

44 See 7.11., p. 9.
References

1. Laws
   1.2. Law of the Republic of Armenia On Refugees (03.03.1999).

2. Official documents and publications
   2.3. Concept of the State Regulation of Migration of Population of the Republic of Armenia (25.06.2004).

3. Comprehensive surveys


4. Local surveys


4.6. Dataset of survey conducted in 1500 households within Asian Development Bank’s projects on “Transfers from Migrants” and “Transfers-financial sector”.

4.7. Data from the Survey on Money Transfers Received From Abroad by the Households in Armenia in 2005 (2000 respondents) funded by the CBA.

5. Non-migration surveys


5.3. Household Survey (1200) conducted by the Center for Population Dynamics (CePoD) of Arizona State University jointly with CRRC-Armenia in May 2007 within Gegharqouniq Marz within the project “Labor Migration and Risks in Rural Armenia” (http://www.asu.edu/clas/ssfd/cepod/migration_armenia/index.html);

5.5. Poverty assessment using participatory method in Tavush and Gegarukin marzes in Armenia. Program of territorial development of Armenia, DFID, EDI MFE RA, Yerevan, 2004

6. **Pilot migration surveys**


6.3. Community-based labour-migration data collection surveys implemented by the Migration and Return Resource Centres established by the Eurasia Partnership Foundation (see at: http://www.epfound.am/index.php?article_id=46&clang=0);

7. **Surveys and analytical publications**


After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the disruption of integrated
economic and political system, natural and artificial obstacles arisen in
the process of the formation of new independent states, ethno political
conflicts incited by outside powers, civil war, economic collapse and
precipitous drop of living standards, liberalization of people’s movement
between states incurred the unprecedented increase of population emi-
gration potential and created big migration waves of population from
Georgia. It should be noted that the volume of gross domestic product
in 1991–1995 decreased 4 times, in the conditions of hyperinflation the
standard of living fell drastically and it made up 42.2% with respect to
subsistence minimum. That time the system of social protection was
completely disrupted. “With a monthly pension it was possible to buy
9 kg of bread, or 3 kg of macaroni, or 1 kg of beef, or 1 kg of cheese.” [1].

The huge imbalance between demand and supply in the labour market
and devaluation of labour force compelled a significant part of population
to find a way out in emigration. The scales of permanent emigration took
the unprecedented form. In between the 1989-2002 population censuses
more than one million migrants (20% of population) moved abroad per-
manently where the crisis was developed much less (post-Soviet coun-
tries), or it didn’t take place there at all.

In the noted period 64% of emigrants moved from Georgia to Russia;
16.2% – to Greece; 5.6% – to western European countries; 1.7% – to the
US and Canada. Most of emigrants (71%) were not ethnically Georgian
population that appreciably changed the ethno-demographic balance in
Georgia which had been formed for a long period of time (table 1).

In the noted period, basically due to population migration the num-
ber of Russian population in Georgia decreased 3.4 times, Armenians
– 1.6 times, Jews – 6.5 times, Greeks – 6 times, Ossetians – 2.4 times.

The most intensive emigration process of ethnic minorities took
place basically in the first half of the 1990s. This is apparent from the
researches conducted in the Institute of Demography and Sociology of
Georgia under our methodical supervision and which reflected the information obtained from 10 thousand registration data sheets on population movement in 1993 from the entire territory of Georgia. According to these data sheets in the negative balance of migration Russians made up 39.7%, Azerbaijanis – 14.7%, Armenians – 10%, Ossetians – 5%, Greeks – 6.3%, Ukrainians – 6.1%, Jews – 5.3%. The share of Georgians for that period was only 8.4%.[2] Then it increased gradually. In between the censuses period 329 thousand ethnic Georgians moved abroad for permanent residence, mostly to the Russian Federation. At the first stage biethnic families’ emigration was more intensive who had more relatives, friends and acquaintances abroad to rely on, and had not language barriers.

Labour emigration for a significant part of immigrants who moved from Georgia to other countries originally was of temporary nature then gradually it turned into stationary labour emigration.

Many researches confirm that intensive emigration from Georgia is determined mainly because of economic reasons. They definitely overshadowed such reasons for emigration of that time as political

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</table>

* in the whole territory of Georgia including Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region.
chaos, state disorder and helplessness in citizens protection, civil war, worsening of criminogenic situation, mass forced displacement of people and so on.

The intensity of permanent emigration is extremely reduced in recent years and it is largely determined by the circumstances when Georgia’s population, who go abroad to make a living or to study, acquire the status of citizenship of foreign countries, marry foreign citizens and so on.

In the post-Soviet period due to the above noted grave economic situation in Georgia there was generated and developed a large-scale labour emigration. On the basis of population censuses, household surveys, formulation of many sample surveys we can assume that the number of labour migrants accounted for 8-10% of Georgia’s population. This is conditioned by economic reasons and the main goal is financial assistance to family members and relatives remaining in Georgia[3].

Despite the fact that Georgian citizens frequently are in illegal situation, employed abroad in the sphere irrelevant to their professions and education level, labour and living conditions are abysmal, they are detached from their home country and families, and regardless of their skills degradation and social vulnerability they manage to send a part of their incomes to their family members and relatives living in Georgia and they provide them with subsistence minimum. The researches show that money is sent to home country by not only those Georgian citizens who went abroad temporarily but by those ones who moved to foreign countries for permanent residence. In recent years the volume of remittances received electronically in Georgia amounted to approximately 1 billion USD per year (table 2).

On the basis of investigations carried out by the World Bank it was found that in Georgia the volume of remittances sent electronically made up 60%[4] of the total amount of money sent by emigrants though a variety of means. Thus, presumably the aggregate amount of remittances in Georgia is 1.5 billion USD. This amount in 2010 was 12.9% of the GDP and exceeded direct foreign investments 1.8 times; it was equal to the indicator of export and so on. It basically provides
population with subsistence minimum. Its influence on social stabilization in the country is extremely great.

In spite of world economic crisis and tense political standoff between Russia and Georgia, more than half of remittances received electronically in Georgia is still from Russia. This can be explained by the fact that the largest Georgian diaspora lives in the Russian Federation. According to the conducted researches the share of Russia in labour emigrants streams in various periods was 40–50%; from other recipient countries it can be outlined Greece (14%), Germany (14%), US (13%). Emigration streams gradually become diversified. The number of Georgian labour migrants grows rapidly in Italy, Spain, Great Britain and in other countries. On the other hand it should be noted that in new migratory streams the number of emigrants declined sharply in the direction of Russia. This is caused by some circumstances.

The first main reason is the political standoff between Georgia and Russia, the severance of diplomatic ties, blockade of communications, strong growth ofigrantofobia in Russia, its development into ethno-

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<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
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<td>249,1</td>
<td>403,1</td>
<td>544,6</td>
<td>866,1</td>
<td>1002,1</td>
<td>841,6</td>
<td>939,7</td>
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<td>363,9</td>
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<td>15,7</td>
<td>16,3</td>
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</table>

Source: The National bank of Georgia
fobia and specifically into georgianofobia has taken the severe form since the 2008 Russian-Georgian War.

We should completely agree with those Russian public figures, scientists who consider migrantofobia as a threat to Russia’s national security.[5] It should also be said that migrantofobia is common more or less to other European countries, but among Russian political elite and a significant part of population, thanks to mass media, it is expressed stronger.[6] Naturally, in such situation the number of migratory streams in the direction of Russia is small.

The other circumstance that contributed to the reduction of migratory streams in the direction of Russia is the reinforcement of the Georgian diasporas position in western countries (Greece, Italy, Spain, Germany, England, France), increase of their influence, formation of compatriots associations and reinforcement of the basis of immigration. In the conditions of world crisis they not only maintained a significant part of labour emigrants (most of them are illegal emigrants) but also they managed to recruit new streams of migrants into the local labour markets.

It should also be noted, that Russian language lost its prestige in Georgia in parallel with the strained relations between Russia and Georgia, and Georgian youth started to learn English language on a mass scale. The government made a significant contribution to mastering English language and in recent period this process was given an intensive nature. This in turn significantly reduced the aspiration of youth toward the Russian labour market and largely facilitated the process for young Georgian labour emigrants to gain a foothold in the labour markets of developed countries. “Brain drain” became more intensive; a significant part of graduates who got education abroad remained in the labour market of Europe and the US.

Naturally there is a question: how favourable is the normalization of interstate labour ties and Georgians labour emigration for Russia?

For a long time there had been a heated debate over permanent immigration necessary for Russia (Z. Zaonchkovskaya, L. Ribakovsky, O. Vorobiova, O. Gontmaher, A. Vishnevsky, S. Gradirovsky, V. Elizarov, I. V. Mukomel, I. Ivahniuk and others). Against a background of
demographic depression for Russia’s vital interests it becomes necessary to recruit hundreds of thousands of immigrants annually to meet the demand of Russia’s labour markets. “If new Kalita appears in Russia, he will gather people and not territories.”[7] In essence the same vision is laid out in the conclusion of the fundamental research published under the editorship of S. Gradirovsky: “A Change of Geostrategic Paradigm – from gathering of lands to gathering of people.[8]” As Z. Zainchkovskaya considers immigration has no alternative in Russia.[9] Only one thing is problematic, from where and what intensity is appropriate for recruiting immigrants. It is uniquely justified that first of all the most acceptable way out is repatriation of Russians and so called Russian-speaking population from the former Soviet Union countries and their settlement in Russia, but since it is not sufficient, immigration of native population from the post-Soviet countries is expedient as well.

On the other hand, through the researches it is found that “South Caucasian peoples are ethno-culturally different from the peoples of Russia. Georgians most easily become assimilated in Russia, they are more educated as compared with other people of South Caucasus.”[10] It should also be taken into account Russians and Georgians’ common religious faith, mental closeness that had been formed for a long time of co-residence. Georgians don’t aspire to create compact settlements and their own sections in Russia. Therefore, the fear that the Georgia diaspora will, at some point, have a negative influence on Russia’s ethnopolitical situation is completely groundless in the opinion of scientists and politicians.

On the other hand there is a question: to what extent do Georgian citizens need labour emigration in Russia?

By our assumption, which is based on the formulation of many sample surveys, at present in Russia there are 160–200 thousand labour emigrants. Although a part of them is employed in difficult jobs with discriminative reimbursement and in bad labour conditions, we have indicated above the importance of remittances for their family members remaining in Georgia. It should also be noted that a part of them got involved in business and achieved some success in it. The Georgian
diaspora exhibited great abilities to adapt to new market conditions and to be successful entrepreneurs that made the attitude of local authorities and population loyal to them in many places against a general background of migrantofobia. Through one of our researches whose goal was to study labour emigration of internally displaced persons in Georgia (more than 400 interviews) it was found that 14.4% of those who were outside of the home country managed to go into business of different scales and the majority of them were employed in Russia.[11] In the conditions of normalization of political relations between Georgia and Russia and proceeding from globalization tendencies, temporary legal employment of Georgia’s citizens will be favourable for both countries in all respects.

As the researches show, at present the potential of labour emigration in Georgia is rather high. Low incomes compared with immigration countries, low standards of living and mass unemployment still don’t provide opportunities for compatriots’ intensive return to their home country. Quite the opposite, the persons who emigrated abroad actively attract their family members and relatives to them. Youth has a strong disposition towards emigration. The measures taken and realized by the readmission are good but its influence is too weak. Even though Georgia’s economy has revived, still there are not created favourable conditions for return of emigrants to their home country and their provision with high-income jobs. Hence the government seeks to achieve an agreement with the governments of developed countries on introduction and legalization of civilized forms of labour emigration.

At present the whole attention of Georgian public is directed to intensive emigration processes. Due to the small scales of immigration streams nobody still can predetermine those consequences that can emerge in the future from the standpoint of demographic security. The point is that Georgia has a goal and ability in view of its high labour potential to catch up to the neighbour countries by living standards which have high demographic potential (Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan and others). This will significantly increase immigration streams from these countries. The absence of immigration policy will exacerbate the tense conflict situation even more. Thus, it becomes necessary to in-
tensify scientific studies of migration processes, to develop the concept of migration processes management. It will create a solid base for pursuing a correct migration policy in Georgia.

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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN: NATIONAL PROBLEMS AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES

Elena Sadovskaya

1. Main trends in migration processes in Kazakhstan within the period of sovereignty and migration after-effects

1.1 Main trends of migrations in Kazakhstan

In spite of a very short historical period which has passed since the day of the USSR disintegration the Republic of Kazakhstan (the RK) already has its own history of migration processes – large-scale and dynamic, spontaneous and controlled ones. At present in Kazakhstan there are all major types of migration movements: international and home, constant and temporary, legal and illegal, voluntary and forced, etc. The most widely used type of migration is an international labour migration.

In 1990s there was a mass forced migration the climax of which fell on 1994 when 481,000 people moved out of the Republic. The strongest influence on emigration sentiments of Kazakhstan population within the first years of sovereignty had been exerted by an economic crisis and decline in living standards as well as the nation building policy which was discriminative with regard to ethnic minorities. First of all the discriminative relation had been manifested within the process of natural resources redistribution and privatization, limited access to higher education (governmental grants and credits giving the right for free education), possibilities of professional and career growth and a limited access to the state management.

At the end of the 1990s, the migration flow intensity decreased and in 1999–2003 the migration negative balance stabilized and since 2004 one could see a positive migration balance. In 2010 as many as 41,883 people came to the Republic and 26,675 people left it, so the migration balance amounted to 15,208 people\(^{45}\). Migration processes of the 2000s witness a

considerable decrease in foreign migration turnover (8-fold one compared to 1994) and of migration movement stabilization in the RK.

Apart from the labour migration within the first decade of the 21st century there had not been any cardinal changes in migration processes, but their dynamics changed apparently. Within the 2000–2010s in the RK the Slavic population migration survived. Migration of ethnic Germans and other previously deported peoples noticeably decreased. The Germans’ migration decreased both due to exhausted migration potential and owing to tightening the repatriation policy in the Federal Republic of Germany. Though basically the migration potential of the Slavs and the Germans was exhausted the migration would continue within the nearest decade due to social and economic reasons. The main countries to emigrate to were Russia, Ukraine and other countries outside the CIS: Germany, Israel, Canada and the USA.

Emigration for a permanent residence in Kazakhstan in the 2000s was characterized with an increased mono ethnicity contrary to the ethnic variety of the 1980–1990s. The main contingent (up to 70–80%) were the Kazakhs (the Oralmans), who were coming within the framework of the repatriation governmental policy. The Kazakh repatriation has been the main trend in the RK migration policy since 1991. The countries of the repatriate escapement were Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Mongolia and China.

The key trend change of the first decade of the 21st century compared to the last decade of the 20th century lies in the fact that Kazakhstan, the country of a forced emigration turned to be Kazakhstan the country of a labour emigration. Though the emigration with the purpose of earning money also took place in the 1990s, the international labour migrations of the first and second decades were essentially different. In the 1990s it was the Kazakhstan population\textsuperscript{46} i which was involved in the labour migrations, both inside and outside the RK and in the 2000s Kazakhstan turned out to be the country which was receiving labour migrators.

\textsuperscript{46} According to the representative sociological research 15.8% of the total number of polled people in municipal homes had been leaving to earn money inside and outside the RK. Source: Sadovskaya E. Labour migrations of Kazakhstan citizens within the period of sovereignty // Labour in Kazakhstan. 2007. No.5. Pages 17-25.
The reason of such changes lies in the fact that in the 2000s Kazakhstan (same as Russia) got through the period of favourable economic conditions (high world prices of hydrocarbons) and against the background of macroeconomic stabilization it attracted considerable investments especially in mining industry and electric power industry, construction, transport and communications. It contributed to the development of these and accompanying branches of industry, small and medium businesses which improved the social and economic situation and increased the RK population earnings. Spontaneous labour migration started mainly in poorer neighboring republics of Central Asia.

In the 2000s the region experienced formation of a migration sub-system – a part and an element of a post-soviet migration system and of global movements where Kazakhstan was a receiving country while Kirgizstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were the sending countries. According to the author’s evaluation the uncontrolled labour migration in Kazakhstan in 2005-2007 amounted to as many as 500–700 thousand to 1 million people yearly which equals to 5–10% of the RK economically active population. Besides the uncontrolled labour migration this period faced the official attraction of foreign labour (FL) and migration increase with the purpose of opening and maintaining businesses, so the trade migration continued. Money transfers from the RK amounted to about USD 3 billion in 2007 which equaled to about 3% of Kazakhstan GDP.

The recent years (2008-2011) have seen opening of a new period in migration processes in Kazakhstan which take place under global financial and economic recession conditions. Labour migration decreased but these lowering dynamics shall depend upon duration and depth of the recession. Kazakhstan is also a transit country (in particular for illegal transit migration) and the country which sends migrants but these trends are not dominating.

1.2. Positive and negative consequences of migration to the RK

One of the migration consequences is the change of Kazakhstan population ethnic structure. It changes not only due to exit of a large number of Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians but also due to the
depopulation which is typical for the Slavic peoples as well as thanks to a higher natural growth of the Kazakh population and some other Turk groups and to the arranged Kazakh repatriation to the RK. The ethnic structure becomes progressively uniform: within the intercensal period of 1989 till 2009 (total RK population in 2009 equalled to 16.2 Million people) the Kazakh share increased from 39.7% to 63.1% and the share of the Russians decreased from 37.8% down to 23.7%, of the Ukrainians from 37.8% to 23.7% correspondingly.

After-effects of the massive emigration of the 1990s affected the labour market in Kazakhstan. Within the period of 1992–2006 as many as 3.1 Million people left the Republic (16.5 Million people out of the total population), and about 2.0 Million people left for good. Among the population which had left the country in the 1990s as many as 63% – 65% belonged to the groups of active working age; about 45% of the population (over 15 years old) had higher and secondary vocational education. Together with the birth rate decline and the death rate increase the emigration led to the fact that by 2002 the total Kazakhstan population decreased by 10%.

A large-scale exit of people of active working age affected the labour market, its structure and qualitative composition. The numerical strength of economically active population had decreased within the period of 1991 till 2004 and had been compensated up to the former level by 2005 only. From 2000 till 2007 with the annual GDP growth of 9% - 10% the number of economically active population increased by 13.5% and the population economic activity level increased only by 4.4% compared to the labour market indicators of 1991. Thus the labour emigration was a reaction to the shortage and need in labour which formed up at the moment at Kazakhstan labour market.

On account of the repatriate migration (the Oralmans) the total population and the share of economically active population in the RK slightly increased. But due to the fact that the educational level and proficiency of repatriates who came to stay under quotas was lower than those ones of the RK native population especially of those repa-

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triates who were coming from Mongolia and China (among them dominates secondary and primary education and there is no any vocational training), qualitative description of the human population and its economically active population degenerated.

Negative migration after-effects are primarily connected with a large-scale loss of human capital in Kazakhstan. Due to the “brain drain” the Republic suffers a want of qualified personnel in the sphere of education, health, management, industry, agriculture and other economy sectors. In Kazakhstan there is a want of experts and workers to implement the Program of a boosted industrial and innovative development and a strategic orientation of the RK economic development. A want of highly qualified personnel which is required to develop innovative and technological branches of industry is the most serious challenge to Kazakhstan. This factor reduces the possibilities of reaching a competitive power with other countries of the world and due to this the change of Kazakhstan’s place in the world labour specialization (exclusive of the “traditional” oil-producing specialization) is still highly doubtful.

Special attention should be paid to the labour migration which has numerous positive after-effects (and negative as well which are more noticeable in a medium-term perspective) to macro- and micro-levels both in a country of exit and in an accepting country. On account of the limited scope of the article this matter has not been studied in detail. Let’s just refer to the fact that same as in Russia the labour emigration in Kazakhstan became a structural economy factor because both the legally engaged employees and the uncontrollable labour migrators are engaged nearly in all economy sectors. Labour immigrants meet the RK labour markets demands in work force, firstly in construction, industry, service trades and agriculture. According to the author the migrators’ (both the legally engaged and the uncontrollable ones’) contribution to the economy in 2006–2007 amounted to at least 10–12% of the RK GDP.

Highly qualified experts are engaged in technologically intensive production sections, in transnational company management. Foreign companies create additional jobs and restrain local population for fur-
ther substitution of foreign work force, invest in social programs and local projects.

2. International legal and national legislative base for international migration control and its role in the migration effectivization in the RK

2.1 International legal control base

The International legal base for controlling the RK migration processes comprises basic international conventions and agreements; interstate agreements within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), the Customs Union (CU) and other interstate associations; other multilateral and bilateral agreements.

The International agreements control temporary migration, visa regime, consular matters, entry regulations and sojourn of foreign citizens; migration to a permanent residence, naturalization and family reunification; labour migration (work force intake to the RK, work force “export” from the RK, protection of migrators’ rights); protection of refugees and those who seek refuge; illegal migration prevention. Agreements on boundary cooperation between states and the simplified border crossing regime may be referred to the migration-related spheres.

2.2. National legal basis

The basis for legal control of migration issues is the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan which was adopted on August 30, 1995 with amendments and addenda thereto introduced within the following years. The Constitution fixed the following integral human rights and liberties: the right of free migration within the Kazakhstan territory and of a free choice of a place of residence unless otherwise specified by the Law; the right of exiting the Republic and the right of its citizens’ unimpeded return to the Republic of Kazakhstan (Section 2, Article 21).

The Constitution also secures the fact that foreign citizens and stateless persons enjoy in the Republic the rights and liberties and bear the
responsibilities stipulated for its citizens unless otherwise specified in
the Constitution, legislation and international agreements (Section 4,
Article 12).

Within the past years about 250 normative and legal acts governing
relations in migratory and related spheres have been passed in Ka-
zakhstan. The main legal instrument is the RK Law “On population
migration”. First of all the Law regulates the ethnic Kazakh repatriation
principles but the Law barely tends the regulation of relations in the
sphere of international labour and illegal migration. After its passing
in December 1997 the Law suffered numerous amendments which
called for the development of a new Draft Law on the population mi-
gration in 2009-2011.

The main thing in the Law are the goals, tasks and principles
governing public relations in one or another sphere and compliance of
the Law articles by international standards and home legislation pro-
visions. And of course also important are definitions of major notions
with reference to which differences arise quite often. The present Law
on migration entails criticism regarding key items thereof.

As for the migration policy goals an accurate wording of it is
missing. A vague wording of the goals is given in the RK Migration
Concept for 2007-2015 which reads as follows: “The Republic of
Kazakhstan migration policy consists of decreasing negative after-
effects of migration processes within the framework of the country’s
national identity and security protection and development by means of
a maximum reduction of illegal migration and formation of a selective
migration”. In other words Kazakhstan shall continue the ethnic
Kazakh repatriation policy and in the increase of the Kazakhs share in
the total population it sees the guarantee of “protecting … the national
identity and security” of the RK.

Can the ethnic migration be declared the main direction of the mi-
gregation policy in the time of economy globalization and migration flow
trans-nationalization? Does it meet Kazakhstan needs of the 21st cen-
tury? Such goals solve home challenges of a national state construction
but they do not meet the present day global and regional challenges in-
cluding the ones in the sphere of the international migration control –
labour, illegal and transit ones. Based on the vague wording of the goals, precisely its absence, the migration policy goals stated in the Draft Law also appear unsystematized; among them such an important goal as the legislation development and improvement is missing.

The list of the major notions stated in the Law Draft is a random set of definitions. Some of them do not meet international standards and other important notions are missing in the glossary, e.g. the working migratory labour and social rights definitions. That is why it seems necessary to normalize the listing sequence of the major notions in an alphabetical order and complement them with important notions in the sphere of labour migration and protection of working migrators’ rights. And these are only few remarks regarding the project which needs important reworking.48

We are not pitching in detail on the international legal and national legislative base analysis because this is a matter of a special and extensive analysis. It is important for us to understand major goals and key directions of migration process control in the RK. It should be noted that in spite of a rather good many concluded international agreements the RK interstate cooperation level and its national legislation in the sphere of migration process control and in the related spheres do not meet the present time requirements so far. A new momentum should be given to normative and legislative base development and international cooperation and what is most important – to implementation of passed laws and signed agreements.

2.3. Migration efficiency promotion mechanisms

As stated above one of the most important goals of demographic and migration policy in the RK is the population growth and increase of the ethnic Kazakhs share in the general population. To implement these goals the “On the population migration” Law governs ethnic

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Kazakhs repatriation principles: their migration, arrangement and social protection. The Kazakh emigration quota mechanism is used to implement this policy and every year the State allocates considerable financial assets for these purposes. In compliance with the Law the quota is approved by the Head of the State on the annual basis.

The Kazakh repatriation is covered with multiple benefits and preferences: the Oralmans are exempted from paying customs dues when crossing the border, they are given credits to purchase homes or apartments, their children are given free school education and students are allotted a 2% quota for an academic institution education. The Government also opens adaptation and integration centers where the repatriates are taught Kazakh language (in Cyrillic graphics) and Russian, get vocational knowledge and skills at special courses and then promotes their employment. Such governmental measures against the background of a relatively trouble-free economic situation make Kazakhstan a very attractive country for ethnic Kazakhs from poorer countries which actually led to the threefold ethnic emigration increase in the 2000s compared to the recessionary 1990s.

At the same time the ethnic nature of the migration policy in a multiethnic nation creates different levels of a state civil responsibility to other immigrant categories such as refugees seeking political asylum and labour migrators whose rights are poorly protected by legislation. Granting benefits and preferences to repatriates and being de-facto discriminatory with regard to other citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan (both to Kazakhs themselves and to ethnic minorities) the ethnic migration contradicts not only the legislation but also some Articles of the RK Constitution.

As was noted before the major migration trend in the RK is a labour migration. To settle the economic development problems including the ones in new and technologically important branches, Kazakhstan has been drawing qualified foreign experts and workers. The foreground value of the labour migration control belongs to the home labour market protection. To protect the RK local markets they use the quotas mechanism (quantitative limitations) for foreign labour engagement. The foreign labour quotas have been set up by the government on a
yearly basis in terms of percentage (0.15%) of economically active population since 1993 (about 2 000 people). The quota started to grow fast after 2004 and in 2007 it amounted to as many as 50 000 people and in 2008 to more than 126 000 people. But the 2008 – 2009 recessions led to the necessity of axing the quotas which was promptly done within the framework of the RK Government antirecession measures by means of reducing the quotas down to 0.75% of economically active population for 2009 and 201049.

The quotas set by the Government do not always meet the Kazakhstan economy needs. Small-sized quotas and bureaucratic problems regarding their obtaining force employers to illegally use foreign labour thus violating legislation and migratory workers’ rights. Legislative measures (for example, tightening of punishment for illegal employment of foreign labour) and operative mechanisms (e.g. “Migrators” and “Illegal Aliens” operations which are performed by the RK local Ministry of Interior Affairs authorities in various regions of the Republic) are used to suppress the RK labour and migration legislation violation facts.

In order to fight illegal migration Kazakhstan realized an enforcement operation regarding legalization of illegal labour migrators. It was conducted due to a large-scale yearly inflow of labour migrants in the middle of the 2000s. The RK Law “On amnesty due to legalization of illegal labour migrators” was enacted on July 4, 2006. Though under the Law illegal migrators were subject to legalization, in fact the amnesty first of all concerned uncontrollable labour migrators. These were the CIS citizens who had illegally (without visas) come to Kazakhstan before May 31, 2006 and had not had any legally issued documents for labour activities. These migrators received from authorities in the RK Ministry of Interior Affairs special migration cards which gave them the right of work within 3 years. Legalized labour migrators and their employees were exempted from any administrative responsibilities.

In the course of the amnesty from August 1 till December 31, 2006 as many as 164.6 thousand labour migrators had been legalized, out of which 71.1% were from Uzbekistan, 14.5% were from Kirgizia, 6.5% were from Russia, 2.8% were from Tajikistan and 5.1% were from other CIS countries. The main part of the legalized labour migrators was employed at construction sites, service sector and agriculture.

Unfortunately the economic recessions of 2008–2009 in a sense “devaluated” the legalization results. Nevertheless in future Kazakhstan government authorities intend to carry out legalization actions on a regular basis. The RK Labour and Social Security Vice-Minister B. Nurymbetov reported as follows: “We stipulate that at least once in five years an action for legalizing labour migrators having an uncontrollable status shall be carried out in the country”\(^{50}\). In a new Draft Law on migration there is an article about carrying out regular amnesties in future. Thus the amnesty mechanism shall contribute to migration policy liberalization and to easing residency and labour conditions for low-skilled workers from Central Asian countries.

An important direction in preventing illegal migration is an institutional cooperation between Kazakhstan internal affairs authorities and law-enforcement authorities of border districts in Kirgizstan, Russia and Uzbekistan. With this purpose agreements on border cooperation between Kazakhstan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministries of Internal Affairs of the above countries had been signed. There have been fixed mechanisms of interrelation with such international organizations as the International Organization for Migration, the European Community Delegation, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Drug Enforcement Agency.

Thus it is obvious that Kazakhstan quite expeditiously reacts to situational home and foreign changes and for this purpose it uses legislative and institutional mechanisms (administration agency reforms, inter-agency cooperation, development of recruitment agencies for arranging legal labour migration and others). Nevertheless many internal

problems have accumulated in the international migration regulation sphere.

Many negative facts in the international migration regulations are connected with national legislation crudity, institutional base dullness and enforcement practice. According to legislator experts the existence of a large number of subordinate acts which govern migrators’ rights and obligations within the Republic of Kazakhstan as well as the contradiction of the subordinate acts to the Constitution, to other laws and to each other is the main problem of Kazakhstan migration legislation. In the labour migration sphere the insufficiency of legal mechanisms together with migrators’ and employers’ legal illiteracy leads to migration legislation violation, to migrators’ labour low efficiency and to Kazakhstan economy losses.

So far the Republic has not determined conceptual approaches and has not elaborated the policy which would adequately meet modern challenges. Still continues a gap between situational response within the state (in its interests) and the migration policy implementation in compliance with the international obligations undertaken by Kazakhstan after joining international conventions and other international instruments.

The most demonstrative example is the implementation of the UN Convention “On Refugee Status” of 1951 and of the Additional Protocol thereto of 1967 which related to refugee status and which was ratified by the Republic in December, 1998. In spite of the fact that in exit countries there was a threat to their lives, shortly after the ratification in February 1999 and many times within the 2000s the Republic of Kazakhstan had been deporting refugees seeking asylum to China and Uzbekistan.

Not always the Republic fulfills its obligations concerning labour migrators in compliance with international standards. In the RK legislation there are no fixed regulations ensuring the rights of labour migrators and their families – the right to safe working conditions, social welfare, participation in trade unions etc. The Republic of Kazakhstan is the only state which had made remarks when signing the Convention on a legal status of working migrators and their families of the CIS.
countries in Kishinev in November 2008 (ratified in December 2009). Exemptions (deletions) referred to the Convention items related to education and other social rights of working migrators and their children.

Temporary labour migrators are not given the rights which are enjoyed by foreign citizens residing in the Republic. That is why solving problems of legal employment, adaptation and integration to local communities, protection of labour migrators’ rights shall be one of important tasks for Kazakhstan within the nearest years and decades.

3. Perspectives of migration process development in the RK and migration ties with Russia

3.1. New migration trends

Economy globalization and liberalization of migration regime change the international migration vectors. At present many Kazakhstan citizens tend to leave for permanent residence or for jobs not only to Russia and other CIS countries but to Western and Eastern Europe, the USA and Canada. There appeared such new labour migration vectors as China and the Middle East countries. Today the educational emigration includes not only post-soviet republics but also Western Europe countries, the USA and China. In spite of the migration vectors diversification, in whole regional tendencies dominate in population movement directions in the Republic.

3.2. Migration ties with Russia

Russia and Kazakhstan are neighbouring countries and their common border makes 7 500 kilometers. The basis of an active migration exchange between the countries lies in historical, socio-economic and humanitarian ties between the RK and the RF. An additional migration factor lies in a similar socio-cultural space. Russian language is an integrating language of international communication and it contributes to mobility between the countries. Along the whole perimeter of Kazakhstan and Russian border an intensive border (frontier) migration takes place. The migration exchange is intensified at the expense of the largest Diasporas habitation – the Russian one in Kazakhstan and
the Kazakh one in Russia exactly in the bordering regions of both coun-
tries.

Migration to permanent residency from Kazakhstan to Russia has
noticeably decreased within the period of 2003–2004 after adopting in
July 2002 the RF restrictive Law on the statute of foreign citizens in
the Russian Federation. After a dramatic drop the emigration flow from
the RK has never reached the level of 2001–2002, to say nothing of
the 1990s. In 2007 as many as 40 258 people left Kazakhstan for
permanent residency in Russia and 10 211 people left Russia for
Kazakhstan; a negative migration balance (for the RK) amounted to
30 047 people51.

Within the latest years labour migration of Kazakhstan citizens to
Russia has increased. At the beginning of the period of migrators’ at-
traction to Russia in 1994 it amounted to 1007 people and by 2009 it
increased 11.1 times. In 2010 the number of Kazakhstan labour migra-
tors decreased down to 8267 people52. In spite of the growth of a num-
ber of work force from the RK it still amounts to less than 0.5% of the
total number of foreign work force in Russia (0.4% of the total foreign
work force in 2007). Workers’ migration from Russia to Kazakhstan is
even less: in 2006 it amounted to 99 people and in 2007 to 79 people
(according to Russian statistics).

In the sectoral structure of Kazakhstan laborers’ employment (legally
engaged) in the RF dominates civil engineering – 22%, processing and
mineral industries – 21% (of the total number of Kazakhstan migrators)
and also trade, transportation and communications industry, agriculture
and other kinds of economic activity (2007). Kazakhstan employees
work mainly in the Urals and Central Federal Districts as well in
Siberian, Volga, North-Western and other RF Districts53.

According to the research of the mojazarplata.kz web portal in 2011
recruiting agencies noted souring interest of well-to-do Russians in em-
ploying housemaids and nurses from Kazakhstan. This is specified by

52 Legal foreign labour migration monitoring // Edited by K. O. Romodanovsky. Collection
53 Ibidem.
the fact that most of Kazakhstan domestic workers have higher education and agree to live with an employer’s family and they have a perfect command of Russian. As a rule Kazakhstan workers’ salaries in Russia are 50% – 70% higher than in the RK. According to agents, domestic workers from regional centers go to Russia most frequently. Labour flow from Astana and Alma-Ata is minimal54.

In Kazakhstan (same as in Russia itself) the work force mobility is restrained with undeveloped social infrastructure (undeveloped system of lodging rentals, lack of kindergartens, absence of a legal system of obtainable social services) and with registration institution retention.

There is a dynamic growth of the educational migration, primarily to Russia and to Western Europe, the USA and China as well. The Author considers the educational migration as a prospective channel for irretrievable intellectual migration.

The most important interstate initiative in 2009 – 2011 was the creation of the Customs Union with the participation of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. On November 19, 2010 in Saint-Petersburg Heads of the Governments of the Customs Union member-states signed agreements in the sphere of labour migration: the “Agreement on a legal status of migrator-workers and their family members” and the “Agreement on cooperation in opposing illegal labour migration from third countries”, about cooperation of the CU member-states regarding ensuring migrator-workers’ rights in receiving countries and on national labour market protection from illegal labour migration.

The Byelorussian Parliament ratified the complete package of the agreements in December 2010. On June 2, 2011 the Kazakhstan Parliament passed the RK Law “On ratifying the Agreement on a legal status of migrator-workers and their family members” and the RK Law “On ratifying the Agreement on cooperation in opposing illegal labour migration from third countries”55.


The Agreements provide for harmonization of the national legislation by means of exchanging regulatory legal acts of the CU member-states regarding foreign citizens’ migration and labour activity matters; exchange of information and experience in illegal labour migration control, cadre training; opposing illegal labour migration; concluding readmission agreements. For Kazakhstan the conclusion of the Agreements is of a special importance inasmuch as the RK is the major transit passage for labour migrators from Tajikistan, Kirgizstan and Uzbekistan to Russia. Favourable conditions for staying in the RK are created for migrator-workers from Russia and Byelorussia. They will be exempted from the necessity to get registered at Migration police sub-divisions within 30 days from the moment of border crossing and from getting special permits to exercise labour activities.  

KYRGYZSTAN: DEVELOPMENT OF MIGRANTS’ REMITTANCES POTENTIAL

Gennady Kumskov

In the 2000s, globalization processes in Kyrgyzstan intensified, on the one hand, due to accelerated inflow of capital, technologies, goods and services, and, on the hand, increased international labour migration characterised by workforce export. External labour migration processes involve (according to different labour flow estimates) from 12% to 26% of economically active population, which, in turn, contributes to the development of the communications and international electronic money transfer systems. Transfer systems enable migrant household members receive transfers from migrants working abroad.

Analysis shows that in the Kyrgyz Republic labour migration and migrants’ remittances principally are a strategy of survival rather than development. The national government has not yet developed practical mechanisms of remittances use for national economic development. However, since labour movement flows tend to grow and money transfer amounts increase, their use not only for consumption but also for development becomes ever more crucial.

Currently, in Kyrgyzstan, migrants’ remittances are a serious poverty reduction factor, which plays a positive socio-political role and impacts the stability in the country generally. In the poorest households, money is spent to satisfy daily needs: purchase food, clothing, medicines, support parents or children. In case of larger savings, migrants’ remittances are used to purchase or repair a house or apartment, pay for education in an institution of higher education, college or school; however, the share of such investments is very small.

Since remittances account for a considerable portion of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP (29%, with about 30% or one and a half billion dollars expected by the end of 2011), the government should regulate labour flows developing a system of efficient use of migrants’ money transfers for the development of not only individual households but the national economy generally. One of the incentives for investment for the purposes of development might be the development of measures to change...
the correlation between the two principal types of remittances from labour migrants – official and unofficial, in favour of the former.

Specialised international and national remittance systems are generally used as official systems. In addition to official channels, there are “unofficial” ways of conveying money, such as direct bringing in by migrants, sending money with relatives and friends, conductors and couriers, bus drivers, merchants, etc., and use of informal channels. Simple money delivery operations are carried out by many unregistered mediators who usually provide services for lower remuneration than widely known systems of banks and organisations dealing with money transfers. According to UN data, proportion of “unofficial” transfers is more than 40% of the total migrants’ transfers worldwide.

Like in CIS generally, in the Kyrgyz Republic there are several types of transfer systems: specialised international money transfer systems, transfer systems of Russian banks and the national transfer system.

In addition to specialised international transfer systems, such services are provided by Russian money transfer systems, such as Anelik, Bystraya Pochta, Contact, Migom, PrivatMoney, Unistream and others. They were established on the basis of bank and non-bank credit institutions in the Russian Federation and principally specialise in transfers to CIS countries. For example, the Contact system established by Russlavbank currently carries out transfers through banks, post and local transfer systems to Russia, CIS countries, Baltic states and 78 countries worldwide.

In the process of transfer of individuals’ money, Russlavbank in fact studies the movement of money and people. In 2008, 12 mln. people were “surveyed” in this way, and this statistics is unique. According to the bank chairman N. Gusman, the results of migrants’ labour were several times as much as what they received: $7–8 per each sent US dollar were left as products or services. In 2008, $3.9 bln. were sent to CIS countries and about $2 bln. returned back.

The basic motivation is the difference in potential earnings, that is, economic reasons. For Kyrgyz nationals, Russia is 3.2 times more attractive than their native country, for Ukrainians – 1.5 times, for Azerbaijanis – 2.5 times, for Tajiks – 8.2 times and for Georgians – 11.1 times (see Table 1).
This is a magnetic force for migrants. The force driving them out of their native country is also of economic nature due to the existing ratio of able-bodied population to the number of available jobs. For example, in Armenia, redundancy is 48%, in Georgia and Tajikistan – 38%, in Moldova – 47%, in Ukraine – 36%, in Uzbekistan – 30%. Generally, in 2008, more than 20 mln. of able-bodied population in CIS countries were unable to find employment in their native country.

Difficulties that migrants face in the host country are largely due to their illegal status and, therefore, use of unofficial money transfer systems. Russlavbank’s statistics prove that labour migrants want and are prepared to regularisation. This can be seen in the light of money transfer perspective: legal services appeared to attract millions.

For Russia, this is a unique opportunity allowing it to use much-needed labour resources. For sending countries, including Kyrgyzstan, it is an opportunity to ensure the development of migrants’ remittances potential by arranging transfers not in cash but to migrants’ bank accounts and encouragement of contributions for medical insurance, education and mortgage. Investment in local business should be encouraged, business development credits issued and lower interest offered for implementation of social and economic projects.

As migrants’ remittances are private funds, they, naturally, should not be regarded as a substitution for official assistance for socio-

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average wages in native country</th>
<th>Average transfer from Russia</th>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>8,2</td>
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<td>Turkmenistan</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>200</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>591</td>
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economic development. Most migrant workers seek jobs abroad to support their families left in their native countries, and they would wish to send home as much of their earnings as possible even in the absence of any special tax benefits. Therefore, one of the main aspects in the remittances potential development should not be the maximum increase of their amounts but the establishment of more cost-effective, accessible, reliable and transparent transfer channels (services).

To this end, general information and actual data on money flows, specificity of their use, transfer mechanisms, analysis of preferences and existing proportions of savings and investments are necessary. Official migrants’ remittances statistics often underestimates these factors, though such data may be obtained based on the inclusion in the analysis of the flows unrelated to money transfers. In Kyrgyzstan, such data usually are not analysed due to lack of information on unofficial money transfer channels.

Currently, the two principal sources of migrants’ remittances for the Kyrgyz Republic are the Russian Federation and USA, followed by Kazakhstan and the UK that jointly accounted for less than 3% of the total number of transactions and less than 1% of the total transfers.

Detailed migrants’ remittances analysis shows that large ($10,000–$50,000) and very large (more than $50,000) transactions account for a rather small share of the total number of transactions, but their proportion in the total transfer amount is very high and continuously increasing. An increase in remittances is very likely to be due to the change in the principal way of income repatriation – from unofficial to official channels and expansion of Kyrgyz shuttle trade.

In methods of assessment of migrants’ remittances amounts coming into the country from labour migrants, assessment of labour migration, i.e., the number of Kyrgyz citizens working abroad, is of primary importance. Currently, there exist several methods of assessment. Thus, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), based on the data provided by relevant embassies, estimates the number of labour migrants in Russia at 300,000–500,000, in Kazakhstan – 50,000. In some Kyrgyz media the number of labour migrants is estimated at about 500,000–600,000. The research of the Institute of Economic Policy
“Bishkek Consensus” (IEP) has taken as a basis the minimum IOM data and added 50,000 labour migrants outside CIS, i.e., the total number was 400,000 labour migrants.

However, the 2009 population census data evidence that their number is limited to 267,000. This figure is proved by the estimates of the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Migration, which show that in 2009, 250,000–300,000 Kyrgyz citizens worked abroad depending on a season.

Differences in figures may be due to the fact that currently major studies on labour migrants and effect of their money transfers on the economy are unavailable and reliable sources on the number of Kyrgyz labour migrants abroad and the system of remittances accounting are lacking.

To date, a few studies on migrants’ remittances to the Kyrgyz Republic have been known. One of them was conducted by the Institute of Economic Policy, the other by the Ministry of Finance. The Report of the Asian Development Bank on Remittances of International Migrants and Poverty in the Kyrgyz Republic is of great practical interest.

The first study relies on the official data of the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic on workers’ remittances. The main conclusion of the study is that remittances play a key role in the socio-economic development of the Kyrgyz Republic accelerating economic growth through promotion of consumption and poverty reduction. To assess the role and scope of remittances in the Kyrgyz economy, the Institute of Economic Policy surveyed 1,177 respondents from among labour migrants and their family members. According to the survey results, two thirds (67%) of respondents go to the Russian Federation and 19% go to Kazakhstan. Remittances largely come in cash and only 34% of respondents send money via the banking system. Half of transfers reportedly are spent to satisfy daily needs, 10% are used as investments and the remaining part is spent for healthcare, education, durable goods, etc. Average remittance amount was estimated at $1,419 per migrant per year.

The authors of the second study estimated the money transfer amount using a method close to the approach used by the Institute of
Economic Policy, the only difference being that they assumed that the share of the money coming into the country via the banking system had increased to 44%. To prove that figure, the authors compared the data on population income of the National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic with the retail and paid services turnover. Excess of consumption expenditures over cash income was close to remittance estimates calculated by the authors.

Surveys conducted under the ADB project make it possible to analyse the factors affecting migrant’s remittance flows. For these purposes, this phenomenon is analysed from the point of view of individuals and households – senders and recipients of such remittances.

The first such survey was a representative survey of 3,997 households in all regions of the Kyrgyz Republic presenting data on household characteristics, welfare, migration and remittances.

The second data source was the survey of migrants’ remittances recipients conducted in some Kyrgyz banks in Bishkek and Osh. Generally, the results of the two surveys are concordant.

The household survey data show that most migrants lived in rural areas. An overall majority has complete secondary or higher education; 82.5% of migrants go to the Russian Federation, 12% to Kazakhstan and only 5.5% go to other countries. Most migrants stay abroad during a short period of time: on average, 1.2 years. The two main sectors of employment of Kyrgyz migrants are construction (45%) and trade (30.4%). Migrants from Bishkek work in more sectors, with less such migrants working in construction.

Data show that 16% of households in the Kyrgyz Republic receive money transfers; in Bishkek, their share is lower (11.2%). Cash remittances account for 95% of the total number of transfers, 5% are goods transfers. An average cash remittance size per receiving household is $1,380 per year – from $1,255 in rural areas to $1,865 in Bishkek.

According to the household survey data, more than 80% of all cash transfers come from the Russian Federation, a little more than 10% from Kazakhstan and the remaining 10% from other countries. The share of remittances from the USA is very small, though this source of cash transfers, the second largest in the NBKR database, may signal
that a small group of persons receiving cash remittances from that
country (mostly Bishkek residents with a higher education level and
income much higher than the average level) was not adequately cov-
ered by the household survey. The household survey data show geo-
graphic distribution of cash remittance recipients; about three quarters
of all cash transfers are sent to southern regions: Osh, Osh, Zhalalabat
and Batken regions.

Surveyed households reported much less cash transfer amounts than
those in the NBKR database (even adjusted for possible cash transfer
consolidation by remitters). In our opinion, it can be regarded as addi-
tional evidence that most money coming into the country through large
transactions via MTO, are not cash transfers of workers but, rather,
cash flows related to trade and other businesses.

The survey data show that most migrants (78.5%) use for money
transfer bank accounts and/or MTO, i.e., official channels, and that
most remittances (78.2%) enter the country through this channel. The
second important channel is direct delivery of money by migrants. This
channel is used by 25.6% of all households receiving remittances;
17.2% of all cash transfers come in this way. The role of mediators is
rather insignificant, with only 8.2% of all households using this chan-
nel; individual mediators bring in just 4.3% of all cash remittances.

According to data of both surveys, in the absolute majority of
households the remitter decides on what type of cash transfer system
to use and informs recipients about respective remittances. Most re-
pondents are informed about the remittance within one day. Only 36%
of respondents can receive their money immediately upon receipt of
the notification. Usually, the remaining 64% have to wait for several
hours. Moreover, 88% of respondents did not mention commission
payment to the company dealing with cash transfers upon money re-
cipt. Three quarters of recipients receive remittances in US Dollars.
In some cases people receive soms and roubles. It should be noted that
much more people prefer to receive remittances in the national cur-
rency.

Data on the duration of receipt of remittances by households show
that more than half of recipients reportedly had been receiving remit-
tances for more than one year; the proportion of households receiving remittances for more than 5 years is about 10%.

The household survey demonstrates that more than half (59.9% in the household survey) of all households receiving remittances reported that they had some savings, while the proportion of those who do not receive remittances and have savings is only 37.3%. Most households receiving remittances save money in cash (in the national or foreign currency), and only 1% of respondents save money on bank deposits.

According to the household survey data, there seems to be no significant differences between households that receive remittances and those that do not receive them in terms of using financial services. Less than 13% of households borrow money from any sources, only 1.7% lend money and less than 1% have a bank account or bank card. Usually, money is borrowed from relatives and/or friends (55%), microfinancial organisations and credit unions (22%) and banks (17%).

It follows from the above analysis that people, especially poor rural population, still have inadequate access to financial services. On the other hand, both financial institutions and their potential clients see the use of financial services as a kind of superfluity intended for people with higher income and education levels or venturesome people and/or those who do not fear transparency. This view has historical roots. However, the situation in the financial sector and living standards have been gradually improving. In our opinion, it is time for financial institutions to invest in trust and confidence building and teaching people to use financial services.

Therefore, currently, Kyrgyzstan is facing two challenges. First, rather weak financial systems and intensive labour migrations suggest that a considerable number of remittances does not come through official channels. Data statistics and, accordingly, unofficial flows estimates are unavailable.

Secondly, poor data quality and improper collection or accounting of payments unrelated to cash transfers distort the analysis of available data.

In this respect, in our opinion, the situation may be improved through:
• introduction of a centralised data collection and reporting mechanism for banks and money transfer organisations, so that cash remittance flows could be recorded and evaluated;
• surveys of migrant households to identify the types of services used to transfer money, efficiency of their use and their impact on the improvement of living conditions;
• information sharing among money transfer companies, banks and microfinancial institutions, on the one part, and government institutions that determine the national migration policy, on the other part.

Reduced cost of cash transfer services and improved labour migrants’ access to most cost-effective, rapid and safe services would not only make life easier for migrants, but also potentially increase the amounts of transferred and received means.

In our opinion, such initiatives would have a positive effect on cash transfer flows increasing their flow through official channels. Since migrants’ cash remittances are private transactions, organisational measures on the part of government and financial institutions concerned should largely be of incentive nature.

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TAJIK MIGRATION: 
HISTORICAL LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Rahmon Ulmasov

Abstract

On the scale, brutality, human and material losses of the twentieth century is unparalleled in the long history of the Tajik people. In the irretrievable loss of population does not include many taken prisoner and never returned from captivity during the Second World War, years of repression during the first and second civil war, the daily loss in time of peace in a foreign land.

During Soviet times there was an opinion that the Tajiks are difficult to climb, they do not leave, they are chained to their native land, young people their parents, and parents continue the tradition of generations. In the 1970 - 1980. send youth to the All-Union Komsomol construction projects were daunting task. Titular nation in a rare exception traveled to work outside the country, and about women in general were not discussed. And it was under a real historical basis.

The Tajik people in the twentieth century has experienced three stages of migration, emigration and remigration. If you count the number of refugees, migrants, political refugees, internally displaced, repressed, perished during the Great Patriotic War, the wounded and maimed, a large number died in the senseless civil war – all this experience and be able to withstand not every state, every nation will be able to exist as a nation. On average in the last century every 5–10 years of the Tajik people had their own destiny. Time and history have scattered Tajiks around the world. Tajiks now living in different parts of the world: Asia, Africa, Europe and America. According to Professor Mansour Babahanova «the number of Tajiks living in other states, more than the number of Tajiks of Tajikistan about seven times» (Babakhanov 2005:5). It’s safe to say that the twentieth century will go down in history of the Tajik people age forced migration. This is a topic for a separate study. For such a small nation to survive and to survive it was very difficult, and not every nation can come out of this difficult situation
with dignity. Each of these stages has left an imprint in the life of every Tajik family.

The first stage:

After the October Revolution of 1917, during the struggle with Basmachis «serious violations that led to mass emigration from the republic» (At the root of history, 2011: 19). «Together with the propertied elements went against unwarranted prosecution poor and middle, creating an alarming situation in the country, many villages and border areas so depopulated that they had less than 5% of the population.» At the same time Basmachis robbed his people, for example, «only in 1924–1925’s. basmachi of force and threat to the people gathered for a family of Amir, who lives at that time in Afghanistan, 3 million gold money» (Fanyan, 1940: 18). The civil war after the October Revolution took the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. Only the eastern Bukhara as a result of hostilities, «died 4418 people and injured 3835 people and 2409 houses destroyed and burned. Of the 36 villages in Kurgan-Tyube area, only 5 villages and farms of 3500 only 450, or 13% were» (Abdulhai, 2009: 30-31). The reasons for emigration Tajiks this period are directly related to the activities of the new Soviet State (Babakhanov 2005: 111). Professor Mansoor Babakhanov, believes that the number of forced migrants are several times higher than official figures. In 1936, the number of refugees in Afghanistan reached 120 thousand families – 600 thousand (Abdullaev, 2009). In all likelihood, these figures are approximate. Statistical data of the period can not say perfect. Unfortunately, historians mostly studied historical documents relating to Afghanistan. While we do not possess full information of forced migration of Tajiks in Pakistan, China, India, Turkey, Iran and European countries.

Here are some details from the report of the Central Commission of Tatarstan to help emigrant, Litvinenko and samosdavshimsya Basmachi for the period from September to August 1926 returned to his native Tajikistan red, returnees expect fraternal aid, at least a partial restoration of their livelihoods. «Dekhans returns, and in the near future are expected to return up to 40 thousand farmer families on their land,
of which at least 25% of the totally destitute, homeless and products» (At the root of history, 2011: 145).

From the Report of the first Constituent Congress of Soviets, President of the Revolutionary Committee of the Tajik Autonomous Republic Nusratullah Makhsum December 2, 1926. «Reducing the size of our farms, due to the emigration of a few undermine our economic situation and reduce the possibility of recovery of our economy» (Ibid: 104). «Come returnees will be given land, but not one that fostered another, and in another place which he chooses, he will be given proper assistance in the restoration and strengthening of its new economy.»  In 1927, despite the harsh Afghan government measures (confiscation of property who wish to return to their homeland and the like), in Tajikistan and 60 000 returned emigrants. Further deepening the activities of the Soviet Government of Tajikistan will certainly facilitate the return of the vast number of Tajiks (above 250 000) emigrants who fled from Tajikistan to Afghanistan during the civil fronts in 1923–24 and 1925. (At the root of history, 2011: 131).

For a short historical period, particularly before World War II (1941), the Tajik people survived the most difficult stage of forced migration. Fear of «red Bolshevism» forced to leave their homeland and repression of the 1930s, when the flower of the nation was destroyed. Many fled the country, but a significant proportion of the population was deported to Siberia.

Thus, we can draw the following conclusions. If in the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, a population of 747,222 people. About every third person was forced migrants. Before the Great Patriotic War, although it is a short historical period, the situation has stabilized. A large number of Afghan refugees have returned, they began to build a new life. However, the 1418 days of the Great Patriotic War, made adjustments in the social and political life. Tajiks, like all peoples of the Soviet Union, have contributed to the defeat of fascism. Were called to the front of 260 thousand people, hundreds of thousands working in industrial enterprises of the Urals. In Tajikistan, was evacuated for more than 80 thousand people from the frontline of the republics, cities, scientists, cultural workers and artists. The Tajiks were divided his last bread with
evacuated citizens. The working people of the republic have a defense fund of more than 75 thousand rubles, and passed the 40 570 tons of cereals, the Foundation made the construction of weapons 125 865 rubles were built tank column ‘collective farmer in Tajikistan, «Squadron» «Soviet Tajikistan», «Tajikistan Komsomolets», etc. (Sattorov, 2005: 40). Over 70 thousand messengers Tajikistan laid down their lives on the altar of the fatherland for a happy life on earth. More than 60 thousand soldiers from Tajikistan were awarded orders and medals, 54 of them were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, 15 soldiers became full holders of the Order of Glory. Thus, the image of World War II for the people of Tajikistan became virtually the most colossal misfortune in its history. Casualties and economic losses, the reorientation of industry, the destruction and chaos, the migration process – to list all the negative consequences can be very long. Many different and sometimes contradictory enough information about what a terrible time to open and to this day.

The second stage:

XX century historians, among other items gave the name of ‘the century of refugees. «Politbezhentsy have always existed: the French nobles who fled the revolution, let the world the word ‘immigrant’. However, with the approval of national states in the XIX century division and hatred acquired a new quality. ‘Bad’ faith, ‘wrong’ ideology, ‘wrong’ nationality – who is ‘not our’, that should run aimlessly - if have time, of course. Age of ethnic cleansing began».

The beginning of civil war in Tajikistan has begun precisely because of these domestic issues, and evolved into a civil war. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan was the only republic where civil war has begun, will last for five years, leaving a black mark in the history of the Tajik people. During the civil war killed more than 100 thousand, 600 thousand refugees, more than one million internal migrants, the damage amounted to over U.S. $ 7 billion, more than 300 thousand Russian-speaking left the republic, including scientists, skilled personnel, professors, teachers doctors (Read Ulmasov, 2007). Hundreds of women were left without a husband, without a home. The war has brought not only grief and suffering of the inhabitants of the country, but the Tajik economy suffered a huge loss. Forces of the Tajik gov-
ernment and international organizations to do everything possible to return the displaced refugees to their homeland. Every fourth citizen of the republic became a refugee or forced migrant labor.

**The third stage:**

After the Civil War to the present time begins the third phase of migration, the population of Tajikistan. According to preliminary estimates the number of migrant workers who travel outside of Tajikistan is estimated at 750 thousand to 1.5 million people (See more Ulmasov, 2010, ILO, 2009, Umarov, 2008, Central Asia, 2010). The exact number of Tajik migrant workers abroad, now no one knows. For obvious reasons, illegal migrant workers do not fall into the state statistics, so the experts have to resort to rough estimates of the situation. Data on the number of migrant workers far apart, even the government agencies and international organizations.

Almost every family has a Tajik migrant worker. Over the last 15–20 years, Tajikistan became a «money-transfer-dependent» country. Remittances have become like a drug. The experts should examine the prospects of development of the migration situation and the future of our workers, both in Russia and elsewhere. We should draw conclusions from a French lesson and develop a strategy for the next decade due to changes in migration policies in European countries. So, what conclusions can be drawn from the tragic history of forced migration in the Tajik people? On the scale, brutality, human and material losses of the twentieth century is unparalleled in the long history of the Tajik people. I think that this is due to a number of interrelated factors. They are ambiguous in their nature and value. Therefore unacceptable overestimation and underestimation of some or ignoring others.

*Seven Lessons of the Tajik migration*

**FIRST LESSON**

The most important lesson is that policy in its purest form does not exist. It is vital only when the organic unity of the whole complex of factors into account to ensure the safety of the country, the nation – political, diplomatic, economic, ideological, informational, and not
least the defense. Public officials, regardless of the activities necessary to use a feedback mechanism with migrant workers in the form of the Internet and social networking for the study of the migration situation, both at home and abroad. Migrant issues should be dealt with, especially those who lived through himself, who is now back home. In the near future, the Internet and social networks will become a real force, it is precisely that back channel of communication that we should make full use.

SECOND LESSON

It concerns, above all, of the strategic ministries and agencies, expert opinions, findings, scientists, or more precisely, their ability to anticipate emerging changes in the political and economic situation in the country and abroad. Both then and now the power of the state not fully been realized. From this should be the lessons learned and to this day. Hence a very important lesson for our time, which reduces to the fact that the assessment of the situation, not on a «fashionable» ideological, stereotypes and abstract principles, it is important to be able to discern the essence of the processes. Constantly we have to draw the attention of our countrymen, that they respect and not violate the laws of the host country, that live by the law - it is profitable, it’s interesting, it’s cultural. Our task – this is the development of respect to compliance with Russian laws.

THIRD LESSON

It consists in the organization of the strategic management of migration processes. It should be based on knowledge of what is happening. However, in hindsight, was surprised to note that for all these years there was no textbook published on migration, is not carried out large-scale case studies (and those that were supported by international organizations that do not reflect the real situation). As a result of the migration processes occur spontaneously, no one has no control over them.
FOURTH LESSON

It refers to the need to study the labor market in Tajikistan and outside it. On this depends the answer to the question, what is the need for skilled workers and how to cook them. On this basis throughout the country to create the infrastructure of state regulation of the labor market, which includes a set of organizations and institutions making proposals to increase labor mobility, the creation of the Russian labor exchanges in the capital city, regional centers of Tajikistan, will determine the direction of spatial movement of labor, render assistance employment to citizens in connection with the direction to work in another country at the suggestion of foreign companies;

FIFTH LESSON

Formation of the vocational training of young people is a stabilizing factor in the social sphere, to revive vocational technical schools for this purpose it is expedient to adopt a state program of support for vocational schools. Pursue the establishment of joint vocational schools and employers from Russia and at the same time send to school, to practice for employers. The main goal of the vocational training system is to increase competitiveness and occupational mobility of the labor market and professional services, providing guaranteed employment. In organizing the training office employment should be guided as to the needs of the unemployed and employers from overseas.

SIXTH LESSON

Enormous importance of scientific approaches to the study of migration processes. It is important that management of migration has been scientifically proven. Thus the available data, no matter how negative they are, need to objectively analyze, synthesize and process, filtering out valid information from the imaginary, and bring to the attention of management, decision-making in the field of migration. Without a deep analysis of the situation and the skillful use of the findings of this analysis it is impossible to ensure the effectiveness of decisions and actions.
SEVENTH LESSON

Human losses incurred by Tajikistan for years considered, make us think that the actions and policies based on ideological slogans, in fact, turn out great sacrifice. In the current appeals looked through many elements of demagogy and speculation than genuine concern for people. First, we need to critically evaluate themselves own past experience. The demands in this regard should be fully cultivated and nurtured. Secondly, you need to understand that saving people is not achieved and the wishes of abstract slogans. New generation of leaders to critically reflect on past experience, to use it creatively. We must, at least not worse than it was possible to our older generation to solve modern problems of the country. Any public figure and politician must reckon with the views that exist. The security issue, the problem of crime, shall, in focus, migration services, diasporas. Every migrant should know their rights and responsibilities. The main problem is not in the laws and their implementation, the application of these laws as part of those to whom it is entrusted to the post, and from our citizens.

References
1. International Migration of Population with Change of Permanent Residence Location. During the whole post-Soviet period Uzbekistan keeps the negative balance of external migration of the population, since the number of those who left the Republic exceeds the number of newcomers. According to the estimations, in the beginning of the 1990’s the ratio of these flows was 1.7-1.8 times, during the subsequent years the gap became greater, and in the mid 1990’s emigration exceeded immigration by 4-5 times. In the recent years the absolute values of both flows decreased significantly, and the ratio between them increased noticeably, mainly due to reduction of the immigration rate.

According to data of the State Committee for Statistics of the Republic of Uzbekistan, main portion of emigration from Uzbekistan is to CIS countries (97-98%). The biggest outflow is traditionally directed to Russia, and during 1991-2010 Russia admitted about one million of people, which is greater than 60% of the total number, and three fourths of this flow are represented by ethnic Russians. Currently, Kazakhstan is competing with Russia in the sphere of the population migration from Uzbekistan.

During the recent 20 years the number of migration outflow decreased significantly, from 189 thousand people in 1990 to current 40 thousand people (Figure 1).

Decrease of migration outflow can be considered as a quite steady trend of the migration situation in the Republic, which has a long-term effect. As shown by relevant studies, it is determined by the following governing factors.

First of all, a significant decrease of the emigration potential. Ethnic migration flows were prevailing in the international migration during the post-Soviet period. During the past two decades the number of Russian living in the Republic decreased by 1.7 times, as well as the number of the Ukrainians, Tartars, Jewish, Germans and representatives of other nationalities. In fact, the majority of those who wished
to emigrate had already left the Republic. Remaining are mostly the persons of pre-retirement and retirement age, whose children emigrated; and their migration potential is obviously low.

We have attempted to evaluate the international migration potential in Uzbekistan for the forthcoming years. According to the estimations, the number of people positively planning to leave the Republic is relatively not big. They are mostly represented by the Russians and Tatars. Their emigration potential can be assumed as 300 thousand people, and with account of other Russian-speaking nationalities – not more than 400 thousand people.

According to the results of population interviewing, about a half of potential emigrants plan to leave for Russia. Despite various collisions, Russian remains the main migration partner for Russian-speaking population.

When determining the magnitude of the potential migration from Uzbekistan one should also take account of the migration of the titular population (the Uzbeks and Kara-Kalpaks). Currently its participation in the international migration is relatively low, but it increased significantly in the recent years. According to the data of the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Statistics, in the modern emigration flows from Uzbekistan the titular population percentage exceeds 11%
as compared to 6–7% in the beginning of the century. However this increase is mainly due to the general reduction of the migration level, while absolute values of emigration of the Uzbeks and Kara-Kalpaks increased insignificantly.

According to the estimations, the migration potential of the titular population oriented at Russia is relatively low. Based on the results of the population interviews, people prefer to leave for Russia not for the purpose of permanent residence but for a certain period of time – in order to earn money.

Thus, the migration potential of the population planning to leave Uzbekistan may be equal to about half a million of people. In the course of its gradual implementation during at least 10-15 years, this will count approximately 30–40 thousand people per year. By estimate, 15–20 thousand people per year out of them will leave for Russia. Current emigration processes are also within these ranges.

Another factor governing the potential emigration processes is the improvement of social and economic development of Uzbekistan. As opposed to the 1990’s, during more than 10 years the economic growth rates are well in advance of the population growth rate, which allows to increase the standard of living and social stability of the society. In combination, these positive changes will restraint the emigration attitudes in the forecast period.

International Migration of Labour Force. Labour force migration in Uzbekistan is mainly fed by demographic factors. The Republic has rapidly growing population. During the recent 20 years it increased by 8.3 million people, those of active working age – by 7.4 million people (Figure 2).

Each year 650 thousand of young people reach the working age. Taking into account the birth rate decline and the relative reduction of number of children and adolescents, percentage of the working age population increased to 60% in 2010 and 2011 (Figure 3), as compared to 44-45 in the beginning of the 1990’s.

Such situation creates the quite strong pressure on the labour market and facilitates the increase of people migration from the Republic in order to seek employment.
Main stream of labour force migration is directed to Russia. As per the data of the Federal Migration Service of Russia, number of labour migrants from Uzbekistan currently exceeds 600 thousand people. They are mostly employed in construction, agricultural, trade sectors, and on various non-prestigious jobs. According to data of studies, a significant share of labour migrants work illegally and this creates lots of problems both for the sending country and recipient country.

Other centres of attraction for labour migrants are Kazakhstan and some countries of so-called far-abroad countries.
The same flows will also determine labour force migration in the forthcoming years. Russia will remain the priority direction. Currently in Russia there is nearly no regions without labour migrants from Uzbekistan. This is proved by the data of sociological inquiries performed by Russian researchers, official data of regional migration authorities, etc.

When evaluating the real scale of potential labour force migration, in particular, to Russia, one should judge from the current state and take account of the new trends. According to our estimations the number of labour migrants from Uzbekistan to Russia may reduce to 400–450 thousand people in the next 10–15 years. Taking into account any other directions, the forecast labour force migration can be within the range of 700–800 thousand people, i.e. somewhat smaller than current figures.

Expected decrease of migration figures in the future will be due to the changes in the demographic situation within the Republic. As a result of prolonged birth rate decline in the 1990’s, labour force growth rates will slow down significantly. This situation will already occur in the nearest years, when the working age will be reached by generations born in the late 1990’s – early 2000’s. Due to this, the rate of alternation of generations will decelerate significantly. According to the calculations, the ratio of the population reaching the working age and those who are leaving it can be 1.7:1 in 2020, as compared to current 3.7:1, which will be quite a strong factor restraining formation of the migration flows.

The following factors will influence development of future trends of international migration of labour force:

– condition of the republican labour markets. According to the results of interviewing labour migrants, most of them would prefer to work at home, if there are significant changes in the Republic regarding job availability and wages;

– salary level in the Republic. Currently this factor is one of the factors governing decision making on labour force migration;

- level of competition on international labour markets;
- changes in migration policies regarding social protection of labour migrants both in employment locations, and at exit points.

In the recent years recipient countries adopted the whole range of quite efficient measures aimed at normalization of labour force migration processes, which resulted in the increase of the number of legal labour migrants who obtained official work permits. Nevertheless, this problem is not resolved finally.

Labour migration is associated with significant economic effects both sending and recipient countries. Recipient countries which face the decline of working age population, resolve the problems of market saturation with required work force and filling the unskilled labour niches by means of foreign workers inflow. In sending countries these effects are first of all reflected by the currency cash inflows. Uzbekistan has quite significant volumes of money earned abroad.

According to data of National Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan, amounts of money transfer to the Republic are continuously increasing: they equalled to 225 million US dollars in 2002\textsuperscript{58}, and one and a half billion US dollars in 2006, including one billion US dollars – by labour migrants\textsuperscript{59}. During subsequent years the volume of money transfer increased significantly (Figure 4). According to the estimations, in Uzbekistan the amount of money transfer by labour migrants is about 10\% of GDP.

Based on the current conditions, establishment of new approaches and priorities during formation of the migration policy is advisable to ensure more civilized development of the labour migration processes in the forecast period, and amplification of its positive effect for sending and recipient countries. In recipient countries, particularly in Uzbekistan, these can be the measures aimed at the more efficient use of the labour migration potential for development purposes.

According to the research data, money transferred by labour migrants is mainly spent for current families’ consumption. However,

\textsuperscript{59} World Economic and Financial Surveys. Regional Economic Outlook. Middle East and Central Asia Sept. 2006, p.7
money earned abroad can not only make a significant contribution in their family budgets, but also become a source for own business establishment. This portion in Uzbekistan is relatively low (6–8%), but under certain conditions investment of this money into production can increase and play a much greater role in social and economic development of the Republic.

In order to amplify the economic effects of labour migration it is essential to ensure more active use of the investment potential of money earned abroad for development purposes. It is expedient to establish a national program for support of labour migrants and their families in the efficient use of transferred money, which would include an efficient mechanism of encouraging labour migrants’ investment in the market segments oriented at development and establishment of new jobs. It is required to provide specific assistance to migrants’ families in the use of international experience and investment practice, and to establish for them appropriate and accessible mechanisms in the regions, which will allow to use the potential of transferred money more fully and efficiently.

Taking account of the international experience and specifics of the Republic, it is feasible to establish a multi-faceted national system intended for providing assistance to labour migrants and their families in the field of efficient use of transferred money, with identification of main directions of activities and co-operation in order to ensure more efficient use of the labour migration potential for development purposes. This mechanism shall include an efficient tool for promotion of labour migrants’ investment in those market segments which are oriented at development, establishment of new jobs and income level increase.

Some opportunities of improvement of economic effects given by labour migration are also present in the recipient countries, in particular, in Russia. Researches show that working skills of labour migrants could be in more demand than today, even on the same construction sites or agricultural farms. Not a small share in the number of labour migrants is represented by quite educated young people, who have a promising labour potential, and certain ambitions for professional and
career development. It is possibly required to work out new approaches to the use of migrants’ labour, including vocational and refresher training issues. Their implementation will undoubtedly increase the labour migration input in Russian economy.

It should be emphasized that alongside with significant economic effects, migration processes also have negative consequences. In donor countries they cause significant labour potential losses and impair the qualitative composition of labour force. Each year Uzbekistan loses specialists having higher and specialized secondary education, who lose their professional skills during migration. The most mobile, capable and laborious people leave Uzbek labour market. Adverse social and demographic consequences are also quite strong: health deterioration, family relationship problems and in some cases family disruption, insufficient attention to children rearing, all of which can result in the deterioration of demographic situation in the future.

Improvement of labour migration management and mitigation of its negative consequences is possible provided that more efficient international cooperation is established, which combines efforts of both sending and recipient countries. Uzbekistan and Russia have already taken specific measures in this direction. In 2007 a number of intergovernmental agreements were entered into, which were aimed at improvement of migration process control: on migrants’ labour activity and protection of their rights; on co-operation in the field of illegal migration control; on readmission.

Adoption of these documents undoubtedly strengthens the legal framework of the population labour migration and facilitates social protection of people working outside their countries.

Development of international labour migration in the forecast period will to a great extent depend on accelerated development of positive trends in the migration policies aimed at normalization of migration processes and amplification of social protection of migrants and their family members.

An important role in the future development of international cooperation and extension of interaction opportunities in the field of labour migration can be played by CIS Migration Authorities Manage-
ment Council established in 2008. Main task of the Council is conver-
sion of the overseas employment into a civilized process, establishment
of new approaches and conditions of ordered labour migration.60

It is quite natural that modern forms of ordered labour migration
must be greatly different from those of Soviet period. However, they
can play a significant role in normalization of migration processes.

Level of ordered labour migration of population of Uzbekistan will
to a great extent depend upon the expected efficiency of interstate co-
operation with Russia, which, in its turn, is interested in the inflow of
labour migrants from Central Asia.

It is advisable to establish in Uzbekistan a special agency of Federal
Migration Service of the Russian Federation, which will deal with
search and selection of migrants for work in Russia. It can be quite ef-
ficient in terms of target-oriented selection of workers and be of interest
for Russia, since this is in line with the objectives of Russian target
program on establishment of a system for organized employment of
foreign workforce.

Potentially, it is also possible to increase the organized flows to
Kazakhstan, in accordance with any new interstate agreements based
on current conditions. As for any other partners, for example, Korea,
an organized workforce export can also increase to a certain extent, but
provided that significant institutional reforms in the sphere of overseas
employment are implemented in the Republic.

Thus, future migration of the population of Uzbekistan depends on
the whole set of socio-economic and demographic factors, each of
which shall be taken into account when developing and adjusting the
migration policies of sending and recipient countries.

1. Changes in migration processes during the post-Soviet period

Latvian Central Statistical Bureau (CSB) has compiled data on population long-term migration in Latvia for the last two decades. CSB acquired statistical data by processing the information of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (OCMA) register on persons, who have declared their place of residence, and persons, who had left the country. In accordance with the UN Recommendations and European Parliament and Council Regulation on Community statistics on migration, in statistics long-term international migrants are persons arriving in a country with a purpose to stay for a permanent residence or to stay for at least one year, as well as persons who are leaving it to go to other permanent residence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Emigration</th>
<th>Net migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>242638</td>
<td>213044</td>
<td>29594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>30872</td>
<td>168230</td>
<td>-137388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>12223</td>
<td>47064</td>
<td>-34841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>7778</td>
<td>17268</td>
<td>-9482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>15285</td>
<td>33532</td>
<td>-18247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CSB population database 2011*

The CSB data presented in table 1 show long-term migration and these data do not include persons who have arrived and left temporally and have not declared their arrival or departure. We assume that actual number of emigrants are several times larger than reported by official statistics.

The CSB obtained the information on 1.9 million people in population census in 2011. The information was not received on about 300,000 people. The population counting carried out in Latvia was a part of the global population census organized by the UN and it took...
place according to Regulation of population census and Regulation of the European Parliament and Council on population and dwelling census issued in July 9, 2008. In the previous census in 2000 2.38 million people were counted in Latvia.

According estimations done by reserchers representing University of Latvia it is calculated that since the accession of Latvia to the EU the number of departing passengers in Riga Port and Riga Airpaort exceeds the number arriving ones by 170.5 thousand. (Purmalis, 87). This number can be considered as minimal non-registered level of migration from Latvia since joining the EU in 2004.

According to the United Nations 10th Inquiry (2009) Latvian government viewed population growth as “too low” and declared “to raise it”. However, as for immigration and emigartion government was satisfied with migration levels and wished to maintain their current levels, encouraging only the return of citizens. (World Population Policies 2009, 288). Since 2010 Latvian government has increased its attention to the demographic issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Emigration</th>
<th>Net migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Латыши</td>
<td>Русские</td>
<td>Латыши</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>522</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>225</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>274</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>1046</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>2293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>4584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4066</td>
<td>6588</td>
<td>13701</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: calculations of the authors for CSB database
As it is seen in Table 2 the immigration and emigration numbers for ethnic Russians are higher than the same indicators regarding ethnic Latvians. Although this is information only about registered migration numbers, one can assume that there are similar trends and proportions in factual migration for ethnic Russians and Latvians.

The uncertainty over Russians’ status in independent Latvia is reflected in migration trends. In 1990, there was a net outflow of 3 968 persons (mostly ethnic Russians) but this grew quickly to 15 045 in 1991 and peaked in 1992 at 53 474 when Russian military personnel and their families left Latvia. However, the exodus of Russians was rather short lived. The net outflow from Latvia fell to just 10 000 by 1996, about one-fifth of the 1992 peak. By 2003–2005, the annual net outflow of ethnic Russians from Latvia was between 544 and 843, mainly to Russia but in the last 5–6 years it increased considerably.

The drop-off in Russian emigration in 2002–2005 was partly due to the relative stability of independent Latvia’s economy compared to the Russian economy. Latvia and the other Baltic states were able to shift their foreign trade away from the Former Soviet Union towards Western Europe rather quickly. After shrinking by nearly 50 percent, the Latvian economy started to grow in 1994, and by 2004 was at 89 percent of its pretransition level.

The emigration of Russian speakers was the major factor in population decline although the numbers of all major ethnic groups, including Latvians, decreased between 1989 and 2000. The Russian population in Latvia declined by 22 percent, the Belarusian population by 19 percent, and Ukrainians by 31 percent. The proportion of Russians declined from 34.0 to 29.6 percent and further to 27.6 percent in 2010, while the Latvian population had increased to 57.7 percent in 2000 and 59.4 percent in 2010. (Demography 2010, 38).

The post-Soviet period for Latvia was related to European integration process. The key factor in migration processes has been massive emigration. Germany, Israel, and the United States – were the top destinations of Latvian emigrants through the 1990s. Between 1990 and 2003, 6400 people from Latvia migrated to Germany, 4700 to Israel, and 4200 to the United States. Some migrated because they were Jewish or ethni-
cally German; others joined family or went for economic reasons. Since 2004 the UK, Ireland and Sweden were the first countries which opened their labour market for the EU newcomers including Latvia. By 2011 all EU Member states have opened their labour market for all EU citizens. According to the data of the Ministry of Economics of Latvia, during 2000–2006 the majority of Latvian labour was leaving to Ireland, UK and Germany. The total number of those who emigrated constituted approximately 8% of the total active labour force of Latvia. It has been estimated that nearly 86 000 Latvians worked outside country during 2004–2007. (Krisjane, 2007, 25). During 2008–2010 Latvia was experiencing economic and financial downturn of unexpected scale. Latvian GDP during 2009 has dropped by 18% which is the highest among the EU Member States. Taking in consideration the current economic situation, a new wave of emigration from Latvia started during global recession. Because of free movement of labour within EU the exact data on emigration numbers is not available.

The compiled registered data show that in 2010 due to the long-term migration the population in Latvia reduced by 7912 persons, and that is more than in 2009, when the population of Latvia because of this factor decreased by 4700 persons. In 2010 2790 persons from 68 countries arrived for the residence in Latvia (3.8% more compared to 2009), but 10702 persons departed for permanent residence in 86 countries (46.2% more than in 2009). 49% of migrants came from the countries of the European Union (in 2009 – 55%), but 66%, in turn, emigrated to these countries (in 2009 – 56%).

Countries chosen most by the Latvian emigrants were United Kingdom (2.9 thousand), Russia (1.6 thousand) and Ireland (1.1 thousand). Emigration to United Kingdom in 2010 grew 2.2 times, to Denmark – 2.1 times, to USA – 2 times, to Ireland – 1.9 times. Out of the international migrants of 2010 68% of the emigrants and 24% of the immigrants had Latvian citizenship. Immigrants were mainly men – 52.8%, but majority of the emigrants (54.2%) were women.

Immigration level in Latvia is low. Since 2004 the annual number of registered immigrants in Latvia is from 1.7 thousand in 2004 to 3.5 thousand in 2008. Latvia is not a target country for immigrants and
this kind of situation is because of comparatively low level of social welfare in Latvia. The data of employers testify decrease of demand for foreign labour force since 2008. In comparison with 2008 the number of work permits issued for construction works in 2009 has decreased by 98%, for transport section – by 53% and for manufacturing industry – by 42%. However, the data of the OCMA show that in the recent years the number of people of Latvia with temporary residence permits and permanent residence permits has gradually increased – at the beginning of 2005 there were 7429 persons with temporary residence permits and 26976 persons with permanent residence permits but in 2011 there are respectively 13333 and 38694 persons. The most part of people are citizens of Russia – more than 33600. The number of foreigners with valid residence permits is about 2% of the total number of people. In 2010 the total number of working population in Latvia was about 800 thousand, and it means that the people from non-EU countries make only 0.2% of employed people. One of the main reasons to issue residence permits to people from non-EU countries is reunion of families. Two thirds of immigrants from the former states of the USSR are women who have married into Latvia. In its turn from Asian countries behind the boundaries of the former USSR two thirds of immigrants are men. Immigrants mostly are in the age from 20 to 40 years with a secondary education (85%).

2. Laws and regulations on international migration adopted in Latvia

The migration and asylum issues are regulated by the following main legal documents:

Regulation No. 417 regarding Allowances for Refugees and Persons who have been Granted Alternative Status (amended in 2004)
Law on Asylum (2002, subsequent amendments are pending)
Regulations on Order in Which Refugees May Choose Their Place of Residence in Latvia (1998)
Regulations on Delivering, Extension and Annulment of Residential and Work Permits to Aliens (1995)
Law on Citizenship (amended in 1995)
Law on Entry and Residence of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Republic of Latvia (amended in 1994)

The Immigration Law establishes a main distinction between two types of permits: temporary residence permits which are granted for different periods of time (from a maximum of 6 months to 5 years) and permanent residence permits. Next to these two types of residence permits, the legislation organises the status of long term EC residents. This three-fold permit system encompasses all types of immigration status i.e. family reunification, study, training, research and work. Regarding immigration for work purposes, individuals may be seek employment or self-employment. Guest workers are accepted into the Latvian labour force each year, however there is no specific legislation regarding seasonal labour.

Non-citizens make up a special category of residents in Latvia, which are defined as persons who were USSR nationals, but who after 1991 did not qualify for Latvian nationality and did not acquire Russian or any other nationality (Former USSR Citizens Act, Art. 1). Non-citizens are given a special passport that grants them special status of belonging to the state allowing for the constitutional right to return.

The Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs is responsible for implementing migration policy, including development of repatriation and asylum policy, issuance of identity and travel documents, and maintenance of the national population register. Refugee issues, though, do not receive much government attention. In the past few years, fewer than five people per year have received refugee status, and, in some years, the government has not granted refugee status to anyone. The office's major task has been bringing Latvia's migration and visa policy in line with EU requirements. Latvia passed a new Immigration Law in July 2003 that spelled out the specifics of foreigner entry into and residence in Latvia and further adjusted the list of visa-free countries. Visa policies are being aligned with other EU Member States, and border controls are gradually being abolished as with other EU members in the Schengen area. (IOM, 2007, 68).
The following policy branches within the EU migration and asylum policy area lie in the competence of the Latvian Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs:

- Visa policy
- Free movement of persons and legal migration
- Fight against illegal immigration
- Asylum and international protection
- Document security
- External dimension of migration policy

**Visa policy**

Procedures and conditions for issuing, extension, annulment and revocation of short-stay visas (for transit through or intended stays in the territory of the Member States not exceeding three months in any six-month period), as well as uniform format for visas is laid down in the EU legislation. Also a common list of the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those third countries whose nationals are exempt from that requirement has been elaborated on the EU level. The term ‘third country nationals’ means “nationals of non-member countries”. However, the term is widely used even in EU legal texts which refer to immigrants who arrive in the EU from countries outside the EU and the EEA. In addition the term is used when talking about people with undetermined citizenship. For instance, non-citizens in Latvia would also be qualified as third country nationals in EU law.

In order to promote and facilitate short-stay travel regime between EU and third countries, the EU has concluded several agreements with third countries on visa facilitation. Moreover, the discussion on entering into negotiations with other third countries on conclusion of such agreements is ongoing. Although, in general, provision on long-stay visas lie in the national competence of each Member State, several issues, for instance, rights to travel within Schengen area and visa format, are regulated on the EU level.
Free movement of persons and legal migration

One of the fundamental freedoms of the EU is free movement of persons. The EU legislation defines conditions for the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, while stipulating also several restrictions to be placed on the right of free movement and residence on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.

Also harmonized rules on the conditions for exercising the rights to family reunification by third country nationals residing lawfully in the territory of the Member States are stipulated by the EU law.

Besides, adopted legislative acts in the area of legal migration establish conditions and procedures for entry and residence of several categories of persons (for example, researchers, students, highly qualified workers), as well as rights that have to be granted to them. At the same time, every Member State retains rights to define number of legal migrants to be admitted according to the Member State’s labour market needs and peculiarities.

According to the EU legislation, third country nationals if they have fulfilled the prescribed criteria, may apply for and receive EC long term resident status and rights that derive from that status.

Fight against illegal immigration

Common standards and procedures in the Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals are defined in the EU law in order to strengthen the fight against illegal immigration, a mechanism has been established for mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals and the approach towards sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third country nationals has been harmonized. Besides, the Member States are actively cooperating in practice in order to prevent and combat illegal immigration.

Readmission agreements, that have been concluded between the EU and third countries and define a specific mechanism for return and readmission of illegally staying persons, play a very important role for effective functioning of the EU return policy.
Asylum and international protection

The EU law defines broad set of issues regarding asylum and international protection – reception conditions for asylum seekers; criteria and procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status and subsidiary protection status and content for such protection, as well as criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national.

Solidarity among the Member States, as well as with third countries that suffer from particular pressure on their asylum systems due to the high numbers of asylum seekers, by rendering assistance to them is a very significant issue within the area of asylum policy. The participation of Member States in various solidarity measures is voluntary, according to each Member State’s possibilities and capacity of its asylum system. As during the course of year 2011 European Asylum Support office will start operating, additional attention will be paid towards practical cooperation among the Member States.

Document security

Conditions on security standards of passports, travel documents and residence permits issued by the Member States are set out in the EU legislation in the area of document security.

External dimension of migration policy

Recently, the issues of the EU cooperation with third countries – countries of origin and transit of migrants – on migration and asylum issues, as well as strengthening links between migration and development policies has become topical. This partnership is implemented through various projects and cooperation formats between the interested Member States and third countries. The key objective of such cooperation is to aid third countries and to enhance their capacity to manage and sustain their migration and asylum systems, as well as to share best practices and experience with them. Currently, the largest share of cooperation is carried out with southern, eastern and southeastern regions neighbouring the EU.
3. Mechanisms in migration/economic policies in Latvia aimed at rising developmental potential of international migration

Since July 2011 the new changes in the Latvian Immigration Law have been announced in the government. The changes include the new procedures, where multiple entry visas for businessmen will no longer be canceled, when a person has applied for permanent residency. The entry to Latvia for third country citizens, who are also the family members of Latvian citizens has been eased – they would no longer need a visa. Also there will be no longer need for visa invitation, if visa is asked by a spouse or child of a citizen of Latvia. Finally the person entering to Latvia will no longer need a working permit, of planned period of work does not exceed 14 days.

Since July 1, 2010 amendments of Immigration law are in force making substantial changes in the procedure of immigration of foreigners. Together with the mentioned amendments of law six new regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers came into effect. These regulations are connected with the procedure of immigration of foreigners. There were also amendments of two other regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers on immigration matters. All the mentioned amendments will not only extend substantiation of receiving temporary residence permits but they will also decrease bureaucracy in the procedure of immigration, therefore, making deals with documents regarding immigration matters will be easier both for Latvian people and employers and for foreigners. The OCMA takes over the function from the State employment agency (SEA) and will be able to issue residence permits to foreigners and also work permits for employment in Latvia.

Up to now the employers who needed to employ foreigners, first of all had to address the SEA where they had to complete an invitation to get work permit. In order the invited employee could stay legally in Latvia for more than 90 days in half of a year, an employer had to complete an invitation to get residence permit. In future the both processes will be joined together in one and employers will be able to do all the necessary formalities in connection with invitation of foreigners for employment in one institution – the OCMA. Latvian people will have priority rights in labour market also in the future and the employers
will have to register the vacancy at the SEA first of all for offering vacancies to Latvian people. If in a month a qualified and knowing specialist is not found in Latvia, the employer will be allowed to invite foreigners.

In accordance with amendments of Immigration law the foreigners who have invested substantial financial resources and promoted the economic development in Latvia will be able to claim for temporary residence. Namely, a foreigner who has invested not less than 25,000 lats in the equity capital of the company registered in Latvia and this company will pay in taxes not less than 20,000 lats in the state and local budget will be able to get temporary residence permit in Latvia for the period of five years. Temporary residence permits for not more than five years will be also issued to persons whose total sum of business affairs is at least 100,000 lats and who has acquired one or several properties in Riga, in Riga region or in the largest cities – Daugavpils, Jelgava, Jekabpils, Jurmala, Liepaja, Rezekne, Valmiera or Ventspils. When a foreigner gets a residence permit, all the members of his or her family will be able to get it as well.

Taking into account the above mentioned in the future business activities will be considered active optional activities with economic benefit if the members of the board and council of the association pay at least 10,000 lats in taxes and employ not less than 5 employees. Individual businessmen will have to pay in taxes at least 8,000 lats a year and have to employ no less than 3 employees. In its turn foreign business agencies in Latvia will be evaluated taking into account agreements they have concluded and starting from the third year these agencies will have to employ at least three employees.

4. Prospects of migration relations between Latvia and Russia

Latvia's population is projected to decline to 1.96 million in 2035 and 1.67 million by 2060 (Eurostat news release 80/2011) because of extremely low fertility rates and an aging population. In addition, the number of Latvians migrating to other EU Member States may well hasten this decrease if economic opportunities at home do not improve. These demographic trends have a number of implications for Latvia's
economy and society, and the government may need to adjust its policies in the future to encourage Latvians to return home and to persuade foreign workers to immigrate.

Currently, Latvia does not have a large number of immigrants. The total number of residents with permanent and temporary permits is about 52,000. In the near future Latvia will have to rely on immigrants to sustain economic growth. (Indans, 2006, 18). On the other hand, there are other factors determining critical attitudes towards immigration, primarily concerns of social integration and security issues. Underlying tensions exist between "traditional" Europeans and immigrants over cultural differences, what have led the government to encourage "cultural integration" rather than multiculturalism. Latvia will have to address concerns such as these on the part of their native citizens if they are to encourage the immigration that will keep the country economically viable. The Latvian case might be even more complicated because the government already has problems with the implementation of the social integration programme for the Russian speaking population.

Considering the low compensation, employers in Latvia are at a disadvantage, compared to employers in other EU member states, when it comes to attracting highly-skilled workers. Employers in Latvia have to pay third country workers a certain level of compensation, a medium level salary, which they agree is a major limitation. However, the requirement is reasonable since Latvia is focused on attracting qualified labour force. The Ministry of Welfare admits that simplifying the administrative procedure and reducing administrative costs are the directions to be taken. Therefore, it has made recommendations to the Work Group to design and implement a one stop agency principle, i.e., whereby the documents would be submitted to one institution (instead of the current two, the State Employment Agency and the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs) and one work/residence permit would be issued to a foreign national.

Employers have an increasing interest to hire workers from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, especially in construction as well as in other sectors requiring low-skilled workforce. The reason is that most of Latvian
residents exercising free movement rights are from these sectors. Other reasons mentioned are that a number of students is increasing and employers are not paying adequate salaries or opt for “envelope wages” to avoid taxes. The official data on immigration from Third States remain low because employers avoid recruiting workforce officially. Thus the numbers of hidden immigration are rising, although the exact figures are not available. The estimates are in between 14-20%. There are two main reasons for this: strict immigration policy and unattractive social assistance provision for third country nationals.

The migration policy of Latvia has to solve a lot of problematic matters connected with growing amount of emigration, shortage of qualified labour force, ageing of society and the general objective of the country – to achieve the average level of living standard in the EU as soon as possible. Among unemployed people in Latvia we can notice the tendencies of increase of structural employment. Its characteristic feature is gradual loss of skills (now there are about 40% people who cannot find a job for more than a year and this proportion is increasing). Young people are especially endangered group – the proportion of those who are looking for a job in the age of 15 to 24 is approximately twice bigger than in average in labour market. Young people are the most mobile group and ready to emigrate, therefore we can lose this labour force for a long time or forever. Discrepancy between skills and market demands can cause raise of salaries that is more rapid than increase of productivity – economy develops and the demand for labour force increases but this demand is difficult to satisfy as the unemployed have not got the necessary skills.
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NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

Indans Ivars – Master of Political science and International relations at University of Latvia, researcher and doctoral student of Demography doctoral study programme at the Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Latvia.

Ivakhnyuk Irina – Dr. in Economics, Professor / Deputy-Director of the Department of Population at the Faculty of Economics of the Lomonosow Moscow State University, member of the Government Commission on Migration Policy.

Kumskov Gennady – Dr. in Economics, Professor /Head of the Economic Theory Chair at the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University.

Maksakova Lyudmila – Dr. in Economics, Principal Researcher of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan.


Mosneaga Valeriu – Dr.habil.econ., Professor, Honoured Scientist in Education and Research of the Republic of Moldova 'Om Emerit'; Head of the Department of Political Sciences at the Faculty of International Relations & Political Sciences at the Moldova State University.

Pribytkova Irina – Dr. in Economics, Professor, Senior Researcher of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Head of the Research Committee on Sociology of Population and Demographic Education at the Sociological Association of Ukraine (SAU).


Sadovskaya Elena – PhD., President of the Conflictology Center (Almaty, Kazakhstan), expert of the Research Council on Migration in the CIS area affiliated to the Center for Migration Research at the
Institute for Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences
(Moscow, Russia)

Shakhotska Liudmila – Dr. in Sociology, Professor, Chief Researcher of the Department of Complex Issues of the Socio-Economic Development at the Institute of Economics of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus.

Tukhashvili Mirian – Dr. in Economics, Professor of the Department of Macroeconomics of the Tbilisi State University; Head of the Center for Migration Research of the TSU.

Ulmasov Rakhmon – Dr. in Economics, Professor, Vice-Chancellor of the Russian-Tajik Slavic University.

Yeganyan Ruben – PhD in Economics, President of the “Armenian Social - Demographical Initiative” NGO, member of expert council of the Department of Migration and Refugees at the Ministry of Local Self-Government of Republic of Armenia.

Zvidrins Peteris – Dr.habil.econ., Full Member of Latvian Academy of Sciences, professor, Head of Department of Statistics and Demography, University of Latvia.
INFORMATION ABOUT THE SERIES

The book series “International Migration of Population: Russia and the Contemporary World” was founded in 1998 in view of the fact that there was not a single scientific periodical in Russia dealing with international migration of population. Due to this reason the Department of Population at the Faculty of Economics of the Lomonosov Moscow State University made a decision to establish a book series aiming to raise both theoretical and applied aspects of contemporary trends of international migration of population as well as its determinants and consequences.

The Editor-in-Chief is Professor Vladimir Iontsev, the Head of the Department of Population at the Faculty of Economics. The Executive Secretary of the series is Irina Ivakhnyuk, Professor at the Department of Population.

The volumes of the series are published biannually. They can be either edited volumes or monographs. The series is in fact an active discussion on various dimensions of international migration in the world and in Russia in particular.

The first volume (1998) mainly consists of the papers of Russian scholars presented at the IUSSP General Population Conference at Beijing, China in October 1997. (Detailed information about the Conference is also presented.) These are the articles by Vladimir Iontsev and Andrey Kamensky Russia and the International Migration of Population dealing with the entrance of Russia into the international community by means of migration and the allied problems – both for Russia and the world; and the article by Andrey Ostrovsky Labor Migration from China to Russia’s Far East: Possibilities of Immigration Today and in Future concerning the turn of labor migration into permanent immigration in the certain region.

The other articles of the first volume are devoted to a very topical for Russia aspect of international migration – ‘brain drain’: Igor Ushkalov – Intellectual Emigration from Russia: the Factors, Scale, Consequences, Ways of Regulation, Irina Malakha – ’Brain Drain’ in the Central and Eastern Europe. Besides, the issue included the digest
of the well-known book by Julian L. Simon – Economic Consequences of Immigration (N.Y.: Blackwell, 1989). Reviews of noticeable publications of Russian and foreign specialists on international migration are an integral part of every issue of the series. Another important section of every volume is “Young Scholars’ Viewpoints” where students and post-graduate students from the MSU and other universities are granted an opportunity to publish the results of their research in international migration.

The second volume (1999) includes articles on a broad variety of themes related to international migration in Russia and in the world: Vladimir Iontsev, Aminat Magomedova (Russia) – Migration between Russia and other Former Soviet states (Historical Review); Irina Ivakhnyuk (Russia) – The Experience of State Regulation of Labor Force Emigration (Case of Turkey); Andrey Kamensky (Russia) – Labor Force Export and the Impact of Migrant Workers’ Remittances on Balance of Payment of a Sending Country; Igor Ushkalov (Russia) – Emigration and Immigration: the Russian Phenomenon. Apart from the Russian scientists’ articles the volume also includes contribution of Prof. Janez Malačič, (the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) – «Labor Market and International Migration Situation in Central European Transitional Economies». Starting from the second volume it has become a good tradition of the series to invite foreign colleagues to contribute because their papers can be hardly available in Russian.

The third volume (1999) presents the monograph of Vladimir Iontsev «International Migration of Population: Theory and History of Studying» dealing with the classification of main scientific approaches for the studying of migration. The analysis of principal concepts in the field of international migration that exist presently both in Russia and the world demographic science are presented. There is also a detailed analysis of international migration affecting Russia since the eighteenth century up to the present day, as well as a projection of possible future migration trends. The work includes a glossary of terms used in Russian-language demographic studies on migration. It is worth mentioning that this monograph contains a numerous bibliography of publications on international migration of population (1200 titles).
The *forth volume* (2000) presents a number of articles depicting both global trends in international migration of population and specific migration flows to and from Russia. The article by Sema Erder (The Marmara University, Turkey) – New Trends in International Migration and the Case of Turkey presents the author’s view on migration picture of contemporary Europe and the changing place of Turkey within this picture. The appearance of new migration space in the Eastern Europe has encouraged new migration flows in the region. That is the subject of two other articles – by Irina Ivakhnyuk – International Labor Migration between Russia and Turkey and by Evgeny Krasinets and Elena Tiuriukanova – From-Russia–to–Italy Migration as a Model of Ethnically Neutral Economic Migration. Ethnic aspect of international migration is presented by the article of Israeli demographer Mark Tolts (the Hebrew University of Jerusalem) – Migration of Russian Jews in the 1990’s. Among the book reviews presented in the forth volume one is worth to be stressed. That is the digest of the last publication of Igor Ushkalov – “Brain Drain”: Scale, Reasons, Consequences (Moscow, 1999) which has gained special emphasis because of the untimely decease of the author in November 1999. Igor Ushkalov was undoubtedly among the best experts on international intellectual migration.

The *fifth volume* (2000) has one common theme that penetrates all the articles – the impact of international migration on demographic development. The situation in three former Soviet Union states – Russia, Ukraine and Armenia – is presented in the articles of scholars from the corresponding countries: Vladimir Iontsev (Russia) – International Migration of Population and Demographic Development in Russia; Alexander Khomra (Ukraine) – International Migration and Demographic Development of Ukraine; Ruben Yeganian (Armenia) – Demographic Realities and Perspectives of Armenia on the Eve of the 21st century. The article by Mikhail Denissenko (Russia) – Replacement Migration analyzes the UN Report on Replacement Migration in which the author had taken part. The article tries to answer the question if the replacement migration could be a solution to declining and ageing populations. Besides, the paper by Michel Poulain (Belgium) – The Comparison of the Sources of Measurement of International Migration
in the Central European Countries – is a valuable contribution for promoting some common methodology in international migration studies.

The sixth volume (2001) is fully devoted to forced migration taking this chance to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the activities of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Regional Office of UNHCR in Moscow has supported this publication. Naturally, all the articles of the sixth volume deal with forced migration: Vladimir Mukomel (Russia) – Forced Migration in the Context of Migration Processes and Migration Policy in the CIS: Stages of Development; Marek Okolski (Poland) – Migration Pressures on Europe; Sergei Ryazantsev (Russia) – «Forced Migration in Europe: Current Tendencies and Problems of Regulation»; Philippe Wanner (Switzerland) – Asylum-Seekers in Switzerland: Principal Socio-Demographic Aspects; Marina Kunitsa (Russia) – Forced Migration of Population in Regional Development: Specific Problems in the Bryansk Region, Russia; Svetlana Gannushkina (Russia) – Russia’s Migration Legislation and Policy; Yakhya Nisanov (Russia) – Totalitarian Traditions and Business in Russia: Law’s Clashes Force to Migrate.

The seventh volume (2002) is breaking up the chronology of the series due to the fact that it is timed to coincide with the jubilee of the Center for Population Studies at the Faculty of Economics of the Lomonosov Moscow State University which includes the Department of Population as well. This volume is different from the others as it is presented by the annotated bibliography of publications on migration at the Center. It is titled Migration of Population: 35 years of Research at the Center for Population Studies of the Lomonosov Moscow State University (1967–2002). (The author is Irina Ivakhnyuk). This bibliography represents the scale and traditions of migration studies which have formed the theoretical background for developing the modern approach to investigation of the contemporary stage of Russia’s migration history.

The eighth volume (2001) deals with the problems of international migration statistics and registration, which have national peculiarities in every country, and this fact seriously impedes the comparative analysis of the world migration flows. The article by Olga Tchoudinovskikh
Present State and Perspectives of Current Migration Registration in Russia analyzes the shortages of the Russian system of migrants’ primary registration that perform as an obstacle for reliable migration estimates and studies. The article by Mikhail Denissenko – Emigration from Russia According to Foreign States’ Statistical Data represents foreign states' immigration statistics as an alternative and more exact source of estimation of emigration flows from Russia. A short contribution of George Tapinos – International Migration of Population as the Factor of Economic Development contains valuable comments, very topical for contemporary migration situation in Russia and other former Soviet states. The article by Alexander Slouka International Migration of Population and Demographic Development of the Western Europe continues the theme which is meaningful for the editors – about the role of international migration in demographic development – started in the third and the fifth volumes.

The theme of the ninth volume (2002) is highly topical for Russia and the neighboring countries as well as for many other regions of the world – illegal immigration. The contributors to the volume are researchers and practical workers from Russia and other former Soviet Union states: Galina Vitkovskaya – Irregular Migration in Russia: Situation and Policy of Counteraction; Eugeny Krasinets – Irregular Migration and Latent Employment in the Border Territories of the Russian Federation; Elena Sadovskaya – Prevention of Irregular Migration in Kazakhstan; Lyudmila Shakhotko – Illegal Migration: Factors of Growth and Methods of Solution; Tatyana Kutsenko – Illegal Migration and Irregular Employment of Foreign Citizens and Apatrids in the Russian Federation. Geopolitical position of the former USSR states and transparent borders between them have turned this vast territory into the corridor for transit migrants from Asia heading to Europe. All the authors stress on indissoluble relation between illegal immigration and irregular employment and on the importance of government control over illegal hiring of foreign labor force in the context of struggle against irregular international migration.

The tenth, jubilee volume (2002) is a collection of articles by distinguished experts in international migration from many countries.
The papers deal both with theoretical issues of migration studies and migration overviews for certain countries and regions. The article of Douglas Massey (USA) – A Synthetic Theory of International Migration is in fact an attempt to summarize existing migration concepts into a universal, general theory. Dirk van de Kaa (the Netherlands) in the article On International Migration and the second Demographic Transition emphasizes the role of migration in the analysis of demographic development and makes a serious theoretical step towards better understanding of the classical demographic transition theory. Different, but equally interesting views on contemporary skilled migration are presented in the papers of Reginald Appleyard (Australia) – Skilled Migration in the Globalized World and Irina Malakha (Russia) – On ‘brain drain’ in Russia during the second half of the 1990’s. A new theoretical approach to understanding of the latest trends in international migration flows is presented by Mary Kritz (USA) in her paper International Migration to Multiple Destinations where she argues that not only developing countries but also developed ones are to be considered as both labor force importers and exporters. The contribution of Marek Okolski (Poland) – The Incoming Civilizations, the Outgoing Civilizations on the Turn of the 20th Century. Reflection from the Perspective of Demography is especially engaging by depicting the role of demographic processes, and migration in particular, in evolution of human civilizations, e.g. in the forthcoming replacement of the present European civilization (if current demographic trends in Europe last) by Asian civilization. The replacement is already taking place as a result of Chinese immigration. This theme is developed and detailed in the paper of Vilia Gelbras (Russia) – Chinese Migration and Chinese Ethnic Communities in Russia. Shifts in international migration trends in the Eastern Europe and former Soviet space are the focus of a number of articles: Janez Malacic (Slovenia) – International Migration Trends in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990’s and and the Beginning of the 21st Century; Mark Tolts (Israel) – Statistical Analysis of Aliyah and Jewish Emigration from Russia; Andrey Kamenskiy (Russia) – Contemporary Russia in International Labor Migration; Vladimir Iontsev, Irina Ivakhnyuk (Russia)

The eleventh volume (2003) is entitled “Migration and National Security”. It reflects an active discussion on security dimensions of international migration in the Russian society, in both academic circles and government, and in media as well. The article of Leonid Rybakovskiy – Demographic Security: Geopolitical Aspects and Migration is analyzing the role of international migration and reasonable migration management in counteracting demographic crisis in Russia that is by itself a threat to national security and sovereignty of the country. The same issue but from the perspective of foreign researchers is examined in the contribution of Graeme P. Herd and Rosaria Puglisi (UK) – National Security and Migration Policy in Putin’s Russia: a Foreign Perspective. The analysis of the role of migration in counteracting depopulation trends is topical both for Russia (article of Dalkhat Ediev – International Migration as a Way to Overcome Depopulation Trends in Russia) and Ukraine (article of Alexander Khomra – Migration of Population in Ukraine in 1989–2001: Input to Population Dynamics and Ethnic Structure). Paper of Irina Ivakhnyuk and Ramazan Daurov – Irregular Migration and Security in Russia: Threats, Challenges, Risks is focused on “multilayer” nature of the problem; the authors mention political, economic, criminal, and social aspects. Economic and ethnocultural aspects of security are detailed in the paper of Svetlana Soboleva and Olga Tchudaeva – Foreign Migrants in the Russian Labour Market based on the results of the survey of migration in the eastern regions of Russia.

The twelfth volume (2004) is dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the UN International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994) and preliminary results of the 20-year Programme of Actions admitted at this Conference, in the field of international migration. This volume was timed to the Russian National Population Forum “Present and Future of Population in Russia” held in Moscow on 3–4 November 2004. The paper of Vladimir Iontsev and Andrey Kamenskiy (Russia) – International Migration of Population: Lessons of the Cairo Conference is based not only on the analysis of the ICDP
Programme of Actions but also on personal experiences of the authors who were the participants of the ICPD. David Coleman (UK) in his paper Europe at the Cross-roads: Must Europe’s Population and Workforce Depend on New Immigration? questions the possibility to achieve certain objectives framed by the ICPD in the field of migration, and besides, he touches upon long-run effects of numerous migration to Europe. The article of Irina Pribytkova (Ukraine) – Modern Migration Studies: in Search for New Theories and Concepts is an attempt to summarize theoretical approaches and methodological principles in migration studies, with special emphasis on interdisciplinary research. The paper of Sergey Ryazantsev (Russia) – Forced Migration in Russia: Ten Years Since Cairo deals with the most topical for Russia international migration issue in the 1990s. Articles by Liudmila Ponkratova (Russia) – International Migration of Population in the Far East of Russia: Transformation of Flows and Prevailing Trends and Svetlana Gribova (Russia) – Migration as the Element of the Integration Mechanism of Russia’s Far East Region into the Chinese Economy analyze important for Russia issue of Chinese labour migration. The paper of Elena Tiuriukanova (Russia) – Labour Migrations in the CIS and New Practices of Labour Exploitation based on sociological surveys results, deals with a painful issue of migrants’ human rights protection that is specially emphasized in the ICPD Programme of Actions.

The thirteenth volume (2005) “International Migration from the Perspective of Young Scholars” is fully made up of contributions by Master students, Ph.D. students and young research workers from Russia and other CIS states specializing in international migration studies.

The fourteenth volume (2005) represents the papers presented at two workshops organized by the Council of Europe in collaboration with the Department of Population of the Lomonosov Moscow State University: “Economic Migration in Russia – Legal Protection of Migrant Workers’ (Moscow, December 2003) and “Prospects of Labour Migration in Russia and Its Regions: Migrants’ Rights in the Context of Economic and Demographic Development” (Saint Petersburg, July 2004). Over 20 papers analyze most topical issues of
labour migration in Russia from the perspective of migration officials and experts, and from political, legal, economic, social, regional and ethnical points of view. Contributions by experts from European countries experienced in international labour migration management discuss the best possible ways for Russia to cope with increasing labour inflow, in particular by signing the European Convention on Legal Status of Migrant Workers (1977).

The fifteenth volume (2005) is a collection of papers submitted to the Session on international migration trends at the XXV IUSSP Conference, 18–23 July 2005, Tours, France. The papers reflect most typical contemporary international migration trends, including globalization of migration flows, growing role of international migration in demographic development of receiving countries, qualitative shifts in the global migration flows, the increasing role of labour migration, expansion of irregular migration, feminization of migration flows, and dual role of migration policies.

The sixteenth volume (2006) is the Russian version of the fifteenth volume.

The seventeenth volume (2006) presents the monograph of Aminat Magomedova «Economic and Demographic Aspects of External Migration in Russia». The impact of international migration on economic and demographic development in Russia is regarded both from the historical perspective and from the viewpoint of modern migration concepts.

The eighteenth volume (2006) includes papers by Russian and overseas researchers dealing with theoretical and applied issues of interrelations between migration processes, on the one hand, and economic and political challenges, on the other hand.

The nineteenth volume (2007) is an annotated bibliography of publications on migration of professors and researchers of the Center for Population Studies of the Lomonosov Moscow State University in 1967–2007. The bibliography gives the idea of the scale and traditions of migration studies that have grounded the contemporary approach to conceptualizing migration in the new stage of migration history of Russia. The author is Irina Ivakhnyuk.
The *twentieth, jubilee volume* (2007) is timed to the international conference ‘Migration and Development’ (the Fifth Valenteevskiye Chteniya) that was organized in Moscow on 13–15 September 2007 by the Center for Population Studies of the Faculty of Economics of the Lomonosov Moscow State University. The title of the 20th volume coincide with that of the conference – ‘Migration and Development’. It is dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the scientific series and includes papers of session chairs, some key speakers, and distinguished migration researchers. The paper by Jean-Claude Chesnais (France) – La Migration, le Lever de Development proves that migration can be an instrument to make positive shifts in this development. The same idea runs through the paper of Ronald Skeldon (United Kingdom) – Social and economic dimensions of migration: discussions of migration and development. The academic debate on international migration trends is also reflected in the article of Douglas S. Massey (United States of America)-Toward a Comprehensive Model of International Migration where the author persistently grounds his idea for comprehensive synthetic migration theory. Paul Demeny (United States of America) in his paper entitled Globalization and international migration: conflicting prospects comes to the conclusion that appears paradoxical at the first sight: maybe it is reasonable to turn down the attempts to manage migration since the previous experience proves their failure. The same ‘internal contradictoriness’ of contemporary migration the readers will find in the paper of David Coleman (United Kingdom) – Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low-fertility Countries – a third demographic transition in progress? where he warns about replacement of European civilization by another one, most likely Asian civilization in case the current demographic trends stay stable. As to Coleman, in order to avoid this scenario, it is necessary to impede or reject immigration. The role of international migration in the current and future development of the post-Soviet area is analyzed in the papers by Irina Ivakhnyuk (Russia) – Eurasian Migration System: theoretical and political approaches; Elena Sadovskaya (Kazakhstan) – International Labor Migration, Remittances and Development in Cen-
Central Asia: towards regionalization or globalization? and Irina Pribytkova (Ukraine) – Migration and Demographic Development of Ukraine. The volume also includes theoretical papers of Russian scholars: Leonid Rybakovsky (Russia) – Mechanisms of Migration Flows Formation and by Vladimir Iontsev and Ivan Aleshkovski (Russia) – International Migration and Globalization of World Economy. Other papers in this book are not less interesting. They present authors’ concepts on the role of international migration in the demographic and economic development of the world and its regions, on the role of migration in integration processes at the regional level, on prospects of immigration policy, etc.

The twenty-first volume (2008) is presented by an analytical report on the UNDP Project on ‘Migrants and HIV/AIDS in Russia: Problems and Solutions (express-analysis in the field of international labour migration and HIV/AIDS in the Russian Federation)’ that was conducted by a group of researchers of the Department of Population of the Faculty of Economics of the Lomonosov Moscow State University Vladimir Iontsev, Irina Ivakhnyuk, and Ivan Aleshkovski. This is in fact the first attempt to analyze interrelationships between migration of population and health and mortality, including mortality caused by HIV/AIDS.

The twenty-second volume (2009) entitled ‘The Russian Migration Policy and Its Impact on Human Development: the Historical Perspective’ is the original English text of the research paper made by Irina Ivakhnyuk for the Global Report on Human Development 2009 and its translation into Russian. The paper deals with the impact that the Russian migration policy focused on the country’s economic and political interests, has on the human development of the whole of the post-Soviet area.

The *twenty-fourth volume* (2011) ‘International Migration of Population and Challenges of Globalization’ deals with major challenges that are posed by globalization for international migration from economic, demographic and political perspectives, both at the global and national levels. The paper by Vladimir Iontsev and Julia Prokhorova deals with the global perspectives of international migration and nuptality in the context of the possibility of the fourth demographic transition. The papers by Irina Ivakhnyuk and Patrick Taran (ILO) are focused on international labour migration management in the globalizing economy. The paper by Marina Lifshits is dealing with economic and demographic role of contemporary international migration with special focus on Russia.
The scientific series ‘International Migration of Population: Russia and Contemporary World’ is open for both distinguished experts and young researchers engaged in international migration studies. To get detailed information on contribution terms or to send your papers including electronic version, please contact the Editorial Board.

For more detailed information about the scientific series «International Migration of Population: Russia and the Contemporary World» please contact the Editorial Board:

119992, Russia, Moscow,
Lomonosov Moscow State University,
Leninskiye Gory, Building 46,
Faculty of Economics,
Department of Population, room 462
Tel: +7 (495) 939 29 28; Fax: +7 (495) 939 08 77.
E-mail: iontsev@econ.msu.ru; ivakhnyuk@econ.msu.ru.