
The EU, Germany, Central Europe and Russia: Determinants of the EU's Foreign Policy towards Russia.

A compilation of study texts by
foremost scholars and analysts in this field
from the Central European region.

Barbora Veselá (ed.)

June/July 2011
Prague

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INTRODUCTION

Germany and Central Europe: New Normality and Seeking Extended Common Ground for Foreign Policy Action

(July 2011)

Vladimir Handl, IIR Prague

In 1990, Germany and the Central European countries entered the era of normalisation, intensification and multilateralisation of their relations. Twenty years on, as has been widely expected, Germany is the most important and active of all the large western states engaged in the region. Her dominant position in the region's economy has been undisputable, and the dynamic of co-operation in nearly every policy sector and in the cross-border relations has been impressive.

In this sense, the region has returned to the *pre-war normality*. What really changed Europe's centre dramatically and profoundly, however, is the *newnormality* of relations between Germany and its regional partners. In an unprecedented political development, the national interests of all the above mentioned countries have become compatible on a general level for the first time in modern history. The legal and political issues arising from the past have been largely exempted from the mutual relations, and historical

normalisation has been achieved. Existential issues represent a glue rather than an obstacle in the regional relations: Germany and its eastern neighbours – thank to the NATO- and EU-membership – guarantee each other's security, each other's territorial integrity, and the recognition of the existing borders. The multilateralisation of the mutual relations also decreased the importance of the asymmetry of the national potentials. And last but not least, since the EU accession, the bilateral relations have been dominated by 'European' issues. Most importantly the EU-Presidencies of the Central European states have initiated an active and intensive co-operation between them and Germany.

This kind of "practical" Europeanisation of German-Central European relations represents an important development: a close co-operation "on Europe" may be essential for dealing with two problems.

Firstly, the foreign policies of the Central European countries (and of some other small and middle sized EU-member states) as well as of Germany are faced with problems which show a certain level of similarity: substantial budgetary cuts; the decreasing level of interest of the political elite, the media and the public in broader foreign policy issues; the growing detachment of the public from the project of the European integration. Since the accession of the CE countries to the NATO/EU and the reform of the EU (the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty), Germany looks more like a *Handelsstaat* ("trading state") than a *Zivilmacht* ("civilian power") – which also applies to other CE countries with the notable exception of Poland. In fact, Germany appears to be more Central European than one would expect. Germany and most of the CE countries behave like "saturated states" without clearly defined ambitions and strategic priorities. They lack a clear vision of their priorities and exercise a mostly reactive policy, with the national focus being on their economic interest.

Secondly, we also witness a lack of coherence in the German-Central European relations given the differing positions that Germany and the CE

countries may take (and often have taken) on issues which influence the level of political co-operation between them – e.g. the future of the EU, and the roles of the USA and of Russia in Europe.

This publication will focus on several aspects of the relations to Russia, and it will do so in the broader context of European and transatlantic relationships. But before we turn to the attitude towards Russia, two specific issues have to be mentioned.

Firstly, there is the issue of the volatility of the policy in the CE countries. The German political class has developed a permissive consensus (currently somewhat weakening) in regard to the main foreign policy issues after World War II. Such a broad political consensus is either weak or missing in many of the CE countries, particularly in the Czech Republic and Poland. Since the NATO and EU accession, the long-term internal division of the political class into four individual streams of thought has surfaced: the Atlanticist stream (primarily Anglo-Saxon orientated, preferring intergovernmental multilateralism); the Europeanist/Continentalist stream (more EU-oriented and accepting of the sharing of sovereignty in multilateral institutions); the internationalist/universalist stream (combining the above approaches and usually representing the basis for a broader national compromise) and the sovereignist/autonomist stream (this stream in principle rejects all of the above, but in practice it co-operates most closely with the eurosceptical Atlanticists).¹ The future of the EU, the attitude to Russia, and other such issues are approached very differently in the opinions of these individual foreign policy streams. Inevitably, the level of compatibility with the predominantly continuing German policy depends on which political school of thought prevails at which particular moment in the governments of the individual ECE countries.

¹ Petr Drulák – Michal Kořan – Jan Růžička (2008). Außenpolitik im Ostmitteleuropa. Von Universalisten, Atlantikern, Europäern und Souveränisten, in: OSTEUROPA, 7/2008, pp. 139–152.

Secondly, co-operation in the area of military security is much less prominent in the German-ECE relations than European policy. Germany did offer (and pay for!) a wide range of assistance/modernisation programmes for the armed forces of the ECE countries in order to prepare them for NATO-accession during the 1990s. This kind of practical co-operation has not automatically secured the strategic level of co-operation, though.²

One of the reasons lies in the difference between the *strategic culture* of Germany and those of its CE partners, primarily Poland: Germany mainly represents a European “civilian power” when it comes to the use of force, while Poland and some other CE countries have often acted as military activists.

On the political level, Germany and the CE countries often differ in their *attitude to the USA*. The German dependence on the USA in the military security area has decreased and the partial emancipation of Berlin from Washington during the GW Bush administration has had a lasting effect. Also, there is a tension between the US expectations and the German ability/readiness to engage politically and militarily in European and global security.³ The effect of the policy of the GW Bush administration (in particular the Rumsfeldian perception of NATO as a “tool box”) caused the rush for stronger bilateral ties with the US. Some CE countries searched for compensating strategies, and participation in the US programme of missile defence seemed to offer exceptional ties with the US, guaranteeing power “for free”. Germany even became a part of the geopolitical argument in favour of the American bases on Czech soil.⁴

² Vladimir Handl – Kerry Longhurst – Marcin Zaborowski (2000). Germany’s Security Policy towards East Central Europe, in: *Perspectives*. 14/2000, pp. 54-70.

³ Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger (2011). „Obamas Zukunftsvision“, FAZ (June 7, 2011), URL: <http://www.faz.net/-01wx5q>.

⁴ Mirek Topolánek. Speech at the conference “U.S. Missile Defence in Europe: Consequences for the Transatlantic Relations”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, May 31, 2007, in: Dokumenty, 2007/5, p. 35.

This all impacted in one way or another on the differences in the German and CE relations with Russia. Germany does not fear Russia, and German-Russian relations can be viewed as symbiotic. German policy sticks to the imperative “do not lose Russia”. It seems that since the NATO and EU enlargement and reform, the German policy towards Russia has represented one of the very few truly strategically based German foreign policy agendas.

Unlike Germany, most of the CE countries lack both the potential to establish equal relations with and a distance (geographic as well as emotional) from Russia, and they experience occasional or permanent Russian pressure. Their policy has thus been much tougher towards Moscow than the German inclusive strategy. Finding a mutual understanding in regard to this issue has therefore been one of the critical preconditions for any closer partnership between Germany and the ECE countries.

Since the arrival of Barack Obama and Donald Tusk to the leading political positions in the USA and Poland, the room for co-operation between Poland and Germany and for a flexible Polish policy towards Russia has increased: in fact, the normalisation of the Polish-Russian relations – backed by continuous German efforts – opened up a new dimension for the strategic partnership between Poland and Germany. Also, the reconfiguration of the missile defence programme by the Obama administration largely liberated the Polish and Czech relations with Germany from the controversial issue. The ongoing lack of trust in the Obama administration among some Polish and Czech Atlanticists increased somewhat paradoxically the importance of the CESDP context – at least for the time being.

One example of the increasing German-CE bilateral co-ordination concerning Russia has been the EU project of the Eastern Partnership: Germany has invested time and diplomatic effort in order to – first – open the originally rather anti-Russian oriented programme to Russia and – second – to obtain a Russian general consent to a future co-operation on this basis. After reaching a consensus with the government of Mirek Topolánek,

Chancellor Merkel became the only head of a major EU-state to participate in the EU summit in Prague in April, which launched the Eastern Partnership. In autumn 2010, after a further series of German-Russian discussions, Russia softened its objections to the project (it also indicated a possibility of its participation in a missile defence programme of NATO/EU).

In fact, however, the issue has remained unresolved and Germany has been constantly under pressure from Moscow to withdraw its support to the project, which has been perceived as a “normative competition” between the European and the Russian/CIS model of politics and integration.

* * *

The attitude to Russia in the context of NATO and the EU thus represents an important dimension of the German-Central European relations. This is why the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Prague) and the Institute of International Relations joined their efforts in 2008-2009 and held one seminar and two conferences on various diverse aspects of the topic.

This publication derives from the contributions to the conference “*Determinants of the EU’s Russian Policy – Divergences, Differentiation and Search for Consensus among EU Member States in Central Europe*”, held on 24-25th November 2009. It may be of interest to the reader to trace the development of the previous debates over the span of the previous two years in the appendix to this collection, where all three of the conference reports are compiled.

Two categories of texts are included in this collection: firstly, conference contributions or relevant texts by the conference participants that were published elsewhere; secondly, texts by authors who did not directly participate in the conference but published on relevant topics.

The final written forms of the conference contributions and most of the other texts were written or revised in 2010. Therefore they sometimes present quite vividly diverging responses to several key events which took place in 2008-2010. The foreign and security contributions echo the aftershocks of the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, and the reactions to the change in the US policy under the Obama administration in 2009, the arrival of the new conservative-liberal coalition headed by Chancellor Merkel in Germany (autumn of 2009), the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (October 2009) and the Copenhagen climate change summit (December 2009).

The first section is devoted to the security policy. Hans Joachim Spanger (Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt am Main, HSFK) seeks in his contribution to analyse the often troubled NATO-Russian relationship and proposes a set of measures which could improve the relations and contribute to European and global security. Marek Menkiszak (Centre for Eastern Studies, OSW, Warsaw) focuses on the internal division within NATO by presenting two competing perceptions of Russia – as a partner and as a potential threat. He calls for a policy of engagement of as well as an active response to Russia. Markus Kaim (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP, Berlin) looks at the chances of a reset of the NATO-Russian relationship. According to him, all NATO member states should make relations with Russia a priority and Russia should refrain from hegemonic policy in the post-Soviet space and from viewing NATO as her rival. The section is completed by two reprinted texts: the impact of the change in the US policy under President Obama represents an important contrasting case in the article by Nikola Hynek and Vít Strátecký (Institute of International Relations, Prague); the authors analyse the similarities as well as the substantial differences in the Polish and Czech approaches to the project of the missile defence. The analysis by Cortnie Shupe (Bertelsmann Foundation, Munich) focuses specifically on Obama’s reset in the relations with Russia

and calls for a New Ostpolitik of the EU that would utilize elements of Medvedev's proposal for a new European security architecture.

The second section of the publication turns to another topical issue in relations with Russia – energy security. The conference contributions discuss the topic in a broader context, highlighting its global, European or national aspects. Andrea Zlatňanská (Greenpeace, Slovakia) takes a global as well as a specifically Slovak view and argues in favour of an energy (r)evolution, increased energy efficiency and use of renewables; the aim, according to her, should be a fossil fuel phase-out and a nuclear phase-out in parallel. András Deák (CEU, Center for EU Enlargement Studies) discusses the chances of the ECE countries to secure a more diversified gas network by building a number of South-North interconnectors, linking the existing East-West pipelines and locking in new import sources. Jonas Grätz (SWP, Berlin) argues that by concentrating their effort on the internal market, individual member states could substantially reduce their vulnerability in relation to Russian energy deliveries, and the EU's capacity to act coherently towards Russia would be enhanced. Unlike Andrea Zlatňanská, Artur Gradziuk (Polish Institute for International Relations, PISM, Warszawa) argues in his contribution (which was delivered in the period "before Fukushima") that the set of measures that are necessary to meet the planned EU climate objectives will inevitably have to include further development of nuclear energy. Lukáš Tichý (IIR, Prague) brings the whole region into the debate in his article: while discussing the energy relations and interaction between the Czech Republic and Russia, he comes, i.a., to the conclusion that co-operation within the Visegrád Group could improve the energy security of the Czech Republic. An even broader perspective is opened up in a reprinted article by Martin Kremer (SWP, Berlin) and Sascha Müller-Kraenner (The Nature Conservancy – an environmental organisation). They discuss the failure of the Copenhagen climate conference and argue that the newly established European External

Action Service should help the EU to continue to shape/lead the international climate diplomacy.

The last section consists of two reprinted texts: Vladimír Handl (IIR, Prague) and Tomáš Ehler (MFA CR)⁵ seek to establish a differentiated assessment of the German relations with Russia in the political, security and energy areas. And last but not least, Cornelius Ochman (Bertelsmann Stiftung) traces the short but politically complex history of the Eastern Partnership and of the German approach to it. He emphasises the importance of the Polish-Russian rapprochement and calls, i.a., for a stronger involvement of the civil society in the project.

The appendix, as indicated above, consists of two reports of conferences co-organised by the Institute of International Relations and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Prague. They may be of interest to some readers as they offer a short-cut through the continuous debate on the topic in the years 2008 and 2009.

The publication would not have been possible without financial support of Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Prague and the meticulous editorial work of Barbora Veselá. Last but not least, the publication is dedicated to Erfried Adam, the former head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Prague. Erfried Adam was the spiritus agents of a great variety of important and highly recognised public events and other activities – including the above mentioned two conferences. We wish him well in his further professional endeavours and in his private life.

⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.

I.

**The Security Policy
as a Determinant of the EU-Russia
Relationship**

A Mutual Peculiarity: Russia and NATO

(March 2010)

Hans-Joachim Spanger, Peace Research Institute
in Frankfurt am Main (PRIF)

Whereas German-Russian relations have consistently been labelled – and praised – as “strategic”, “close” and based on a broad-ranging mutual understanding by representatives from both sides, NATO-Russia relations give exactly the opposite impression. Thus Russia’s new military doctrine, signed into force by President Medvedev on 5 February 2010, stipulates that NATO constituted the No. 1 external “danger” to the Russian Federation. And although NATO professes to be less explicit, many voices from within do not leave any doubt that Russia does not make NATO feel comfortable. For more than a decade, these relations have been so bad that one feels tempted to speak of a mutual and deeply entrenched syndrome. It exists on both sides with quite some elements of mutual reinforcement – yet in accordance with the overall structure of the presentations the focus will be on Russia’s NATO syndrome.

1. Traits of Russia's NATO Syndrome

For Russia's attitude towards NATO to qualify as a syndrome it requires continuity, broad application and a compromising of other foreign and security policy objectives. In all these regards, the evidence that it is a syndrome is striking.

There has been virtually *no change* over time: the same grievances have been expressed in the same way since 1994, that is, when the alternative was posed as to whether NATO's new "Partnership for Peace" programme was conceived as a genuinely new relationship or rather as a preparatory stage for the accession of a selected number of prospective members. Take, for instance, then deputy foreign minister Boris Kazantsev, who objected on principal grounds to NATO's enlargement in a speech that he delivered on 6 March 1997. Instead he called for a "multipolar and really democratic structure," a universal security system that would be based on equality in place of the previous bipolar system, and argued against "new dividing lines in Europe". He also left no doubt that he felt that Russia had to react "adequately" as NATO expansion could undermine all treaties (CFE, START) and lead to increased tensions. The only acceptable option for NATO, in his view, was for it to be transformed into an organization for crisis prevention and management, including peace keeping.⁶

The current list of NATO grievances is equally long and it has hardly been affected by Rasmussen's three suggestions, which he launched in his first major speech as NATO secretary general in 2009. Although the suggestions were greeted as "well-founded and logical", the sense of still dominant "destructive elements" in NATO-Russia relations prevails. These elements are namely:

- NATO's willingness to expand further, most notably to Georgia and Ukraine,
- anti-Russian attitudes (many members have demonstrated anti-Russian attitudes on many occasions and at least six have proved outright antagonistic),
- NATO's desire for military superiority over Russia (including the non-ratification of CFE),
- military bases and installations close to Russia's borders (which currently refers to the US bases in Romania and Bulgaria),
- ongoing plans to deploy land- and sea-based missile defence systems,
- stepped-up air and naval activities along Russia's borders,
- the view in which Russia is allegedly still considered the primary potential adversary in NATO's military and strategic orientation,
- and not least the rejection of Medvedev's call for a new European security pact that would include Russia as an equal partner.

These grievances have been *all-encompassing*; that is to say, they have by no means been confined to those parts of Russian society with vested interests in a confrontational posture such as the Military Industrial Complex, which desperately needs the bogeyman for its very survival while it is stagnant and firmly detached from any meaningful modernization and still geared towards outdated modes of warfare. These sentiments are equally prominent among liberal segments of the society. Take, for instance, Aleksei Arbatov, who, on behalf of the Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR), gave some hints of the broad-based consensus in his assessment of Russian-US relations. Although he acknowledges a "low likelihood of a premeditated wide-scale military attack on Russia", he nevertheless claims very much in line with Andrei Kozyrev's famous Helsinki speech in 1992 that "disastrous results" would occur in case of NATO's further expansion

⁶ "NATO and Russia", Presentation by Boris Kazantsev in Paris, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, March 6, 1997.

and in particular with regard to the inclusion of Ukraine. If this were to happen, the following worst-case scenario might ensue:

- there would be zones of constant violence, and unlawful acts would occur along the new borders,
- the economic, humanitarian and technological relations between Russia and Ukraine would be threatened,
- there would be a high risk of political destabilization in Ukraine, including mass violence, which could draw Russia and the West into a direct confrontation,
- Russia would lose military facilities, which would open up “a vast new ‘window of vulnerability’”,
- a Russian “complex of a partitioned nation” would develop,
- anti-Western and authoritarian sentiments in Russia would rise even further,
- and finally compensatory measures such as Russia maintaining ties with anti-US regimes across the world would necessarily follow.⁷

His proposed solution to this problem is that at the very least Russia should delay “NATO’s expansion into the post-Soviet space indefinitely”. But Russia also has something to offer, since it should act as “a guarantor of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its CIS neighbours – on the condition, of course, that these nations retain their neutral military-political status”.⁸

There is a kind of *conceptual mismatch* between the emphasis on quite up-to-date objectives and new trans-national threats, on the one hand, and the concurrent reference to fairly traditional threat perceptions, on the other, when it comes to NATO and the US.

Thus President Medvedev in his 2009 *poslanie* – his address to the Federal Assembly – called for an “extremely pragmatic” foreign policy which

⁷ Igor Yurgens – Alexander Dynkin – Alexei Arbatov (eds.) (2009). *Russian-US Relations: Towards a New Agenda*, Moscow, pp. 15-6.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 19, 39-40.

should be guided by “a simple criterion: does it contribute to improving living standards in our country?” And he made it equally clear that his overall aim of modernizing Russia can best be achieved in close cooperation with the most advanced countries, which are incidentally located in the West. In a similar vein the most recent National Security Strategy emphasized that “Holding an open and predictable foreign policy is inextricably linked to the implementation of sustainable development in Russia”.

At the same time, however, in Russia’s relations with the West traditional hard security concerns like NATO expansion, AMD, and arms control still dominate. And these concerns also occupy a prominent place in the list of military threats that includes first and foremost the aim of “a number of leading foreign countries” to achieve “overwhelming military superiority”, as equally stipulated in the National Security Strategy.⁹ Therefore: “The determining factor in relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will remain plans to move the military infrastructure of the alliance to its borders and attempts to assume global functions that are inconsistent with international law and unacceptable for Russia.”¹⁰

⁹ It reads: “30. Threats to military security are: the policy of a number of leading foreign countries aimed at achieving overwhelming superiority in the military field, especially in the strategic nuclear forces, through the development of high precision, information and other high-tech means of warfare, strategic weapons in non-nuclear roles, the formation of a unilateral global missile defence system and the militarization of space that could lead to a new arms race, as well as the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological technology, the production of weapons of mass destruction or their components and delivery systems. The negative impact on the military security of Russia and its allies is compounded by a departure from international agreements on arms limitation and reduction, as well as actions to breach the stability of systems of state and military command and control, missile warning, space control, the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, storage sites, nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, nuclear and chemical industries, and other potentially dangerous objects.”

¹⁰ National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, No. 17. This, however, does not necessarily rule out cooperation: “Russia is keen to develop relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the basis of equality and to strengthen overall security in the Euro-Atlantic region, the depth and content to be determined by the willingness of the alliance to take into account the legitimate interests of Russia in the implementation of political and military planning, respect for international law and as to their further transformation and the search for new tasks and functions of humanistic orientation.”

Yet the more recent trans-border threats are equally present. Look, for instance, at the Foreign Policy Doctrine of July 2008, which enumerates terrorist attacks, narcotics trafficking, trans-national organized crime, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, demographic challenges and illegal migration, spread of poverty, shortage of energy resources, and climate change. In addition there has been a much greater emphasis on domestic security challenges. Both of these problems call for close cooperation with the West. This is incidentally also reflected in the budget appropriations for defence on the one hand and those for broad security (Ministry of the Interior, border security, civil emergencies and the like) on the other. Whereas in 1997 the spending on the latter comprised just 45% of the amount spent on defence, the difference grew continuously smaller and since 2008 broad security spending even surpassed defence spending.

2. How to Explain the Syndrome?

These factors clearly show that one can hardly attribute Russia's stance on NATO to Putin and the authoritarian departure of Russia from the mainstream of European politics as pundits of the democratic peace theory would have it. This approach maintains that the preservation of authoritarian power crucially rests upon having external scapegoats whereas a democratic Russian polity would automatically anchor the country in the Western camp, as it were. The evolution of Russia's NATO stance, however, tells a different story. Consequently, the sources of its discontent lie elsewhere.

The first important element is the Great Power syndrome – nothing peculiar to Russia. There is an ostensible and repeated call that Russia will never accept being relegated to the sidelines of the civilized world. Whether it wants to stand on a par with the US, the G8 or just the G20 and the European Union, one can hardly expect Russia to accept a second or third

tier role. Its preferred mode of operation as a lone great power, as outlined in its May 2009 National Security Strategy, is a concert of great powers. This concert would be a means to improve cooperation among the great powers, but Russia is somehow aware of the inherent instability of such a concert, as it admits to the concurrent need to establish common rules for governing and reducing the (growing) competition among them.

This has repercussions on Russia's foreign behaviour, for instance, in the field of arms control, which can again best be highlighted by referring to INSOR. Thus Aleksei Arbatov is in favour of (re-)establishing the current strategic arms reduction talks "as a permanent institute" for the reason that they proved (during the Cold War) to be "an irreplaceable instrument in restoring Russia's special status in US foreign policy and the entire international security agenda". And they allegedly also allow Russia "to advance along other security lines".¹¹ Although strongly objected to by others, such as Sergei Karaganov, as a "revival of military standoff mentality", these favourably conceived potential implications certainly have a great attraction to a political class longing for an international stature. Similarly, Arbatov calls for using the still remarkable stockpiles of Russian tactical nuclear weapons as a trump card and recommends sweeping disarmament only in case of "a radical reduction in the number of NATO conventional armed forces in Europe and an irreversible renunciation of the alliance's future expansion plans".¹²

With great power aspirations comes the quest for an exclusive sphere of interest, the notorious bone of contention between Russia and the US in particular: "Russia's near abroad is turning into a zone of intense international competition, where Russia's claim to special relations with the

¹¹ Igor Yurgens et al. (2009), pp. 7-8.

¹² Thereby displaying exactly the same military logic that was employed by NATO during the Cold War arms control talks, *ibid.*, p. 20.

region's countries not only is not shared by a substantial portion of the world community, but also is met with its active countermeasures. In recent years, this policy has been taken up also by China.” Moreover, the prospects for a “constructive collaboration” between Russia and the US in the region “remain marginal”.¹³

A third – and more recent – factor is the change in the international balance of power, most notably the rise of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China as originally lumped together by the US investment bank Goldman Sachs). This has given the impression that new openings are being provided. In fact, the issue of “multipolarity” that became much more tangible with the BRIC is the only thing that has visibly changed in favour of Russia. First coined by then-Foreign Minister Primakov in 1996, it has eventually become common currency in official rhetoric to characterize the new features of the international system. The operational relevance, however, seems still fairly limited to me.

3. Which Steps Should be Taken to Improve Relations?

As the mutual misunderstandings and accusations piled up for more than a decade, one lesson seems obvious: NATO cannot rest on its benign rhetoric and keep wondering why Russia does not subscribe to it. If it is to improve its relations with Russia, NATO clearly has to move – in its own interest and in the interest of European security and beyond. In light of the prevailing balance of power it clearly can do so without undermining

¹³ Ibid., pp. 37-38. The inclusion of China, which is much cherished because it is seen as adding to the multipolar counterweight against US unipolarism, is the most remarkable deviation from the well-established uneasiness of the Russian political class about Western incursions into the Russian backyard. The proposition is equally rare in that it derives the conclusion that Russia's main task is to forge constructive relations with its neighbours and harbours no Soviet dreams at all.

its standing or, less so, its existence. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen (in his first major international speech) has outlined three points that he considers major avenues: (a) “NATO and Russia should immediately look to reinforce practical cooperation in all the areas where both agree to face the same risks and threats to security”; (b) “rejuvenate the NATO-Russia Council, so that it can be used as a forum for open and unbiased dialogue on all issues related to peace and stability in Europe”; and (c) “carry out a joint review of the new 21st century security challenges, to serve as a firm basis for future cooperation”. This is clearly a reasonable yet still insufficient overture, since it bogs down everyday business and lacks a real vision. A better one, however, would require addressing and picking up on Russia's concerns.

Approaching this issue systematically requires that, as a first step, we clarify the assumptions on which any proposition is based (explicitly or implicitly). As a rule this implies an application of theories, but two basic questions will have to be answered in any case:

What *can* be achieved with Russia? This concerns the prospects of change within Russia (in terms of attitude and in terms of behaviour) and the relevance of external incentives or constraints for stimulating or encouraging such a change. Though it is a great power in its own right, Russia is – to some extent – receptive to the demands of its environment.

What *ought* to be achieved with Russia? Irrespective of the first question this concerns the need for engaging Russia in one's own interest but also in the interest of overarching objectives such as improving European security and addressing pressing international challenges as, for instance, the Iranian nuclear issue. Who would question in earnest that it is beneficial to engage Russia in this realm?

Once these assumptions (contentious as they are) have been clarified, they need to be translated into concrete steps, their overall aim being to combine pragmatic moves with a broader vision of where we are (prefer-

ably jointly) heading. Previous NATO policy with regard to Russia and its expansion in particular was lacking such a vision, although the overall approach has by no means been destructive. NATO was aiming at combining enlargement with a continuous deepening of its relations with Russia, as shown by the Founding Act of 1997 and the upgrading of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. But this did not work well, since it ultimately did not solve the inside/outside problem.

With Regard to NATO the Following Measures Should Be Considered

(a) NATO could establish official relations with the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (ODKB) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (ShOS) (both beyond the perimeter of NATO's 1999 strategic concept). The ODKB used to be a fairly hollow organization up until recently but it is gradually gaining substance as a venue for security consultation and coordination and has even gained some operational relevance on the margins of common security concerns. The ShOS, on the other hand, has been marred by substantial differences between China and Russia as to what its primary role should be – the major common interest being to manage the area concerned without external interference by the US, which applies first and foremost to Central Asia (in itself the subject of a turf battle between Russia and China). But here too one can find sufficient room for cooperation, Afghanistan being a prominent example.

(b) NATO could engage Russia in the “Corfu Process” on upgrading European security mechanisms. This is impeded by two facts, though: Russia has not yet come to grips as to the format (in the framework of or separate from the OSCE); and neither NATO nor Russia has made up its mind as to its interests with respect to the future security role of the OSCE. Both

consider the organization less than efficient. Yet whereas NATO is not exactly eager to envisage any infringement on its room of manoeuvre, Russia is not eager to give the OSCE's third basket new credit. However, there will almost certainly be a classic CSCE-type trade-off, and NATO cannot expect to escape pan-European rules of conduct indefinitely – if it does not want to alienate Russia indefinitely. Consider the alternative: a quite traditional concert of great powers, which would inevitably come about if a comprehensive rule-based system did not materialize.

(c) NATO could clarify the relationship between collective defence and collective security, which has to be addressed in NATO's new strategic concept. In practical terms this concerns, among other things, NATO's stationing commitments of the Founding Act (no nuclear forces and no permanent stationing of “substantial combat forces” – a term yet to be clarified and agreed upon). Thereby the ways and means to reassure the Central East European allies in terms of coupling and in terms of mitigating the classic alliance fear of abandonment have to be addressed (the equivalent fear of entrapment is no longer relevant, provided Saakashvili-type irresponsibilities do not make their way into NATO). In broader terms it refers to the question as to whether the NATO Council can again be upgraded to become the “central locus of security debates” as called for in the current German coalition platform – which, by extension, should then include an upgrading of the NATO-Russia Council.

And a final call on Russia: There is a need for Russia to sort out its relations with NATO directly, not by making them conditional on relations to other states. Thus benchmarking NATO-Russia relations on reneging on any future expansion of NATO amounts to nothing but limiting state sovereignty and thereby violating the principle of equal security in the most fundamental sense – which is much cherished by Russia itself. There is also

another benchmark, since this task will have been completed in conditions where such an accession is not deemed necessary or detrimental any more.

Russia Factor in the Post-Georgia NATO Debate

(February 2010)

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Relations between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Russian Federation are one of the key issues of European security. These relations, without any doubt, will be a major factor shaping the future of NATO. The following short text focuses on the dilemma the Alliance has in its relations with Russia and on possible NATO policies in that respect.

1. Lessons from the History of NATO-Russia Relations

Relations between NATO and the Russian Federation had many ups and downs in the last 18 years. There were moments of hope and more intensive dialogue, like in 1991-92, 1997-98 or 2001-02, and moments of crisis like in 1994-95, 1999 and 2008. However a dominant trend over the course of the whole period was the process of the steady institutionalization of the privileged partnership between the Alliance and Russia. Started formally in 1995, this process led to the establishment of a Permanent Joint Council under the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 2007 and a fur-

ther institutionalization of the NATO-Russia Council under the Rome Declaration of 2002.

Despite this both sides seem not to be satisfied with their relations. The problem is rooted mainly in the different approaches of the two sides. Russia was aiming at two simultaneous goals: to use its ever closer relations with the Alliance to stop the eastward NATO enlargement (providing an alternative to that by its cooperation with NATO), and to change the European security architecture, allowing Russia to become one of the key decision makers, however without embracing Euroatlantic values, norms and standards. NATO, on its part, looked upon Russia as an important partner which also needed help to reform itself to accord with Euroatlantic standards on one hand, and on the other hand, the further institutionalization of the relations was seen as a kind of price to pay for calming down the Russian frustration over the ongoing process of the NATO enlargement. The expectations on both sides were different and their goals were not reached, so disillusionment was the obvious reaction.

What was clearly seen within NATO, as the Alliance was enlarging to the East, was the difference in the approaches of the “old” and the “new” member states. For the “old”, especially large Western European member states Russia was a formerly feared enemy who had been changed into a partner. This remarkable change raised hopes for a closer constructive cooperation and fueled the policy of reaching out to Russia to create a stable and prosperous Europe. For the “new” member states Russia was the successor of the Soviet Union – their unwanted *hegemon* in communist times. Still fresh memories of dependence and a clear wish to consolidate their independence and security made the aim “to escape from Russia” an implicit base of their security policies. “New” member states observed with concern Russia’s attempts to limit to the greatest possible extent the practical military consequences of the NATO enlargement and were reluctant to give Russia

instruments for influencing NATO policies in the process of developing the NATO-Russia partnership.

What really poisoned NATO – Russia relations was two wars: one in Yugoslavia in 1999 and another in Georgia in 2008. For Moscow the spring 1999 NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia in the context of the Kosovo crisis had both a practical political and a symbolic meaning. It reinforced the Russian perception of NATO as mainly a US instrument of violent change of the (geo)political status quo, without paying attention to international law and relations with Russia. It also became a powerful symbol of Russia’s weakness for the Russian elite. Russia had been ignored and failed in its attempts to stop the West in the Kosovo crisis. In this context the Russian – Georgian war of August 2008 was a kind of symbolic revenge in the Russian perception. In practical terms it was a demonstration that Russia is able and willing to violently change the status quo in its neighbourhood for Moscow’s benefit and the West is helpless in a way, since it does not want to confront Russia. The Georgian war was seen among the Russian political elite as a symbol and ultimate proof of Russia’s rebirth as a global power. But among NATO member states the perceptions of this war were different. A large part of the political elite of Western Europe perceived the Georgian war as a consequence of the failed US policy of ignoring or provoking Russia under G. W. Bush. On the other hand a large part of the political elite in Central Eastern Europe perceived that war as an ultimate proof of Russia’s neo-imperial revisionist policy changing from being one of assertiveness to being one of aggressiveness towards its direct neighbours.

2. The Two Faces of Russia in NATO’s Perception

Against this background it is not a surprise that the tension is rising between the two different perceptions of Russia within NATO: that in which

it is an important or even strategic partner and that in which it is a challenge or even a threat.

2.1 Russia as NATO's Important Partner

Many years of dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Russia allow for certain conclusions to be made on the results of this partnership. One can find certain obstacles to the use of its potential, though.

Since the NATO operation in Afghanistan is often seen as the most important current Alliance endeavour and some even go so far as suggesting that it is a test of NATO's effectiveness, the **cooperation with Russia on Afghanistan** has been especially highlighted recently. The importance of this cooperation for NATO has grown considerably in the last few years because of the constant deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan, and especially because of the growing problems with the overland transportation of supplies for the mission through the territory of Pakistan. Russia has skillfully used its position of being the transit country and provider of long-haul air transport on a commercial basis to increase its financial benefits and uplift its bargaining position with the West. In the last few years, Moscow has made a few gestures towards some NATO member countries and to the Alliance in general in which it extended its offer of both air and land transit of supplies for NATO troops in Afghanistan. On the other hand it made it clear to NATO and the US that there is a price to pay if further steps in that direction are going to be made. On numerous occasions, Russian officials were open in their suggestions for NATO to establish official relations and start a cooperation with the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Russia-dominated security structure being a *de facto* instrument of Russia's control over some of its CIS neighbours and their security relations with the West. Also the Russian postulate to include Moscow in NATO's frameworks of dialogue and cooperation with the

Central Asian partner states should lead to the same goal: acknowledgement by the West of the CIS area in general, and the post-Soviet Central Asia in particular, as a sphere of dominant Russian interest. This provides NATO with a certain dilemma. Moreover, the popular belief that NATO and Russia have a common interest in political-military success over the Taliban rebels in Afghanistan should be put under a big question mark after a more in-depth analysis. It seems that Moscow wants NATO to remain engaged in Afghanistan and to avoid completely withdrawing its troops from the country, but it does not necessarily want NATO to succeed in this matter. All the above mentioned facts suggest that the NATO-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan is very important, but it has certain limitations and involves certain risks.

The fight with terrorism is officially labelled as one of the priority spheres of the NATO-Russia cooperation. Under this label documents on threat assessment and a joint action plan have been agreed and individual Russian Navy ships periodically participate in exercises of a sort in the NATO's Operation Active Endeavour on the Mediterranean Sea. However this last type of Russian participation is purely symbolic. Seminars and conferences on the subject are currently taking place. Also a limited anti-terrorist intelligence cooperation is occurring between Russia and some individual NATO member states, but the Alliance as a whole is rightly not treated as an important partner in that sphere by Moscow.

Another sphere of NATO-Russia dialogue which has been perceived as very important for the last couple of years is **Theatre Missile Defence**. In the long process the two sides have theoretically analyzed the possibilities of creating an interface between the Russian and NATO non-strategic missile defence systems (the NATO system being still under development); exercises (simulations) also took place in this regard. However, it seems that we got to a point where we cannot go much further without serious political decisions. The project has been hampered both by the defi-

cit of trust on both sides (after all, it involves cooperation in a sensitive area) and the problem of the practical use of such joint systems. It seems that the most sensible form of creating a joint NATO-Russia TMD could serve the protection of deployed forces under a joint NATO-Russia (NRC) peacekeeping operation. However, such a collective endeavour is not on the horizon. There are also other possible forms of TMD usage, such as using it for the limited defence of territories and/or strategic installations, especially *vis a vis* the threat of a short range rocket attack by a rogue state. Hopes for such a possibility have grown after the recent decision of the new US administration to change plans on the SMD, which for many years has been opposed by Moscow. But still what is needed is consensus in threat assessment and on the policy responses. The case of Iran clearly shows that this is difficult to achieve.

Crisis management/collective peace-keeping has been another important area of the NATO-Russia dialogue. And even if the political-military frameworks of possible joint NATO-Russia operations were agreed, it seems we have a certain deadlock in that respect. The two main barriers are apparently the same as those in the case of TMD: the problem of how to allow for the collective operational planning with Russia's full participation not compromising the integrity of the NATO system and procedures, and the question of where and on which concrete terms we should deploy such collective forces. The natural area for such deployment could be one of the "frozen conflicts" in the CIS area, but this idea was approached with reluctance in Russia. The important problem in that context is the level of commonality of interests between NATO and Russia. Obviously the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 gave a huge blow to such a possible cooperation, showing clearly that Russia is a part of the problem rather than a part of the solution.

Support for a **democratic defence reform** in Russia used to be seen in the Alliance as an important element of the NATO-Russia partnership.

The dialogue has been officially claimed as productive and without a doubt defence reform is progressing in Russia, especially in the last couple of years. The Russian Federation is definitely making a huge effort to develop a more modern and effective military structure. The problem is that even if some of these reforms are in line with those taken in the NATO member states' armed forces, the political context of the security and defence system in Russia differs much from the one in the Allied nations. It is not a democratic defence reform because Russia is not a democracy, but an authoritarian state that merely maintains formal appearances of having democratic institutions. Changing that situation is not possible without a positive change of the political elite ruling Russia, which does not seem to be probable in the foreseeable future.

What seems to be a very positive example of NATO-Russia cooperation is the **Collective Airspace Initiative**. The system of live data exchange on the civilian and military air traffic between NATO and Russia is effective because it is based on the common interest of both sides to improve the safety of air transport. It shows that a pragmatic positive cooperation between NATO and Russia is possible when it responds to both sides' needs, has practical output and is not politically sensitive.

There are many **other spheres of dialogue and cooperation** between NATO and Russia, such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, search and rescue at sea, counter-piracy, civilian emergency, military-to-military contacts, scientific cooperation, etc. Most of them, however, have a political-symbolic rather than a practical value. Still they should not be disregarded in the search for possible spheres of pragmatic cooperation.

2.2 Russia as a Challenge or Possible Threat to NATO

However, the Russian Federation is perceived among some NATO member states not only as a partner but also as a challenge or even a security threat. Such a perception is based on the analysis of some aspects of Russia's defence policy, its policy towards its neighbours in the CIS area and certain Russian actions *vis a vis* individual NATO member states.

As far as the **developments in Russia** are concerned, some NATO nations have certain concerns over the intensive buildup of the Russian armed forces. This process has sped up considerably especially since 2006. Between 2000 and 2008 Russia's official annual defence spending increased by a factor of 12 (10-20% growth p.a.). The process of modernization of the armed forces continues at a fast pace. Under the current state armament programme, for the period between 2007 and 2015 the equivalent of 183 bln USD was assigned for new military equipment. Exercise activity of the armed forces has grown considerably in the last years. Among many other events, in 2008 the strategic exercise "Stability" took place, involving around 100 th. troops of all branches of the armed forces. In 2009 the combined operational exercises "West" and "Ladoga" took place, involving in total more than 30 th. troops amassed on the western borders of Russia. Structural changes include the ongoing prioritizing of the permanent readiness combat units, which are growing in numbers, and other similar activities. Certain features of these processes suggest that Russia is preparing its offensive military potential. Moreover, the financial and economic crisis in Russia has not hampered these processes, but actually their pace has been increased and some deadlines were shortened (from 2015 to 2012).

As far as the **policy of Russia towards some neighbor states in the CIS area** is concerned, concern in some NATO member states has grown because of the cases of very assertive and even aggressive Russian policies. Since 2006 Russia has been using energy supplies and trade restrictions as

a political tool to pursue its interests vs. Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia. Especially Georgia has suffered in the last couple of years, as it was subjected to political sanctions, a partial trade embargo, a periodical energy blockade, violation of its airspace and the shelling of its territory. The culminating point in Russia's policy vs. Georgia was the Russian military invasion in August 2008 (on the pretext of the Georgian intervention in the separatist region of South Ossetia), leading to many casualties, huge material losses and a violent change of the political status quo in the region (by the later recognition by Russia of the separatist Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states). In 2009 there followed the energy conflict with Ukraine (a kind of "gas war" started by Russia) and later with Turkmenistan. Further problems seem to be on the horizon with high tension remaining between Russia and Georgia and tension growing between Russia and Ukraine, as well as to a lesser extent between Russia and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Possible conflicts over the issue of the withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol (which should take place until 2017) and the possible conflict involving the Russian population in Crimea, Ukraine are the most dangerous. The problem for the Alliance is that the above mentioned conflict situations involve NATO's partner states, and the biggest tensions exist in relation to the most advanced partner states, Ukraine and Georgia, having an ambition to become NATO members. Another problem for NATO is connected with the growing institutionalization and development of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which was initiated by Russia. Moscow is increasing its pressure on the CSTO members, which are all NATO partner states, and clearly has an ambition to control and limit their cooperation with the Alliance.

As far as **Russia's actions vis a vis individual member states** are concerned, there are the concerns that were provoked by some Russian actions undertaken in the last couple of years, such as:

- the Russian cyber attack on important Estonian computer servers in 2007 (committed by Russian hackers but apparently supported by Russian state institutions; the same pattern has been used against Georgia during the August 2008 war) in the circumstance of the Russian-Estonian political conflict;
- the violations of the airspace of the Baltic States (especially Estonia) by Russian military planes on numerous occasions;
- the demonstrative flights of Russian strategic bombers and other military planes near the borders of Norway, the United Kingdom, and Canada and the US bases on the Pacific Ocean (esp. in 2007 and 2008);
- the simulation of Russian military invasions of Poland, the Baltic States and Finland in the course of the “West” and “Ladoga” exercises in 2009.

There are also other Russian policies that are a source of concern for NATO and its member states. The most important seem to be:

- Russia’s *de facto* withdrawal from the CFE Treaty in 2007;
- the growing Russian activity in the Arctic in support of its territorial claims;
- Russia’s continuing military and energy cooperation with Iran (including the deal on the delivery of some Russian S-300 anti-missile systems).

Even if the Russian armed forces’ preparations for a hypothetical war with NATO in Europe are a reality, it does not mean that the Russian Federation is contemplating full scale military aggression against any NATO member states in the near future. However, modern history suggests that local conflict situations may well escalate into serious regional conflicts. Such conflicts may involve NATO member states, providing that art. 5 (*casus foederis*) of the NATO Treaty applies to the situation.

3. Russia as an Internal NATO Problem: How to Resolve It?

It is difficult to foresee how NATO – Russia relations will look in the medium-term future. Many important factors will be at work here, including the development of the US-Russia relations, the fate of the NATO operation in Afghanistan, developments in the problem of Iran, EU-Russia relations, the dialogue with Russia on European security and, last but not least, Russia’s policy in the CIS area.

What is sure even now is that NATO has a problem in defining its policy versus Russia. This policy is an issue which is provoking growing tension inside NATO, even if it does not always come to the surface in public debate. If this is not actively handled by the Allies, a dangerous drift may occur in the Alliance that would undermine its cohesion and effectiveness and in the end adversely influence the security of its member states.

There is no miraculous recipe for dealing with the Russia problem in NATO. An attempt at a solution could be NATO’s possible double response, a certain mixture of an engagement of Russia and an active response towards the NATO member states and partner states.

3.1 NATO’s Engagement towards Russia

As mentioned above the **cooperation with Russia in Afghanistan** has certain limitations and involves risks, but since this operation is perceived as important for the future of the Alliance and surely there is a degree of commonality of interests between NATO and Russia in that case, it is worth it to explore the possibility of an enhancement in the NATO-Russia cooperation. It is not a question of any new ideas. We know Russian military involvement in Afghanistan is a very low probability event (and the consequences of such hypothetical involvement would not necessarily be positive). What is possible and what has already been discussed is an

increased Russian support in transit of supplies for the NATO troops, as well as a larger Russian participation in training and especially in arms deliveries for the Afghan armed forces. The problem is to agree on the terms of such a cooperation, which would serve the interests of the Allies and partners and not undermine NATO policy principles. Since the chances of NATO succeeding in Afghanistan in the current circumstances are low and the scenario of the withdrawal of NATO forces is on the horizon, there will be a need for an increased presence of NATO in Afghanistan's direct neighbourhood, especially in Central Asia. The real challenge will be to find some new arrangements with Russia on security cooperation in Central Asia in that context to avoid direct conflict. A danger coming from the Taliban-dominated Afghanistan will be a factor working for the benefit of such a cooperation in this case.

The change in the US plans on SMD could open up more room for cooperation with Russia in the sphere of missile defence. The **NATO-Russia dialogue on TMD** could benefit from that. However, since the Russian opposition to the original SMD plans was based on political rather than military concerns (it contradicted the Russian goal to create a semi-demilitarized zone in Central Europe) the problem of Russian opposition to MD is not over. Still, the development of the missile programmes of several Asian states (which is, by the way, the main reason for Russia's suggestions of its possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty) may increase the chances for an MD cooperation with Russia in the future, including a southward-oriented TMD with NATO.

Another important issue seems to be the European security architecture. Russian proposals are controversial in that respect, especially for the Central-Eastern European states. Despite the so-called Corfu process of dialogue with Russia, which was started under OSCE, the chances of reaching a broad consensus on an important political document, not to mention a legally-binding treaty, are low. However, since the *de facto* Russian with-

drawal from the CFE Treaty complicated the security situation in Europe, and there is a low probability of consensus on the new CFE being adapted according to the Russian demands, there is a need to engage in **dialogue with Russia on the confidence and security building measures**. NATO member states should make an attempt to have a consolidated position on that *vis a vis* Russia. The corresponding negotiations would focus on practical issues of implementing the already existing CSBMs and development of new ones in a circumstance of the end of the CFE limitations. NATO as a whole could present initiatives in that respect.

3.2 NATO's Responses to Members and Partners

NATO, as a principle structure safeguarding the security of the democratic Euro-Atlantic states, cannot ignore the legitimate security concerns of some of its member states connected with particular Russian policies. In that respect, there are two major fields for a possible NATO response.

a. Responses to the Individual NATO Member States

NATO should not only reinforce its formal commitments to the defence of all the member states, but first of all it should develop mechanisms and capabilities to ensure a practical use of art. 5 (guaranties). This is especially timely in the case of the NATO members directly bordering Russia: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Norway. First of all a development of updated contingency plans is needed (as it is totally non-existent in the case of the three Baltic states). Moreover it is highly desirable to move some NATO troops and develop a military infrastructure in Central-Eastern Europe (the NATO investment programme should be included in this). On the other hand Russian postulates leading to a *de facto* creation of a semi-demilitarized buffer zone within NATO in Central-Eastern Europe (i.e. some Russian postulates concerning the new CFE adaptation or some

principles of a new security architecture, the Russian opposition to any new military bases or installations in the area, and the postulate to define and make legally binding the NATO declarations on non-deployment of substantial combat troops and nuclear arms in the territories of the “new” members) cannot be accepted by NATO.

b. Responses to the Individual NATO Partner States

NATO and the individual NATO member states should increase their co-operation in the security sphere with partner states in the CIS area other than Russia. Among the main goals of such a cooperation should be assistance in the defence reform according to NATO standards, building interoperability with NATO troops, and support for increases in the military capabilities of individual partner states through arms deliveries and military-technical cooperation, among other means.

In some cases there are new important spheres of cooperation between NATO and the partners such as the more direct cooperation in support of the NATO operation in Afghanistan (including the existing and new transit arrangements, usage of the military bases, a soft security cooperation, etc.) as well as in increasing the safety of the critical energy infrastructure.

To find the right balance between the two above mentioned approaches (engagement and active response), one which could be acceptable for all the member states, is one of the biggest challenges for NATO, and it will strongly influence the future fates of the Alliance and the European security.

Russland und die nordatlantische Allianz – Begrenzte Chancen für einen Neubeginn¹⁴

(März 2010)

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Zwei Paradigmen leiteten in letzter Zeit die Politik der NATO gegenüber Russland: Einerseits halten zahlreiche Mitgliedsstaaten Moskau für einen unerlässlichen Partner bei der Bewältigung internationaler sicherheitspolitischer Herausforderungen. Daher müssten die gemeinsamen Interessen der beiden Akteure nach dem Konzept der „gemeinsamen Sicherheit“ in den Mittelpunkt gestellt und Russland (wieder) institutionell eng an die nordatlantische Allianz gebunden werden.¹⁵

Anders argumentiert die „hegemoniale Schule“: Russland habe sich mit dem russisch-georgischen Krieg 2008 als Hegemon im postsowjetischen Raum entpuppt.¹⁶ Da Moskau zentrale Werte und Handlungsprinzipien der NATO sowie den territorialen Status quo in Europa nicht akzeptiere und einzelne Mitglieder durch politische Maßnahmen unter Druck set-

¹⁴ Die Erstveröffentlichung des Artikels erfolgte in „Welttrends“ – Zeitschrift für internationale Politik 18 (2010), Nr. 70, S. 9-14.

¹⁵ Robert E. Hunter – Sergey M. Rogov (2004). *Engaging Russia as partner and participant. The next stage of NATO-Russia relationship*, Santa Monica u.a.

¹⁶ Jeffrey Mankoff (2009). *Russian Foreign Policy. The Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham u.a.

ze, sei Moskau ein potenzieller Unruheherd. Kooperation mit Russland sei nur begrenzt möglich; Moskau dürfe keinen Einfluss auf die Verhandlungsprozesse der Allianz haben.¹⁷

Ergebnis dieser antagonistischen Positionen ist, dass keine kohärente NATO-Russland-Politik existiert. Dieses Problem wurde durch die Wiederaufnahme der Treffen des NATO-Russland-Rates im Juni 2009 auf Korfu nur teilweise behoben. Zwar wurden Felder zur Kooperation identifiziert (Afghanistan, Pirateriebekämpfung etc.) und die militärische Zusammenarbeit wiederaufgenommen. Doch die Sichtweisen zur Russland-Politik werden unterschiedlich bleiben. Die russische Führung könnte diese Uneinigkeit der Allianz als Schwäche interpretieren und zu ihren Gunsten nutzen.¹⁸

Kompassnadel USA

Die zukünftigen Beziehungen zwischen der NATO und Russland hängen von der Entwicklung des amerikanisch-russischen Verhältnisses ab: Dominiert hier Kooperation, ist diese auch zwischen Brüssel und Moskau möglich; dominiert hingegen Konfrontation, sind auch die Optionen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen der NATO und Russland begrenzt, wie die Amtszeit Präsident George W. Bushs illustriert.¹⁹ Weil Russland die

¹⁷ Hannes Adomeit (2008). „Putins Paukenschläge. Wie Russland sich vom „strategischen Partner“ zum Risikofaktor europäischer und internationaler Sicherheit wandelt“, *Internationale Politik* 63/2, S. 53-62.

¹⁸ Martin A. Smith (2009). „Partnerschaft, Kalter Krieg oder Kalter Frieden?“ *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, April 6, 2009. S. 21-27; Martin A. Smith (2006). „Russia and NATO Since 1991. From Cold War Through Cold Peace to Partnership?“; Abingdon u.a. und Jaap de Hoope Scheffer, Rede bei der Pressekonferenz nach dem NATO-Russland-Ratstreffen, Juni 27, 2009, Korfu. URL: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_55989.htm.

¹⁹ King, Charles, Sestanovich (2008). „Stephen: Checking Russia“, *Foreign Affairs* 87, Nr. 6, 2008, S. 2-28.

Führungsrolle Washingtons im Bündnis überzeichnet wahrnimmt, kam es zu Spannungen zwischen den Regierungen Bush und Putin, die entweder direkt die NATO betrafen oder sie mittelbar berührten: Der russisch-georgische Konflikt, die Frage der NATO-Erweiterung um Georgien und die Ukraine, die Rivalität der beiden Akteure in Zentralasien, die Debatte um die Anerkennung des Kosovo, die stockenden bzw. unterbrochenen Verhandlungen im Bereich der Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle u.v.m. Diese Konflikte waren Symptom grundlegender Differenzen: Auf Seiten der USA herrschte die Einschätzung, dass sich der autoritäre innenpolitische Kurs Präsident Putins und der ihn umgebenden Eliten letztlich in einer konfrontativen Außenpolitik, vor allem im postsowjetischen Raum, manifestieren werde. Russland folgerte daraus, dass Washington kein Interesse an einem gleichberechtigten russischen Partner in den internationalen Beziehungen hatte.

Kurswechsel unter Obama

Seit der Amtseinführung Präsident Obamas Anfang 2009 zeichnet sich ein Paradigmenwechsel ab. Rhetorisch zeigt sich dieser Neubeginn in der Rede von Vizepräsident Joe Biden bei der letztjährigen Münchener Sicherheitskonferenz: „The United States rejects the notion that NATO’s gain is Russia’s loss, or that Russia’s strength is NATO’s weakness. The last few years have seen a dangerous drift in relations between Russia and the members of our Alliance. It is time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should work together.“²⁰

²⁰ Joseph R. Biden, Rede bei der Security Conference. URL: <http://www.securityconference.de/Joseph-R-Biden.234.0.html>.

Es wurde bereits deutlich, dass sich die Regierung Obama um eine Neuorientierung der amerikanisch-russischen Beziehungen bemüht: Zu ersten Signalen gegenüber Moskau gehörte die Abkehr vom bereits vertraglich vereinbarten Raketenschild in Europa. Die Obama-Administration kündigte im September 2009 an, stattdessen nun eine flexiblere und kostengünstigere Variante zu verfolgen. Sie beinhaltet die Abwehr iranischer Kurz- und Mittelstreckenraketen durch land- und seegestützte Raketen-systeme. Moskau gab daraufhin seine Pläne zur Stationierung von Kurzstreckenraketen in Kaliningrad auf. Der von der Obama-Administration gewünschte Gegenzug, Moskau möge gegenüber dem Iran mehr Härte zeigen, erfolgte dagegen nicht.²¹

Ein weiteres Zeichen des Entgegenkommens ist die Zurückstellung der möglichen NATO-Erweiterung um Georgien und die Ukraine, gegen die sich Russland ausgesprochen hat und die von der Regierung Bush forciert wurde. Zwar betonten Vertreter der Obama-Administration, dass man keine russischen Einflussphären akzeptieren werde und erinnerten stattdessen an das Recht souveräner Staaten, über ihre Bündniszugehörigkeit frei zu entscheiden. Gleichzeitig wiesen sie jedoch darauf hin, dass dies erst erfolgen könne, wenn beide Staaten dazu politisch wie militärisch in der Lage seien. Der Beschluss der NATO-Außenminister zur Wiederaufnahme der Treffen des NATO-Russland-Rates am 05. März 2009 war vor allem durch den amerikanischen Positionswechsel möglich.²² Dass Hillary Clinton sich im Anschluss an ihren Brüssel-Besuch in Genf mit ihrem

russischen Kollegen Lawrow traf, unterstreicht die von der Obama-Administration angestrebte Aufwertung der bilateralen Beziehungen.²³

Auch bemüht sich die US-Regierung um einen Neubeginn im Bereich der Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle: Bei seiner ersten Pressekonferenz schlug Präsident Obama Russland die gemeinsame Führungsrolle im Kampf gegen die Verbreitung von Atomwaffen vor. Hier sollten beide Staaten mit gutem Beispiel vorangehen und Verhandlungen über einen weiteren Abbau ihres nuklearen Waffenarsenals aufnehmen. Erste Gespräche betrafen eine Nachfolgevereinbarung für das Ende 2009 ausgelaufene START-Abkommen zwischen den USA und Russland über die gemeinsame, schrittweise Reduzierung atomarer Trägerwaffensysteme.²⁴

Neuaufgabe Kalter Krieg?

Dies erscheint als eine gute Grundlage für die Wiederaufnahme eines kooperativen Verhältnisses zwischen Washington bzw. der NATO und der Regierung Medwedjew/Putin. Es wäre jedoch fahrlässig, Prozess mit Substanz zu verwechseln und die erneuten Gespräche im NATO-Russland-Rat als unumkehrbaren Beginn einer Zusammenarbeit zu betrachten. Einen neuen Kalten Krieg zwischen Russland und der NATO zu konstatieren ist aber übertrieben und auch nicht nachzuweisen. Dennoch muss sich die NATO auf eine komplexe Gemengelage von Kooperationsbereitschaft Russlands in einigen Politikfeldern und von Kooperationsverweigerung in anderen einrichten. Der russische Wille zur Zusammenarbeit wird ent-

²¹ Steven Hildreth (2009). "Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe", CRS Report for Congress, September 23, 2009. URL: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34051.pdf>. und Peter Baker. "Obama Offered Deal to Russia in Secret Letter", New York Times. March 3, 2009. Und Clifford Levy – Peter Baker. "Russia's Reaction on Missile Plan Leaves Iran Issue Hanging", New York Times, September 18, 2009.

²² Hilary Clinton, Rede bei der Pressekonferenz im Anschluss an das Treffen. URL: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/03/120068.htm>.

²³ Glenn Kessler. "Clinton 'Resets' Russian Ties – and Language", Washington Post, March 7, 2009.

²⁴ Michael Paul – Oliver Thränert (2009). „Nukleare Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle. Ausblick auf die amerikanisch-russischen Verhandlungen“, SWP-Studie 2009/S 9. URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5842.

scheidend davon abhängen, wie Russlands Eliten die Rolle ihres Landes definieren und welche Machtressourcen dem Staat zur Verfügung stehen.

Ein Problem bleibt die Uneinigkeit der NATO mit Blick auf Russland: Die Obama-Administration begreift ihre Beziehungen zu Moskau als Teil der amerikanischen Globalstrategie. Dagegen folgen die europäischen NATO-Mitglieder in weiten Teilen einer regionalen Perspektive und sind in der Frage gespalten, ob Russland ein strategischer Partner oder eine strategische Bedrohung sei. Entscheidend für eine kohärente, glaubwürdige Politik der NATO ist, dass die Allianz Mechanismen zur Koordination und Harmonisierung ihrer Russland-Politik entwickelt.

Ob die institutionelle Form dafür nach seiner mehrmonatigen Aussetzung noch der NATO-Russland-Rat sein kann, erscheint fraglich. Denn Russlands Erwartungen in dieses Gremium wurden enttäuscht: Während das nordatlantische Bündnis im NATO-Russland-Rat einen institutionellen Rahmen zur Anbindung Russlands an die atlantische Allianz sah, begriff Moskau das Gremium als Instrument, um Einfluss auf die NATO bzw. ihre Mitglieder zu gewinnen.²⁵ Dieser Grundwiderspruch wurde nie aufgelöst, in der Praxis verhinderte er, dass das Gremium zu einer Kooperationsplattform zwischen beiden Seiten wurde.

Nimmt man die seit Jahren steigende russische Ablehnung der Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (OSZE) hinzu, zeichnet sich eine „funktionale Aushöhlung“ der Institutionen für die Beziehungen Russlands zu den Staaten des euro-atlantischen Gebietes ab: Die beiden Institutionen, die das Forum für sicherheitspolitische Kooperation „von Vancouver bis Wladiwostok“ bieten, werden zwar weiter existieren, aber die an ihnen teilnehmenden Staaten haben das Interesse verloren, in ihnen zusammenzuarbeiten. Auch die vagen Vorschläge von Präsident

Medwedjew zur Neuordnung der euro-atlantischen Sicherheitsarchitektur deuten in diese Richtung.²⁶ Ein institutionelles Defizit trotz existierender Institutionen wäre die Folge für die NATO-Russland-Beziehungen.

Beiderseitiges Entgegenkommen ist nötig

Entscheidend wird daher zukünftig sein, ob einerseits die Regierungen der Allianzmitglieder Präsident Obama darin folgen, den Beziehungen zu Moskau wieder erhöhte Priorität einzuräumen. Die Debatte über das neue strategische Konzept des Bündnisses, das im Herbst 2010 verabschiedet werden soll, bietet in dieser Frage einen Anlass zur Verständigung über das Verhältnis zu Moskau. Andererseits wird das außenpolitische Selbstverständnis der Regierung Medwedjew/Putin darüber entscheiden, in welchen Bereichen eine Zusammenarbeit zwischen Moskau und den NATO-Mitgliedern möglich ist. Setzt sie weiterhin auf eine hegemoniale Politik im postsowjetischen Raum und definiert die nordatlantische Allianz implizit als einen regional- wie weltpolitischen Rivalen, dürften die Möglichkeiten der Kooperation zwischen beiden Akteuren begrenzt bleiben und wenig Entwicklungspotenzial aufweisen.

²⁶ Andrey S. Makarychev (2009). „Russia and its ‘New Security Architecture’ in Europe: A Critical Examination of the Concept”, Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Document (Nr. 310), Brüssel 2009. Und Margarete Klein (2008). „Der russische Vorschlag für eine neue gesamteuropäische Sicherheitsordnung: ernst zu nehmender Vorschlag oder Spaltungsversuch?“, Russland-Analysen (Nr. 175), December 12, 2008. S. 9-13. URL: <http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/pdf/Russlandanalysen175.pdf>.

²⁵ Iwan Rodionow (2009). „Russland und die NATO: Grenzen der Gemeinsamkeit“, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, April 6, 2009. S. 34-40.

Raketenabwehr, ade? Sicherheitspolitisches Denken in Polen und Tschechien²⁷

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Die USA versetzten polnischen und tschechischen Sicherheitspolitikern im Herbst 2009 einen schweren Schlag: Präsident Obama erklärte die Pläne zur Stationierung eines Raketenabwehrsystems in Ostmitteleuropa für passé. Damit beendete er auf der ersten Debatte, in der exemplarisch Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede des sicherheitspolitischen Denkens in Polen und Tschechien zum Ausdruck kamen. In Polen herrschte ein breiter Konsens über die Raketenabwehr, und Warschau setzte konsequent auf bilaterale Verhandlungen mit den USA. Prag, wo selbst in der Regierung Skeptiker saßen, wollte die NATO beteiligen.

Die sicherheitspolitische Debatte in Polen und der Tschechischen Republik war für mehrere Jahre von einem Thema beherrscht: dem dritten Pfeiler der amerikanischen Raketenabwehr. Im Jahr 2007 hatten sich die USA unter Präsident George W. Bush offiziell mit der Bitte an Warschau und Prag gewandt, die Komponenten eines Raketenabwehrsystems in den

beiden ostmitteleuropäischen Staaten zu stationieren. In Tschechien sollte eine Frühwarnradaranlage installiert werden, in Polen Abfangraketen zur Zerstörung von Interkontinentalraketen. Diese Pläne sind seit September 2009 fürs Erste obsolet. Der Anfang 2009 angetretene amerikanische Präsident Barack Obama hat von den Stützpunkten in Ostmitteleuropa Abstand genommen. In der polnischen und tschechischen Debatte über die Raketenabwehr sowie in den Verhandlungen mit den USA spiegelten sich jedoch ein tiefverwurzeltes sicherheitspolitisches Denken, das auch die Reaktionen der beiden Staaten auf die amerikanische Kehrtwende beeinflusste und ihre zukünftige sicherheitspolitische Strategie prägen wird.

Bilaterale Verhandlungen, amerikanische Übermacht

Die Wahl der Bush-Administration war sicher nicht zufällig auf Polen gefallen. Seit dem Umbruch in Ostmitteleuropa Ende der 1980er Jahre hat Polen konsequent versucht, möglichst enge Beziehungen mit den USA zu pflegen. Besonders deutlich zeigte sich dies nach dem amerikanischen Einmarsch im Irak.²⁸ Daher bemühte sich Polen auch, beide Komponenten des Raketenabwehrsystems zu erhalten. Ganz anders die Tschechische Republik: Dort war die Skepsis gegenüber dem amerikanischen Rüstungsprojekt viel größer und es herrscht bei weitem kein so großer gesellschaftlicher Konsens über die USA-Politik wie in Polen. Daher galt die als „passiv“ betrachtete Radarkomponente als das Maximum des Durchsetzbaren. Die amerikanische Anfrage erreichte die tschechische Regierung im Januar 2007 nicht nur unmittelbar nach ihrem Amtsantritt. Auch war die Regierung unter dem damaligen Ministerpräsidenten Miroslav Topolánek alles

²⁸ Grzegorz Gromadzki – Olaf Osica (2004). „Pro-European Atlantists: Poland and other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe after Accession to the European Union“, Policy Paper 3/2004, Warszawa: Stefan Batory Foundation. URL: www.batory.org.pl/ftp/program/forum/rap3en.pdf.

²⁷ Zuerst erschienen in: OSTEUROPA 60/6, 2010.

andere als stabil. Sie war erst ein halbes Jahr nach den Parlamentswahlen vom Sommer 2006, die mit einem Patt geendet hatten, zustande gekommen. Und mit den Grünen hatte Topolánek ODS einen Koalitionspartner, der von Beginn an der Raketenabwehr kritisch gegenüberstand. Darüber hinaus hing die Regierung sogar von den Stimmen zweier abtrünniger Sozialdemokraten ab, deren Partei sich in der Opposition eindeutig gegen die amerikanischen Pläne positionierte. All dies trug dazu bei, dass das Thema in der Tschechischen Republik von Beginn an erheblich politisiert war.

Wenn auch die Gründe ganz unterschiedliche waren, so begingen beide Regierungen den gleichen Fehler: Sie ließen sich auf bilaterale Verhandlungen mit den USA ein. Dies brachte den USA einen klaren Verhandlungsvorteil, den sie in Dreiergesprächen nicht gehabt hätten. Prag versuchte wenigstens, sich mit Warschau abzustimmen, stieß jedoch auf Desinteresse.²⁹

Noch wichtiger war, dass zunächst weder Warschau noch Prag auf eine Multilateralisierung des Projekts drängten. Beide Regierungen behaupteten, Verhandlungen im Rahmen der NATO oder der EU könnten auf unüberwindbare Schwierigkeiten stoßen. Tatsächlich ging es den Regierungen aber vielmehr darum, mögliche amerikanischen Gegenleistungen auf das eigene Konto zu verbuchen, ohne dass dies allzu sehr auffiel. So wollte Prag erreichen, dass die USA die Visumpflicht für tschechische Staatsbürger aufheben, Warschau hoffte auf amerikanische Militärhilfe, insbesondere auf die äußerst fragwürdige Stationierung bodengestützter Mittelstrecken-Flugabwehrraketen des Typs Patriot an der polnischen Ostgrenze.

All dies führte dazu, dass die USA die Agenda der Verhandlungen eindeutig bestimmten und die beiden ostmitteleuropäischen Staaten nur reagierten. Entsprechend passiv war die innenpolitische Debatte, die sehr

eng auf das Thema Raketenabwehr beschränkt blieb. Eine breite sicherheitspolitische Grundsatzdiskussion wurde nicht geführt.

Die politische Debatte in Polen und Tschechien

Obwohl die USA die Agenda der bilateralen Verhandlungen mit beiden Staaten eindeutig bestimmten, Warschau und Prag dagegen nur reagierten, entwickelte sich die innenpolitische Debatte in Tschechien und Polen recht unterschiedlich. Bereits die Begründungen, mit der die Regierungen das Projekt zu legitimieren suchten, waren andere. In der Tschechischen Republik übernahm der dem damaligen Vizepremier Alexander Vondra unterstehende Sonderbevollmächtigte Tomáš Klvaň – in den tschechischen Medien meist „Mister Radar“ genannt – die Argumente der amerikanischen *Missile Defence Agency* nahezu unverändert. Sein zentrales Thema war die „iranische Gefahr“.³⁰ Die tschechische Debatte war daher gar keine „tschechische Debatte“ im eigentlichen Sinne.³¹ Vielmehr bestimmte ein enger Kreis von Neokonservativen um Alexander Vondra – dessen amtliches Aufgabengebiet ironischerweise europäische Angelegenheiten waren – den Diskurs. Eine offene, unideologische Debatte über die tschechischen Interessen wurde nicht geführt.

Während Prag über die iranische Gefahr diskutierte, drehte sich die polnische Debatte um die „russische Gefahr“. Von dieser sprachen der damalige Präsident Lech Kaczyński und der damalige Premierminister Jarosław Kaczyński von der Partei *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (Recht und Gerechtigkeit).

²⁹ Interview mit einem hohen Beamten des tschechischen Außenministeriums in Prag, März 16, 2008 und des Verteidigungsministeriums, Mai 25, 2008.

³¹ Exemplarisch dafür, wie eine tschechische Debatte hätte geführt werden können, siehe Nik Hynek – Vít Střítecký (2010). „The Fortunes of Czech Discourse on Missile Defense“, in: Mats Braun – Petr Drulák (Hrsg.). *The Quest for National Interest: A Methodological Reflection on Czech Foreign Policy*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010.

²⁹ Interview mit einem hohen Beamten des tschechischen Außenministeriums in Prag, März 20, 2008.

keit, PiS) ebenso wie Jarosław Kaczyńskis Nachfolger Donald Tusk und der Verteidigungs- und spätere Außenminister Radosław Sikorski von der *Platforma Obywatelska* (Bürgerplattform, PO).³² Aus polnischer Sicht war es daher nur konsequent, die Stationierung der Patriot-Raketen als Gegenleistung zu fordern. Aus amerikanischer Sicht hingegen untergrub diese Forderung die Glaubwürdigkeit der Behauptung, die Raketenabwehr würde sich nicht gegen Russland richten. Auch die zweite polnische Forderung, die USA sollte die Modernisierung der polnischen Armee technisch und finanziell unterstützen, war Wasser auf die Mühlen Moskaus und erschwerte daher die polnisch-amerikanischen Verhandlungen. Gleichwohl einigten sich Warschau und Washington Mitte September 2008. Zunächst hatte Polen die astronomische Summe von 30–40 Milliarden Dollar an Militärhilfe sowie Patriot-Raketen des weiterentwickelten Typs PAC-3 an der Ostgrenze gefordert.³³ Durchsetzen konnte Warschau allerdings nur die Stationierung einer älteren, aus Deutschland verlagerten Patriot-Batterie zum Schutz Warschaus vor Luftangriffen, an deren Betriebskosten sich Polen sogar beteiligten sollte.³⁴

Eine weitere Forderung Warschaus zeigt den Unterschied zur tschechischen Politik noch deutlicher. In Polen ist das Misstrauen in multilaterale Sicherheitsgarantien erheblich größer. Ganz im Sinne der engen Anlehnung an die USA forderte Warschau daher, die USA solle über die in Artikel V des NATO-Vertrags gewährleistete Beistandgarantie hinaus eine gesonderte einseitige Verpflichtung abgeben, Polen im Falle eines Angriffs beizustehen. Dabei spielte sicher eine Rolle, dass in der Schlussphase der Verhandlungen der Krieg zwischen Russland und Georgien ausbrach. Tatsächlich brachte der polnische Premierminister die Forderung nach einem

bilateralen Sicherheitsvertrag zwischen den USA und Polen mit dem Krieg in Südossetien in Verbindung und sprach davon, dass Russland nach Georgien als nächstes Polen überfallen könnte.³⁵ Doch darf man sich nicht täuschen lassen: Einen echten strategischen Vorteil wird sich auch Warschau von dieser Forderung nicht versprochen haben. Washington hätte sich nicht zu mehr verpflichtet, als es der NATO-Vertrag ohnehin vorsieht, Warschau hingegen wäre sicher nicht darum herum gekommen, mehr polnische Soldaten für die weltweiten amerikanischen Operationen zu versprechen. Daher sollte die Forderung nach einem bilateralen Zusatzabkommen und der Verweis auf den Kaukasuskrieg eher als Ablenkungsstrategie betrachtet werden, die verschleiern sollte, dass Warschau mit den finanziellen Forderungen gescheitert war. Für diese Interpretation spricht auch, dass in Polen von der Forderung nach zusätzlichen Garantien schon bald keine Rede mehr war.

Die Unterschiede zwischen Polen und der Tschechischen Republik verdeutlicht auch das Auftreten der Regierung auf der heimischen Bühne. In Tschechien warfen sich die Politiker aller Parteien wechselseitig vor, der jeweils andere sei verantwortlich für das nicht ganz befriedigende Ergebnis der Verhandlungen über die Radaranlage. Politische Gewinne konnte niemand mit dem Thema Radar verbuchen. Anders in Polen: Dort rangen die Politiker der unterschiedlichen Parteien darum, wer sich am meisten um den Abschluss des Vertrages verdient gemacht habe.

All dies bedeutete, dass auch die Gegner der Raketenabwehr in Polen und Tschechien mit einer unterschiedlichen Situation konfrontiert waren. In Tschechien hatten die neokonservativen Kreise zwar die Diskurshoheit. Dies führte jedoch selbstverständlich nicht dazu, dass Opposition und Zivilgesellschaft ihre Grundsatzkritik an dem Projekt aufgeben hätten.

³² Martin Sieff, "BMD Focus: Poles block base – Part 1", Space Daily, Juli 9, 2008. URL: www.spacewar.com/reports/BMD_Focus_Poles_block_base_Part_1_999.html.

³³ Interview mit einem hohen amerikanischen Diplomaten (US EUCOM) in London, Juni 12, 2008.

³⁴ "U.S., Poland Agree to Anti-Missile Defence Deal", Associated Press, August 15, 2008.

³⁵ "Russia threatens nuclear attack on Poland over US missile shield deal", The Daily Telegraph, August 23, 2008.

Vielmehr verhinderte das nahezu paranoide Festhalten an der aus den USA übernommenen Legitimation des Projekts eine sachliche strategische Debatte, an der sich vor allem Sicherheitsexperten beteiligt hätten.³⁶ Das Ergebnis war das Gegenteil des erwünschten: Die Gesellschaft wurde eher skeptischer. So kam der entschiedenste Widerstand gegen die Radarstation aus den Reihen der Zivilgesellschaft. Die Regierung setzte die Bürgerinitiativen, die die Öffentlichkeit gegen die Raketenpläne mobilisierten, unter Druck. In der ideologisierten Debatte beschuldigte sie die Radargegner, sie würden mit russländischen Geheimdiensten zusammenarbeiten. Kurz vor der Abstimmung über die Stationierung der Radaranlage im tschechischen Parlament gab der tschechische Inlandsnachrichtendienst *Bezpečnostní informační služba* am 25. September 2008 in einer Pressemeldung bekannt, er verfüge über geheime Informationen, die belegten, dass der Einfluss russländischer Geheimdienste wachse und dass die Russland die tschechischen Radargegner finanziere.³⁷ Ganz unabhängig davon, ob diese Behauptung richtig oder falsch war, untergrub der Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung in einer politisch extrem angespannten Atmosphäre die Glaubwürdigkeit des BIS.

Die polnischen Gegner der Stationierung von Abfangraketen waren deutlich weniger organisiert. Auch lehnte anders als in Tschechien keine im Parlament vertretene Partei das Projekt ab. Doch gerade der breite Konsens führte dazu, dass abweichende Meinungen umso weniger toleriert wurden. Davon zeugt vor allem der Fall des ehemaligen Leiters des Instituts für Internationale Beziehungen (Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, PISM) Roman Kuzniar. Nachdem das PISM sich in einer internen Exper-

tise kritisch zu den amerikanischen Raketenabwehrplänen geäußert hatte, sorgte Premierminister Jarosław Kaczyński für seine Entlassung.³⁸

Rigider und flexibler Bilateralismus

Im Laufe der Verhandlungen mit den USA zeigte sich ein weiterer Unterschied zwischen der Tschechischen Republik und Polen. Während Polen strikt auf dem bilateralen Ansatz beharrte, war die Tschechische Republik offener für eine Multilateralisierung der Raketenabwehr im Rahmen der NATO. Hinter dem polnischen Beharren auf Exklusivität stand sicher die Selbstwahrnehmung als ein großes Land, das alleine angesichts seiner strategischen Bedeutung eine amerikanische Sonderbehandlung verdient habe. Umso größer war die Enttäuschung, als die USA Polen keineswegs besondere Konditionen anboten. Diese bittere Einsicht führte allerdings nicht dazu, dass Warschau von seinem rigiden Bilateralismus abgewichen wäre und ein strategisches Gesamtkonzept erwogen hätte. Vielmehr beharrte Polen auf dem bilateralen Ansatz, um in den Verhandlungen über die Stationierung der Raketen den Preis in die Höhe zu treiben. Erst als die USA ihr ursprüngliches Konzept paralleler bilateraler Verhandlungen aufgegeben hatten und Polen dazu drängten, eine Beteiligung der NATO zu akzeptieren, änderte Warschau den Kurs.³⁹

Die Tschechische Republik hingegen zeigte sich von vornherein flexibler und offener für einen multilateralen Ansatz. Da Prag keinen „Preis“ für die Errichtung der Radaranlage gefordert hatte, konnte es seine Ver-

³⁶ In einem Fall übte die Regierung Druck auf ein staatlich finanziertes Forschungsinstitut aus, um die Entlassung eines Mitarbeiters zu erreichen, der sich immer wieder skeptisch zur Raketenabwehr geäußert hatte; als sie auf Widerstand stieß, gab sie das Ansinnen jedoch rasch auf.

³⁷ „Ruští agenti chtějí v Česku vyvolat odpor k radaru, varovala BIS“, Mf Dnes, September 25, 2008; „BIS: Ruské tajné služby vedly v Česku kampaň proti radaru“, Hospodářské noviny, September 25, 2008.

³⁸ Marek Glogoczowski. „‘Anti-Missile Shield’. An Exercise in Obedience to the Global Hegemon?“, in: Current Concerns, 10/2007. URL: www.currentconcerns.ch/index.php?id=392; „Odwołano go, bo nie chciał tarczy antyrakietowej?“, URL: <http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80269,3909551.html>.

³⁹ Interview mit einem hohen Beamten des tschechischen Außenministeriums in Prag, März 12, 2008.

handlungsstrategie besser an den Verlauf der Debatte anpassen.⁴⁰ Aus Sicht der tschechischen Diplomatie versprach diese konsensorientierte Strategie mehr Erfolg. Die polnische Seite betrachtete den tschechischen Pragmatismus allerdings als Ausdruck von Schwäche: Prag schöpfe die sich bietenden Möglichkeiten nicht konsequent aus. Nach dem Verzicht Obamas auf den dritten Pfeiler des amerikanischen Raketenabwehrsystems in Ostmitteleuropa steht jedoch fest, dass der Schwenk der tschechischen Diplomatie von der Präferenz für ein amerikanisches Raketenschirm zu einem Projekt aller NATO-Staaten richtig war.

Diese Umorientierung ging allerdings nicht auf die Einsicht zurück, dass das Projekt sicherheitspolitisch betrachtet von vorneherein als gemeinsames Projekt der NATO-Staaten angelegt hätte werden sollen. Der Grund war vielmehr der innenpolitische Druck, den die tschechischen Grünen ausübten, die von Beginn an ihre Zustimmung zu der Stationierung einer Radarstation des Raketenabwehrsystems davon abhängig gemacht hatten, dass das Projekt die europäischen NATO-Staaten nicht ausschließt. Da die regierende ODS zur Ratifizierung des Stationierungsvertrags auf die Stimmen des Koalitionspartners angewiesen war, hatten die Grünen eine gute Verhandlungsposition. Nachdem sich diese Position durchgesetzt hatte, teilte die tschechische Diplomatie dies den USA recht forsch mit. In einer diplomatischen Note an die amerikanische Regierung erklärte das tschechische Außenministerium unmissverständlich, dass es von nun an

⁴⁰ Von der Flexibilität des tschechischen Ansatzes zeugt auch der Umgang mit den „Begleitforderungen“. Wollte Prag zunächst noch die visumsfreie Einreise tschechischer Staatsbürger in die USA erreichen, so verlegte sich die tschechische Diplomatie bald darauf, in erster Linie gemeinsame Forschungs- und Entwicklungsprojekte in verschiedenen Technologiesektoren zu fordern. Natürlich sollte es dabei primär um Forschungen im Bereich Raketenabwehr gehen, doch eine Ausweitung auf andere Sektoren war vorgesehen. Bei einem tschechisch-amerikanischen Seminar, an dem Forschungseinrichtungen und Rüstungsunternehmen aus beiden Staaten teilnahmen, wurde bereits ein Rahmenvertrag entworfen, der den tschechischen Ingenieuren Zugang zu Know how garantiert und eine Kooperation mit amerikanischen Rüstungsunternehmen in Aussicht gestellt hätte. Dieses Dokument hätte Teil des Stationierungsvertrags werden sollen.

bei den Verhandlungen mit den USA davon ausgehen werde, dass über ein NATO-Projekt gesprochen wird.⁴¹

Offiziell zu einem Projekt der Allianz erklärten die NATO-Staaten das Raketenabwehrprojekt auf dem Gipfel in Bukarest.⁴² Dies war das aus strategischer Sicht einzig richtige, denn das System zur Zerstörung von Interkontinentalraketen sollte mit den Bemühungen der NATO um den Aufbau eines auf Kurz- und Mittelstreckenraketen ausgerichteten Systems zur Verteidigung von Streitkräften im Einsatz (Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence, ALTMBD) verbunden werden.

Vom geopolitischen Projekt zur politischen Verhandlungsmasse

Warschau und Prag waren sich bewusst, dass ein Wahlsieg Barack Obamas bei den amerikanischen Präsidentschaftswahlen das Projekt Nationale Raketenabwehr gefährden würde. Sie drängten daher auf eine rasche Unterzeichnung und Ratifizierung der Verträge. Zwar hatte Obama im Wahlkampf keine eindeutige Position zur Raketenabwehr bezogen. Gleichwohl war klar, dass er dem Projekt skeptisch gegenüberstand. Tatsächlich änderten die USA mit Obamas Amtsantritt ihre Haltung zu dem Raketenschild. Hatte die Bush-Administration es als rein geostrategisches Projekt betrachtet, so machte Obama daraus ein politisches Thema, das er in den Ver-

⁴¹ Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR (2007). Diplomatická nota č. 33, V14306/2007-OBP.

⁴² In der Schlusserklärung des Gipfels heißt es: „Wir begrüßen den substantiellen Beitrag, den die geplante Stationierung US-amerikanischer Raketenabwehrkomponenten in Europa zum Schutz der Mitglieder der Allianz vor Interkontinentalraketen leistet.“ Vgl.: NATO (2008). „The Bucharest Summit Declaration“. Press Release Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest, April 3, 2008. URL: www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html.

handlungen mit Russland einsetzte.⁴³ Bereits im Februar 2009 schrieb er in einem Brief an Russlands Präsidenten Dmitrij Medvedev, dass er bereit sei, das Projekt aufzugeben, wenn Russland einer substantiellen atomaren Abrüstung zustimme und Druck auf den Iran ausübe, damit Teheran sein Atom- und Raketenprogramm aufgibt.⁴⁴

Zwar zeichnete sich bereits im Laufe des Jahres 2009 ab, dass der neue amerikanische Präsident eine andere Sicherheitspolitik betreiben würde als sein Vorgänger.⁴⁵ Gleichwohl löste die Nachricht, dass Obama vorläufig auf die Anlagen in Polen und Tschechien verzichtet, eine hysterische Reaktion in beiden Staaten aus. Selten hatten Politiker und Medien in den vergangenen 20 Jahren so emotional reagiert.⁴⁶ Die Medien zeichneten eine zeitlang düstere geopolitische Untergangsszenarien, in denen die ostmitteleuropäischen Staaten durch Obamas Entscheidung erneut zu Vasallen Russlands wurden. In einem von der polnischen Tageszeitung *Gazeta Wyborcza* veröffentlichten offenen Brief drückten 22 ehemalige Präsidenten, Ministerpräsidenten, Außenminister und wichtige Botschafter ihre Besorgnis darüber aus, dass die USA die Interessen und Befürchtungen Ostmitteleuropas nicht mehr berücksichtigen würden.⁴⁷ Da Washington gleichzeitig Moskau entgegenkomme, seien die transatlantischen Beziehungen gefährdet. Die

USA müssten daher, so forderten die ostmitteleuropäischen Atlantiker,⁴⁸ trotz globaler Herausforderungen in Europa präsent bleiben.

So übertrieben manche Reaktionen aus Ostmitteleuropa auf Obamas Verzicht gewesen sein mögen, so war doch die Art und Weise, mit der die USA das Projekt Raketenabwehr beendeten, recht arrogant. Ganz abgesehen davon, dass es nicht von Taktgefühl zeugte, die Entscheidung am 17. September bekannt zu geben, dem Tag, der in Polen untrennbar mit der sowjetischen Invasion im Jahr 1939 verbunden ist, zeugte die Tatsache, dass weder Warschau noch Prag vor der Entscheidung konsultiert worden waren, davon, dass sich in Washington tatsächlich etwas substantiell geändert hatte. Während in Ostmitteleuropa – wie die Reaktionen auf das Projekt zeigten – viele in geopolitischen Kategorien denken, haben sich die USA unter Obama von diesem Denken entfernt.

Fazit

Der Rückzieher der USA in Sachen Raketenabwehr in Ostmitteleuropa kam wenig überraschend. Irritierend ist allerdings, dass Washington das Kind mit dem Bade ausgeschüttet hat. Nachdem es in schwierigen Verhandlungen gelungen war, mit der Multilateralisierung im Rahmen der NATO einen Kompromiss zwischen konkurrierenden Interessen zu finden, sieht es nun so aus, als hätte sich die Position Deutschlands und Frankreichs durchgesetzt, die sich von Beginn an grundsätzlich gegen das Projekt gestellt hatten. Die Erklärung des auf den Bukarester NATO-Gipfel folgenden Treffens in Straßburg und Kehl erwähnt die Raketenabwehr

⁴³ Nik Hynek (2009). "Continuity and Change in the U.S. Foreign and Security Policy with the Accession of President Obama", in: *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, 3/2009, URL: www.cejiss.org/assets/pdf/articles/vol3-2/hynek-continuity_and_change.pdf; Nik Hynek – Vít Strátecký (2009). "Divided We Stand: Limits of Central European Atlanticism in the New Era", in: *International Issues and Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, 4/2009, S. 19–30.

⁴⁴ "Obama Offered Deal to Russia in Secret Letter", in: *New York Times*, March 3, 2009.

⁴⁵ Nik Hynek – Vít Strátecký – Vladimír Handl – Michal Kořan (2010). "The U.S.–Russian Security 'Reset': Implications for Central Eastern Europe and Germany". In: *European Security* 2010, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2009, pp. 263–285; Michal Kořan (2009). „O ‚strategicznym porozumieniu‘ USA–Rosja, czyli dlaczego proste rozwiązania nie zawsze się sprawdzają“, in: *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, 2/2009.

⁴⁶ Nik Hynek – Vít Strátecký (2009). *Divided We Stand*.

⁴⁷ "An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe", URL: http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.html.

⁴⁸ Zu außenpolitischen Denkschulen in Ostmitteleuropa siehe: Petr Drulák – Jan Růžička – Michal Kořan (2008). „Außenpolitik in Ostmitteleuropa. Von Universalisten, Atlantikern, Europäern und Souveränisten“, in: *OSTEUROPA*, 7/2008, S. 139–152.

bereits nicht mehr.⁴⁹ Nach zwei Jahren heißer Debatte ist von dem Projekt nichts geblieben als die vage Ankündigung Obamas, Abfangraketen auf Schiffen zu installieren und in einer zweiten Phase ein Raketenabwehrsystem auf Land zu errichten.⁵⁰ Tschechien und Polen könnten dabei wieder in Betracht gezogen werden, doch darüber wird erst in vielen Jahren entschieden werden. Sehr rasch und überraschend kam hingegen Obamas Entscheidung, dass die USA in Polen entgegen den ursprünglichen Plänen nun doch Patriot-Flugabwehrraketen des neuen Typs SM-3 stationieren. Ende Mai 2010 wurde eine erste Batterie ins ostpolnischen Morąg verlegt.⁵¹ Während Russland zwei Jahre zuvor auf dieses polnische Ansinnen mit der Ankündigung reagiert hatte, es werde Kurzstreckenraketen des Typs *Iskander* im Gebiet Kaliningrad stationieren, blieb nun eine heftige Reaktion aus. Dies hat nicht nur damit zu tun, dass Polen anders als noch 2008 darauf verzichtete, Russland als Sicherheitsbedrohung zu bezeichnen. In erster Linie dürfte die Zurückhaltung Moskaus der Wiederbelebung der Abrüstungsverhandlungen zwischen den USA und Russland geschuldet sein.

⁴⁹ NATO (2009). "Declaration on Alliance Security". Press Release Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg/Kehl, April 4, 2009. URL: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease.

⁵⁰ "Remarks by the President on Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe". Statement by the President, September 17, 2009. URL: www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Strengthening-Missile-Defense-in-Europe/.

⁵¹ "Poland says U.S. Patriot boosts security", in: Reuters, Mai 26, 2010. URL: www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64P3KU20100526.

The Eastern Partnership and the New European Security Architecture: A New Ostpolitik?⁵²

(2009)

Cortnie Shupe, Bertelsmann Stiftung

Changes in the security orientation of Washington since the beginning of the year, in particular toward Eastern Europe, are generating for the EU a growing need to act and ensure stability on its eastern border. Simultaneously, the consequences of the absence of Russian participation on an equal basis in existing security institutions ("security architecture") since the end of the Cold War are intensifying. Particularly in their common neighborhood, the EU and Russia demonstrate diverging perceptions of security interests and threats. While Brussels concentrates on modernization promotion and crisis prevention in the eastern neighborhood, Moscow bemoans the neglect of hard security aspects in EU rhetoric, distrusting its intentions there. As long as Russia remains isolated from decision-making in the European security architecture, new initiatives such as the Eastern Partnership (EaP) will have little chance for success. Dmitri Medvedev has offered the EU a unique opportunity to jointly create a new agreement for the future of the European security architecture. The EU should seize this chance and react constructively and in unity to the proposal in order to

⁵² First published in: Bertelsmann Stiftung, Working Paper, 2009.

make progress on necessary reforms. Parallel to the inclusion of Russia, the region awaits advancements in the EaP and a new partnership agreement with Russia. This paper offers recommendations for a more holistic and effective approach to the *Ostpolitik* of the EU.

1. The Importance of European Cooperation in the East

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin wall, the West has failed to effectively incorporate the Russian Federation into security institutions in Europe. The consequences of this deficiency reach from the recurrent reigniting of “frozen” conflicts and gas rows to a growing inability in Europe to successfully confront common challenges of the 21st century. This realization, coupled with the new security orientations that accompanied administration changes in both Washington and Moscow, offers a chance to harmonize EU policy and relations with the United States, Russia and the Eastern neighborhood.

With the discontinuation of plans in Poland and the Czech Republic, President Barack Obama appears to have assumed a more consistent line of engagement in his security policy in comparison to his predecessor. While the Bush administration insisted on installing the anti-missile system in Eastern Europe, it expected Russia's cooperation with sanctions against Iran, with the fight against terror and with military transport to Afghanistan. Exactly this form of contradiction met with non-cooperation in Moscow. Consequently, the Obama administration is increasingly pursuing a prioritization of security threats rather than attempting many contradictory endeavors at once. The nuclear program in Iran is at the top of the list.

Without cooperation from Moscow, attempts by the United States and its allies to pressure Iran will prove futile. Russia has the ability to produce and transport goods for the entire spectrum of Iranian demand, which

would render tougher sanctions ineffective.⁵³ Until recently, President Medvedev refused to support the tougher sanctions pushed by the US. However, on September 23 in Pittsburgh – shortly after Obama's compromise in regards to the anti-missile system – he agreed that Moscow would be open for tougher sanctions against Iran.⁵⁴ These latest events show the extent to which the United States will have its hands tied in potential conflicts between Russia and the “near abroad”. Despite the fact that recent developments do not deliberately aim at worsening ties between Washington and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the concessions of the Obama administration nevertheless carry serious consequences for those countries. The cancellation of the placement of anti-missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic not only marks a turning point in relations between Washington and Moscow, but also signals at least in the medium term a fundamental alteration in the security situation on the eastern borders of the EU. This evolving security reality demands a more proactive role of the EU in fostering positive cooperation with Russia in the common neighborhood in general and in conflict prevention in particular. A combination of existing and developing instruments lend themselves to this end: the Eastern Partnership (EaP), the dialogue over President Medvedev's proposal for a new European security architecture, a new “Euro-Atlantic Council” within the OSCE, the Four Common Spaces and a new partnership agreement between the EU and Russia.

Beyond its stabilizing character, a truly functioning partnership with Russia and the eastern neighborhood countries would offer manifold ad-

⁵³ George Friedman. “The BMD Decision and the Global System”, STRATFOR, Geopolitical Intelligence Report, September 21, 2009.

⁵⁴ According to a member of the administration, the concession on the part of President Medvedev was only possible due to the gesture of Barack Obama to rethink the placement of the antimissile system: “Iran is Warned over Nuclear ‘Deception’”, New York Times, September 25, 2009. URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/world/middleeast/26nuke.html?pagewanted=2&ref=global-home>.

vantages for the EU. Only the constructive inclusion of this important European player in the security policy dialogue will enable the EU to help shape Russia's (re)emerging role in a multipolar world. Notwithstanding Russia's loss of power in the global arena following the end of the Cold War, other not-so-insignificant reasons exist for the indispensability of Russian-EU cooperation. In addition to the fact that Russia possesses more fossil fuels than any other country worldwide as well as one of the two largest nuclear arsenals, its borders stretch from Europe across the greater Middle East and Central Asia to East Asia and thus across many of the most important geostrategic regions and those essential for countering transnational threats. Furthermore, a great deal of potential exists in cooperation toward necessary global reforms of the international financial system and combating global warming.⁵⁵

In no other area can Moscow better demonstrate its willingness to build a new, substantial partnership with the EU than in the common neighborhood;⁵⁶ A partnership based on common principles of non-violence—including the prohibition of the threat of violence—and mutual respect for state sovereignty presupposes that these principles also apply in the common neighborhood. Against this background, this paper analyses the intentions of President Medvedev's security policies regarding the European Union and the "near abroad". Subsequently, it will examine the hitherto existing *Ostpolitik* of the EU with particular consideration of the Eastern Partnership and opportunities for a more effective cooperation with Russia. On the basis of this analysis, this paper will offer recommendations for a holistic EU approach in Eastern Europe.

⁵⁵ See J. Hamre und C. Fred Bergsten (2009), Preface in: Anders Aslund und Andrew Kuchins, *The Russia Balance Sheet*. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics und Center for Strategic and International Studies.

⁵⁶ Edward Lucas (2009). *The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

2. Security Ambitions in the European Neighbourhood under Dmitri Medvedev

2.1 Foreign and Security Policy under Medvedev

Put forward in June 2008, President Medvedev's proposal for a "new European security architecture from Vancouver to Vladivostok" has since gained momentum, attracting the attention of the U.S. and European policy communities alike. Indeed, Russian administrations since the end of the Cold War have continually questioned the existential purpose and direction of NATO, but failed to deliver a concrete, constructive counterproposal. Then came the war with Georgia. As Dmitri Medvedev presented his concept anew at the World Policy Conference in October 2008 in Evian and then at the Council on Foreign Relations that November, he asserted that no war would have taken place had an appropriate and effective security architecture been in place.⁵⁷

At the very latest by the beginning of the Russian-Georgian war, security deficits forced the EU and the US to recognize that neither individual states nor the presently existing security organizations, in particular NATO, were in a position to prevent the war or resolve the underlying conflict. Moreover, one must acknowledge that the current framework still remains incapable of settling a number of other frozen conflicts in the region that threaten the security of Europe (Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Crimea, and Kosovo).⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Council on Foreign Relations. "Transcript: A Conversation with Dmitry Medvedev." November 15, 2008. URL: http://www.cfr.org/publication/17775/conversation_with_dmitry_medvedev.html.

⁵⁸ A recommendable analysis of Medvedev's proposal can be found under: Klein, Margarete (2008). „Der russische Vorschlag für eine neue gesamteuropäische Sicherheitsordnung: ernst zu nehmender Vorschlag oder Spaltungsversuch?“ *Russland Analysen*. 2009-07-22. URL: <http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/pdf/Russlandanalysen175.pdf#page=9>.

The Medvedev proposal for a new security architecture must be considered in the context of other security documents and statements of his administration. Of these, the most important include the five guiding foreign policy principles of the Russian Federation, announced in an interview with Euronews in September 2008⁵⁹ and the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, ratified by presidential fiat on May 12, 2009.⁶⁰

After the war in Georgia, two of the five guiding principles deserve particular attention: point 4 emphasizes the protection of Russian citizens also abroad as a foreign policy priority and point 5 defines certain regions as “regions of privileged interest” for the Russian Federation. In contrast to “sphere of influence”⁶¹ rhetoric, that of “regions of privileged interest” indicates a position in Moscow that third countries should have limited rights (rather than none at all) in these areas. In the case of Georgia or Ukraine, such a position rejects the endeavors of these countries to acquire NATO membership or accept military bases from western countries.⁶² The EU however has an obligation to respect the right of sovereign neighboring countries to make their own decisions on membership and association issues.

Much more detailed than the guidelines for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, the national security strategy from May 2009 serves the purpose of creating a common basis for the work of various actors in the se-

curity sector.⁶³ However, it is precisely the lack of coordination and synthesis of the different sections in this document that prove striking. Because an array of various actors and ministries worked on the strategy, the final version alludes to interministerial disagreement.⁶⁴ In this respect, the security strategy of the Russian Federation under Medvedev remains relatively ambiguous as to what extent the document will actually steer the relevant security actors. None the less, the security strategy provides insight into the direction of Russian policy in her common neighborhood with the EU. Most apparently, the national security strategy accentuates the importance of national economic development for the security of the country. It devotes, in fact, such a substantial proportion of the document to socio-economic goals that they comprise 5 out of 7 of the measurable criteria by which progress in the security situation will be measured in the future: unemployment, Gini coefficient, the development of consumer prices, national and foreign debt of the state as a percent of GDP and the level of resources provided to sectors of health, culture, education and sciences as a percent of GDP. Only the last two points refer to military power: the annual level of innovation in areas of military and armament and the degree to which human resources can be guaranteed in areas of military, technology and engineering.⁶⁵

⁵⁹ These include first and foremost foreign and defense ministries as well as the Ministry of the Interior, FSB, the office of the presidential administration, an administration representative (Vladimir Putin) and the Duma.

⁶⁰ Compare for example de Haas, “Medwedews Sicherheitspolitik: Eine vorläufige Einschätzung” and Hans-Henning Schröder, „Ein strategisches Sammelsurium: Medwedews „Strategie für die nationale Sicherheit Russlands bis zum Jahre 2020“ in Russland-Analysen, Nr. 186, 3. 7. 2009.

⁶¹ This strategy corresponds to the latest statements from high official levels in which representatives underscore that the RF is focusing predominantly on internal developments. Examples include the speech from Vladimir Kobrin at the Deutsch-Russisches Forum on October 21, 2009 in Berlin and Dmitry Rogozin on November 5th in the DGAP in Berlin. Due to the effects of the financial and economic crisis, this internal concentration is likely to persist.

⁵⁹ Dmitri Medvedev, Interview on Euronews, Moscow, September 2, 2008. URL: www.kremlin.ru.

⁶⁰ Совет Безопасности Российской Федерации. „Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года.“ URL: <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>.

⁶¹ The use of the term “sphere of influence” dates back to Russian imperialism in the 19th century, where Russia used its military power to subjugate territories into its empire. Aslund und Kuchins (2009). *The Russia Balance Sheet*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, p. 120.

⁶² Ibid.

Despite both the weight given to the concept of security through development apparent in the strategy document until 2020 and the recognition of the importance of soft power, the Russian leadership has thus far perceived national economic development only as a means to enable its assertion on a global scale rather than as a means to ensure long-term stability through increased prosperity on its borders, as is the case in the EU security strategy. In the context of the “sphere of privileged interests” rhetoric, Russia offers the countries of the common neighborhood with the EU few incentives for convergence with the Russian development paradigm.

2.2 The Proposal for a New European Security Architecture

Taking a closer look at both the initial, rather vague proposal for a new European security architecture and then the more detailed version from President Medvedev, it becomes possible to formulate some assumptions about the intentions of the proposal. In his speech in Berlin, President Medvedev explicitly appealed to the EU member countries to participate in a summit on the topic as individual countries rather than in blocks or as a group. Moscow continually attempts, often successfully, to reach bilateral agreements with individual EU states rather than addressing the diverse group as a whole. Although this approach from Moscow is understandable, (less obstacles and a more favorable power dynamic) it does not serve the interests of the EU and raises suspicions that Russia is attempting to “divide and conquer”.⁶⁶

Many of the later defined details of the proposal proved neither new nor specific in terms of implementation. These aspects included: 1) respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries; 2) prohibition of

the use of force as well as the threat to use force; 3) insurance of equal security for all (this point alludes to a ban on military alliances such as NATO that threaten, according to Medvedev, the security of some non-members); 4) the rejection of an exclusive right of one state or organization to maintain security in Europe (yet a further reference to NATO) and; 5) fundamental rules for improving arms control.

In particular, points 3 and 4 aim unmistakably at the weakening of NATO’s role in Europe. The last point, arms control, refers predominantly to U.S. – Russia relations and the first two points already exist in international law. However, a novelty does exist in the legally binding character proposed in which all of these points would be unified. Thus far, the central issue of enforcement of even such a binding agreement remains unclear. For the security dilemma in the EU neighborhood, the first two points carry special relevance. Against the background of the war in Georgia, in which Russian troops advanced beyond Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia proper, central and eastern European countries condemn Russia for a *lack* of respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty of their countries. Many doubt the sincerity of the proposal, insisting that Moscow will never itself abide by the ban on the use or threat of force. While the “Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia”⁶⁷ found Georgia responsible for the first strike in the conflict in South Ossetia, it admonished Moscow for its disproportional reaction and illegal invasion into Georgian territory beyond the enclaves.

Interestingly, the proposal from President Medvedev focuses exclusively on hard security and military defense, which fundamentally diverges from the comprehensive EU security concept based on internal modernization of the state. According to the European security strategy, “the best protec-

⁶⁶ It should be mentioned that Medvedev invited participation from organizations and groups such as the EU and NATO in his later address.

⁶⁷ Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG – CEIIG), September 30, 2009. URL: <http://www.ceiig.ch>.

tion for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states.” For this reason, the EU views “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights” as the best means to ensure security.⁶⁸ While EU member states do not completely abstain from the use of hard security, they chiefly rely on soft power and common values such as democracy to influence developments in neighboring countries. While one could argue that the EU can only afford to focus on soft power because of the hard security guarantee from the United States and NATO, the fact remains that the security reality in Europe over the last decades has changed normative perceptions in the EU about what a secure Europe should look like.

Although aspects of democracy and human rights do not find explicit mention in Moscow’s proposed treaty, President Medvedev offered the EU an open dialogue about these issues in June 2008 during his stay in Berlin and underlined the “humanistic ideals and values that are shared by all of Europe and are an integral part of the culture of Russia and the unified Germany.” He moreover appealed to a common European identity and foundations of democracy, which also in Russia find their roots in Roman, Germanic and French law.⁶⁹ This appeal to common values serves as confirmation of the attractiveness of the EU’s soft power and the effectiveness of a comprehensive security strategy based on European values.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ European Security Strategy: “A Secure Europe in a Better World.” December 12, 2003, p. 9.

⁶⁹ President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev’s Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders, Berlin, June 5, 2008. URL: <http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/320>.

⁷⁰ These expressed values can also be found throughout Dmitri Medvedev’s internal communications, for example on the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repressions. See Dmitri Medvedev, “Память о национальных трагедиях так же священна, как память о победах.” October 30, 2009. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5862>.

3. Recommendations for EU Action

3.1 Unity

When it comes to relations with its eastern neighbors and with Russia, both “old” and “new” member countries struggle to come to agreement on the proper course. While Poland, Estonia, Sweden and England tend toward skepticism in dealings with Russia, Germany, Italy, France and Hungary actively seek deeper cooperation.⁷¹ Not able to establish concordance as a union, member states often conclude bilateral agreements with Russia rather than collective ones. One can only hope that through the Lisbon treaty and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy the EU will become more consistent not only in its strategic documents, but in practice as well. This development will first become apparent in the years to come.

The EU must harmonize its many strategies with its eastern neighbors in order to gain more consistency, avoid undermining its own strategies and emerge as an attractive, strong actor in not only development but also security issues in the neighborhood countries. So that the EU can act with a unified voice and meet regional as well as international challenges, new forums are needed which promote a process of vetting the many diverging

⁷¹ ECPR divides member countries into five groups according to their patterns of behavior in relation to Russia: “Trojan Horses” like Cyprus and Greece often veto common EU endeavors due to lobbying from Russia, “Strategic Partners” such as Germany, France, Italy and Spain enjoy special economic privileges and seek deepened cooperation, “Friendly Pragmatists” like Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia tend to value business interests above political ones, “Frosty Pragmatists” in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK exhibit prioritization of business interests, but speak out more often against Russian policies, and “New Cold Warriors” Lithuania and Poland have hostile relations with Moscow and block many decisions between the latter and the EU. For more on this analysis, see European Council on Foreign Relations. “A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations.” November 2, 2007.

security interests and perceptions and building consensus. After all, as the ECFR emphasized, the EU's most powerful leverage lies in its unity.

The EU member states must not only elaborate a common basis of interest for cooperation with neighborhood countries and Russia, but must also analyze to what extent the EU can actually influence developments in third countries and decide how much effort it is willing to make in order to reach the goals. To date, progress in cooperation in the East lacks measurability, as the EU has failed to formulate goals and objectives in a measurable way. The current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement consists for instance of many statements of intent but is void of measurable objectives. More clarity in defining these objectives with the consideration of both outcome and input-oriented dimensions would prove more conducive to successful EU policies in the eastern neighborhood.

3.2 The Institutional Incorporation of Russia

An overarching lack of consequence and a common perception of security interests in the shared neighborhood present the most significant hitherto existing challenges for EU policies toward the Russian Federation. In regards to modernization promotion in the neighboring countries for example, the EU continually insists that the EaP is not aimed against Russia. Objectively, that is true. However, in the politics of security, perceptions of intentions outweigh the importance of the intentions themselves. In exactly this manner, Moscow can argue that it poses no threat to Central and eastern European countries. As long as these countries feel threatened, they will have a reason to block the further incorporation of Russia into European institutions. Consequently, it is imperative that the EU replace the practice of "clarification" of intentions with practical confidence-building measures in order to bring these diverging perceptions closer together in the long term. In a first step, cooperation in areas of shared interest will

likely demonstrate the highest potential for success. Possible areas include conflict prevention, energy security and economic cooperation.

While both the EU and Russian Federation identified these areas as those of common interest, the EU only then can expect constructive cooperation with Russia when Moscow perceives that its security interests are being taken seriously. Taking Moscow seriously should not become confused with or equated to yielding to its demands. Nevertheless, beyond isolated concessions (even if they are not communicated as concessions) such as the cancelation of the antimissile systems in the Czech Republic and Poland, institutional concessions for shared decision-making have fallen too short. Although President Medvedev welcomes the latest antimissile defense decision, the point of the matter is not just whether the EU, U.S. or NATO make a decision in Moscow's favor, but whether Moscow is allowed to participate on level with these actors in the decision-making process.

Despite the isolated concessions and the rhetoric of *perezagruzka*, the perception in Moscow persists that the US "will never allow the Europeans or the Russians access to the button."⁷² For this reason, it would be an illusion to expect that Russia will settle for their position within the framework of the NATO Russia Council. Regardless of the actual intentions of NATO or the US, due to Russia's perceptions of them, its incorporation into the security architecture in Europe must occur independently from but parallel to NATO: independently because a new council is needed that Russia can help shape from the very beginning and parallel because most EU states still see NATO and its US participation as the preferred institution for providing security in Europe. While it would run contrary to European interests to devalue NATO, the EU should not wait for a proposed solution from Washington, but rather take the initiative to explore

⁷² Dmitri Rogozin, 5. November 2009, DGAP Berlin.

possibilities for a more effective and institutionalized inclusion of Russia in the future of European security.

Due to the broad participation in the OSCE, the organization should seize the suggestion of the Aspen European Strategic Forum and found a “Euro-Atlantic Council” within the OSCE.⁷³ The new council would encounter more acceptance in Moscow and could improve the reputation of the organization on both a political and working level as one that is quick to act and dynamic in its responses. In particular, this council could formulate a common security strategy for new, shared security challenges. The fight against narcotics trade and Islamic extremism would lend themselves as pilot projects. Although the NATO-Russia Council could also deal with these topics, Moscow does not feel adequately included in decision-making processes and treatment of them in a new council would have a different character.

Just as NATO is currently revising its strategic concept, a Euro-Atlantic Council could formulate a common concept with the difference that Russia would also enjoy decision-making rights on the topics defined as falling within its mandate. Through an open dialogue in the course of formulating a strategic concept, Russia, the EU and the US, along with other OSCE members, would also define a common threat perception. The potential new council and NATO would need to decide which topics are more appropriate for which institution. Fundamental questions of NATO enlargement and others would still reside in NATO while the main responsibility for areas defined by the new strategic concept could be anchored within the new Euro-Atlantic Council.

The new council could deal with the changes to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), necessary since the last NATO en-

largement, in order to reach progress in an important area of hard security. Possible overlapping between NATO and the council within the OSCE should be considered positive as long as the needed coordination exists, as healthy competition between the two institutions could bring many advantages. The new council would only then persist when it proves effective and conducive to improved security in Europe and thus presents a win-win development in the European security architecture. Furthermore, it is worth consideration whether certain decisions of the Euro-Atlantic Council could be executed through projects within the framework of the EaP.

3.3 The New Ostpolitik

3.3.1 The Eastern Partnership in Context

Launched in May 2009, the Eastern Partnership must be considered within the context of the general neighborhood policy on the one hand and other regional organizations on the other in order to understand its potential added value for European security. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which provides the framework for cooperation between the EU and the North African, Mediterranean and eastern European neighbors, proved a first step, following the enlargement of 2004, toward preventing the creation of new borders within Europe. Yet it fell short of achieving its very ambitious goal of increased prosperity and security on its borders. Experts attribute lack of success to the nature of the ENP as too comprehensive, not specifically tailored to each country context and void of adequate incentives for the proposed reforms.⁷⁴

With the enlargement in 2007, the need for action beyond the eastern border of the EU only intensified. Through the incorporation of Romania

⁷³ Aspen Institute Deutschland. “Russia and the West: How to Restart a Constructive Relationship.” Aspen European Strategy Forum, November 5, 2009. URL: http://www.aspenberlin.org/uploads/assets/pdfs/general/AESF/Russia_and_the_West_fin.pdf.

⁷⁴ See Susan Stewart (2009). “EU Relations with Russia and the Eastern Neighborhood in: Peter Ludlow (ed.) *Setting EU priorities 2009*, European Strategy Forum, Ponte de Lima 2009, pp. 125-150.

and Bulgaria into the union, the EU moved into a wider neighborhood, reaching the Black Sea and thus directly bordering not only the frozen conflicts of Southeast Europe, but also those of the Caucasus. Consequently, a new security policy that would effectively combat the insecurity of neighboring states reached a heightened level of prioritization. Simultaneously however, a direct response by the EU by way of hard security would run counter to her long-term interests. The EU enjoys a considerable advantage in comparison to other security actors in that she is perceived in the neighboring countries predominantly as a legitimate soft power with whom cooperation leads to an increase in standard of living. In order to assert itself as a superpower, the EU should not let itself be forced into playing the role of a hegemon, but rather continue excelling at that what it does best: trade and economic spheres, development and environmental policy, consumer protection and the area of culture—in other words areas of soft power.⁷⁵ Legitimacy of this Ostpolitik lies in the fact that the EU applies the same values foundation for policies both within the EU and outside of its borders and that these policies aim to transfer its paradigm for stability and prosperity to these countries.⁷⁶

The key challenge the EU will have to face lies in utilizing its soft power for prosperity and stability promotion in the region and the effective resolution of frozen conflicts. In the past however, the EU's eastern neighbors did not perceive it as a relevant security actor in the region. Even the intervention for the mitigation of the crisis in Georgia in the summer of 2008

⁷⁵ Compare Zepter, Bernard (2009). "Strukturen, Akteure und Inhalte der EU-Außenpolitik." In: Bendiek and Kramer. *Globale Außenpolitik der Europäischen Union: Interregionale Beziehungen und „strategische Partnerschaften“*. Nomos: Baden-Baden.

⁷⁶ For more on this topic, see Annegret Bendiek / Heinz Kramer, "Die europäische Politik der interregionalen Beziehungen und "strategischen Partnerschaften": Hegemoniale Politik im neuen Gewand?", *Globale Außenpolitik der Europäischen Union: Interregionale Beziehungen und „strategische Partnerschaften“*, Baden-Baden 2009; Richard Rosecrance, "The European Union: A New Type of International Actor", in: Jan Zielonka, *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, The Hague 1998, pp. 15-25.

resulted from the strong French European Council presidency and remains both an exception and ad hoc.

Indeed, the EaP offers an approach for a solution to the prior inadequacies of the ENP, which also could not be corrected by the Black Sea Synergy or Black Sea Economic Council. Firstly, the "eastern European neighbors" receive the necessary prioritization in comparison to "Europe's neighbors" in the Union for the Mediterranean, as the EaP will receive an additional 75 percent increase of funding through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Beyond this symbolic value however, the EaP, if successfully carried through, will lead to more convergence with the EU without promising membership, but also without eliminating this possibility in the future. Moreover, because of more tailored agreements, more self-responsibility and ownership ensues and further convergence with the EU gains a more performance-dependent character. The EaP breaks away from the path dependency of enlargement policy and the status denomination of "neighbor" or "member", advocating instead a dynamic policy framework that envisions a broader definition of enlargement.⁷⁷

The EaP presents a new approach to *Ostpolitik* precisely because it does not propose old patterns of integration, but rather offers a convergence that depends on the reform will of the individual state. Whereas the older members of the EU possess few carrots or sticks to induce reform in new member states, it leaves the membership question open for the time being, which enables it to offer gradual incentives through additional convergence funds. Instead of relinquishing all possibilities for influence at once, the EU offers incentives for various policy areas such as for a visa regime or for a free trade zone.

⁷⁷ See for example. Lippert, Barbara (2007). „Teilhabe statt Mitgliedschaft?“. In: Osteuropa, Die EU und ihre Nachbarn: Inklusion, Exklusion, Illusion., Berlin.

Concerning the further development of the EaP, which does not envision the institutionalized participation of Russia, the biggest challenge for the success of the initiative consists of the diverging perceptions of security interests of Russia and the EU. The EU speaks about stability and implies long-term modernization that leads to stability and the resolution of frozen conflicts. Russia on the other hand, as mentioned in the above, concentrates on hard security. On an official level, Moscow regrets that the EU rarely addresses hard security issues explicitly in its conversations about its eastern neighbors.⁷⁸ Where security notions collide, namely in crisis management, the EU and Russia could work together within the EaP. The conflict in Transnistria offers promising possibilities for a first step in security cooperation in the shared neighborhood. Furthermore, rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia could be utilized to encourage a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As Russia plays a central role in both conflicts and Moscow expressed desire to cooperation in the area of crisis management, resolution of these conflicts—in addition to the immediate added value—would send a signal to the EU that Moscow is serious about its constructive proposal for a new European security architecture.

As long as the increasing convergence of the common neighborhood with the EU means a divergence from Russia, Moscow will view the EaP with suspicion and as if it were aimed against her and refuse to accept the invitation to participate in projects on an individual basis.⁷⁹ Although projects should exist that do not involve third countries, many projects are imaginable in areas of shared interest with Russia. The promotion of small and medium-sized business serves an example of an area that could prove promising for a joint project within the EaP.

⁷⁸ Vladimir Kobrin, Speech at the Deutsch-Russischen Forum Oktober 21, 2009 in Berlin.

⁷⁹ Andrei Zagorski stressed this point at the Deutsch-Russisches-Forum on October 21, 2009.

3.3.2 The Partnership Agreement and the Four Common Spaces

So that in a best case scenario, the convergence of the eastern European neighborhood countries could occur parallel to convergence with Russia in areas of common interest, the EU needs a new PCA with Russia, officially in negotiation since the EU-Russia summit 2008. At the moment, too much overlap exists between the outdated PCA from 1994 and the four common spaces, which have been implemented since 2005. These two institutional formats should be consolidated and optimized. The EU would be well advised to evaluate which of the four spaces (common economic space, Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, Space on External Security and that on Research, Education, Culture) have made progress thus far and in which of these spaces advancements can be expected. The EU should then foster these areas.

Due to the absence of the US in the common space on external security, cooperation in this area has been ineffective. Against this background, this common space lends itself all the more to a more inclusive forum such as the proposed Euro-Atlantic Council, as security issues in Europe will not be managed without the US and NATO in the near future. In the PCA as well as the four common spaces, economic cooperation presents the area with by far the most progress and potential for its successful further development from a standpoint of mutual interests. As suggested by Moscow political scientist Andrei Zagorski, the EU could work to merge the sectoral economic dialogues into a new partnership agreement and thereby induce a targeted promotion of these areas. Moreover, further cooperation in the complementary area of Freedom, Security and Justice, which seeks to improve the legal conditions for a gradual liberalization of trade relations, could set the groundwork for Russia to join the WTO and lead to more convergence with the neighborhood and with the EU. Following entry into the WTO, a free trade zone could be gradually established.

Through the modernization and diversification of the Russian economy as well as through the growing middle class that this would generate, the EU can most effectively contribute to long-term political modernization. The EU must acknowledge the inconvenient reality that conditionalities in the area of democracy and human rights in Russia have hitherto practically failed. Rather than deploring internal developments against democracy and freedom in Russia and patronizingly formulating these issues unidirectionally as an area within the agreement, the EU would find its policies much more effective by formulating the basis for cooperation around the shared values of freedom and democracy recently so praised by Dmitri Medvedev.⁸⁰ In this context, the EU could still make critical statements, but in a more constructive fashion. Furthermore, not the EU, but the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) constitutes the appropriate forum for the institutionalized treatment of human rights abuses in Europe, including in the Russian Federation.

Finally, the potential impact of increased exchanges in the area of culture and civil society presents an aspect of convergence between Russia and the EU that should not be underestimated. Visa facilitation on an EU level would be the most important single step toward advancing these exchanges.

4. Outlook

It will prove difficult if not impossible to receive a positive reaction from Moscow to the Eastern Partnership as long as the overarching relations, in particular in the area of security, remain unsettled. For this reason, the EU

should respond positively to Dmitri Medvedev's proposal and engage in dialogue with Moscow in order to produce a more detailed version. After all, one should not forget that the Helsinki Accords from 1975 emanated from a Soviet proposal. Through dialogue and joint revision as well as concretization of the proposal, a mutually beneficial agreement could emerge. In particular, the Corfu process within the OSCE presents the proper forum to discuss the future of the European security architecture and the suggestion to found a Euro-Atlantic Council, through which all relevant actors could elaborate a joint threat perception and a concerted reaction to the new security challenges of the 21st century.

Significant potential exists for the further development of the EaP toward an effective instrument of cooperation and inclusive European security governance. However, the EU must act now, while this window of opportunity is still open. The proposal from President Medvedev placed the ball in the European court and the EU should put forward projects within the framework of the EaP in order to make Russia a concrete offer of inclusion in the initiative and to fill it with life.

⁸⁰ Schröder, Hans-Henning (2008). „Medwedew ante Portas“, SWP Aktuell, (Nr. 58/ June).

II.

**Energy Security
as a Determinant of the EU-Russia
Relationship**

Is Nuclear Power the Right Way Forward?

(March 2010)

Andrea Zlatňanská, Greenpeace Slovakia

1. Introduction

The nuclear power industry is attempting to exploit the climate crisis by aggressively promoting nuclear technology as a “low-carbon” means of generating electricity. Nuclear power is claimed to be safe, cost-effective and able to meet the world’s energy needs. But nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, nuclear power undermines the real solutions to climate change by diverting urgently needed investments away from clean, renewable sources of energy and energy efficiency. Nuclear power is expensive, dangerous and a threat to global security. And when it comes to combating climate change, it cannot deliver the necessary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in time; any emissions reductions from nuclear power will be too little too late and come at far too high a price.

Nuclear power is a woefully inadequate response to the climate crisis, and in contrast, renewable energy and greater energy efficiency can be delivered in time to tackle climate change without any of the dangers posed by nuclear power – key environmental, health and security issues affecting every stage of the nuclear process; the unsolved problem of radioactive

waste; the risk of catastrophic accidents; and the dangers posed to global security.

In defiance of logic, nuclear power has benefited for over half a century from massive financial support in the form of taxpayers' money. Yet it is barely possible to conceive of a more complex and risky way of heating water to produce steam and generate power. It is now time to give priority to simpler, cheaper and more reliable ways of meeting consumer demands for electricity.

2. Slovakia

Political Situation

One of the biggest problems of environment protection in Slovakia is certainly the instability of the Ministry of Environment, as there were 5 changes in the post of Minister of the Environment within the last four years, accompanied by several scandals.

Two ongoing issues in this regard are the lack of a complex environmental and climate policy and the absence of the environment and climate change on the political agenda. These issues are not properly addressed, and there is no public discussion happening in regard to them.

And last but not least, our government is openly pro-nuclear, and in their communication there is no support for renewables, especially not for wind and photovoltaics electricity production.

Primary Energy Sources – Current Situation

Slovakia's dependency on imported primary energy sources is very high – up to 90%. Most of these sources are imported from Russia – about

98% of gas and oil, 100% of nuclear fuel and a large share of black coal, even though black coal is also imported from Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine.

Energy Security Strategy

The currently valid energy security strategy mainly relies on the development of dirty projects. The government still relies on domestic coal mining, even though it is a social project and the burning of the coal is not even profitable. In coal mining, the strategy relies on new coal plants having a capacity of about 1600 MW until 2025.

Two other sources that are meant to secure energy supply are the completion of two old nuclear reactors in Mochovce (block number 3 and 4) and the development of one or more new reactors in Jaslovské Bohunice with an installed capacity of up to 1700 MW by 2025. Not only is Slovakia planning to keep up the support of nuclear power, but there is also a plan to assess the viability of uranium mining.

Furthermore there is a planned support for some new large hydro plants which are projected to have a new installed capacity of 600 ME until 2025.

On the renewables field, some 2100 MW are planned to be installed by 2030, while major support is being considered for biomass, hydro power and geothermal energy.

On the one hand, the pro-import energy strategy is clear. On the other hand, however, there is a 9% reduction in energy intensity planned for 2016 in comparison to the EU 15. The current numbers are rather distressing, as Slovak energy intensity is currently 4,1 times higher than the EU 27 average. This, however, shows a great energy saving and energy efficiency potential for the future.

Renewable Energy

While Slovakia is lacking domestic primary energy sources like coal and gas, renewables are the only way for the country to become independent from imports of energy resources, as well as for it to secure energy security for the future.

The state, however, only formally supports development of renewable energy sources. Without large hydro plants, renewables only account for about 4% of the country's energy consumption, but the country is committed to raising this figure to 14% by 2020, which is probably going to be mostly achieved by heat production. Renewable sources of electricity production like wind and PVs continue to be demonized and their support is very low. These sources are being undermined by, e.g., the Ministry of Economy's statements, while nuclear power is widely promoted.


The main messages the public receives from decision makers are that the prices of these sources are high, and that their impact on the grid is negative (e.g. blackouts). The grid, however, is not being prepared for a condition in which it would be able to take in more renewables.

3. Global Situation

Can Nuclear Energy Secure Energy Supply?

Uranium for electricity production is mainly supplied by seven countries that provide about 90% of all of the world's uranium – Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Niger, Namibia and Uzbekistan.

Is There a Nuclear Renaissance?



It is visible on the above graph that last year, there were 438 reactors in operation worldwide, with a 371,000 MW installed capacity, and a mean reactor age of 25 years. There was a final shutdown of one reactor- the 440 MW reactor in Slovakia, and no new reactor was connected to the grid. There are three reactors under construction in the EU.

In the two previous years, there were 5 new reactors connected to grid (two in China, two in India and one in Romania). However, 8 reactors were shut down, all in Europe (Spain, Bulgaria, the UK and Slovakia).

This shows that the so-called nuclear renaissance is only a PR trick of the dying nuclear industry rather than a reality.

Too Little Too Late

Although some people talk of a 'nuclear renaissance', it exists only on paper. The pretentious words and high expectations are not matched by orders for new reactors or by interest from the investment community. Only

during nuclear power's peak in 1985 and 1986, the equivalent of 30 new reactors (30 GW) of additional capacity was built per year. In the last decade, though, the average construction rate was just four new reactors (4 GW) per year.


The declining nuclear industry is attempting to latch on to the climate crisis and concerns about energy security by promoting itself as a “low carbon” solution. Today's world is hooked on coal, oil and gas. Burning these fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide, the main cause of global warming and climate change. Furthermore, oil and gas are finite and concentrated in a limited number of locations around the world, often in unstable regions. This concerns policy makers who are keen to ensure sufficient and secure supplies of energy for the future.

But, for the simplest of reasons, nuclear energy cannot be a part of the solution: nuclear power can only deliver too little too late.

The Energy Scenario produced by the International Energy Agency (Figure ES 2) shows that **even if the existing world nuclear power capacity could be quadrupled by 2050, its share of world energy consumption would still be below 10%. This would reduce carbon dioxide emissions by less than 4%.**


Implementation of this scenario would require that one new reactor be built every 10 days from now until 2050. Investment costs for the 1,400 new reactors needed would exceed USD 10 trillion at current prices (figures based on Moody's estimate of nuclear power – 7,500 USD/KW).

Nuclear power cannot meet concerns about energy security either. The 439 commercial nuclear reactors in operation generate around 15% of the world's electricity. This is just 6.5% of the world's total energy supply. Furthermore, nuclear power only generates electricity. Any contribution of nuclear power to the supply of hot water and central heating would be marginal, and it does not meet our transport needs at all.



The Solution

Installation of renewables is fast and growing. In 2008, the global installed capacity of wind power was more than 27 000 MW, in comparison to 0 for nuclear power (ES1).



Energy [R]Evolution by DLR for EREC/Greenpeace is a scenario based on policy targets that include rapid fossil fuel phase-out, only proven tech-

nology use, achieving a global climate target with a parallel nuclear phase-out, a global CO₂ emission peak by 2015, ~ 1 t CO₂/year per capita by 2050, equity, fairness and sustainable economic growth.¹

Nuclear Power Is Undermining Real Climate Solutions

We are facing a huge and decisive crossroads. In OECD countries, massive replacements for retiring power plants will be built in the next 15 years. In non-OECD countries, massive new capacities will be installed.

IEA's estimation is that 11 trillion USD (currently about €16,5 trillion) will be spent on new power generating capacities, and an additional 7 trillion USD will be spent on infrastructure (grids) by 2030. Those massive investments will define the shape of the electricity industry well beyond the first half of the 21st century.

The nuclear industry is aware that this is the last window of opportunity for it – and it recognizes renewables as competition: *“Time is running out. Further delays, including those forced by Greenpeace, could see the new [nuclear] build halted by the energy gap in 2018-mid 2020’s, and an alternative non-nuclear build instead. Competition for capital could become critical during this period.”* (recorded at the Public Information Materials Exchange, Nuclear Industry’s Conference in Edinburgh, February 16th, 2009).

Why Should We Say NO To Nuclear?

Measures to improve energy efficiency are available now. According to Amory Lovins, Rocky Mountain Institute, US, *“Each dollar invested in electric efficiency displaces nearly seven times as much carbon dioxide as a dollar invested in nuclear power, without any nasty side effects”*.

¹ URL: <http://www.energyblueprint.info>.

Technically accessible renewable energy sources are capable of producing six times more energy than the current global demand.

There is no solution to radioactive waste, which is hazardous for hundreds of thousands of years. In contrast to nuclear power, renewable energy is both clean and safe.

Nuclear power gambles with our lives, health and environment, while a sustainable energy future without these risks is at hand.

4. Summary

A nuclear phase-out is needed to create political support and space for renewable energy solutions and energy efficiency in order to secure the energy supply and the emission reductions needed to tackle climate change on time.

Slovakia needs to start taking environmental issues seriously, create a climate policy and stop halting the development of renewable energy sources.

2009 – an Annus Mirabilis in the CEE-Russia Gas Relations?

(March 2010)

András Deák, Center for EU Enlargement Studies (CEU)

There is hardly any doubt that since 1989 the year 2009 has been one of the most eventful ones with regards to energy relations between Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and Russia. A number of significant factors influencing this relationship – such as market balance, security perceptions and political milieu – have changed or have been shifted in the course of this year, suggesting a new climate for the upcoming period. Indeed, it is not an overstatement to speak about a paradigmatical shift of relations. When we look back in a few years from now, 2009 will certainly be seen as a major milestone glooming in the past.

There are three major events that began to influence the CEE and Russian energy agendas in 2009. First, at the beginning of the year, the Russian-Ukrainian gas transit war, with its unprecedented level of escalation, challenged the prevailing perceptions of energy security. The “impossible” – the total standstill of gas supplies – happened to many CEE countries, forcing them to improvise in a strategic and extremely sophisticated industry for an unbelievably long two weeks. While the memories of the January 2006 gas crisis faded away rather quickly, the scale, the length and the

consequences of this gas transit war have made the security of the networks a central element in future CEE planning. These countries need to make an effort now to adjust their policies to new perceptions, even if the form and effectiveness of the new measures are still to be seen.

The second major development of the year was the change in the political climate. Obama’s new Russia-policy marked the end of the strained period between Eastern Europe and Russia, in which energy played a distinguished role. Even if skepticism regarding Russian energy interests remains dominant in the CEE region, the softened nature of the US-Russian power struggle will give these conflicts a more regional character. This has a positive effect, given that during the past years the Bush-Putin pattern bore an extremely prohibitive, sometimes destructive character, raising the potential political costs of any energy project enormously. Co-operation with one side meant confrontation with the other, leading to an “arena-feeling” in both Washington and Moscow without any real commitments to increasing investments in the region. The current turn in US-Russian relations means some kind of a return to normality, during which CEE states will have to find some common or – at a maximum – European responses to their energy problems; US attention and Russian assertiveness towards the region will likely decrease in the coming years.

The third development, and the by far the biggest change in the European energy landscape, is the rapid swing from a seller’s to a buyer’s market. There has been a similar move in the oil market, where, however, the OPEC short-term adjustment mechanism on the supply side – very efficiently setting the oil price at a relatively high level – has dampened the change. In the gas industry a buyer’s market is a medium-term fact, and classical supply-demand equalization and price adjustment are the dominant factors in keeping the market in balance. The consequences of past investments into the gas industry coupled with a more than 7% drop in European demand are already felt: the long-standing and enormous price

gap between spot priced and oil-link priced gas has put a serious strain on existing contractual patterns, leading to redistribution of imports in favour of the former. Russia's Gazprom is one of the biggest losers both in terms of purchased volumes and selling prices. The Russian monopoly's income from exports might fall by more than one third to 40-42 billion USD in 2009. What is more, due to the changes in the market, diversification into LNG, the access to spot-priced gas and an increase of the flexibility of imports, for CEE countries, the option of buying spot priced gas turned not only into a question of investment into gas security, but also into a rational economical choice with which they can decrease gas prices domestically. This situation is unlikely to change in the next 3-4 years, providing a window of opportunity for CEE countries to lock in new import schemes in the region.

The scale of changes especially on the gas markets, but also on the oil markets, will influence both Russian and CEE strategies in the coming years. It is too early to make an assessment or even define a future line of actions: the players are still analyzing the situation and trying to clarify their options. In the following I will give a short overview of these, focusing particularly on the third factor described above. I will attempt to outline some options for the Russian oil and gas industry at first and then assess the possible ways of utilizing the new opportunities created in the CEE region during the last year.

Europe Speaks Gas, Russia Thinks Oil

It is very important to make a difference between the oil and the gas industry in Russia. In Europe we tend to speak more about gas, but we should realize that in Russia the importance of the oil industry is far bigger in some particular regards. Gas plays a significant role in terms of cheap domestic

supplies for the local population and the industry – a responsibility mainly born by Gazprom. More than two thirds of the Russian gas production is purchased on the internal market at relatively low prices. This means that in effect, Gazprom's main mission is to provide a social and economic benefit distributed among a high number of domestic actors. Financial instruments, the “monetization” of this subvention, and export markets are only of secondary importance for the regime. Even if Gazprom is interested in turning towards more profitable foreign markets, from the Kremlin's point of view the main purpose of gas export revenues is really only to compensate the losses of the under-priced domestic market. Gazprom's rise in the Russian political system came much more from its domestic leverage than from its size in terms of finances and/or external influence.

Oil was and is the real trophy in post-communist Russia. The oil industry – in comparison with the gas industry – is incomparably larger with regards to finances. In terms of gross revenues, Gazprom is only one of several major Russian energy companies, like Rosneft or Lukoil. Oil and oil product exports are four times larger than exports of gas while overall federal tax revenues from the oil industry exceed those from gas by more than five times.² Even after these reductions, net aggregated company revenues in the oil industry are almost three times higher than in the case of gas. The oil industry is export oriented and financially mature. After the basic “tribute” paid to the state, the few national oil companies may use their income as they want. While there is an in-kind redistribution of cheap energy in the gas sector, in the oil industry the divide between the companies and the state is a fiscal one. Rent-seekers would likely rather go into the oil industry than into the gas industry.

² In 2007 49,2% of the total exports came from the oil industry (the gas exports amounted to only 12,7%), while the proportion in tax revenues was 39,4% to 7,4%, in: „Toplivo-energeticheskiy kompleks Rossii 2000-2007“. Moscow: Minenergo, 2008. p. 63.

The above facts have a number of very important consequences. First of all, while the gas industry plays a significant role in social consolidation and industrial competitiveness, oil exports are meant to provide fiscal and macroeconomic stability. Fiscal and social expansion, foreign debt repayment, budget surpluses and the build-up of stability funds are all managed mainly from oil money. The mission of the oil industry is to yield export revenues for the country. This is a much more important short-term goal of the regime, since macroeconomic stability decreases its external dependence and saves it from social and political unrest. However, interestingly, while oil revenues are more important, the income from the oil sector is not as stable as that from gas. In the latter there is a domestic bargain between two Russian subjects, namely Gazprom and the Kremlin, about internal gas prices and export duties that influence incomes. In the Russian oil industry, however, the revenues and the fate of 40% of federal taxes depend on volatile foreign markets and world prices.

Considering all the data, Russian energy exports mean, first of all, oil exports. Oil and oil product exports have been growing from a share of 53,2% of total energy exports in 2000 to a share of 64,6% in 2007.³ Not surprisingly oil companies show a much higher level of activity on external markets than Gazprom. They have to actively form their environment, optimize their sales and revenues, and fight for market shares. The oil industry has a much greater amount of interests, resources and political weight with which to actively implement its strategies. It has the primacy over foreign trade in Russian energy. While CEE states and Europeans are much more concerned about the Russian gas sector, for the Kremlin, oil exports have a clear preference.

In view of this reality the worsening geopolitics of gas supplies is a bit overrepresented in EU-Russia and CEE-Russia relations. The dynamics of

the development of Russian oil exports and the decreasing importance of Europe as a target area have a similar relevance for future political and energy relations. Russian transit diversification of oil supplies, efforts to increase oil product exports at the expense of crude supplies and the striving for Far Eastern markets will have long-term and far-reaching impacts. The national oil champion Rosneft invests significantly into Far Eastern fields and has proclaimed that it would like to increase exports to China while borrowing from Chinese companies. For Rosneft Europe is increasingly becoming a simple export destination or a field for potential takeovers rather than a partner. While Europeans pursue an uneasy dialogue with Gazprom, they should not forget about the fact that it is the Russian gas monopoly's dependence on the EU markets that makes such a dialogue possible in the first place. Rosneft's assertiveness comes not only from its "statist touch", but also from its decoupling from European markets. It is not only oil's relatively lower security sensitiveness that made EU-Russia oil relations rather peaceful recently!

The current crisis has had a slightly different impact on gas and oil sectors. OPEC supply cuts saved Russia from the worst outcomes of the crisis, providing relative macroeconomic stability. What is more, the Russian oil industry indirectly benefited from the international credit crunch. Referring to the problems of external funding, Igor Sechin, deputy prime minister in charge of the energy industry, successfully lobbied for tax decreases on Far Eastern field developments, accelerating the export diversification efforts substantially. Further transit diversification projects, such as the expansion of Baltic crude oil and the "North" oil product pipeline system, are under way, foreshadowing the halt of direct pipeline exports to the CEE region in the foreseeable future. Consequently, these countries will have to adjust their import strategies to the changing Russian export policies unilaterally. Russian oil companies will not make any concessions in this

³ Ibid. p. 75.

regard. Higher import prices for CEE companies are likely – even if this situation is also an opportunity to diversify imports in the long term.

The situation with regards to Russian gas exports is entirely different from the one described above. International gas markets are in turmoil and this is especially true in Europe. Following the 2003 oil price boom, the impact of higher prices and the accompanying investments has just started to be felt recently. At the same time, the increasing share of domestic shale gas production in the US has made the prospects of large-scale future LNG imports into the US very small for a while. In the coming five years, however, an incremental LNG capacity of more than 100 bcm is to be expected on the supply side, mainly from Qatari sources, which is likely to result in not only lower LNG prices, but also an easier entry into this market on the consumer's side. All these effects are magnified further by the scale of the economic crisis: European gas demand fell by 7% in 2009, while in the traditional Gazprom export markets this drop was well over 10%.

In such a situation the margin of difference between spot prices and oil linked prices increased significantly all over Europe. At the National Balancing Point (UK) and in Germany spot prices were almost 50% lower than Gazprom European average prices⁴. European companies have decreased their imports from expensive Russian sources, switching to cheaper spot-priced imports. The major headache for Gazprom is that this unfavorable market situation might be sustained in the long term. Growing LNG supplies and decreasing US imports in the Atlantic Basin might significantly shift import patterns for cheaper LNG imports. Economic recovery in Europe will be slower than in other parts of the globe, while the appearance of shale gas technology has major downsizing potential for

future import projections on the continent. Gazprom will have to accommodate itself to the new situation and fight for its market positions. The major uncertainties they face are the questions of how long the current trends will dominate the market and which new instruments to adapt to counter their adverse effects.

To sum up, in the coming few years, the CEE region should expect a continuation of present Russian policies in the field of oil industry, which go together with the fact that the region and Europe as a whole have lost and continue to lose their previous significance for Moscow. This trend is much more important with regards to general Russian foreign policy attitudes than is generally perceived in Europe. Gazprom, on the contrary, will have to show more flexibility if it wants to keep its position in the European markets, providing a chance – particularly for the CEE region – to decrease dependence on Russian gas and to modify the state of relations.

A partial diversification of CEE gas imports will not change the Russian foreign policy attitude towards the region significantly. Yet, it may have an important psychological effect on the CEE states' awareness of their own energy and general security. This could lead to a relaxation of relations vis-à-vis Russia and a softened perception of the Russian threat among CEE elites. Even if Moscow might try to preserve its influence in CEE gas markets, the general Russian external energy trends are too deeply entrenched in the changing global energy landscape for changes on a relatively small gas market to affect Russian foreign policy significantly. CEE and Balkan states with their less than 20% share in total Gazprom exports, coupled with the relatively small importance of Gazprom in Russian external energy relations, are likely to ensure a less prohibitive Russian reaction to diversification efforts than is expected in most of the CEE capitals.

⁴ While the Gazprom price was 280 and 250 in Q2 and Q3 2009 respectively, NBP prices were accordingly at 149 and 130 USD.

A Chance for Central Eastern Europe

Of the factors listed above, the Russian-Ukrainian gas transit war in January 2009 appeared to be the most important development of the past year for CEE states. The crisis gained a Europe-wide media coverage, and due to its prominence it allowed CEE states to raise the problem in Brussels and in the EU, with a good chance for some regulatory and financial help. In view of potential EU help, the planned interconnection of CEE gas networks and the creation of regional gas and electricity markets have appeared as real possibilities on the horizon. These initiatives could lead to more security, a larger market with a correspondingly stronger negotiation position, more efficiency and a better investment climate in the energy sectors. Indeed, they are logical steps, both in terms of a unified – and not strictly national – management of a common problem and the potential success of energy efficiency measures.

In practical terms, the building of interconnectors has already started: Hungary is building two new gas pipelines with Croatia and Romania, while Polish-Czech and Hungarian-Slovak pipeline connections are also being planned. EU subsidies have been instrumental in starting off these projects.

What is important to remember, however, is that at this point these pipelines are security measures. It is difficult to imagine who might permanently use these throughputs at their full capacity. Since there is no contracted transit on these routes, companies would have never built this infrastructure. Political intervention was necessary and the events of January 2009 acted as a trigger for national capitals and the EU to act. This is an adequate response to short-term supply crises, but it will take time until commercial actors make full use of these new capacities.

The new connection pipelines do not provide for a more balanced import pattern in the region. They are mainly an instrument of CEE states to

manage their Ukrainian transit rather than their Russian dependence problem. If these countries can adequately co-operate during gas supply cut-offs, offset Ukrainian storages and help each other, all this actually makes Moscow's bargaining positions versus Kiev better. Coupled with the North Stream pipeline, which may decrease Ukrainian transit drastically, Moscow will have enough instruments to discipline Ukrainian transit behaviour.

The basic question for CEE states will therefore be whether the other benefits of the current Western 'buyer's market' also reach the region, and whether they can make use of it. The big chance in this regard is not EU support for further interconnections to manage short-term supply cuts, but rather the favorable market dynamics of LNG and technological innovations in the field of shale gas. Adopting new supply sources and technologies would be an important paradigm shift, bringing not only more reliability to the market – decreasing the need for additional and costly investments into security measures – but also creating a competitive market pattern for natural gas. A window of opportunity is now open for relatively cheap investments into, and a substantial contracting of, LNG.

This window is relatively small and it is difficult to say when it will be shut again. The LNG market situation very much depends on certain policy decisions in capitals like Beijing or New Delhi, while the prospects for shale gas technologies in Europe are still unsure⁵. Tight market conditions may come back as soon as 2015, leaving a very small time frame for decision makers, particularly since CEE countries have only now started thinking about a less fragmented market in the region. A further difficulty is the lack of leadership. Small and relatively poor companies and governments do not dare to launch risky projects alone. The decade-long hesitation over a Polish LNG terminal at the Baltic Sea, for example, shows very clearly the

⁵ Despite the smaller technological revolution in the US, American gas companies have just recently stopped their exploration activities in Hungary.

difficulty of implementing such projects even for a relatively big national actor.

Despite the favorable environment on the global LNG market, negative tendencies are overwhelming on the regional one. Western European countries have heavily invested into their gas networks during the time of high gas prices and booming demand. Due to these developments in 2009-2010 LNG re-gasification capacities will increase in Europe by more than 60 bcm (almost 10% of the European demand)⁶. These countries will be able to enjoy all the benefits of cheap LNG supplies. CEE countries missed this opportunity. During the economic slump, as these countries have minimal takeover obligations towards Gazprom, it is relatively difficult to contract new imports to these markets. Neither the prospects nor the inflexible nature of these markets make such decisions easy for commercial actors.

This is a relevant issue because without new import options, it will be difficult to modify existing contractual patterns. Gazprom is interested in changing oil-linked pricing only in markets where spot-priced gas can compete with it. These are the German, French and Italian markets, where most of the import cuts were towards expensive Russian gas in 2009. But CEE countries have only limited capacities to buy cheap gas, mainly because of infrastructural bottlenecks. Nothing is pushing Gazprom to change its pricing and involve some spot price elements in the contracted formulas. One way in which this may happen, though, is through regional contracts of multinational companies like E.ON or RWE. These companies strive for a number of modifications in their long-term contracts and have the potential to ask for some discounts on these markets. RWE on the

Czech market or E.ON and GdF on the Hungarian and Slovakian markets may achieve something by relying on their bargaining power.

The other outstanding issue is the problem of take-or-pay clauses. Gazprom has been insisting on these minimal takeover obligations as a key guarantee of its demand security. In the course of the demand crunch, the clause caused serious difficulties for importers, decreasing their flexibility and hampering their adjustment opportunities. They had to take a minimal amount of expensive Russian gas even if other, cheaper sources were present on the market. In Western Europe and markets with multiple import options, it makes sense to drop such commitments. In these markets, Gazprom has to choose: it can either give discounts in prices or export less to the market. Without one of these concessions, European companies will not opt for Russian gas during the economic recovery and Gazprom will lose market shares, which is definitely an option that is too risky for it, keeping in mind the uncertain perspectives for the future dynamism of the European market.

In the CEE region Gazprom has not faced these difficult questions yet. While diversification options are scarce, it is relatively risky for local states to get rid of Gazprom's supply obligations in the form of take-or-pay clauses. It is in the best interest of these countries to have long-term contractual obligations from Gazprom to deliver a fixed amount of gas at reliable prices. CEE countries do not have the physical infrastructure and multiple import options to start negotiations about new and more flexible Russian gas supply conditions. They can turn to this new agenda only parallel to diversification projects.

All in all, in the next couple of years the CEE region may create a more secure gas network by building a number of South-North interconnectors, linking the existing East-West pipelines. But if the region cannot lock in new import sources as well, the positive effects of the current European

⁶ „O marketingovoi politike OAO «Gazprom» v usloviyah mirovogo finansogo-ekonomicheskogo krizisa, Ustupka Evrope“, Vedomosti, February 24, 2010.

buyer's market will be much fewer than expected. Gazprom may give some concessions because of its fear that newly built LNG terminals and imports may reach the region through existing West-East import pipelines, offsetting some of the Russian gas. CEE markets may also experience some positive modifications in the price formulas of Western multinational companies. However, in all, Gazprom will be less open for renegotiations in the CEE region as long as it is aware of its market superiority and the lack of challenge to its position.

The EU Energy Trade with Russia and Energy Market Integration

(March 2010 and May 2011)

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In some ways, energy matters seem to be a bit more complex than classical security issues, as there are more players and interests in place. Political actors are not always in the driving seat, or their action space is quite limited by domestic pressure groups. On the other hand, this issue is easier in terms of substance, as it is not too much about “hard” security issues, like life and death. It has more to do with a certain way of living and with political autonomy.

This presentation is about the future of the EU's energy trade with Russia or, maybe better, about the possible futures of this relationship. A wider discussion opens up possibilities for political action in the EU, which will affect the relationship to Russia in a more indirect way. The core argument is that the EU member states have considerable scope for common political action separately from their foreign policy in regard to Russia. By concentrating their effort on the internal market, which means both physical interconnection and market liberalization, individual member states could substantially reduce their vulnerability to Russian energy deliveries. In addition, the EU's capacity to act coherently towards Russia would be enhanced.

The paper will have the following structure:

- 1) key issues in the debate on the EU-Russia energy relationship;
- 2) an overview of the interdependence relationship and its likely future development;
- 3) a consideration of the benefits from an internal market approach for the EU and its member countries.

1. Debate on the EU-Russia Energy Relationship

The first question that often arises in the debate on energy supplies from Russia is whether Russia is a “reliable partner”; it is about the security of energy supply. The issues at hand are political risks such as the short-term, authoritarian rule in Russia as well as investment and transit risks. Things have gotten worse here, as the Russian politico-economic elite is not ready to cooperate in multilateral frameworks, such as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) or WTO, which could make the Russian elite’s actions more predictable. At the same time, the proposal on a “Convention on ensuring international energy security”⁷ put forward by Russia as a starting point includes only a watered-down arbitration mechanism and allows for nationalization of assets.

Secondly, it is about the possible political and economic pressure that might be put on countries that have an excessive dependence on Russia, including transit countries. This issue has been specifically discussed with regard to Ukraine and Lithuania.

Thirdly, it is about the more specific fear that the market dominance of Gazprom could lead to excessive gas prices and a producer-driven mar-

ket in the future. This is linked to the quarrel over long-term gas supply contracts and the oil price linkage versus gas-to-gas competition, which is becoming increasingly viable due to the global gas supply glut. This development occurred mostly because of shale gas development in the USA, which resulted in much lower import dependence of North America than had been projected a few years ago.

Currently, a substantial disagreement exists between EU member states not only about common strategies, but even about the common perception of these issues. The only thing that seems to be agreed on is that Russia is the most important country for the EU’s energy supply. From this supposition, different perceptions lead either to the conclusion that we have to appease Russia, as it is so powerful, or that we have to diversify from Russia. But as the article’s following sections will argue, Russia is less powerful than is implied by some debates and consequently EU member states have a greater capacity to act than is usually assumed.

2. Interdependence Relationship and Its Likely Future Development

This section will deal with the general situation of the EU energy trade with Russia and its prospects. This will lead to debates about the relative dependency of the EU for both the gas and the oil sector.

For gas, overall import dependency amounted to 61.3 percent of final consumption in 2006. Russia supplied 41.5% of the imports, a share that decreased from nearly 50% in 2000, as North African and Middle Eastern suppliers had enlarged their market share. In terms of final gas consumption, Russia supplies 25.5%, a share that dropped from 30% in 2000 to below 25% in 2005 and has been on the rise again since then due to falling indigenous production and substitution of other fuels.


⁷ The text of this “non-paper” was leaked and can be found here: <http://ua-energy.org/upload/files/Convention-engl1.pdf>.

However, it is still largely a fiction to speak of an EU gas market, as member state markets depend on Russia very differently. Especially the New Member States are mostly very dependent on Russian gas due to the historical legacies of the pipeline infrastructure that was built during Socialist times. Also, gas supplies as a share of the total primary energy supply are very different. This dependence is something that should be reduced by constructing interconnections with the Western European market and an LNG terminal at the Baltic seashore.

Concerning the future, different demand and production forecasts have been produced by the IEA, the Commission, and the Russian government (energy strategy 2030) for the period until 2030. It has now become common to imagine at least two different scenarios – one that assumes that current policies remain intact and only economic parameters change, and another that takes climate change policies into account. Figure 1 summarises the demand forecasts for the EU. The first piece of good news is that while gas demand in the EU is assumed to grow, it is about to do so more slowly than what was assumed in previous forecasts. The second piece of good news is that much can be done to reduce reliance on natural gas. This is shown by the substantial difference between the “business as usual” and the climate change policy scenario. Both the IEA and the EU PRIMES scenario assume that the oil price will stay below the US price of \$ 100 per barrel until 2015 and then surpass it. The IEA baseline scenario assumes that the EU will need 516 bcm of gas imports in 2030, some 200 bcm more than today. With the assumption that an international regime aiming at reducing CO₂ emissions to 450 parts per million will be adopted, the IEA projects a slightly lower gas demand than in 2007 and an import demand of 428 bcm, which is 120 bcm above the current level. The projections of the EU PRIMES model, carried out only until 2020, are somewhat more sanguine. The EU model projects only a slight growth of 70 bcm in gas imports until 2020, even if current policies are *not* altered. The differences

between the IEA and the EU projections in the baseline scenario are due to the different policy assumptions: The EU baseline scenario assumes that all policies (internal market, CO₂ emissions trading, building efficiency) that have already been adopted are being implemented by member states effectively. The additional assumption leading to the more positive 20-20-20 scenario is that the Commission’s proposals to reduce greenhouse gases by 20%, increase renewables to 20% of primary energy consumption until 2020, and increase biofuel production to 10% will be implemented.

Figure 1: Comparison of different forecasts for gas demand and production, EU-27



Source: Own compilation based on International Energy Agency (2009). “World Energy Outlook 2009”, OECD; European Commission, Second Strategic Energy Review, COM(2008) 781 final, Paris, November 13, 2008.

Like every projection, it is subject to severe uncertainties, as gas demand will be heavily influenced by investment decisions taken by corporations, and government policies in the energy sector are changing at a rapid pace. This has also been evident in the aftermath of the nuclear meltdown in Fukushima. For gas, a growing demand is likely to come primarily from


power generation. Investment into new gas-fired power plants is incentivised by the lower capital costs compared to other power plants, opportunities for flexible operation (baseload vs. peak capacities), low construction time and slightly lower greenhouse gas emissions than coal or oil. However, price and supply security risks are high, as fuel costs are the highest segment of the overall cost for gas-fired power generation. In addition, there are risks connected to the future CO₂ price. In this context, investments in gas fuelled power plants would first and foremost be made by actors who think they can control the fuel price risk. Therefore, it would be good if Gazprom or other gas suppliers could not take such investment decisions, as this would pose the serious question of whether the gas market is in fact driven by consumers or suppliers. Also, if the CO₂ price rises above \$60 a tonne, investment in wind power would be more rational, according to calculations of the International Energy Agency. In this context, of course nuclear power emerges as the most cost-efficient variant, but the “residual risk” a society is willing to take in exchange for cheap electricity generation is a fundamental question that cannot be answered by scientific analysis but has to be negotiated in society. So, in order to get more reliable forecasts we definitely need a greater certainty about climate change policy and a discussion on the risks and benefits of nuclear power.

Let me now turn to the Russian side of the equation. In 2008, the Russian gas monopoly and exporter OAO Gazprom sold 160 bcm to EU member states, which equals 29% of the total Russian gas extraction and 57% of Russia's total gas exports, measured in physical volumes. However, gas sales to companies in EU member states accounted for approximately 60% of Gazprom's total turnover in 2008 due to administratively set domestic gas prices. This results in Gazprom's extraordinary dependence on the EU market, which is not going to wane in the foreseeable future.⁸ There

⁸ In contrast, Gazprom is going to sink substantial costs in new infrastructure such as Nord and South Stream – albeit with the goal of increasing the market share and marginalising Ukraine.

simply is no other market for Gazprom with similar characteristics. China will be a low-price market and will mainly be served by its own sources and Central Asian gas. China will develop its indigenous reserves first, and its domestic gas production is projected to decline only in 2030. The US market is largely saturated, operates at low cost, and is sensitive to higher prices. And the East Asian market is much smaller than the European one. Only about 15% of the overall gas production is projected to take place in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East by 2030, as projected by the Russian government in its 2009 energy strategy. Most of the production until 2030 will come from Western Siberian fields (Yamal), and a pipeline infrastructure to supply other markets is not easily put in place.

Figure 2: Russian gas production, demand, and export forecasts



Source: International Energy Agency (2009). “World Energy Outlook 2009”, OECD; European Commission, Second Strategic Energy Review, COM(2008) 781 final, Paris, November 13, 2008; “Energetičeskaja strategija Rossii na period do 2030 goda”, November 13, 2009. URL: [http://www.energystategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_\(uvr_N1715-p_13.11.09\).doc](http://www.energystategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(uvr_N1715-p_13.11.09).doc); Sergej Šmatko Ivanovich (2009). “O proekte energetičeskoj strategii Rossii na period do 2030 goda”, August 2009, URL: <http://minenergo.gov.ru/upload/docs/energostrategiya.ppt>

Figure 2 shows projections of both the IEA and the Russian government. The IEA projects that the Russian supply will grow by 0.7 percentage points annually and reach a total of 760 bcm by 2030 in the reference scenario. The domestic gas demand will grow at the same time by 0.4 percentage points annually and reach 500 bcm in 2030. That is, Russia will be able to export 260 bcm by 2030, some 80 bcm more than in 2007. In the climate scenario (450 ppm), Russia will consume 19% less gas than projected in the reference scenario, that is, 405 bcm annually. At the same time, it will produce 24% less than in the reference scenario, due to the lower projected gas demand worldwide. Thus, Russia will be able to export only 175 bcm annually, 6% less than in 2008 (186 bcm). At the same time, the Russian projections are more sanguine, as they are issued by the government and have to be somewhat populist (by advocating a prosperous Russia where high-tech industry is picking up and domestic consumption is rising sharply). Russia projects that it will produce as much as 885 bcm annually in 2030. At the same time, it expects the domestic demand to rise by 140 bcm to 606 bcm (30%), and exports to increase by 53 percentage points to 279 bcm. The Russian government's scenario seems overly optimistic and assumes huge investments, especially in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. At the same time, investment risks remain high for Russia due to the volatility of political decisions. It is interesting that in the government scenario domestic demand is foreseen to increase quite a lot, while exports to the EU are stagnating at 200 bcm. This contradicts Gazprom's pipeline plans. Actually, the current capacity would be enough to fulfil export volumes to Europe until 2030. Given the constrained export volume, Gazprom could switch substantial volumes from Ukraine or the Yamal pipeline to Nord and South Stream by 2015. It could completely turn off the Jamal pipeline by then. By 2020 at the latest, Gazprom could completely shut down Ukraine's export corridor. So the excess capacity reveals the real intentions of these investments. If the first section of Nord Stream

could be justified in the sense that additional volumes from Central Asia are going to be transited, the second branch, as well as South Stream, only makes sense as a measure of transit avoidance.


According to the arguments provided, the EU will possibly need more imports of both oil and gas in 2030. But Gazprom will remain dependent on the European market in the forecasted period (2030) regardless of the chosen scenario. This does not take into account the possible development of unconventional gas resources in the EU – these resources are enough to replace imports for 40 years, according to the IEA.⁹ Therefore, the dependence of the EU on Russia is mostly overstated for the gas sector.

In the meantime, the implications for oil are less sanguine, as Russia will most likely extract less in 2030, according to both IEA and government figures, as is shown in Figure 3. At the same time, Russia's domestic demand is projected to increase, while the government projections are again higher in this regard. Furthermore, Russia is diversifying its oil export routes – not only to East Asia, where exports are substantially increasing this year because of the newly built ESPO pipeline to the Pacific coast, but also in the European direction. Here, Russia aims at reducing its dependence on transit states and is instead relying on sea transport. This is adding flexibility to export routes. It means that less oil will be available for export to the EU: For Europe, the Russian government projects that exports will decline by 29% until 2030, when they reach the amount of 122 million tons per year. At the same time, the import demand of the EU will decline by 10% in the IEA reference scenario and by 26% in the climate change scenario. The Russian diversification of export routes will severely affect the Družba route, as there will be a significant overcapacity for exports of Russian oil in the Western direction. This might negatively impact mainly

⁹ International Energy Agency (2009). "World Energy Outlook 2009", OECD; European Commission, Second Strategic Energy Review, COM (2008) 781 final, Paris, November 13, 2008, p. 413.

on the performance of Central European refineries connected to Družba. However, as oil can be easily transported by sea, rail, and truck due to its physical characteristics, this will not be a security of supply but rather an economic issue. A closure of Družba or reduction of throughput volumes would negatively impact on the refineries located in Poland and Germany (a “Mažeikiai scenario”), whereas refiners in the Czech Republic can easily import oil via the TAL Pipeline. So this is largely a local issue. German refiners already reacted by bringing in Rosneft as a shareholder. In this way, Russia’s diversification efforts already bore some concrete economic fruits and helped the internationalisation of Russian capital.

Figure 3: Russian oil production and export forecasts



Source: International Energy Agency (2009). “World Energy Outlook 2009”, OECD; European Commission, Second Strategic Energy Review, COM(2008) 781 final, Paris, November 13, 2008; “Energetičeskaja strategija Rossii na period do 2030 goda”, November 13, 2009, URL: [http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_\(utv._N1715-p_13.11.09\).doc](http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(utv._N1715-p_13.11.09).doc); Sergej Šmatko Ivanovich (2009). “O proekte energetičeskoj strategii Rossii na period do 2030 goda”, August 2009, URL: <http://minenergo.gov.ru/upload/docs/energostrategiya.ppt>

The EU has substantial market power vis-à-vis Russia in the gas market but not in the oil market due to the different characteristics of the respective markets. At the same time, the EU does not control the resources to leverage its market power vis-à-vis Russia. As has been shown by the 2009 gas crisis, security of supply cannot be guaranteed to all EU member states, as Russia did not back off from shutting down supplies to force through its goals, and the EU’s gas market is fragmented both physically and institutionally. This leads not only to severe asymmetries in reliance on Russia, but also to predominantly national considerations of supply security and often to irrational decisions from an EU-wide perspective. Thus, the EU theoretically has sufficient market power in the gas market, but only a few means to use it at the moment, as the markets are too fragmented physically.

3. Internal Market Approach and Its Benefits for the EU and EU Member States

So what should the EU do in relation to this matter? First of all, member states should concentrate on possible unilateral (EU-internal) policy alternatives to enhance security of supply. This is because the EU is better equipped institutionally to agree on internal policies than to agree on a foreign policy towards Russia. In addition, the completion of the internal market has the prospect of facilitating a greater convergence of member-state interests. That is, if they cannot agree on a common position towards Russia, the member states should at least agree on the rules of a common internal market, making an effective use of their market power possible.

What should be done to improve the EU’s capacity to use its market power in the gas market? The EU needs a redistribution of responsibilities between member states and the community level, as envisaged by the 3rd Liberalisation Package and the 2nd Strategic Energy Review. The rules on

liberalisation should be duly implemented, leading to a level playing field without market distortions for the entire EU. This also requires enhanced physical interconnections of gas markets. Demands by Russia to water down market liberalization rules and to grant exemptions for Russian pipelines have to be resisted. The EU and member states seem to be on the right track here: EU co-funding of crucial gas infrastructure investments got a serious boost in 2010, when the EU Commission granted € 2.3 Billion to gas and electricity projects. Several member states are investing in interconnectors to enhance the flexibility of the energy network. Also, the 3rd Liberalisation Package had a promising start in 2011, with Poland and Gazprom agreeing on an independent operator of the Yamal pipeline.

The implications of the EU's policies for Russia are twofold: First of all, by increased market integration, improvements in physical interconnections between gas markets, and demand reductions, the vulnerability of individual member states and the EU, and hence Gazprom's market power, will be reduced. Secondly, the EU could use its substantial market power in the gas market to set barriers for the downstream expansion of monopoly suppliers, unless reciprocal access is granted, as the EU has been trying to achieve this with the reciprocity clause, which was blocked by some member states.

In sum, the member states would be better off individually and collectively if they concentrated their work on a common internal energy and climate policy that would set clear frameworks and leave concrete decisions (energy mix) to the member states. It would firstly enhance security of supply, especially for the New Member States, by increased investment in gas and electricity grids. Secondly, it would reduce consumption by agreeing on common targets for renewables as a share of the primary energy supply, efficiency measures and CO₂ pricing. Thirdly, it would maximise market power by enacting clear rules for downstream expansion of suppliers. And finally, it would require common decisions on which import pipelines we need and which ones we don't. This would be a big step forward in agreeing on a common Russia policy.

The challenge of Emissions Reduction in Poland and Prospects for Nuclear Energy

(March 2010)

Artur Gradziuk, Polish Institute of International Affairs

The European Union is a global leader in actions to mitigate climate change, with the EU 'energy and climate change package' being a good example of this. It set ambitious mid- and long-term greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets, introduced the carbon cap and trade system and is now ready to provide funds for climate change mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries. The EU climate policy is a huge challenge for the European economy, particularly when there is no global climate treaty containing comparable to the EU's CO₂ emission reduction commitments for other big economies. Within the EU, for countries such as Poland, where most of the electricity and heat is produced from coal, meeting planned EU climate objectives will mean tremendous changes in the way the energy is produced and used. One of the solutions is development of nuclear energy, which is still controversial in many countries, but taking into account its mitigation potential, it is necessary to introduce it in order to meet long-term GHG emissions reduction objectives.

1. CO₂ Emissions Reduction


Poland is the sixth largest greenhouse gases emitter in the EU-27, accounting for about 8% of the total EU-27 GHG emissions¹⁰. However, during the last two decades Poland has achieved a remarkable emissions reduction. Total greenhouse gases emissions decreased from about 564 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO₂-eq) to less than 400 Mt CO₂-eq (Figure 1). Poland made a commitment to reduce GHG emissions by 6% in the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period – 2008-2012. It will meet the Kyoto target with a surplus, as indicated in the latest data, which shows that between 1988 and 2007 GHG emissions decreased by more than 29%. The steepest drop in emissions—by nearly 110,000 tons—occurred between 1988 and 1990, but between 2002 and 2006 emissions in Poland rose by 28,000 tons. That trend indicates that the target of the 40% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 set in “Polityka klimatyczna Polski” [Poland’s Climate Policy], a document adopted by the Council of Ministers in November 2003¹¹, will be difficult to meet.

In the first period of economic transition (1988-1992) Poland experienced a recession with a decrease of industrial production and, in effect, a significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The main factors responsible for the GHG emissions reduction in the following years were the decline of energy inefficient heavy industry, the implementation of energy efficiency policies and measures and the overall restructuring of the economy. This trend also led to the changes in the structure of the sources of the emissions: there was a decrease in the emissions from the energy and manufacturing sectors and an increase in emissions from road transportation¹².

¹⁰ European Commission (2009). *Progress Towards Achieving the Kyoto Objectives*, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 12.11.2009, COM(2009)630 final, p. 7.

¹¹ Ministry of the Environment (2003). „Polityka klimatyczna Polski: Strategia redukcji emisji gazów cieplarnianych w Polsce do roku 2020”, Warsaw, p. 14.

Figure 1: National emissions of greenhouse gases for 1988–2007 (Mt CO₂-eq).



Source: K. Olendrzyński – I. Kargulewicz – J. Skośkiewicz – B. Dębski – J. Cieślińska – A. Olecka – M. Kanafa – K. Kania– P. Sałek (2009). *Submission under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol, National Administration of the Emissions Trading Scheme*, Poland’s National Inventory Report, Warsaw, p. 20.

Table 1: Electricity generation by type of plant in 2006 (in %).

Type of plant	Germany	Spain	France	UK	Poland
Thermal	48.03	22.82	4.62	38.51	93.63
Hydro	3.11	8.55	9.81	1.17	1.27
Nuclear	26.58	20.10	79.09	19.13	0.00
Oil	1.52	7.97	1.25	1.27	1.52
Gas	12.09	30.18	3.87	35.83	1.94
Other	8.68	10.38	1.35	4.09	1.65

Source: IEA Statistics, 2008.

¹² K. Olendrzyński – I. Kargulewicz – J. Skośkiewicz – B. Dębski – J. Cieślińska – A. Olecka – M. Kanafa – K. Kania– P. Sałek (2009). *Submission under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol, National Administration of the Emissions Trading Scheme*, Poland’s National Inventory Report, Warsaw, pp. 5, 164-167.

Due to various internal factors future GHG emissions reduction could be a more challenging task for Poland than for other big EU countries. One of the main impediments for CO₂ emission reduction is Poland's almost full dependence on coal in electricity and heat generation (Table 1). Carrying out changes in the structure of primary energy mix is a long-term process requiring huge financial investments, which in the context of other developmental needs (i.e. transport infrastructure) could be insufficiently available for implementation of clean technologies. Other factors affecting the carbon intensity of the Polish economy are the insufficient improvements of energy efficiency in the process of energy production, distribution and use, the dramatic rise of road transportation at the expense of railway transportation, and the rise of private transportation at the expense of mass transportation¹³. Nevertheless more necessary actions can be expected in the following years, taking into account commitments from the EU 'energy and climate change package' as well as the future post-Kyoto international climate agreement.

2. Poland and the EU Climate Policy

In principle, Poland supports the EU climate policy. It supports its GHG emissions reduction, renewable energy and energy efficiency targets. However, during the 'energy and climate change package' negotiation, Poland questioned some measures proposed by the European Commission to achieve those targets, which – according to some governmental analysis – could mean a rise of annual energy production costs by 8-12 billion PLN, a rise of energy prices by even 60%, a rise of monthly expenditures by

¹³ Z. M. Karaczun – A. Kassenberg – M. Sobolewski (2009). „Polityka klimatyczna Polski – wyzwaniem XXI wieku, Instytut na rzecz Ekorozwoju”, Warszawa, pp. 21-22.

households on energy by 14-18% and a decrease of the GDP by 7.5%¹⁴. It criticized the drafts presented in January 2008 for their failure to sufficiently take into account the principles of equitability, cost-effectiveness and flexibility, the observance of which was critical in view of the development diversities of the EU states and their differences in the structure of energy mix.

The main issue of contention was a proposed reform of the EU emission trading scheme (ETS) assuming full auctioning of emission allowances from 2013. Poland was effective in forming a coalition of countries opposing that solution, which in the Polish case, with Poland's huge reliance on coal in the electricity generation sector, would lead to an increase of electricity prices, a hampering of the competitiveness of Polish industries and additional costs for households. Another issue of contention was the European Commission's estimates of future emission allowance prices, which in the view of the Polish government were underrated. This issue led to the proposal that changes of allowance prices be kept within a strictly defined range. Poland also wanted larger numbers of free emission allowances in the ETS, fearing the financial consequences of the package and the possibility that achieving its targets could force it to rely heavily on less carbon intensive energy resources (natural gas) supplied mainly from Russia¹⁵.

The final agreement on the EU 'energy and climate change package' in December 2008 was satisfactory for Poland because many Polish proposals were accepted therein. The main consequences of the final decisions

¹⁴ A. Żmijewski (2008). *Analiza gospodarczych i technicznych skutków skokowego wprowadzenia dla sektora energetycznego (100%) systemu aukcyjnego dla emisji CO₂, mających wpływ na bezpieczeństwo dostaw energii elektrycznej ze źródeł krajowych, ograniczenia sieciowe wynikające ze zwiększenia międzysystemowego przesyłu energii elektrycznej i sytuację przedsiębiorstw energetycznych na rynku*, in: *Pakiet energetyczno-klimatyczny. Analityczna ocena propozycji Komisji Europejskiej*, Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej, Warszawa, pp. 122-154.

¹⁵ A. Gradziuk – E. Wyciskiewicz (2009). „Międzynarodowy wymiar polityki klimatycznej Polski”, in: *Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2009*, PISM, Warszawa, pp. 253-262.

include the approximately 60 billion PLN that Poland will receive from the EU solidarity mechanism in the years 2013-2020, a gradual introduction of full auctioning of emissions allowances for the power sector by 2020 and the inclusion of the Polish proposal of a benchmarking system for distribution of free emissions allowances. As a result of the 'energy and climate change package', Poland is to increase the share of renewables in final energy consumption to 15% by 2020, but it also allowed a rise in emissions from non-ETS sectors by 14%.

The Polish government realizes the scale of its task to reduce GHG emissions. This task will require a huge investment in the introduction of clean technologies as well as a costly modernization and restructuring of energy and heavy industry sectors. The greatest challenge relates to the energy sector. That is why energy was the main issue of interest for the Polish Ministry of Economy in the months after the adoption of the EU 'energy and climate change package'. Its activities referred to, e.g., energy efficiency, renewables, CCS, nuclear energy, and the establishment and implementation of the measures necessary to meet the Polish commitments of GHG emissions reduction.

3. Nuclear Energy - Benefits and Concerns

Nuclear power is an effective GHG mitigation option. Total life-cycle GHG emissions per unit of electricity produced from nuclear power are below 40 g CO₂-eq/kWh, similar to those for renewable energy sources. Nuclear power currently avoids approximately 2.2-2.6 GtCO₂/year in comparison to what would be the case if the same amount of energy were instead produced from coal (the emission coefficient in electricity generation from coal is more than 970 gCO₂-eq/kWh; the world average for electricity generation is 540 g CO₂-eq/kWh)¹⁶. IEA presented some alternative

policy scenarios which indicate that nuclear power can contribute 10% to emissions reduction to stabilize CO₂ concentration at the level of 450 ppm by 2030. To realize that potential, in 2030, the share of nuclear power in global electricity production should rise to 18%¹⁷. In addition to the need to reduce GHG emissions, other energy supply concerns also affect the debate on introducing or expanding nuclear power, such as increases in demand for all forms of energy, the rising/volatile price of fossil energy sources, the risk of energy supply disruptions, diversification of energy and electricity supply. Looking at the recent interest in nuclear power in many countries, we can expect a renaissance for that energy type, especially when we take into account that according to IPCC, nuclear power represents the largest mitigation potential at the lowest average cost in electricity generation¹⁸.

There are several concerns associated with the use of nuclear power. Operational safety was the main concern in the context of the Chernobyl accident in 1986. However, since then many improvements have been made to reduce safety risk and enhance safety performance. Storage of spent fuel and the long-term disposal of nuclear waste is the second concern. It is also an essential issue in the decision making process on development of nuclear energy. Nuclear proliferation is another contentious issue that influences international politics, even with the existence of the non-proliferation regime. In terms of public acceptance for nuclear power it has secondary

¹⁶ "Climate Change 2007: Mitigation", Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in: B. Metz – O.R. Davidson – P.R. Bosch – R. Dave – L.A. Meyer, (eds) (2007). *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (2007), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 269.

¹⁷ International Energy Agency (2009). *World Energy Outlook 2009*, IEA, Paris, pp. 211-221.

¹⁸ "Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change", in: B. Metz – O.R. Davidson – P.R. Bosch – R. Dave – L.A. Meyer, (eds) (2007). *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (2007), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 300.

importance as the risk associated with it applies only to a few countries. Nevertheless the problem of proliferation can be a stumbling block for future development of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Last but not least, the high cost of the construction of nuclear power plants is an important impediment in decision making on investment, even if, once constructed, the electricity produced from nuclear power plants is competitive with that of other generation plants¹⁹. Without climate protection policies that take into account the carbon footprint of various energy sources, it is hard for nuclear energy to compete with cheap coal.

These four main concerns about nuclear power are shaping its public acceptance, which varies across the regions. Recent studies show that the European Union is the most divided region, with countries expanding (France, Finland), phasing out (Germany), possibly reentering (Italy) and introducing (Poland) nuclear energy. A similar divide is found in East Asia, where negative attitudes might prevent the building of new nuclear power stations in Japan, but public opinion is reported to be positive in South Korea and China. As for other regions reports tell of a good public acceptance in India and improving public approval rates in North America and the Russian Federation, but unpopularity in Eastern Europe (the aftermath of Chernobyl) and the South Pacific.²⁰

Prospects for Development of Nuclear Power in Poland

Development of nuclear energy in Poland was included in the *Energy Policy of Poland to 2030* (adopted by the Polish Council of Ministers in November 2009)²¹. That issue was very controversial during the public consul-

tation on the document. During the debate a strong support for it was expressed by scientific institutions and the business community, but most ecological organizations opposed that path of development of the Polish energy sector, indicating the need to shift funds to development of renewable energy sources²². However, there was no significant opposition to nuclear energy from the main Polish political parties. Furthermore, recently the support of public opinion for the construction of nuclear power plants in Poland has risen. According to opinion polls, support for the construction of nuclear power plants in Poland increased from 25% in July 2006 to 50% in September 2009. During the same period opposition decreased from 58% to 40%. Nevertheless, there is still insufficient knowledge in the public opinion about the pros and cons of nuclear energy, and the government will have to conduct a broad informational campaign to explain the potential risks and consequences of the operation of nuclear power plants.

After consultation with the main interest entities the Polish government decided that development of nuclear energy would be beneficial due to both either economic and energy security reasons. The main reasons to start the Polish nuclear energy programme are enhancement of energy security and reduction of CO₂ emissions (in the framework of the EU 'energy and climate package'). In January 2009 the Polish government adopted a decision to start the Polish nuclear energy programme. The Polish government's plans assume that the construction of the first nuclear power plant will be carried out by the end of the 2020s and that another one will be built by 2030, with a total capacity of the three planned reactors of about 4-5 GWe. According to the *Framework timetable of actions for nuclear energy*, the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Poland will begin in

¹⁹ International Atomic Energy Agency (2008), *Climate Change and Nuclear Power 2008*, IAEA, Vienna, pp. 22-37.

²⁰ Ferenc L. Toth (2008). "Prospects for nuclear power in the 21st century: a world tour", *International Journal of Global Energy Issues*, Vol. 30.Nos. 1/2/3/4, 2008, p. 19.

²¹ Ministry of Economy (2009). „Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2030 roku“, 10 November 2009, Warsaw.

²² Ministry of Economy (2009). „Raport z wyników konsultacji społecznych projekt polityki energetycznej polski do 2030 roku“, July 2009, Warsaw, pp. 7-8.

2016. Since taking a decision in January 2009 the Polish government held a few series of meetings with representatives of France, the U.S., South Korea, China and Finland on sharing knowledge and experience in the launching and safe use of nuclear facilities. These and future meetings aim at choosing a partner and technology for the construction of the nuclear power plant in Poland, a significant decision taking into account the scale of the project, its costs and the potential safety risk.

The implementation of the nuclear energy programme will change the structure of electricity production in Poland, but it will also address the predicted growth of its consumption in the next two decades. According to an estimation by the Polish Ministry of Economy, the final demand for electricity in Poland will rise by 55%, from 151 TWh in 2006 to 217 TWh in 2030. During that period some coal-fired power plants will be decommissioned (to meet the EU ‘energy and climate package commitments’) and assuming that three nuclear reactors will be fully operational, the nuclear energy share in the structure of electricity generation in Poland will rise to approximately 15% (Table 2).

Table 2: Electricity production in Poland by source of fuel 2006-2030 (TWh)

	2006	2020	2030
Hard coal	86,1	62,9	71,8
Lignite	49,9	40,0	42,3
Gas	4,6	8,4	13,4
Oil	1,6	2,8	3,0
Nuclear	0,0	10,5	31,6
Renewable	3,9	30,1	38,0
Hydro	1,0	1,0	1,0
Other	0,6	0,6	0,7
TOTAL	147,7	156,1	201,8

Source: Ministry of Economy (2009), *The Forecast of the Demand for Fuels and Energy until 2030*, Warsaw, November 2009.

4. Conclusions

Within the European Union Poland is one of the leaders in terms of reduction of GHG emissions and meeting Kyoto Protocol commitments. However, the Polish government is less effective in presenting Poland as a very successful country in the fight against climate change. It was especially visible during the negotiations on the EU ‘energy and climate change package’, when Poland was accused of blocking reform of ETS and lowering the level of ambitions of the EU climate change mitigation actions. But one of the main postulates of the Polish government was not to apply *one-size-fits-all* solutions and be more realistic in setting targets, especially given the fact that most EU-15 countries have problems with meeting their Kyoto Protocol commitments. The final agreement on the EU ‘energy and climate change package’, even with the inclusion of some Polish proposal, still poses a great challenge for the economy, especially for the energy sector. Adopted in November 2009, the *Energy Policy of Poland to 2030* had been formulated in the context of the Polish commitments to the EU ‘energy and climate change package’. The development of the nuclear energy programme is one of the most controversial decisions, but it seems necessary for meeting the predicted growth in electricity demand without a rise in GHG emissions.

The Energy Relations Between the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation²³

(July 2010)

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1. Introduction

At the beginning of 2009, when the Czech Republic took up the presidency of the European Council after the French presidency ended, the first problem that the Czech Republic had to deal with, besides the Near East conflict, was the dispute over the price of natural gas between Russia and Ukraine. As a result of the Russian-Ukrainian disagreement, several European states were left without deliveries of natural gas for approximately three weeks. Once again, the energy crisis revealed the weakness that stems from Europe's dependence on deliveries of energy supplies from Russia, which make up a fifth or perhaps even a fourth of the EU's total consumption of crude oil and natural gas.²⁵ Already in January, a debate was

²³ The article was first published in Czech as Research Paper 2/2010 by Association for International Affairs in July 2010.

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stirred up between the EU countries as to the trustworthiness of Russia and Ukraine as business partners. Similarly in the Czech Republic the question of securing energy security²⁶ and stable relations with Russia was examined in expert and political discourses.²⁷

The main goal of the presented article is to explain why the current frame of the energy-related interaction between the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic can influence the energy politics of Russia in regard to the CR, and what Russian decisions in the area of energy politics directly have an effect on and threaten the energy security of the Czech Republic. The second goal of the contribution is to show how not only the energy politics of the EU but also the Czech Republic's cooperation with the other members of the Visegrad Four (V4) could contribute to changes in the frame of the energy relations between the CR and Russia and correspondingly to lowering the CR's dependence and increasing its energy security.

In the first part of the text, the basic signs of the concept of mutual dependence are described. Next, with the help of the method of agreement, these signs are connected to the current energy-related interaction between the CR and Russia with the goal of postulating a frame of mutual energy relations.²⁸ The second part then focuses on defining the concrete practices and expressions of Russia's energy policy, as these can adversely threaten the securing of stable and uninterrupted deliveries of oil and gas to the Czech Republic.

²⁵ Lukáš Tichý (2009). „Energetická bezpečnost České republiky a (energetické) vztahy s Ruskou federací“, p. 99, in: Michal Kořan (eds.). *Česká zahraniční politika v zrcadle sociálně-vědního výzkumu*, Praha: IIR.

²⁶ In this article, the term “energy security” is used in the sense of a sustainable securing of uninterrupted and stable deliveries of energy at commensurate prices.

²⁷ Marek Loužek (ed.) (2009). *Energetická politika*, č. 76, Praha: CEP; Nik Hynek – Vít Střítecký (2010). *Energetická bezpečnost podle českých atlantistů*, in: Petr Drulák – Vít Střítecký (eds.). *Hledání Českých zájmů. Mezinárodní bezpečnost*, Praha: IIR.

²⁸ Michal Kořan (2008). *Jednopřípadová studie*, pp. 43–44, in: Petr Drulák (eds.). *Jak zkoumat politiku. Kvalitativní metodologie v politologii a mezinárodních vztazích*, Praha: IIR.

The third part analyses the meaning and possibilities of the European Union in the process of safeguarding the energy security of the Czech Republic and its efforts to reduce the energy dependency on Russia. Although the article is mainly focused on the level of the whole EU, it also briefly looks at the regional level. In the case of the Czech Republic, this kind of energy cooperation is likely especially in the context of the V4.

2. The Theoretical Approach to the Energy Relations Between the CR and Russia

This part of the contribution will begin with a description of the basic signs of the neoliberal theory of mutual dependence, on the basis of which a complex theoretical corpus for the following analysis of the current energy relations between the CR and Russia will be created. The theory of mutual dependence is a widely used concept in political and economic studies of international relations. It tries to analyse the complexity of cooperation and conflictual questions in international relations. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane define mutual dependence, in the form of a basic concept or an analytical tool, as a situation in which “across state borders, intensive transactions (flows of money, goods, persons and information) are taking place, entailing certain expenses”.²⁹ As the actors have an effect on each other, this process must include gains and losses that would not come about without their existence.

The following analysis of expenses and profits in relations of mutual dependence then draws the conclusion that interdependence cannot be limited to a situation of equal mutual dependence, as this would indicate a relatively balanced situation. Keohane and Nye emphasize that “an unequal distribution of gains and expenses lies at the heart of asymmetrical mutual depend-

²⁹ Robert O. Keohane – Joseph S. Nye (2001). *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd edition Longman. p. 10.

ence, which secures the source of power”.³⁰ This means that asymmetrical interdependence can simply serve as a source of influence during negotiations over certain questions when the stronger state takes advantage of the dependence of the weaker state to secure better gains for itself. To understand the character of asymmetric mutual dependence, it is important to see the closer characteristic signs of its dimension – sensitivity and vulnerability.³¹

Vulnerability is a degree of weakness of a state in a relationship of mutual dependence in a situation where the other state tries to end this relationship.³² In this case, vulnerability refers to the relative expenses of the changing structure of the system of mutual dependence.³³ In contrast, sensitivity refers to the extent of the state’s ability to react to stimuli in the political frame – for example, the speed with which changes in one country lead to costly changes in another, and the size of the costly effects. Thus, sensitivity refers to the speed and extent of the changes in one country that were caused by a change in another country while the politics in the affected country remained unchanged.³⁴

3. The Energy (In)Security of the Czech Republic and Its Relations with Russia

Besides knowing the basic characteristics of the theory of mutual dependence, to understand the energy relations between the Czech Republic and Russia, we need to delimit the state of the Czech Republic’s dependence

³⁰ Ibid. p. 9.

³¹ Ibid. p. 10.

³² Alexander Wendt (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press. p. 343.

³³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2007). *Understanding International Conflicts. An Introduction to Theory and History*, 6th Edition, Harvard University Longman. p. 214; Robert O. Keohane – Joseph S. Nye (2001). *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd edition Longman. p. 11.

³⁴ Alexander Wendt (1999). p. 343.

on its imports of crude oil and natural gas from Russia, as these supplies account for three quarters of the Czech Republic's total consumption of oil and gas.³⁵ On the other hand, though, the overall dependence of the Czech Republic on energy raw materials from Russia is only slightly above 40% – especially because of the Czech Republic's considerable supplies of coal and uranium ore.³⁶ This is accounted for mainly by the structure of the energy mix of the Czech Republic, where the share of solid fuel (coal) is 47%. Natural gas then accounts for 20% of the energy mix, renewable resources make up 3%, and nuclear energy constitutes almost 12%. Liquid fuel (oil) then makes up 18%.³⁷

Crude Oil

In the Czech Republic, smaller sources of crude oil can be found in the region of South Moravia. Although the oil from these sources is of a high quality, it only provides approximately 2-3% of the oil consumed by the CR each year. Thus, the Czech Republic depends on imports for approximately 97-98% of its oil.³⁸ The Czech Republic imports about 71% of the oil it consumes from Russia,³⁹ and this oil is transported via the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline. It is a medium sulphur oil of the Russian Export Blend (REB) type. The Czech Republic negotiates about the distri-

³⁵ „Zajištění energetické bezpečnosti ČR, stav a riziko realizace hrozeb“, 2006, p. 1.

³⁶ Martin Hermann (2007). „Energetický mix ČR – fakta a priority“. URL: http://www.oldrichvojir.cz/uploads/Herrmann_RWE_Transgas.pdf.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Petr Kratochvíl – Petra Kuchyňková (2009). “Between the Return to Europe and the Eastern Enticement: Czech Relations to Russia”, in: G. Fóti – Z. Ludvig (eds). *EU–Russian Relations and the Eastern Partnership. Central-East European Member-State Interests and Positions*, Series East European Studies, Budapest: Institute for World Economics Hungarian Academy of Science, p. 72.

³⁹ The Czech Republic also imports oil from Azerbaijan (18.7%), Libya (3.4%), Kazakhstan (3.7%), Algeria (1.7%) and Turkmenistan (0.9%), see „Zajištění energetické bezpečnosti ČR, stav a riziko realizace hrozeb“, 2006, p. 1.

bution of Russian oil with the Russian state-owned business Transneft, and the oil itself is bought directly from the oil mining companies.⁴⁰

An alternative to the Russian oil deliveries is provided by the Ingolstadt-Kralupy-Litvínov (IKL) pipeline, which was commissioned at the end of 1995 and secures about 26-30% of the CR's yearly oil supply. The IKL pipeline is used to transport low sulphur (sweet) oil (for example, the oil from the area of the Caspian Sea – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan) to the CR from the oil terminal in Terst and through the trans-Alpine TAL pipeline. The IKL pipeline also supplies refineries in Schwechat (Austria), Vöhlburg and Karlsruhe (Germany).⁴¹ With its launch, the Czech Republic stopped being 100% dependent on deliveries of Russian oil.⁴² The total transportation capacity of both of the domestic pipelines is approximately 19 million tons of oil per year. More specifically, the yearly capacity of the Druzhba pipeline in the Czech Republic is 9 million tons of oil, and the transmission efficiency of the IKL pipeline is 10 million tons of oil per year.⁴³

Natural Gas

The situation is similar in the area of natural gas, where the CR is basically fully dependent on deliveries of natural gas from foreign countries. In 1998 a contract was made between the stock companies Transgas and Gazexport for a delivery of 8 to 9 milliard cubic meters of Russian gas to the CR per year for a period of 15 years.⁴⁴ In 2006, this contract was extended to 2035

⁴⁰ Jan Hodač – Petr Strojček (2008). *Politika Ruské federace v postsovětském prostoru a střední Evropě*, Brno, MU, p. 264.

⁴¹ Jan Zaplatílek (2007). „Zásobování České republiky ropou“, Pro-Energy Magazin I, no. 2, p. 70.

⁴² Petr Kratochvíl – Petra Kuchyňková (2009). p. 73.

⁴³ Zajištění energetické bezpečnosti ČR 2006, p. 10.

⁴⁴ B. Litera – K. Hirman – B. Makyta – J. Vykoukal – J. Wanner (2006). *Energie pro Evropu. Energetická spolupráce Ruska a zemí postsovětského prostoru s Evropskou unií*, Praha: Eurolex Bohemia, p. 23.

by the company RWE Transgas, which assures long-term gas deliveries for the Czech Republic. The CR is dependent on Russian gas, which is transported from the reservoirs near the Russian city Orenburg through the Sojuz and Bratrství pipelines, for 75%⁴⁵ of its gas needs.⁴⁶ “South of Brno (Lanžhot), the Bratrství pipeline is linked to the Transit pipeline, which ensures the transportation of natural gas mainly in the east-west direction to other EU countries”.⁴⁷

The current operational configuration of the CR's Transit pipeline also makes possible parallel gas deliveries in the west-east direction. “This possibility was first taken advantage of during the 2009 gas crisis⁴⁸, when the company RWE used the pipeline to transport transit deliveries of natural gas from the Jamal pipeline to the Czech-German border. From there, the gas travelled over the territory of the CR to the border delivery station at Lanžhot and then to Slovakia”.⁴⁹ The Czech Republic took an important step towards reducing its 100% dependence on Russian gas in April 1997. Despite some reservations from Russia and Gazprom, Transgas signed a

⁴⁵ Zajištění energetické bezpečnosti ČR 2006, p. 10.

⁴⁶ The CR is also dependent on Norwegian gas for 24% of its gas needs. 0.4% of the gas the CR consumes comes from Germany. See Lukáš Tichý (2009a). Význam jižního Kavkazu pro energetickou politiku EU, Mezinárodní politika, XXXIII, no. 4, pp. 12-15. Vošta, M. – Bič, J. – Stuchlík, J. (2008, eds): Energetická náročnost: determinanta změn toků fosilních paliv a implikace pro EU a ČR, Praha, Professional Publishing.

⁴⁷ Petr Kratochvíl – Petra Kuchyňková (2009). p. 71.

⁴⁸ Besides the diversification of deliveries of natural gas, another thing that contributes to the energy security of the CR is the 8 Czech underground gas reservoirs which have an overall capacity of approximately 3.077 milliard cubic meters of gas, which makes up about 33% of the yearly Czech gas consumption, see Nezávislá odborná komise (2008). „Zpráva Nezávislé odborné komise pro posouzení energetických potřeb České republiky v dlouhodobém časovém horizontu“, p. 127. The goal of the state energy conception of the Czech Republic of October 2009 (containing energy-related plans for the period until the year 2050) is to increase the capacity of the reservoirs to 40% of the amount of gas consumed by the CR per year and for the guaranteed monthly gas production to be 70% of the average daily gas consumption during the winter by 2015, see „Státní energetická koncepce ČR“ (2009), p. 17.

⁴⁹ Lukáš Tichý (2009b). „Bruselský rybář v Kaspickém moři & plynová bezpečnost ČR“, *Natoaktual.cz*, URL: http://www.natoaktual.cz/bruselsky-rybar-v-kaspickem-mori-plynova-bezpecnost-cr-pjz/na_analyzy.asp?c=A090227_205226_na_analyzy_m02.

long-term contract according to which Norway would send deliveries of natural gas to the Czech Republic until 2017. The Norwegian gas enters the CR at Hora Svaté Kateřiny (St. Catherine's Mountain) in Krušné hory (Krušné Mountains), and the volume of the gas deliveries is at the level of about 2.0 milliard cubic meters.⁵⁰

4. The Asymmetric Mutual Dependence Between the Czech Republic and Russia

If we take into consideration the given energetic situation of the Czech Republic and followingly apply the above mentioned signs of the theory of mutual dependence to the relations between the CR and Russia, we can see that we can define the frame of the CR-Russia energy interaction as an asymmetric mutual dependence rather than a one-sided dependence. This will be the argument of this section. This assertion will also be tested against examples of the sensitivity and vulnerability of not only the Czech Republic, but also Russia.

4.1 The Energy Sensitivity of the Czech Republic

As was already mentioned in the text, a party's energy sensitivity is expressed by the amount it spends as a result of a change in the conditions of its interaction with another party.⁵¹ In this regard, the energy sensitivity

⁵⁰ B. Litera – K. Hirman – B. Makyta – J. Vykoukal – J. Wanner (2006), p. 18.; Nezávislá odborná komise („Pačesova komise“) (2008). „Zpráva Nezávislé odborné komise pro posouzení energetických potřeb České republiky v dlouhodobém časovém horizontu (2008)“. Verze k oponentuře, September 30, 2008 p. 124. URL: <http://www.vlada.cz/assets/ppov/nezavisla-energetickakomise/aktuality/Pracovni-verze-k-oponenture.pdf>.

⁵¹ Robert O. Keohane – Joseph S. Nye (2001). p. 11.

of the Czech Republic will be expressed, for example, by the fact that it will spend greater amounts of money for deliveries of more expensive oil through the IKL pipeline if Russia decides to reduce the agreed upon deliveries of its oil to the CR, as Russia already reduced its oil deliveries once before in July 2008.

The energy sensitivity of the Czech Republic will be similarly hit should a short term suspension of the deliveries of Russian gas take place. The last time such a suspension occurred was in January 2009. Although the Czech Republic handled the energy crisis without any greater problems (i.e. without declaring a state of emergency and without limiting individual purchasers), to safeguard its energy security, it had to import more expensive gas from Norway via the northern route.⁵²

The energy sensitivity of the Czech Republic will also be made evident in the event of Russia not investing enough into developing new oil and gas fields and renewing its now outmoded transportation infrastructure.⁵³ In relation to this, there exists the danger of a time coming when Russia will not be able to cover the oil and gas consumption of the EU countries, and thus it will have to reduce the agreed upon volume of its exports. In this scenario, the Czech Republic and other European states will be forced to make unexpected investments into renewing the Russian energy sector just to safeguard their own deliveries of energy resources.

The Czech Republic's sensitivity is not only connected to the possibility of suspensions of deliveries of mineral raw materials on the part of the Russian Federation. The CR is also sensitive to any sharp rise in the prices of oil and gas, as such a price increase would have negative effects on all the economic and social areas of the country's functioning.

⁵² Nik Hynek – Vít Střítecký (2010). „Energetická bezpečnost podle českých atlantistů“, in: Petr Drulák – Vít Střítecký (eds). *Hledání českých zájmů. Mezinárodní bezpečnost*, Prague: IIR. p. 81.

⁵³ Robert O. Keohane – Joseph S. Nye (2001). pp. 10-11.

4.2 The Energy Vulnerability of the Czech Republic

In contrast to a country's energy sensitivity, its energy vulnerability depends on the availability of alternative resources that could take the place of an unavailable raw material or compensate for its unavailability. For example, if Russia stopped its gas deliveries to the CR, the CR would not be able to make up for this lack in a time horizon that would exceed 90 days.⁵⁴ However, if Russia stopped exporting oil to the CR permanently or at least for a longer period of time, the vulnerability of the Czech Republic would be relatively lower. The CR also imports the non-Russian Caspian oil via the IKL pipeline. The overall share of this oil in the whole volume of the Czech oil imports has continued to grow since 1999 – and this growth occurred at the expense of the Družba pipeline.⁵⁵ The reasons for this are not only geopolitical, but also technical, as the Družba pipeline is currently obsolete in terms of its technology.

Both of the presented scenarios for how the Russian energy media will end are currently rather unlikely. This is because a permanent stop to the deliveries of Russian oil or gas to the CR would directly affect the exports of mineral raw materials to other European countries.

On the other hand, according to the strategic conceptions for the area of power supply until 2020 and 2030, Russia's long term interest is 1) to lower its transit dependence on Ukraine, Belarus and Poland; 2) to diversify export paths to Europe; and 3) to diversify exports and thus lower Russia's dependence on deliveries to EU countries.⁵⁶ To reach these goals, Russia

⁵⁴ Nezávislá odborná komise („Pačesova komise“) (2008). „Zpráva Nezávislé odborné komise pro posouzení energetických potřeb České republiky v dlouhodobém časovém horizontu (2008)“, p. 127.

⁵⁵ Petr Kratochvíl – Petra Kuchyňková (2009). p. 71.

⁵⁶ „Energetičeskaja strategija Rossiji na period do 2020 g“ (2003). URL: http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/ES-28_08_2003.pdf; „Energetičeskaja strategija Rossiji na period do 2030 g“ (2009). URL: http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/ES-28_08_2003.pdf;

plans to build several projects for oil transport (the Baltic System II and the East Siberia – Pacific Ocean pipeline) and several gas pipelines (Nord Stream, South Stream) but without expecting that the CR will be a direct purchaser of Russian oil or gas when these projects are completed.⁵⁷ Thus these projects could significantly increase the vulnerability of the CR⁵⁸.

4.3 The Energy Sensitivity and Vulnerability of the Russian Federation

On the other hand, though, the state of the asymmetric mutual dependence of the Czech Republic and Russia can make the latter vulnerable and sensitive as well. As Joseph Nye Jr. points out, “the state that is less vulnerable does not necessarily have to be less sensitive as well”.⁵⁹

The sensitivity of the Russian Federation, whose economy is heavily dependent upon income from exports of Russia’s mineral riches, involves two factors: the risk of other countries importing a smaller amount of mineral raw materials and the risk of Russia receiving lower profits from these exports. Russia’s energy sensitivity is also influenced by the threat of a country not paying for its deliveries of Russian oil and gas, and the real or possible unreliability of transit countries. When the Transit pipeline carries Russian gas to Germany (Russian gas accounts for roughly 43% of German gas imports) and then to France,⁶⁰ the gas is transported through the territory of the Czech Republic.

⁵⁷ Lukáš Tichý (2009), p. 110.

⁵⁸ For example, after the Nord Stream pipeline is completed, it will be easy for Russia to shut down gas deliveries to today’s transit countries, including the CR, but without threatening the market for Russian gas in the main European economies, namely those of Germany and France.

⁵⁹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2007). *Understanding International Conflicts. An Introduction to Theory and History*, 6th Edition, Harvard University Longman, p. 214.

⁶⁰ Petr Kratochvíl – Petra Kuchyňková (2009). p. 72.

In contrast, the vulnerability of Russia consists of the risk of Russia losing its access to the EU energy market, and European countries’ efforts to diversify gas producers. The situation is similar in the case of the EU’s efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian oil. At the same time, Russia is also vulnerable to the EU’s attempts to build new alternative routes for transportation of oil and gas.

One of the few opportunities that the Czech Republic has to gain some advantage over Russia lies in the CR’s ability to support the building of new transportation routes. If one of the planned pipelines that would go around the Russian territory (e.g. the Nabucco gas pipeline, the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline or the Trans-Caspian oil pipeline) is actually built, the Russian Federation will be sensitive to smaller purchases of Russian oil and gas on the part of the EU, and it will be vulnerable in the sense that its share and influence in European markets will decrease.

5. Asymmetric Interdependence as a Source of the Power of the Russian Energy Policy towards the Czech Republic

In spite of the partial vulnerability and sensitivity of the Russian Federation, the asymmetric interdependence in the Czech-Russian energy relations acts as a source of Russia’s power, and it can threaten the energy security of the CR.⁶¹ The first reason for this is the CR’s dependence on deliveries of oil and gas from Russia. The second reason is the unequal distribution of gains and expenses in the mutual energetic relations. And the third reason is Russia’s conception of its energy policy, which oscillates between thoughts of maximum gains and using energy sources to gain a dominant economic and political position in the world.

⁶¹ Robert O. Keohane – Joseph S. Nye (2001). pp. 9-10.

All the basic priorities and main tasks of the Russian Federation's energy policy were formulated in August 2003 in the Strategy for the Development of the Energy Policy of the Russian Federation until 2020. In the Strategy, the energy policy is closely connected to Russia's foreign policy and diplomacy.⁶² Russia's energy policy is set up similarly in the new Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030, which was made public in August 2009. The Energy Strategy creates a new strategic orientation for the energy sector in the Russian economy's move towards a new innovative path of development. The main goals of the Energy Strategy are the most effective possible use of natural resources and the potential of the energy sector for the long term sustainable growth of the domestic economy, improving the living standards of Russia's citizens, and strengthening Russia's position in other countries. In Russia, energy is altogether openly recognized as an instrument for renewing Russia's power in the international arena and also as a means to protect Russia's sovereignty against external influences.⁶³

Jeffrey Mankoff, in his report *Eurasian Energy Security*, defined the following energy policy practices of the Russian Federation which could have an unfavourable effect on securing stable deliveries of oil and gas to European countries: 1) using energy supplies as an instrument in Russia's foreign policy; 2) the efforts to diversify buyers of Russian energy; 3) supporting Russian subjects' presence in and intensive penetration into the current and new energy markets of other countries.⁶⁴

⁶² „Energetičeskaja strategija Rossiji na period do 2020 g“ (2003). URL: http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/ES-28_08_2003.pdf.

⁶³ „Energetičeskaja strategija Rossiji na period do 2030 g“ (2009). URL: <http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/ES-2030.pdf>.

⁶⁴ Jeffrey Mankoff (2009). *Eurasian Energy Security*, NY, The Council of Foreign Relations, p. 5.

5.1 The Use of Energy Sources as an Instrument in Foreign Policy

The biggest threat for not only the sensitivity but also the vulnerability of the CR is the real risk that Russia will reduce its deliveries of oil or gas as a result of Russia's use of its raw material resources as an instrument in the its foreign policy. The Russian discourse about the possibility of using energy to achieve Russia's political goals in relations with other states came about in relation to the increases in state interventions in the energy sector during 2003-2004.

According to Vladimir Milov, the conservative part of the of the Russian academic community started to think of energy as a key factor in foreign policy in 2001-2002, when it was clear that the world oil and gas prices would rise and remain at a high level. At the same time, Milov presents four basic purposes or scenarios for supporting the use of energy as a foreign policy instrument: 1) the reality of energy dependence could be used to achieve certain political goals in regard to states that buy Russian crude oil and natural gas; 2) the potential opportunity for a future expansion of Russian energy deliveries primarily through new pipelines could be used to support the interests of the Russian Federation in various countries; 3) investors and energy firms from countries that are dependent on deliveries of Russian energy could become involved in the management of oil and gas mining projects or in the development of Russian energy reserves, and the purpose of this would be to support and strengthen Russia's bilateral relations with these countries; 4) Russia could gain control over subjects who administer the oil and gas imports in a given country and also over key energy companies which manage the networks of oil and gas pipelines on their territories for the sake of achieving economic and political goals.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Vladimir Milov (2006). “The Use of Energy as a Political Tool”, *EU-Russia Centre Review*, May 2006, URL: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail?ots=591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&cid=48826>, pp. 14-15.

Robert Larsson, in his defense study *Russia's Energy Policy – Security Dimensions and Russia's Reliability as an Energy Supplier*, followingly delimits several motives that lead the Russian Federation to use its energy resources politically:⁶⁶ 1) to get better prices for oil and gas deliveries from the other side; 2) to gain control of the distributional infrastructure of pipelines in other countries; 3) to reduce the limit of the autonomy and the foreign policy sphere of the neighbouring states; 4) to punish the neighbouring states for their pro-western orientation and their disloyalty to Russia; 5) to coerce other states into making economic concessions (such as selling shares in the other countries' strategic energy companies).

The primary examples of Russia using its mineral riches as a foreign political instrument were the disputes between Russia and Ukraine over the price of gas in 2006 and 2009 and the energy crisis between Russia and Belarus in January 2007, which directly threatened the energy security of the European Union. The Russian Federation also used its mineral riches in a similar way in regard to Latvia, Georgia, Moldova and other countries that previously belonged to the Soviet Union in recent years.⁶⁷ The Czech Republic itself got a taste of Russia's unreliability at the beginning of July 2008. In connection with the signing of the agreement between the CR and the US on the placement of an American radar base on the territory of the CR, there was a sharp reduction in the deliveries of Russian oil through the Družba pipeline. What the real reason behind this suspension of deliveries is still being discussed, however.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Robert L. Larsson (2006). "Russia's Energy Policy: Security Dimensions and Russia's Reliability as an Energy Supplier", FOI Swedis Defence Research Agency, Scientific Report March, URL: <http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir1934.pdf>.

⁶⁷ According to Robert Larsson, after 1992, there were 55 threats of Russia stopping its energy deliveries or changing its energy prices, and out of these only 11 did not have a political background. For example, in 1998-2000, the Russian energy company Transneft stopped its oil deliveries to Lithuania nine times, see Robert L. Larsson (2006), p. 191; Vladimir Milov (2006).

⁶⁸ Petr Kratochvíl – Petra Kuchyňková (2009). p. 76.

5.2 Efforts to Diversify the Energy Market

There are also two other ways in which the CR could prove to be vulnerable in its energy relations with Russia: 1) Russia is currently making efforts to diversify its oil exports to include more "big" clients, namely the US and China; 2) Russia is also trying to reduce its transit dependence and transport its oil exports via tankers instead of pipelines.⁶⁹ By these measures, Russia is trying to regain full control over the export of its energy raw materials to world markets.

The Russian Federation took its first steps towards achieving this strategic goal approximately in 2000, and the goal will definitely be fulfilled through the realization of two oil transportation projects. After the completion of the Baltic oil pipeline system (with a capacity of 74 million tons per year) in 2007, its second phase, the Baltic System 2, which will have a capacity of 40 to 45 million tons per year and end in the Primorsk terminal, will be finished by 2013.⁷⁰

Another project of this sort is the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline (ESPO) with a capacity of 80 million tons of oil per year, which is one of the biggest projects in the current Russian oil industry. The ESPO should secure oil deliveries from the vast oil fields in East Siberia to China and other Asian-Pacific countries. The first section of the ESPO oil pipeline, which has a length of 2750 km. and stretches from Taishet to Skovorodin, was completed in December 2009. However, oil exports to China via this path will begin in 2011 when the interconnection of the tubular systems of the neighbouring states will be completed. The second section of the

⁶⁹ „Energetičeskaja strategija Rossiji na period do 2030 g“ (2009). URL: <http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/ES-2030.pdf>

⁷⁰ Nezávislá odborná komise („Pačesova komise“) (2008). „Zpráva Nezávislé odborné komise pro posouzení energetických potřeb České republiky v dlouhodobém časovém horizontu (2008)“. p. 89.

ESPO oil pipeline will be 2100 km. long, and it will lead from Skovorodin to Kozmin. It is expected to be finished in 2015.⁷¹

At that point, the RF will need 80-130 million tons of oil per year to carry out both projects. Although in 2009, oil mining in the RF rose by 1.5%, the RF lacks the ability to raise its oil mining to such an extreme degree. At the same time, the RF will have problems in trying to find such a huge volume of oil in other producer states, which could lead to a decision to optimize the export paths that carry Russian raw materials to world markets. This optimization will especially have an impact on the infrastructure, which is currently outmoded and leads through several transit states. One of the pipelines that is affected by this is the Družba pipeline. Thus, there is the real danger that the CR, which is connected to the southern branch of the Družba oil pipeline, might not be able to use the pipeline's full capacity, or it might be able to use the full capacity, but at higher prices.

5.3 Russia's Firm Presence in and Intensive Penetration into the New Energy Markets

The asymmetric interdependence, as a source of power, enables the stronger Russia to ask the more vulnerable Czech Republic for more concessions even in other areas of the development of their mutual relations. For example, in the Czech Republic, the Russian energy company Gazprom is trying to gain a dominant position by becoming the exclusive distributor of natural gas. Currently, the firm RWE Transgas controls 80% of the Czech natural gas market. If Gazprom managed to gain control of the energy market of the CR or a majority interest in some energy companies, the

⁷¹ Jaroslav Ungermann (2010). „Nové linie ropovodů a plynovodů ve východní Evropě, Pro a proti“, p. 4, URL: http://juniors.wbs.cz/nove_linie_ropovodu_a_plynovodu_ve_vychodni_europe.pdf.

CR's opportunities for reducing its dependence would be significantly reduced.⁷² Similarly, the Russian company Lukoil is trying to obtain a share of the Czech corporation Česká rafinérská, a.s., which is the biggest oil processor and oil product producer in the Czech Republic. With this step, Lukoil, like Gazprom, would gain access to the energy market of the CR.⁷³ In connection to this, there exists the risk that the new owner could decide to close the refinery in Kralupy and cause the CR to lose the option of processing the non-Russian Ingolstadt oil. At the same time, only the IKL pipeline is an alternative to the CR's dependence on Russian oil.⁷⁴

The Russian Federation is also focusing its efforts on entering the liquid gas market and developing new directions in its exports of raw energy materials. According to many experts, by doing this, Russia could disrupt the balance of the mutual dependence. It could lead to not only the Czech Republic but the whole European Union getting into an even less advantageous position in relation to Russia. Plus, the offensive politics of the Russian Federation will cause significant increases in the prices of raw energy materials.⁷⁵

6. The Challenges of the Energy Security of the Czech Republic

For the Czech Republic to improve its asymmetric position in its relations with Russia, which was defined above, the CR must carry out the following steps in the medium term.

⁷² Lukáš Tichý (2009), p. 118.

⁷³ Jan Macháček (2009). „Poprask na ropné laguně“, *Respekt*, No. 36, p. 25.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 26.

⁷⁵ Richard Youngs (2009). *Energy Security Europe's New Foreign Policy Challenge*, London, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, p. 90.

1) The Czech Republic Should Promote the Energy Policy of the European Union

The efforts of the Czech Republic to balance out the decisive share of Russia in energy security, or to gain an alternative to the Russian deliveries of crude oil and natural gas and, at the same time, to secure more stable imports of mineral raw materials, are the main factor that determines the position of Prague in the direction of the EU's energy strategy.⁷⁶ The space of the European Union then represents an important vector for the Czech energy policy, which is confronted and influenced by various initiatives coming from Brussels. These initiatives are focused on, among other things, liberalization of the gas and electricity markets of individual member states, diversification of current transportation routes⁷⁷, and legislative proposals for strengthening the EU's own energy security. The EU can then play a key role in lowering the sensitivity and vulnerability of the CR. At the same time, the EU as a whole can noticeably influence Russia's vulnerability and relatively straighten out the asymmetry of the mutual dependence. To strengthen the energy security and defend the states against the aggressive politics of the Russian Federation, the European Union supports liberalization of the electricity and gas market on both the level of the member states and that of the Union. Furthermore, the EU advocates rules of competition for the protection of both itself and its member states from the influence of Russian energetic subjects. Last but not least, the EU is working towards the integration of old and new gas suppliers into the European energy market, as this should create competition. This competition

⁷⁶ Petr Kratochvíl – Petra Kuchyňková (2009), p. 75.

⁷⁷ For example, the European Commission, in its Second Energy Review from November 2008, mentions the need for the European Union to increase its activity and participate more in, for example, the Caspian Sea area and the South Kavkaz. The new EU Action Plan for Energy Security and Solidarity stipulates, among other things, the need for the EU member states and the Commission to intensively negotiate and cooperate with their energy partners – for example, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and other Caspian Sea countries, see Lukáš Tichý (2009c), p. 119.

will followingly cause Russia's share in the EU energy market to decrease, and it will also bring about a partial stability and a strengthening of the energy security.⁷⁸ The EU's energy precautions can then change the state of the mutual dependence even more to the detriment of the Russian Federation. Russia's energy sensitivity will be hit as a result of the reduction of gas purchases on the part of the EU and thus also the reduction of financial gains from the sale of Russian gas. The reduction of the presence of Russia on European energy markets will then have an influence on its vulnerability. Besides finishing the liberalization of the energy market, the EU, in its efforts to reduce the energy dependence of some states, focuses on diversifying its sources and suppliers and on building new transportation routes. This involves, above all else, the European project of the Nabucco pipeline, which should transport 31 milliard cubic meters of natural gas from Caspian and Middle Asian fields to Central Europe per year without having it travel over Russian territory.

On the other hand, the Nabucco pipeline is a long term problematic issue in the eyes of the EU (the EU Council and the EU Commission decided on a tentative allocation of 50 million Euros for this project instead of the 250 million Euros that were originally planned as a part of a 3.98 billion Euro package for the support of the EU's new energy projects).⁷⁹ Also, the EU has not succeeded so far in concluding an agreement regarding deliveries of gas with any of the Middle Asian states. Another fact that keeps the Nabucco pipeline from being realized is that the member states lack a sufficient amount of will to unanimously agree on the realization of the project.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Filippou Proedrou (2007). The EU-Russia Energy Approach under the Prism of Interdependence. *European Security*, Vol.16, Nos 3-4, p. 341.

⁷⁹ Petr Kratochvíl – Petra Kuchyňková (2009), p. 72.

⁸⁰ Lukáš Tichý (2009).

The planned Trans-Caspian pipeline is closely connected to the Nabucco pipeline. The Trans-Caspian pipeline is intended to transport natural gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Baku. From there, the gas would travel through the already existing Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline and the Nabucco pipeline to Central Europe. The capacity of the Trans-Caspian pipeline is planned to be about 30 milliard cubic meters per year, and the costs of the project are estimated to be approximately 2-3 milliard Euros.⁸¹ The political developments of the last months of 2010 indicate that the political obstacles to the project could be overcome by the fact that as Turkmenistan tries to diversify its exports, its relations with Azerbaijan grow warmer. Similarly, another current topic of discussion is the so-called Southern Corridor, which is supposed to create a network of pipelines that would transport natural gas from the region of the Caspian Sea and the Near East through Turkey to Europe. The Southern Corridor is a realistic and important project for both the EU and the Czech Republic.

Support of diversification and building new oil and gas pipelines that would go beyond Russian territory is, for the CR, one of the ways in which it could bring at least a partial balance to the asymmetric mutual dependence. In the event of the realization of one of the proposed projects of the EU, Russia's vulnerability will be related to the partial decrease of its geopolitical influence in areas which are vital to it, and its sensitivity will suffer because of its loss of a portion of its gains from the transit of oil or natural gas. In turn, if a new European oil or gas pipeline is built, it will reduce the dependency of the Czech Republic and thus also its sensitivity and vulnerability. Nevertheless, without the involvement of other EU member states and their willingness to work and negotiate with each other, the building of the new European pipelines will be very hard to bring about.⁸²

⁸¹ Lukáš Tichý (2009a). „Význam jižního Kavkazu pro energetickou politiku EU“, *Mezinárodní politika*, 33, no. 4, p. 13.

It is precisely the disunited approach of the member states and the de facto nonexistence of a common energy policy that got in the way of the thus far coordinated approach of the EU in its energy relations with Russia, and the realization of alternative arrangements. Before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, energy politics were in the exclusive competence of the member states, and the key actors (for example, Germany or France) unequivocally preferred bilateral agreements with suppliers. This allowed Russia to take a “divide and conquer” approach. That is, it allowed Russia to oblige the main buyers while taking advantage of the dependence and vulnerability of the new EU member states to achieve its political goals.

The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force on December 1st, 2009, should contribute to a partial removal of these obstacles and the fulfilment of the EU's goals. In its format, the Lisbon Treaty is the first agreement to explicitly refer to energy politics with concrete goals such as safety of deliveries, interconnectedness of networks, solidarity, and environmental protection.⁸³ The Lisbon Treaty, which ensures a new legal framework for energy cooperation, lists energy policy under the shared competences of the EU and its member states. The treaty also places other significant issues into the category of shared competences, such as energy efficiency and the creation of a single energy market.⁸⁴ In these areas, decisions are currently being made under the new so-called Ordinary Legislative Procedure (the

⁸² T. Málek (2008). Pohled Ruské federace na energetickou politiku. in: Vladimír Prorok. (eds.): *Energetická bezpečnost – geopolitické souvislosti*, Praha: Vysoká škola mezinárodních a veřejných vztahů Praha. p. 238.

⁸³ Vladimír Beroun (2009). „Energetika v Lisabonské smlouvě: Čekají nás výrazné změny?“, *Newsletter Evropský program* 12/2009, Prague: Association for International Affairs, p. 3. URL: <http://www.amo.cz/publikace/newsletter-evropskeho-programu-122009.html>.

⁸⁴ Valeria Termini (2009). Energy and European Institutions, p. 99, in: S. Micossi – G. L. Tosato (eds.): *The European Union in the 21st Century. Perspectives from the Lisbon Treaty*, Centre for European Policy Studies Brussels, URL: <http://www.ceps.eu/book/europe-21st-century-perspectives-lisbon-treaty>.

co-decision procedure), which makes the implementation of decisions at the EU level considerably easier.⁸⁵

In the new treaty, the EU energy policy is conceived in a spirit of solidarity between member states and has the following goals: to guarantee a functioning energy market and reliable deliveries of energy for all of Europe; to increase energy efficiency; to support the use of renewable sources of energy; to connect the energy networks of the EU.⁸⁶ In practice, the principle of solidarity should make certain that other EU countries will help the Czech Republic if Russia cuts off its oil or gas deliveries to it. The principle of solidarity should thus contribute to lowering the influence of Russia and limiting its use of energy as a political instrument.

At the same time, by establishing the positions of the Chairman of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Lisbon Treaty strengthens present and future coherent foreign political activities of the EU. Through this, the EU's continuity in its foreign relations, including its relations with Russia, should improve. In turn, Russia should to a significant degree lose the option of going around the EU 27 in energy matters and leading bilateral negotiations with individual member states.

2) The Central European Energy Cooperation Should Be Intensified

Besides a more active participation in the framework of the energy platform of the EU, another possible future alternative path for the Czech Republic in regard to its energy security is energy cooperation between the CR and other Central European states. The states of Central Europe are united in their efforts to gain access to other energy supplies besides those

from Russia and to extend the currently existing oil and gas pipelines that lead from the north to the south.

These days, the Central European countries are mainly focusing their efforts on the project of connecting the north and the south for the Visegrad states. If a gas pipeline going from Denmark to Poland and/or an LNG terminal in the northwestern part of Poland are/is built, we will be able to discuss a project of increasing the security of gas deliveries for the Visegrad states. We can then think about continuing the project in the southern direction, or more specifically in the direction of the already built gas pipelines, over southern Moravia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria, and then to Croatia with a connection to the LNG Adria terminal.⁸⁷

Another obvious benefit of the regional cooperation is the stronger position of the Central European countries in negotiations over the terms of contracts and the prices of gas deliveries. The V4 countries pay higher prices for deliveries of natural gas, which puts them at a disadvantage economically in relation to their wealthier western neighbours. Together, the V4 countries have an 18% share in the Russian natural gas export market. This share is the second largest, only behind that of Germany. In the event of coordination and cooperation during negotiations with Russia, this fact could be made evident in a convergence of gas prices if not in their radical reduction.

3) The Czech Republic Should Strengthen the Role of Its Own Energy Policy when Ensuring Its Energy Security

Last but not least, in the current climatic-geographical-geopolitical conditions of the CR, energy security can be built and strengthened in the following ways:

⁸⁵ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (2008).

⁸⁶ Valeria Termini (2009), p. 99.

⁸⁷ Nezávislá odborná komise („Pačesova komise“) (2008). „Zpráva Nezávislé odborné komise pro posouzení energetických potřeb České republiky v dlouhodobém časovém horizontu“, p. 126.

First, it could be done by a quantitative strengthening of the role of nuclear energy in the Czech energy mix. This means 1) maintaining the current level of producing electricity from nuclear fission and extending the originally projected working life of the nuclear power plants at Dukovany and Temelín, and 2) creating the necessary conditions for other quantitative and qualitative developments of nuclear energy on the part of the state.

Second, it could be done by realistically evaluating the role of renewable resources. This means supporting their development while being aware that their role in the CR will be merely complementary for at least several years. Also, because of the geographical location of the Czech Republic, its use of renewable resources in the production of energy will be necessarily limited.

Third, the Czech Republic could reduce its oil and gas deliveries from one source to a maximum of 65% of its yearly consumption, and in the long term, it could reduce its consumption of oil and gas. It could also secure the maximum possible capacity of strategic supplies of oil and gas for the event of an energy crisis.⁸⁸

Fourth, the CR could build up its energy security by diversifying its producers of oil and gas. One way to reduce the share of Russia in natural gas deliveries to below 50% in the future is to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Algeria, Nigeria and other territories. The liquefaction of gas would turn this raw material into a truly global commodity like, for example, crude oil. This is because if this happened, the dependence on gas pipelines would disappear, and it would be possible to transport the liquefied gas by special tankers and then by cisterns on trans.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ „Zajištění energetické bezpečnosti ČR, stav a riziko realizace hrozeb“, 2006. p. 15.

⁸⁹ Nezávislá odborná komise („Pačesova komise“) (2008), p. 127; „Zajištění energetické bezpečnosti ČR, stav a riziko realizace hrozeb“, 2006. p. 15.

Fifth, the CR could search for alternative transportation routes for its existing oil and gas deliveries. Diversifying sources is a long term matter. Besides the planned LBL gas pipeline, which should be about 60 kilometers long and go from the Austrian station at Baumgarten to the point where it would connect to the currently existing gas pipeline network at Břeclav, preparations are currently being made for building several new connections between the Czech gas pipeline system and those of Germany, Poland and Austria.⁹⁰ Below are some new gas pipelines which should significantly increase the security of natural gas deliveries to the Czech Republic:

1) The Moravia pipeline is a 30 kilometer gas pipeline that will connect the systems of Poland and the Czech Republic. Its capacity should be 500 million cubic meters of gas per year.

2) The Nord Stream gas pipeline will connect Russia with Germany at the bottom of the Baltic Sea. Nord Stream will be linked to the Opal gas pipeline, which will extend from the north of Germany to the Czech border. From Hora Svaté Kateřiny (St. Catherine's Mountain) to Rozvadov, the Opal pipeline will be connected to the Gazela gas pipeline (a Czech gas pipeline). The capacity of the Gazela pipeline will be 30 milliard cubic meters of natural gas per year.

3) The Mozart gas pipeline will connect Austria and the Czech Republic. The end of this pipeline on the Czech side will be at Jindřichův Hradec.

7. Conclusion

Due to several energy crises that resulted in suspensions of oil and/or gas deliveries to European countries, the question of energy security and relations with Russia became a relevant and much discussed topic for the

⁹⁰ Lukáš Tichý (2009).

Czech Republic during the last few years. This is made evident by the fact that the CR chose energy security as one of the priority issues of the Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which took place in the first half of 2009.

The main intention of the presented article was to explain why the current framework of the energy interaction between the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic can influence Russia's energy policy towards the Czech Republic, and what energy policy decisions by Russia directly affect and threaten the energy security of the CR. A second goal was to show how the European Union as a whole and the cooperation in the framework of the Visegrad Four (V4) can contribute to changing the framework of the energy relations between the CR and Russia.

With the help of the neoliberal theory of mutual dependence, one can come to the conclusion that the current energy relations between the CR and Russia can be defined as an asymmetric mutual dependence in which the Czech Republic is at a disadvantage with an emphasis on the CR's vulnerability in regard to deliveries of natural gas. However, partially because of the alternative IKL pipeline, the CR's vulnerability in regard to deliveries of crude oil is significantly lower. Similarly, the sensitivity of the CR will be lower in the event of a short term suspension of the volume of the oil or gas. The asymmetric interdependence could function as a source of Russia's influence on energy security and thus have an effect on the vulnerability and sensitivity of the CR. Evidence for this is found in the procedures and expressions of Russia's energy policy. These procedures and expressions negatively threaten the securing of stable deliveries of oil and natural gas to the Czech Republic. Some examples of this are Russia using energy as a political instrument, Russia's efforts to diversify the purchasers of its energy supplies, and the efforts of Russian energy subjects to gain entry into new energy markets in other countries.

On the other hand, the energy policy of the Czech Republic is influenced by many initiatives in the European Union. These initiatives are focused on, e.g., liberalization of the gas and electricity market, diversification of the currently existing transportation routes, and legislative proposals aimed at strengthening the EU's own energy security. In its external relations, the EU tries to obtain energy partnerships with new producer countries and currently existing suppliers – especially with Russia. The EU as a whole then contributes to raising the energy security of the CR, and it could create a greater equality in the asymmetry of mutual dependence, thus lowering the sensitivity and vulnerability of the Czech Republic. Meanwhile, the EU as a whole could noticeably influence the vulnerability and sensitivity of Russia. Besides a more active participation at the EU level, another alternative path that the CR could take to improve its energy security is that of strengthening the Central European energy cooperation in the context of the V4.

Europe's Green Diplomacy Global Climate Governance is a Test Case for Europe⁹¹

(February 2010)

Martin Kremer⁹² – Sascha Müller-Kraenner⁹³

The Lisbon Treaty provides new tools for Europe to combat climate change. Europe will have to figure out how to put the European External Action Service to use in order to avoid another failure of global environmental leadership like that in Copenhagen. Obviously, leading by example is not enough.

The failure of the Copenhagen climate conference to broker a binding global climate treaty throws into question the European Union's strategy of operating multilaterally through the United Nations. The post-Copenhagen climate negotiations will be particularly challenging for Europe. In the multipolar world of climate governance,⁹⁴ Europe lacks the veto power

⁹¹ First published in: IP-GE 2/2010.

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⁹³ Sascha Müller-Kraenner is the European representative at the environmental organization The Nature Conservancy.

⁹⁴ Frank Loy, the lead US climate negotiator from 1998 to 2001, declared: "Future climate cooperation should be driven by whatever coalitions are best suited to the task. The geometry will differ depending on the specific challenge... Groups, like the G-20, should become the focal points for efforts to actually reduce emissions." *New York Times*, December 24, 2009.

of China and the United States. Instead it must try to reconcile a fluid multipolar world with the European Union's vision of "effective multilateralism."

Although the UN process fails to deliver, and informal groups like the G-20 are emerging, it is not yet clear how like-minded countries can carry on negotiations outside of the established structures. For European leaders there is no easy solution. There will, however, be the need to upgrade the European Union's existing green diplomacy. The European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Union's new foreign service, provides a unique opportunity to increase analytical capacity and to design the right instruments and institutions for confronting climate change.

Climate Diplomacy For a Multipolar World

At the Copenhagen climate summit in December 2009, the European Union found itself sidelined at the highest-level negotiations, cut out of the political deal-making between the United States and key emerging economies led by China. The dual leadership of the Commission and Council Presidency, in conjunction with ambitious national leaders and an ongoing internal decision-making process in the course of negotiations marginalized the Europeans. As a result, the European Union was not in the best position vis-à-vis both the newly formed BASIC group (China, India, Brazil, and South Africa) and the United States. The EU strategy of leading by example – notably offering additional emission reductions and financial incentives – proved insufficient.

For the European Union, the implications of the debacle extend far beyond climate change. Climate change is no longer merely an environmental issue. Economic growth, energy security, and environmental sustainability are interconnected issues at the core of complex power relations.

Decisions made during the multilateral climate process impact the future of global governance structures. These decisions will also help define the relations with EU key strategic partners, including the United States, Russia, China, and India. If the European Union is to become a serious global actor, it needs to engage at this strategic level.

In the updated European Security Strategy of 2008, energy security and climate change—and hence their governance structures—are defined as key areas of action. The report highlights climate change as a “threat multiplier.” Furthermore, member states recognize in various Council conclusions that climate change and international security implications are part of the wider EU agenda involving energy security and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

A major opportunity for stronger global clout for the European Union is at hand in the form of the newly minted president of the European Council, its new foreign policy czar and the EEAS. Climate change can no longer be left in the hands of environment ministers or even the new climate commissioner alone.

Climate Diplomacy and the EEAS

The EEAS is now in a crucial phase. The debate so far about Europe’s new diplomatic service has been focused on the body’s legal status, functional overlap with the Commission, and staffing rules and decisions. There has been little debate on diplomatic priorities and how to advance the European interest via the capabilities of the new service. No special thought has been given to the fact that the European Union needs a holistic, practical strategy for green diplomacy, similar to the existing programs geared toward conflict prevention and fighting terrorism. Member States and the European Union should consider the following suggestions:

- Climate diplomacy should be concentrated in the High Representative’s office in a special strategic unit. Extra planning capabilities for the climate challenge should be included in the cabinet of the new high rep, Lady Ashton.
- Climate negotiations will continue on track.
- Environment ministers and the European Commission will retain their respective roles, national foreign ministers can contribute via the Council.
- Staffing decisions should consciously build capacity on the global change themes that will dominate policy making, including climate change.
- Staff from member state climate and environment ministries could be included in the rotating process for the new diplomatic service.
- Climate competent staff should be placed in the European Union’s 130 international missions.
- The European Parliament should ensure that climate literacy is included in the confirmation processes for newly nominated EU ambassadors.
- The existing Green Diplomacy network remains an asset, linking staff who hold formal responsibilities concerning the climate issue in the member states’ embassies with central units in national capitals and Brussels.

The European Security Strategy and a recent report by the Council Secretariat and the High Representative have already called for further steps of analysis, early warning capabilities, conflict prevention, and crisis management. Climate change adaptation strategies will have to be better integrated into the European Union’s development cooperation.

EEAS will probably gain significant influence over EU financial instruments for development cooperation, including the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). Climate change priorities, fused with conflict prevention and crisis management, have to be integrated with one another when new development

cooperation frameworks with partner countries are being set up. Against this backdrop, the EEAS must devise ways to work within new governance formats like the G-20, thus further mainstreaming climate change into “high politics” while recognizing the continued value of the UN system to provide legitimacy to the final decision-making process. A climate “G-20+” format could benefit from the groundwork already done in the area of energy technologies and efficiency. Representatives from the African Union and small island states (as well as from least developed countries) should be included. While expanding on the European Union’s strategic partnership initiatives with the United States, China, India, Brazil, and Russia, the EEAS should put a stronger emphasis on foreign policy-led economic cooperation in the climate area, including green technology transfer.

An Updated EU Climate Diplomacy Strategy

After Copenhagen, the European Union must rethink its strategy of negotiating in a multilateral setting. China does not want to lead and the United States cannot. If the European Union continues to believe that global climate policy is important, it should make radical choices in its climate diplomacy. The Copenhagen Accord may still evolve into an anchoring agreement. The European Union, however, may also—at least for an interim period—need to consider additional bilateral and regional agreements, and additional “coalitions of the willing,” such as a “G-3” of the United States, China (or the newly established group of BASIC countries), and the European Union. After all, the United States and China contribute well over 40 percent of all greenhouse gases.

Much will depend on how the European Union and member states henceforth recognize core interests revolving around sovereignty, development, competitiveness, and financial transfers. While the European foreign

ministries have a fairly accurate grasp of the role major polluters like China and India play, they underestimate the importance of smaller or medium-sized emerging economies (such as Thailand, the Philippines, Peru, or Ecuador) that are often reluctant to align themselves with the big BASIC countries. At the same time, all outreach efforts made before or during Copenhagen to the African Union or the Alliance of Small Island States did not suffice to strengthen Europe’s overall standing toward the developing country alliance of G-77.

During the ongoing negotiations, the Europeans would be well advised to exercise leadership by reinforcing bottom-up initiatives in the field of financial assistance and technology cooperation well before the next UN climate summit in Mexico in November 2010. One route could be to pursue the approach of the International Carbon Action Partnership that fosters and eventually links regional carbon markets, including possibly regional or sectoral markets in emerging economies like China. Another, more traditional, policy approach could be to nudge Russia and other transitioning economies firmly toward taking responsibility for the energy and climate agenda. European technology and policy know-how could assist those energy-intensive nations in adopting low carbon growth strategies. The recently founded International Agency for Renewable Energies, provide a blueprint and a platform for identifying trigger points for policy interventions, as well as mechanisms for capacity building, technology cooperation, and financial incentives.

Copenhagen demonstrated the need to engage China, but also the need for the European Union to continue to develop its own position as well as to challenge the United States. The Obama administration in general prefers to work toward a network of partnerships with itself at the core in order to preserve its influence in the world. Given the importance it attaches to historical responsibility and finance, the European Union could become a bridge between developed and developing countries.

Last but not least, the European Union will need to embed climate diplomacies in strategic foreign policy relations. The European Union is the biggest economic power in the world, but this does not translate into clout. The EU climate agenda is still built around leadership on narrow issues that do not reflect the political priority or allow trade-offs (e.g. for trade or security commitments) or the imposition of conditionality (e.g. in exchange for financial assistance). If the European Union and its EEAS choose not to take up this new multilateral challenge, Copenhagen could very well be a harbinger of a world order in which international diplomacy will increasingly be shaped by others.

III.

Germany as a Player in the EU-Russia Relationship

The German Policy towards Russia – The Meaning of the Context of the European Union

(August 2009 and March 2011¹)

Vladimír Handl (IIR) – Tomáš Ehler (MFA CR)²

1. The State and Dynamics of the FRG's Policy towards Russia

The Historical Roots of the Relations and the Continuity of the Ostpolitik

The historical base of the current German-Russian relations reaches back at least as far as the beginning of the modern era, when the modernization of the czar's empire depended upon contact with Prussia. Thus began the asymmetric but mutually complementary processes of modernization and emancipation. During these processes, Germany/Prussia played the role of a source and an active exporter of political, institutional and cultural mod-

¹ The text is a slight adaptation of a policy paper that was uploaded to the web site of the Institute of International Relations in August 2009, URL: <http://www.iir.cz/upload/PolicyPapers/2009/Handl.pdf>. In March 2011 parts of the policy paper were updated.

² Tomáš Ehler contributed to this article with his own independent analysis of German-Russian relations in the field of energy. The text reflects his own views, but not necessarily the views or attitudes of the institution that employs him.

els (policy export), and it also mediated and influenced Moscow's efforts to integrate Russia into the European system in a significant way. Geopolitically, Russia always represented Europe's inert and almost inexhaustible Euro-Asian hinterland while Germany represented a modern European centre and Russia's bridge to Western Europe.³

World War II plays the role of a moral imperative in the German relations towards Russia. That is one reason for why since the end of the Adenauer era, the FRG's policy towards the USSR was not done from a position of power, but rather from a position that always sought to maintain a balance and reduce tensions. Also, the role of the USSR in the unification of Germany bound German politics to feelings of being indebted and grateful to it. Additionally, after 1990, Germany's fascination with Russia returned in the sense that once again Germany saw Russia as a geographical colossus rich in just about all natural resources and as a country which connects an impressive culture and advanced technology with the deficits of a society that was late in becoming industrialized and still retains pre-industrial elements.

In Russia, the FRG became a recognized and favoured partner, and most of the Russian public and politicians have a positive view of it. Although the dispute over the returning of the art objects that the Soviet Union confiscated in Germany in 1945-1946 weighs the relations down, it does not stop them from developing further.

For many countries, the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR meant a reduction in Russia's significance and the attention paid to it. However, in Germany the opposite was the case as the German-Russian relations were strengthened in a manner that reflected the historical traditions and geopolitical facts of the two countries.

³ Angela Stent (2007) „Russland“, in: Siegmund Schmidt – Gunther Hellmann – Reinhard Wolf (2007) *Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 436-454.

The Political Dimension: Security and Integration

There are several factors which have an especially pronounced influence on the German relations towards Russia in the area of security and integration:

- the conviction that safeguarding the peace and security of Europe is not too likely if it is done without Russia, and that it is even less likely if it is done “against Russia”;
- the current absence of a feeling of actually being threatened by Russia politically, militarily or economically – including energy;
- Important German actors (in policy and business) view Russia as the only additional reservoir of strategic importance of Europe in the age of globalization, which is culturally compatible and geographically adjacent.

The growth of Russia's economic weight and “the Putin factor” (“the German at the head of the Russian state”) both played a role in the closer relations of the two countries in recent years. Furthermore, Schröder's government shared Putin's frustration with the policies of G.W. Bush. Thanks to this, among other things, Germany's view of Russia as a factor in European/world security in German politics went through a historical circle of sorts from Bismarck's *Reinsurance Treaty* (1887) to the current “strategic partnership” (2006). The German politicians and society place a great amount of faith and trust in their knowledge of Russia – not only their knowledge of Russia's potential and politics, but their knowledge of “the Russian soul”. However, an essential difference between modern times and the end of the 19th century is that today, Germany is fully integrated into western structures, economics and culture. Even the strategic partnership should develop at both the FRG-Russia level and the EU-Russia level.

If there are actual or potential risks in this matter, according to most actors in German politics, they arise mainly from Russia's insufficient internal modernization and structural weakness. In the globalized world, these

weaknesses spill over into the danger of an uncontrolled proliferation of weapons and armament technologies (including WMDs), into areas of internal security (nontransparent flows of capital, organized crime) and into Russia's irrational behaviour, which arises from its feeling that it is threatened, treated unjustly and besieged by enemies.

To battle these problems, German politicians, in their relations with Russia (and other important partners), are systematically building a thick network of *institutionalized relations*. Every year, so-called intergovernmental consultations take place. These consultations are the highest form of bilateral association, and they are reserved only for Germany's strategic partners. The Strategic Working Group (which is summoned on the German side by *Ost-Ausschuss*, the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations) deals with the development of economic relations on both the state and the private level. Strengthening social contacts in the areas of politics, culture and science is the responsibility of the German-Russian Forum (*Deutsch-Russisches Forum*). Through the initiative of G. Schröder, the Petersburg Dialogue (*Petersburger Dialog*, since 2000) was founded with the intention of getting civic society involved in the regular contacts between Germany and Russia. However, like the forum above, the dialogue suffers from formalism and also the rejection of civic society by the current Russian power vertical. In 2003, the position of coordinator for intersocietal German-Russian relations was created at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, 90 partnerships between cities of the two countries are currently being actively developed. The newest project, the "Partnership for Modernization" (2008), is oriented towards practical cooperation programmes ranging from health care to transportation.⁴

⁴ Typically enough, Germany "multilateralized" the idea of the Partnership for Modernisation by "exporting" it into the EU. The respective programme was adopted as an EU policy in 2009 and was launched during the EU-Russia summit on June 1st, 2010 in Rostou-on-Don.

The War in Kavkaz

The Georgia-Russian War sent a shock to the German political world and exposed to it the limits of the influence that the FRG (as well as NATO and the NATO-Russia Council) has (have) in Russia and Georgia. However, it also increased the FRG's sensitivity to the feeling of being threatened in the countries that find themselves between NATO/EU and Russia. The German political world is now more aware of Russia's growing efforts to gain a dominant position in these countries and thus to at least partially revise from a geopolitical perspective the results of the end of the Cold War in Russia's favour; nevertheless, it does not see any alternative to its inclusive strategy.⁵

The Georgia-Russian War illustrated well the German approach to Russia and its limits. Berlin tried to implement preventive diplomacy in this matter, and Minister Steinmeier initiated a three-sided discussion between Abkhazia, Georgia and Russia, although the war in August put a stop to this discussion. Not only was the involvement of the FRG unable to prevent the conflict, but it was not able to ward off the extensive Russian retaliation in reaction to the Georgian attack. Originally, German politicians took a neutral position toward the armed conflict, but when Russian forces actually entered Georgia, the FRG sided with the severe critics of the war and cooperated with the EU and the French Presidency of the EU Council in this matter. A combination of the pressure from Germany (which surprised Russia) and the slump in the Russian stock markets apparently influenced Moscow's behaviour and contributed to the stopping of the advancement of the Russian forces.⁶

⁵ Mathias Dembinski – Barbara Schumacher – Hans-Joachim Spanger (2010) „Reset Revisited – Zur Programmierung europäischer Sicherheit“. HSFK-Report 6/2010.

⁶ Constanze Stelzenmüller (2009) "Germany's Russia Question". *Foreign Affairs*. New York: Mar/Apr 2009. Vol. 88, Iss. 2; pp. 89-92.

As this problem developed further, German politicians tried to find a multilateral solution to it; they feared a state of affairs where Russia would isolate itself and fall into a state of irrationality rather than any direct military expansion or aggression from Russia. That is why they went against the stopping of the activities of the NATO-Russia Council and refused the efforts to speed up the process of further expansion of the Alliance. In the framework of the EU, Germany put the main emphasis on its *Black Sea Synergy* project in 2008-2009, which includes Russia and Georgia, and promoted the idea that the programme of the Eastern Partnership should be as open as possible in regard to Moscow.

Questions of Armament

Germany has an eminent interest in continuing in its checks and reductions of armament. F. W. Steinmeier personally tried hard to keep Russia from leaving the agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and to persuade Russia to return to the agreement.⁷ In the matter of the anti-missile defence, the FRG did not completely deny the rationality of such a programme, but it sought a multilateral anchorage for the programme in both the framework of NATO and relations with Russia. Its priority was not to permit more strategic estrangement and/or further growth of the military tensions between the West and Russia; however, some German actors still uncritically took up Moscow's arguments in this matter. More recently, Berlin welcomed the Obama administration's intention to reexamine the need for, the effectiveness of and the possible configuration of the anti-missile defence.⁸

⁷ Interview with SPD Deputy Gerd Weisskirchen, 21. 4. 2009, Berlin.

⁸ According to some experts the road to Moscow goes through Berlin: the reset in relations between the U.S. and Russia thus has been seen as both an opportunity as well as a challenge for German policy. See Stephen Szabo (2009) "Can Berlin and Washington Agree on Russia?" *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, Nr. 4, October 2009, pp. 23-41.

European Integration/ENP

Since the 1990s, the FRG wanted to carry over to the states of the former Eastern Bloc its post-war experiences, in which its renewal/modernization and democratization were fundamentally influenced by the multilateral normative environment of NATO and EEC/EU. In this, the German policy has de facto tried to "westernize" the East. As this meant the gradual acceptance of the countries of East Central Europe into both organizations, Berlin, in its relations with Russia, searches for a corresponding instrument in the institutionalization of the cooperation and various forms of strengthened partnership.

But it is precisely in this area that a new potential for conflict opens up, and so far, Germany does not have a solution to it. Not only did Berlin fail in its attempts to get Russia to join the European Neighbourhood project, but it was surprised to find that Moscow sees the Eastern Partnership as a new form of *Drang nach Osten* on the part of the EU and that Russia wants to establish itself in the region as an alternative political and *normative* power. An explanation for this is that the euphoria felt in Moscow because of the success of the military intervention in Georgia was replaced by the fear that Russia would lose more of its influence not only in Ukraine (especially in relation to the EU-Ukraine protocol on the modernization of the Brotherhood gas pipeline), but also in Belarus.⁹ This is why one of Moscow's current priorities is the creation of a single economic space between the CIS countries. Meanwhile, Moscow pushes its own (Russian) norms to its partners and rewards them for complying with the norms with lower prices for gas and/or oil.

German policy has tried to mitigate Russia's aversion. The FRG emphasizes that the Eastern Partnership is an open concept in whose programmes

⁹ Suzan Stewart (2009) „Russland und die Östliche Partnerschaft“, SWP-Aktuell 21, April 2009.

Russia could take part, and points to the mutually complementary character of the EaP and the *Black Sea Synergy*. For reasons of carefulness, Germany avoids the argument that objectively, the EU's normative influence is also involved, and at the same time, the FRG refuses to recognize the principle of spheres of influence that is being pushed forward by Moscow.

Medvedev's Security Plan

In principle, the German policy reacted positively to President Medvedev's proposals for negotiations about new European security architecture. This is an expression of not only German multilateralism, but also its emphasis on the processual elements in international relations: in the German view, not only institutions but also processes of negotiation are values in themselves to a certain extent. Calls for Russia to further specify its ideas about the peace order in Europe can thus be perceived as efforts to pull Russia into multilateral ties with western states, especially the U.S.

The Criterion of Closeness: Does the Military Cooperation Have a Strategic Character?

The fact that Germany, in its obliging approach to Russia, does not seek an alternative to NATO and the EU is reflected in the extent of the two countries' military cooperation. This cooperation does not embody a closeness that would be comparable in any way with the FRG's relations with its allies, including the Czech Republic.

Actually, the military cooperation does not in any way go beyond "normal" and rather formal relations, and it has practically nothing to do with arms production or the combat activities of armed forces. It is limited to regular official contacts between the ministries of defence and general staffs of the two countries, during which the interaction takes place mainly for

the sake of obtaining information and, often, politeness. The influencing of military policy is, in principle, one-sided: the information that the Russian side receives from the German partners usually concerns matters like the models for securing the conditions of the work and life of soldiers carrying out their basic military service and officers, including food and health care. Relevant military-strategic projects do not take place – after all, the main problem of the Russian army is in the securing of its units' basic fighting capacity.¹⁰ Thus, this is by no means a military dimension of the conception of the "strategic partnership".

Thus there is something like a *security imperative* in the German policy: a constructive, effective and security-oriented cooperation with Russia is seen as absolutely necessary, and Germany, on all levels and platforms (including those of NATO and the EU), promotes the development or at least the maintenance of the relations with Russia. Nevertheless, the German policy does not show any quality that would indicate that Germany has an intention to free itself from its military ties to NATO (and the EU) or act within these ties as a "Trojan Horse" of Russia.¹¹

Economic Relations

Germany always exported technologically advanced products to Russia, and Russia repaid it with supplies of raw materials. This historical *model of the German-Russian economic symbiosis* is de facto sustained even today. Thus, besides the security imperative, there arose the *raw material-economic imperative*: from the point of view of Germany, the future of not only the German but also the European economy is difficult to imagine without cooperative relations with Russia.

¹⁰ Interview with two employees of the Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin, 22. 5. 2009.

¹¹ This apprehension has been visible mainly among Atlanticists in some European countries, including the Czech Republic.

During the Cold War, Germany's economic relations with the USSR were one of the few areas in which the German (left-wing, right-wing and liberal) policy asserted its independence and did not submit to pressure from the U.S., as in the 1970s, Bonn refused to give up its gigantic "gas in exchange for pipes" deal with Russia. This deal helped the German steel industry and secured for the FRG (and other European countries) reliable deliveries of gas through the "Iron Curtain".

After the end of the Cold War, the political limitations on the economic relations with Russia fell away. Nevertheless, Russia was not a strategically significant partner – at the end of the 1990s, Russia even yielded to the exports of the Czech Republic in the matter of the volume of German imports.¹²

This situation changed with President Putin's entry into office. The gradual stabilization of the political and economic situation in Russia after Putin's coming into power and especially the sharp growth in the prices of energy raw materials allowed Russia to undergo a sharp growth in its imports of not only consumer goods but also modern manufacturing machinery and technology, which are necessary for a beginning modernization programme. This led to a strengthening of the significance of the Russian market and Russian firms. It was only at the end of the 1990s that capital from advanced economies, including Germany, began to flow into Russia on a mass scale. By 2009, 4600 German firms are doing business in Russia. The volume of the trade with Russia reached 36% in 2006, 25% in 2007¹³ and 19.7% in 2008.¹⁴ However, this does not change anything about the

fact that the German economy remains oriented toward the West. Nevertheless, an important exception to this is the area of energy security.

Energy Security

The relations of the FRG and Russia in the field of energy have a special significance in the framework of the two countries' bilateral relationship as a whole and nonnegligible implications for the political and energetic relations of Russia and Germany with other EU countries and the transit countries of Eastern Europe. The base of the energy relations is the oil and gas mining in Russia and the export of these raw materials to Germany. Other areas of the energy cooperation include increasing the energy effectiveness and utilizing renewable sources of energy, as the development of these sources in Russia has a great amount of potential – among others, for German investments. The high level of the energy relations between Russia and the FRG is mainly determined by the two countries' geographic proximity and economic aspects. To a significant degree, it is also determined by the historical development and context of the mutual political-security relations. The psychological level of the relations or the closeness of the two nations in terms of their mentalities is also nonnegligible (an example of this closeness is the Russian phrase "Germans understand Russians the most, and Germans understand Russians the best. And that is the way it will stay.").

One characteristic aspect of the Russian-German relations in the area of energy is the macroeconomic and institutional asymmetry of the energetic relations. The transfer of energy carriers between Russia and the FRG is exclusively unidirectional. In 2008, Russia exported 26.7 milliard Euros worth of oil and natural gas to Germany, and the total Russian exports to the FRG amounted to 33.126 milliard Euros. From an institutional view, the second asymmetry lies in the character or ownership structure of the

¹² Deutschlands Handelspartnern in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Ein Betrag der deutschen Aussenhandelsstatistik. Statistisches Bundesamt 2002, pp. 9-10.

¹³ Gernot Erler (2009) *Mission Weltfrieden: Deutschlands neue Rolle in der Weltpolitik*, Marburg: Herder 2009, p. 134.

¹⁴ Deutsche Auslandshandelskammern (2009), „Handesaustausch“, URL: http://russland.ahk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Publikationen/Kurzinfo/2009/2009_03_04Handelsaustausch_de.

subjects that form the energy relations. While the energy sector of the FRG is decentralized and liberalized,¹⁵ the Russian energy sector is characterized by a high level of monopolization and oligopolization. The mining, distribution and especially exports of Russian oil and natural gas are virtually and in some cases de jure (for example, the exportation of natural gas) controlled and led by the state.

The FRG is forced to depend upon imports of energy carriers, and in recent years these imports made up around 70% of the consumption of primary energetic sources (PES).¹⁶ The degree of the FRG's dependence on Russian energy carriers (the share of the energy imports that comes from Russia / the consumption of PES) came to approximately 21.7% in 2009 (11.6% for oil, 5.9% for natural gas, 2.2% for black coal and 2% for uranium).¹⁷ During a discussion of the FRG's energy dependence on Russia, the primary role is played by natural gas, as unlike in the case of oil, the FRG is not able to easily obtain deliveries of gas from other sources.¹⁸ The FRG's dependence on deliveries of gas from Russia mildly rose in recent years (from 33% in 1990 to 37% in 2008 and 32% in 2009). In a wider context, the asymmetry described above or the relative dependence

of the FRG on energy carriers from Russia is presented rather as a mutual dependence – an *interdependence*. This is because on the other side of the relationship, Russia is dependent on its gains from the export of energy carriers to the FRG and also on the German investments and know-how (not only) in the Russian energy sector.

In the framework of the EU-27, the FRG is the country whose energy sector is the most interconnected with that of Russia. Russia's sector fossil energy carrier exploration and mining (*upstream*) mainly consists of the activities of German concerns, and minority shares in companies that mine natural gas – E.ON (Yuzhno Ruskoye) and Wintershall (Yuzhno Ruskoye and Urengoy /Achimgaz/) – that were realized in 2008-2009. Furthermore, in March 2011, Wintershall signed some memoranda with Gazprom that dealt with developing mining in two other localities of Urengoy and also with Wintershall acceding to the highly politicized South Stream project. Previously, the concerns RWE and E.ON had declined the offer to join this project. While RWE is a part of the rival Nabucco project, E.ON's negative response probably had to do with its financial problems. These financial problems also led to E.ON's decision to sell its property share in the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom (3.5%). Until 2010, E.ON was the only western company to hold a more pronounced volume of the shares in the Russian gas monopoly, which was, among other things, a symbolic expression of the Russo-German relations. In the framework of the privatization of the Russian electroenergetic sector, E.ON got a majority share in OGC-4 in 2008. In the area of transportation of oil, the FRG is connected to Russia via the northern branch of the Druzhba oil pipeline (its capacity is circa 22 million tons of oil per year, and it transports oil to the East German refineries in Schwedt and Leuna). In the area of natural gas transportation, Germany is connected to Russia via the Transgas pipeline, the Jamal pipeline (with a capacity of 30 bcm per year) and the already partially realized Nord Stream project (it is expected to be completed in 2013; its capac-

¹⁵ What is more, in the area of oil industries a relevant German company de facto does not exist.

¹⁶ In 2009, these imports made up 71.9% of the total PES consumption; more specifically, they accounted for 97.7% of the oil, 84.5% of the natural gas, 71.8% of the black coal, and 100% of the uranium that was consumed.

¹⁷ For the sake of comparison, we should mention that the average degree of dependence on Russian gas from the perspective of the share in the consumption of primary energy in the framework of the EU-27 was approx. 7%.

¹⁸ In the case of oil, only the East German oil refineries have greater problems in obtaining alternative oil deliveries. The East German oil refineries are primarily connected to the northern branch of the Druzhba oil pipeline, as the oil terminal in Rostock lacks a sufficient capacity in this respect (however, one idea that the operators of the East German refineries are considering is expanding the capacity of this terminal). Furthermore, the FRG does not have a terminal for liquefied natural gas. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the German gas sector has the second largest underground storage tanks after Ukraine (47 tanks with a capacity of approx. 20.3 bcm). These German storage tanks can cover the average gas consumption of the FRG for approx. 75 days.

ity will be 55 bcm per year). In the sector of processing/distribution and sales of natural gas and oil (*downstream*), the Russian-German relations are mainly in the form of the activities of Russian companies in the FRG. These companies are trying to secure the vertical structure or, more specifically, to gain access to the end buyers. In the natural gas sector, Gazprom (Gazprom Germania) is active. It has numerous daughter companies and minority shares in German firms (VNG) and, above all else, the joint venture Wingas.¹⁹ In October 2010, the Russian oil company Rosneft bought a 50% share in the company Ruhr Öl from the Venezuelan company PdVSA. Through this, Rosneft managed to gain control of approx. 11% of the FRG's oil market. The remaining 50% of Ruhr Öl and its management are in the hands of Deutsche BP. Ruhr Öl owns 100% of two refineries in Gelsenkirchen (with an overall capacity of 13 million tons per year), a 37% share in the PCK refinery in Schwedt (10.5 million tons per year), a 25% share in the Bayernoil refinery in Ingolstadt (12 million tons per year), a 24% share in the Miro refinery in Karlsruhe, which is the largest German refinery (14.9 million tons per year), and 100% of the chemical factory in Münchmünster. Rosneft will be able to supply the mentioned refineries via the Druzhba oil pipeline, or more specifically via the oil terminals in the North Sea (Wilhelmshaven) and the Adriatic Sea (Trieste and the TAL oil pipeline). Rosneft's entry into the FRG's oil market increased the guarantee on the oil deliveries through the Druzhba oil pipeline, whose reliability was discussed recently in relation to, among other things, the development of Russian oil terminals in the Baltic Sea.

The main German importers of Russian gas sealed a long term contract for natural gas deliveries directly with Gazprom (which is supposed to remain in effect until 2035/2042). In the past, East German refineries had been forced to buy oil in a nontransparent manner through a middleman

(quarterly contracts), and since 2007 they had to wrestle with similar problems like those that the CR faced in 2008 (i.e. the Russian side failing to deliver the full agreed upon volume of oil).

Even the active capital of German companies in the energy sectors of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can become a potential object of the bilateral energy relation between the FRG and Russia. For example, this could happen in relation to the efforts of German firms to gain a direct share in the mining of energy carriers (e.g. in the form of a so-called "asset swap"), or in the framework of the sale of active capital for the sake of the financial consolidation of German concerns that are in debt.

Generally, the Federal Government sees the securing of deliveries of mineral raw materials/energy as a task of the private sector while believing that the state should "safeguard the political, legal and institutional framework for an internationally competitive securing of deliveries of raw materials".²⁰ The Federal Cabinet basically does not implement a proactive policy in relation to, for example, the building of a new infrastructure or the sealing of specific contracts, but it rather carries out supportive actions and intervenes only when German interests are directly threatened – and this applies even on the highest level (see lobbying for the Nord Stream project). With respect to the close interconnectedness between the Russian energy sector and state power, the FRG executive plays a greater role in the framework of the energy relations with Russia. Regardless of the political affiliation of the ministers of the relevant government departments, one can say that while the approach of the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs to the energy relations with Russia is more political (that is, it takes into account political contexts beyond the framework of energy), the approach of the Federal Minister of Economics (BMWl), who is the main broker of the energy

¹⁹ Gazprom Germania owns a 49.8% share in Wingas. The majority shareholder is Wintershall (BASF).

²⁰ Cf. e.g. „Elemente einer Rohstoffstrategie der Bundesregierung“, March 2007, p. 6.

agenda, is determined mainly by economic interests, or more specifically by the interests of German energy concerns.

With consideration for the above standard position of German companies on the Russian energy market and its specificities, in many cases German concerns take up a position that is close to or the same as a corresponding Russian point of view.²¹ Nevertheless, we can to a certain extent differentiate between the approaches of energy concerns that are active in the framework of the energy relations with Russia (BASF/Wintershall) and the approaches of those that are not (e.g. RWE) or that have specific problems with their deliveries from Russia (e.g. Deutsche BP). In the last two cases, there is a general pattern in which the inactive companies and companies with problems have a more critical view of their relations with Russia, but they communicate this view almost exclusively on the informal/nonpublic level.

A specificity of the Russian-German energy relations is the effort of the FRG to raise the energy efficiency in Russia. Besides gaining investment opportunities for the technologically developed sector of the FRG, the main motivation for this effort is that it indirectly increases the FRG's own energy security. As a result of Russia's energy savings, whose potential is enormous,²² a greater amount of oil and natural gas can be exported to the FRG or the EU via transit routes. This FRG policy toward Russia was institutionalized in the framework of the so-called Partnership for Modernization (2009) or the creation of a Russian-German energy agency (Rudea, 2009).

²¹ Some concrete examples of such views are the emphasis on Russia's innocence and the criticism of Ukraine in regard to the dispute between these two countries in January 2009; the basic rejection of state interventions from both the FRG and the EU in the FRG's energy relations with Russia; the intentional ambivalence in regard to the high degree of state monopolization of this sector in Russia, etc.

²² The potential of the savings in PES consumption until 2020 is estimated to be approx. 40-50% of today's PES consumption, that is, roughly twice the amount of energy that is contained in the current deliveries of natural gas to the EU (170-180 bcm). See S. Köhler's presentation, CEO DENA, 26. 5. 2009, DGAP, Berlin. At the same time, it is especially necessary to take into account the development of energy prices in Russia, as these determine the development of the domestic PES consumption.

In the last few years, there were certain conceptual changes in the German policy in the framework of the Russian-German relations in the area of energy security. Russia is still considered to be a strategic partner and a significant (although no longer 100% reliable) energy raw material supplier. Nevertheless, a greater emphasis is now placed on the diversification of sources, supplier countries and transportation routes. In the new Energy Concept of the Federal Government of September 2010, Russia is not mentioned at all, and natural gas and fossil energy sources generally do not play a particularly distinct role. The first reason for this trend is the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis and especially the Russian-Belorussian oil crisis – that is, the growing politicization of external energy relations. The second reason is the primary orientation toward renewable sources of energy, which took place in relation to climate protection, lowering the dependence on deliveries of energy carriers, and the movement away from nuclear energy use. The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis tested the German gas sector in its ability to effectively find substitutes when the energy deliveries from one source are suspended. However, reevaluating nuclear energy in relation to the catastrophe at the Japanese Fukushima nuclear power plant could lead to a strengthening of the significance of natural gas in the framework of the FRG's "energy mix", which would have a direct effect on the German-Russian energy relations.

The decline of natural gas prices on the spot market in relation to the economic recession of 2008-2009 and, among others, the development of gas mining from unconventional sources is another nonnegligible aspect that, in the last few months, led to a certain tension between German suppliers and Gazprom.²³ The long term contracts regarding deliveries of

²³ Some authors refer to this trend as a "new epoch in gas manufacturing". Cf. Deutsche Bank Research (2010), "Gas glut reaches Europe", Frankfurt am Main. As far as shaly gas is concerned, the first exploration tasks in regard to it are currently being carried out on German territory. Like Poland and Ukraine, the FRG is referred to as a country with pronounced supplies of this unconventional gas.

natural gas (LTC), which are an important pillar of the energy relations (in terms of the security of the deliveries or the certainty of sales and distribution) and whose price is determined on the basis of oil prices and thus does not reflect the falling prices on the market, are causing German concerns to incur pronounced losses. Since 2009, German importers of natural gas (E.ON, Wingas, VNG, RWE) have been making efforts to achieve a greater flexibilization of the LTC price mechanism. More specifically, they want to make it so that a substantial part of the price would be determined according to the prices on the spot market instead of the prices of oil. However, Gazprom (like the Norwegian company Statoil) refuses to accept greater changes in LTCs. In January 2010, it agreed only to a limited flexibilization of prices (between 10 and 20%).

In the framework of international organizations that have the FRG as a member and that deal with questions of energy policy/security, in our view, the most relevant organization of this sort is the EU (the G8/G20, NATO, OECD and IEF are some of the others). Even for the area of energy, the rule that “there is not a relevant common EU policy towards Russia without Germany” no doubt applies. Furthermore, the common external energy policy of the EU is just being gradually formed. The evaluation of the German policy in this regard is not unequivocal – in contrast to the strong emphasis on the common bilateral energy relations between the FRG and Russia under Chancellor Schröder, we can see a greater emphasis on multilateralism under Chancellor Merkel, especially after the Russian-Georgian conflict and the gas crises in 2005/2006 and 2009 (that is, the policy is now rather reactive in regard to these problems). However, under no circumstances does this indicate a devaluation of the bilateral relations with Russia, which is confirmed, for example, by the continual rigorous political support for the Nord Stream project, even if Germany is now more careful in its support, and its actions in this regard are more transparent to its partners and the EU. Another important aspect is the FRG’s consistent em-

phasis on the principle that the EU policy should not antagonize Russia, and this applies even to the efforts to diversify sources (e.g. the Nabucco process), which are naturally in direct contradiction to Russia’s geopolitical approach. This a priori inclusive approach towards Russia in the field of energy comes not only from the usual emphasis of Germany’s foreign policy on cooperation, dialogue and transparency, but also from the bilateral and multilateral context of the mutual relations: 1) the FRG is convinced that in the framework of the above standard relation, it has a certain influence on Russia, and this is one reason for why it tries to maintain good relations with Russia (here energy plays a special role); 2) the FRG is convinced that we need Russia for solving international and global problems (the fight against climate changes, security, etc.), and that is why we need to make efforts toward transparency and inclusiveness in regard to Russia.

In relation to the EU-27’s different interests in connection with Russia and their different levels of dependence on Russian oil and gas, we cannot say the FRG is holding back the EU energy policy towards Russia. Nevertheless, at the same time the FRG is not the initiator or “motor” of the policy either, even if the FRG’s greater involvement in the policy would be desirable, considering the FRG’s significance. The German approach is selective. For example, the FRG supports the export of EU legal norms to Russia, but it refuses to share information about natural gas contracts on the level of the EU-27. It is absolutely essential to maintain the German support for the formation of a single liberal energy market, but in the framework of this, several conflicts with Russia arise. A current study of the Centre for the Transformation of the Bundeswehr excellently summarizes the case of the bilateral Russian-German relations and the EU’s common policy towards Russia: “The foreign energy policy towards Russia, which equilibrates European and national interests, is also becoming more important. However, Moscow should have the option of trying for a different policy towards EU member states in case the threat of a worsening of Rus-

sia's bilateral relations with the FRG should prove real. At the same time, though, this course of action must not lead to Russia dividing Europe in questions of energy security to a greater extent than what would be necessary. The current strategy of supporting the interconnection (*Verflechtung*) at the level of firms/businesses is apparently still prospective, but it should be placed into a wider European context.”²⁴

The FRG is more restrained in regard to the question of the role of NATO in the area of energy security, a fact which most experts put into the context of the FRG's relations with Russia. That is why in 2007 the then Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs F.-W. Steinmeier negated the Polish proposal for the creation of a “NATO in the area of energy security” with the argument that what should be created instead is a “CSCE for energy security” (“a system of cooperative energy security”). Unlike the Polish concept, the German one would include Russia as a fully fledged partner.²⁵

The Formation of the German Policy towards Russia: Factors and Actors

What follows from the above findings is that German policy is affected by an imperative related to security, raw materials and economics that reflects the historically formed quasi-symbiotic relation. But the FRG's relations with Russia are increasingly faced with the critical test of a new kind of asymmetry: in every substantial area, the Russian policy returned to a traditional diplomacy based on geopolitics, national interests and the au-

tonomy of the centralistic modern nation state in international relations – see the key significance of the conception of “full sovereignty” and the principle of equality in Russian political thought.

The German Political Consensus in the Relation with Russia

Unlike in the case of Russia, the FRG's multilateralism and the anchorage of the German politics, economy, and society among the western democracies are among the bases of the FRG's social and political consensus. From the beginning of the 1990s, this German policy has substantially participated in the support of liberal and democratic forces and helped create the multilateral platform for the integration of Moscow into international structures on the intergovernmental level (NACC, G8, the NATO-Russia Council). The relation towards Russia was and is seen as the last logical step that should finish the process of uniting Europe.²⁶

Multilateralism also provides a “confidence building measure”: it guarantees that Germany will not seek its own individual path of strategic agreements with Russia to the detriment of its allies – a “new Rapallo”, “Alleingang” or “Sonderweg” of sorts. Until today, the German leaning towards multilateralism also expressed the belief that the development of the relations with Russia *demands* an effective multilateral framework, especially the strengthening of the ability to act of the EU and the multilateral participation of the U.S.

However, the German multilateralism does not prohibit the efforts to sustain the comparative advantage of bilateral relations with Russia, e.g., in the area of energy; that is why at least at the present time the German policy supports the preservation of the energy policy in the competences of the German national government. This becomes a politically relevant topic

²⁴ Zentrum für Transformation der Bundeswehr (2010), pp. 78-79.

²⁵ See Oliver Geden – Andreas Goldthau – Timo Noetzel (2007) „Energie NATO und Energie KSZE – Instrumente der Energiesicherheit?“, SWP-Diskussionspapier, Mai 2007, Berlin. Cf. also Frank-Walter Steinmeier (2006) „Energie-Aussenpolitik ist Friedenspolitik“, *Handelsblatt*, 23. 6. 2006 and Johannes Varvick(2008) „Die Militärische Sicherung von Energie“, *Internationale Politik*, 3/2008, pp. 50-55.

²⁶ Interview with Volker Weichsel at the editor's office of *Osteuropa*, 25. 5. 2009, Berlin.

in a situation where both the EU and the FRG are relatively weakened. The FRG does not have an alternative to supporting European integration. However, the attractiveness that the EU loses in the eyes of the FRG if Lisbon Treaty does not operate effectively means that the FRG will strengthen its independent policy like some other EU member states – according to some views, the FRG is thus moving closer to the conceptions of national interests and priorities that are commonly applied in British or French politics (and it is “falling into” these conceptions rather than intentionally moving closer to them).²⁷

The Differences in the Approaches in the Policy towards Russia

If we simplify the situation to a certain extent, we could define several basic approaches to Russia in the German policy. They differ in the degree to which they are open to and willing to oblige Russia, and especially in the manner in which they react to the developments in Russia's interior policy and the progress in its foreign policy. They also differ in the settings of their so-called *red lines*, that is, the limits to how far Russia can go without causing a substantial change in the German policy. But on a general level, what is considered a red line in Russian policy is along the lines of an openly fascist government coming into power in Moscow (in the words of E. Bahr, “a new October Revolution”²⁸) or an act of direct unprovoked aggression against a neighbour or possibly other countries.

A few general conditions apply here. First, the individual approaches can be differentiated only very conditionally, and individual actors, in their approaches, often cross the boundaries between them in both directions. Second, actors who present themselves in a relatively radical way on the

grounds of the Parliament often move in the direction of the “mainstream” after their entry into a governmental position (for example the then Minister of Defence zu Gutenberg). What is especially evident, though, is that the relations toward Russia are a part of a much more significant agenda in which individual actors define their views on the more general question of the direction of the German foreign policy at the beginning of the 21st century, including the relations with the U.S. and the EU and the conception of the FRG's national interests. Thus, the German politics are currently going through a debate that, according to some experts, reminds one of the 1960s, when there was a sharp division between two extreme positions – that of the “Gaullists” (or should we rather say “Putinists” today?) and that of the Atlantists.

The “Pro-Russian” (Gaullist/Putinist) Orientation

The goal of this approach is the fullest possible integration (*Einbindung*) of Russia into the economic and (gradually) the political space of the EU; this involves the FRG and Russia growing closer through a tight interconnectedness in the hope that Russia will undergo a “change through closer relations” (*Wandel durch Annäherung*). Closer relations are also promoted in foreign policy – even in opposition to the U.S. (namely in reaction to the policies of G. W. Bush). Criticism of the shortcomings of democratic standards and the legal state in Russia is acceptable as a part of the wider unofficial debate, but it is relativized by pointing out the shortcomings of western democracies and their policies.

The motivation for this view is in both interests (especially economic interests) and the tendency to be open and obliging toward Russia (which is based on history and values) and, as a rule, likewise toward its concrete representatives, especially Vladimir Putin. The distance from the U.S. is also significant. It is connected with both a rejection of G. Bush's policies

²⁷ Joschka Fischer (2009) „Germany's drift from Europe“. *Guardian*, Juni 1, 2009.

²⁸ Interview with Egon Bahr, 20.5. 2009, Berlin.

and traditional elements of anti-Americanism in general. It comes out of the presupposition that Germany/EU will get a strategic chance to create a single economic space with Russia. This space would then play a unique role in the globalized world. This chance is seen as temporally limited: if Germany (and other EU countries) do not become Russia's real strategic partners within a given amount of time, Moscow will reorient itself towards China.

The Strategic/Pragmatic Approach

The pro-Russian position steadily crosses over into the strategic/pragmatic approach towards Russia. This approach emphasizes the engagement (*Anbindung*) of Russia in the bilateral and multilateral ties in the West. Its supporters hope that Russia will be modernized, that its legal state will be built and that there will be a gradual democratization of the country under the direction of President Medvedev, whose position was perceived as "wholly independent" (*durchaus eigenständig*).²⁹ In contrast to the pro-Russian position, this approach is not uncritical towards Russia, but essentially it does not publicly voice its reservations: like the former *Ostpolitik*, it is based in the Realpolitik presupposition that a country must work with its partners while accepting that the partners will be the way they will be. Thus, the main goal is considered to be a nonaggressive export of norms and institutions to Russia through cooperation and a faith in "(Russia's) change through closer relations". In foreign policy, this approach builds on cooperation and the two countries growing closer, but not to the detriment of Germany's ties to its western partners.

The main motivation of the supporters of the strategic approach comes from economic and security interests. But the "change through closer rela-

tions" is also aimed towards the traditional goal of modernizing and stabilizing Russia like Germany's geographical neighbourhood. In the area of foreign policy, according to some views, the development of the relations with Russia (a sort of "special competence of Germany") is a reaction to the insufficient effectiveness of the EU's foreign policy.

The Europeanization Approach

The main content of this approach is an agreement with inclusive politics (*Anbindung, engagement*). Its main differentiating element is its greater emphasis on democratic values and the readiness to publicly criticize Russia's foreign policy and the development of interior politics. It involves a more offensive effort to achieve Europeanization (offering the democratic and legal standards of the EU). This approach in turn criticizes the strategic approach to Russia on the grounds that it is too pragmatic and weighed down by the efforts to avoid provoking the Russian partner. The supporters of the Europeanization approach agree with the negotiations over President Medvedev's proposal for European security, but they believe that it is unacceptable to exclude questions of human rights from the negotiations, for if Russia's civic society does not develop, Russia will not be democratic or internally stable.

Beside the interest of Germany and the western community in cooperation with Russia and its modernization, what is also involved in this approach is the coherence of the FRG's policy as a policy of *soft power*, including the persuasive emphasis on democratic values and principles.

The Atlantic Approach

Supporters of Atlanticism perceive Russia and its policies as a risk or possibly even as a threat. Although they support the multilateral cooperation

²⁹ Erler, *Mission Weltfrieden*, p. 146.

with Russia and think that Russia should not be isolated, they connect any openness toward it or any willingness to oblige it with conditions. They do not avoid elements of containing (*Eindämmung*) Russia in those places where they judge its policies to be overly expansive. They also openly criticize the Russian interior or foreign policy whenever it is perceived as violating democratic principles or implying efforts to revise the conditions that came with the end of the Cold War.

The motivation for the Atlantic approach comes from the feeling of opposition to the revisionist tendency to make efforts towards the maximal possible “renewal of the USSR” with the use of power levers and economic levers in Russian politics. In contrast, the goal of Atlantists is to gradually disseminate Euro-Atlantic structures into this space – even into Ukraine and Georgia. A defensive anti-Russian reflex connected with the Cold War is also expressed here.

To a significant degree, the FRG’s media and public share a distinctly critical view of Russian politics, and they remain very distant from the FRG government’s primarily cooperative and inclusive policy towards Russia.

Summary and Recommendations

The General Political Level

The German-Russian relations currently find themselves in a *post-Bismarck era* of sorts, and the FRG sees Moscow as an absolutely indispensable partner. However, in contrast to the end of the 19th century, Berlin is trying to arrange a functional interlacing not only between Russia and Germany, but also between Russia and NATO/EU. “

The conception of the “*strategic partnership*” with Russia involves an ambitious etiquette for cooperation that even has a European dimension. It can be understood as an attempt to build a practically oriented *security partnership* (solving the problems of the international security agenda) and an *energy partnership* (the reliability/prospectiveness of deliveries of energy raw materials), and to export German/European norms and technologies in the framework of a so-called *modernization partnership*. In all these areas, Germany acts primarily as a *civilian power* (in its emphasis on prevention and political, legal and economic instruments) but also as a *soft power* (in putting across the economic, political and cultural attractiveness of Germany and its model).

However, an essential difference from Bismarck’s relation with Russia lies in the character of the German policy and of international relations – or at least the international relations of the Western Hemisphere. The base of the FRG’s policy remains in multilateralism, and the policy is anchored mainly in the alliances with the U.S./NATO and in the framework of the EU. Since the middle of the 1990s, the FRG has been moving away from an automatic/fundamental and “exaggerated” multilateralism in the direction of pragmatic, instrumental approaches; Germany rehabilitated the conception of national interest. Nevertheless, the FRG’s approach to the Lisbon Treaty and the EMU up to this point confirms that from the perspective of Germany, the *German-Russian symbiotic relation* has a *multilateral base* in western institutions.

However, some factors could threaten this base of the German policy towards Russia:

– The EU’s low functionality (especially its procrastination in the matter of the Lisbon Treaty coming into effect) makes the EU rather unattractive for the German policy; the impulses to place a greater emphasis on each country’s individual ability to act and participation are thus growing stronger.

- The absence of a functional energy policy in the EU. Actually, Germany is not particularly active in promoting an EU energy policy, but after the gas crisis in January 2009, it is not expected that Germany would actively try to block the creation of such a policy.
- The implications that the U.S. could move towards the creation of a “strategic condominium” in its relations with Russia.³⁰
- The scepticism toward and the obstructions to multilateral cooperation on the part of Russia.

On the other hand, the multilateral dimension is strengthened by the fact that the German policy towards Russia reached its limits during the conflict in Georgia, over the course of the January 2009 gas crisis and during the efforts of the EU to raise the quality of the relations with the countries that lie between itself and Russia.

The relations with Russia thus unavoidably pose a significant challenge to the FRG’s policy, which is a part of the more general German debate about the new role of the country in international relations. It is being decided whether Germany will be both willing and able to take up a leadership role in the EU in regard to the relations with Russia (so far, it has mostly stayed “at the end of the EU peloton”). By doing so, it would strengthen not only its own role, but the influence and ability to act of the EU as a whole. By taking this step, Germany could even significantly support the U.S. efforts to “reset” the relations with Russia and thus renew them on a new basis. An alternative path to this development is one in which the FRG would slide into a purposeful bilateralism in its cooperation with not only Russia but also the U.S. and other big states, the idea of a European “directorate of

three” would be renewed and a stronger accent would be placed on national interests – with predictable results for the cohesion of the EU and the position of small states in it. Furthermore, if the multilaterally anchored German policy towards Russia takes into account basic principles and values, a crossing over to exclusively bilateral relations would apparently mean its further pragmatization.

The German policy has this choice independently of the parliamentary elections of September 2009. Their results by themselves will not change the German policy towards Russia in any significant way. A coalition between the SPD and the Linke party is out of the question at the federal level. All conceivable coalition constellations include supporters of both the Europeanization approach and the strategic approach towards Russia. These two sides will then balance each other out via mutual compromises. The search for an effective foreign policy not only towards Russia will further continue.

Thus, to create a successful European policy, it is important that we deepen our knowledge of the German policy not only on the level of the German policy as a whole but also on the levels of individual actors, approaches and currents, and utilize the German institutional pluralism (the roles of German Länder, individual government departments, etc.). It is also important to develop a dialogue with individual German actors and for both sides of the dialogue to share each other’s European “know how” when it comes to the situation in Russia and the countries of the former USSR. The aim should be to participate at the German discourse and strengthen the multilateral context of the German policy.

To form a common policy, it is necessary to present well prepared proposals for cooperation with Russia to German (and other European) partners. Our experiences show that well prepared actors have a high chance of receiving support from the German side; reactive policies on the national

³⁰ Nikola Hynek – Vít Střítecký – Vladimír Handl – Michal Kořan (2009) “The U.S.-Russian ‘Reset’: Implications For Central-Eastern Europe And Germany”. *European Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2009, pp. 263-285.

and European levels do not correspond to the significance that the German policy attributes to relations with Russia.

A high priority interest of the European policy is, on the one hand, to obstruct Germany's possible tendencies to return to its own individual path (*Alleingang*) in its relations with Russia (and generally in its relations with larger states such as China) and, on the other hand, to strengthen the anchorage and realization of the German policy in the framework of the EU. Thus it appears to be important to support the German inclusive policy towards Russia and to clearly define the "boundaries for what is acceptable" when it comes to Moscow's attitudes. A point of intersection for the generally European unifying approaches could be a single unified policy towards Russia (*hard-headed engagement*)³¹ which would connect elements of integrating Russia into any institutions and programmes that would give it the opportunity for integration; convincing Russia about the closeness of values and interests, and the added value of multilateralism; and, in cases where it would be necessary, restraining Russia when it would cross the clearly defined "boundaries for what is acceptable" (especially when it would use force and coercion against the countries that lie between the EU and Russia).

It is also necessary to strengthen the EU and NATO's ability to act – even when considering the dynamic new U.S. policy towards Russia. This would reduce the probability of a sort of German-Russian post-Bismarckian bilateralism.

But mainly and above all, it is necessary to advocate, through the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and other steps, the strengthening of the functionality of the EU as a political actor. Also for Germany the EU has to be a part of the solution, not of the problem in relations with Russia.

³¹ FCO experts brought a proposal for *hard-headed engagement* with a slightly different structure to the debate. See the interview of 28. 5. 2009, London.

Die Zukunft der Östlichen Partnerschaft aus deutscher Sicht³²

(Mai 2010)

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Die Östliche Partnerschaft wurde auf polnisch-schwedischen Vorschlag als EU-Strategie vom EU-Rat am 28. Mai 2008 verabschiedet und beim Gründungs-Gipfel am 7. Mai 2009 in Prag bestätigt. Das Ziel der Östlichen-Partnerschaft war die konzeptionelle Neugestaltung der Beziehungen der erweiterten EU zu ihren östlichen Nachbarstaaten. Noch während der Ausarbeitung der Strategie brach im August 2008 der Georgien-Krieg aus und veränderte die Rahmenbedingung der gesamten Ostpolitik der EU. Im Januar 2009 stoppte Russland die Gaslieferungen an die Ukraine und hat auf diese Weise die Beziehungen zu der EU eingefroren. Entsprechend reagierte die EU mit dem Prager Gipfel zur Östlichen Partnerschaft. Im folgenden Jahr hat sich allerdings die Lage vollständig geändert – die Beziehungen zu Russland verbessern sich langsam aber stetig. In der Ukraine ist ein Präsident in demokratischen Wahlen gewählt worden, der einige Monate nach der Wahl mit Russland einen Vertrag abgeschlossen hat, der

³² Der Text wurde zuerst als Studie der Bertelsmann Stiftung 2010 veröffentlicht. URL: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-6FE84B1D-07934593/bst/xcms_bst_dms_31394_31395_2.pdf.

eine stärkere Anbindung an Moskau zu Folge haben wird. In allen anderen Nachbarstaaten mit Ausnahme Moldaus zeichnen sich keine Schritte ab, welche auf eine verstärkte Annäherung an die EU hindeuten würden. Unter diesen Umständen stellt sich die Frage, welchen Stellenwert die Östliche Partnerschaft in der künftigen Außenpolitik der EU annehmen wird.

Verabschiedung der Östlichen Partnerschaft

Die Östliche Partnerschaft, die finanziell nur mit 600 Millionen Euro ausgestattet ist, soll die reformorientierten Länder im Osten Europas in ihren Reformen Richtung Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft unterstützen. Sie war auch ein Preis für die Akzeptanz der Mittelmeer-Union, die vom französischen Präsidenten Sarkozy am 13.7.2008 in Paris ins Leben gerufen wurde. Der schwedisch-polnische Vorschlag sah eine Verstärkung der Kooperation mit den östlichen Nachbarstaaten vor, die auf der bisherigen Strategie der EU-Nachbarschaftspolitik aufbaute und darüber hinausging.³³

Die Östliche Partnerschaft sieht sogar langfristig eine Möglichkeit der Abschaffung der Visumpflicht vor. Dies ist seit dem Schengen-Beitritt der mitteleuropäischen Staaten im Dezember 2007 eins der symbolträchtigsten Probleme an der Ostgrenze der EU. Außerdem wird die Einsetzung eines „multilateralen Gremiums“ vorgeschlagen, um Streitfragen und den Verlauf von Grenzen zu diskutieren. Sie beinhaltet die Option für ein Engagement der EU in innerstaatlichen Konflikten im Kaukasus. Schließlich sieht der Vorschlag eine Reihe von Kooperationsfeldern wie: Demokratieförderung, Unterstützung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Verhinderung von Migration(???), Belebung des Handels und des Tourismus, Verbesserung

³³ Kai-Olaf Lang (2008). „Eine Partnerschaft für den Osten“, SWP-Aktuell (Nr. 66/Juli). URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5163

der Verkehrsanbindungen, Kooperation im Umweltbereich und Studentenaustausch vor. Hinzu kommen Sondermaßnahmen für Belarus, die unter Umgehung der staatlichen Kontrollorgane sich direkt an belarussische Staatsbürger richten. Auch Russland wird eingeladen, sich an einzelnen Projekten zu beteiligen.³⁴

Die Östliche Partnerschaft ist mit der Zentralasien-Strategie kompatibel, die während der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft 2007 verabschiedet wurde und bildet mit dem Mandat für Neuverhandlungen des Partnerschafts- und Kooperationsabkommens mit Russland die Konturen der Neuen Ostpolitik der EU.³⁵

Drahtseilakt der deutschen Ostpolitik

Bevor die Strategie der Östlichen Partnerschaft in der EU verabschiedet wurde, sind einige Entscheidungen in der EU getroffen worden die näher erläutert werden sollten um die Zusammenhänge besser nachvollziehen zu können:

Die Reaktionen in Deutschland auf den Vorschlag des französischen Präsidenten Sarkozy zur Gründung einer Mittelmeer-Union waren sehr verhalten. Der französische Vorstoß wurde indirekt mit einer Rede des Außenministers Steinmeier am 4.3.2008 zur europäischen Ostpolitik beantwortet.³⁶

³⁴ „Die Östliche Partnerschaft – ein neues Kapitel in den Beziehungen der EU zu ihren östlichen Nachbarn“, Europa, Press Releases, December 3, 2008. URL: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1858&format=HTML&aged=0&language=DE&guiLanguage=en>

³⁵ Cornelius Ochmann (2009). „Im Osten was Neues“, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Spotlight Europe (Nr. 2009/06). URL: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-5047C3D3-4D7E8F0/bst/Deutsch_spotlight_Im%20Osten%20was%20Neues_09-05-28.pdf. Cf. Also Joachom Fritz-Vannahme – Armando García Schmidt – Margarethe Gawelek – Christian-Peter Hanelt – Cornelius Ochmann (2008). „Hallo Nachbar! Für eine neue EU-Politik von Marokko bis Aserbaidschan, Bertelsmann Stiftung“, Spotlight Europe (2008/07). URL: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-165E5E1E-2055C247/bst/spotlight_Nachbar_07_2008_.pdf

³⁶ Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Rede bei der Willy-Brandt-Stiftung, März 4, 2008 in Berlin. URL: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080304-BM-Ostpolitik.html>

Allerdings stand die Russlandpolitik im Vordergrund des Vorschlages von Steinmeier, der an die Ostpolitik von Willi Brandt anknüpfte. Der Architekt der Brandtschen Ostpolitik Egon Bahr betonte mehrmals die Verbindung zwischen der deutschen Ostpolitik der 60-er und 70-er Jahre und der EU-Ostpolitik – „Annäherung durch Wandel“ sollte von der „Annäherung durch Verflechtung“ abgelöst werden. Zum damaligen Zeitpunkt war Steinmeier Außenminister der großen Koalition CDU/CSU – SPD und Kanzlerkandidat der SPD im Wartestand. Sein Vorschlag zur Gestaltung der Europäischen Ostpolitik spielte jedoch keine Rolle im Wahlkampf. Die Mehrheit der politischen Elite in Berlin nahm ihn wohlwollend auf.

Während eines privaten Besuches beim polnischen Außenminister Sikorski Anfang April 2008 wurde Steinmeier mit den polnischen Plänen für eine Östliche Partnerschaft konfrontiert. Einen Monat nach seiner programmatischen Rede zur Europäischen Ostpolitik war er jedoch nicht bereit, den polnischen Vorschlag mit zu tragen. Steinmeier stellte die Beziehungen zu Russland in den Vordergrund und sah in dem polnischen Vorschlag eher eine Gefahr für die deutschen Interessen in Russland. „Wir haben während unserer Präsidentschaft eine EU-Strategie für diese Region entwickelt, die ein breites Spektrum der Zusammenarbeit eröffnet: Energiepartnerschaft, Ausbau der Handelsbeziehungen, gemeinsamer Kampf gegen Drogen und Terrorismus, Förderung rechtsstaatlicher Strukturen, Bildung und Ausbildung, effektive Nutzung der Wasserressourcen.“ so Steinmeier in seiner programmatischen Rede und „Eine moderne europäische Ostpolitik – das heißt heute: Heranführung der Ukraine an die EU, Partnerschaft mit Russland, Demokratisierung von Belarus, Kooperation mit Zentralasien und ein gedeihliches Miteinander am Schwarzen Meer und im Kaukasus. Das heißt auch: Enge Zusammenarbeit mit den USA und unseren anderen Verbündeten, um diese gemeinsamen Ziele zu verwirklichen. Das heißt vor allem: Ein gemeinsamer Raum des Friedens und

des Wohlstands von der Atlantikküste bis nach Sibirien oder, noch weiter gefasst: von Vancouver bis nach Wladiwostok.“³⁷

Die Fokussierung auf Russland konnte jedoch von den Befürwortern einer aktiveren Nachbarschaftspolitik nicht unbeantwortet bleiben. Es sind vor allem Politiker der CDU und der Grünen, die neben Russland auch andere Staaten unter dem Begriff „Europäische Ostpolitik“ erfassen. Die wichtigste unter Ihnen ist die Bundeskanzlerin selbst, die als einzige Vertreterin der europäischen „Schwergewichte“ beim Prager Gipfel anwesend war. „Die Östliche Partnerschaft ist ein Projekt, dass dem Frieden, der Entwicklung und dem Austausch dient“, definierte Bundeskanzlerin Merkel die neue Strategie der EU für die Nachbarstaaten im Osten Europas.³⁸

Im Bundestag selbst hat die Östliche Partnerschaft eine starke Unterstützung erhalten. „EU-Ostpartnerschaft ist keine Ersatz-Mitgliedschaft“ betonte Ruprecht Polenz, Vorsitzender des Auswärtigen Ausschusses im Bundestag am 30. 4. 2009.³⁹

Parallel dazu änderte sich die Wahrnehmung Russlands in Deutschland. Die Auswertung der Medienspiegels beweist, dass im Laufe der letzten Jahre die Sicht auf die Transformationsprozesse im Osten Europas vielschichtiger geworden ist. Dies verändert auch die Sicht der Politik auf Russland und den postsowjetischen Raum. Anfang der neunziger Jahre trat Präsident Putin noch im Bundestag auf, heute überwiegt eine kritische Betrachtungsweise seiner Präsidentschaft, wie die Rede des Koordinators für deutsch-russische Beziehungen Andreas Schockenhoff zeigt.⁴⁰

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ „EU gibt grünes Licht für Östliche Partnerschaft“, Die Bundeskanzlerin, Mai 7, 2009. URL: http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/nn_700276/Content/DE/Artikel/2009/05/2009-05-07-eu-oestliche-partnerschaft.html.

³⁹ „EU-Partnerschaft ist keine Ersatz-Mitgliedschaft“, Deutsche Welle, Fokus Ost-Südost, April 30, 2009. URL: <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4219286,00.html>

⁴⁰ Andreas Schockenhoff, Rede, 2009. URL: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2009/090121-SchockenhoffKAS.html>.

Nach der Bundestagswahl im September 2009 übernahm die FDP mit Guido Westerwelle das Auswärtige Amt. Bisher ist er nicht als großer Befürworter der Östlichen Partnerschaft aufgefallen, allerdings haben sich andere Parteimitglieder und Anhänger zu diesem Thema positiv geäußert.⁴¹

Auf der anderen Seite kann die Politik – und vor allem das Bundeskanzleramt – die klaren Interessen der deutschen Wirtschaft, die vom Ostausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft deutlich vertreten wird, nicht außer Acht lassen. Russland ist einer der wichtigsten Absatzmärkte für die deutsche Industrie, insbesondere die Automobil- und Maschinenindustrie. Im besten Jahr 2008 erreichte der Warenaustausch mit Russland über 68 Mrd. €, und der gesamte Osthandel Deutschlands 84 Mrd. €. Schon heute werden 50 Prozent des russischen Handels mit der EU abgewickelt. 80 Prozent der russischen Energieexporte gehen in die EU. Und über 75 Prozent der ausländischen Investitionen kommen aus der EU. Deutschland liegt bei den russischen Exporten und Importen an der ersten Stelle.⁴²

Strategiewechsel nach dem Georgien-Krieg

Die Politik Deutschlands gegenüber den Nachbarstaaten im Osten hat zwei Ebenen. Einerseits bemüht sich die Bundesregierung um gute Beziehungen mit Russland, d.h. eine Neuauflage des Partnerschaft- und Kooperationsabkommens (PKA) zwischen der EU und Russland. Andererseits wurden die Beziehungen zu den anderen Nachbarstaaten in der Strategie der Östlichen

Partnerschaft der EU neu definiert. Bei der Gestaltung beider Richtungen der Europäischen Ostpolitik spielt neben der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Polen eine Schlüsselrolle, nicht nur wegen der inhaltlichen Kompetenz und staatlichen Ressourcen die dafür aufgewandt werden, aber auch wegen des Konsenses in der politischen Elite des Landes, den es in dieser wichtigen Frage des Politik gibt. Sowohl bei der Verschiebung der Verhandlungen um ein neues PKA mit Russland Ende 2006 als auch bei der Gestaltung der Östlichen Partnerschaft 2008 ist dies deutlich zum Ausdruck gekommen.

Eine gewisse „Arbeitsteilung“ bei der Gestaltung der EU-Ostpolitik war ein wichtiges Signal für die Wiederbelebung der deutsch-polnischen Kooperation. Nach dem Regierungswechsel in Warschau im Herbst 2007 entspannte sich die Lage in den bilateralen Beziehungen und gerade Radek Sikorski stand nicht im Verdacht pro-deutsche Politik zu verfolgen. Nach den historisch kontroversen Themen konnte die Zuwendung zum Thema Ostpolitik die Kooperation beleben. Hinzu kam die Tatsache, dass es Polen gelungen ist, trotz der deutschen Zurückhaltung, die schwedische Diplomatie für die Östliche Partnerschaft zu gewinnen und auf diese Weise den Gegensatz alte- neue Mitglieder in der EU zu überwinden. Als dann noch die Polen halfen, die Litauer zu überzeugen die Blockade des Verhandlungsmandates für PKA mit Russland auf zu geben, war der Deal perfekt – Gegenbalance zur Mittelmeer-Union einerseits und ein Mandat für die EU-Kommission für die PKA Verhandlungen mit Russland andererseits. Die EU-Außenminister konnten am 26.4.2008 den Vorschlag Polens für die Östliche Partnerschaft annehmen und die EU-Kommission beauftragen die Verhandlungen mit Russland über ein neues Partnerschafts- und Kooperationsabkommen auf zu nehmen.⁴³

⁴¹ „Liberalen Positionen zur Östlichen Partnerschaft“, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit, 2009. URL: http://www.freiheit.org/webcom/show_article.php?wc_c=617&wc_id=15024&wc_p=1. Cf. also Harald Leibrecht (2009). Überholt in zweifacher Bedeutung – Russlands Widerstand gegen die „Östliche Partnerschaft“, Blog der FDP-Bundestagsfraktion, Mai 7, 2009. URL: <http://fdpbundestagsfraktion.wordpress.com/tag/russland/>.

⁴² „Deutscher Handel mit Mittel- und Osteuropa“, Ostausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft, 2009. URL: http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/sites/default/files/pm_pdf/26_02_2009_pm_handel_uebersicht.pdf

⁴³ Piotr Buras – Fraser Cameron – Cornelius Ochmann – Andrei Zagorski (2008). „Neues im Osten: Erwartungen an ein EU-Russland-Abkommen“, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Spotlight Europe (Nr. 2008/07). URL: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-BB5EDB1A-618725F3/bst/Deutsch_spotlight_EU-Russland_10%2007%2008_v2.pdf.

Teile der deutschen Diplomatie waren nach dem Ausbruch des Georgien-Krieges am 8.8.2008 völlig schockiert. Steinmeiers Reise in den Nord-Kaukasus im Juni 2008 war der letzte Versuch, dort präventiv einzugreifen. Ende August, nach der Einstellung der militärischen Handlungen in Georgien herrschte eine konzeptionelle Leere in Berlin, aber auch in Brüssel. Sowohl die Kanzlerin als auch der Außenminister waren sich einig, dass ein klares Signal an Russland und die Nachbarstaaten nötig war. Auf diese Weise ist der polnisch-schwedische Vorschlag mit Dankbarkeit aufgenommen worden und konnte entsprechend im Sinne der Verfasser ausgestaltet werden. Beim EU-Sondergipfel am 1.9.2008 wurde die Bewertung der Östlichen Partnerschaft entsprechend gewürdigt.⁴⁴

Infolge des Georgien-Krieges hat sich die Position der EU geändert und die Union wurde global gestärkt. Zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte hat die EU die Rolle des Mediators zwischen Russland und einem Nachfolgestaat der Sowjetunion übernommen. Russland musste es akzeptieren obwohl es Versuche gab, Sarkozy „nur“ als französischen Präsidenten zu „degradieren“ und nicht als EU-Präsidenten zu empfangen. Die Rolle von Sarkozy war sehr wichtig, allerdings ist dies eine riesige Herausforderung für die EU, der sie leider noch nicht gewachsen ist. Dies zeigte die Entwicklung in den Monaten nach der Einstellung der militärischen Handlungen in Georgien. Der gegenwärtige Zustand in den Konfliktgebieten beweist, dass die EU nicht fähig war die Bedingungen des Waffenstillstandes zu exekutieren. Bis heute haben die Vertreter der EUNN-Mission keinen Zugang zu Abchasien und Süd-Ossetien.

Strategieänderung in Moskau

Die Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und Russland entwickelten sich seit der EU-Erweiterung im Jahre 2004 in allen Bereichen negativ. Nur die größten Optimisten konnten sie als partnerschaftlich bezeichnen. Der Verlauf und Ausgang der orangenen Revolution in Kiew hat in Moskau zu panischen Reaktionen geführt. Die EU wurde in den Augen der russischen Elite zum ideologischen Feind, der im Namen von Demokratie ihre Einflussphäre ausweitet. Der Energiebereich ist zu einem Konfliktthema geworden, obwohl die Interessen beider Seiten kompatibel sind. Die Unterbrechung von Gaslieferungen im Januar 2005 und insbesondere im Januar 2009 hat das Image Russlands als zuverlässigen Partner zerstört. Dies wurde zunächst in Moskau unterschätzt. Es hat sich selbst unkritisch als ein wachsendes Machtzentrum im postsowjetischen Raum definiert. Selbst nach dem Beginn der Wirtschaftskrise machte sich Moskau keine Gedanken über die Folgen einer Reduzierung der Gaslieferungen im Winter 2009. Dies war der strategische Fehler Russlands. Die Krise veränderte das Kräfteverhältnis grundlegend. Angesichts des schrumpfenden Exports nach Russland reduzierte sich der Druck der exportierenden Wirtschaft auf ihre Regierungen, gute Beziehungen nach Russland zu sichern. Mit der Annahme des dritten Energie-Pakets im April 2009 durch die EU wurden praktisch die Hoffnungen von Gazprom zerstört, an den europäischen Endabnehmer direkt heranzukommen. Der Krieg in Georgien wiederum hat die Aussichten vernichtet, einen gemeinsamen Sicherheitsraum herzustellen. Insofern ist es kaum verwunderlich, dass Moskaus Entwurf einer neuen europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur keinen Enthusiasmus in Europa hervorgerufen hat. Auf beiden Seiten gibt es auch keine positive Entwicklung bei der Abschaffung der Visapflicht, es fehlt das gegenseitige Vertrauen.

⁴⁴ Auswärtiges Amt, Länderinformationen Georgien. URL: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laenderinformationen/Georgien/Aktuell/080901-ratsschlussfolgerungen.pdf>

In Moskau wurde der Brüssels Kurs immer intensiver beobachtet. Zunächst versetzte Sarkozy die politische Elite in Moskau in einen Schock im August 2008 als er darauf bestanden hatte als EU Präsident im Georgien-Konflikt zu vermitteln. Mit der Verabschiedung der Östlichen Partnerschaft wurde Moskau zum wiederholten Mal überrascht, weil es davon ausgegangen ist, dass die Schwerpunkte der EU-Ostpolitik im postsowjetischen Raum neu gesetzt werden. Die russische Elite war zu stark auf das Angebot Steinmeiers fokussiert und unterschätzte völlig die polnisch-schwedische Initiative. Die EU wird von Teilen der russischen Elite bis heute als Papiertiger angesehen, weil sie die Funktionsweise von Brüssel nicht versteht. Moskau hat im Frühjahr 2009 allerdings verstanden, dass die Russlandpolitik der EU nicht nur von Deutschland bestimmt wird und Polen nach fünfjähriger EU-Mitgliedschaft immer mehr Einfluss in der EU gewinnt. Dies war unter anderem einer der Gründe warum Premierminister Putin sich entschieden hat nach Westerplatte zu fahren und einen Ausgleich mit Polen zu suchen. Russland ist heute stärker an einer Partnerschaft mit der EU interessiert als umgekehrt. Und zwar nicht nur wegen der Wirtschaftsreformen, sondern auch angesichts der fortschreitenden Globalisierung, die Russland vor völlig neue geopolitische Herausforderungen stellt.⁴⁵

Umsetzung der Östlichen Partnerschaft in der EU und den Partnerstaaten

Der EU-Gipfel am 7.5.2009 verabschiedete die Östliche Partnerschaft. Von Anfang an wurde er jedoch mit dem EU-Gipfel für das Mittelmeer

⁴⁵ Cornelius Ochmann (2009). „Im Osten was Neues“, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Spotlight Europe (Nr. 2009/06). URL: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-5047C3D3-4D7E8F0/bst/Deutsch_spotlight_Im%20Osten%20was%20Neues_09-05-28.pdf

verglichen, der am 13.7.2008 in Paris stattgefunden hat. Es fällt sofort auf, dass in Prag die politische Vertretung der EU-Staaten sehr mager ausgefallen ist. Von den wichtigen Staats- und Regierungschefs war nur Bundeskanzlerin Merkel angereist. Frankreich, Großbritannien, Italien oder Spanien ließen sich auf einer niedrigeren Ebene vertreten.⁴⁶

Nach dem EU-Gipfel im Prag ist es gelungen, eine Reihe von Schritten zu unternehmen, welche der Östlichen Partnerschaft ein konkretes Gesicht verleihen. Zunächst ist in der EU-Kommission gelungen die Rahmenbedingungen für die Finanzierung fest zu legen.⁴⁷

Im nächsten Schritt konstituierte sich das zivilgesellschaftliche Forum, welches die Aktivitäten der Zivilgesellschaft in den Partnerstaaten koordiniert. Ein erstes Treffen fand dann im November 2009 in Brüssel statt.⁴⁸

Auf diesem Feld liegt eine große Chance für die Östliche Partnerschaft der EU – weg von der großen Politik zum einzelnen Bürger. Da es sich um eine Region handelt, die sicherlich in den nächsten Jahrzehnten nicht der EU beitreten wird, ist die gesellschaftliche Dimension das Wichtigste in dieser Strategie. Es muss hier um eine langfristige Einbindung der Staaten der östlichen Partnerschaft in paneuropäische Projekte, Diskussionen und Prozesse gehen. Es handelt sich dabei um einen langfristigen Prozess und die Östliche Partnerschaft soll den Menschen vermitteln, dass Sie der europäischen Familie angehören, wenn auch ohne Mitgliedschaft in der EU.

In den Partnerstaaten entwickelte sich die Lage nach der Verabschiedung der Östlichen Partnerschaft negativ. Zunächst erwies die Ukraine der neu-

⁴⁶ „Gemeinsame Erklärung des Prager Gipfeltreffens zur Östlichen Partnerschaft, Rat der Europäischen Union, Mai 7, 2009. URL: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/de/09/st08/st08435.de09.pdf>.

⁴⁷ „Vademecum on Financing in the Frame of the Eastern Partnership“, Directorate European Neighbourhood Policy, European Commission, December 16, 2009. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/docs/eap_vademecum_14122009_en.pdf

⁴⁸ „Eastern Partnership“, European External Action Service, European Union, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/index_en.htm

en EU-Strategie einen Bärendienst, indem sie noch vor dem Prager Gipfel selbst die Strategie heftig kritisierte und ablehnte. Die EU konnte der Ukraine zum damaligen Zeitpunkt leider nicht mehr anbieten. In Berlin wurde die kritische Haltung der Ukraine zu Ungunsten Warschaus ausgelegt. Es wurde klar, dass Warschau die Strategie in den Partnerstaaten nicht entsprechend erklärt hat. Bei einem gemeinsamen Besuch der Außenminister Steinmeier und Sikorski in Kiew ist es zu keiner Klärung des Problems gekommen.⁴⁹

Im Sommer 2009 hat die Wahlkampagne die Ukraine lahmgelegt und die Präsidentschaftswahl die Lage zu Ungunsten der EU verändert. Nach der Wahl ist der neu gewählte Präsident Janukowitsch nach Brüssel gefahren und hat ein Zeichen für die Beziehungen zur EU gesetzt. Die folgende Entwicklung hat jedoch das Fundament für eine erfolgreiche Kooperation der EU mit der Ukraine erschüttert. Der Vertrag über die Stationierung der Schwarzmeerflotte in Sewastopol auf der Krim und Gaslieferungen, der am 21.4.2010 von den Präsidenten Medwedew und Janukowitsch unterzeichnet wurde, stellt die EU-Anbindung der Ukraine in Frage. Der Vertrag sieht vor, dass die vor dem Staatsbankrott stehende Ukraine durch Veränderungen der Gasverträge von Russland einen Rabatt von umgerechnet 30 Milliarden Euro erhält. Die Gegenleistung ist, dass die russische Schwarzmeerflotte mindestens bis 2042 auf der ukrainischen Halbinsel Krim stationiert bleiben darf.⁵⁰

Die Ukraine ist noch nicht der Zollunion unter Führung Russlands beigetreten aber der Druck steigt. Sollte es zu einer Übernahme des ukrai-

nischen Gasmonopolisten-Naftohas Ukarainy durch Gazprom kommen wäre dies ein Ende des europäischen Traumes einer unabhängigen Ukraine.⁵¹

In Belarus sieht die Lage genauso schlecht aus. Der Verlauf der Kommunalwahlen im April 2010 deutet darauf hin, dass die von der EU erhoffte Demokratisierung in diesem Lande noch lange auf sich warten lassen wird. Die Öffnung Minsk macht keine Fortschritte. Die Spannungen zwischen Lukaschenko und Moskau werden wahrscheinlich dafür sorgen, dass auch in den nächsten Monaten das Verhältnis zwischen der EU und Belarus nicht vollständig abkühlen wird, ein Durchbruch ist jedoch nicht zu erwarten.

In den anderen Partnerstaaten der Östlichen Nachbarschaft gibt es auch keine positiven Entwicklungen. Der Dialog zwischen Armenien und der Türkei ist auf der staatlichen Ebene ins Stocken geraten, obwohl die wissenschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Diskussion weiter voran getrieben wird. Die Öffnung der Grenze zwischen den beiden Staaten wurde auf unbestimmte Zeit verschoben. Sollte es zu einem Scheitern des Dialoges kommen, ist eine stärkere Anbindung Armeniens an Russland kaum aufzuhalten, nicht zuletzt aus sicherheitspolitischen Überlegungen der Armenier. Der armenisch-türkische Dialog ist auch mit dem armenisch-aserbaidschanischen Konflikt um Berg-Karabach eng verbunden. Die Türkei ist an der Fortsetzung des Dialoges mit Armenien interessiert, es fordert jedoch Fortschritte bei den Verhandlungen um die Region Nagorni-Karabach. Armenien weigert sich, die beiden Dossiers miteinander zu vermischen.⁵²

⁴⁹ „Europäische Unterstützung für die Ukraine – Steinmeier und Sikorski gemeinsam in Kiew“, Auswärtiges Amt, Juni 16, 2009. URL: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/AAmt/BM-Reisen/2009/Ukraine/090616-vorab.html>.

⁵⁰ Reinhard Vesper, „Gasabkommen in Russland, Kiew zahlt den politischen Preis“, FAZ.NET, April 24, 2010. URL: <http://www.faz.net/artikel/C31325/gasabkommen-mit-russland-kiew-zahlt-den-politischen-preis-30061279.html>.

⁵¹ Volodymyr Kulyk (2009). „The End of ‘Euro-romanticism’ in Ukraine, The Origins of Anti-Western Origins in the Presidential Campaign“, SWP Comments 28, December 2009. URL: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=6595.

⁵² „Armenien setzt Ratifizierung von Türkei-Abkommen aus, Konflikt um Nagorni-Karabach“, NZZ Online, April 22, 2010. URL: http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/international/armenien_tuerkei_1.5514883.html.

Aserbaidshans Interesse an der EU sinkt mit jedem neuen Problem beim Bau der Nabucco-Pipeline. Die Entscheidung, die Erschließung der Gasfelder für die Nabucco-Pipeline auf das Jahr 2017 zu verschieben, trägt keinesfalls dazu bei, die Beziehungen zu intensivieren, einmal abgesehen von der ausbleibenden Demokratisierung des Landes.⁵³

Nach einem Jahr der Existenz der Östlichen Partnerschaft werden die Außenminister der EU und der Partnerländer bei einem inoffiziellen Treffen am 24.5.2010 in Sopot in Polen die Chance ergreifen eine erste Bilanz zu ziehen.

Schlussfolgerungen

Die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen Polen und Russland spielen eine Schlüsselrolle für die künftige Gestaltung des Verhältnisses der erweiterten EU zu Russland. Daher bemühte sich Deutschland immer wieder um eine ausbalancierte Ostpolitik der EU. Ein prorussischer Vorschlag – „Annäherung durch Verflechtung“ – des damaligen Außenministers Steinmeier, der von der Bundeskanzlerin Merkel nicht verhindert wurde, konnte von der polnisch-schwedischen Östlichen Partnerschaft ergänzt werden. Bundeskanzlerin Merkel unterstützte diese Ergänzung durch ihre Anwesenheit in Prag.

Die ausgewogene und pragmatische Russland-Politik der polnischen Regierung unter Donald Tusk, welche eine Erwärmung der polnisch-russischen Beziehungen bewirkte, wurde von der deutschen Außenpolitik immer unterstützt. Der Wendepunkt war in diesem Falle der Besuch des russischen Premierministers Putin bei der Gedächtnisfeier auf Westerplatte am 1. September 2009. Diese Entwicklung stärkte die Position Polens bei

Gestaltung der europäischen Ostpolitik. Die Katastrophe in Smolensk am 10.4.2010 bei der neben dem polnischen Präsidenten Kaczynski weitere 95 Vertreter der polnischen Elite umgekommen sind, und die anschließende polnisch-russische Annäherung können eine neue Chance für die Verbesserung der Beziehungen Polens und der gesamten EU zu Russland eröffnen.

Nach seiner Übernahme des Auswärtigen Amtes führte die erste Auslandsreise des neuen Außenministers Westerwelle am 30.10.2009 nach Warschau. Dabei wurde die Wiederbelebung des Weimarer Dreiecks vereinbart, einer deutsch-polnisch-französischen Initiative aus dem Jahre 1991, die einer Koordinierung der Europapolitik der drei EU-Staaten dienen soll.⁵⁴

Im Rahmen des Weimarer Dreiecks werden nicht nur neue Ideen zu Stärkung der EU entwickelt, sondern auch die bestehen Herausforderungen wie die Ostpolitik der EU konzeptionell weiter entwickelt. Beim letzten Treffen der Außenminister des Weimarer Dreiecks am 27.4.2010 nahm der ukrainische Außenminister Hryschtschenko als Gast teil. Außenminister Westerwelle begrüßte den Willen der neuen ukrainischen Führung, an den europäischen Werten und am Annäherungskurs an die EU festzuhalten und sagte weitere Unterstützung bei der Umsetzung der ehrgeizigen ukrainischen Reformagenda zu. Alle machten eine gute Miene zum Bösen Spiel, indem Sie betonten, „die jüngsten positiven Entwicklungen in den Beziehungen der Ukraine zu Russland lägen auch im gemeinsamen europäischen Interesse.“⁵⁵

Die innere Entwicklung in der EU, d.h. die Griechenland-Krise und die Anlaufschwierigkeiten des diplomatischen Services der EU selbst, binden die internen Ressourcen und verzögern die Hinwendung zur Außen-

⁵³ „Nabucco: Vorest kein Gas aus Aserbaidshans“, Gastipp.de, April 21, 2010. URL: <http://www.gastip.de/News/21979/Nabucco-Vorrest-kein-Gas-aus-Aserbaidshans.html>.

⁵⁴ Auswärtiges Amt, Reise des Bundesministers nach Polen. URL: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/AAmt/BM-Reisen/2009/polen/090131-polen.html>.

⁵⁵ Auswärtiges Amt, Weimarer Dreieck. URL: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Europa/Aktuell/100427-WeimarerDreieck.html>.

politik. Hinzu kommt die interne Entwicklung in den Partnerstaaten der EU, insbesondere in der Ukraine, welche die Umsetzung der Östlichen Partnerschaft behindern. Unter diesen Umständen kann es nicht verwundern, dass Russland doch im Vordergrund der deutschen Ostpolitik wieder steht, wie die Stellungnahme des Staatsministers Hoyer in der FAZ vom 23.4.2010 zeigt.⁵⁶

Der ehemalige Außenminister und heutige Vorsitzende der SPD-Fraktion im Bundestag Steinmeier bestätigte die Bedeutung Russlands für die deutsche Ostpolitik in einem Antrag der SPD-Fraktion vom 23.3.2010 zu „Modernisierungspartnerschaft mit Russland – Gemeinsame Sicherheit in Europa durch stärkere Kooperation und Verflechtung.“⁵⁷

In seiner neuesten außenpolitischen Rede hat Außenminister Westerwelle die Östliche Partnerschaft nicht einmal erwähnt, obwohl er sie in Bonn am 27.4.2010 gehalten hat, direkt nach dem Treffen der Außenminister des Weimarer Dreiecks.⁵⁸

Das gegenwärtig geringe Interesse der EU-Akteure an der Strategie der Östlichen Nachbarschaft und die negative Entwicklung in den Partnerstaaten selbst bedeutet nicht das Ende der Östlichen Partnerschaft. Die Strategie muss allerdings umstrukturiert werden. Der Umbau muss eine Verstärkung der zivilgesellschaftlichen Aktivitäten zu Folge haben und weniger offizieller Begegnungen und Projekte. Auf diese Weise kann die Östliche Partnerschaft eine Unterstützung der Transformationsprozesse in den Gesellschaften der östlichen Nachbarstaaten der EU gewährleisten.

IV.

Appendix

⁵⁶ Auswärtiges Amt, Interview mit Werner Hoyer. URL: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2010/100423-Hoyer-FAZ.html>.

⁵⁷ „Modernisierungspartnerschaft mit Russland – Gemeinsame Sicherheit in Europa durch stärkere Kooperation und Verflechtung“, Antrag der Fraktion SPD, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/1153. März 23, 2010. URL: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/011/1701153.pdf>.

⁵⁸ Bundesaußenminister, Rede „Deutschland in Europa“. URL: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2010/100427-BM-D-in-Europa.html>.

CONFERENCE REPORT I.

Relations of Central Europe to Russia and Prospects of the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership. A Central Europe Dialogue between Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland¹

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague – 29th–30th September 2008)

Vladimír Handl – Nikoletta Sebestyén – Liyan Hu²

Panel I.

“Determinants of National Policy toward Russia”

Moderation: Petr Kratochvíl

Speakers: THE GERMAN VIEW – Hans-Joachim Spanger, HSFK, Frankfurt/M.

THE POLISH VIEW – Marcin Zaborowski, ISS EU, Paris

THE SLOVAKIAN VIEW – Ján Šoth, Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs

THE CZECH VIEW – Michael Romancov, Charles University Prague

¹ The Conference Report was first published by the IIR Prague, URL: <http://www.iir.cz/upload/News/Conf%20Rept%20G-Vis-Russia.pdf>

² Vladimir Handl is a IIR Researcher. Nikoletta Sebestyén and Liyan Hu were IIR research assistants in Prague.

The first panel commenced with a speech presented by Hans-Joachim Spanger, who started with the Russia-Georgia War. He asserted that the crises around Georgia's breakaway territories had implications for the German policy toward Russia: the policy of damage limitation has become the priority. In his opinion, there are two fundamental interests and two soft issues at work in Germany's basic attitude and policy towards the Russian Federation. The two fundamental interests are the preservation of stability on the European continent and the exploitation and expansion of economic opportunities. The two interests are closely linked, and there is not much of a dispute about either of them. Dr. Spanger pointed out that the soft issues regard the problematic image Russia has in Germany, on the one hand, and two discourses, in both the political class and the public at large – the one on reconciliation and the other regarding gratefulness for Gorbachev's readiness to accept German unification – on the other.

Then he continued to state that the war in Georgia has reinforced the long-standing debate about "engaging" versus "containing" Russia. The split is much more pronounced between Germany and some of its allies than within the German political class. Berlin's ultimate goal is still a pan-European Peace Order, and it treats Russia as an indispensable strategic partner, so that its policy is aimed at a "mutual interlocking" in order to come to terms with Russia in the security realm and assist it on the way towards domestic modernization. In Dr. Spanger's analysis, Germany maintains a fairly clear stance as to the current conflict in European Russian policy, which is framed by the alternative of "freedom of choice" versus "zones of influence". This is, in his view, however, a false dichotomy to encourage a rapid NATO enlargement. Therefore Dr. Spanger concluded that Germany is interested in a pan-European policy toward Eastern Europe, including Russia. He agreed with the German foreign minister that the policy should combine the following goals: leading Ukraine up to an unidentified entity west of its borders, partnership with Russia, democrati-

zation of Belarus, cooperation with Central Asia, and advantageous side by side living conditions near the Black Sea and in the Caucasus.

In the following presentation, Dr. Zaborowski gave a speech on Polish national policy towards Russia from a Polish perspective. He described the specifics of the Polish-Russian relationship in three points: First, the relations include an element of competition. Poland not only opposes Russian domination in Eastern Europe but also seeks its own influence in the region. It has been the historical experience of Poland that it either exercises influence in the region or is about to lose its own sovereignty. Second, Poland has been engaged in the East because of the concept of responsibility. It may not, for example, remain silent about "Orange Revolutions" or the Georgia War. While it may not be always clear how to implement the principle of responsibility, Poland has always had to take a position regarding the East. The third point is that Russia's response to the Polish engagement in the region is punishment. Since the colour revolutions, Poland has been isolated and divided from the EU to be put among the Baltic States by Russia because Russia views Poland as a troublemaker in the Eastern region. Thus economic relations with Russia are also affected by political issues. The reason for this is that Russia disagreed on the Polish position in the region.

The third presentation was given by Ján Šóth. In his speech, he named three issues related to how Slovakia perceives Russia. The first is that the Slovakian government's foreign policy towards Russia is a constructive partnership because Russia is Slovakia's crucial partner in regard to energy security. Slovakia is 90% dependent on Russian supplies of oil and gas, Czech Republic 70%, and Poland 78%. He stressed that he disagreed with EU's containment policy toward Russia. However, the Slovakian society's view of Russia was different from that of its government because it has a negative image of Russia due to the historical aspects of the two countries' relationship and because it is difficult for the Slovaks to accept Russia as a

partner emotionally and psychologically. According to Šoth, NATO is Slovakia's real security guarantee, and EU provides an economic environment for Slovakia's development, but one cannot neglect Slovakia's contacts with its Russian partners. Šoth stressed that Russia is also a part of the European civilization and that its culture belongs to the European family. Slovakia can be the bridge between EU and Russia in their dialogue. As for the third issue, Šoth criticized Russia for taking the wrong approach in the Caucasus. The Russian elites have used the wrong strategy when they used energy in their security policy as a political instrument, when they threatened to use military weapons, etc. However, it can be understood that Russia needs respect. In his remarks, Šoth claimed that it was difficult to start a dialogue between the two sides because they interpret "democracy", "human rights" and "rule of law" differently. By the end, he concluded that Slovakia needs a democratic Russia as its partner, and he expressed his hope for Russia to support the rule of law in the global perspective.

In the subsequent presentation, Michael Romancov dealt with the national policy towards Russia on the Czech side. According to Romancov, the Czech Republic adheres to the group of countries described as "frosty pragmatists" as regards its attitude towards Russia. He spelled out five interrelated arguments to explain his opinion from a geopolitical perspective: Firstly, since the end of the Cold War, the most important geopolitical questions are those related to the enlargements of both NATO and EU. Secondly, Russia has for a long time shown interest in East Central Europe by using geopolitical games. Thirdly, even if Czech Republic shares Central Europe with its neighbours, its historical perception of this area and the historical events which took place here is, in many important aspects, entirely different, and there is a clear linkage between the evaluation of the past and the prognosis for the future. Fourthly, Central Europe, whose fate was sealed from the outside for the entire 19th and most of the 20th century, is once again becoming the subject of political games. Finally, the

last argument is that in the last fifty years, the Western half of Europe has had two main strategies for dealing with the Eastern half: containment and integration. He stressed that Russia's view of relations with the EU is fairly instrumental and that Russia is clear on what it wants from the Union, while the EU's Common Strategy with Russia is vague.

He was concerned that the EU may not have succeeded in changing Russia, but Russia is certainly changing the EU because the EU is not a centralized state. Its interests are much more diffuse than those of Russia. Therefore, Dr. Romancov concluded that Russia is a big challenge to the EU because it is setting itself up as an ideological alternative to the EU, with a different approach to sovereignty, power and world order. He suggested that political representation for understanding the current Russian approach is also a potential danger for Czech Republic. However, he pointed out that the country's neighbours and allies lack any stable long term common strategy towards Russia so far.

Policy Panel

"EU, Russia and the Transatlantic Relations-Germany and the Central European Prospects"

Moderation: Petr Buriánek, Director General, European countries section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic

Speakers: THE GERMAN VIEW – Hans-Ulrich Klose, MdB, Deputy Chairman of the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Relations

THE CZECH VIEW – Jan Hamáček, Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Czech House of Representatives
– Jaroslav Bašta, the Czech Ambassador to Ukraine

The Policy Panel commenced with a speech presented by Hans-Ulrich Klose, the Deputy Chairman of the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Relations. In terms of Russian, EU, and US relations from the German point

of view, he claimed that Russia was more nationalistic and self-assertive than it was a year ago. While presenting the war in Georgia as not only a Russian but also a Georgian problem, he asserted that both sides overdid the use of force. The recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia cannot be referred to Kosovo as a precedent – the recognition of Kosovo had been preceded by eight years of intensive international negotiations. Russia was big, and its economy was increasing fast. It became a member of the BRIC countries, along with India, Brazil and China. It also has become a dominant member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It is an economy growing in influence in Georgia as well. Furthermore, Hans-Ulrich Klose pointed out that the US and other western countries made a mistake when they took the risk of letting Yeltsin stabilize the Russian democracy and society alone. He continued his speech by discussing NATO. NATO focused on political instruments rather than military instruments after the Cold War, but the expansion of the Alliance led Russia to perceive it as trying to surround Russian territory.

Klose used the expression of “re-nationalization” to describe the situation in the EU. Some EU countries, such as Spain, Italy, France, etc., declared that the EU should cooperate with Russia because Russia is a European country and cannot be excluded from Europe, while some other EU countries disagreed, as was the case with Britain, which more or less defended the current status quo by using arguments related to geography. Klose claimed again that the Russia-Georgia war was not discussed by the EU-Russia council. That meant that since there was a lack of dialogue or discussion, there were no solutions to the issue. Russia itself does not understand the EU and prefers to deal with individual European states. Russia is a big economic market and a large energy supplier. Although Russia is not a democratic country, the EU and US are eager for Russia to become one, which should happen in the next generation. Klose concluded that

the German position on Russia focuses on an eye-to-eye dialogue, and that it is not sensible to push Russia into a corner.

Jan Hamáček, Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Czech House of Representatives, argued that Russian foreign policy has been linked mostly with its domestic politics. Today's Russia feels stronger than before and maltreated by the West – a feeling which the western states can hardly help with. Russia has aspirations as a new and independent power centre but lacks adequate resources; its share in the world economy remains modest.

Nonetheless, there is a general consensus in Russia when it comes to foreign policy.

Russia seeks to divide the EU, to gain control over it and maximize its own gains. One of the reasons of this policy is the notorious lack of understanding of the nature of the EU. Therefore it rejects any further strengthening of the EU.

It is therefore necessary to develop a united attitude of the EU to Russia, define clearly our priorities (such as the fight against terrorism) and act pragmatically. It is necessary to accept Russia and its interests – not to try to isolate it or change its nature. The EU has enough common interests with Russia, such as oil and gas supplies. The EU is the most reliable partner Russia has, and it can offer Russia money and advanced technologies. On the other hand, even diversification of energy resources supplies will not compensate for Russian supplies. Jan Hamáček agreed with the thesis of Hans-Ulrich Klose that pushing Russia into a corner would be a counter-productive strategy.

Jaromír Bašta, the Czech Ambassador to Ukraine, elaborated in his speech on elements of Russian expansionism. The democratic standards of the country are, according to his view, not worse than those in the other BRIC states (indeed, they are better than those in China). Russia has its interests and has a tendency to pursue them while relying on its power, but

it can hardly surprise the other international actors. The crucial issue is the one of the zone between the EU and Russia. The EU has a dilemma: it can either gradually integrate the relevant countries or neutralize them.

Panel II

“Prospects of the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership”

Moderation: Marcin Zaborowski, ISS EU, Paris

Speakers: POLAND – Marek Menkiszak, Head of the Russian Department, Centre for Eastern Studies, OSW (Warsaw)

SLOVAKIA – Alexander Duleba, SFPA Bratislava

GERMANY – Susan Stewart, SWP Berlin

CZECH REPUBLIC – Petr Kratochvíl, IIR Prague

The second panel began with a speech by Dr. Menkiszak from the Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw. He addressed the relationship between Europe and Russia and stated that Russia’s internal policy is “drifting away from Europe” in the sense that Russia is developing an authoritarian political system and state capitalism in the economy, while neither of these systems is compatible with European standards, which means that Russia is drifting farther away from European values, democracy and rule of law. Then he continued to state that mental changes also occurred in Russia. The ruling elite had a growing self-confidence because the economy was growing sharply, and Russia’s military capabilities were strengthened largely because of the energy boom. Therefore, Russia is booming in its ambitions to change the global balance of power and redesign its arrangements with the West, which reflects Russia’s new assertiveness in its foreign and security policy. Next, he set forth the conflicting interests between EU and Russia: common neighbourhood policy, external security, energy economy, and EU-Russia bilateral trade.

The most disputed issue in the EU is the Lisbon Treaty, which Marek-Menkiszak believed to have caused the most important institutional crisis. Then the division in the EU internal policy on Russia is growing because the EU is not a centralized state and because of its lack of a common foreign defence policy. In his conclusion he pointed out the relevant problems and described options for further EU-Russian relations: High stakes issues stem from the Eastern ENP, CFSP, ESDP, energy policy and the EU institution crisis. The EU can increase systematic engagement in the ENP and Central Asia to defend EU interests. The EU might try the option of a “re-engagement” of Russia and of a “strategic deal”. This strategy is, however, inherently dangerous. Alternatively, the EU might develop pragmatic EU-Russia ties as a deconstructed relationship, based on interests, not on common values and standards. The EU should also revitalize its transatlantic relationship with the US and enforce its relationships with Turkey, Iran and Japan. At the same time, the EU should also take care of its own backyard, especially focusing on overcoming institutional crises.

In the following presentation, Alexander Duleba addressed two fundamental components of the EU-Russia relations: cooperation and competition. He claimed that the EU-Russia relationship does have a strategic importance for both of the actors. That’s not only because of Russia’s importance when it comes to the energy security of the EU and vice versa, but also because of the EU’s importance for Russia as a key foreign trade partner and similar issues. He also acknowledged that if the EU fails to develop an inclusive pan-European policy, it will lose its strategic initiative in Europe, which will sooner or later undermine its internal coherence and functioning, and he suggested that the EU set up a *European modernization project for the 21st century and beyond* to insure its long term interests.

Dr. Duleba argued that Russia became the “other Europe” in fall 1993 rather than summer 2008, the time of the Georgia war. In his opinion, Russia became not only an alternative model of post-communist political

transformation in the region of the former Eastern bloc, but also the source of an alternative foreign policy to that of the EU and its member countries by supporting authoritarian regimes in the region during the political crisis in 1993. Next, he mentioned the challenge of EU's eastern border and its enlargement within his main argument of "two Europe(s) in one Europe". He believed that Russia's strategic interest is to maintain the existing status quo of two Europes through the securitization of the European agenda. By the end of the speech, he claimed that the EU not only set up a "Russia policy", but a regional "Eastern European one", and the way the EU should go is to develop a comprehensive and coherent "Eastern policy" to make the ENP in the Eastern neighbourhood converge with the Common Spaces with Russia.

In Dr. Susan Stewart's presentation, she stated that after the Caucasus crisis, the common EU policy towards Russia is one of divergent interests and attitudes. In regard to the balance of energy and security aspects in the policy field, before the crisis, the security issues were as high a priority as the energy issues, while after the crisis, the two types of issues were difficult to balance because the basis for a security dialogue with Russia had been weakened. As for the balance of interests and values, the EU's traditional interests with regard to Russia should renew negotiations on a new agreement, and its precondition is that Russia will return to its pre-war positions, or else the EU will cause a credibility problem for it. Subsequently, she supported the necessity of the Lisbon Treaty. One reason that she gave for her support of it is that the EU will become slightly more coherent and visible, and then it will be able to arrange its internal energy market so as to provide energy security for all the member states. In conclusion, she stated that she believes that the new Lisbon Treaty instruments will ensure a greater EU influence, even within the Eastern border and Russia.

The last presentation of this panel was presented by Petr Kratochvíl, a representative of the Institute of International Relations, Prague. In his

contribution, he outlined two different causes for the creation of a common policy (the internal and external ones) and two shifts in the EU experience. To assert the two different causes, Dr. Kratochvíl gave two examples. The first was that of the Italian Prime Minister who advocated Russian action in Chechnya in contradiction to the position of the EC and the other member states. The other example was that of a contravention of the Lisbon Treaty, which supported his opinion that a unification of the policies of individual member states towards Russia is caused by internal reasons. He explained the external reasons by discussing Russia's use of energy as a strategic weapon, backsliding in democratic standards in Russia, and, most recently, the Russia-Georgian War. He believes that there is no single influential intellectual or decision-maker in the EU that would cause the new collision course of Russia to change the EU's priorities. Furthermore, he presented two current shifts in the EU, which move in two different directions. The first is the general drift of the EU as a whole towards a more guarded stance toward Russia. A second trend is the trend of the radicalization of some new member states.

In addition, he claimed that there are two moments when member states can use the EU as a diplomatic weapon with which Russia may be threatened if need be. On the other hand, the EU's reaction to the Russian-Georgian War is its defining moment. Finally, he added two assumptions to the question of whether the emergence of a unified strategy from the EU is probable: 1) If Russia pushes its neo-imperial ambitions and challenges to the west, the probability is higher that the EU will elaborate, albeit slowly, the common strategy. 2) The EU should be successful in drafting such a strategy in a coherent manner if the "doves" have the ability to placate the "hawks" and convince them that they can achieve more in the framework of the EU.

Panel III.

“European Energy Dependence on Russia and Vertices of the Common EU Energy Policy – Conflicts and Approaches”

Moderation: Volker Weichsel, the Journal “Osteuropa”, Berlin

Speakers: CZECH REPUBLIC – Jiří Schneider, PSSI, Prague

SLOVAKIA – Karol Hirman, Slovak Innovation and Energy Agency (SIEA), Bratislava

POLAND – Maria Sadowska, demos EUROPA, Warsaw

GERMANY – Roland Götz, ret., SWP, Berlin

The third panel has commenced with Roland Götz’s presentation focusing on the question of the ‘asymmetric dependency’ of Europe on Russia in energy imports, especially in the gas sector. While ‘asymmetric dependency’ can be regarded as a widespread view on European energy security, Götz disagreed with this assessment since he considers the European Union – Russia economic interdependency as a more balanced relationship. He stressed that Europe’s share in Russian gas exports is more than 90 per cent, while Russia’s share in European gas imports is only about 60 per cent. In addition, Gazprom is dependent on its good reputation, and any stop of gas delivery would remarkably strike back against the Russian economy, while it would be possible for European power stations and industrial consumers to exchange gas for coal or renewable energy sources, which would result in a loss of markets on the Russian side. In the end, Roland Götz has drawn the conclusion that the thesis of asymmetric dependency has been largely unfounded.

Maria Sadowska has provided an overview on European Union – Russia energy relations and analysed the energy policy of the European Union from the Polish perspective, focusing on solidarity as well as energy security. Concerning the European Union – Russia energy relations, she stressed that the European Union gets over 40 per cent of its gas imports from

Russia and that deliveries to the European Union make up two thirds of Russia’s gas exports. Moreover, one third of the European Union’s oil and one quarter of its coal imports are covered by Russia. On the other hand, imports of energy resources are often perceived as a security threat or ‘political weapon’. According to Sadowska’s argument, market integration and solidarity are the key for the security of energy supply: only a fully integrated energy market based on solidarity could provide an opportunity to reduce the dependency on Russian imports. In the scope of Polish energy imports, 95 per cent of the oil and 45 per cent of the gas demand is covered by imports from Russia. The Polish government plays a decisive role in the energy sector not only as a policy-maker but also as the leader of the main companies. Construction of new gas pipelines avoiding the Polish territory represents a challenge for Poland. Sadowska urged more action and more definite actions by the European Union, since it was clearly visible in the case of the Nabucco versus South Stream projects that the European Union could not play any decisive role.

In the subsequent presentation, Karol Hirman set out the main characteristics and tendencies of the development of the European Union-Russia energy dialogue, the effect of enlargement, Germany’s role, geostrategic questions and Russia’s gas or oil production capacity. As far as the roots of the European Union – Russia energy dialogue are concerned, Hirman emphasized the significance of the clearness and definiteness of the Russian point and of the changes in Russian energy regulations. For Russia, the enlargement of the European Union invoked tensions as it represented a threat of loss of markets and the spread of influence of European gas companies. Hirman supposes that enlargement has been a decisive factor in the increase of the dispute on oil and gas export to Belarus and Ukraine. Furthermore, Germany has a great impact on European Union – Russia relations in the aspect of energy policy. Hence, the shutdown of nuclear power plants strengthens the dependency on Russian gas as well as the construc-

tion of the Nord Stream and another pipeline in 2013. The construction of new pipelines directly linking Germany and Russia must be analysed in the context of the energy security of the new European Union Member States (especially the Baltic States, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and the security and independence of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Moreover, the problem of the full coverage of both domestic consumption and gas and oil exports is about to occur in Russia in 2010–2015, which should be prevented by an energy sector reform. Hirman concluded his presentation with recommendations on the energy dialogue with Russia.

In the last presentation of the section, Jiří Schneider mitigated the question of whether the European Union – Russia relations can be defined as dependence or interdependence and analysed the aspects of a possible European common energy policy. As Schneider stressed, Europe's main energy security challenge is how to decrease its dependence on energy imports, especially in the case of gas since more than 60 per cent of imports comes from Algeria and Russia. However, Europe and Russia are interdependent competitors. Their relationship is asymmetric since they do not share common rules of arbitration. Moreover, Europe conceives itself as a market, while Russia is driven by geopolitical concerns. Schneider posed the question “Would Russian state-owned companies operating on the European Union market comply with the antitrust and competition decisions of the Commission or the European Court of Justice?” In the scope of the possibility of a common energy policy, Schneider has outlined four aspects to be considered: the external coherence of the Common Foreign and Security Policy should be strengthened by creating a code of conduct for energy policy; the existing informal cooperation should be enhanced as a contribution to the internal coherence of the European Union policies; the development of the Nabucco project is necessary; and transatlantic energy-related research projects should be pursued in the field of renewable sources, energy efficiency and other advanced energy technologies.

One of the questions discussed during the subsequent debate was the nature of *Gazprom*. Roland Götz argued the company is only partly state-owned; about 80% of the Russian energy sector is private, the only exclusion being nuclear power. Gazprom as such is not an instrument of Russian state policy. It is rather the other way round: Gazprom instrumentalizes the Russian state for its own interests (a point on which Marek Menkiszczak disagreed strongly). Gazprom has a monopoly position in Russia as it assumes the role of the price-setter; it lacks such a position in the EU, however. Marie Sadowska confirmed that the energy and climate package of the EU is very expensive for Poland. 95% of the Polish energy mix is covered by coal with serious consequences for the environment. On the EU level, unbundling is of crucial importance: its implementation could crucially improve the security of consumers.

Karol Hirman noted that the situation in Slovakia has taken a positive turn as the energy consumption has been decreasing over the last three years. Speaking of the future of nuclear power in Germany, Roland Götz suggested that an extension of the life expectancy of the German nuclear power plants would be a reasonable step. The relevant debate has only just begun, however.

Panel IV.

“Security Policy and Transatlantic Relations – US Missile Defence and EU-Russia Policy”

Moderation: Vladimír Handl, IIR Prague

Speakers: SLOVAKIA – Vladimír Tarasovič, Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), Bratislava

POLAND – Łukasz Kulesa, PISM, Warsaw

GERMANY – Markus Kaim, SWP, Berlin

CZECH REPUBLIC – Vít Střítecký, IIR Prague

Vladimír Tarasovič has described the role of the missile defence in the Slovakian security policy and political discourse as well as the dimensions of threat perception in the Slovakian society. Tarasovič began his presentation with an in-depth analysis of the perception of threat in the Slovakian civil society, in the expert and security community as well as among the political elite. The development of the official position of the Slovak Republic was detailed. In particular the role of Prime Minister Robert Fico has been highlighted. Similarly, the influence of the position of individual actors has been discussed, focusing primarily on Russia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the United States of America and the Visegradgroup. Further prospects of security were discussed, such as a tendency to replace the institutions of collective defence by institutions of collective security and the probable impact of the presidential election in the United States.

In his presentation, Łukasz Kulesa has outlined the main features of the debate and of the official positions as regards the deployment of the American missile defence systems in the Czech Republic and Poland. The relations to the European Union, Russia and the United States have been highlighted in this context. During the mentioned political dispute, the missile defence project was strongly criticized by Russia, while the European Union formally stayed outside. Moreover, many European countries have opposed the bilateral form of the agreement and prefer a multilateral solution in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Furthermore, Russia's strategy was to take advantage of this divergence and try to isolate Czech Republic and Poland from the other member states of the European Union. Hence, with the change of the United States administration pending, Russia is currently expecting a turn in American policy on missile defence or at least a postponing of the extension of the missile shield. As far as the dispute within the United States is concerned, Kulesa stressed that the reliability of the missile defence system is doubted. How-

ever, a postponing of the implementation of the agreements with Czech Republic and Poland could result in a vague situation in relations with Central Europe and Russia.

Markus Kaim has outlined the main questions and challenges facing the German government and foreign policy in this context. He emphasized that the German position is primarily based on two pillars, namely on an interoperability of the system with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as with national defence systems and on Russia's inclusion into the talks. He outlined four crucial aspects of the respective discussion. Firstly, is there an Iranian threat? If so, secondly, can the missile defence system be considered as a reliable solution for this challenge? Thirdly, how should Russia be treated? And fourthly, are there any alternatives for the American bilateralism and can the solution be worked out in the multilateral framework of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? As Kaim asserted, the existence of the undeclared Iranian nuclear project is evident, but the majority of Germans perceive the United States as a greater threat to peace than Iran. In addition, the effectiveness of the system is heavily debated in the American Congress, and the funding of the project after the presidential elections is not foreseeable. As far as the Russian attitude is concerned, Moscow acknowledges the Iranian threat and offered to establish a radar site on its territory. Senator John McCain claimed that the United States missile defence systems can be used as a potential deterrence against other states like China or Russia. Despite its relevance, the topic of missile defence was not discussed in the framework of the European Union. The United States initiated negotiations with the Czech Republic and Poland on a bilateral basis so as to gain time. However, discussion of this topic in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should soon seriously begin. The project should have a strong Euro-Atlantic basis and should be opened to the countries outside NATO.

In the following presentation, Vít Střítecký provided a brief reflection on the genesis of the issue of missile defence in the Czech context while stressing the significance of the decision leading to the “NATOization” of the Third Pillar of the missile defence. Secondly, he set out some comparative points regarding the negotiation processes in the Czech Republic and Poland, arguing that these processes clearly resembled long term political and security patterns that have been developing in both countries since the early 1990s. Thirdly, he criticized the level of both the public and the expert debates, particularly because they have primarily focused on the search for potential enemies. Instead of continuing in this pointless endeavour, he suggested concentrating on the strategic objectives of the missile defence system and its consequences. One of the possible approaches to achieve this could be an evaluation of the relation between the missile defence and the strategy of deterrence, including its post-Cold War modalities. Such an analysis may provide for fresh views on the roles and potential of various actors around the globe (including the EU and Russia).

In the subsequent debate, the main point of discussion focused on the US foreign policy towards Russia and the role of missile defence in the relations between the EU, the United States and Russia. Furthermore, the question of the possibility of a ‘desecuritization’ of the relations with Russia was debated. As a reflection for the raised questions, Łukasz Kulesa has emphasized the relevance of three points concerning the Russian position on missile defence: Russia argues that the project endangers the strategic balance between the United States and Russia; it is not explained exclusively by the situation in Iran; countermeasures should be implemented if Russia is not involved in the developments of the system in a proper way. On the other hand, the current Russian strategic missile defence system is a more reliable and more effective instrument than the still existing United States system, as it is regularly tested and is based on technology using nuclear warheads. In his comments, Markus Kaim argued that the

United States should be more active in the case of Georgia by pursuing ‘shuttle diplomacy’. Regarding the foreseeable tendencies of US policy towards Russia, an upgrading of symbolic gestures should follow, but bilateralism is likely to further remain characteristic for the policy. According to Vladimír Tarasovič, the Russian security strategy and foreign policy do not make it possible to put the issue of ‘desecuritization’ on the table in the next decade, and multilateralism should be promoted in the field of missile defence. Vít Střítecký has focused on the ongoing military reform in Russia, the main feature of which is developing and increasing the number of mobile forces, especially submarine-launched missiles and the new version of the Topol missile. As far as the ‘desecuritization’ of the relations with Russia is concerned, Russia’s regional ambitions (e.g. the Georgian conflict) make it hardly feasible to set aside the issue of security.

CONFERENCE REPORT II.

Determinants of EU's Russian Foreign Policy-Divergences, Differentiation and Search for Consensus among EU Member States in Central Europe³

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague – 24th–25th November 2009)

Cillian O'Donoghue – Ardit Azizaj – William MacDonald⁴

The Conference is a follow up to the first expert conference of EU-Russia relations, which was titled 'Relations of Central Europe to Russia and Prospects of the EU-Russia strategic partnership. A Central Europe dialogue between Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland' and held on 28th-29th September 2008 in Prague, Czech Republic.

Last year's conference saw differences of opinion over the internal developments in Russia and also substantial differences with regards to security and energy policies. This follow up conference was aimed to pick up on the issues not resolved at the previous year's conference with these two topics, security and energy, central to our debate.

³ The Conference Report was first published by the IIR Prague, URL: <http://www.iir.cz/upload/News/Conf%20Rept%20G-Vis-Russia.pdf>.

⁴ Cillian O'Donoghue – Ardit Azizaj – William MacDonald were IIR research assistants.

This year's conference was aimed to develop a critical dialogue of experts from foreign policy analysis and advising institutes from Central European member states. The partly incompatible analyses of the political situation and different national perceptions of security, interests and strategies were the central focus of the debate. The aim was to explore the possibility of consensus building and elaboration of common European positions and strategies among Central European member states.

Day 1: Tuesday 24th November 2009

Welcome speech: Erfried Adam, Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Prague

Petr Kratochvíl, Deputy Director, Institute of International Relations (IIR), Prague

Erfried Adam: Introduction Remarks

Period of Transition

Mr. Adam opened by welcoming all guests and speakers and stating that we are in the middle of a period of transition, citing the transitional government in the Czech Republic, the new European commission in the making, the new structures of leadership and representation created by the Lisbon Treaty and a new government in Germany. Mr. Adam felt that all these aspects will impact on issues surrounding energy and climate change policy.

The Aim of the Conference

According to Mr. Adam, 'the aim of this conference is to contribute to consensus building in Europe'. He stated that it was never the aim to have a direct dialogue with Russia, but to have a structured dialogue between experts in CEE on Russia's energy policy under the perspective that this

type of dialogue could have an impact on policy formulation and consensus building in the respective countries.

Changes over the Last 12 Months

Mr. Adam highlighted four major changes that have occurred since last year's conference.

The first was the 'Obama factor', which, in Mr. Adam's opinion, certainly had brought about change but not everybody in Central Europe was happy with the new policies pursued by his administration. The second was the appointment of a new secretary general of NATO, whose first major public speech was on NATO and Russia, thus bringing a new beginning. The third was the restart of the NATO-Russia Council, and finally, the fourth change was President Medvedev's new initiatives, which he began taking both internally and externally, including those related to climate change and energy policy.

Petr Kratochvíl: Introduction Remarks

Streamlining EU Opinion

Mr. Kratochvíl highlighted the wide range of opinions among the EU actors on how best to deal with Russia. However, he felt that following the Georgian war, there was a greater acceptance of the need to streamline a common EU policy in dealing with Russia.

Opening Session

Ernst Reichel, Head of Division for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, German Foreign Office, Berlin

Eva Dvořáková, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic

Ernst Reichel

How to Handle Russia – Understanding the Russian Mentality

In order to handle Russia, Mr. Reichel advised adopting a sober analysis in light of the clearly increasingly confrontational pattern of relations. He also advocated a greater understanding of Russia and the Russian mentality, saying that many in Russia still think in old fashioned geopolitical terms and that this results in a natural opposition towards EU members and NATO.

Reasons for the Increase in Confrontation between the West and Russia

He stated that relations were not always so confrontational and that we did have a so-called 'romantic phase' in which people believed Russia was in one camp with the West, but with President Putin, people in Russia changed the way they think about foreign policy. He also felt the West missed a lot of chances and that many of the negative developments have to do with how the Bush administration treated Russia, e.g. the strong efforts of the Bush administration to put Ukraine and Georgia in NATO plus the missile defence system.

Obama's Reset Policy

The US is now showing leadership in a different direction than that of the previous administration. Mr. Reichel stated that they need to engage Russia in a step by step approach beginning with nuclear disarmament and that the German government strongly supports such an approach.

"We can influence Russia through engagement. We have tried containment, which doesn't work, so why not try engagement? Antagonism like the policy of the Bush years has not been successful. We should be pragmatic and conduct useful co-operation."

Current Policy Successful

Mr. Reichel stated that it looks like the current newly adopted policy is working at the moment and that Russia has become more flexible on issues such as Iran sanctions. Relations between Russia and the West are better than before. This can be highlighted by British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband's recent trip to Moscow.

Floor Opened to Questions

Question (Q): *What are the red lines between Russia and Europe?*

Answer (A): Mr. Reichel responded that we cannot give a conceptual answer to this question because politics is blurred, so it is not possible to give clear cut red lines. Thus, Mr. Reichel requested not to be asked to define red lines. He did say, though, that the clearly possible expectation that Russia has extra rights in the neighbourhood is not accepted and can be considered as a red line.

Eva Dvořáková

Visegrád Perspective

Ms. Dvořáková spoke from both the Czech and the Visegrád perspective, stating that when we are reviewing all the possibilities in how to influence the shaping of the EU policy towards Russia, we should not forget to take into account the perspective of the V4 countries. With the Hungary EU Presidency in January 2011 and the Polish Presidency (July 2011), the Visegrád position towards Russia will have an important say in EU policy and both these countries will try to keep EU-Russian relations high on the EU agenda. In relations with Russia Ms. Dvořáková recommends realistic expectations and to go in the direction of small steps and individual concrete projects.

I. Security Policy of the European Union and Russia – New Common Security Architecture and the Future of NATO

Among the Topics Discussed Were

Medvedev's proposal of a new European security architecture; NATO's role in Eastern Europe and in relation to Russia; arms control and disarmament issues; Ukraine as the prime target of Russian policy.

Panel I.

“The EU's Security Policy and Common Security Architecture with Russia”

Moderation: Kai-Olaf Lang, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin

Speakers: SLOVAKIA – Radoslav Kusenda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bratislava

POLAND – Olaf Osica, Natolin European Centre, Warsaw

GERMANY – Markus Kaim, SWP, Berlin

CZECH REPUBLIC – Vít Střítecký, IIR, Prague

The moderator Kai-Olaf Lang opened the discussion by raising four questions which shape EU – Russia relations. The first question raised was on how to deal with Russian claims to the influential area that it has inherited from the Soviet Union. The second question to be asked was how to engage Russia in EU – Russia talks. The last questions to the panel were related to the US – Russia relations and the Russian relations with other international organizations such as NATO, OSCE and EU.

Radoslav Kusenda

The Current Political Situation in Russia

Radoslav Kusenda started his presentation by giving an overview of the current political situation in Russia. For him, no basic new overhaul of the existing institutional structure is needed and it is important to work within and reinforce the existing OECD framework. He encouraged engagement by saying we should talk to the Russians about it but we should not invent anything new as regards structural architecture. According to him, recent developments in Russia might bring the country to a confrontation with Europe. Even though the Russian military capabilities are not the same as they were during the Soviet Union era, Russia still owns nuclear weapons. Afterwards, he proposed that when the relations between EU and Russia get much tensed, EU should respond to Russia by freezing relations rather than by military means.

No Overhaul of Existing Structures Needed

Moreover, Kusenda proposed two different approaches for how to interact with Russia. First of all, the US and EU need to engage in international talks with Russia. These talks should be carried on in a formal relationship, and the need to commit to the agreements was discussed. The second proposal consisted of constructively engaging Russia in other cooperational areas such as Environment and Energy so that it could contribute to the dialogue. He was complimentary towards the current security architecture, describing it as functional and as serving the EU well, but he also said that we should strengthen our structures in a concrete way. Furthermore, even other partners such as the OSCE should take part in these cooperation activities, since both the EU and the OSCE share the same concerns about rule of law, human rights and so on and so forth. Therefore, coordination

between the International Institutions, as well as a clear vision of where these relations should go, was analyzed.

Olaf Osica

Over-institutionalized Security Landscape

Olaf Osica looked back to the European Security System in 1989, when the framework was created for institutions such as NATO and EU, as these institutions were designed to complement each other. He analyzed the security system in Europe, which after the end of the Cold War was characterized by enlargement of the system as well as institutionalization. Furthermore, Osica described the present European Security architecture and pointed out the problems that resulted from past policies. In his point of view, the European security landscape is over institutionalized because of all the actors involved, such as EU, NATO and the OSCE.

Intra-Regionalization

Secondly, he added that the European security is facing increasing intra-regionalization, where countries tend to form regional grouping such as Nordic countries, Baltic countries, Eastern countries and so on.

Enlargement Policy

It was proposed that the enlargement policy should be removed with a so-called post-enlargement policy, in which the countries would deepen their reforms in the institutions. Secondly, he argued that the Eastern partnership should be enforced so that it could promote good relations.

Markus Kaim

Principles, Not Institutions

In the presentation that followed, Markus Kaim argued that on the EU level, there is no consensus on whether to engage more with Russia or to move away from such an engagement. He presented the Russian approach towards the international world order, which has not changed since the end of the Cold War. Kaim outlined the scheme of the three main actors (NATO, EU and OSCE) that deal with the European security and analyzed the functioning of these institutions after the end of the Cold War. According to him, none of these institutions have lost their rational purpose and importance. NATO as a defence actor has developed into a global actor from a regional security organization. In the same way the EU has been engaged with humanitarian and peace operations. Even the OSCE remains a big player, especially in the areas of human rights, democracy and security. Kaim provided a lot of examples of these actors being engaged at the regional and global level, such as the military and humanitarian intervention in Bosnia. However, when it comes to the relations between Russia and these institutions, Kaim proposed that Russia should engage in dialogues with these actors, but instead of speaking about institutions, they should speak about principles. He also noted that both EU and Russia are global actors, and thus they should engage in global problems such as proliferation, global crisis, global poverty and many other global issues.

Vít Střítecký

Change in US Policy

Vít Střítecký started his presentation by providing a brief description of the development of the American foreign policy under the Obama administration. Despite the change in US foreign policy, Střítecký stressed that it

would be very naïve to think that the solutions for European problems will come from America.

Bilateralism and Working on a Step by Step Basis

At this point he proposed some measures that need to be taken on the part of the EU in order for the EU to be able to constructively engage with Russia. The measures included bilateralism from the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). It was noted that if the CEECs move from multilateralism to bilateralism in their relations with Russia, this might help in shaping and helping relations between the EU and Russia. Střítecký proposed the avoidance of assertive geo-political language because such an approach creates problems in EU-Russian relations. President George W. Bush's initiative to establish the missile defence system in Europe was provided as an example of this. Finally, he also proposed a move away from the institutionalized relations with Russia. Střítecký mentioned that the EU should work on a step by step basis in trying to engage Russia in a more constructive manner. It was argued that unlike any other country, Russia tended to be more cooperative in global issues such as climate change, the Middle East, transnational crime and many others.

Panel II.

“Russia and the Future of NATO”

Moderation: Jiří Schneider, Prague Security Studies Institute

Speakers: POLAND – Marek Menkiszak, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw (TBC)

GERMANY – Hans-Joachim Spanger, Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK), Frankfurt a.M.

HUNGARY – András Rácz, Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, Miklós Zrínyi National Defence University, Budapest

Jiří Schneider

Red Line Debate

Mr. Schneider began by stating that the red line of the debate was how to have a dialogue with Russia. He stated that we all agreed that dialogue was needed but disagreements remained over the best way to go about such a dialogue.

Marek Menkiszak

Perceptions of Russia

Mr. Menkiszak began by stating that two very different perceptions have shaped and influenced NATO in its policy towards Russia, and this is because Russia has two faces simultaneously. Russia can be seen as an important strategic partner who can help NATO with issues such as terrorism, missile defence, discussions on crises management, air space initiative, piracy, etc. All these factors underline Russia's role as a partner. However, there is also another perception of Russia amongst NATO members.

Russia as a Challenge and Even a Threat

For him, interpretations of Russia as a challenge or threat were based on several aspects: 1 internal development in Russia, such as concerns over the build up of armed forces and increased defence spending, 2 Russia's disharmonious relations with some neighbour-states, e.g. Moldavia, Belarus, and Georgia. Examples of this include the Russia-Georgian conflict of 2008 and the January 2009 energy crisis with Ukraine. 3 Russian actions against NATO member states, such as the cyber attacks against Estonia, the violation of the Baltic airspace by Russian planes, and provocative military exercises.

Finding a Balance between the Two Approaches

Mr. Menkiszak highlighted that he believed that NATO needs a double/two-track policy vis-à-vis Russian factor. The first policy would involve *Engagement of Russia* where there is potential to co-operate over issues such as Afghanistan and missile defence (understanding also limitations of such cooperation), but he also advocated a policy of *strategic response* addressed at both NATO partners and members who feel themselves vulnerable vis-à-vis Russia. In case of the former, he said NATO should reinforce them (e.g. by contingency plans and exercise policy). In case of the latter by increase of its security and defence cooperation with some states in the CIS area.

Russia as an Internal NATO Problem

Mr. Menkiszak criticized those who advocated only a greater engagement with Russia by saying that Russia is considered by some member states as a challenge or even a military threat and that the invasion of Georgia has reinforced their concerns. They have to be addressed if NATO wants to remain a strong, unified and effective alliance. He said he felt the current imbalance between the so called "old" and so called "new" NATO member states in terms of US and other NATO troops stationing and development of the military infrastructure cannot be maintained any longer. This assessment was largely rejected by some other panellists, who saw the commitments under Article 5 of the NATO treaty as being a strong enough deterrent to prevent Russia from invading any member of the EU and NATO.

Hans-Joachim Spanger

Russia's NATO Syndrome

Mr. Spanger began by arguing that Russia has a NATO syndrome as evidenced by the following observations: (1) There has been virtually no

change in Russian's basic opposition to NATO since 1994; (2) the opposition has been all-encompassing and by no means confined to those parts of society with vested interests in a confrontational posture (such as the military); and (3) there is a conceptual mismatch between the emphasis on new trans-national threats in relevant doctrines and the concurrent references to the fairly traditional threat perceptions when it comes to NATO.

In his view this can be explained by three factors: (1) Russia's 'great power syndrome'. Russia has never accepted being relegated to the sidelines in international affairs and aims at a concert of great powers as the adequate decision-making format. (2) With great power aspirations comes the quest for an 'exclusive sphere of interest' which applies in particular to its post-Soviet neighbourhood, an area of intense competition, but only little room for co-operations. (3) The gradual change in the "international balance of power" because of the rise of the BRIC. This has reinforced the impression of providing new openings in terms of "multipolarity" which is in face the only thing that has visibly changed in favour of Russia.

On the question which steps should be taken to improve relations, Mr. Spanger emphasized that NATO obviously cannot rest on its benign rhetoric and keep wondering why Russia does not subscribe to it. If it were to improve relations with Russia, NATO had to move – in its own interest and in the interest of European security and beyond. He enumerated a number of concrete steps with the overall aim to combine pragmatic moves with a broader vision where NATO and Russia were (preferably jointly) heading. In his view, previous NATO policy with regard to Russia, and its expansion in particular, was lacking such a vision, although the overall approach to combine enlargement with a continuous deepening of NATO's relations with Russia had by no means been destructive. Those steps could include: (1) Establish relations of NATO with the CSTO and the SCO; (2) Engage Russia in the "Corfu Process" on upgrading European security mechanisms; (3) Clarify the relationship between collective defence

or collective security in NATO's new strategic concept; and (4) on Russia the need for Moscow to sort out its relations with NATO directly, not by making them conditional on relations with other states (such as Georgia and Ukraine).

András Rácz

Russian Successes over the Past 15 Months'

Mr. Rácz began his speech by stating that he will 'try to present the Russian side of NATO-Russian relations'. Outlining the Russian perception, he said that Russia perceives NATO as an enemy, as a threat which is expanding towards the Russian borders. In the 15 months since the Georgian conflict, Russia has been very successful vis-à-vis the EU. In order to prove this, he cites 1 the opinion that the EU and US are trying to be friendly towards Russia, something which he considers as a victory for Moscow, 2 that the US reversal on Missile Defence is a victory for Moscow, 3 that further enlargement of NATO eastwards seems to be off the agenda, and 4 that nuclear disarmament is also very favourable towards Russia, as it has outdated weapons and also a policy of arms modernization.

EU-Russian Rivalry

Mr. Rácz stated that Russia prefers bilateral ways of negotiations and will continue to do so and European countries have thus far been more than willing to be partners in a bi-lateral approach. He concluded with a prediction that the Arctic Circle is going to be a future region of conflict between the two powers.

Congress

On the containment versus engagement debate, Mr. Rácz highlighted the importance of America in EU-Russian relations, as America 'makes up

80% of our relations'. He also highlighted Congress's pact on Russia, saying that it is proof that the US wants a stable and strong Russia'.

Panel II. Concluding Remarks

Jiří Schneider

Addressing Internal Divisions

Mr. Schneider concluded by stating that from having heard all the panelists speak, one issue that certainly needs to be addressed is the deep internal divisions within CEE and the EU about how to conduct policy towards Russia.

He also asked 'What is the appropriate approach for the EU? Should the EU aim to empathize with or contain Russia?' He also pledged his dislike towards the idea that relations with Russia should be psycho-analytical, saying that we should instead focus on ourselves (the EU) and what we can do on our own side.

Day 2: Wednesday, November 25th

II. European Energy and Climate Policy - Geopolitics, Environment Protection and Economy as Determinants of the EU Policy

Issues and topics to be discussed: the dependence on Russia and the search for alternative strategies; the reliability of Russian gas and oil supplies in the context of the decreasing Russian capability to explore and develop new

sources; the context of the world economic crisis; the European energy policy and the issues of *responsibility* and *solidarity*; the state-private business relationship in the energy sector; the climate policy and CO₂ reduction targets; the differences in the approaches to nuclear energy.

Opening session

Introductory Address FES/IIR – Vladimír Handl, IIR Prague

Irena Moozová, Representative of the European Commission

H.E. Catherine von Heidenstam, Ambassador of Sweden to the Czech Republic

Vladimír Handl

Mr. Handl reminded the guests in his introductory speech that we discussed very similar issues last year and raised two questions which he felt needed to be answered.

1. *Do we want to engage or contain Russia?*
2. *Is there a regional dimension to energy security policy?*

H. E. Catherine von Heidenstam

Sweden's Position

Ms. von Heidenstam outlined the position of Sweden, the current holders of the EU presidency position, on energy security. She highlighted EU's and Sweden's dependence on Russian energy, presenting statistics which showed that 85% of the gas and almost 100% of the oil that Sweden imports comes from Russia, but she also highlighted that we must not forget that Russia also very much needs the EU.

Irena Moozová

EU 2020 Vision

Ms. Moozová discussed energy security from the point of view of the European Commission and gave a visual presentation outlining the vision for the EU in 2020 and its top 5 priorities, which, according to the presentation, were: solving the economic crises, climate change, new sources of growth and social cohesion, advancing a People's Europe *and* opening a new era of Global Europe.

Dealing With Climate Change

On climate change and energy, she was very normative and prescribed that we decarbonise the electricity supply and transport, exploit the potential of EU environmental friendly industries, adopt policies to combat the challenge of climate change and construct a European super grid for electricity and gas. She also talked about external policy, about how the Lisbon treaty would give the EU a stronger external policy and about the institutional means to put energy priorities into practice.

Early Warning Mechanism

Ms. Moozová said that there was now an enhanced early warning mechanism between EU and Russia, which was met with a cynical response from the panel. Mr. Bartuška stated that he was very sceptical about the concept, stating that 'we all know that if there is a difficulty, we will not be told in advance.'

'Putin or Miller?'

Q: Ms. Moozová asked the question whether Gazprom influenced Russian state policy or whether Russian state policy influenced Gazprom?

A: To this, Mr. Bartuška responded that it is clear from being at meetings with both Alexei Miller (leader of Gazprom) and Prime Minister Putin that Putin is the authoritative figure in the relationship and he tells Gazprom what to do.

Panel III.

"Russia and Geostrategic Dimensions of Energy Security"

Moderation: Volker Weichsel, the Journal "Osteuropa", Berlin

Speakers: CZECH REPUBLIC – Václav Bartuška, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague

SLOVAKIA – Urban Rusnák, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bratislava

GERMANY – Jonas Grätz, SWP, Berlin

HUNGARY – András Deák, CEU Center for Enlargement Studies, Hungary

Q: Volker Weichsel opened the discussion by asking Mr. Václav Bartuška, ambassador at large for energy security under the Czech EU Presidency, whether 'the January 2009 gas crisis gives us strong evidence about what the Russian foreign policy is about?'

Václav Bartuška

Critical of Ukrainian Elites

Mr. Bartuška was very critical of Ukrainian elites, saying that from gas deals done in Ukraine, a lot of money goes into the private pockets of members of the Ukrainian elite.

Future Projects Going Alone or with EU Co-operation

For Mr. Bartuška, however, the central question is whether Russia will open new gas and oil fields with European companies. The question is

whether Russia will opt for a pure Russian solution (it will be their own) or whether it will go there with the aid of multinationals ('then the West is looking into their own private kitchen'). According to Bartuška, 'this will be Putin's decision solely'. The most important factor in deciding this is whether Russia will acquire the know-how to do certain things without service companies (can it buy the know how without the multinational?). If they acquire this know-how, then they will certainly build the oil fields by themselves, in Mr. Bartuška's opinion.

Civil Society

He also compared the lack of civil society in Russia with the system here in Europe, saying that 'in our countries we have NGOs, etc. who don't always obey the government. It is not so in Russia.'

Urban Rusnák

Slovakia Highly Dependent

Mr. Rusnák gave a presentation titled 'Russia and the Geo-Strategic Dimension of Energy Policy – a Slovak Perspective', in which he outlined the different levels of independence and how Slovakia is one of the European nations most dependent on Russian energy. He highlighted how all oil in Slovakia comes from a single country (Russia) and a single transit country (Ukraine) and that there are very few options available as an alternative to this system.

Short and Medium Term Objectives

Next in his presentation, he outlined the short and medium term objectives from the EU perspective. From a short term perspective, the EU will remain a key consumer of Russian raw energy supplies but the EU should aim to diversify its supply routes away from dependence on Russia and

search for a new legal framework in dealing with Russia. From a medium term perspective, he stated that we need to invest in possible solutions and that in this regard the future of the Druzhba pipeline will be an important development.

Jonas Grätz

Using Our Power More Efficiently

Mr. Grätz opened by raising the question whether *Russia* is a reliable partner. To this he answered that currently there is great disagreement between the member states but that Russia is less powerful than is sometimes implied and the EU has more of a capacity to act in a confrontational manner. He also argued that imports of gas from Russia have declined since 1990 and will continue to decline. Mr. Grätz also predicted that Gazprom will remain reliant on the European market place and rejected arguments that Russia will be able to divert its gas supplies to the Chinese or American energy market. In conclusion he stated that Russia is highly dependent and Europeans could use its power more efficiently.

András Deak

Russia a Petro-state

Mr. Deak spoke about energy and Visegrád interests but first, he began with his assessment of Russia, in which he stated that Russia had become totally dependent on oil and is now a petro-state similar to Qatar. Mr. Deak also highlighted the need for all 27 of the EU members to speak with one voice rather than the current de-unified approach. He disagreed with Mr. Grätz's assessment and said that he thinks that the Russian energy agenda is increasingly turning towards the Far East, saying that there are some clear Chinese strategies in the Russia agenda and that EU-Russia

interdependence is declining. ‘Russia is thinking less about EU and more and more about China,’ he stated.

The presentation was followed by a series of open floor questions.

Q: Kai-Olaf Lang of *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)* began by directing a question to Mr. Bartuška, asking ‘What is the stance of the Czech Republic towards the Nord Stream project?’

A: In response Mr. Bartuška stated that since there is no united EU policy, the Czech Republic must defend itself. The Czech Republic needs the transit to go through it. Otherwise it would avoid the Czech Republic and go to Germany.

Concluding Remarks

Mr. Weichsel concluded by stating that in the short term, unilateral measures can be used but that in the long term, an external energy policy is a necessity for the European Security Policy.

Panel IV: “EU Climate Policy, Targets for CO₂ Reduction and the EU Controversy over Nuclear Energy”

Moderation: Lenka Kovačovská, Association for International Affairs, Prague

Speakers: GERMANY – Sascha Müller-Kraenner, Nature Conservancy, Berlin

POLAND – Artur Gradziuk, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM),
Warsaw

SLOVAKIA – Andrea Zlatňanská, Greenpeace Slovakia

CZECH REPUBLIC – Petr Holub, Representative of the Ministry of Environment,
Prague

HUNGARY – András Perger, Energia Klub, Budapest

Lenka Kovačovská

Timely Discussion

After giving a brief introduction to the topic that was being discussed to the participants of the panel, Ms. Kovačovská gave a short speech. She stated that the topic being discussed (the issue of climate change) is especially important due to the fact that it is being discussed just two weeks before the Copenhagen Summit. She also stressed the pioneering role that the EU is playing in fighting climate change. However, she also raised the question which she felt needed to be asked: ‘Is the EU the pioneer leading the climate change agenda?’ Finally, Kovačovská opened the floor to the speakers by relating climate change to the EU – Russia relationship. She gave a few facts in regard to this like that the Central and Eastern European countries are almost 100% dependent on the gas which is supplied from Russia. Also, she pondered some questions like ‘If the EU decides to go back to nuclear energy, which technology should it use, and where are they going to enrich the uranium?’

Sascha Müller-Kraenner

EU Not Meeting Reduction Targets

Sascha Müller-Kraenner started his speech by claiming that climate change has become one of the themes that characterize EU – Russia relations. The reasons for why the EU is attributing so much importance to climate change and the increase of awareness among Russian politicians and citizens of this issue were detailed. Regarding the Copenhagen Summit, Müller-Kraenner analyzed the importance of the Russian participation and Russia’s importance as an actor in fighting the climate change. He asked why the EU and other countries are not reaching their long term reduction targets. Also, the difficulties that many countries face in fulfilling the

settled criteria were discussed and a transition period for developing countries (which they need) was proposed. Furthermore, the need of building climate diplomacy and appointing people to deal with climate change was discussed. Examples of such diplomacy were given between the European countries and their delegations to China. Further proposals and areas to explore were provided, such as expanding the climate diplomacy to other countries as well as technology cooperation between countries.

Artur Gradziuk

CO₂ Emissions Reduction – The Polish Perspective

In his presentation Mr. Gradziuk elaborated on CO₂ emissions reduction in Poland and nuclear energy prospects. He provided a detailed chart of GHG emissions reduction in Poland between 1989 and 2007, stressing that in spite of almost full dependence on coal in electricity and heat generation, Poland succeeded in lowering its CO₂ emissions substantially. He indicated Polish concerns, proposals in the negotiations as well as the consequences of the implementation of the EU energy and climate change package.

Nuclear Energy

Mr. Gradziuk also reviewed the arguments in favour of building nuclear power plants along with the concerns involved, presenting a timetable of the nuclear energy program in Poland and its potential impact on electricity production by 2030. Naming climate change and energy security among key challenges for policymakers, he stressed that the two issues were interwoven.

Andrea Zlatňanská

Nuclear Not Tackling the Issue

Ms. Zlatňanská was asked whether nuclear energy is the right way forward or whether, instead, a revolutionary approach should be taken to tackle climate change. She combined both the EU and the Slovak approach to the issue. Although climate change is not a great concern in Slovak politics, a strategy for fighting climate change was provided by Slovakia. In particular the building of a power plant was mentioned. Furthermore, the steps that the EU is taking in fighting this problem were not seen as strong enough. While the EU aims to reduce greenhouse emissions by 20%, in reality a 40% decrease is needed.

Wind, Not Nuclear Energy, Is the Way Forward

Ms. Zlatňanská also claimed that nuclear energy is a case of too little too late. Even if 32 reactors were built per year, it would still only yield a 6% reduction in greenhouse gases by 2050. Moreover, such a strategy is neither practical nor possible. However, she did propose that the EU should move towards other solutions, such as wind energy and other renewable. Much data was provided in support of wind energy as it was argued that it is one of the efficient ways of fighting climate change and reducing emissions.

She perceives the ENEF (European Nuclear Energy Forum) as “just a circus”, by no means independent and objective, as it is used for promotion of Slovak and Czech pro-nuclear ambitions. Talking about the Slovak government approach, Ms. Zlatňanská described it as strongly pro-nuclear, as the government subsidises nuclear and supports it publicly.

Petr Holub

Czech Republic Needs Nuclear Power

Petr Holub based his speech on topics that had been discussed during the conference. His first remark was that there is a need for the construction of a nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is exporting 18% of its electricity abroad, and the nuclear power plants are going to be supplied with fuel from Russia.

Relations with Russia: Finding a Middle Ground

However, in regard to the relations between the EU and Russia, especially regarding energy policy, Holub proposed that both the EU and the Czech Republic should find a middle ground. They should not be afraid when they deal with Russia but at the same time they should be aware that Russia is not a stable partner, as history has shown, which is further evidenced by the gas crisis that occurred last year. Further aspects of energy security were discussed, such as a more environmentally friendly economy promotion and the differences between the centralized and decentralized power systems.

András Perger

Reduction Targets Are Declarations Rather than Guarantees

In his presentation, András Perger discussed EU climate policy, targets for CO₂ reduction and the EU controversy over nuclear energy. Perger outlined the main issues and challenges of climate change policy and the greenhouse gas emissions. He raised awareness of the capability of the EU of reaching the targets set in the Kyoto Protocol. In his point of view, these were political declarations rather than any guarantees of fulfilling the commitments. Furthermore, the future of the coal subsidy in the EU

and the relation between the EU and ETS were argued about. Perger also mentioned the difficulties that the EU is facing in regard to nuclear energy and the bad experiences that it had in the past. Other issues discussed were the expansion of nuclear energy towards the East, the problems that such movement brings with it and whether the targets for renewable resources would be achieved.

Subsequent Debate

Changing Russian Attitudes to Climate Change

In the subsequent debate, one of the main points of the discussion was the change of the Russian attitude towards climate change and whether this reaction had balanced the opportunities and the challenges. As a reflection of the raised question, Müller-Kraenner noted that in Russia, what is happening now is the same as what happened in Europe almost 20 years ago: a lot of half knowledge is now being replaced by real knowledge, and the policymakers in Russia are learning more and more about what the effects of global warming are. Moreover, it was argued that there is now a consensus among the elites in EU that the costs of global warming are real and need to be taken seriously. Müller-Kraenner also emphasized that, similarly to contemporary Russia, it took a while for the USA to join the debate on climate change.

Q: Is there a national consensus on moving towards nuclear energy and does the region play a role in the dialogue?

A: Petr Holub claimed that there is no national consensus on the issue. Instead, there is a fierce political fight on the issue. Regarding the regional cooperation, he followed by saying that the Czech Republic's cooperation depends on circumstances.

However, Sascha Müller-Kraenner took a different stand in his answer, which was related to the German consensus. He argued that the new coalition formed in Germany is against the building of any new nuclear power plant. In his opinion, in the last number of years, there was a consensus about the position created in the EU.

A similar answer was given by András Perger, who stated that there is a national consensus in Hungary on nuclear energy and that this spring, 96% of the Members of the Hungarian Parliament voted for the construction of nuclear power plants. However, when it comes to regional cooperation, he claims that not much dialogue is taking place between the Visegrád countries regarding nuclear energy.

Andrea Zlatňanská pointed out that the Slovak strategy does not have a clear consensus, and she also noted that the European Nuclear Forum should play a more active role in the issues of nuclear energy.

According to Artur Gradziuk, Poland's major political parties did not object to the government's plans to construct nuclear power plants in the country, although some segments of the public remained sceptical. He added that the Polish government was organizing consultations with other countries to learn about their experiences in building nuclear power plants. In reaction to the presentation of Andrea Zlatňanská, he presented some arguments questioning her approach to nuclear energy as a misguided solution in climate change mitigation.

Concluding Remarks

In the end, a conclusion was made by Mr. Adam. He stated that the reason for why a panel discussing EU climate change should be included in a conference that is mainly about EU-Russia relations is that there are such large differences of opinion among EU member states. Furthermore, he added that last year, Germany had been accused of increasing its dependence on

Russia by deciding to drop its nuclear program, but as this panel showed, we need to continue the debate on how we define future policies of climate change and energy efficiency.

Mr. Adam concluded by stating that 'we all want a more decisive EU that would bring the different opinions closer together, and I hope that we will have a continuation of the debate'.

Evaluation of the Conference

Consensus building remains an important precondition for effective co-ordination of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. The conference came at an important period in EU-Russian relations, as it came just prior to the Copenhagen summit and 15 months after the invasion of Georgia. The broad range of panellists coming from government institutions, EU institutions, think-tanks, universities and NGOs highlighted the broad range of perspectives at the regional and European level on the critical issues being discussed during the conference. Given the differences and competing interests, it was difficult to form a cohesive attitude in regard to the issues discussed at the conference, and this highlighted how difficult it is to reach a consensus at the EU level. It also showed that in regard to issues of EU-Russian relations, energy security and climate change, the CEE countries and Germany are not unified in their approach. The conference should be viewed as a further proof of EU divergences and differentiation as well as co-operation, and it is an important contribution to the discourse of EU-Russian relations.



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