American Indian Culture and Economic Development in the Twentieth Century

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AND
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Foreword

The day finally arrived in the late twentieth century when American Indians became an economic force to be dealt with in the U.S. business world. Previously, American Indian communities and their tribal governments had reacted to U.S. actions and policies. Now the rest of America began responding to American Indian enterprises, largely as a result of the success of Indian gaming, an annual $10 billion industry involving over 200 tribes in twenty-four states. As a result, American Indian economic development in the twentieth century marked the greatest pivotal change in Native American history. How did this happen? The seeds of successful economic practices had already been sown in the reservation lands of American Indian tribes. There were hard times and lessons to be learned. That enormous change and how it has occurred throughout Indian country are what this book addresses.

Brian Hosmer and Colleen O'Neill have carefully chosen essays that broadly cover Indian country, ranging from the late nineteenth century to the present. These important studies are about commerce and incorporation, wage

work, methodology, and theoretical implications. These salient case studies are written by established scholars and younger scholars, native and nonnative, for a well-balanced approach to reveal inside accounts of the rise of American Indian economic development and cultural change in modern native history.

American Indians learned the values of their colonizer—the Anglo-Americans. By the late nineteenth century, Indians understood such values and began to operate in the capitalistic system of big business. But have Indian business leaders gone too far? Have they assimilated into the mainstream so they are no longer Indians? The answer and the key to understanding the tragedy and triumph of American Indian capitalism are provided in the chapters of this book. And the story is more complicated than anyone immediately realizes. American Indians have always operated within a system of multiple trade relations, temporary agreements, kinship alliances, and military confederations. These relationships shaped their economies in ways scholars are just beginning to understand.

The history of business between Indians and the white man has been one of trade and exploitation, with a long tradition of bartering, capitalism, and power. This long history was unfair to the Indians because they were forced to adhere to the white man's business system. Eventually, native peoples lost property and their homelands while holding on to 2 percent of their original lands. Eager opportunists took advantage of Indian people who could not read or write and whose command of English was often inadequate. The systems of values and dealings were different between Indians and whites, and Indians learned the white ways at their own expense.

The Indians' lack of cultural materials produced an uncontrolled change among Indian communities. Tribe after tribe quickly became dependent on the white man's material goods, such as metal cooking utensils and guns. The growing need for these items undermined native peoples' ability to control events within their own communities. External influences became too great, as Indians' desire for white goods increased. In fact, native peoples became too dependent on the mainstream and on the federal government. Whereas before they had depended on their natural environments for their livelihoods, the shift of dependency to a paternalistic federal government and an opportunistic mainstream re-educated American Indians in white ways and capitalism. But native peoples held on to their basic values, as well as to their hope, identity, and integrity. They would change yet still remain "Indian." They were flexible enough to control this change.

As a result, Indian acculturation of mainstream materialism began to change native peoples to a certain degree. Their mind-sets were no longer purely native. Through increasing contact with Anglo-Americans, Indian people found themselves leaving reservations during the late nineteenth century to work on ranches and in Wild West shows. Indians in the business world actually constituted the workforce, supplying labor for backbreaking jobs. All of this began to change as the pendulum of Indian business began to swing toward a new cycle, starting with mixed-bloods who well understood the American capitalist system.

Change was under the control of native people and their tribal communities, and controlling such change became important for their survival. A suppressed people can experience limited sovereignty in their lives as long as they have hope and their basic identity remains intact. These dynamics of controlled change and acceptance of acculturation remained internal within Indian communities. Factionalism and kinship influences abounded as they normally did, but the real threat to Indian livelihood and forced change came externally—from the federal government and American culture.

In these pages strong arguments are made case after case for the success of American Indian sovereignty in devising a new culture that has borrowed much from the American mainstream. But Indians are in control. That control remains vibrant with each passing decade as native business and tribal leaders have learned how to deal effectively with the white man's linear world. One might even say native systems have meshed with non-Indian systems in an Indian-white business world. The arguments are convincing, and the evidence is here to tell a new story of how native peoples have incorporated external culture into their communities and their thinking.

The dawn of a new American Indian culture emerged in the twentieth century, as substantiated in the following chapters. This new culture of native ingenuity is being shaped with each new opportunity as indigenous leaders in various positions seek to advance the interests of their people. This is a new era of American Indian history, and this important book opens the door to understanding a new Indian-white relationship while advancing into the twenty-first century. Collectively, this well-conceived volume is an enlightening native pathway toward an invigorating American Indian history of old and new values operating in a complex Indian-white world.

—DONALD L. FIXICO
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

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they reflect on their historical journeys and imagine possible pathways ahead. Thanks to our families, John and Laura Nelson and Victoria and Megan Hosmer, who never allowed us to wander too far off course.

This book began with an e-mail and a phone call, blossomed into a session at a professional conference, and then took shape as we solicited contributions and edited submissions. We hope the final product is a timely and useful contribution. What has emerged is as much dialogue as anything else, the end product somewhere beyond but still elaborating the initial idea. If this is the purpose of such edited volumes, then we have met the challenge.

Native Pathways

CHAPTER ONE

Rethinking Modernity and the Discourse of Development in American Indian History, an Introduction

COLLEEN O'NEILL

> Simon was world famous, at least famous on the Spokane Indian Reservation, for driving backward. He always obeyed posted speed limits, traffic signals and signs, even minute suggestions. But he drove in reverse, using the rearview mirror as his guide. But what could I do? I trusted the man, and when you trust a man you also have to trust his horse.
>
> —SHERMAN ALEXIE, *The Lone Ranger and Tonto Fistfight in Heaven*[1]

One afternoon several years ago I was browsing through the stacks in the library, and I stumbled on a book entitled *Stories of Traditional Navajo Life and Culture.* That book, published in 1977 by the Navajo Community College Press and edited by its director, Broderick Johnson, included stories from twenty-two Navajo men and women about their "traditional culture."[2]

Traditional culture? My research was on twentieth-century labor and working-class history. I was interested in "the modern." So the book sat on my desk for weeks while I tried to sort out the "modern" evidence I'd found in the archives, stories that were at best fragmented snapshots. Most troubling were the absences, the invisibility of Navajo workers in the documents. Where were the Navajo workers? Surely Navajo men worked in the coal mines in Gallup,

The author would like to thank Tisa Wenger, Flannery Burke, Michelle Nickerson, Benjamin Johnson, and John Nelson for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this chapter.

one of the most industrialized towns bordering the reservation in the mid-twentieth century. I pored over payroll and company housing records, newspaper accounts, and company correspondence and found little evidence that could help me describe the experience or even the existence of Navajo workers in Gallup in the 1930s and 1940s.

When I finally opened the book that promised, at least in my imagination, sacred stories of emergence and fables that stressed values of pastoral traditions, I found something that made me reexamine my assumptions: workers. Almost every narrator in the book told a story about some sort of wage work—working on the railroads, in the agriculture fields, for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, or at a trading post. They remembered the everyday struggles they faced in their jobs, as well as their ongoing efforts to fulfill customary kinship and ceremonial obligations. For these Navajos, "modernity" and "tradition" were overlapping, not mutually exclusive, categories. Navajo people met their sacred responsibilities as well as the demands of the capitalist workplace.

This research vignette illustrates how one's underlying assumptions about culture, tradition, and modernity shape modes of inquiry as well as the eventual narratives—large and small. The rigid modern/traditional dichotomy that too often marks historical writing is a by-product of a larger problem that renders American Indians invisible within the broad narrative of American history. That narrative, steeped in positivist assumptions, tends to embrace and naturalize a universalized notion of modernity.[3]

Modernity, as a guiding social principle or state ideology, emerged during the eighteenth century. Enlightenment thinkers challenged the basic worldview and social structures of Western European society, rejecting the absolute power of kings and the association of knowledge with the realm of Christianity. They advocated a rationalization of power, ideas, and social relationships. As geographer David Harvey explains, "It was, above all, a secular movement that sought the demystification and desacralization of knowledge and social organization in order to liberate human beings from their chains."[4] Part of that modernizing project involved seeking universal truths about human nature through scientific observation, logic, and reason. Proponents were, of course, assuming that there was *a* universal humanity to be revealed. In the search for a singular truth and the application of reason to political and economic realms, Enlightenment leaders generalized that which was "true" for Western European societies to the rest of the world. As states contested for power in Europe and in their colonial holdings abroad, the "appeal to reason" increasingly informed expansionist ideology, justifying conquest of indigenous peoples as

well as provoking opposition from nationalists throughout Europe in the mid-nineteenth century.[5]

"Rule by reason" had its price. As Eric Wolf argued in his final book, its practitioners became the "apostles of modernity," and up to this day they "readily tag others as opponents of progress." Wolf continues, "[T]hey have advocated industrialization, specialization, secularization, and rational bureaucratic allocation as reasoned options superior to unreasoned reliance on tradition."[6] Modernity has become synonymous with capitalism, and that narrative, a history in which Indians are portrayed as irrelevant victims of military and economic conquest, pronounces the "cultural death" of indigenous peoples in twentieth-century America.[7] It seems there is no room for tradition in a modern context.

Yet the lived reality of American Indians in the twentieth century proves otherwise and makes us rethink the kinds of analytical categories that for so long have rendered them invisible. Like historian David Roediger, who helped us recognize whiteness, we need to lay bare the assumptions of what constitutes modernity.[8] The chapters in this volume help us recognize how American Indians transcended these rigid categories and created alternative pathways of economic and cultural change that were not merely static renditions of some timeless past or total acceptance of U.S. capitalist culture. American Indians in the twentieth century blended their modern and traditional worlds as a matter of course and in the process redefined those categories in ways that made sense to them.

This introductory chapter is an attempt to rethink the modern/traditional dichotomy and to consider how that construct has informed ethnohistorical thinking about American Indian economic development. It is an effort to stimulate a conversation that examines the relationship between American Indian culture and capitalism by suggesting ways American Indian histories challenge underlying assumptions about modernity itself. Revisiting the terms of the debate may inspire scholars and policy makers to see American Indian cultural and economic innovations as neither "modern" nor "pre-modern" nor even "antimodern." Instead, we are suggesting that American Indians have crafted alternative pathways of economic development that transcend linear analytical categories. This chapter will explore that intellectual history and raise questions that complicate our notions of modernity to reveal a much more complicated past—a past vividly described by the contributors to this volume.

Authors in *Native Pathways* represent a variety of disciplinary approaches and theoretical models, each engaging the literature on culture and economic

development in critical new ways. They examine how class formation, gender, race, and cultural practices shaped capitalist incorporation of American Indian communities—a historical process that influenced the nature of wage work, the ways indigenous people produced "for the market," and how they weathered shifts in federal policy. We hope this volume inspires a meaningful dialogue among academics, activists, and policy makers, those who are developing new ways to understand American Indian historical struggles and who are initiating new pathways toward decolonization.

TRADITION AND MODERNIZATION

The categories "modern" and "traditional" have survived a long and sordid history of draconian and paternalistic federal policies, as well as internal debates among American Indian communities. Those categories describe a cultural position wherein American Indians define and are defined by their relationship to the American capitalist economy, with all its political, cultural, and economic features. "Tradition" acquires meaning in relation to the "modern." The modern is the benchmark against which tradition is measured. And at least since the Enlightenment, the concept of the modern has been linked to the notion of "progress."[9]

The modern and traditional dichotomy is a product of modernization theory, a linear way of thinking about economic change that has shaped ideas about development as well as our understanding of dependency. Embraced by development "experts" in the post–World War II era, its underlying assumptions about culture and economic development date back to the mid-nineteenth century.[10] "Building on positivist notions of Western Enlightenment and 19th-century conceptions of evolution," according to historian Kathy Le Mons Walker, at the heart of modernization theory are the social evolutionary notions "that all cultures follow unilinear and evolutionary stages of development."[11] Infused with ideological notions of the "white man's burden," modernization theory linked the expansion of capitalist relations into nonstate, indigenous societies as a measure of progress. It was a self-congratulatory embrace of capitalist values and logic that legitimized the expansion of Western imperialist powers worldwide.

Modernization theory has had a lasting impact on development policy, shaping intellectual paradigms and policy initiatives well into the twentieth century.[12] Scholars and policy makers concluded that the "neoclassic modeling of economic behavior that described the logic of incentive, disincentive, and growth in the advanced West could also describe the logic of economic

backwardness and felicitous take-off in non-Western regions."[13] Developing countries would have everything to gain and nothing to lose from following the example of the West. In fact, these theorists argued that clinging to those "archaic and outdated structures" kept American Indians poor and at the margins of the U.S. economy.[14] Clearly ethnocentric and, at best, paternalistic, modernization theory shaped the foundations of American Indian policy from the development of the first boarding schools and reservation land allotments to the Indian New Deal and Termination.[15] The central thread that connected these sometimes contradictory policies was that success, or, for that matter, survival within the capitalist economic system, required cultural change. Western society became synonymous with the "modern" and therefore was not only desirable but also the ultimate cultural destination on the road to economic development.

DEPENDENCY AND THE DISCOURSE OF DEVELOPMENT

Dependency theory emerged as a counterbalance to modernization theory as the debates over development and modernization were taking shape in the midst of the decolonization struggles in Africa and Latin America.[16] Instead of viewing the inevitable capitalist transformation as a purveyor of prosperity, dependency theorists saw the extension of the capitalist economy to developing regions as one of the causes of poverty and cultural degradation.

Underdevelopment was more than an early stage of capitalist progress. Impoverished regions in the Third World were not just lagging behind the industrialized West. Borrowing from Latin American critics of dependency theory and incorporating the core-periphery concept, Andre Gunder Frank argued that capitalist development and underdevelopment were part of the same process. Coining the phrase "development of underdevelopment," he called for a global analysis of the historical development of capitalism, suggesting that capitalism's success hinged on the underdevelopment of peripheral countries. Feudal relationships in Latin America were a product of capitalist expansion, not a "backward" stage of economic development. Capitalist world markets had determined Latin American class relations ever since the Spanish arrived on American shores in the late fifteenth century.[17]

The use of dependency theory to explain Native American history in the United States has had extraordinary staying power for American scholars, activists, and officials.[18] Drawing on the work of Latin Americanists and African scholars, dependency theory offered intellectuals, policy experts, and community activists an explanatory model for understanding why Native Americans

suffered such extreme poverty on Indian reservations in the United States. They found that, like African and Latin American peasants, American Indians suffered from a legacy of colonial exploitation. For example, dependency theorists argued that unequal trade restrictions between countries at the "core" and those in the "periphery" undermined the development of Latin American economies. Advanced capitalist countries siphoned the financial surplus from developing nations, preventing them from accumulating sufficient capital to develop an internal industrial base.

In 1971 anthropologist Joseph Jorgensen incorporated Frank's dependency model to show that incorporation into the U.S. political economy created desperate economic conditions on Indian reservations. Writing against the functionalist paradigm, an anthropological approach primarily concerned with American Indian assimilation, Jorgensen stated that "Indian poverty does not represent an evolutionary stage of acculturation." Contrary to what the functionalists assumed, incorporation into the U.S. market was not a solution. It was the root of the problem.[19]

Jorgensen described the relationship between the United States and American Indian communities as a history of super-exploitation. Drawing from Frank's metropolis-satellite model, he applied his analysis of the relationship between developing nations and advanced industrial states to the relationship between the United States and its Native American environs. Jorgensen argued that "the conditions of the 'backward' modern American Indians are not due to rural isolation nor [to] a tenacious hold on aboriginal ways, but result from the way in which United States urban centers of finance, political influence, and power have grown in expense of rural areas." The growth of the metropolis, Jorgensen explained, depended largely on the wealth farmers, ranchers, railroads, and mining companies expropriated from Indian lands. Although rural people of all races suffered from the underdevelopment of the countryside, Indians remained formally disenfranchised, under the tutelage of a bureaucratic system—"special neocolonial institutions such as tribal governments which exercise[d] only a modicum of control over their affairs."[20]

Historian Richard White, in his examination of how U.S. policies undermined Native American subsistence strategies, not only incorporated the broad dependency frameworks suggested by Frank and Jorgensen but also examined how "underdevelopment" impacted the land and indigenous cultural practices. Drawing from the work of anthropologists and other social scientists who were thinking about capitalist development and underdevelopment in the Third World, his work shows the existence of similar types of historical

dynamics in the United States. In the Navajo case, he argues that federal restrictions and non-Indian settlement patterns circumscribed Navajo land-use methods. Confiscation of livestock and enforcement of strict grazing limits undermined the subsistence base for many Navajo families and forced them into the wage labor market, into a dependency relationship with the federal government, or both.[21]

Dependency theory supplied an emerging Pan-Indian, nationalist movement with a fundamental explanation for what caused Native American impoverishment and connected that struggle with other liberation movements in the United States and abroad. But like nationalist discourse in general, it was rife with internal tensions and contradictions. As Partha Chatterjee has suggested, nationalist discourse both contests the "alleged inferiority of the colonized peoples" and asserts "that a backward nation could 'modernize' itself while retaining its cultural identity." The result is a discursive trap. According to Chatterjee, nationalism "produced a discourse in which, even as it challenged the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the very intellectual premises of 'modernity' on which colonial domination was based."[22] By contesting the legitimacy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and demanding control over natural resources, the discourse of dependency and the discourse of development were two sides of the same coin. Activists and advocates demanded an end to super-exploitation but did not challenge the goal of capitalist development. The dependency paradigm provided a compelling set of political objectives, including control over land, political sovereignty, and a moral case for retribution, but it prohibited a discussion of alternative models of development. Scholars and activists then faced the prospect of choosing between "tradition," which relegated culture to a timeless past, or "modernity," a homogeneous future within the dominant capitalist society. The dichotomy is preserved, only in reverse as "romantic primitivism or crude nationalism."[23]

Scholars and policy specialists employing a dependency paradigm have revealed much about exploitation of indigenous people in the United States. Whereas the dependency paradigm offered insight into the structural causes of poverty on Indian reservations, universal assumptions about the relationship between capitalism and Native American culture embedded in that framework obscured the role of indigenous people in crafting alternative strategies or pathways of development. If capitalism required a specific set of historical experiences, including alienation from the land, dependence on wage labor, and a culture that valued individualism, then how could a people like the

Navajo create their own version of that system without losing all that was central to their cultural identity?

Even the noted anthropologist David Aberle, a strong advocate of Navajo rights and an expert in Navajo affairs, could not imagine alternatives that fell outside the parameters of the dependency paradigm. In 1969 he explained to the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress that "Navajo country is an underdeveloped area." According to Aberle, "[I]ts historical and current relations with the larger polity, economy and society" caused such impoverishment. Like the dependency experts designing programs that would allow Latin American countries to "catch up" to the more industrialized world, Aberle argued, federal policies deprived the Navajo of capital and needed serious reform.

With "a good deal of reflection on the condition of underdeveloped economies in the world today," he recounted how the BIA had underdeveloped the Navajo Reservation. First and foremost, the Navajos did not have "the capital or the know-how to achieve development." Second, the Bureau of Indian Affairs was in no position to help, since Congress and the states were unwilling to supply the agency with adequate funds. Finally, private industry had expressed little interest in investing in industrial development on the reservation.[24] Like development experts who were fashioning programs for the Third World, Aberle saw the Navajo economy as something that could be fixed to follow the well-worn path toward capitalist development. But much to his credit, Aberle knew Navajos themselves would determine the success of development efforts. Although he shared the view that the ultimate goal was industrialization, he believed the Navajos needed to control that process. Academics and specialists were there to offer the Navajo people their services, not to dictate policy. The Navajos should not be just part of a planning team, stressed Aberle: "The solution is for Navajos to plan for themselves, drawing on such advice as they wish, whether from the Bureau and other Federal agencies, Congressmen, universities, management consultants, private industry and whatever experts they need."[25]

Aberle's perspective, although sensitive to Navajo cultural imperatives, fell well within the development discourse of the post–World War II era. Latin American anthropologist Arturo Escobar argues that development experts of that generation conceived of Third World "problems" in ways that suggested limited solutions. According to those scholars and policy specialists, Third World communities suffered from a lack of capital and insufficient industrialization. For these experts "[t]he only things that counted," according to Escobar, "were increased savings, growth rates, attracting foreign capital, developing

industrial capacity, and so on." This narrow discourse, then, prohibited alternative solutions that conceived of social change in egalitarian and culturally specific terms. Escobar concludes that this postwar climate preempted an analysis of economic development "as a whole life project, in which the material aspects would be not the goal and the limit but a space of possibilities for broader individual and collective endeavors, culturally defined."[26] Aberle's analysis and the solutions he proposed for improving economic conditions on the Navajo Reservation implied (like his counterparts described by Escobar who were devising plans for Latin America and Africa) a model of development measured by the "yardstick of Western progress."[27] That Aberle could at once critique the system he found responsible for the impoverished status of Indian reservations and yet find solutions for those problems within that same system demonstrates how this paradigm prevented alternative ways of thinking about the past, understanding current problems, and planning for the future.

Since the 1970s, cultural anthropologists and other social scientists studying Africa and Latin America have generally rejected modernization frameworks, but they have yet to reexamine their assumptions about modernity.[28] As William Roseberry and Jay O'Brien suggest, even scholars who are careful not to reproduce positivist paradigms still assign analytical categories that are only meaningful relative to a universal capitalist narrative. Thus, "traditional" only acquires meaning in relation to the modern; forms of exchange that do not conform to capitalist definitions are defined for what they are not. According to Roseberry and O'Brien, an analysis of "non-Western economics and politics . . . founders on the unrecognized use of capitalist categories or categories designed to illuminate Western capitalist life."[29] The traditional remains part of the unchanging past, and culture occupies a temporal space that exists outside of history. Modernity becomes the moment when history begins, and culture remains the product of precapitalist memory. Capitalist categories remain the historical benchmarks that define the significant moments, elements, and actors that bring about social change.

In the 1980s, Native American activists and scholars moved beyond the dependency paradigm to question Western-style industrialization—a goal all participants in the development discourse seemed to accept as a given. At the heart of the problem, according to Ward Churchill, were the assumptions about modernization that Marxists as well as liberal scholars had failed to examine. He argued that Marxists refused to consider issues that countered a positivist understanding of history, a perspective that saw industrialization as a necessary

step toward human liberation.[30] Churchill's comments condemned leftist scholars in the United States for applying "European ideology" to American history. He argued that American Marxists' inability to offer a satisfying analysis of Native American history centers on their refusal to accommodate questions of land, culture, and spirituality. Churchill found that a materialist approach, one that assumes a fundamental division between nature and culture, lacks explanatory depth for Native Americans. As he and other Native American leaders and scholars have suggested, many Native Americans have historically articulated a more holistic and cyclical vision of human relationships to the land and to the past.[31] Churchill's critique echoes Escobar's analysis of the postwar development discourse. Because industrialization remains the final goal among Marxists as well as more conservative agency officials, alternatives that do not embrace an industrial worldview are shut out of the debate.

Critics have argued that world systems and dependency analysis tend to minimize the historical specificity of capitalist development. More important, they suggest, are the ways local historical dynamics shaped incorporation into the capitalist market, from the development of commercial markets to the creation of colonial labor systems. The ensuing debates over dependency theory, world systems, and mode of production analysis moved the literature on the colonial and developing world beyond the mechanistic formulas critics often characterized as teleological or economically deterministic.[32] Scholars influenced by social history and anthropological methodology stressed the importance of scrutinizing the historical specificity of colonial expansion and the internal dynamics of "receiving" societies.[33]

The problem is not necessarily with the concepts of the traditional and the modern but with the dichotomous manner in which they are employed. That dichotomy paints a picture of American Indian history in polar extremes, leaving very little room to act in ways that defy the rigid and static construct.[34] It is a false dichotomy for American Indians. They exist in a world where the two cultural categories fold into one another. So why not discard the categories once and for all? The notion of "tradition" as a cultural indicator of "difference" is primarily a Euro-American construct. Yet it would be wrong to discard these terms altogether, since the categories themselves have become important cultural markers for American Indians. "Modern" and "traditional" retained significant currency among native communities throughout the twentieth century. Asserting their "traditional" rights has become a significant strategy for American Indian communities as they struggle over decolonization. Navajos who have resisted relocation at Big Mountain since 1974 serve as a relatively

recent example of American Indians' political use of "tradition." Their spiritual and cultural strategies powerfully frame their opposition to relocation in ways that endow them with moral authority and symbolize the essence of Navajo-ness. Part of their efforts has included documenting sacred places to support claims to the land under the 1978 American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Although Indian activists have insisted that this law is ineffective, it has provided Big Mountain residents with some strategic advantage and postponed relocation, at least for the near future. Setting aside those terms ignores the ways American Indians have engaged those concepts, a process that at times amounts to a dynamic history of cultural reinvention.[35]

Asserting the "traditional" as a political strategy or as an alternative way of living and seeing the world has had measured success in forcing the U.S. and Canadian governments to cede physical and epistemological terrain to native peoples.[36] As Chris Paci and Lisa Krebs demonstrate in their insightful discussion of traditional ecological knowledge in this volume, indigenous peoples, in Canada in particular, are shaping development policies in their homelands by insisting on access to their land and meaningful incorporation of their perspectives into conservation measures. Native peoples are asserting the value of local knowledge in land-use planning, as well as the importance of decentering notions of conservation and other concepts about nature steeped in Western scientific tradition.

Despite the efforts of some American Indian communities to evoke "tradition" in their struggles to gain political rights and power over land and resources, their frame of reference remains a kind of universalized modernity, a development discourse that emerged out of nineteenth-century economic theory and policy applications that were devastating to American Indian existence. Whereas asserting "tradition" may be a useful resistance strategy, a way to maintain cultural and economic sovereignty and to counterbalance the impact of colonialism on American Indian culture, the modern/traditional dichotomy nonetheless remains problematic for those concerned about issues of culture and economic development. Some scholars have addressed this issue by examining the ways subaltern groups have evoked "imagined and archaic pasts" as a strategy to resist modernizing forces.[37] But is it enough to view indigenous cultures as socially constructed within modernizing contexts or to see cultural traditions as constituting "imagined communities"? Roseberry and O'Brien argue that seeing the "natural as historical" or the "traditional as modern" merely preserves the dichotomous paradigm. Rather, they contend "that there have been a variety of modern tracks toward the traditional [so]

that with the construction of different household economies, different ethnicities, and so on, the (combined and uneven) development of the modern world has created worlds of social, economic, and cultural difference."[38] Tradition and modernity are expressions of "difference" rather than historical benchmarks that distinguish a particular community's place in time. Indigenous peoples have developed new traditions in modernizing contexts and in the process have contested the terms of modernity itself. These efforts are not necessarily conservative rejections of capitalist change. In some cases American Indian communities have embraced capitalist forms. Yet as the chapters in this volume show, they have done so in ways that cultivate and support their traditional ways, demonstrating that many paths to capitalist development might exist.

UNIVERSALIZED MODERNITY

Modernity is a culturally specific, historical construct, yet the concept remains stubbornly reified as some sort of natural historical phenomenon. As Joseph Gusfield described in 1967, "We cannot easily separate modernity and tradition from some *specific* tradition and some *specific* modernity, some version which functions ideologically as a directive. The modern comes to the traditional society as a particular culture with its own traditions."[39] The use of universal categories of capitalist development defines a particular kind of historical narrative. Theoretical paradigms that posit subsistence ways of life against proletarian experiences and the traditional versus the modern render historically invisible economic systems that do not fit within those dualistic parameters. Recognizing the coexistence of modernity and tradition within the same historical time and space and refusing to think of culture as purely a terrain of resistance reveals a much more complicated and compelling story. As historian Kathy Walker suggests from her study of Chinese peasants, "Alternative pasts indicate a counter-appropriation of history that simply cannot be reduced to a logic of capitalist development or universalized modernity. They must be explained on their own terms."[40] Reaching for historical specificity does not mean ignoring the bigger picture or abandoning the work of capitalist theory. On the contrary, moving beyond the "discourse of development," to use Arturo Escobar's term, means creating new theoretical models to help make sense out of the multiple histories that are bound to emerge once we remove the paradigmatic blinders.

American historians can learn a great deal from scholars studying the ways rural peoples in the Third World have shaped and been shaped by capitalist

development. Peasant and subaltern studies scholars have chipped away at assumptions that had previously characterized peasant societies as undifferentiated, or "traditional," and peasant uprisings as reactive and conservative. In effect, they opened Marx's "sack of potatoes" to look inside. What they found were complex societies divided along wealth, gender, and age hierarchies and united by kinship and other socially constructed identities. Third World social scientists found that peasants, a social category once defined as "precapitalist," existed within capitalist structures as well as on the periphery of the world system. These scholars wondered how the internal dynamics of peasant cultures mediated their interactions with the world economy, how they resisted absorption into the capitalist market, as well as how they accommodated to it. This type of scholarship produced a nuanced view that expanded definitions of resistance beyond collective uprising and revolution to oppositional popular culture, nationalism, gender antagonism, and subtle subversion encoded in "hidden transcripts."[41] Still, revealing the agency of historical actors does not necessarily shed light on the power structures within which they operate. However, these types of studies revealed how complex the dance between power structures and historical agents can be.[42]

NATIVE PATHWAYS: COMMERCIAL INCORPORATION

The capitalist market has taken its toll on American Indian communities, particularly since incorporation has usually meant a devastating loss of land and other natural resources—elements of central economic and cultural significance. Yet the way indigenous communities recovered in the twentieth century shows a creative engagement with the market. By contesting the terms of incorporation, either as laborers or as tribal capitalists, American Indians are challenging the cultural assumptions of modernity itself.

Native Pathways reflects much of the exciting scholarship done by Third World scholars since the mid-1980s. This volume helps to flesh out what historian Florencia Mallon has described as "that skeleton historians call the development of capitalism." She examines how Andean peasants used "traditional relationships" to shape their villages' transition to a capitalist economy, and in the process those "weapons of the weak" transformed the villagers and their communities.[43] Paul Rosier's chapter on Blackfeet oil leasing demonstrates the importance of understanding the "culture of political economy" implicit in the incorporation of indigenous societies into the capitalist market economy. Even though American Indians do not dictate the terms of their incorporation, they may in fact shape its impact. For example, Rosier shows that the revenue

earned from oil leasing did not necessarily subvert Blackfeet culture. Instead, tribal members incorporated it into their established cultural practices, such as giveaways, which helped to "mitigate against incipient class conflict" through a redistribution of tribal income. Cultural practices changed, but they remained no less Blackfeet in their reincarnation.

Whereas cultural practices might temper the effects of incorporation, Tressa Berman describes ways informal women's networks served as a buffer against the surrounding capitalist market, helping to "spread the risks of survival across households." American Indian women on the Fort Berthold Reservation intermixed their production for the market with ceremonial use so that those realms have become interdependent. Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara women pooled resources such as commodity food issued by the federal government, wages, or star quilts and redistributed them for ceremonial purposes or to aid kin who were in need. As a result, Berman states, "[in] both their structural adaptation and their community-based resistance the core cultural life remains intact, such that new strategies emerge from the maintenance of traditional practices."

David Arnold's chapter on Tlingit fishermen describes a similar cultural dynamic. Although development of a commercial salmon industry in southeastern Alaska drew Tlingits into the market economy, it did not necessarily undermine their subsistence practices. Indeed, customary fishing traditions and seasonal cannery work allowed Tlingits to retain some autonomy from the market. And like the Blackfeet, the revenue they earned in the commercial market and from wages in the canneries could be redistributed through ceremonial activities and community feasts.

David La Vere's analysis of the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Business Committee in the early twentieth century shows a similar use of "tradition" to build, protect, and enhance tribal resources. In this example, kinship obligations remained central to the goals of the Business Committee "as a way of navigating the white man's road." In this vein, the council developed a process of adopting people into the tribes—a well-worn tradition among the Comanche and the Kiowa—as a way to build tribal membership and resources. Jeffrey Shepherd's history of the Hualapai describes a similar dynamic. Like the wealthier peasants Mallon describes in Yanamarca Valley, who drew on their influence at the village level to fashion a system of wage-based, commercial agricultural from a kinship-based system, participation in the market economy as labor contractors provided Hualapai elites with a new avenue of power and prestige. According to Shepherd, incorporation into the market economy actu-

ally encouraged tribal cohesion and strengthened Hualapai identity instead of eroding it.[44]

The history of American Indians' relationship to the developing capitalist market involves multiple strands of analysis. Although it is important to think about how Indians responded to the cultural and economic demands of incorporation and how they fashioned strategies that rejected the incipient cultural logic of twentieth-century capitalism, the more compelling story involves the new institutions they created out of the conflict. Duane Champagne's chapter raises these issues in important ways. As he suggests, although American Indians formed tribal governments under pressure from the federal government, those tribal councils did not always behave in the ways the federal government had hoped. He argues that in fact, many "[t]ribal governments continue to operate within the holistic orientations of native community life. Unlike U.S. society, institutional relations among economy, community, kinship, and politics are not separated." For example, whereas the federal government created many of the modern tribal councils in an effort to extract valuable natural resources such as oil, timber, or other resources Western capitalists coveted, the tribal councils became something else indeed. Champagne's examples show that American Indians embraced capitalism yet developed a system that embodies native values. As American Indians have been drawn into the capitalist economy, they have also been able to transform the institutions originally intended to control and exploit them.

Jessica Cattelino's and Nicolas Rosenthal's chapters on gaming offer interesting examples of what tribal capitalism looks like. Although American Indian sovereignty and the morality of gaming dominate the public debate, how and why those operations are "different" from the gaming establishments in Las Vegas or Atlantic City are often overlooked. Yet as Cattelino and Rosenthal demonstrate, American Indians have crafted a new pathway of development. For the most part, American Indians have crafted capitalist endeavors that redistribute and redirect profits for community benefit. The success of gaming is unparalleled. However, these chapters show that gaming did not emerge in a vacuum. The Seminoles and the southern California tribes developed gaming enterprises as one in a long line of development initiatives.

NATIVE PATHWAYS: LABOR

Rethinking "modernity" also means reexamining standard notions of class. For some scholars the historical development of a working class is the foundation on which capitalism rests. It is a historically complex process, one labor historians

have been debating for decades. On a basic level, a working class develops when economic and political forces transform people into workers, a population that has nothing but its labor to sell to make a living. This historical process distinguishes "class" from other forms of coerced labor, and capitalism from other types of economic systems. The debate in labor history centers on how and when workers understand their fate and what they do with that knowledge.

Much of labor history has focused on the development of "class identity," a collective self-perception workers derive from their common experiences on the shop floor. This model for understanding "class" is particularly limiting, since it privileges the industrial, waged workplace and imposes a historically specific construct on populations for whom it may not be particularly relevant. And according to this definition, American Indians and other workers who move in and out of the workforce and who may perform labor that is marginal to the "shop floor" fall outside the definition of "class" and, by extension, exist beyond the realm of modernity.

Other labor historians turn to "culture" to explain the development of class identity. This paradigm assumes a contradiction between "culture," or "old-world ways," and the demands of the "modern" workplace.[45] At first glance this seems to provide a possible way to bring American Indians into the narrative. But this approach tends to reproduce the modern/traditional dichotomy that freezes American Indian culture in the preindustrial past. Since cultural practices that contradict a capitalist worldview not only persist but may be created by capitalist development, a paradigm that equates culture with a precapitalist existence cannot accommodate the persistence of American Indian tradition within the framework of an industrialized economy. Furthermore, privileging culture tends to neglect the role of trade unions and the shop floor, conflates class with ethnic and racial identity, and thereby obscures class divisions and other hierarchies that may divide ethnic communities.

Feminist labor historians offer insights into class that might prove instructive to those exploring the issue of wage work among American Indian communities. The use of gender as an analytical category has encouraged historians to think about class in radical new ways. As Alice Kessler-Harris argues, we "must lay siege to the central paradigm of labor history," namely, we must

> challenge the notion that paid work, as a fundamentally male activity, inevitably reproduces itself in a closed system in which men derive their identity from the process of production (and then reproduce themselves by training other men), while women act in the household and in the workplace as the handmaids of the male reproductive system.[46]

The shop floor paradigm not only excludes women from the defining experience from which workers derive their class identities, it also marginalizes others who are not permanent wage workers. Since working-class women, both white and American Indian, may not fit the "shop" floor criteria, their experience of class remains at best derivative of male industrial workers' history or at worst invisible. American Indian men are as marginal to the industrial formula as are white women and women of color. And as a result their story remains similarly obscure.

Other lines of inquiry might explore the impact of wage work on American Indian ideas and social practices that define men's and women's gendered social worlds. Yet gendered relationships take on different meanings in varying cultural and historical contexts. So the gender impact of wage work might mean something very different for American Indian households than it does for non-Indian communities. For example, in the Navajo's "matricentric" culture, a man's identity may be closely linked to how well he attends to his mother's or his wife's needs, and, as a result, he may remain somewhat ambivalent to the demands and rewards of the wage labor market. In this case women retain a great deal of power and respect regardless of the increasing lure of the wage economy.[47]

More work needs to be done on the issues of gender and class in American Indian communities. Scholars have ignored the history of American Indian women workers, leaving a great deal of empirical work to be completed, particularly for the twentieth century. Historians and anthropologists have explored gender in American Indian communities in some depth, but not within a class context.[48] Several chapters in this volume examine the role of women in reservation economies, a contribution to the field that serves as a significant starting point. For example, the Navajo women in Kathy M'Closkey's chapter were not actively involved in the wage labor market, yet their work contributed significantly to the Navajo household economy. Navajo women made important economic decisions in which they found ways to deal with the drop in the global wool market by weaving wool into rugs rather than selling it unprocessed. They could get a much higher price for the finished product. Those decisions, according to M'Closkey, inadvertently provided traders with a buffer from the volatile wool market, an advantage they did not necessarily pass on to the weavers.

An examination of the division between the sacred and the secular might yield significant insights on the gendered work experience of American Indians. Severing the secular from the sacred obfuscates the cultural significance

of economic behavior, or, as Berman terms it, the "ceremonial relations of production" in American Indian life. Much of that is women's work. M'Closkey shows that Navajo women's work has largely been ignored, both as a source of income for Navajo families and in the central role it has played in maintaining Navajo cultural identity. Characterizing Navajo weavers' work as secular fails to acknowledge the cultural significance of the work itself and, as M'Closkey suggests, furthers the notion that pre–trading post–era rugs—rugs that supposedly remain untainted by the traders' edict or the demands of non-Indian consumers—are more culturally "authentic."

To understand cultural production and to fully comprehend indigenous people's experience with wage work, we need to think about questions not often addressed by labor historians. For example, how do American Indian households or kinship networks shape the meaning of work, for themselves as well as their employers? Or, how have cultural practices influenced Indian performance of work, when and where they work, and for how long? How do reservation communities and nonreservation workplaces exist within a larger universe of "making a living"? How have federal, state, and tribal governments participated in "creating" wage work for American Indians? Other issues worth exploring include examining the relation of wage work to sovereignty questions.[49] For example, how have tribal governments regulated labor relations on their reservation lands? Have federal labor laws threatened the rights of tribal governments to govern?

Research on American Indian definitions of work might yield conclusions similar to what Keletso Atkins found in Natal, South Africa. In one rich case she examined the stereotype of the "lazy Kafir" and found that, contrary to British Colonial impressions, the Zulu had developed a strong work ethic. From their experience performing agricultural labor in their own village communities, they defined a fair day's work as beginning at sunup and ending at sundown, and they kept track of their wages and workdays on a lunar cycle. British officials who attempted to impose rationalized time regimes were dismayed when the workers demanded: "The moon is dead! Give us our money!" Those officials who did not conform or at least adjust to the Zulu work ethic were subject to labor shortages.[50] Like the British Colonial officials who wanted to ensure they would have a supply of laborers in Natal, South Africa, employers of American Indian laborers have had to adjust to their workers' cultural demands in order to get their crops picked, their railroads cleared, and their coal mined.[51]

To search for answers to these questions means moving away from a concept of universalized modernity. The place where "modernity" and "tradi-

tion" overlap most dramatically is in the commodification of American Indian culture. Much has been written about the exploitive relationship between non-Indian consumers and Indian producers, including studies that explore the impact of tourism on American Indian cultural expressions and the creation and consumption of the colonial "exotic."[52] Contributors to *Native Pathways* look at this issue from the artists' perspective, as a way to make a living. Since the collecting of Native American cultural objects began, non-Indians have bemoaned the impact of commercial interests on American Indians, preserving the primitive in all its imagined innocence. As Cattelino suggests, the demand for authentic Indian artistic expression assumes a fundamental notion that culture is a thing that can be tarnished. When we look at the issue from the perspective of the American Indian artist or performer, it is much more complicated. As Clyde Ellis points out, "[D]ancing for pay revealed that the relationship between victimization and agency rested on complex negotiations and mediations in which an either/or paradigm had little meaning." Jessica Cattelino's study shows how producing cultural artifacts and wrestling alligators, although rooted in the tourist industry, provided cohesiveness to the Seminole culture. And although gaming infused the Seminole Nation with significant capital, Seminoles do not see those enterprises as defining their cultural production. Dancing for five dollars a day, making sweetgrass baskets, or wrestling alligators may seem exotic to the non-Indian consumer, but from the perspective of the workers they were meaningful ways to make a living—ones that strengthened rather than eroded their cultural identities.

This is not to say that wage work did not profoundly affect American Indian communities. The kinds of jobs available to American Indians, such as railroad, agricultural, and domestic labor, usually required them to leave their reservation communities for extended periods. The absence of loved ones, the migration experience, and the dependence on wages rather than subsistence strategies influenced Indian communities in ways we are just beginning to understand.[53] William Bauer's work on Round Valley demonstrates that working for wages was a mixed experience for American Indians. Employers reinforced stereotyped notions of "Indianness," which fortified the racialized labor market. Yet American Indian workers used their wages to strengthen their distinct Indian identities. Brian Hosmer's work adds an even more complicated picture to the narrative. Instead of migrating off the reservation to enter the world of wage labor, in Hosmer's chapter wage work came to them. Working for the Civilian Conservation Corps introduced many American Indians to wage work for the first time in the U.S. West. For American

Indians living on the Wind River Reservation, going to work for the Civilian Conservation Corps meant entering into a lifetime of wage work. Hosmer's interviews with Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho elders show that the memories of those experiences continued to shape American Indian cultural and class identities.

These chapters do more than fill in the gaps in existing American Indian scholarship; they challenge the very categories we use to define our questions. Writing about capitalist development in a way that includes American Indians as historical agents requires pushing past the discourse of development to incorporate multiple perspectives. Those histories raise many questions about the role of indigenous peoples in the history of capitalism, as well as about the nature of that economic system itself, and provide insights American Indian communities will likely find useful. These case studies demonstrate that American Indians have found creative ways to engage that "modern world," and the complexity of their experience defies the static dichotomy of "modernity" and "tradition." Their stories provide the vehicle for understanding modernity, in all its complex forms. Like Simon in *The Lone Ranger and Tonto Fistfight in Heaven,* driving forward in reverse may not alter the road's destination, but the travelers themselves make the journey meaningful. As Jimmy Many Horses concluded, "[W]hen you trust a man you also have to trust his horse."[54]

NOTES

1. Sherman Alexie, "The Appropriate Size of My Favorite Tumor," in *The Lone Ranger and Tonto Fistfight in Heaven* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994), 156.

2. Broderick H. Johnson, ed., *Stories of Traditional Navajo Life and Culture* (Tsaile, Navajo Nation, AZ: Navajo Community College Press, 1977).

3. A full discussion of modernity, including its numerous manifestations in art, literature, and architecture, is beyond the scope of this essay. In this chapter I am primarily concerned with how the social, economic, and political assumptions of the concept have shaped underlying notions about American Indian history and the implications of that thinking for federal Indian policy.

4. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 12–13.

5. Eric R. Wolf, *Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 25–28.

6. Ibid., 25.

7. Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989); Frederick E. Hoxie, *Parading Through History: The Making of the Crow Nation, 1805–1935* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2.

8. David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York: Verso, 1991).

9. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, 12.

10. For an insightful analysis of the politics of anthropology and anthropologists' involvement in development policy in the postwar era, see Thomas C. Patterson, *A Social History of Anthropology in the United States* (New York: Berg, 2001), 105–123.

11. Kathy Le Mons Walker, *Chinese Modernity and the Peasant Path: Semicolonialism in the Northern Yangzhi Delta* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 255.

12. Brian C. Hosmer, *American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence and Innovation Among the Menominees and Metlakatlans, 1870–1920* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 7–9; Thomas D. Hall, "Patterns of Native American Incorporation into State Societies," in *Public Policy Impacts on American Indian Economic Development,* ed. C. Matthew Snipp (Albuquerque: Institute for Native American Development, University of New Mexico, 1988), 23–38; David E. Wilkins, "Modernization, Colonialism, Dependency: How Appropriate Are These Models for Providing an Explanation of North American Indian 'Underdevelopment'?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16 (July 1993): 390–419.

13. Frederick Cooper, Allen F. Isaacman, Florencia E. Mallon, William C. Roseberry, and Steve J. Stern, *Confronting Historical Paradigms: Peasants, Labor, and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 12.

14. Hosmer, *American Indians in the Marketplace*, 8.

15. Ibid. Scholars such as Robert Berkhofer and Fred Hoxie, who have done extensive studies on the impact of federal assimilationist efforts on American Indians, make similar points about Eurocentric notions of progress and civilization. Robert Berkhofer, *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian From Columbus to the Present* (New York: Knopf, 1978); Fred Hoxie, *The Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880–1920* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984). For an overview of modernization theory and American Indians, see Wilkins, "Modernization, Colonialism, Dependency," 390–419; Hosmer, *American Indians in the Marketplace*, 8–13.

16. Stern et al., *Confronting Historical Paradigms*, 12.

17. André Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," in *Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy,* ed. James D. Cockcroft, André Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972), 3–17. For an intellectual history of the dependency theory debates, see David Goodman and Michael Redclift, *From Peasant to Proletarian: Capitalist Development and Agrarian Transitions* (New York: St. Martin's, 1982), 24–67, and Joseph Love, "The Origins of Dependency Analysis," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 22 (February 1990): 143–168.

18. One of the most notable examples of dependency theory in American Indian history is Richard White, *The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change Among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983). For policy applications, see, for example, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *The Navajo Nation: An American Colony* (Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, September 1975). Other writers who examine how colonial models apply to Native American history include Vicki Page, "Reservation Development in the U.S.: Peripherality in the Core," in *Native American Resurgence and Renewal: A Reader and Bibliography,* ed. Robert N. Wells Jr. (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1994), 354–388; Lawrence D. Weiss, *The Development of Capitalism in the Navajo Nation: A Political-Economic History* (Minneapolis: MEP Publications, 1984); Cardell K. Jacobson, "Internal Colonialism and Native Americans: Indian Labor in the United States from 1871 to World War II," *Social Science Quarterly* 65 (1984): 158–171; Gary C. Anders, "Theories of Underdevelopment and the American Indian," *Journal of Economic Issues* 14 (September 1980): 681–701;

Joseph Jorgensen and Richard O. Clemmer et al., *Native Americans and Energy Development* (Cambridge: Anthropology Resource Center, 1978); Joseph Jorgensen, "Indians and the Metropolis," in *American Indian in Urban Society,* ed. Jack O. Waddell and O. Michael Wilson (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 66–113; Joseph Jorgensen, *Oil Age Eskimos* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

19. Joseph Jorgensen's critique in "Indians and the Metropolis," 84. Functionalism dominated anthropological research on Native Americans in the 1950s and 1960s and tended to reinforce federal policy that favored the termination of Indian reservations. Anthropologists employing this paradigm generally favored Native American acculturation of dominant American values and behavior. They conducted various studies that explored Native American adaptations to urban contexts, including how they transcended cultural "obstacles" that prevented their full incorporation into non-Indian communities. Also see Brian Hosmer's explanation of functionalism in his PhD dissertation, "Experiments in Capitalism: Market Economics, Wage Labor and Social Change Among the Menominees and Metlakahtlans, 1860–1920" (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1993), 14.

20. Jorgensen, "Indians and the Metropolis," 85.

21. White, *The Roots of Dependency*.

22. Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World—A Derivative Discourse* (London: Zed, 1986), 30. Thanks to Kathy Le Mons Walker for leading me back to Chatterjee's work.

23. William Roseberry and Jay O'Brien, *Golden Ages/Dark Ages: Reimagining the Past in Anthropology and History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 10.

24. David Aberle, "A Plan for Navajo Economic Development," in *Toward Economic Development for Native American Communities: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 237.

25. Ibid., 250.

26. Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 83.

27. Ibid.

28. For a brief description of modernization theory, see Stern et al., *Confronting Historical Paradigms*, 11.

29. Roseberry and O'Brien, *Golden Ages/Dark Ages,* 3.

30. Ward Churchill, "Introduction: Journeying Toward a Debate," in *Marxism and Native Americans,* ed. Ward Churchill (Boston: South End, 1983), 14.

31. George Cornell, "Native American Perceptions of the Environment," in *Buried Roots and Indestructible Seeds: The Survival of American Indian Life in Story, History, and Spirit,* ed. Mark A. Lindquist and Martin Zanger (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 21–41; Winona LaDuke, "Natural and Synthetic and Back Again," in *Marxism and Native Americans,* ed. Ward Churchill (Boston: South End, 1983), i–iix; Russell Lawrence Barsh, "Contemporary Marxist Theory and Native American Reality," *American Indian Quarterly* 12 (Summer 1988): 205.

32. Frederick Cooper, Allen F. Isaacman, Florencia E. Mallon, William C. Roseberry, and Steve J. Stern, *Confronting Historical Paradigms.*

33. Steve Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism and the World System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean," *American Historical Review* 93 (October 1988): 829–872.

34. David Rich Lewis, "Reservation Leadership and the Progressive-Traditional Dichotomy: William Wash and the Northern Utes, 1865–1928," *Ethnohistory* 38 (Spring 1991): 141.

35. James Treat, "Intertribal Traditionalism and the Religious Roots of Red Power," in *Native American Spirituality: A Critical Reader,* ed. Lee Irwin (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 270–294.

36. Contemporary American Indian activists have often framed their struggles over fishing rights, against relocation, and for the preservation of sacred landscapes in terms of "tradition." See, for example, Hopi, Lakota, and Wintu efforts to preserve sacred lands chronicled in the film by Christopher McLeod and presented by the Independent Television Service and Native American Public Telecommunications, *In the Light of Reverence* (Oley, PA: Bullfrog Films, 2001); also see Winona LaDuke, *All Our Relations: Native Struggles for Land and Life* (Cambridge: South End Press, 1999).

37. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Terrence Ranger and Eric Hobsbaum, *The Invention of Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

38. Roseberry and O'Brien, *Golden Ages/Dark Ages*, 11.

39. Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," *American Journal of Sociology* 72 (January 1967): 361.

40. Walker, *Chinese Modernity and the Peasant Path*, 4.

41. Drawing from Marx's treatment of the French peasantry in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,* Marxists have often portrayed peasants as conservative or backward, without revolutionary potential. But with the renewed interest in peasants kindled by the Vietnam War, Third World scholars consistently challenged that characterization. For example, see the body of literature inspired by Eric Wolf's *Peasants* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966) and his *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), as well as Teodor Shanin, ed., *Peasant and Peasant Societies* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987); James Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). See, for example, Stephen Vlastos's treatment of the ideology and popular culture of Japanese peasants in *Peasant Protests and Uprisings in Tokugawa Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986) and the writings of the "subaltern group," in particular Partha Chatterjee, "More on Modes of Power and the Peasantry," in *Selected Subaltern Studies,* ed. Ranagit Guha and Gayatri C. Spivak (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 351–390.

42. See Wolf, *Envisioning Power*, 1–15. Richard G. Fox and Orin Starn, *Between Resistance and Revolution: Cultural Politics and Social Protest* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997).

43. Florencia Mallon, *The Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle and Capitalist Transformation, 1860–1940* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), xi.

44. Peter Iverson makes a similar case for the impact of the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act in *The Navajo Nation* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1981), 56.

45. See the Gutman/Montgomery debate derived from the classic works, Herbert Gutman, *Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America* (New York: Vintage, 1976); David Montgomery, *The Fall of the House of Labor* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

46. Alice Kessler-Harris, "Treating the Male as 'Other': Redefining the Parameters of Labor History," *Labor History* 34 (Spring–Summer 1993): 195.

47. On the concept of "matricentric," see Marsha Weisiger, "Diné Bikéyah: Environment, Cultural Identity, and Gender in Navajo Country" (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2000); Colleen O'Neill, *Making a Living and Working Elsewhere: Navajo Workers in the Twentieth Century* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, forthcoming).

48. Laura F. Klein and Lillian A. Ackerman, *Women and Power in Native North America* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995); Nancy Shoemaker, *Negotiators of Change: Historical Perspectives on Native American Women* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

49. Robert B. Campbell, "Newlands, Old Lands: Native American Labor, Agrarian Ideology, and the Progressive-Era State in the Making of the Reclamation Project, 1902–1926," *Pacific Historical Review* 71 (May 2002): 203–238; Rolf Knight, *Indians at Work: An Informal History of Native American Labour in British Columbia, 1858–1930* (Vancouver: New Star, 1978); Daniel L. Boxberger, "In and Out of the Labor Force: The Lummi Indians and the Development of the Commercial Salmon Fishery of North Puget Sound, 1880–1900," *Ethnohistory* 35 (1988): 161–190; Albert Hurtado, "Hardly a Farmhouse or a Kitchen Without Them: Indian and White Households on the California Borderland Frontier, 1860," *Western Historical Quarterly* 13 (1982): 245–270; Joseph Mitchell, "Mohawks in High Steel," in *Apologies to the Iroquois,* ed. Edmund Wilson (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959), 1–36; Martha Knack and Alice Littlefield, *Native Americans and Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical Perspectives* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996); Hosmer, *American Indians in the Marketplace*.

50. Keletso Atkins, *The Moon Is Dead! Give Us Our Money!: The Cultural Origins of an African Work Ethic, Natal, South Africa, 1843–1900* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1993), 78–98. Atkins's approach is reminiscent of June Nash's work on Bolivian tin miners. See June Nash, *We Eat the Mines, and the Mines Eat Us: Dependency and Exploitation in Bolivian Tin Mines* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

51. Colleen O'Neill, "Navajo Workers and White Man's Ways: Negotiating the World of Wage Labor, 1930–1972" (PhD diss., Rutgers University, 1997).

52. Molly H. Mullin, *Culture in the Marketplace: Gender, Art, and Value in the American Southwest* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); Laurie Ann Whitt, "Cultural Imperialism and the Marketing of Native America," in *Contemporary Native American Cultural Issues,* ed. Duane Champagne (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira, 1999), 169–192; L. G. Moses, *Wild West Shows* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996); Phil Deloria, *Playing Indian* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

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PART ONE

Commerce and Incorporation

CHAPTER TWO

Searching for Salvation and Sovereignty: Blackfeet Oil Leasing and the Reconstruction of the Tribe

PAUL C. ROSIER

Economic development in Indian country is frequently characterized as a contest between "traditionalists" and "progressives," a competition pitting forces of Western-oriented modernization against those seeking to protect cherished cultural values, even if the result is poverty. In his analysis of Blackfeet political economy during the first half of the twentieth century, Paul Rosier complicates this familiar dichotomy by suggesting a dynamic relationship among politics, culture, and economic development, wherein decisions regarding resource distribution shaped and were shaped by traditional ideas regarding redistributive justice, notions of democratic governance, and market-oriented economic practices.

In spring of 1934, Native Americans debated among themselves and with representatives of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) the Wheeler-Howard Bill under consideration in Congress. Facing a sympathetic federal government for the first time in their lives, Native American leaders and their constituents expressed diverse reactions to the legislation. Some leaders saw it as yet another

level of intervention in their political and social lives, an effective end to relations defined by treaties. Others saw it as a unique opportunity to enhance control of the tribal estate by embedding regulations within tribal constitutions and charters. For some Native Americans the reason to support this bill was simple. At the Great Plains Congress, one of the ten conferences the BIA held throughout Native America to discuss the bill, a full-blood delegate of the Blackfeet Tribe named Rides at the Door told the assembly: "My people now own a large area of oil land and we have now on our reservation three producing wells, and that is the reason I came here, and I want some law or protection whereby I can always hold that property intact so that no white man can take it away from me."[1] He, like many Native Americans, had seen a shrinking land base and the assiduous efforts of government officials to detribalize Native America lead to diminished political and economic power, sufficient reasons to explore a legislative option that had no precedent in modern Indian-white relations. For the elderly Rides at the Door, who had witnessed the taking of his people's land through corrupt treaties and coercive allotment policies in the nineteenth century, the tribe's natural resources represented a last chance for salvation and self-sufficiency in the twentieth century. Without new laws ensuring Blackfeet protection of those resources, he believed that chance would disappear.

For two decades the Blackfeet Tribe had been trying to "hold that property intact" and realize some revenue from its oil operations. In addition to the prospect of credit facilities, the promise of enhanced tribal sovereignty spurred the Blackfeet and other Indian nations to support the Wheeler-Howard Bill and to adopt what came to be known as the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). An examination of twentieth-century Native American political economy requires a consideration of the IRA, as it gave many Indian communities administrative tools and expanded sovereignty and access to federal loans. What is interesting in the Blackfeet case is the extent to which natural resource development had dominated political discussion for two decades leading up to the debate over the IRA, contributed to the tribe's embrace of the IRA, and engendered changes in Blackfeet political economy after it was adopted. In the end, oil leasing and the income it produced politicized the Blackfeet, especially full-bloods, or "traditionalists," who engineered a reform movement using the IRA to ensure that oil revenues would benefit "the tribe" as a whole rather than individuals. The Blackfeet case thus provides a good vehicle for exploring connections among political change, culture, and economic development.

The relationship between Native American culture and economic development has been a source of recent scholarly inquiry, although much of it has been limited to studies of the 1960s and beyond. Analyses by Terry Anderson, Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt, Duane Champagne, Joseph Jorgensen, and others aid in understanding Native Americans' attempts to construct a political economy based on cultural and economic conditions specific to their "institutional environment."[2] Such reviews need to consider the role of both collective and individual sovereignty, the impact of self-aggrandizing individuals, but most important the *culture* of the political economy—the historical, climatological, and social forces that drove or, in the case of federal intervention, hindered its development. Kathleen Pickering and David Mushinski, building on the work of scholars noted previously, have found that "the cultural characteristics of a tribe do not serve as an impediment to a tribe's level of development, but . . . they do have an impact on how the income obtained from that level of development is distributed." Pickering and Mushinski also note that the degree to which income distribution reflects long-standing traditions of "inter-community reciprocity" is influenced by political factors such as the "hierarchical" nature of decision making, the extent to which evolved political institutions have attenuated "traditional" collective or consensus decision making.[3]

I question their conclusion that "the cultural characteristics of a tribe do not serve as an impediment to a tribe's level of development," but the second half of the equation, that income is in large measure distributed according to cultural rules, fits nicely with my focus on the problem of income distribution in Native American communities struggling with difficult political changes. On reservations with limited income streams and individual "dams" to divert those streams to acculturated tribal members attuned to white economic practices, the revenue derived from economic programs created great social stress. As Michael Walzer contends, the distribution of community assets in a democratic community "is what social conflict is all about."[4]

Cornell and Kalt have argued that "Indian societies have collective templates that describe how they can and should organize themselves and respond to the political, economic, and social conditions they encounter. In the development arena, culture thus provides standards by which to measure the 'goodness-of-fit' of goals, governing institutions, and economic strategies."[5] The Blackfeet Tribe was forced by changing demographic and economic conditions to consider the meaning and value of its cultural institutions while debating its future in a market economy governed by a decision-making process

characterized as a representative democracy. What follows is an account of how culture interacted with Blackfeet "goals, governing institutions, and economic strategies," specifically how the Blackfeet struggled first to establish a viable oil-leasing program and then to maintain an equitable distribution of its revenues. The promise of oil was a unifying force on the Blackfeet Reservation in the 1920s and 1930s, and the profit of oil was the most divisive issue in the 1940s and 1950s. By the early 1940s oil leasing was producing roughly $300,000 annually for the Blackfeet treasury.[6] As a result, the Blackfeet tribal government became responsible for directing a political economy increasingly based on community-owned oil revenues. Culture had little to do with driving resource development, already sanctioned by political consensus. But culture and economy overlapped in more complex ways. When it came to distribution, questions arose about the cultural significance of per capita distributions and the extent to which modern tribal decision making marginalized traditional social groups fighting to preserve their political influence and the idea of tribal obligation.

In the 1910s the Blackfeet Tribe was divided over the value of land: for whom should it produce income, in what ways should it do so, and who should control this development—tribal institutions or the individual? A predominately mixed-blood (or assimilated) group pushing for dissolution of the tribal estate struggled to control a predominately full-blood (community-oriented) group intent on keeping the reservation intact for the benefit of the tribe. The advent of natural resource development and the attendant promise of wealth created new forms of stress as the tribe, as a cultural institution and a means of social control, faced internal and external forces of coercive assimilation bent on reducing its power to act politically. Full-bloods in particular felt this pressure. In 1885 only 18 mixed-bloods lived among roughly 2,000 full-bloods; in 1914, 1,189 full-bloods lived among 1,452 mixed-bloods. Political influence shifted accordingly.[7]

The allotment policy altered the physical nature of the Blackfeet Reservation and created a contentious debate over the fate of the tribe's 156,000 "surplus" acres. Since 1913, Robert J. Hamilton Sr. and the full-blood tribal members he represented had been actively campaigning against the sale of the surplus acreage, which he contended was sought mostly by "the favored class" of Blackfeet allied with white ranchers and merchants organized in local chambers of commerce. Hamilton contended that the surplus land should be "held intact" for

livestock cultivation to benefit all Blackfeet and that the land contained deposits of oil and gas belonging to the tribe.

As the fight over the surplus acreage raged, Hamilton consolidated power as head of the new Blackfeet Tribal Business Council (BTBC) and began to promote the tribe's natural resources. In May 1916 Hamilton outlined to Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane his vision for development, explaining that BTBC members "have every reason to believe that our tribe will develope [sic] into a self-supporting condition, if the natural resources upon this reservation, are developed."[8] He asked Interior to support the tribe's interests by giving it permission to lease more than 4,800 acres, the limit specified in department regulations. But the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA) declined, believing mining regulations passed in 1891 adequately served the Blackfeet's interests.[9] The OIA's perfunctory dismissal of Hamilton's requests for aid underlined the disjunction between the Blackfeet's interest in oil leasing and the distant bureau's lack of interest. The decision, the first of many to deny the Blackfeet latitude in developing their natural resources, reflected the OIA's bias against *tribal* economic organizations. Under the tutelage of Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells, the OIA sided with acculturated Blackfeet mixed-bloods who had little interest in preserving the tribe as a cultural and political entity, displaying a prejudice against collective economic action that subsequent commissioners also practiced.

After a bitter battle that carried both factions to Washington, D.C., for two separate congressional hearings, the case of the 156,000 acres was finally resolved when Congress passed the June 30, 1919, act.[10] In a victory for the Hamilton faction, each Blackfeet received an additional 80-acre allotment, and the tribe retained the land and the rights to the oil and gas many Blackfeet believed flowed beneath it. Thus, by the end of the 1910s the allotment of the Blackfeet Reservation had been completed, but the debate on the best ways and means to utilize the remaining tribal land continued. The acculturated Blackfeet whom the OIA had supported wanted to liquidate not only the reservation as a formal zone of economic development but also the tribe itself as an empowered political manager of that development. These Blackfeet opposed the *tribe's* efforts to manage the development of community-owned natural resources because it distributed widely both the control of and the revenue from those resources. Acculturated Blackfeet ranchers thus rejected any relationship between Blackfeet culture and economy, on either the production or the distribution side. Hamilton, on the other hand, understood clearly that any plan for economic progress had to consider the increasing class stratification

and cultural disjunction that had manifested during the battle over surplus land.

The agenda of Hamilton and his full-blood supporters protected the notion of tribe as a way to mitigate incipient class conflict and ensure that a political body truly representative of tribal interests could manage that economic progress by evenly distributing the return from its development of natural resources. In a sense, Hamilton championed institutionalizing the Blackfeet tradition of the "giveaway," which dictated that poor Blackfeet benefit from the largesse of wealthy Blackfeet or the community at large. This struggle between assimilated conceptions of economic development that championed individual accumulation of wealth and tribal conceptions that retained a community-oriented distribution of tribal income would dominate debates and decisions on the shape and management of Blackfeet political economy through the 1950s and beyond. At stake were the nineteenth-century notion of "the tribe" and the meaning of culture in the political and economic lives of the Blackfeet people in the twentieth century.

The development of the gasoline-powered automobile and the Great Northern Railroad's conversion to oil burners in 1910 stimulated great interest in Montana crude oil prospecting. Discoveries of promising fields, including one on the Crow Reservation, fueled an "oil excitement" in the state in 1921. The discovery of the Kevin-Sunburst field and the Cut Bank field, which lay east of the Blackfeet Reservation, had much to do with the keen interest in Blackfeet resources in the early 1920s.[11] The Blackfeet sought to take advantage of this oil excitement in part because the postwar failure of the livestock industry and the collapse of wheat prices had devastated the reservation economy. By 1921, with most Blackfeet in dire straits, tribal leaders had become restless. The OIA had not approved a single tribal oil lease, so no money from oil sales had been pumped into the Blackfeet treasury.

Oil leasing, therefore, dominated BTBC deliberations. The battle over the Lambert lease in early 1921 heralded a decade-long struggle to secure assistance from the government theoretically representing the tribe's best interests. H. L. Lambert, an agent for eastern oil and gas interests, proposed in January 1921 that the council give him a monopoly on mineral development of the tribe's 553,032 unallotted acres for a period of ten years. Lambert's presence generated excitement on a reservation in need of good news. During the January 8 BTBC meeting, Lambert told the Blackfeet, "You might become one of

the rich nations of the United States or of the world as the Oklahoma Indians of today have done," citing the unusually high per capita income of the Osage Indians to illustrate his point.[12] Frustrated by the lack of any progress in natural resource development, tribal leaders supported the idea of giving control of the reservation's putative reserves to one developer, especially one promising to make the Blackfeet the Osage of the Northern Plains. Both mixed-bloods and full-bloods supported Lambert's proposition. Full-bloods seemed unified in their support of large-scale development. Rides at the Door argued that Lambert's project would "bring joy" to every Blackfeet and make them "rich."[13] Mixed-bloods shared the "excitement" but expressed concern that Lambert could turn out to be yet another speculator who would eventually sublease the land to other developers. In the end, the BTBC accepted a lease it knew was flawed, in large measure because it felt compelled to act for the tribe.[14]

The time and energy spent discussing the lease came to naught when the OIA again informed the BTBC that Interior regulations prohibited leases of over 4,800 acres.[15] As a consequence, by 1926 the once contagious oil excitement in Montana had virtually disappeared on the Blackfeet Reservation. The few tribal leases that were granted generated no royalty income for the tribe or employment for its members.[16] The Blackfeet were naturally disappointed that no oil had been found, but they were also bitter that the OIA had failed to represent their interests.

Frustrated by the constraints and favoritism of the department's leasing system, the BTBC looked for new ways to facilitate tribal oil development. In February 1927 mixed-blood oil booster John Galbraith proposed that the tribe fund its own oil and gas corporation, explaining to the BTBC that his experience with oil companies had taught him that "if we operate our own well here we will know . . . what is wrong with our resources." The council approved of the idea of forming a tribal oil corporation.[17] But the Blackfeet lacked capital, credit, and collateral. In August 1927 the BTBC petitioned Congress for $12,000 to promote oil leasing, but the OIA refused to consider the request.[18] The election of Herbert Hoover gave the tribe hope that it might benefit from a different group of policy makers. But Hoover's "oil conservation policy" was applied to Indian reservations as well as to public lands, angering the BTBC.[19] In April 1929 the council protested to Hoover that "an emergency exists on this reservation both as to the needs of the Indians and the preservation of mineral rights and that the only relief immediately available is the development of the tribal oil lands." The council asked the president to exempt the Blackfeet from his conservation policy so that "the Indians *now living* may participate in the

enjoyment of the revenues to be derived from [oil] development, and our people may be relieved from their present condition of poverty." The Blackfeet received no dispensation, although the OIA did approve a lease with the Browning-Fertig oil company, whose principals included three white businessmen and mixed-blood Levi Burd, the kind of men the OIA supported.[20]

The decade that began with the oil excitement of 1921 ended with Hoover's oil conservation policy of 1929. The resolution the business council telegraphed to the president in April 1929 captured a decade of Blackfeet hopes and frustration. The council's act of underlining the words *now living* symbolized the deep frustration felt by all Blackfeet who had actively pursued resource development throughout the 1920s, only to face prejudice from the Department of the Interior and false promises from the business community.

Facing a mixed-blood majority, many full-bloods organized in chapters of the Piegan Farming and Livestock Association (PFLA), although they also participated in BTBC elections and routinely won seats commensurate with their demographic presence.[21] Factional conflict between the PFLA and the BTBC, which raged during the 1920s, was mediated by a collective interest in the development of oil lands. Politicized by sustained OIA prejudice against tribal economic development, the promise of oil revenue and increased tribal control of that revenue unified Blackfeet factions, bringing them together to talk about common ground and common goals. A consensus emerged among full-bloods and mixed-bloods that natural resource development would give the Blackfeet some control over reservation conditions and, importantly, that tribal resources should be developed by the tribe for the use of the tribe rather than allotted to individuals. The oil believed to be flowing beneath the reservation had become for many Blackfeet the "second buffalo."[22]

In the early 1930s, wildcatters began producing oil near the reservation's eastern boundary, creating a new round of oil excitement on the reservation. Rides at the Door's trip to the oil fields on the reservation border had given him hope. "I thought salvation had come to the tribe and [we] would live in plenty," he told his BTBC colleagues. In late February 1933 the *Cut Bank Pioneer Press* reported that tribal members "became richer" by nearly $48,000 from a per capita distribution of oil-lease bonuses. "This is the first of what is expected to be several 'melons' to be cut by the Blackfeet," the article exclaimed, predicting that by the end of 1933 "a steady stream of oil royalties will be flowing into the tribal treasury."[23] The Blackfeet finally saw oil flow on

their reservation two months later when wildcatter Tip O'Neil's oil well yielded roughly seventy-five barrels of oil. On April 28, 1933, a group of Blackfeet, including several "Chiefs in full regalia" and the tribe's famous band, visited the Blackfeet's first producing well to celebrate Mother Earth's new offering.[24] The first oil strike and the per capita distribution that resulted were not large by any means, but, after so many years of promises unfulfilled, they were tangible. And the first oil revenues were distributed on a per capita basis, reflecting the tribal conception of oil development—the idea that the tribe produced it rather than individuals—as well as the tribal conception of sharing its revenues. Any other distributive scheme would have been unacceptable to a people who had waited for over fifteen years to see the promises of oil realized.

The Blackfeet's first per capita distribution of money earned from oil leasing coincided with the arrival of John Collier, a Progressive reformer whose vision of Native American renewal married his embrace of traditional Indian culture to the statistical legacy and programmatic blueprint of the Meriam Report of 1928, which documented in alarming detail the failure of U.S. policies.[25] Collier and his staff emphasized organization above all as the means to the desired end of Indian self-determination. At the February 1934 Great Plains conference, Collier argued that "in the United States, if you are going to do business and make money and protect yourself, you have got to do it in an organized way."[26] Collier believed neighboring whites would continue to gain access to Indian resources unless Native Americans organized to protect themselves, to "keep the wolves" away as Blackfeet full-blood councilman Oscar Boy put it. This theme of organization resonated with the Blackfeet. Their political system enabled citizens to elect, every two years, a governing council—the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council—which typically contained a number of full-blood members. Full-bloods had organized the PFLA to promote their agricultural interests. In addition, the Blackfeet Indian Welfare Association had formed to pressure federal officials to promote Blackfeet employment, education, and release of the tribe's treasury funds in per capita payments. Organization came naturally to the Blackfeet, but none of these groups had any real authority to effect economic development to benefit the tribe as a whole.

As Collier's vision found legislative expression in the Wheeler-Howard Bill (IRA), the Blackfeet as well as other tribes began to debate its merits. This debate dovetailed with the Blackfeet's heightened expectations of expanded oil development and heightened frustration over the BIA's continued control of that development. As noted previously, full-blood councilman Rides at the

Door explained at the Great Plains Congress that he wanted "some law or protection" that would allow his people to maintain control of their oil fields. Similar sentiments percolated throughout the meetings the BTBC organized to discuss the Wheeler-Howard Bill. Most speakers at these meetings agreed that the best economic policy remained the development of the tribe's oil resources.[27] On October 27, 1934, nearly 83 percent of participating Blackfeet voters supported the IRA.[28] The Blackfeet did not vote to adopt the IRA simply because it offered them the promise of expanded control over their oil resources; the IRA's proposed Revolving Credit Fund was especially appealing to assimilated mixed-bloods eager to expand farming or ranching operations, and the somewhat vague promise of sovereignty appealed to all political leaders frustrated by the BIA's reluctance to accept their voices as authentic and authoritative.

But it is important to stress that the Blackfeet's history of oil leasing affected their views of the IRA and its applicability to their arrested political economy. The tribe's overwhelming support represented a rejection of a past characterized by the vagaries and vice of BIA rule. And adopting the IRA's machinery of political economy was a natural first step for a tribal community eager to control its future by strengthening its existing organizations with constitutional powers. Politicized by the debates over the IRA itself as well as by BIA encroachment on their expanded sovereignty, the Blackfeet subsequently completed their "reorganization" by adopting a constitution that empowered the BTBC to "manage all economic affairs and enterprises of the Blackfeet [corporation], including . . . the disposition of all oil royalties from tribal lands," and a charter of incorporation, which would make the tribe eligible for federal loans.[29]

By 1936 the tribe's leasing program had generated only an annual $10 royalty for each Blackfeet, a negligible amount and a small percentage of the average $162 per capita income.[30] Interest in the reservation's potential remained high, but the tribe had to compete with productive white-owned oil lands in the adjacent Cut Bank field. The BTBC had won some concessions from the OIA to make tribal oil leases after the tribe adopted an IRA constitution and charter, but it still needed OIA authority to advertise for bids and faced Interior's veto of those leases. Assistant Solicitor Felix Cohen advised that Interior could not appear heavy-handed in its use of the veto because BTBC leaders had made it clear that the "question of tribal management of oil resources has always been uppermost in their minds."[31] Frustrated by the OIA's delays in approving bids, several councilmen sanctioned a "showdown" with

the OIA. Medore La Breche told his colleagues, "Here is our chance to find out whether or not we are really self-governing and how much power we have."[32]

The BTBC's hardened attitude led to productive changes in its ability to manage both production and revenue distribution. Cohen's advice precipitated a change in the department's conception of Blackfeet sovereignty and of Indian sovereignty generally. Cohen in particular emphasized to OIA staff the need to help tribes develop both sources of revenue and the mechanics of managing that revenue for tribal benefit.[33] A Blackfeet delegation had raised this issue during a visit to Washington in February 1937 by asking the OIA to modify its standard oil lease to permit revenue to go directly to the tribal treasury rather than to the superintendent. The OIA's decision to grant the Blackfeet the right to manage their own funds set a precedent that would become one of "broad policy." Some OIA officials felt revenue was best managed by white superintendents, fearing "malfeasance or misfeasance" on the part of Indian officials. But John Herrick maintained that the OIA was "honor bound to give the Blackfeet the privilege of handling money" because it had adopted the IRA, an instrument designed to give control of such functions to tribal leaders.[34] After three months of strenuous negotiations the BTBC received permission from Interior officials to use the new lease and thus assume control of oil income.[35]

The Blackfeet had won an important victory, convincing the OIA that they had the right to manage their own revenues, in large measure because they had faithfully adopted the government's prevailing Indian policy. Blackfeet politicians asserted their right to assume control of an essential function of government—the distribution of community-owned financial assets. Once in control of these assets, however, fair distribution of them would prove a bigger challenge for the BTBC than its effort to secure their rights from the federal government.

As oil revenue slowly increased in the late 1930s, the question of what to do with it dominated tribal politics. The BTBC, encouraged by BIA officials, decided to invest tribal revenues in the Rehabilitation Program—specifically the rebuilding and resettling of the dormant Two Medicine Irrigation Project (TMIP) to expand hay production for the Blackfeet's growing livestock industry, considered by most tribal and government officials to be the best long-term economic program. Demand for participation in the TMIP was high, especially among younger mixed-blood couples who could take advantage of the IRA's

Revolving Credit Fund. In November 1937 the BTBC voted to establish a partnership with the federal government to fund the TMIP. The BTBC made the right decision, taking advantage of the government's offer to *give* money outright and to lend monies at 1 percent interest to provide the tribe with a basis for long-term economic development.[36] But the decision to invest in the Rehabilitation Program contributed to political turnover at the polls. On January 11, 1938, ten of the thirteen incumbents lost their seats, most by large margins. Although many Blackfeet supported the "rehabilitation," many more thought it either discriminated against their communities or diverted per capita income from them during the difficult winter months. The BTBC's December 27 resolution asking the Indian Office to approve a per capita distribution was too little too late.

The newly elected council failed to deliver on its promise of distributing oil revenue, maintaining the previous council's commitment to the TMIP and the livestock industry. As the January 1940 election approached, a class consciousness manifested among Blackfeet voters. In a letter to the *Glacier County Chief,* Hugh Jackson asked his fellow Blackfeet: "When your councilman whizzes past you in a new shining gas buggy, don't it sort of seem to you that some of your [oil] money missed your pants pocket or stocking?" Jackson attacked council "aristocrats" and "elites," like Councilwoman Mae Williamson and her oil-rich husband, who were all perceived to be ill suited to represent the interests of the "Blackfeet Tribe of Indians."[37] The result of the election was once again high turnover.

The lesson of the 1938 and the 1940 BTBC elections was that the pursuit of the economic "greater good" was not enough to ensure a measure of political stability. The exigent task of new councils was to create a political economy that balanced rehabilitation with relief and to address full-bloods' argument that oil revenues belonged to "the people." During a heated council meeting held shortly after the 1940 election, Blackweasel complained that "all of our Tribal money and oil money goes toward [IRA administration]" while elderly Blackfeet went hungry. James White Calf told the new council to "ask the people what they want to do with this money. It is the people who have hired you to do the work for them."[38] As the 1938 and 1940 elections demonstrated, many tribal members wanted the council to distribute oil revenues to "the people" rather than invest them in programs that benefited a small segment of Blackfeet society. A perception existed that the BTBC spent oil revenues on council salaries and on loans for "white people"—Blackfeet with little Indian blood.

By 1940 the Blackfeet Nation had become split between proponents of long-term rehabilitation funded by oil revenue and supporters of short-term per capita distributions of that revenue. Two economies were therefore evolving on the Blackfeet Reservation: one an organic economy that rested on the hope of a "rehabilitated" reservation capable of providing self-sustaining agriculture; the other an "artificial economy," to use Thomas Biolsi's term,[39] that depended upon welfare from tribal and federal sources, a system that offered little promise of structural change. Each economy contained elements of the other. The artificial economy depended largely on the benefits of tribal oil production, whereas the organic economy depended in part on the "corporate" welfare of government credit and investment. The artificial economy remained a tribal economy, embracing the tribe as both developer of natural resources and provider of welfare payments; the organic economy evolved as an assimilation economy, asserting the need for individual investment and adoption of "white monetary attitudes."

Economists typically sanction the allocation of financial resources for long-term development programs rather than cash payouts. What is important here is how cultural issues infused this debate over income distribution, especially because oil production connoted, for full-bloods in particular, an offering from Mother Earth. The protest against the BTBC's management of oil revenues was both economic and cultural in origin. Many Blackfeet, mixed- and full-bloods alike, did not believe they would benefit from the BTBC's trickle-down cattle economics, which they considered discriminatory because it favored younger mixed-blood families. Older Blackfeet of high blood quantum saw these families, by virtue of their age and limited Blackfeet blood quantum, as the least worthy of receiving the proceeds of the tribal estate. In a 1941 protest letter to John Collier, Hugh Jackson argued that "the *real* Indians are ignored and penalized under the present set up. . . . Your honor my pure blood friends positively want their oil money paid to them in cash." Jackson claimed tribal revenues should be "paid out to the *rightful* owners annually."[40] Full-bloods and mixed-bloods like Jackson objected to council members "profiting" from "their" lands, in part because full-bloods, more than any other group, had retained their individual allotments and an attendant belief in the sacredness of land. Blackfeet who had sold their allotments had, in effect, given up their right to earn any income from the land or from the oil that lay beneath it.[41] The conflict that raged between the respective supporters of the Rehabilitation Program and per capita distributions—what Duane Champagne calls "sustained economic enterprises" and "subsistence

economic orientations," respectively[42]—thus had class, cultural, generational, and racial dimensions.

Historians of Native American political economies have noted the effect of an "unstable political environment" on the viability of long-term economic development.[43] But these factors feed off each other, as the 1938 and 1940 BTBC elections indicated. And per capita payments, although not a source of stimulation to an economy lacking consumer goods production, nevertheless provided the means for individual or group investment. A family of five (the average family size on the Blackfeet Reservation) could use its combined payment to purchase livestock or farm seed or for other worthwhile purposes. Some Blackfeet, for example, used a distribution from a 1936 land claim to pay for school tuition. Per capita distributions were seen as welfare payments or handouts by most federal officials and by some, but not all, assimilated mixed-bloods. Both groups were intent on creating "sustained economic enterprises" in line with Western models. Failing to consider the various cultural dimensions of Native American economies, federal officials opposed Blackfeet control of distribution in the 1940s and 1950s, just as they had fought to control tribally based production in the 1920s and 1930s.

The BTBC thus faced pressure to produce a long-term investment program sanctioned by the BIA while satisfying the short-term needs of an increasingly outspoken group of Blackfeet injecting culture into an economic debate. The council was stuck in the middle between struggling constituents needing income and enterprising constituents needing capital. The council could not avoid releasing per capita payments, given the demand for them; councilman Leo Kennerly argued in late 1941 for the timely release of oil money to help "the poorer class of people."[44] And yet by doing so the council risked setting expectations of annual distributions. When those expectations were not fulfilled, political turnover was the result, creating an unstable political environment. BIA official George Fox noted to a colleague in 1942 that councilmen felt compelled to "get the [oil] income committed in order to take the heat off themselves that is being applied by their constituents."[45] The BTBC's challenge was to create a stable political economic environment that could balance the needs of the two factions—the assimilated and the tribal—and stimulate growth in their respective economies.

The Blackfeet Nation's economy was affected by a number of factors besides federal resistance and constant political turnover. According to Howard Gaare, who audited the nation's finances during the late 1940s and early 1950s, BTBC members' lack of financial education and their resistance to white ad-

visers and their administrative practices contributed to their poor performance and thus to the rise of dissident groups eager to divest them of fiscal control of community resources. Gaare, echoing Fox's point, also attributed the council's problems to the "constant pressure" members faced from relatives, friends, and constituents to release funds in per capita payments or "loans" for hay, school uniforms, and other necessities—most of which "were not paid back"; although many of the loans were for good causes, their proliferation created budget problems and the perception of favoritism. For example, Gaare confronted BTBC treasurer Iliff McKay after discovering a $6,500 "shortfall." McKay explained to Gaare that he "took the money and gave it to people who asked for it." In Gaare's (and McKay's) mind these distributions were not corrupt but were an "Indian" form of resource distribution, a modern form of the traditional giveaway that characterized traditional Blackfeet social relations.[46]

Other contemporary observers of Blackfeet politics like Felix Cohen, John Ewers, and William Fenton all argued that what appeared to white officials to be corruption was actually a syncretic form of cultural tradition. Fenton, who investigated Blackfeet factionalism in August 1950, described a "payoff problem" that was "related to the problem of gift giving" and the maintenance of "status."[47] Cohen, the tribe's attorney, described to new council members the "resentment which white officials have so often expressed against the generosity that Blackfeet Indians and their tribal leaders have always shown towards those of their own people who are in need or distress. We have a hard job ahead of us, in trying to combine Blackfeet generosity and white man's business practices."[48]

Thus, the Blackfeet cultural tradition of the giveaway, the sharing of community or family assets in difficult times, was institutionalized through tribal income distribution. Council officials would issue "tribal emergency loans" of between five and twenty-five dollars, many of which went to full-bloods.[49] Despite good intentions, such distributions were not regularized and so were open to abuse. For example, during the unusually harsh winter of 1950, the council distributed a portion of its tribal funds in the form of a per capita advance.[50] According to Howard Gaare, Blackfeet from outlying communities traveled to the tribe's welfare office during a blizzard, only to discover that the funds were insufficient to give everyone a "loan."[51] In the framework of IRA constitutional democracy, BTBC fiscal behavior was inconsistent and at times corrupt, leading many Blackfeet citizens as well as BIA officials to rightly expect reform.

Leaders of the Blackfeet Nation, a constellation of interest groups that had formed along cultural, ethnic, and class lines, tried to mediate this civil conflict

through various democratic measures. In March 1945 the BTBC organized a Constitutional Convention to consider amendments to the nation's governing political framework and, more generally, its future in postwar America. During the nine-day meeting, the first of its kind in Native America, delegates spoke urgently about providing returning servicemen and younger Blackfeet with viable work and establishing a diversified economic agenda in the event the tribe's oil supplies dried up like a dust bowl grazing range.[52] Theodore Haas, the BIA's chief counsel, emphasized the need for coordinated development that would ensure a steady revenue stream not contingent upon sustained oil flow. BIA officials were concerned that if the tribe's oil revenues decreased or were "spent entirely on per capita payments, it is possible the future Blackfeet generation may be in a critical condition." Per capita payments jeopardized a tribe's capital wealth, Haas argued; he sanctioned instead investment vehicles like war bonds, land purchases, and livestock enterprises.[53] BTBC chairman Joseph Brown told the delegates he had experienced difficulty "expressing [similar] views because if I did, you would be on my neck, particularly so with this per capita payment that we have been making here every year."[54] Brown acknowledged that the pressure for per capita payments would continue, but he cautioned delegates that "it is just as Mr. Haas told you, that unless you put your money into something to bring your money back, you are sure to fail, as soon as your oil wells dwindle down and that is sure to come. Your income will be exhausted."[55]

Brown succeeded to a great extent in presenting a view of a council well-meaning in its control of the reservation economy by explaining to the full-blood faction and other interested Blackfeet "where your money has been going." But he admitted that a certain segment of the tribe did not wish to support stock owners and wanted the cash instead. He thus failed to satisfy those Blackfeet who could not secure loans because of insufficient collateral or those who had little inclination to begin a stock enterprise, as well as the perennially disgruntled minority who continued to believe the tribal government "cost too much on overhead expenses."[56] Oil revenue distribution practices stubbornly remained a cause of intratribal tension.

On one hand, elderly full-bloods failed to appreciate the various programs the BTBC had established in support of their interests. Under the leadership of Joseph Brown, whose mother was a full-blood, it had funded a tribal welfare office, tribal ceremonies, arts and crafts programs, and rheumatism treatments for full-blood members, as well as championed referendums that established a tribal sick fund and a funeral fund.[57] At the same time, these full-blood dissidents

succeeded in waging a remarkable campaign to keep the "poor Indian"—both mixed-blood and full-blood—involved in and the object of Blackfeet politics. The "minority group" posed legitimate questions about the BTBC's management of tribal oil assets. A related problem involved the granting of preference rights to oil tracts to the wealthiest Blackfeet rather than seeking the highest return from competitive bidding.[58] Most important, these problems affected not just full-bloods but all tribal members who depended on oil revenues—whether for per capita distributions or for legitimate tribal loans.

Tribal members became increasingly sensitive to BTBC economic strategy because it had the potential of jeopardizing a sustained income flow. A new resistance to BTBC activities began in late 1945 when tribal members voted on two referendums on oil policy.[59] On October 3, 1945, Blackfeet voters soundly rejected the BTBC's plan to invest tribal funds in its own oil operation by a vote of 543–55, deciding, in effect, to retain BIA supervision of their oil resources.[60] Concerned about losing access to tribal loans and to what little income they got from per capita payments, voters elected not to risk it. On November 30, Blackfeet voters defeated by a vote of 532–244 a similar referendum that proposed the sale of the tribe's "participating royalty interest" in drilling contracts for a lump sum.[61] The Indian Reorganization Act had given the BTBC more authority to engage in economic development. It also gave the Blackfeet people democratic tools to circumscribe that development agenda depending on how they saw it; the Blackfeet's IRA charter had forced the BTBC to put the oil plans to a vote. And in the 1946 election, Blackfeet voters again made their voices heard, rejecting ten of thirteen council members who had decided to withhold an end-of-the-year per capita distribution in favor of livestock purchases.

The legitimacy of BTBC sovereignty was questioned in two important elections in the early 1950s that represented two radically different paths for the Blackfeet. In June 1950, voters rejected by a wide margin the BTBC's efforts to expand its control of tribal economic affairs by "terminating" elements of the Interior Department's regulatory authority. And in May 1952, dissidents organized a referendum on transferring the authority to distribute tribal income from the BTBC to the agency superintendent. Concerned about the BTBC's capacity to function for the tribe as a whole, the Blackfeet electorate took the path toward lesser sovereignty rather than the one leading to greater sovereignty. In the middle of this intense civil conflict, a terminationist BIA helped to drive Blackfeet factions apart and prevent an agreement that could have ended a long-standing cycle of dissension. BIA officials co-opted the full-bloods'

new "people's committee" that had pushed for fiscal reforms, assumed control of managing the referendum election in violation of the Blackfeet Nation's IRA constitution, and refused to sanction a compromise measure reached between the people's committee and a newly elected crop of progressive BTBC leaders.[62] But the Blackfeet Nation as a whole benefited from the election campaigns. The public discussions and anger over government interference perforce pushed the factions closer together even as BIA officials pulled them apart.

Although the BTBC did not secure expanded powers of supervision, it did retain control of tribal revenues. And the issue of per capita distributions assumed a prominent place in budget considerations because it had become obvious to council leaders that they had to regularize these distributions. During the July 1952 BTBC budget meeting, "per capita payment" was item 1 on the agenda, reflecting its political importance. The council chairman announced that "*the people* should be informed that in accordance with their wishes, approximately 50% of the anticipated income has been set aside for the [payment]."[63] The council also agreed to budget $800 to fund the full-bloods' political action committee, the Honorary Council Committee, thus indicating its newfound influence. The BTBC subsequently approved per capita payments in late 1952 and in 1953, 1954, and 1955. The council's actions reflected both the importance of this new political consensus and the dramatic increase in oil revenues. The 1955 payment amounted to $225 per tribal member—the largest amount ever released—the result of oil-lease bonuses totaling nearly $2.5 million. According to the local newspaper, the *Browning Chief*, "Every member of the Blackfeet tribe is looking forward to Christmastime this season—out of the joy of expectancy in a per capita payment from accumulated Tribal oil royalties." Not quite satisfied, full-blood leaders protested the $225 payment because the council had originally promised to pay out $300 to each tribal member. And so the council issued an additional $75 payment.[64]

Per capita distributions failed to solve all of the tribe's political problems; tribal dissidents, full-bloods in particular, continued to protest the actions of the BTBC and to pressure Interior officials to monitor tribal finances. But they served as reminders that the Blackfeet electorate had demanded an equitable distribution of tribal resources and that political action could produce change if properly organized. Since the mid-1930s most of the tribe's financial resources had

gone to fund the expansion of the livestock industry: the council allocated funds for cattle and land purchases, credit committee and cattle board expenses, cattle and hay loans, and the reservation's irrigation infrastructure. These expenditures were mostly legitimate and had resulted in the creation of what could be called a Blackfeet middle class. But, as noted, cattle had not become the "second buffalo" for many Blackfeet citizens. Oil had. And "the people" accordingly had demanded what Michael Walzer calls "distributive justice."

Beyond the political and economic dimensions of this struggle over community-owned resources was the question of the character of the Blackfeet community. Full-bloods sought to preserve the idea of the tribe as a "family," as Wades in the Water put it. According to Walter Wetzel, BTBC chairman in 1952, "the main thing [full-bloods] asked me to [do was] keep the reservation—the tribe—together."[65] Walzer wrote that "[d]istributive justice in the sphere of welfare and security has a twofold meaning. . . . [I]t refers, first, to the recognition of need and, second, to the recognition of membership. Goods must be provided to needy members because of their neediness, but they must also be provided in such a way as to sustain their membership."[66] Per capita distributions of tribally owned assets represented both a form of economic justice for the Blackfeet "needy" and a symbol of the Blackfeet Nation taking care of its own by providing welfare and security to its members through an institutional form of the giveaway custom that had governed traditional Blackfeet social relations.

Salvation and sovereignty were tied together in a cultural economy shaped by political action, class-based struggle, and cultural persistence. Between the end of the allotment period in the 1910s and the termination years of the 1950s, oil leasing and its profits dominated the discourse of Blackfeet politics and drove the BTBC's search for sovereignty. Blackfeet politicians defended this sovereignty in the face of coercive state intervention in the democratic process while resisting exploitation by white businessmen intent on stripping the Blackfeet Nation of its assets. Through referenda governed by IRA provisions, Blackfeet citizens mediated this vision of sovereignty to help steer the Blackfeet Nation's economic policies, influencing the character of their community in the process. In searching for salvation and restored social influence, full-bloods adapted to the political reality of Western models of twentieth-century democratic decision making. And in waging a sustained protest movement they also helped shape a syncretic Blackfeet political culture that contained an element of nineteenth-century decision making based on deliberation and consensus. By doing so, they helped enlarge the constituency of the "real Indians

who constitute the real tribe" and thus defended the value and importance of being Blackfeet in the modern world.

NOTES

1. "Minutes of the Plains Congress, Rapid City Indian School, Rapid City, South Dakota, March 2–5, 1934," 2. Records Concerning Wheeler-Howard Act (RCWHA), National Archives (NA) Record Group (RG) 75, Box 3, pt. 2AA, File 4894-1934-066, 19. The assembly included hundreds of Native American leaders and officials of the BIA and the Department of Interior.

2. Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt, "Culture and Institutions as Public Goods: American Indian Economic Development as a Problem of Collective Action," in *Property Rights and Indian Economics,* ed. Terry Anderson (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), 246. See also Terry L. Anderson, *Sovereign Nations or Reservations: An Economic History of American Indians* (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1995); Duane Champagne, "Economic Culture, Institutional Order, and Sustained Market Enterprise: Comparisons of Historical and Contemporary American Indian Cases," in *Property Rights and Indian Economics,* ed. Terry Anderson (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), 195–213; Joseph G. Jorgensen, "A Century of Political Economic Effects on American Indian Society, 1880–1990," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* 6 (Fall 1978): 1–82. See also Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt, "Where's the Glue? Institutional Bases of American Indian Economic Development," *Journal of Socio-Economics* (December 2000): 443–447.

3. Kathleen Pickering and David Mushinski, "Making the Case for Culture in Economic Development: A Cross Section Analysis of Western Tribes," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 25, 1 (2001): 46.

4. Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic, 1983), 11. See also Interview with author, Princeton, NJ, December 4, 1998.

5. Cornell and Kalt, "Culture and Institutions as Public Goods," 246.

6. "Table of Resident Blackfeet Indian Net Income, 1943." NA RG 75 Central Classified File (CCF)-2 File 7056-1944-BF-071 [hereafter BF]. Fifty-four allottees earned another $150,000. Although a number of Blackfeet allottees earned royalties from their oil lands, most drilling occurred on tribal land protected by the 1919 allotment act. The tribe's oil fields produced just over 2 million barrels of oil in 1945, about 9 percent of all oil pumped on Indian reservations.

7. See Freal McBride, "Ten-Year Program for the Blackfeet Reservation, Montana": Population and Trend, 3. NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 7056-1944-BF-071; E. B. Linnen and F. S. Cook, "Report of Investigation of Affairs on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, Montana." NA RG 75 CCF File 30650-1915-BF 150. Although the pending land sale clearly divided the tribe along ethnic and racial lines, the principal cause of dissension stemmed largely from a class division of stock owners and non–stock owners. Roughly 2 percent of the tribe owned over 85 percent of the livestock.

8. Robert Hamilton to Francis K. Lane, May 29, 1916. NA RG 75 CCF File 61576-1916-BF-054.

9. Hamilton to Indian Office, May 29, 1916; Meritt to Hamilton, May 31, 1916. NA RG 75 CCF File 63114-1916-BF-322. See "Memorial and Petition to the Honorable Senate of the United States in Congress," in "Minutes of a Meeting of the Business Council of the Blackfeet Tribe Held at the Blackfeet Agency, Browning, Montana, on May 20,

1916." 61576-1916-BF-054. The authority for mineral development came from an act of Congress approved February 28, 1891 (Statute 26: 795).

10. *Statutes at Large of the United States,* vol. 41: 3, 17. For details, see Cato Sells to Charles M. Roblin and Louis S. Irvin, Special Allotting Agents, July 29, 1919. NA RG 75 CCF File 1630-1943-BF-175.2. For details of the congressional hearings, see Paul C. Rosier, *Rebirth of the Blackfeet Nation, 1912–1954* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), ch. 1.

11. By the early 1930s the Kevin-Sunburst and Cut Bank fields were the largest-producing oil fields in the state. See Don Douma, "The History of Oil and Gas in Montana," in *A History of Montana,* ed. Merrill G. Burlingame and K. Ross Toole (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing, 1957); J. H. Ashford and K. M. Raymond, "Management of Oil and Gas Resources on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation: 1873–1946" (Washington, DC: Indian Claims Commission, Docket Number 279-D, 1975).

12. Minutes of a Blackfeet Tribal Council meeting, January 8, 1921. NA RG 75 CCF File 3434-1921-BF-322. For a study of Osage energy development, see Terry P. Wilson, *The Underground Reservation: Osage Oil* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985). The act of June 30, 1919, which finally decided the fate of the Blackfeet's surplus lands, reserved all subsurface mineral rights to the tribe, with the exception of land patented before the passage of the act.

13. Minutes of a Blackfeet Tribal Council meeting, January 8, 1921.

14. Minutes of a Blackfeet Tribal Council meeting, January 10, 1921, and evening session. File 3434-1921-BF-322.

15. Sells to Wilson, January 12, 1921. File 3434-1921-BF-322.

16. "History of Oil Leasing on Blackfeet Reservation, 1921–1926 Inclusive," NA RG 75, CCF-1, File 35135-1926-BF-324, sheet 1 and sheet 2. Capturing the sentiments of many Blackfeet, Louise Dogears complained to the OIA: "Under the terms of the leases . . . I would have received money sufficient to carry me through this long cold winter and possibly to prevent my death from hunger, cold and insufficient housing. . . . Does the Department intend to supply my needs in some other manner? Why then should the Department refuse to approve this lease and thereby cause me to suffer from hunger, cold and lack of shelter?" See Dogears to CIA, January 4, 1922. NA RG 75 CCF File 84814-1921-BF-322.

17. "Blackfeet Tribal Council Proceedings," February 24, 1927. NA RG 75 CCF File 16072-1927-BF-054; full-blood councilman George Starr told his colleagues: "The oil is here, it is all around us. . . . You half breeds are just as smart as any white man and some are smarter and we can do our own drilling, form a company and do our own work." See also Galbraith to Campbell, February 18, 1927. NA RG 75 CCF File 16642-1927-BF-322.

18. George Arnoux, William Brown et al., to Campbell, August 4, 1927. NA RG 75 CCF File 41869-1927-BF-322. See also Wright to Campbell, September 24, 1927. File 41869-1927-BF-322.

19. Minutes of the Blackfeet Business Council, April 30, 1929. NA RG 75 CCF File 22496-1929-BF-054.

20. BTBC telegram to President of the United States, April 30, 1929. File 22496-1929-BF-054.

21. In 1914 the tribe's population included 1,189 full-bloods and 1,452 mixed-bloods; in 1929 there were 1,130 full-bloods and 2,510 mixed-bloods. For 1914 figures, refer to Linnen and Cook, "Report of Investigation of Affairs on the Blackfeet Indian

Reservation, Montana." For 1929 figures, see 1930 census. NA RG 75 CCF File 00-1930-BF-034.

22. Speeches of a General Tribal Council held July 20, 1929. NA RG 75 CCF File 40274-1929-BF-054, 2–3. See also "Minutes of the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council," July 16, 1929.

23. "Blackfeet Members Cut 'Melon,'" *Cut Bank Pioneer Press,* February 23, 1933. See also "Was Joyful Week for the Blackfeet," *Cut Bank Pioneer Press,* December 23, 1932.

24. "First Reservation Producer," *Cut Bank Pioneer Press,* April 28, 1933.

25. Lewis Merriam et al., *The Problem of Indian Administration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1928). The report savaged the allotment policy and boarding school education while promoting the reform of Indian economies through a "well-rounded program of economic advancement framed with due consideration of the natural resources of the reservation"; 14.

26. "Minutes of the Plains Congress, Rapid City Indian School, Rapid City, South Dakota, March 2–5, 1934." RCWHA, Box 3, pt. 2-AA, File 4894-1934-066. Seventeen Blackfeet delegates attended.

27. See in particular "Minutes of the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council," February 5, 1934, 5. NA RG 75 CCF General Records Concerning Indian Organization (GRCIO) File 9522-E-1936-BF-054, pt. 1; "Minutes of the Meeting of the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council," March 31, 1934, 2. File 4894-1934-066, pt. 2-A. The meetings drew upwards of 700 people, representing some of the largest gatherings ever held on the reservation. Subsequent debates focused on what kind of community government the Blackfeet should adopt—one central government, a tribal "corporation" that managed affairs for the whole reservation, or numerous self-governing community governments. A consensus emerged that a central government along the lines of the BTBC would be best, in part because it would strengthen Blackfeet sovereignty and in part because full-bloods were wary of seceding from a tribal government influenced by the cohort of mixed-bloods active in promoting oil leasing. Isolated from such activity, it would have been especially difficult for full-bloods to monitor the per capita distribution of funds from tribal oil production.

28. Stone to Indian Office, October 28 telegram. GRCIO Box 2 File 9522-1936-BF-066. A total of 823 Blackfeet voted for it, whereas 171 voted against it; 114 of the 148 Blackfeet who mailed their ballots also voted for it. *Statutes at Large of the United States,* 48 Stat. 984 (1934).

29. See "O'Hara to Commissioner of Indian Affairs," November 14, 1935. File 9522A-1936-BF-068; "Results of Charter Election August 15, 1936." GRCIO File 9522B-1936-BF-061. The Blackfeet Nation voted overwhelmingly to adopt the constitution by a vote of 884–157 in November 1935; the August 1936 vote in favor of the charter, however, was 737–301, a decline in support that reflected the Blackfeet's impatience with the slow pace of economic growth.

30. "Annual Report of Extension Workers, Jan. 1, 1936, to Dec. 31, 1936," p. 2 of statistical report. NA RG 75 CCF-1 File 4634-1937-BF-031.

31. Assistant Solicitor Felix Cohen to Acting Solicitor, May 18, 1937. Felix Cohen Papers (FCP), Yale University, Western Americana Collection, New Haven, CT. Box 5, Folder 73. See also Acting Solicitor Frederic L. Kirgis to CIA, May 22, 1937. FCP Box 5, Folder 73.

32. "Minutes of a Meeting of the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council, June 3, 1937," 6. NA RG 75 CCF-1 File 10809-1936-BF-322.6. See also the July 20 BTBC meeting.

33. "What Remains to Be Done in the Field of Tribal Organization," Felix Cohen to Organization Division, July 15, 1937. FCP, Box 8, Folder 119.

34. John Herrick to Collier, April 7, 1937. NA RG 75 CCF File 30654-1937-BF-054. Cohen supported Herrick's position but argued against using the new Blackfeet lease as a model. See Cohen, "Memorandum: Blackfeet Oil and Gas Leases" (no date). File 30654-1937-BF-054.

35. Zimmerman to Superintendent Charles Graves, May 15, 1937. File 30654-1937-BF-054. The council also had stricter drilling terms codified in the lease, which addressed its frustration with oil speculators who simply waited for the soft market to rebound.

36. See U.S. Department of the Interior, "Memorandum for the Press," December 27, 1937. GRCIO File 3633-1934-BF-054. See also "Blackfeet Irrigation Project Is Approved," *Glacier County Chief* [Browning, MT], January 7, 1938.

37. "Hugh Jackson Writes Regarding Coming Tribal Council Election," *Glacier County Chief,* November 10, 1939; "Hugh Jackson's Letter," *Glacier County Chief,* December 1, 1939.

38. "Minutes of Meeting of BTBC, February 1, 1940," 6, 8. File 9522-E-1936-BF-054. The seventy-four-year-old White Calf was the most vocal critic of the tribal government. He said the Blackfeet "are called the oiled Indians of today and right now every one in this room should be sitting with a lot of money in his pockets."

39. See Thomas Biolsi, *Organizing the Lakota: The Political Economy of the New Deal on the Pine Ridge and the Rosebud Reservations* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1992), ch. 5.

40. Hugh W. Jackson to Collier, November 26, 1941; emphasis added. NA RG 75 CCF File 9522-C-1936-BF-057.

41. See, for example, "Memo: List of Complaints Against Tribal Self-Government by the Blackfeet Full-Blood Minority." NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 174-1943-BF-056. No date (ca. March 1945).

42. Champagne, "Economic Culture, Institutional Order, and Sustained Market Enterprise, 209.

43. Ibid. See also Anderson, *Sovereign Nations or Reservations*; Cornell and Kalt, "Culture and Institutions as Public Goods."

44. "Minutes of the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council in Special Session, December 20, 1941." File 9522-E-1936-BF-054. The BTBC usually tried to release per capita payments in December.

45. George Fox to Joe McCaskill, October 22, 1942. NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 37123-1942-BF-054. In his 1942 reservation survey, Fox argued that since the tribe's adoption of the IRA, the BTBC had been "struggling with many new problems which have become its responsibility, problems that vexed the Indian Service for years." George Fox, "Some Observations on the Blackfeet Reservation," June 26, 1942, NA RG 75 File 9004-1943-BF-042.

46. Interview with author, March 6, 1996. In author's files. Gaare and his associates tried to standardize procedures to limit the damage of turnover, but subsequent administrations wanted to start fresh with a new system.

47. Interview with author, February 15, 1997. For his report on Blackfeet factionalism, see William N. Fenton to D'Arcy McNickle, November 3, 1950. NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 00-1950-BF-071. Echoing Fox and Gaare, Fenton said council members got "pressure from relatives to give them benefits."

48. Cohen to Blackfeet Tribal Business Council, June 16, 1950. NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 16112-1950-BF-154.

49. "Meeting of the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council, March 11, 1948." NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 44997-1945-BF-224.

50. Fickinger to Lucille A. Hastings, Chief, Welfare Section, February 1, 1950; Hastings to Zimmerman, February 2, 1950. NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 50403-1941-BF-720.

51. Interview with author, March 6, 1996. In author's files.

52. "Minutes of the Blackfeet Tribal Constitutional Convention Under Sponsorship of the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council," April 24, 1945, 7–9. NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 36128-1945-BF-054.

53. Ibid., April 26, 3–4.

54. Ibid., 4.

55. Ibid., 5, 6. Brown defended the BTBC's agenda to meet his personal vision of sanitary homes, improved health, and expanded stock operations, outlining the council's funding of home construction, medical treatment, and repayment cattle.

56. Ibid., 10. For FY 1946 (July 1, 1945, through June 30, 1946), council expenses—which included per diem for committee meetings, council salaries, and delegations—represented about 8.4 percent of the total budget. See "Monthly Financial Statement: Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. For Month Ending September 30, 1945." NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 36128-1945-BF-054. The full-bloods contended that the solution to fiscal problems lay in transferring control of tribal income from the BTBC to the white agency superintendent. BIA representative D'Arcy McNickle told full-bloods in late 1945, "All you people seem to harbor the opinion that it would be nice if the Government were handling your [oil] money," arguing that the Blackfeet could become "beggars" if Congress began "spending it for you." Many of these full-bloods had a short horizon and wanted oil revenues sooner rather than later. Representative of the full-bloods' position, Three Calves told McNickle, "Why is it I wear such poor clothes when I come from an oil community? Everyone should have an equal share in the oil money. I am almost starving, and the poor mixed-bloods are in the same position." Other witnesses exhibited a similar class consciousness and supported the plan to divest the BTBC of its distributive authority. See "Meeting of Blackfeet Tribal Business Council and D'Arcy McNickle on the Wheeler-Howard Act," November 5, 1945. File 36128-1945-BF-054.

57. The BTBC had begun to assume a greater role in the distribution of welfare monies in 1940, in part because oil revenues allowed it to do so and in part because many Blackfeet were leery of becoming dependent on county or state welfare services. The advent of war and the generation of significant oil revenues shifted even further the responsibility of welfare provider from the federal government to the tribal government, which appropriated $10,000 for an emergency sickness fund and $10,000 for burial expenses based on tribal referendums. See McBride to Daiker, August 14, 1944. NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 50403-1941-BF-720; "Tribal Council Certifies Vote Cast at Election," *Browning* [MT] *Chief,* January 28, 1944; "Light Vote Cast by Blackfeet at Special Election," *Browning Chief,* October 6, 1944. For a biographical essay on Joseph Brown, see Paul C. Rosier, "Joseph W. Brown: Native American Politician," in *The Human Tradition in the American West,* ed. Regan Lutz and Benson Tong (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2001).

58. See Grant and Kennerly to CIA, January 26, 1944; McBride to Zimmerman, January 28, 1944. NA RG 75 CCF File 5422-1938-BF-055. See also Brown and Pambrun to CIA, March 7, 1944. File 174-1943-BF-056.

59. In January 1944, largely because he promised to increase per capita payments, John Galbraith gained a council seat, through which he began lobbying anew for a tribal oil venture. In November the Reconstruction Finance Corporation agreed in principle to grant a loan, using a portion of existing oil revenues as collateral, to further Galbraith's idea of forming its own oil operation so it could claim 100 percent of the profits rather than the 12.5 or 17.5 percent typically earned. Section 5(g) of the tribe's corporate charter prohibited the use of such revenue as collateral for loans, however, and thus the BTBC had to put the charter amendment to a referendum vote. See "Resolution No. 13 of the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council, January 4, 1945," and "To the Members of the Blackfeet Tribe," September 17, 1945, a mimeographed handout that explained to voters the "relative risks and advantages" of the amendment. File 9522-B-1936-067. See also Zimmerman to Brown, November 17, 1944, and other relevant correspondence, in NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 37019-1942-BF-322.

60. "Indian Voters Reject Change of Charter," *Browning Chief*, October 5, 1945; see also McBride to Secretary of the Interior, October 9, 1945. File 9522-B-1936-067. Area counsel A. B. Melzner concluded that Galbraith's new plan "seems to have for its purpose the division of all profits among a few individuals, if there are any profits." See Melzner to CIA, January 18, 1950. NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 19646-1943-BF-322.

61. The BTBC, in a sense, tried an end run around the previous vote; the council could have used the proceeds from the sale to invest in a tribal oil industry. For the November 30, 1945, vote, see "Tribal Election Returns," *Browning Chief*, November 30, 1945; "Blackfeet Indian Voters Balloting on Sale of Oil Royalty Proposals," *Browning Chief*, November 16, 1945. Voters had rejected a similar proposal by a count of 241–199 in a referendum held in October 1944.

62. For details of these important elections, see Rosier, *Rebirth of the Blackfeet Nation*, ch. 6.

63. "Meeting of the BTBC, July 11, 1952"; emphasis added. NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 44997-1945-BF-224.

64. "Blackfeet to Receive Per Capita Payment," *Browning Chief*, November 28, 1952. See also "Per Capita Fund Distribution Starts Monday," *Glacier Reporter* (*née Browning Chief*), December 18, 1953. For details, see NA RG 75 CCF-2 File 19858-1953-BF-620. See "Petition by Resolution to the Blackfeet Tribal Council" (no date). File 19858-1953-BF-620.

65. Walter Wetzel, Interview by author, August 15, 1997. In author's files.

66. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 78.

CHAPTER THREE

Minding Their Own Business: The Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Business Committee of the Early 1900s

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With their self-government circumscribed by the conditions of reservation life but with the dominant culture still expecting them to "modernize," Indian nations in the early twentieth century responded by establishing business councils. Intended to reconstruct tribal governance in ways that segregated the political (or personal) from the professional, business councils can be seen as evidence of assimilation, critical stages in which external domination extended to the mechanics of governance. But given the reality of external domination, what kinds of "business" could these bodies reasonably conduct? In his examination of the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Business Committee during the first decades of the twentieth century, David La Vere documents a process whereby native council members adjusted their activities to those areas where they still enjoyed some autonomy and used this new body as a way to chart a course between tradition and modernity.

"Follow the money." This is not only a useful guide for investigators in modern America, it also implies what is important in U.S. society. If you want to

know who profited from the merger or why the city council built the bridge where it did, then "follow the money." In American Indian society a better directive might be "follow the lines of kinship." Do you want to know why someone joined this faction rather than the other? Kinship would provide a better clue than a money trail. "Who's your mother" means more and gets asked more often than "what do you do for a living." For thousands of years kinship served as the cornerstone of each and every American Indian band, village, and nation. Kin looked after kin. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the U.S. government tried to inculcate a sense of business enterprise among the Indians but wanted to regulate it at the same time, the government kept getting caught in these webs of kinship and obligations of reciprocity. Turn-of-the-century Indians put more emphasis on supporting kin and expanding one's kinship network than they did on creating profitable ventures. A good example is found at the turn of the twentieth century with the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache (KCA) Reservation Business Committee. Much to the U.S. government's dismay, the reservation Indians used the Business Committee not only to outflank government strictures but also to graft "traditional" methods onto modern economics and politics to produce a uniquely "Indian way."

October 10, 1899, was a busy day for the Indian peoples of the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation in southwest Indian Territory. It proved to be a significant one, also. Their agent, James Randlett, had called a general council of the reservation's three resident nations to present some proposals that needed their collective attention. Scores of Indians milled around the agency headquarters at Anadarko, Indian Territory, now Oklahoma. To a select group of Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache chiefs and principal men, Agent Randlett ticked off the issues.

The Acme Cement Plaster Company of St. Louis, Missouri, had asked to lease some reservation land to mine gypsum. The Absentee Wyandotte Indians wanted to purchase some KCA Reservation land on which they could settle. Settlers from the nearby town of Chickasha had been stealing stone from the reservation, and although Randlett insisted he would try to enforce the law against this thievery, the agent suggested the Indians sell the stone to the townspeople by leasing the quarrying privilege. One T. A. Babb and his sister, Mrs. Bianca Babb Bell, both of Texas, had requested to be adopted by the Comanches in consideration of their brief captivity over twenty-five years ago in one of the last Indian raids into north Texas. Their mother had been killed, and they had lived among the Comanches for eighteen months and ten months, respectively. Their father had spent a small fortune to recover them.[1]

Randlett felt all this was a lot to digest, and he concluded by saying that since commercial concerns would increasingly come before the Indians, their traditional council method of letting every man have a say in the decision-making process would be too cumbersome. So out of thin air Randlett created the "Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Business Committee." He proposed that the reservation's four recognized chiefs form the core of the committee: Apeahtone of the Kiowas; Apache John of the Apaches (Kiowa-Apaches); Quanah Parker, whom Randlett recognized as *the* principal chief of the Comanches; and Eschiti, a Comanche principal chief only slightly less important than Quanah. These four chiefs would each then select one man from among their own followers to make up the remainder of the committee. Apeahtone of the Kiowas chose Pahkotoquodle, Apache John chose Saddle Blanket, Quanah selected Coathty, and Eschiti selected Otto Wells. Apeahtone, Apache John, and Quanah, along with their seconds, tended to be pragmatic, so-called progressive men who acknowledged that their people had to slowly adopt the trappings of American culture being forced upon them. Eschiti and Otto Wells were traditionalists who rejected wholesale acculturation and demanded that the United States observe every last line of the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek, which had placed these Indians on this reservation. An intense rivalry, even a dislike, simmered between Quanah and Eschiti over these issues and would bedevil the committee for years. Although Agent Randlett termed it a Business Committee, in reality it was a three-nation coalition reservation government with the eight men representing the Indians as a whole but under the control of the agent. Although these chiefs represented their respective nations, the agent was king and the Business Committee his royal advisers over whom he held veto power.[2]

That Randlett could create an Indian, multinational reservation government with the stroke of his pen showed how far these Southern Plains peoples had fallen into the clutches of the U.S. government. Prior to the 1860s the Comanches, Kiowas, and Plains Apaches had laid claim to just about everything south of the Arkansas River. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Plains Apaches and Comanches had battled each other for domination of the buffalo- and horse-rich Southern Plains. The Comanches and their Wichita and Caddo allies prevailed, eventually driving most Plains Apaches into the mountains of New Mexico or the Hispanic settlements of northern Mexico. To replenish goods lost in battle, they raided Mexican towns, missions, and ranches and thus managed to keep the Spanish presence in Texas weak and ineffectual. After the 1790s the Comanches solidified their control of the Southern

Plains by allying with the Kiowas and Kiowa-Apaches who were migrating down from Yellowstone country. The Kiowa-Apaches were distant cousins to the same Plains Apaches the Comanches had driven from the Plains, but generations ago they had joined with the Kiowa people and migrated south with them. Although a much smaller nation than the Kiowas, these same Kiowa-Apaches became the Apaches led by Apache John and one of the three nations residing on the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache reservation.[3]

On the Southern Plains the Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches participated in a far-flung economy in which they exchanged horses, buffalo hides, and captives for firearms, kettles, cloth, and a host of other manufactured goods. A man could go far if he controlled the distribution of these commodities. He gained status by taking care of his kin. Strong men generously gave away food and goods and tried particularly to look out for weaker kin. The demands of reciprocity obligated recipients to respond with support and assistance, perhaps even with labor and commodities. The more kin one could call on, the greater one's influence. By drawing upon the obligations of reciprocity his gift giving reinforced, an ambitious man could advance his interests and those of his band. He could gain a true following by expanding his kinships through blood, marriage, or adoption—especially if some of the married or adopted kin were powerful people in their own right, such as other Indian leaders or Euro-American traders. If he could also display such cardinal virtues as generosity, courage, and wisdom while delivering the goods to his people, so to speak, he became a man to be reckoned with, a leader of his people, even recognized as such by the Americans. But he could never forget his kin, from whom his power flowed.[4]

The ability of the Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches to control the Southern Plains economy had eroded by the 1850s. The creation of Indian Territory, the American settlement of Texas and Kansas, the influx of migrants passing over the trails west, the destruction of the great buffalo herds, and the epidemics that periodically swept through their camps hemmed them in and made them weaker. The 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek forced them onto a reservation constituting the southwest corner of Indian Territory. One last attempt to stave off reservation life came with the brief Red River War of 1874–1875. Although they were led by Quanah Parker and others, the Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches were quickly defeated by the U.S. Army and put back on the reservation. By the mid-1880s the Comanche population had plummeted from about 20,000 during the Spanish years to only around 1,400. From the 1880s onward, Quanah and the other leaders found themselves having to

walk a fine line between helping their own people and acquiescing to U.S. demands.[5]

And the United States demanded much, most important that Indians become settled, Christian farmers scratching out a living on individually owned plots of land. To teach the Indians "civilization," the government and religious organizations combined to build churches, schools, and model farms. Aiming to stamp out Indian culture, agents listed rule after rule with which the Indians must comply, such as prohibiting Indian dances and ceremonies, banning the drinking of alcohol, even regulating how cattle must be slaughtered. The government also struck at the issues of kinship and reciprocity when it forbade "giveaways," in which Indians handed out quantities of their goods and property as gifts. A major blow to Indian sovereignty came in 1892 when the Jerome Agreement applied allotment to the KCA reservation. Pressured into giving up their reservation lands for $2 million, the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches began receiving their land allotments in 1901, and in 1906 the United States threw open the remainder of the reservation to white settlement.

Many Indians protested. Kiowa chief Lone Wolf's assertion that the U.S. government illegally broke up their reservation without the three-quarter vote of reservation men as required by the Medicine Lodge Treaty went all the way to the Supreme Court. In 1903 the Court ruled in *Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock* that Congress had the right to allot Indian lands, as it not only had the power to abrogate treaties but could also pass legislation over the Indians' objections. Still, confusion resulted. Were the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches still Indian nations or just a mass of individual Indian property owners? Even the government could not decide. It was in this shadowy period between the signing of the Jerome Agreement and the breakup of the KCA reservation that Agent Randlett created the Business Committee.[6]

If anything, the Business Committee, with elections held every two years, became a new and very visible Indian political arena. Quanah, Eschiti, Apeahtone, and Apache John had followers and kinfolk, and they needed to provide for their people in order to retain power, especially as rivals always lurked in the background hoping to gain at their expense. Quanah and Eshiti often battled each other on the committee, but after they died in the early twentieth century the committee evolved into a 3-3-2 structure: three Comanches, three Kiowas, and two Apaches. But these later representatives sometimes found it difficult to serve their people, as the agent and later the superintendents could overrule the committee. Even elected committeemen could be denied their seats for drunkenness, peyote use, or "evidence of nonprogres-

siveness."[7] With hunting and warfare no longer routes to prestige, aggressive and ambitious men now fought over political positions. Since leaders sat on the Business Committee and such a seat was evidence of leadership, intense rivalries developed within each nation for the positions. In the early twentieth century, what is often described as the old progressive-traditionalist division could best be seen in the peyote issue, pitting those advocating the use of peyote in Native American church services against those who saw it as a drug and as "nonprogressive." So these factions battled for seats on the Business Committee and if their candidate did not win, they immediately asked for a new election.[8]

In the days after the initial Business Committee meeting in October 1899, the eight representatives met with Randlett and quickly disposed of the commercial questions at hand. They approved the gypsum-mining lease with the Acme Cement Plaster Company, and they agreed to sell stone to the Chickasha townfolk. They refused to sell reservation land to the Absentee Wyandottes and unanimously rejected Babb and Bell's petition for adoption. Going a step further, the committee also voted to use $60,000 of their "grass money"—money they received for leasing parts of the reservation to cattle companies— to purchase young heifers to be distributed among the reservation population so they could create their own herds. Finally, the committee officially requested that the agent prevent the sale of alcohol on their reservation.[9]

Then the actual "business" activities of the Business Committee came to an end. For the next fifty years the committee rarely dealt with business as Euro-Americans would define it. From here on the committee mainly authorized the paying of bills or tried to protect the interests of reservation Indians by supplicating the government for various things, such as money for attorneys to press the Indians' land claims or for royalties from oil and gas wells in the Red River.[10] The most obvious reason for the committee's lack of interest in business enterprises was that members quickly realized that the agent and the U.S. government, not the Indians, would decide what type of commercial ventures they should be involved in. For example, when the Business Committee tried to hire an attorney in early 1900 to recover back-due grass money, Agent Randlett quashed the attempt, writing that "this matter will be attended to by the agent and there is no occasion for paying anyone else to attend it."[11] When Randlett convened the Business Committee to select the 480,000-acre "big pasture" initially set aside from allotment, the committee members allowed the agent to select the acreage for them.[12] Any doubt as to who actually held the power was dispelled in 1917 when the Bureau of Indian Affairs told the

Indians that "the Business Committee is not expected to handle any business independently of the superintendent [agent]."[13] Ironically, that same year Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells told the Comanches that the "purpose of the work which the government is doing for the Indians is to train and equip them to attend to their own affairs and to get them away from the old tribal government."[14]

Another reason for ending the committee's business interactions was that as the KCA reservation was allotted and the surplus lands were opened to white settlement, individual Indians rather than the Business Committee began to make, or tried to make, their own business deals. Even then, the agent had the final say. When Kiowa George tried to lease some of his allotted land so a white man could open a slaughterhouse, Randlett stepped in, arguing that the white man had no right to enter into an agreement with Kiowa George, and he ejected the man from the reservation.[15] As the leasing of allotments picked up steam in the early twentieth century, Agent Randlett pressured the Business Committee to allow him to handle the leasings for individual Indians, promising that he would not allow them to take less than twenty cents an acre per year.[16]

Although the Business Committee may have abandoned commercial ventures, it became very active in adopting and enrolling outsiders into the respective Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Nations. The petition of T. A. Babb and Bianca Bell seemed to open a spillway of Business Committee actions on adoption. In fact, the day after the Business Committee was created, the members returned with a list of people they wanted to adopt into their respective nations.

Quanah Parker, chief of the Comanches, proposed the adoption of David Grantham, a white man and "a desirable man to be adopted into the Comanche tribe." Lone Wolf, a chief of the Kiowas, asked the committee to adopt W. D. Lancaster, a white man the Kiowas wanted to hire to build a cemetery and to move the bones of their people into it. Ned Brace, describing himself as a full-blood Kiowa and a graduate of Carlisle Indian School, asked the committee to adopt his wife, Martha, a "half-blood" Indian who had no Indian rights anywhere else. Jim Waldo, a Kiowa and future committeeman, stating that he had no children of his own, asked the committee to allow him to adopt Willie Gibson, a ten-year-old Cherokee boy. And so on the same day that the Business Committee rejected the petition of Babb and Bell, it officially approved the adoptions of Grantham, Lancaster, Martha Brace, and Willie Gibson.[17] Ironically, although Babb and Bell were refused, the Business Committee later adopted

two other former captives—Annie Le Barre, a white woman from Texas,[18] and Herman Lehmann, one of the most famous Texas captives who had lived with the Comanches during the 1870s and had written a widely read account of his captivity entitled *Nine Years Among the Indians*.[19]

But White Buffalo of the Comanches raised an important question: What about white men who had married Kiowa, Comanche, or Apache women? He pointed out two such men, Dr. J. F. Rowell and John Bert Bear, a former Indian trader. Both had married Indian women, had children, and planned to live among the Indians for the rest of their days. "They ought to be adopted so they can get places for their children," White Buffalo explained. "I think we can afford to adopt them."[20] White Buffalo got the Business Committee to think not only about white men who had married Indian women but about others as well. What about people who had been adopted earlier by individual Indians? And what of Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache adults and children who had not been enrolled for land allotment? What of children born after all the allotments had been made and the surplus land sold? Or children born to Kiowa, Comanche, or Apache parents who did not live on the reservation?

Understanding that kin had to be officially adopted into the nation to receive their share of land and money, the committee went on a spree. The committee adopted Rowell and Bear, and also, over the next few years, it adopted William Pedrick, the reservation's district farmer who had married the sister of Kiowa chief Apeahtone;[21] Carl Reid, a part-Lakota part-Chippewa man who had married a Kiowa woman;[22] and Harry Heath, the son of an Apache woman and a Comanche man who had been born at the Uintah Ute Agency but who lived on the Mescalero Apache Reservation.[23] The council officially adopted William Lone Wolf, a mixed-blood Creek who years earlier had been adopted by Kiowa chief Lone Wolf as his own son.[24] A few years later the committee would adopt Laura Clark Parker—the wife of White Parker, Quanah's son—and Aubra C. Birdsong, husband of Quanah's daughter Neda Parker. Eschiti, Quanah's enemy, vigorously opposed adopting Parker and Birdsong, as did Superintendent Ernest Stecker, who pointed out that their spouses owned allotments so there was no need for them to have separate lands. Despite the agent's objections, the committee adopted them and enrolled them for land allotments.[25]

The Business Committee also turned its attention to Comanches and their children who had fled the nation during the Plains Wars and thus missed out on allotment. The committee adopted Mootadah; her two grandchildren, Werchekard and Pessa; and her great-grandchild, Mesquah. All four had been living with the

Kickapoos in Mexico.[26] The committee also approved the adoption of Sotero de la Cerday, the son of a Comanche woman, as well as his three children, and Sanawas, an elderly Comanche—all of whom had been living in Mexico.[27]

Unfortunately, the chance to get a free 160-acre allotment of land or a cut of Indian money also brought the snakes out of the grass. Ellen Davlin appeared at the agency, a two-year-old baby girl in tow, claiming that in 1898 she had spent the night in the tepee of Kooyastley, an Apache man who had since died. The child was his, she said, and so should not only be adopted but should receive a share of the grass money. When no Indians supported Davlin's claims, Agent Randlett, relying heavily on the fact that the child had blond hair and gray eyes, turned down the request.[28]

Another woman, Lizzie Ford, approached Randlett in 1901 with a petition signed by some Kiowas asking that she be adopted. Ford finally admitted that an attorney had told her that if she paid him twenty-five dollars, he would get her enrolled among the Kiowas so she could acquire a tract of Indian land. The agent turned her down, too. Randlett and later agents also had serious misgivings about Dr. Rowell's and Bert Bear's adoptions. They viewed them as "squaw men" who had married Indian women to get their land and who now wanted an allotment and monies of their own. But the Comanches saw Rowell and Bear as valuable kinspeople and fathers of Comanche children who should have enough resources to take care of their families.[29]

The fact that the agent could turn down Davlin and Ford for adoption demonstrates the limits of Business Committee authority. As with so many other issues pertaining to the Indians, the U.S. government had the final say. Just because the Business Committee made the adoptions did not mean these people would be officially recognized as Indians by the government, be placed on the rolls, or ever get a share of annuities, grass money, oil revenues, or allotted land.

Early on, Randlett asked the commissioner of Indian affairs for instructions regarding adoptions, but none was forthcoming. Rather, adoptions and enrollments were taken up on a case-by-case basis and sent to the commissioner and the secretary of the Interior, who either approved or disapproved them. In the first spate of 1899 Business Committee adoptions, Randlett recommended all be disapproved except that of Martha Brace, the half-Indian wife of Kiowa Ned Brace. When the list came back from the commissioner of Indian affairs, the white man David Grantham had been adopted and enrolled because he had been specifically approved to receive land in the Jerome Commission agreement. All others had been rejected, including Martha Brace.[30]

Still, the Business Committee did not give up. Over the years it often went head to head with the agent and later with superintendents over the adoption and enrollment issue.[31] Kiowa chief Lone Wolf's adopted Creek son, William, was finally approved, and he eventually received his own allotment and share of the grass money.[32] Former captive Herman Lehmann was allowed to be adopted and was given, as a Bureau of Indian Affairs lawyer stated, "all the benefits of money conferred by the [Jerome] Agreement of October 21, 1892, the same as if a member by blood, this being the only right which the Indians could confer on persons adopted or enrolled after the cession of their lands."[33] Lehmann never received an allotment of land, although he would keep trying for years to come.[34] Dr. Rowell's allotment came in 1925. Martha Brace, after numerous tries, finally had her adoption approved and, along with fellow petitioners Anacleto Portillo and Bessie Yellowfish, received her allotment in 1926. Carl Reid, the Lakota-Chippewa worker, got his allotment in 1928.[35] W. D. Lancaster, the cemetery worker; Annie Le Barre, the former captive; and Willie Gibson, the ten-year-old Cherokee boy, might not have been so lucky. Their names do not appear on the reservation land rolls.[36]

The Business Committee had much better luck with people who were actually of Comanche, Kiowa, or Apache descent. Harry Heath, the Comanche-Apache boy on the Mescalero Reservation, was finally approved, as were all the Comanche men, women, and children who had missed out on the first allotment.[37] In fact, in 1906 and 1908 the government cut additional, although smaller, land allotments out of the grazing and wood reserves to give to unallotted KCA adults and children.[38] Even after all the reservation land had been allotted or sold, Business Committee members would try to get shares of oil and gas revenues and other monies distributed to their unenrolled and unallotted children.[39]

So why did the Business Committee abandon "business" and spend so much time on adoptions and enrollments? Certainly, a main reason must have been that its members quickly realized that the committee lacked true autonomy over strictly business matters. The government had overturned earlier cattle-leasing arrangements made by Quanah Parker and other chiefs. Even when land allotment became a fait accompli and each head of family was to utilize his allotted land as he saw fit, the government still took it upon itself to approve or disapprove leasing arrangements. So the Business Committee realized the obvious: that it had little power when it came to business affairs.

Nevertheless, adoptions were something committee members felt they had some control over, and in this instance the Indians acted in both a very modern

and a very traditional manner. On one hand, since the U.S. government viewed them as domestic dependent nations, as nations the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches therefore had the right to determine which people were or were not their citizens. In this light, then, adoptions were an act of naturalization, creating new citizens who would benefit the nation as a whole.

On the other hand, the Business Committee was also acting in a very traditional Indian manner. Before the Indians were placed on reservations, adoptions had been a family matter. Some captives, friends, traders, and other strangers who proved their value and loyalty had been adopted by families and so became kin, with all the rights and privileges as members of that society. Many of these adoptees married Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache men and women—a good example being Quanah's mother, a onetime captive named Cynthia Ann Parker. Over the decades the Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches had adopted hundreds, if not thousands, of people into their societies. Adoptions became a method of creating alliances; of bolstering populations decimated by disease, starvation, or war; or of acquiring labor for managing horse herds or processing valuable buffalo hides for use or trade. In fact, by the mid-nineteenth century a high percentage of the Comanche population consisted of either adopted non-Comanches or their descendants.[40]

Once on the reservation and under government scrutiny, families could no longer adopt captives. Raiding had ended, and the pool of available outsiders grew ever smaller. Still, the Indians found people whom they wanted to adopt. Some of these, as we have seen, were already kinspeople, such as husbands, wives, or children not necessarily recognized by the U.S. government as members of the Comanches, Kiowas, or Apaches. Others were people such as Hermann Lehmann and David Grantham with no blood or marriage ties but who had provided or might provide valuable service to the Indians. All these adoptees—as kinspeople always had—were expected to provide for their families, render assistance, and give good counsel. The reservation Indians envisioned them serving as mediators with the white man's world. In turn, the new adoptees would reap the same rewards of kinship the Indians enjoyed and, if the Indians had their way, would share in land allotments, grass money, and oil and mineral royalties. In many ways it was the sharing of the lands and revenues that clouded the adoption issue for the U.S. government and made the agent try to restrict adoptions.

Nevertheless, in the early twentieth century the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches needed more than ever to create new kinships with people who could help them travel down the white man's road. They needed people who would

uphold the reciprocal obligations of kinship by providing assistance and good counsel, whom they could incorporate into their families and into the nation as a whole. So the Business Committee, the only authoritative body recognized by the United States, acted to create both new kin and new citizens. Grantham, Lancaster, Pedrick, Bear, Dr. Rowell, Laura Clark Parker, and Aubra Birdsong were non-Indians who had married either Comanches or Kiowas, some proving valuable by their service to the reservation community. Martha Brace, Carl Reid, and Henry Heath, as well as Mootadah and Sanasa, were Indians and were adopted so they could share in the lands and monies granted to all reservation Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches. Even Annie Le Barre and Herman Lehmann, former captives, kept their kinships alive by living nearby and keeping in touch with their Indian families. All were adopted and enrolled for allotment by the Business Committee, whereas people like Babb and Bell, who had forgotten their obligations of kinship, were turned down. At the same time, the Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches were upholding their own obligations by sharing their land, money, and so much more with their new citizens and kinfolk. And so, in this way the KCA Business Committee truly was "minding its own business" by trying to create kin who could help the Indians navigate through the tempest of twentieth-century American Indian policy.

NOTES

1. Report of a General Council of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes, October 9, 1899, KA-48, no. 467, Kiowa Agency Records (microfilm), Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City, OK, hereafter cited as KA; Report of a General Council of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes, October 10, 1899, KA-48, no. 472, KA.

2. Report of a General Council of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes, October 10, 1899, KA-48, no. 472, KA; Report of a General Council of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes, October 11, 1899, KA-48, no. 474, KA; James F. Randlett to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 18, 1899, KA-34, nos. 729–730, KA; Report of the Business Committee, April 17, 1909, 7RA-205, File 67, Reel 2, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Kiowa Agency Central Files (microfilm), National Archives, Southwest Region, Fort Worth, TX, hereafter cited as KACF.

3. Morris W. Foster, *Being Comanche: A Social History of an American Indian Community* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991), 31–74; Elizabeth A.H. John, *Storms Brewed in Other Men's Worlds: The Confrontation of Indians, Spanish, and French in the Southwest, 1540–1795* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), 258–303; Mildred P. Mayhall, *The Kiowas* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962, 1971), 3–21.

4. Some of the best works that examine the importance of kinship, reciprocity, and status are Gary Clayton Anderson, *Kinsmen of Another Kind: Dakota-White Relations in the Upper Mississippi Valley, 1650–1862* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); Neal Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World: Native Americans and the Coming

of Europeans," in *Indians in American History: An Introduction,* ed. Frederick E. Hoxie and Peter Iverson (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1998), 39–61.

5. William T. Hagan, *United States–Comanche Relations: The Reservation Years* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), 1–58; Thomas W. Kavanagh, *The Comanches: A History, 1706–1875* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 387–477; Dan Flores, "Bison Ecology and Bison Diplomacy: The Southern Plains from 1800 to 1850," *Journal of American History* 78 (September 1991): 479, 485; David La Vere, *Contrary Neighbors: Southern Plains and Removed Indians in Indian Territory* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 137–166.

6. Hagan's *United States–Comanche Relations* examines life and government on the Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache reservation and its eventual breakup under the Dawes Act.

7. Superintendent to Wilbur Pewo, May 10, 1916, File 67, Reel 2, KACF.

8. Report of the Business Committee, April 17, 1909, File 67, Reel 2, KACF; C. V. Sinchecum to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 24, 1916, File 67, Reel 2, KACF.

9. Report of a General Council of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes, October 10, 1899, KA-48, nos. 472–475, KA; Randlett to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 31, 1899, KA-34, nos. 930–931, KA; "'Every Day Seemed to Be a Holiday': The Captivity of Bianca Babb," ed. Daniel J. Delo and Scott Zesch, *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 107 (July 2003): 35–67.

10. Quarterly Session of the Apache, Kiowa, and Comanche Business Committee, August 16, 1915, File 67, Reel 2, KACF; Business Committee Request, April 28, 1934, File 64, Reel 1, KACF; Proceedings of the General Council, August 1, 1934, File 64, Reel 1, KACF.

11. Randlett to Jos. E. Maxwell, March 5, 1900, KA-54, no. 324, KA.

12. Randlett to Apache John, April 2, 1901, KA-60, no. 33, KA; Proceedings of the Business Council, April 10, 1901, KA-61, nos. 76–80, KA; Randlett to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, April 13, 1901, KA-60, nos. 101–103, KA.

13. Report of the Assistant Commissioner, 1917, File 67, Reel 2, KACF.

14. Cato Sells to Millet et al., January 12, 1917, File 67, Reel 2, KACF.

15. Randlett to Maxwell, February 14, 1900, KA-54, no. 182, KA.

16. Report of the Business Council, March 19, 1902, KA-48, nos. 530–531, KA.

17. Report of a General Council of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes, October 11, 1899, KA-48, nos. 474–475, KA.

18. Randlett to CIA, July 26, 1899, KA-34, no. 677, KA; Randlett to CIA, March 7, 1900, KA-54, no. 556, KA.

19. Deposition of Quanah Parker, August 26, 1901, KA-61, nos. 872–873, KA; Randlett to CIA, April 13, 1901, KA-60, no. 105, KA.

20. Proceedings of General Council of Apache, Kiowa, and Comanche Indians, October 25, 1905, KA-48, no. 559, KA.

21. Randlett to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, March 6, 1900, KA-54, nos. 552–553, KA.

22. Proceedings of the Council Held by John P. Blackmon, November 7, 1906, KA-48, nos. 627–636, KA.

23. Randlett to CIA, July 6, 1900, KA-56, nos. 81–82, KA.

24. Randlett to CIA, April 13, 1901, KA-60, no. 157, KA; Proceedings of the Business Council, April 10, 1901, KA-61, nos. 76–80, KA.

25. Report of the Business Committee, April 17, 1909, File 67, Reel 2, KACF.

26. Proceedings of the Business Council, May 17, 1906, KA-48, nos. 571–582, KA.

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28. Randlett to CIA, November 2, 1900, KA-57, nos. 777–779, KA.

29. J.D.C. Atkins to J. Lee Hall, April 14, 1886, KA-49, nos. 662–677, KA; R. Bell to Charles E. Adams, May 13, 1891, KA-49, no. 816, KA; Randlett to CIA, May 16, 1902, KA-65, nos. 881–882, KA; Report of the Business Committee, April 17, 1909, File 67, Reel 2, KACF; Remarks Made in the Indian Council, January 31, 1912, File 67, Reel 2, KACF.

30. Randlett to CIA, February 11, 1902, KA-63, no. 799, KA; Randlett to CIA, February 6, 1900, KA-34, no. 1112, KA; W. A. Jones to Randlett, July 6, 1900, KA-56, no. 127, KA.

31. In the early twentieth century the government abolished the position of agent, and his duties then fell to the reservation school superintendents.

32. Randlett to William Lone Wolf, June 13, 1901, KA-60, no. 785, KA; Randlett to William Lone Wolf, July 16, 1901, KA-61, no. 676, KA; Randlett to William Lone Wolf, February 3, 1902, KA-63, no. 611, KA.

33. A. C. Tonner to Randlett, September 30, 1901, KA-61, nos. 434–435, KA.

34. Quanah Parker to John P. Blackmon, January 29, 1907, KA-47, no. 684, KA.

35. Narrative Report, Kiowa Agency, Calendar Year 1930, Reel 1, KACF.

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39. D. J. Rhoads to John A. Buntin, January 15, 1932, File 67, Reel 3, KACF.

40. Gary Clayton Anderson, *The Indian Southwest, 1580–1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 220–222; Flores, "Bison Ecology," 471.

CHAPTER FOUR

Casino Roots: The Cultural Production of Twentieth-Century Seminole Economic Development

JESSICA R. CATTELINO

"There is, indeed, a certain irony if not paradox in the fact that it was the Seminoles, so long respected for clinging to the 'ways of their ancestors' in the swampy vastness of the Everglades, who would be so pivotal in unleashing the juggernaut of Indian gaming in modern America."

—ANTHROPOLOGIST ANTHONY J. PAREDES[1]

"We're not only B-I-N-G-O."

—MITCHELL CYPRESS (OTTER), VETERAN'S DAY 2000[2]

Jessica Cattelino's chapter examines the links between economic development and cultural identity among the Florida Seminoles. Her work provides an excellent opportunity to rethink the problematic dichotomies that have framed American Indian experience as a choice between modernity and tradition or economic development and cultural survival. Seminole commercial enterprises promoted cultural expression and strengthened tribal identity. In shaping the terms of incorporation, they developed an alternative

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pathway of economic development, rendering the choice between modernity and tradition somewhat irrelevant.

At parties, over coffee, and in supermarket checkout lines, non-Indians of many political stripes who learn that my work addresses Florida Seminole casinos almost always ask a version of "So are Seminoles losing their culture?" or "Have they sold out?" Mainstream newspaper editorials, both for and against tribal gaming rights, worry that native people will become more materialistic, less "traditional." Some tribes vote down tribal gaming referenda in part because they do not view gaming to be compatible with the cultural life they value. Others, including most of the Florida Seminoles with whom I conducted thirteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in 2000–2001 and 2002, do not see a conflict between gaming and their cultural distinctiveness as a people, for reasons that have much to do with their history of poverty and economic development.

In 1979 the Seminole Tribe of Florida opened Hollywood Bingo, the first high-stakes tribally run bingo hall in North America. This act began a slow but steady journey from crushing poverty to economic comfort on the tribe's six urban and rural southern Florida reservations,[3] and it led to a gaming revolution across Indian country, with 201 tribes operating high-stakes casinos by 2001.[4] Gaming did not just *happen* to Seminoles. Instead, it represents one stage in a complex history of twentieth-century economic development initiatives, ranging from cattle to crafts, from airplane manufacturing to alligator wrestling.

Seminole cultural values and economic development have been inextricably intertwined throughout the last century. Indeed, culture and economy cannot be analyzed as separate categories in this context but are mutually constitutive. By accounting for this interplay, we can reject and reformulate the seeming paradox of how Seminoles, often considered by outsiders to be among the most "culturally conservative" Native American groups, became the first American Indian tribe to pursue and embrace a casino economy. This "paradox" assumes an inherent conflict between Native American "culture" and market integration, and it relies on a static and essential concept of "culture" (as something that can be "lost"). Instead, I follow Elizabeth Povinelli in "theoriz[ing] the relationship between the productivity of indigenous practice and the production of cultural identity,"[5] showing how Seminoles have produced meaningful cultural categories and expressive modes through an array of economic regimes. During the casino gaming era, they have chosen a path

of market integration as a mechanism for producing and maintaining cultural and political autonomy.[6]

To understand gaming, it is crucial to examine how prior Seminole economic practices enabled and were shaped by cultural production.[7] It is in part through these economic practices that the very idea of Seminole "culture"—as a measurable, identifiable, and potentially commodified "thing"—emerged. With women's craft production and men's alligator wrestling and cattle programs in particular, gendered economic practices became privileged sites for Seminoles to produce, maintain, and discuss "tradition." More recently, Seminoles have revised the relationship between cultural production and economy by using cigarette and gaming ventures to promote their political self-determination and cultural distinctiveness. In contrast to cattle, crafts, and alligator wrestling, which came to be part of what defined Seminoles *as* Seminole, most tribal members view casinos and cigarettes simply as income sources, as projects that facilitate but do not embody cultural production. Thus they exploit the fungibility of money—the ability to separate its source from its use—to disconnect casinos and cigarettes as economic projects from the forms of cultural production they have enabled. At the same time, many Seminoles view their legal and political battles over gaming rights to be part of an effort to maintain their tribal sovereignty, their political and economic self-reliance and cultural distinctiveness as a people.

COWBOYS AND INDIANS

A 1959 *Miami Herald* article entitled "Indians, Cowboys at Peace: Former Have Become Latter" suggests that "[a] legendary Indian chief looking down from the happy hunting grounds on the Florida Indians of today would probably turn pale with anger" because "as the cash register sings jingle, jangle in the background," Seminoles have become cowboys. An accompanying cartoon (Figure 4.1) contrasts "real" Indian life (bareback riding) with cowboy ways and their technologies, depicting a befuddled Seminole man asking of another Seminole mounted on a saddled horse and dressed in cowboy attire, "What're we coming to?" The answer: "A saddle!"[8]

Seminole cattle programs, a key twentieth-century federal and later tribal economic development project, sparked the imagination of observers who considered cowboys to stand for all that was American and therefore, in a world of mutually exclusive racial identities, not Indian. In fact, Seminole cattle became a marker of heritage and tradition, a symbol and practice of "Indianness," and an institution through which Seminoles elaborated emergent tribal class



Figure 4.1. Miami Herald, 1959.

and gender relations. Culture and economy are tightly entangled in Seminole cattle programs, but they come together productively and in mutual constitution rather than in a simple contrast between economic development and cultural authenticity.

Ironically, there is a historical fallacy in opposing cattle to Indianness. Seminoles and their ancestors have been working cattle since they obtained cows from Spanish colonists, long before American cowboys ranged the West. Seminole cattle ranchers reminded me that their ancestors owned large herds in northern Florida prior to the nineteenth-century Seminole wars and that they fought against Americans who raided their herds and seized their pasturelands. In 1879 R. H. Pratt, an investigator sent by the Office of Indian Affairs in Washington, D.C., who later founded the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, estimated that in southern Florida one-third of Seminoles' annual income—$2,000 of a total $6,000—came from the sale of hogs and cattle.[9]

In late 1936 the federal government shipped 500 head of Hereford drought-relief cattle from Apaches in Oklahoma to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)

Seminole Agency, ushering in a new era of Seminole economic development. Government officials hoped cattle would provide Seminoles with much-needed income, starting them on a march to economic self-sufficiency through modern, scientific agriculture. Officials worked with Seminoles to distribute cattle on the Brighton and Big Cypress Reservations, to build fences and develop pastures, to seek technical assistance from agriculture experts in the government's Extension Service, to build the herd (which required cross-breeding with cattle that could endure the Florida heat), and to structure herd management. Over time the program has evolved, but it generally has consisted of both a tribal herd and individually owned herds, with individual owners paying fees to the tribal cattle cooperative in return for pasture improvement, marketing, breeding, and other services.

Cattle ownership under the new regime had far-reaching social, economic, and political consequences. The Indian agent distributed cattle herds only to residents of the new reservations, and today many Seminoles consider the cattle program to have been a government ploy to "herd" reluctant Seminoles onto reservations. Seminoles in the new program became reliant on government technical and financial aid, and cattle program administration formed the nucleus of the emerging federal apparatus that would dominate Seminole governance through the 1970s.

Over the course of the twentieth century, cattle shaped Seminole social organization, facilitating the emergence of new economic and status distinctions.[10] Federal agents distributed cattle exclusively to men, shifting the gender of property ownership, since women (and, more generally, matrilineal clans) had previously been the primary property owners. In order to own cattle, both individual Seminoles and the tribe as a whole took on unprecedented debt, entering debt relationships to the federal government that would not disappear until the advent of casinos. But cattle investment also had productive potential: cattle owners leveraged their herds as equity to obtain loans unavailable to other reservation Indians, who had no collateral because trust land is inalienable. Cattle as equity, in turn, enabled new capital-intensive pursuits— for example, housing and business ventures—that were previously unimaginable, and cattle owners gained both economic and political power. Cattle owners' emerging status and increased contacts with outsiders led some scholars and BIA agents to characterize them as "the less conservative, more white-oriented members of the tribe"[11] or as agents of acculturation.[12]

Today Seminoles are among the largest cattle operators in the state of Florida, and they collectively own the twelfth-largest cow-and-calf operation

in the United States. The tribal herd, of which all tribal members are shareholders, totals approximately 7,000 head, whereas individuals' herds average about 100 head.[13] The cattle program rarely turns a profit, however, so why does it persist, and what can this tell us about the significance of cattle to Seminoles?

On Seminole reservations today, especially at rural Brighton and Big Cypress, cattle have become a marker of Seminole belonging and community identity, in a resignification of their prior role in government programs as instruments of modernization and assimilation. This is evident in their prominence at public celebrations, as well as in day-to-day practices that mark cattle as key to Seminole heritage. Some nonowners resent that the tribe pours resources into a cattle industry that benefits individuals but consistently loses money for the tribe as a whole (in part because political pressure prevents the tribal government from levying cattle program fees for individual owners at a sufficient rate to defray costs), yet cattle appeal even to most critics as an embodiment of Seminole culture and economy.

Multiple events and institutions celebrate Seminoles' cattle heritage, with rodeo among the most visible. On a warm day in February 2000 I attended Brighton Field Days, a tribally sponsored weekend celebration that features patchwork clothing competitions, sporting contests, entertainment acts, a parade, and a rodeo. Attendance peaked at approximately 2,000 (including hundreds of non-Seminoles) for the evening's professional rodeo, held in a gleaming arena and broadcast on the tribe's closed-circuit television station. Events included bareback and saddle bronco riding, calf roping, steer wrestling, barrel racing (the only event for women), and bull riding. Several Seminoles, mostly men, compete on the professional rodeo circuit, and scores of children participate through the tribal youth recreation program; many rodeo participants are from families that have owned cattle for generations. In addition to rodeo, each spring hundreds of Big Cypress residents and non-Seminole locals gather for the Junior Cypress Cattle Drive. On horseback, participants drive cattle through the reservation to the rodeo grounds, where they gather for a barbecue and an all-Indian rodeo. Each year children participate in a tribal 4-H steer program and annual steer sale, which attracts publicity for the youth and the many civic leaders who buy their steers. Cattle also reinforce Seminoles' "Indianness" through intertribal institutions like the Eastern Indian Rodeo Association and the Intertribal Agriculture Council (est. 1987).[14]

Cowboy aesthetics, albeit in a modified form, have become a Seminole aesthetic. In a 1956 *National Geographic* article about "Florida's 'Wild' Indians,

the Seminole," a caption beneath a photograph of Seminole boys wearing Seminole patchwork shirts and cowboy boots reads: "Cowboy Boots Say American Boy; Shirts Bespeak the Seminole."[15] This typical midcentury logic contrasted the cowboy with the Indian, but cowboy aesthetics today are Seminole aesthetics, with many men wearing cowboy boots, jeans, and hats and tribal officials often donning cowboy hats for public occasions and posed photographs.[16] With casino wealth, expensive ostrich boots and other Western-wear accessories have become a common form of conspicuous consumption. The cowboy motifs extend beyond clothing on the rural reservations, where cattle graze in the pastures, country music blares from extended cab pickups, and rodeo grounds dominate the built environment.

Cattle ownership still conveys status, despite the fact that casino dividends have all but erased the income gaps that once separated cattle owners from others. Richard Bowers (Panther), a Big Cypress resident, is the tribe's natural resources coordinator, chairman of the Big Cypress cattle owners' committee, assistant to the cattle manager, and president of the Intertribal Agriculture Council. He and his brother Paul are third-generation cattle owners. In an interview Richard characterized cattle as "the social fiber of the community." He believes cattle benefit not only the owners but also their extended families, and they produce jobs for Seminoles and non-Seminoles alike.[17] When I asked Richard and Paul about the role of cattle owners, Paul replied that if you are a cattle owner "you're somebody in the community" (April 13, 2001).[18]

Under the cattle program, government officials allocated cattle only to men, and this soon led to a partial male gendering of Seminole tradition. With cattle, men's economic power and social status grew relative to those of women, as property patterns shifted away from female ownership and matrilineal clan inheritance.[19] After anthropologist Alexander Spoehr interviewed Naha Tiger (Snake), an elder at Brighton, Spoehr recorded the following in his 1939 fieldnotes: "A girl with a lot of hogs has an easier time getting a good husband than one with no property. . . . Naha thought that in old times the women proportionately owned more hogs than the men. And they owned the houses and the fields, though the land itself was not owned, so far as I can make out."[20] Today, as the tribe has taken over the cattle program from the federal government, the male gendering of cattle as Seminole heritage, although powerful, is not absolute. Once again, many women own cattle, and some ride in rodeos. Women often run the accounting and business aspects of cattle ownership, and they provide meals when their families' cattle are being worked. Louise Gopher (Panther), a middle-aged Brighton resident, is the principal

owner and manager of a herd she and her siblings inherited from their father. Gopher once presented a paper on female cattle owners at an academic conference, in collaboration with a local anthropologist, Susan Stans. She estimates that about half of the cattle herds are owned at least in part by women. She considers cattle ownership to be her "expensive hobby"; you can't get rich on cattle, she says, but it is "a tradition you carry on" (March 13, 2001).

By analyzing the often hidden role of women in Seminole cattle operations—as owners, managers, cooks, accountants—it is possible to recognize both the male gendering of cattle as a marker of Seminole tradition and the embeddedness of cattle in the extended matrilineal family. Gender is a microcosm for the interplay of cultural production and economic development in Seminole cattle enterprises; government cattle operations did change—some might say assimilated—the gender of Seminole property ownership and inheritance patterns. However, Seminoles have reframed this economic regime as a site for cultural production, and, paradoxically, women's roles as owners and extended family members are reemerging. Cattle are not "simply" an economic venture: they both bind a distinctly Seminole community and reveal some of its internal distinctions.

CRAFTING CULTURE

Gift shops sprinkled throughout Seminole reservations feature bright patchwork skirts and jackets, sweetgrass baskets, palmetto dolls, and glittery beaded jewelry. Twentieth-century tourism and commercial craft production began as economic development initiatives but emerged as important forms of cultural production, enabling Seminoles to engage in meaningful labor during a time when they faced poverty and new pressures of market integration. Other scholars have documented the development and forms of Seminole crafts.[21] Here my project is narrower: to show how Seminole crafts have been shaped by economic development initiatives and, simultaneously, have been a site for the production and consolidation of Seminole "culture" as embodied in material objects, labor, and monetary transactions. Women defined and sustained these practices, such that today Seminole tradition is increasingly located in gendered craft production, women's paid labor, and its objects.

Cultural tourism as an economic development strategy has gained currency among indigenous peoples around the world.[22] Seminoles began to self-consciously market their culture—and themselves *as* culture—during the 1920s, after the hunting-and-trapping economy bottomed out and the completion of the Tamiami Trail highway and the Florida tourism boom opened new markets.

Like other indigenous and minority groups, Seminoles have engaged in cultural tourism and commercial crafts as forms of cultural production, navigating the relationship between the local meanings and the broader sociopolitical implications of marketing culture. These intercultural practices generate and contest cultural meanings: they do not (only) commodify culture, they produce it.[23]

According to ethnohistorian Patsy West, by 1930 more than half of the Mikasuki-speaking Indians in southern Florida were involved in the tourist economy, many employed in white-owned tourist villages where they marketed themselves and their crafts to curious onlookers.[24] Some government officials criticized the villages for exploiting Indian workers;[25] West, however, argues that tourist villages offered Seminoles spaces in which to sustain "traditional" ways of life, and many Seminoles today remember tourist villages as an important part of their economic and cultural history.[26] By the 1960s the BIA Seminole Agency and the tribe decided to pursue the tourist village model, and in March 1960 the tribally operated Seminole Okalee Indian Village and Arts and Crafts Center opened on the Hollywood Reservation. It featured craft sales and demonstrations in a chickee village setting.[27] Despite the fact that the tribe has only intermittently profited from the Okalee Village, it has remained a funding priority. After periodic closures during budget crises, its doors remained open until the building was razed during a 2003 casino expansion; there are plans for a cultural display in the new casino complex (Figure 4.2). At the Ah-Tah-Thi-Ki Museum at Big Cypress, museum officials have constructed another tourist village, although it is focused more on craft education than on profit; the museum also has a gift shop located inside the main exhibit building.

The fact that Seminoles today perpetuate tourist villages as economic and educational institutions suggests that this practice of cultural tourism and display, originated in part by outsiders, has taken hold as a form of cultural production. Indeed, many Seminoles told me that tourism *itself* is a Seminole tradition, and some consider casino gaming, as a form of tourist entertainment, a logical extension of this legacy.

What about the crafts themselves, as objects that convey cultural meaning?[28] Seminole crafts emerged as a modern cultural category in the context of government- and missionary-sponsored economic development initiatives. The category of Seminole crafts quickly became a way of figuring and exploiting the value of culture itself.[29] In 1940, school instructor William Boehmer and housekeeper Edith Boehmer established the Seminole Crafts Guild, a small-scale cooperative at Brighton, with the assistance of the Indian Arts and Crafts

Figure 4.2. The "Culture Village" at the Okalee Village, Hollywood. Photo by author.

Board in Washington, D.C.[30] In 1960 the organization was sold to the Seminole Tribe of Florida for $25,000. Throughout, Mrs. Boehmer worked closely with Seminole women to "improve" the quality of their crafts, selecting design elements and instituting standards in materials and sewing methods. On the Tamiami Trail, Deaconess Harriet Bedell, an Episcopal missionary, led a similar project beginning in 1933, selling Indian crafts at her Glade Cross Mission.[31] In his field notes, William Sturtevant recorded that the deaconess held artists to "high and somewhat peculiar standards," with clear ideas about designs and methods, but that she also encouraged innovation, including beach bags and pillow covers.[32] Government documents suggest that by a conservative estimate, over 25 percent of all Seminoles were engaged in craft production and sales by 1937.[33] In 1967 the tribal government undertook a new mode of craft production as economic development, opening a factory in Big Cypress that employed men to produce wooden items for sale.[34] Unprofitable and plagued by workplace organization difficulties, the factory closed within a year and a half.[35]

The economic development potential for craft production is difficult to gauge, but a gender lens adds clarity. Most scholars and government officials

considered craft production to be supplementary income for Seminole families, relative to male breadwinners.[36] The maximum gross income earned by a craft producer in 1964 was $1,000.[37] In 1963, 99 of 175 total Seminole families earned $500 or less annually, and only 37 families earned more than $1,500, so craft income may have played a significant role in household economies.[38] Most characterizations of craft production de-emphasize this economic impact, in part by overlooking the importance of craft income for women, especially for the many single mothers who could not rely on husbands' incomes. Many Seminoles remember craft production as a crucial part of their household economies. Elaine Aguilar (Otter) said that when she was growing up, her single mother survived by making crafts, sitting at the sewing machine daily by 5:30 A.M.: "She made everything. Anything to make money to feed her kids" (January 3, 2001).

Since gaming has increased individual and family incomes, few Seminoles make a living from craft production, and there is a widespread perception that fewer young people are taking up craftwork. Elder Jimmie O'Toole Osceola (Panther), an accomplished patchwork maker (unusual for a man), believes young people's incorporation into broader American culture directs them away from crafts: "They are too busy with other culture. Young people very busy with schooling and education, and the boys are very busy with sports nowadays, so they're not doing any wood carving. They like things that is done in a few minutes. Craft takes long time to make 'em. Not one day" (May 22, 2001). Nonetheless, gaming has sparked new opportunities for individuals to produce crafts. Several women and men hold jobs demonstrating crafts for visitors to the new museum, and others work as craft instructors for expanding tribal cultural programs. Women own several of the largest reservation craft shops (Figure 4.3). A high-end collector's market, with several Seminole buyers, has opened up for patchwork and baskets, allowing "master" artists to realize significant profits.[39]

In the early 1970s one observer stated with confidence that "most of the wares for sale at the Arts and Crafts Center, clothing excepted, are made just for sale to tourists and do not represent part of an artistic heritage."[40] This is not the case today, if it ever was. Seminole crafts no longer play a major role as income generators, but their significance as markers of identity, tradition, and community has only increased over time; and today many Seminoles and outsiders alike value sweetgrass baskets, dolls, beadwork, and other "tourist items" as meaningful representations of Seminole heritage. Mary Frances Johns (Panther) told a 1999 interviewer that when a Seminole makes and demonstrates

Figure 4.3. The Anhinga Gallery, a Hollywood craft shop owned by Virginia Osceola (Bird). Photo by author.

crafts, "what you are doing is publicizing your people."[41] As forms of cultural expression and celebration, patchwork adorns the stoles on the tribe's Afachkee school graduation robes, Seminole dolls hang as Christmas tree decorations in the tribal headquarters lobby, and contestants in the annual Miss Seminole contest demonstrate basketry, doll making, or other artistic forms in the talent competition. Most tribal festivals feature well-attended clothing contests and craft demonstrations.[42] Crafts also represent the polity of the Seminole Tribe of Florida when Seminoles present crafts to visiting dignitaries from other tribes and foreign countries. In these acts crafts become markers of diplomacy, measures of honor and status, and representations of tribal sovereignty.

Craft producers continue to innovate, from Seminole patchwork sewn onto Miami Dolphins fabric to beaded pool cues to Florida State Seminoles team logos incorporated into sweetgrass baskets. In recent years artists have begun to produce objects that feature clan totems in a new mode of asserting identity and distinction within the tribe, not just between Seminoles and outsiders. Some Seminoles have become specialists in producing historical designs, and several men have begun to produce period clothing and accessories for their costumes in reenactments of nineteenth-century Seminole wars. This

periodization marks a transition of crafts to a new form of historical culture making. The question remains whether the gaming generation will take up craftwork not only as consumers but as producers, not out of economic necessity but for the sake of tradition and aesthetics.

EVERGLADES SMILES

Cultural tourism promoted women's crafts as markers of Seminole heritage and, by extension, located cultural transmission in women's labor, yet tourism also gave birth to a wholly masculine form of Seminole cultural production—alligator wrestling. Beginning around 1920, Seminole men earned money at white- and Indian-owned tourist attractions by climbing into a pool of water with at least one alligator, catching it, and "wrestling" it (Figure 4.4). Soon alligator wrestling became "an activity synonymous with the Florida Seminoles."[43] Some critics decried alligator wrestling as silly, fake, or exploitative; but wrestlers gained status within Seminole communities and became respected as expert practitioners and bearers of tradition. Some men leveraged their skills to travel across the country for fairs and expos. During the early 1950s, Moses Jumper (Panther) took William Sturtevant to the white-owned *Jungle Queen* tourist boat on the New River in Fort Lauderdale, where Jumper wrestled alligators. Sightseeing boats stopped twice daily at the dock, with its chickees and alligator pit. Women sold souvenirs, men wrestled 'gators for tips, and on that day three small girls earned coins by singing "Jesus Loves Me" in Mikasuki and reciting the pledge of allegiance in English.[44] To this day, individual wrestlers develop their own routines and styles, but common skills include sitting atop the alligator, opening and closing its powerful jaws (showing its "Everglades smile"), and rolling it over on its back to scratch its belly and make it "go to sleep." During shows some wrestlers talk about how Seminoles coexist with alligators in the swamps, others describe alligator anatomy and behavior, and some try dangerous tricks like inserting their heads or hands into the beasts' open mouths and pulling them out before the alligators' jaws snap together. One wrestler told me that in the 1980s he could earn $200–$300 per show, performing three shows daily.

Today gaming has eliminated the financial incentive for men to risk their limbs in the 'gator pit, yet alligator wrestling remains a colorful component of Seminole cultural celebrations. Spectators enjoy shows at the Okalee Village and at events such as the annual Tribal Fair. Both the Ah-Tah-Thi-Ki Museum's introductory film and a segment staff members developed for a local television series on Seminole culture feature alligator wrestling. When Naomi Wil-

Figure 4.4. Alligator wrestling at the Jungle Queen. *Photo courtesy of the Seminole/Miccosukee Photographic Archive.*

son (Snake) reigned as Miss Seminole and competed for an intertribal title in Oklahoma, she represented her Seminole heritage by wrestling an alligator for the talent competition (Elsie Bowers [Snake], June 27, 2001).

Alligator wrestling performs Seminole heritage, in a reminder of Seminoles' connection to the Everglades and a demonstration of (masculine) bravery. Alligator wrestling also operates discursively as a metaphor for Seminole values of toughness and fortitude. For example, at a Tribal Council meeting Chairman James Billie (Bird), an accomplished wrestler, greeted a longtime employee returning from an illness by comparing her experience to wrestling alligators. Billie also joked about making outside politicians and businessmen hop into the alligator pit before he would support their causes. Some Seminole men embrace wrestling as connecting their masculinity to their cultural heritage. In 2000, Chairman Billie climbed into an alligator pit after a long hiatus from the craft, only to have his finger bitten off. The *Seminole Tribune* quoted him on his motives for jumping into the pit: "I thought I'd go back in there and reinstate my manhood."[45] While I was in Florida he often wagged his stump and joked about his "battle wounds" from life and politics. Other wrestlers show off physical scars and missing digits as badges of honor, not unlike the war wounds displayed by veterans.

Many Seminoles lament alligator wrestling's decline, and some seek ways to preserve it. The director of the recreation department, Moses Jumper Jr. (Snake), has considered including wrestling in youth recreation programs so boys can learn their heritage. Since gaming, however, young men enjoy many career options, and hardly anyone seems to disapprove of boys' choices to pursue safer and more lucrative paths. Indeed, many tribal members were amused and somewhat befuddled by a September 2000 national media frenzy over the Okalee Village's need to openly advertise alligator-wrestling positions. A *New York Times* front-page article, "Filling the Job Is Like Wrestling Alligators,"[46] got picked up by the NBC *Today* show and the international press. Why would such an obscure story garner front-page attention in a leading national newspaper? Perhaps because it marked the end of an era and presented a paradox of culture and money: How can alligator wrestling be Seminole anymore, and how can Seminoles be Seminoles when no one is lining up to jump into the pit, when they have the money to attend college instead? Alligator wrestling, as an economic form and a performative act, is inalienable from Seminole-ness, insofar as only Seminoles themselves, not hired non-Seminoles, can authenticate it as a cultural practice through their labor.[47] Casinos, and the expanded economic and educational horizons they enable,

have disrupted a familiar equation of Native American tourist arts and cultural heritage with poverty. With alligator wrestling, that which began as an economic pursuit grew into a marker of cultural heritage, only to be displaced by new economic opportunities for young Seminole men. This trajectory illuminates the complex and productive relationship between indigenous economic development and cultural practice.

VICES AND VIRTUES: CIGARETTES AND GAMING

Seminoles' late-twentieth-century foray into cigarette sales and gaming disarticulated and reconfigured the relationship between economic practices and cultural production. The cases of cattle, crafts, and alligator wrestling illustrate that market integration can afford indigenous peoples opportunities to explore new and expanded forms of cultural production, but few Seminoles today claim that gaming and cigarettes—the tribe's main income sources—comprise or express Seminole tradition. Instead, they view these economic practices instrumentally, as ways to escape poverty and make money for the tribe, and thus they increasingly detach economic practices from cultural production. Nonetheless, with cigarettes and gaming Seminoles have perpetuated the valuation of "tradition" through, not despite, a market economy by embracing modern economic and political institutions in the service of tribal sovereignty and a broader vision of cultural distinctiveness.

In 1976, after hearing about efforts by other Native American tribes to open tax-free cigarette shops, the Seminole Tribe of Florida opened its first smoke shops, jumping into legal and political negotiations with the State of Florida to exercise its right to sell cigarettes without state taxation or regulation. Discount cigarette sales were the first Seminole venture to yield regular, substantial revenues, leading the journey out of poverty. Located on busy intersections and even on a few quiet Hollywood streets, the small and rather drab smoke shops—mostly customized mobile homes with drive-up windows—attract a wide range of customers day and night (Figure 4.5).

In 2001 the tribe ran ten smoke shops and over two dozen bingo hall vending machines.[48] Many more smoke shops are owned by individual Seminoles, who purchase cigarettes from the tribe's wholesale operation. A tribal tobacco ordinance governs all transactions, and a tribal tobacco association sets and regulates prices.

Cigarettes set the stage for casinos. Seminoles cut their political and legal teeth on cigarettes when they defended smoke shop operations by hiring lobbyists, working with lawyers to avoid litigation, crafting public relations strategies,

Figure 4.5. One of the more distinctively decorated smoke shops, Hollywood, 2002. Photo by author.

and formulating theories of tribal sovereignty that would be tested in future casino controversies. Prefiguring gaming, smoke shops reworked the relationship between Seminole economic development and cultural production. Unlike crafts or alligator wrestling, cigarettes and their accompanying controversies prompted Seminoles to contend less with the dilemma of selling culture than with the specter of selling out. Despite the availability of images of tobacco as essentially Indian, few Seminoles consider cigarettes to be essentially Seminole, as is evidenced in part by the lack of distinctly Seminole iconography or names on smoke shops and by the near absence of Seminoles among smoke shop staff. But although Seminoles do not see an inherent conflict in pursuing economic ventures detached from Seminole identity, the public response has often been negative and grounded in assumptions about the "proper" activities of native peoples. For example, in the mid-1980s a Tampa city attorney told tribal leaders what she wished they would do with a reservation site instead of building a smoke shop: "You know what you could do is have a few carved canoes and statues and interview some old Indian ladies and get some recipes and put out a cookbook."[49]

In 1979, Seminoles opened Hollywood Bingo, the first high-stakes tribal gaming enterprise in North America. They subsequently litigated and won an important case, *Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth,* which affirmed their gaming rights to be grounded in tribal sovereignty.[50] Although it was only in the 1990s that new electronic games lifted the tribal economy to its present heights, casinos' economic impact is staggering. According to the tribe's general counsel, Jim Shore (Bird), prior to 1979 the Seminole Tribe of Florida administered an annual budget of less than $2 million, with approximately 90 percent of total funds coming from the federal government. Now the tribe's annual budget exceeds $200 million, with over 95 percent of funds coming from casino revenues. Seminoles have chosen to devote substantial portions of casino revenues to social services and cultural programs, and the Tribal Council also distributes per capita dividend checks to each tribal member.[51]

Elected leaders and individuals are attempting to diversify the tribal economy to reduce reliance on gaming and to create jobs. Recent tribal ventures—all subsidized by gaming—include ecotourism, sugarcane fields, and citrus groves, yet failed ventures abound, including a rope factory, a turtle farm, an airplane manufacturer, and a vegetable farm. The tribe has pursued investments in the stock market, non-Seminole casinos, banks and insurance companies, and real estate interests.[52]

Seminoles have also directed gaming profits toward tribal social services, channeling economic development to support self-governance. Because of gaming revenues and expertise, the tribe now controls programs previously administered by the federal government.[53] Today every Seminole child is guaranteed full educational opportunities, from tribal preschool and the K–12 Afachkee School at Big Cypress to adult education. Health clinics on three reservations offer a full array of free services, and all tribal members carry full health insurance. New housing, tribal offices, recreational facilities, and other construction projects dot the reservation landscapes.

Increased gaming revenues enable new and expanding cultural institutions, including language preservation programs, fairs and festivals, the Ah-Tah-Thi-Ki Museum, a closed-circuit tribal TV station, and an expanded newspaper and a new website. Seminoles also engage in cultural production when they choose to direct gaming revenues to economic development and tribal governance, insofar as this is part of their effort to define what it means to be a people.

Despite these gains, Seminole casinos generate widespread fears among outside observers (and some, although relatively few, tribal members) that

Seminoles are sacrificing their cultural integrity to chase the almighty dollar. This anxiety, which to a lesser extent also attaches to smoke shops, extends far beyond earlier rumblings about assimilation or commodification that accompanied craft production, cattle operations, and other twentieth-century Seminole economic practices. Federal officials had previously promoted "nonthreatening form[s] of economic enterprise" for Seminoles,[54] but gaming is a different story, as casinos generate concerns that Indians will be exploited by organized crime operators, will lose their "Indianness," and will encounter increased social problems such as drug and gambling addictions. Gaming anxieties comprise what Fred Myers calls "scandals of commodification," revealing conflicting regimes of value vis-à-vis culture and money and mediating racial and political relations between communities.[55]

Gaming as a *form* of economic development fuels critiques because to many Americans indigenous "tradition" represents the opposite of casinos, which embody capitalism, nonproductive market exchange, and money itself. Conservative critics of tribal sovereignty as "special rights" argue that tribes' embrace of casino capitalism indicates that they are no longer "really" Indians and thus do not deserve special legal status. Many critics of capitalism, on the other hand, decry the spread of casino-based materialism as corrupting indigenous ways. These critiques rely on an understanding of money as corroding culture, and they promote a suspect ideology of money as "a single, interchangeable, absolutely impersonal instrument—the very essence of our rationalized modern civilization."[56]

Recently, many anthropologists have rejected the assumption that money erodes cultural uniqueness, instead analyzing the history and cultural specificity of how people have come to understand and use money.[57] During the twentieth century, Seminoles approached money and markets in diverse ways as they sought to escape poverty through shifting modes of economic and cultural production. Seminoles have neither rejected modernity nor accepted its claims wholesale. Instead, they have chosen to engage modernity on their own terms, to whatever extent this is possible, and they have created "alternative modernities" in their interweaving of market integration with efforts to maintain tribal sovereignty and cultural distinctiveness. Thus they have imposed limits on the universalist "project of modernity."[58]

Gaming is making Seminoles "rich," both as a tribe and as individuals, and the mere fact of this wealth generates crises of cultural meaning and politics vis-à-vis non-Seminoles. By turning to market forces as economic engines to fuel cultural production, Seminoles have realigned the relationship between

economic development and "tradition." Ironically, it is the fungible nature of money, the very abstraction that supposedly erodes social relations and cultural specificity, that enables these resignifications. The day has passed, if it ever dawned, when, as Ethel Cutler Freeman asserts, "[t]he Seminoles despise the man who lives rich."[59] Many, although not all, Seminoles now enjoy the trappings of wealth, from fancy cars and designer clothes to expensive vacations and private educations. For many Americans such a wealthy Indian is an oxymoron or even an offense. Katherine Spilde identifies the dual force of the "rich Indian" stereotype, which weakens claims to sovereignty because tribes seemingly "do not *need* sovereign rights now that they have a new economic resource" and which posits wealth "as the antithesis of 'authentic' Indian identity."[60] As Seminoles escape poverty, engage in novel consumption practices, and experience class mobility, they face new criticisms and they forge new values at the interface of culture and economy.

CONCLUSION

As Brian Hosmer has argued for other native groups, twentieth-century Seminoles repeatedly "chose economic modernization as the best possible way to preserve, not abandon, distinctive identities."[61] Not all choices worked out, yet some—cattle, craft production, alligator wrestling—yielded meaningful cultural practices and identities. The spectacular economic success of gaming casts a new light on this history, allowing us to view the relationship between economic ventures and cultural production in the context of present-day fears about cultural integrity, market integration, and wealth. Accounting for contingency and mutual constitution in the relationship between indigenous cultural production and economic development pushes us to address new forms of political, economic, and cultural integration (e.g., market integration) without resorting to a discourse of assimilation.

Casinos are not a "new buffalo" that has descended magically on American Indian tribes.[62] Instead, casinos represent a new stage in the long and complex history of Native Americans' economic, political, and cultural struggles. By attending to this history, we can move away from "impact" studies that determine what casinos have "done" to native peoples' cultural and social life to instead show how tribal casinos are cultural and social practices worked out at the interface of economy and cultural production. Along with sweetgrass baskets, cattle, Everglades smiles, and other "traditions," Seminole casinos move us away from analyses of culture to cultural production, from modernization to projects of modernity. Thus we escape the paradox of how such a

culturally conservative group as Florida Seminoles could launch a gaming revolution, and we can begin to understand why a religious/medicine leader and businessman replied to my question about changes in gaming's wake: "Changes? I don't see changes. Things basically have stayed the same, just taken new forms."[63]

NOTES

1. See J. Anthony Paredes, "Paradoxes of Modernism and Indianness in the Southeast," *American Indian Quarterly* 19, 2 (1995): 355.

2. Clans are indicated in parentheses.

3. These include major reservations in urban Hollywood, in the swamps of Big Cypress, and on the prairies of Brighton (near Lake Okeechobee), as well as smaller ones at Immokalee, Tampa, and Fort Pierce. This account also includes information about the people who, after a 1950s political split, became the Miccosukee Tribe. In addition to these two federally recognized tribes there are several families of "Independent Seminoles" who refuse recognition by the U.S. government.

4. National Indian Gaming Association, 2002 Indian Gaming Facts, http://indiangaming.org/library/index.html.

5. Elizabeth Povinelli, *Labor's Lot: The Power, History, and Culture of Aboriginal Action* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 24.

6. A disclaimer: I do not wish to imply, by emphasizing the indeterminate and productive relationship between economic forms and cultural practices, that market integration cannot harm indigenous communities. To the contrary, land dispossession, state welfare dependency, market integration, and other imposed economic transitions have often wreaked havoc on indigenous peoples around the world.

7. Originally drawn from Pierre Bourdieu and discussed in his *The Field of Cultural Production* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), the concept of cultural production, in lieu of "culture," accounts for the dynamic processes whereby cultural practices and beliefs gain meaning and value.

8. Fred Porter, "Indians, Cowboys at Peace: Former Have Become Latter," *Miami Herald,* June 14, 1959.

9. R. H. Pratt, "R. H. Pratt's Report on the Seminole in 1879 (Presented and Annotated by William C. Sturtevant)," *Florida Anthropologist* 9, 1 (1956 [1888]): 1–24. More of the income likely came from hogs than from cattle, but the fact that Pratt included cattle in the estimate confirms that they were a source of income for some Seminoles prior to the government program, even if owners lacked capital to build up large herds before government assistance.

10. Leland E. Black, *Report on Indian Land Use and Cattle Program* (Hollywood, FL: Seminole Agency, Seminole Tribe of Florida, 1976); Merwyn S. Garbarino, *Big Cypress: A Changing Seminole Community* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972).

11. Charles H. Fairbanks, *The Florida Seminole People* (Phoenix: Indian Tribal Series, 1973), 43–44.

12. Garbarino, *Big Cypress.*

13. Figures from Richard Bowers (Panther), chairman of the Big Cypress cattle owners' committee (August 20, 2002).

14. Cattle also forge ties with non-Indian outsiders, especially local white cattle

ranchers. These cattle-based relationships ease the climate of racial tension in rural Florida.

15. Louis Capron, "Florida's 'Wild' Indians, the Seminole," *National Geographic Magazine* (December 1956): 835.

16. Some women, especially at Brighton, have also adopted Western wear.

17. These include numerous non-Seminole Indians from around the country, many of whom travel seasonally as cattle hands, as well as Latinos and whites.

18. I have indicated the dates of quoted interviews in parentheses.

19. Before moving onto the Dania (now Hollywood) Reservation in 1928, Ada Tiger (Snake), for example, owned a herd of approximately 75 head, which, according to her daughter, was the largest Florida Seminole herd at the time (Betty Mae Jumper and Patsy West, *A Seminole Legend: The Life of Betty Mae Tiger Jumper* [Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001], 36–37).

20. Alexander Spoehr, "Fieldnotes," in the private collections of William C. Sturtevant, Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History, Washington, DC, 1939.

21. David M. Blackard, *Patchwork and Palmettos: Seminole/Miccosukee Folk Art Since 1820* (Fort Lauderdale: Fort Lauderdale Historical Society, 1990); Dorothy Downs, *Art of the Florida Seminole and Miccosukee Indians* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995). Seminole patchwork, in particular, is not isomorphic with tourism; Seminoles wore patchwork clothing before they sold it on the tourist market. However, it was in the context of tourist camps and trade that Seminoles began to market patchwork, and it subsequently developed in tandem with other tourist arts. An informant of Sturtevant, William McKinley Osceola, believed Indians began selling patchwork at the Musa Isle tourist village when white tourists began to ask if they could buy Seminoles' clothes (Sturtevant private collection).

22. Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, *Destination Culture: Tourism, Museums, and Heritage* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Nelson H.H. Graburn, ed., *Ethnic and Tourist Arts: Cultural Expressions from the Fourth World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Ruth B. Phillips and Christopher B. Steiner, eds., *Unpacking Culture: Art and Commodity in Colonial and Postcolonial Worlds* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

23. Cf. Louisa Schein, *Minority Rules: The Miao and the Feminine in China's Cultural Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000). Jay Mechling argues that Seminole self-representations to tourists smack of inauthenticity, and he cites as evidence the fact that some Seminole "traditions" first emerged as part of the tourist economy they promote (Jay Mechling, "Florida Seminoles and the Marketing of the Last Frontier," in *Dressing in Feathers: The Construction of the Indian in American Popular Culture,* ed. S. Bird [Boulder: Westview, 1996], 149–166). His analysis simplistically contrasts authentic "culture" and identity with cultural forms that emerge in intercultural contexts, whereas I consider the potential of integrative economic practices to sustain, create, and reframe cultural production.

24. Patsy West, *The Enduring Seminoles: From Alligator Wrestling to Ecotourism* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), 9.

25. James Lafayette Glenn, *My World Among the Florida Seminoles* (Orlando: University Presses of Florida, University of Central Florida, 1982), 106.

26. Cf. Trudy Nicks, "Indian Villages and Entertainments: Setting the Stage for Tourist Souvenir Sales," in *Unpacking Culture: Art and Commodity in Colonial and Postcolonial Worlds,* ed. Phillips and Steiner, 301–315.

27. According to a 1962 tribal document, the Okalee Village employed approximately fifteen tribal members, served as an outlet for Seminole craft producers, and offered crafts produced by other Indian tribes (Billy Osceola and Howard Tiger, *Progress Report of the Seminole Tribe of Florida* [Hollywood, FL: Seminole Tribe of Florida, 1962]).

28. First, a caveat about my use of the term *craft*: although I want to resist the pattern of designating objects produced by indigenous people as "crafts," as opposed to Western "art," I use the word *craft* nonetheless, mostly because Seminoles themselves generally refer to these objects as crafts and because this term more accurately reflects their circulation on the market.

29. Cf. Molly H. Mullins, *Culture in the Marketplace: Gender, Art, and Value in the American Southwest* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).

30. The Arts and Crafts Board had been established in 1935 as part of Indian Commissioner John Collier's Indian New Deal, which emphasized cultural preservation and economic self-sufficiency.

31. Patricia West, "Glade Cross Mission: An Influence on Florida Seminole Arts and Crafts," *American Indian Art Magazine* 9, 4 (1984): 58–67.

32. Sturtevant, "Fieldnotes," 1951 day book I, July 26.

33. F. J. Scott, *Annual Report of Extension Workers, Form B.P. 11* (Dania, FL: Seminole Indian Agency, 1937), in the National Archives, Washington, DC, Record Group 75, Central Classified Files, 1907–1939 Seminole, 11.

34. I am intrigued that the tribal government and the BIA developed this factory for men rather than women, who comprised the vast majority of craftworkers. I suspect that this reflected a general desire on the part of Seminole Agency staff to promote employment for men as breadwinners.

35. Garbarino, *Big Cypress,* 27.

36. In a 1930 report to the commissioner of Indian affairs, Roy Nash observed that men generated most of the Seminole household income from trading skins, whereas "[t]he women make a few dollars from the sale of Seminole dolls and a little very indifferent beadwork" (Roy Nash, *Survey of the Seminole Indians of Florida* [Washington, DC: 71st Congress, 3rd sess., 1931], 10).

37. Seminole Tribe of Florida, *Community Action Program* (Hollywood, FL: Tribal Council, 1966), 9.

38. Ronald Elmer Mertz, "An Investigation of Employment Termination Among the Seminole Indians of Florida" (master's thesis, University of Missouri, 1970), 9–10.

39. One day I observed Linda Frank (Otter) weaving a basket she planned to sell for $600.

40. Stephen Mark Palmer, "Culture Change and the Modern Seminole" (PhD diss., University of Missouri, 1973), 68.

41. University of Florida Samuel Proctor Oral History Program, Seminole Indian Collection, Gainesville, FL, 1999, #256, 25.

42. Clothing contests often draw more than 100 contestants and large audiences, and they offer substantial cash prizes in categories such as "Traditional," "Modern/Traditional," and "Modern Contemporary."

43. West, *The Enduring Seminoles,* 42.

44. Sturtevant, "Fieldnotes," box 5. Jumper's wife, Betty Mae (Snake), was one of the few women to wrestle alligators, filling in when her husband was unable to work. It is exceedingly rare for women to wrestle alligators. The only two women I encountered who had done so were members of the Snake clan, which is associated in part

with legitimacy in handling reptiles. Alligator wrestlers seek approval from Snake clan elders before jumping into the pit.

45. Colin Kenny and Peter B. Gallagher, "Gator Bites Off Chief Billie's Finger," *Seminole Tribune,* February 11, 2000, 1.

46. Rick Bragg, "Filling the Job Is Like Wrestling Alligators," *New York Times,* September 20, 2000, late ed., A1.

47. Interestingly, a subsequent made-for-media event recast alligator wrestling as broadly Floridian, not only Seminole, when a (white) wrestler from the Okalee Village traveled to New York City's Central Park to rescue an "alligator" (it turned out to be a small caiman) swimming around a lake. The Florida press took glee in New York City's purported helplessness when faced with a loose reptile, and the public relations staff at the Okalee Village milked the story (Elena Cabral, "Gator Wrestler Flies to N.Y. to Tackle Central Park Critter," *Miami Herald,* June 21, 2001; Lisa J. Huriash, " 'Gator Dundee' Off to Gotham," *South Florida Sun-Sentinel,* June 21, 2001, 6B).

48. The Tribal Council operated two shops, and the Board of Directors (the incorporated business wing of the tribe) operated eight shops and the vending machines.

49. Associated Press, "Seminole Smoke Tax Targeted," *Miami Herald,* March 2, 1986, 14D.

50. Later, however, the tribe lost a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, *Seminole Tribe v. Florida,* in which it was denied the right to sue the State of Florida for refusing to negotiate a gaming compact.

51. Jim Shore, 2001. The 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act limits ways tribes can allocate gaming revenues, yet within these constraints Seminoles have prioritized tribal governance and cultural production.

52. Some of these investments, pursued under the James Billie (Bird) administration (1979–2001), are under investigation by multiple federal agencies and tribal auditors.

53. As I discuss in my dissertation, this movement toward self-determination enables the tribe to implement well-tailored and comprehensive social services, evidenced by shifting priorities in education, housing, and health care programs. Tribal control over self-government, as a realization of sovereignty, has become a point of pride for many Seminoles.

54. Harry A. Kersey Jr., *An Assumption of Sovereignty: Social and Political Transformation Among the Florida Seminoles, 1953–1979* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 53.

55. Fred Myers, *Painting Culture: The Making of Aboriginal High Art* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), 2002. In this context and in contrast to many other tribes, it is notable that I know of no case in which Seminoles have pointed to Seminole games of chance (e.g., the kneebone game) to deploy a narrative of cultural continuity by claiming that gambling is traditional. Instead, to most Seminoles gaming is an instrument of economic development, not a cultural form.

56. Viviana A. Zelizer, *The Social Meaning of Money: Pin Money, Paychecks, Poor Relief, and Other Currencies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 1.

57. See, e.g., Webb Keane, "Money Is No Object: Materiality, Desire, and Modernity in an Indonesian Society," in *The Empire of Things: Regimes of Value and Material Culture,* ed. Fred Myers (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 2001), 65–90; Daniel Miller, *Capitalism: An Ethnographic Approach* (Oxford: Berg, 1997); Daniel Miller, *A Theory of Shopping* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

58. Timothy Mitchell, ed., *Questions of Modernity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

59. Ethel Cutler Freeman, "Fieldnotes, Seminole," Suitland, MD, National Anthropological Archives, 1939–1971, Box 31, "Seminole Goals."

60. Katherine Ann Spilde, "Acts of Sovereignty, Acts of Identity: Negotiating Interdependence Through Tribal Government Gaming on the White Earth Indian Reservation" (PhD diss., University of California, Santa Cruz, 1998), 13 (emphasis in original).

61. Brian C. Hosmer, *American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence and Innovation Among the Menominees and Metlakatlans, 1870–1920* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 224.

62. Cf. Ambrose I. Lane, *Return of the Buffalo: The Story Behind America's Indian Gaming Explosion* (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1995).

63. Anonymous.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Dawn of a New Day? Notes on Indian Gaming in Southern California

NICOLAS G. ROSENTHAL

The proliferation of Indian gaming since the 1980s has produced unprecedented profits for some native communities. It has also generated considerable controversy, particularly as gaming tribes have attempted to translate casino profits to political power. For scholars, the phenomenon of Indian gaming and its impacts on native communities provide opportunity—and challenge—to test abstract ideas about development and critiques of modernization against lived experiences. In his examination of Indian gaming in southern California, Nicolas Rosenthal offers preliminary conclusions on the economic and political consequences of tribal casinos, but just as important he seeks to assess the many ways gambling enterprises have played a role in cultural and tribal revitalization.

On April 19, 2002, the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, a small tribe with a reservation 130 miles east of Los Angeles, celebrated the grand opening of the Cabazon Cultural Museum, a multimillion-dollar facility featuring ongoing exhibits, public programs, and performances illustrating the tribe's history.[1]

About 100 tribal members and friends, from young to old, gathered in the museum's sculpture garden for ceremonial prayers, songs, and speeches. Joining them was a spokesperson for U.S. Representative Mary Bono, who presented the tribe with a congratulatory proclamation. Writing of the event, the director of Cabazon cultural affairs proclaimed, "A new day has dawned. It is a moment of pride for the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians. Come for a visit and bring your children and grandchildren."[2]

Not long before, few could have predicted this day would come. In 1876 the U.S. government designated 2,400 acres of desert land as a reservation for the 600 followers of Chief Cabazon, a nineteenth-century Cahuilla Indian leader who settled his people near the town of Indio, California, after railroad interests appropriated the band's water rights.[3] A century later the tribe's enrollment had dwindled to 28, and only a handful of families remained on the reservation, living in mobile homes without electricity or running water. Yet encouraged by the efforts of other Indian groups around the country, a small group of Cabazon leaders saw the potential for harnessing state and federal funds to serve the tribe. Working out of a rented office in downtown Indio, they set off on an ambitious program of long-term economic development. Initial ventures such as jojoba production and shrimp agriculture produced only marginal returns, prompting the tribe to consider goods and services in greater demand. Beginning with a tribal smoke shop in 1979, then a card club, bingo palace, casino, and the opening of Fantasy Springs Casino Resort in 2000, the Cabazon advanced far beyond their initial goals. By 2002 all tribal members had guaranteed employment, housing had been built for members returning to the reservation, a wide range of social services was provided by the tribe, and profits from tribal businesses had been invested in projects meant to revitalize Cabazon culture, including the Cabazon Museum. Once ignored or thrust aside by policy makers, the Cabazon began getting visits from members of Congress, senators, and state officials, who came seeking campaign contributions and espousing pro-Indian positions on a variety of issues.[4]

Over the last two decades of the twentieth century, several other Indian tribes throughout southern California that opened casinos and entered the world of high-stakes gaming shared the Cabazon experience. Although economic development among Indian tribes has a long and complex history, few engagements with the American marketplace have produced such rapid and dramatic results for Indian people.[5] Indeed, these changes occurred so quickly and are so recent that it is premature to attempt a full treatment of the relationship between economic development and American Indian cultural identity.

Nevertheless, contemporary events do provide the material for some preliminary observations on Indian gaming in southern California. A brief history of Indian economic development in the region shows how tribes went from poverty and relative obscurity to become operators of multimillion-dollar entertainment complexes. The social and economic impact on Indian and non-Indian communities throughout southern California is becoming apparent, as casinos have provided employment and generated revenue for tribal services and economic development, both on and off the reservation. Politically, gaming has not only provided southern California tribes with the means to achieve the long-touted goals of self-determination and tribal sovereignty but has also made them a force in local, state, and national politics. The cultural implications of Indian gaming are the most difficult to discern at this early date, but evidence points to several trends, including cultural revitalization, retribalization, and a rise in Indian people's influence on American popular culture. If these trends continue into subsequent decades, the Cabazon Tribe's notion of a new day dawning seems fitting, not only in terms of tribal culture but also in regard to the social, economic, and political status of Indian people throughout southern California.

The opening of casino resort complexes offering high-stakes gaming and other forms of leisure and entertainment on Indian reservations in southern California should be seen as the most successful of Indians' recent efforts to develop tribal lands and resources to complement the regional economy. During the 1960s and 1970s, Indian people across the country acquired unprecedented funding for economic development through the national Office of Economic Opportunity and other federal and state programs. Much of this funding went to a younger generation of Indians who worked outside the lines of power developed through years of close association between tribal leaders and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Educated in urban universities and radicalized by identity politics, this new leadership sought creative solutions to the economic woes of Indian people. Even within the BIA, an agency with a notorious record when it came to acting in the economic interests of Indian people, there was movement toward support for self-determination, or empowering Indian people to take control of their economic destinies.[6]

These developments were not lost on the thirty or so Indian tribes in southern California, which had long suffered from an almost total lack of economic opportunity on the small, isolated lands that made up their reservations. Over

the years the allure of work in nearby towns and cities and powerful regional interests had drained the reservations of residents and resources, and those Indians who remained negotiated unemployment, poverty, and a scarcity of basic services.[7] For many southern California Indians, new prospects for economic development fueled by federal funds raised hopes of self-sufficiency and tribal revitalization. In 1970, representatives from twenty-two California reservations formed Indian Campgrounds, Inc., a chain of Indian-owned campgrounds seeking to compete with the region's non-Indian recreational facilities. Over the next few years campgrounds and RV parks complete with tribal stores, electrical hookups, showers, and other amenities opened at reservations throughout southern California.[8]

Meanwhile, the Chemehuevi Tribe and Colorado River Tribes underwent more sustained economic development projects. Situated along the banks of the Colorado River, both groups built marinas, campgrounds, beach recreational areas, restaurants, and motels.[9] Southern California reservations also became sites of production for regional and national markets. In 1970 the La Jolla Band of Luiseño Mission Indians, the Rincon San Luiseño Band of Mission Indians, and the Pauma Band of Mission Indians announced the establishment of Southwest Indian Enterprise, a firm that would construct prefabricated glass-fiber homes on the Rincon Reservation.[10] A few years later the same three tribes undertook a joint project to develop reservation fruit orchards.[11] In the mid-1970s members of the Pala Band of Mission Indians broke from the tradition of electing a tribal elder as chairman by choosing a much younger man, Larry Blacktooth, for the job. Blacktooth, a recent graduate in business administration from the University of Southern California, initiated a number of economic development projects, including planting alfalfa, flowers, avocado, and citrus trees and opening a number of tribal businesses, including a wholesale nursery, a sand-and-gravel plant, a trailer park, a cable television system, and a Spanish roof-tile manufacturing facility.[12] Geographic isolation, problems of political and economic capital, and fluctuating federal supports limited the size and viability of all these operations. Nevertheless, Indian people throughout southern California, like Indian people throughout the country, clearly were working during the 1970s to integrate their lives and lands into larger regional economies.

Beginning in the 1980s and into the 1990s, tribal economic ventures in southern California bore unprecedented fruit as tribes turned to offering various forms of gambling, culminating in the development of high-stakes, Nevada-style gaming. Encouraged by a favorable district court ruling for a Seminole

bingo hall in Hollywood, Florida, in 1980, the Cabazon Tribe opened a card club offering draw poker games that same year. Card clubs were legal under state law but were regulated under city and county jurisdiction, prompting police raids and legal challenges by the city of Indio and Riverside County officials. Over the next seven years the case worked its way through the courts until the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision in the case of *Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside* (1987), asserting the right of Indian tribes to operate games of chance already legal under state law, free from local and state regulation. Congress, aware of the potential expansion of Indian gaming into areas beyond card clubs and bingo halls, moved quickly to pass the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). IGRA stipulated that social games for minimal prize values associated with traditional ceremonies or celebrations (Class I gaming) fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of Indian tribes; card games and bingo (Class II gaming) were subject to oversight by a National Indian Gaming Commission but could be played free of state regulation on Indian reservations in states that already allowed such gambling; and Nevada-style casino gambling, lotteries, and pari-mutuel betting (Class III gaming) would be permitted on Indian reservations only after a tribe passed an ordinance authorizing gambling activities and negotiated a compact with the state that set the terms for gaming operations. Moreover, Class III gaming was restricted to states that already permitted some form of such activities; for example, after a successful court battle by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe in Connecticut, it was determined that laws permitting high school students to hold Nevada-style "after-prom parties" were sufficient precedent for allowing tribes to operate table games for high stakes under IGRA. Proponents of Indian gaming in California won another victory in 2000 when 65 percent of state voters approved Proposition 1A, clearing the last legal hurdle to tribal operation of video slot machines and Nevada-style card games.[13]

By 2002, eighteen tribes in southern California had opened Class III gaming facilities, most of which evolved into multimillion-dollar entertainment complexes.[14] The Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, for example, spent over $230 million to upgrade and expand its Spa Resort Casino, which lies on nine acres in downtown Palm Springs and offers slot machines, card games, luxury hotel accommodations, spa services, fine dining, and golf.[15] In addition to Fantasy Springs Casino, which features bingo (in English and Spanish), blackjack and other card games, off-track betting, and slot machines, the Cabazon Tribe built an outdoor amphitheater to accommodate boxing matches and musical concerts. During the period 2000–2002, performers included the Doobie

Brothers, Bill Cosby, Merle Haggard, George Jones, and Isaac Hayes.[16] In June 2002 the Pechanga Band of Luiseño Indians opened Pechanga Resort and Casino, a $262 million gambling and entertainment facility and the largest tribally owned hotel and casino in the western United States. Replacing a smaller casino built in 1995, the Pechanga Resort encompasses a 1-million-square-foot area, including 65,000 square feet of casino space, 522 hotel rooms, six restaurants, a dance lounge, a 1,200-seat theater, and a 40,000-square-foot convention center.[17] For anyone who remembered the reservations just ten years before the casinos, the changes seemed dramatic—these Indian lands, neglected and all but forgotten by most southern California residents, had become major destination centers, drawing millions of people per year from around the world.

Just a decade and a half after the passage of IGRA, a complete assessment of the economic impact brought on by Class III gaming in southern California is difficult to compile. As part of a legislative analysis for an Indian gaming proposition in 1998, California tribes reported $600 million in gambling profits the previous year, but that number is likely to have grown with the expansion of gaming following Proposition 1A in 2000 and the proliferation of gaming resorts.[18] In any case, tribes are under no obligation to enter their earnings into the public record. Nevertheless, some of the economic and related social implications of Indian gaming are becoming apparent; it remains to be seen if these trends continue into subsequent years and decades.

One apparent benefit of Indian gaming often touted by the tribes themselves is the expansion of employment opportunities and other benefits for both Indians and non-Indians in areas that historically have faced economic hardship. Gaming is the most successful venture in the history of Indian interactions with American capitalism in terms of generating jobs and providing the means for individual self-sufficiency. On the Viejas Reservation, for example, the Viejas Casino eliminated unemployment, which before the advent of gaming had reached 80 percent.[19] Yet whereas most casinos have provided employment to any tribal member willing and able to work, the majority of jobs go to non-Indians, thus creating common interests between Indians and their neighbors. In 2002, Barona Casino, owned by the Barona Band of Mission Indians, maintained 1,500 full-time staff, about 97 percent of whom were non-Indians, making it one of the largest employers in San Diego County. Although many of these were service jobs, the casino offered generous benefit packages that included medical and dental insurance, retirement plans, child care, vacation pay, and English as a Second Language classes.[20] The popularity of gambling has also insulated tribal casinos and their employees against

slowdowns in the regional and national economy. Despite a spike in the national unemployment rate and a slowdown in the tourism industry during fall 2001, the Twenty-Nine Palms Band of Mission Indians was predicting steady business for its Spotlight 29 Casino and planned to hire 300 additional workers.[21] Furthermore, notwithstanding an exemption from many forms of taxation, the most successful gaming tribes have pumped substantial amounts of money into local, state, and national economies. In 1999 the Barona Casino purchased $53.9 million in goods and services and paid $3.1 million in payroll taxes.[22] Gaming tribes have also made charitable contributions to non-Indian causes. The Cabazon Tribe, for instance, has supported such groups as the local chapter of the American Diabetes Association, the City of Indio Police Department, United Way of the Desert, Toys for Tots, and the Boys and Girls Club of Coachella Valley, in addition to other local, regional, and national organizations.[23]

Beyond employment, casino profits produce other social benefits for Indian people in southern California. After a century and a half of relying on the Bureau of Indian Affairs for services that were both inadequate and destructive, many tribes gained the ability to determine and provide for their own needs. With casino revenues, the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians spent millions to build and renovate tribal housing, expand tribal offices, construct a community park and senior citizens' center, improve emergency services, and restore the reservation land and watershed.[24] By 2002 the Barona Tribe had committed to provide full medical, dental, and health insurance for all tribal members and their nontribal spouses and dependents, spent $2.5 million on road construction throughout the reservation, and expanded the tribal school to offer tutoring, computer access, a library, and Head Start programs.[25] As long as students maintain reasonable grades, the Cabazon Tribe has paid the educational expense for all its members, from day care through graduate school.[26]

Southern California Indian tribes who have not reaped large profits from casinos have also felt the impact of casino revenues. As a provision of the gaming compacts negotiated with the State of California, Class III Indian casinos agreed to give millions of dollars of gaming revenue to California tribes that have no casinos or that run small gambling operations. In 2001, sixty-eight tribes shared $10.1 million under this plan. A year later more than $39 million had been paid out and earmarked for a variety of tribal services. The Los Coyotes Band of Mission Indians, for example, planned to construct a tribal office building with the money it received or to open a store adjacent to its

campground, whereas the Torres Martinez Desert Cahuilla Indians hoped to improve water and sewer services and create a tutoring program for their children.[27] Outside the requirements of state compacts, gaming tribes in southern California have contributed to Indian causes on their own volition. In 1998 the Viejas Tribe, the Barona Tribe, and the Sycuan Band of Mission Indians helped sponsor the annual powwow of the Southern California Indian Center, Inc. (an organization serving the needs of Indians living in the Los Angeles metropolitan area), and the Barona Tribe began talks to become involved in the Indian Center's social services programs.[28] During the 2001–2002 winter holiday season, the Pechanga Tribe and the Morongo Band of Mission Indians collected about $40,000 in donations for the Santee Sioux of Nebraska, whose assets had been seized by the federal government in a dispute over the tribe's gaming operation.[29]

Although it is easy and perhaps even justified to emphasize the tremendously positive aspects of Indian gaming—for scholars who have spent their careers exploring the ways in which Indian people have struggled against European and American colonialism, this news from Indian country is staggering—it would be shortsighted to leave the economic side of the story a simple narrative of steady progress, uncomplicated by past, present, and future challenges. The ambiguities at the intersection of tribal, state, and federal jurisdiction have produced the legal foundation for Indian gaming while also leaving the entire enterprise open to future court challenges and federal legislation. Some tribes in southern California have realized this and have made efforts to diversify reservation economies and tribal holdings. The San Manuel Band of Mission Indians, for instance, formed the San Manuel Bottled Water Group in April 2002 to produce Big Bear Mountain Premium Spring Water. Although awash in profits from the San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, San Manuel tribal chairman Deron Marquez noted that gaming could be "here today and gone tomorrow," and the tribe planned to "do everything possible to get money from gaming and diversify."[30] Additional efforts at economic diversity have included First Nation Recovery Incorporated, the Cabazon Tribe's tire-recycling facility, and factory outlet stores on the Viejas Reservation.[31] Other tribes have been more reluctant to stake their fortunes primarily on gaming. The La Jolla Tribe opened the smallest Indian casino in southern California, with just thirty slot machines located in a minimarket on its reservation. Rather than compete with several large Indian casinos in the area, the tribe decided to use the slots to promote its popular outdoor recreational facilities.[32] For the San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians, gaming did not pan out

as the tribe had hoped. Its relatively small Valley View Casino made modest profits, but far short of what the tribe had anticipated. The tribe planned to expand its operations by building a much larger, $230 million facility resembling a Mediterranean palace, surrounded by horse trails and vineyards, but trouble with its business partner, First Nation Gaming of Louisiana, put those plans on hold.[33] Although usually in the minority, there have been dissenting voices among tribes contemplating gaming ventures. Karen Toggery, a member of the Jamul Band of Mission Indians, filed a string of lawsuits beginning in the late 1990s in an effort to block casino plans and prevent development on the Jamul Reservation. Distressed by the thought of excavating the grounds where her relatives lived and were commemorated, Toggery stated, "I'm fighting for traditions. I'm trying to stand up for what's right."[34] This and other dissenting voices, the legal status of casinos, tribal economic diversification, and competition among gaming tribes, among other issues, may all prove crucial for native people and for scholars assessing the economic and cultural impact of Indian gaming.

Closely related to the economic growth and development fueled by Indian gaming in southern California have been fundamental changes in the tribes' political fortunes. Beginning in the 1970s, federal policy and the concerns of Indian people themselves focused on concepts like self-determination and tribal sovereignty, or empowering Indian communities to address their own needs and asserting the rights of Indian tribes to act as sovereign nations. With gaming revenues, southern California Indian tribes advanced toward both these goals. Through the social services, economic development, education, and community outreach programs discussed in the last section, the tribes gained considerable control over their day-to-day lives. A concerted effort has also been made to translate economic success into increased political power. Speaking at the 2002 Western Indian Gaming Conference in San Diego, Viejas tribal member Anthony Pico issued a call for Indians nationwide to work through the courts and state and federal legislatures to protect and restore Indian rights. Pico outlined a special role for California tribes, believing they possessed the experience and funds to lead the charge. Jacob Coin, executive director of the California Nations Indian Gaming Association, agreed, arguing that both recent challenges to tribal sovereignty by the states and the improved position of tribes with gaming ventures made action imperative. "Up until now," Coin stated, "tribes have never had the economic wherewithal to make a difference. Before the tribes had resources to contribute to political campaigns, no one cared."[35]

Indeed, one of the big stories of Indian gaming in southern California is that a wide range of politicians suddenly began to care greatly about Indian issues as the tribes ascended to prominent roles in local, state, and national politics.[36] This shift in the political landscape is partially attributable to the necessity for Indian tribes and government officials to enter negotiations following the legalization and proliferation of casinos. The terms of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, for example, stipulated that tribes and the state work out gaming compacts, with federal oversight to make sure both sides act in good faith. Once a tribe had signed a compact and decided to build a casino, new relationships had to be formed with county and city governments. In past decades local officials often found little reason to take Indian issues seriously. With the rise of Indian gaming, the same officials developed a host of concerns relating to traffic, crime, the environment, and other possible casino impacts yet found they had little or no jurisdiction in regulating Indian actions. In San Diego County, for example, new relationships between gaming tribes and local officials slowly evolved through trial and error. Early on, when the county ran into a problem with the tribes, it appealed to state agencies like the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, state officials such as the governor and attorney general, and the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs—often without consulting tribal leaders. When these efforts failed, county administrators were forced to contact the tribes and sit down to negotiate. Following meetings between county supervisors and the Rincon Tribe, for instance, the tribe agreed to pay $7 million for roadwork to offset the increase in traffic caused by the Rincon River Oats Casino. Moreover, in 2001 the county hired a full-time tribal liaison to develop and maintain lines of communication with local tribes on gaming issues.[37]

The reluctance of state and federal officials to get involved in matters between Indian tribes and local officials could be interpreted as a sign of a growing respect for tribal sovereignty. To a great extent, however, that deference only developed as tribes in southern California became able to put substantial amounts of money into the political system, primarily to support pro-gaming politicians. As early as 1994, California gaming tribes became a force in state politics when they gave $700,000 to their preferred candidate for attorney general in an attempt to unseat an incumbent who had frustrated gaming efforts.[38] California assemblyman Tony Cardenas developed into a leading supporter of an Indian legislative agenda, particularly as an advocate for limiting state regulation on Indian casinos and as an author and supporter of bills to expand gaming on tribal lands. This work helped him garner hundreds of thousands

of dollars in contributions for an aborted run to become secretary of state for California in 2001 and thousands more for an election bid to the Los Angeles City Council.[39] In the last days of the tightly contested 2001 Los Angeles mayoral campaign, the Sobobo Band of Mission Indians spent $100,000 on a postcard campaign supporting eventual winner James Hahn, and the Morongo Tribe aired $200,000 in radio spots against Hahn's opponent, Antonio Villaraigosa, who had failed to support Indian gaming while serving in the California State Assembly.[40] California tribes also spent millions of dollars influencing California voters to pass pro-gaming legislation. Collectively, they raised about $21 million for the passage of Proposition 1A, including $7.7 million from the San Manuel Tribe, $3.5 million from the Viejas Tribe, $2 million from the Morongo Tribe, and $1 million from the Pechanga Tribe.[41]

Although impressive, these numbers pale in comparison with the $68.6 million collected by the tribes to support Proposition 5, a similar pro-gaming measure that passed overwhelmingly in 1998 despite substantial opposition by Nevada gaming interests but which the courts later declared unconstitutional.[42] The magnitude of these contributions is an indication both of how profitable gaming has been for the tribes in recent years and of how much is at stake when it comes to gaming legislation. It also suggests that a few hundred thousand dollars given to a mayoral campaign or to support a candidate for secretary of state may be relatively little when compared with the total amount spent by tribes on political contributions. Indeed, if it is believed that substantial monetary support would be a politician's primary motivation to journey to a sparsely populated reservation in the Colorado Desert, then watching the Cabazon Reservation may be a way to gauge tribal spending on state and national politics. Between June 2001 and May 2002, the Cabazon Band hosted U.S. Representatives Bob Filner (California), Brad Sherman (California), and Patrick Kennedy (Rhode Island); California State Senator Jim Brulte; California Lt. Governor Cruz Bustamante; California Governor Gray Davis; and U.S. Senators Tom Harkin (Iowa) and Tim Johnson (South Dakota).[43] Whereas diversifying the economy is good policy for any nation, this participation in the American political system may be the tribes' best insurance against legislative and judicial shifts that threaten the existence and profitability of Indian gaming.

In recent years, scholars of American Indian history have become interested in issues of cultural identity and its intersections with various social, political,

and economic phenomena. The best of this work employs careful, detailed analysis in isolating the markers of Indian cultural identity and exploring change over time. Language, economic activity, community organization, government relations, settlement patterns, social and religious affiliations, marriage, leadership, education, relations to land, and political ideology, among other categories, have proved fertile ground for probing the various, dynamic, and shifting ways of "being Indian" in many different settings throughout the last four decades of American history.[44] Gaming provides a fresh context for examining cultural change among Indian people, one that promises to utilize similar cultural categories, build on this earlier work, and foray into new directions. At the present time, however, a full treatment of gaming and its intersections with Indian cultural identity is not possible. Since gaming has emerged just since the early 1990s, with the greatest activity in only the past several years, scholars might recognize that Indian people are sowing the seeds of cultural change, but it remains to be seen how and if they will grow. Furthermore, the scant sources available represent only the most visible aspects of Indian culture, whereas oral interviews, which might uncover a wider range of cultural response, have yet to be conducted. Nevertheless, there are some initial indications of how casinos have impacted the cultural lives of both Indians and non-Indians in southern California, many of which raise questions that may prove starting points for future inquiries into Indian gaming.

One of the most obvious signs of cultural activity relating to Indian gaming involves efforts at tribal revitalization. In other words, revenue from Indian casinos has allowed many southern California tribes to invest in attempts to rebuild from over two centuries of cultural genocide brought on by European and American colonialism. The Agua Caliente Tribe, for example, began work in 2002 on a 100,000-square-foot, $37 million facility to document and display its history. For the generation of tribal leaders building the museum, the project took on tremendous symbolic value. Believing Indian identity could be a hindrance to survival in a white-dominated world or faced with disinterested children and grandchildren, many past elders were reluctant to hand down tribal culture. In 1951 the ceremonial leader of the tribe burned the tribe's ceremonial house to the ground, ordered the burial of all sacred ceremonial bundles, and declared the customs and traditions of the tribe finished. The tribe's last ceremonial singer died in 1979 after refusing to teach anyone the songs that detailed the tribe's history and beliefs. Only in the late 1980s, as the tribe's fiscal outlook began to improve and its land base was secure, did the Agua Caliente begin to turn its attention toward attempts to

rebuild tribal culture. With gaming revenues, the tribe began Cahuilla language classes, employed older tribal members to teach tribal culture, and drew up plans for the new museum.[45] Efforts at revitalizing tribal culture were also undertaken by the Cabazon Tribe. In addition to its museum, described in the introduction to this chapter, the tribe worked to transform "tribal elder" into an elected position. Beginning in 1989, any retired tribal member with ten years of service to the tribe became eligible for election to the office. Benefits include a lifetime annual salary and a new car, with the understanding that the elder is to represent the tribe at functions and share knowledge of tribal culture with Cabazon youth.[46]

Another cultural development relating to Indian gaming in southern California might be called "retribalization," or the reversal of a decades-long pattern of flight from the reservation and disengagement from tribal life.[47] The social, cultural, and economic opportunities made possible by Indian casinos seem to be attracting tribal members to reservations or retaining reservation residents who might otherwise move out of the area. One example is the Pechanga Reservation, where the population increased from under 100 in the 1960s to 346 in 2000. Individual cases of Pechanga tribal members illustrate this trend. Gary DuBois grew up in nearby San Bernardino County during the 1970s and occasionally visited the Pechanga Reservation for tribal meetings. After attending college in the area, DuBois left for graduate school in St. Louis, then worked in Oklahoma and Washington, D.C. DuBois returned to California and moved onto the reservation for the first time in 1999, becoming cultural resources director for the tribe—a position made possible by the growth of the Pechanga's gaming operations. Russell "Butch" Murphy was raised on the Pechanga Reservation, then went to school in nearby Riverside and settled down to teach in San Diego. In the late 1990s Murphy was able to move back to the reservation when he took a job as tribal spokesman. Marc Macarro also grew up on the Pechanga Reservation, then left for college in Santa Barbara. After graduation he returned to serve the tribe and assumed the office of tribal council chairman.[48]

Although the lives of native people are the most strongly affected by Indian gaming, there have been cultural implications for other residents of southern California as well. Millions of non-Indians, many of whom were once oblivious to the survival of California Indians, have journeyed to southern California Indian casinos and resort complexes, where they have experienced a type of Indian culture firsthand. Even those who have never stepped onto an Indian reservation have felt the cultural impact of Indian gaming. With revenue

from casinos, tribes have taken an increasingly active role in the cultural life of southern California's cities, towns, and rural areas. In 2000–2001, for example, the Cabazon Tribe served as the primary sponsor of numerous events throughout the region, including annual festivals like the Riverside County Fair, the Southwest Arts Festival, and the National Date Festival; sports tournaments such as the Bob Hope Golf Classic; and black-tie Beverly Hills awards shows like the annual Diversity Awards, the annual First Americans in the Arts Awards, and a fundraiser for the American Indian College Fund.[49]

The Cabazon Tribe also got involved with the University of California, Riverside, by working with the college on its endowed chair in American Indian history and by developing its forthcoming Native American Research Center.[50] In 2001 the Pechanga Tribe took steps to become partners with the Southwest Museum, the largest repository of American Indian artifacts in the western United States and the oldest museum in Los Angeles. The financially struggling Southwest Museum first explored a deal with the Autry Museum of Western Heritage, but the Pechanga stepped in with a counteroffer that included annual operating costs and the construction of a museum branch on land adjacent to the Pechanga Reservation, which the Southwest Museum favored. By late 2002 the Pechanga had second thoughts on the deal and the Southwest Museum forged a new agreement with the Autry.[51] Nevertheless, the prominent role of the Pechanga in the negotiations reveals that Indian people have returned as major players in the cultural life of southern California after generations of European and American cultural impositions.

These cultural currents—tribal revitalization, retribalization, and the increasing impact of gaming tribes on southern California as a region—provide starting points to pursue several avenues of critical analysis. Scholars might explore how elements of tribal culture persevered to the advent of gaming and what was chosen and by whom to form the basis for revitalization efforts. Other, perhaps even conflicting or contrasting elements of tribal culture likely exist outside or alongside of these official activities. Questions are raised by the use of museums as a major repository of tribal culture, such as how "museum culture" is both different from and intersects with the "lived culture" of past and present tribal life. The choice and service of elected tribal elders also beg for further examination, including whether these elections become enmeshed in tribal politics and how the activities of an elected elder compare with those of elders recognized in other ways. With regard to retribalization, scholars need to explore how life on a politically sovereign and economically viable reservation might provide different or similar opportunities for engage-

ment in tribal culture than those found while living in cities and other parts of the world. Furthermore, although increases in reservation population can be partially attributed to the return of people who began life with some tribal affiliation, the benefits of being a tribal member in a time of cultural and economic rebirth have likely encouraged some people with Indian heritage to connect with the tribe for the first time. The experience of these people may run a range from those who identify with the community and seek their identity as Indians to those who simply move to where employment opportunities exist. Finally, it should interest scholars to see if the increasing influence of Indian people in the cultural life of the region, along with the presence of non-Indians on gaming reservations, has an effect on the ways Indians and non-Indians in southern California understand themselves and each other. With the examples provided by past scholarship and the possibility of including numerous native voices, especially through oral interviews, these questions represent exciting possibilities for examining the relationship between American Indian economic development and cultural identity.

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The latest beneficiary of Indian gaming in southern California appears to be the Torres Martinez Desert Cahuilla Indian Tribe. Historically, the Torres Martinez has been among the poorest Indian tribes in California. The U.S. government created the Torres Martinez Reservation in 1876 on approximately 24,000 acres of land located 150 miles east of Los Angeles. In 1905 the bursting of a dam on the Colorado River flooded 11,000 of those acres, forming the Salton Sea, a large, saline lake that stayed replenished through agricultural runoff. Over the years, efforts at farming dates and wine grapes, two products grown successfully by non-Indians in the region, failed because of the harshness of the environment or for lack of capital to dig the necessary wells. Although work was available 50 miles away in the Palm Springs area, dirt roads made travel across the reservation slow and arduous. Social services for tribal members were so underfunded that health problems stayed far above the national average, and many adolescents emerged from school unprepared to pursue higher education or compete for good jobs. In the 1990s nearby tribes like the Cabazon, Morongo, and Agua Caliente grew wealthy, but prospects for opening a casino on the reservation seemed dim because of its remoteness from major thoroughfares. By 2001 about 250 of 659 tribal members continued to live on the reservation, many in homes without electricity or running water. For young people like eighteen-year-old Jacob Ward, the reservation

offered few prospects for the future. "There's really not much to do here," Ward stated after outlining his plans to leave the area and attend vocational school in Wyoming.[52]

In March 2002, following fifteen years of litigation, the Torres Martinez Tribe had what it hoped would prove to be a dramatic change in fortune. Congress approved a $14 million reparation package to compensate for the flooding of the reservation almost a century earlier. Furthermore, the tribe was granted the right to purchase 640 acres of land for a casino north of the reservation, near Interstate 10, which would be the first Indian gaming center in the country built on nontribal land. During a public ceremony, Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton presented a check for the first payment to the tribe, accompanied by U.S. Representative Mary Bono, the sponsor of the legislation. Tribal chairwoman Mary Belgardo graciously accepted, stating that the "fruits of all our suffering [are] about to come to bear." The tribe planned to use the money to build new homes, invest in the school system, and embark on a program of economic development, with a new casino as the cornerstone. "This is the key that will lift us out of poverty," said Ernie Morreo, the sixty-seven-year-old spiritual leader of the tribe. "I never thought the day would actually come."[53]

Indeed, it might seem a foregone conclusion that the Torres Martinez would follow what by now has become a well-worn narrative in southern California—an Indian tribe suffering from generations of poverty embarks on a venture leading to rapid economic prosperity, political power, and cultural capital. Yet for the Torres Martinez and other Indian tribes in the region, the future is far from certain. The prospect of a casino run by the Torres Martinez exacerbated concerns that the market for Indian gaming is reaching a saturation point, raising possibilities that casinos operating in the same area will have to cut back their operations, compete for business, or find new ways to cooperate.[54] Any such shift in economic fortune is sure to have implications for the individual tribes, in addition to rearranging the landscape of intertribal relations. Without any precedent for an off-reservation Indian casino, the Torres Martinez may face legal challenges, and the tribe still has to negotiate a gaming compact with the state, which could be strained because of the off-reservation issue. Although the political clout of Indian tribes has clearly grown tremendously in recent years, this political influence does not go uncontested. Relationships between California Indian tribes and the state took a turn for the worse during the early 2000s following former governor Gray Davis's veto of a bill that would have added protections to sites in California considered sacred to native people,

the filing of a lawsuit by the San Manuel Tribe and the Pechanga Tribe against the state over casino revenue-sharing payments to nongaming tribes, and the state's legal efforts to have California tribes disclose political campaign donations.[55] The cultural implications of gaming, which have only begun to emerge and still appear hazy to researchers, are likely to intersect with shifts in other realms of tribal life. These and many more questions surround the social, economic, political, and cultural issues raised by the Torres Martinez casino venture and the ongoing development of Indian gaming as a whole. Based on the evidence available at this time, it seems fair to say, as some Indian people have, that tribal gaming in southern California has ushered in the dawn of a new day. As the sun now breaks the horizon and ascends into the sky, however, it remains to be seen what the new day will bring.

NOTES

1. Most of today's southern California Indian communities descend from bands of wider linguistic, cultural, and political groups, yet they employ both *band* and *tribe* as terms to identify themselves. Throughout this chapter I have used the full name of each tribal community on the first reference (e.g., Cabazon Band of Mission Indians), then a shortened name for subsequent references (e.g., Cabazon Tribe).

2. Judy Stapp, "Taxislu Élis (To Look Forward, to Look Back): News from the Cabazon Cultural Museum," *Cabazon Circle* [publication of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, Indio, CA] 11, 5 (May 2000): 1, 4–5; quotation found on page 4.

3. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, "Who We Are," http://www.cabazonindians.com/who.html (last accessed August 1, 2002).

4. Ambrose I. Lane Sr., *Return of the Buffalo: The Story Behind America's Indian Gaming Explosion* (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1995); Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, "Fantasy Springs Casino," http://www.cabazonindians.com/fantasysprings.html (last accessed August 1, 2002).

5. An emerging interdisciplinary body of literature addresses American Indian gaming. For a detailed analysis of legal and political activities leading to high-stakes gaming in California, see Carole Goldberg and Duane Champagne, "Ramona Redeemed? The Rise of Tribal Political Power in California," *Wicazo Sa Review* 17 (2002): 43–64. For journalistic accounts of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe's and the Cabazon Tribe's gaming ventures, see Kim Isaac Eisler, *Revenge of the Pequots: How a Small Native American Tribe Created the World's Most Profitable Casino* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001); Jeff Benedict, *Without Reservation: The Making of America's Most Powerful Indian Tribe and Foxwoods, the World's Largest Casino* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000); Lane, *Return of the Buffalo.* Dale Mason, *Indian Gaming: Tribal Sovereignty and American Politics* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), is a work of political science that attempts to determine "the status of Indian tribes in the American political system," using New Mexico and Oklahoma gaming tribes as examples (page 5). Alan A. Lew and George A. Van Otten, eds., *Tourism and Gaming on American Indian Lands* (New York: Cognizant Communication Corporation, 1998), includes several articles by social scientists exploring the connections between tourism and Indian gaming. Roger

Dunstan, *Indian Casinos in California* (Sacramento: California Research Bureau, 1998), provides a useful explanation of the legal aspects of Indian gaming in California. For articles, congressional hearings, and federal documents leading up to the landmark 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, see Leslie Anderson Morales, *American Indian Gaming and Gambling: A Bibliography* (Monticello, IL: Vance Bibliographies, 1991). Primary sources on Indian gaming include the comprehensive Victor Rocha, "Victor Rocha's Indian Gaming News," http://www.pechanga.net (last accessed August 1, 2002); individual World Wide Web pages of gaming tribes; and several trade publications, including *Indian Gaming, Indian Gaming Business, Indian Gaming Insider, Indian Gaming News, Southwest Indian Gaming and Tourism News,* and *Wisconsin Indian Gaming.*

6. Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indian,* 2 vols. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 2: 1085–1110; Peter Iverson, *"We Are Still Here": American Indians in the Twentieth Century* (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1998), 144; Daniel M. Cobb, "Philosophy of an Indian War: Indian Community Action in the Johnson Administration's War on Indian Poverty, 1964–1968," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 22 (1998): 71–102; Jack D. Forbes, *Native Americans and Nixon: Presidential Politics and Minority Self-Determination, 1969–1972* (Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center, 1981), 46. Also see Vine Deloria Jr., *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto* (New York: Avon, 1969), 207–221.

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CHAPTER SIX

The Devil's in the Details: Tracing the Fingerprints of Free Trade and Its Effects on Navajo Weavers

KATHY M'CLOSKEY

Kathy M'Closkey examines the impact of commercial incorporation on the lives of Navajo women weavers. She argues that although weavers played a significant role in the regional economy, they rarely received an equitable share of the wealth they created. Their work provided a buffer for traders against the volatility of the global wool market. Yet the more they wove, the poorer they became. Her analysis of the Navajo weavers challenges the paradigmatic divide between the sacred world and the secular marketplace. For the Diné women, weaving for the market did not diminish the cultural and artistic significance of their work or of the textiles they produced.

In his new history of the American West, Richard White highlights how cattle, minerals, timber, and wheat exports supplied a growing world market in the nineteenth century. Although White does not include sheep and wool in his list of commodities, domestic wool production was very much a part of the global economy by the mid-nineteenth century. White notes how, in the drive to wrest the vast resources from that region, Native Americans were pushed

aside, and many perished from starvation and disease.[1] By contrast, Navajo (Diné) and Pueblo peoples of the Southwest were able to maintain their farming and herding economies until well into the twentieth century. This is not to say that Navajos were unaffected by world economic markets. In fact, focusing on the effect of volatile international markets on prices for domestic wools makes it possible to acknowledge the contributions of thousands of Navajo weavers who produced a fully finished product in an extractive economy. And in this fashion, we can link the configuration of Navajo labor with broader economic forces.

Today Navajo weaving is jeopardized by free trade, globalization, and the volatile investment market for *historic* textiles, all of which drastically reduce the demand for textiles created by more than 25,000 contemporary weavers.[2] I conclude my chapter by elucidating how anthropologists' embrace of the reputed bifurcation between the sacred world of religion and the profane/secular world of commodity production compromises the survival of an economic and culturally vital activity.[3]

BACKGROUND/CONTEXT

Over 200,000 Navajo, or Diné, currently occupy an 8,000-hectare reservation in the southwestern United States. Historically, Navajos managed a broad subsistence base that included farming, herding, raiding, and trading, but they earned a major portion of their subsistence from weaving and livestock production until the Great Depression. By 1800 the Navajo blanket had become the most valuable commodity in southwestern intertribal trade, but incarceration at Hwéél̨di (Bosque Redondo) after 1863 undermined Diné self-sufficiency.[4] When they returned home in 1868 to what was now their reservation, the Diné found their self-sufficiency greatly undermined by an incipient network of government-licensed traders and dependence on expendable commodities.[5] This affected blanket producers directly, since the expansion of textile production increasingly bound weavers to individual traders.[6] Weavers, nearly all of whom were women, faced a debt-and-repayment cycle that ensured a continuing supply of rugs while diminishing their bargaining position. Traders reaped double benefits from two-way commodity trade, as they engaged in "credit saturation" facilitated by geographic isolation and territorial monopoly.

Gary Witherspoon estimated conservatively that 100,000 Navajo women have woven 1 million textiles over the past two centuries.[7] Saddle blankets and rugs also served as an alternative means to market wool.[8] In 1934 Charles Amsden observed:

> With weaving, these [favorable] circumstances are spare time and cheap wool. Traders long ago noticed that most of their rug purchases are made in the spring because most weaving is done during the long idle days of winter. . . . [T]he Navajo woman weaves when she has nothing better to do, or when the family wool crop cannot be sold to better advantage in the raw. . . . [W]ool in rug form brings a little more money.[9]

Yet this type of activity has not been factored into our understanding of the Navajo and their influence on the regional economy.

Extant analyses of the Navajo economy have failed to adequately take account of weavers' production because women wove at home and not in factories.[10] My research challenges Amsden's statement, reiterated by Marxist economist Larry Weiss,[11] by investigating linkages between regional geopolitics and fluctuations in wool prices in international wool markets. The characterization of Navajo weavers as primarily "domestic" has masked the relations that link their labor to economic policies legislated by Congress.

The few published government reports that identify Navajo women as weavers designate the production of hand-spun, -dyed, and -woven textiles as an *industry* that, because women produced for an external market, also fell under the category *commercialization.*[12] Yet when scholars consider this prodigious production, they tend to consign it to the domestic sphere, a realm separate from the market economy. This notion is supported by evidence suggesting that Navajo women continued to weave because it was their "favorite pastime"[13] or that they did it "for their beloved pin-money."[14]

"THE MORE THEY WOVE, THE POORER THEY BECAME"

The Navajo population increased by 50 percent between 1885 and 1915,[15] yet textile production escalated more than 800 percent. Annual reports to the commissioner of Indian affairs confirm the escalation in the value of production (no weights are provided) by noting that traders shipped textiles worth $24,000 from the reservation in 1890. That amount had increased to $1 million by 1930.[16] Pima baskets ranked second in cash valuation at $14,500, confirming government reports that textile production by Navajos was "the most profitable of the native industries . . . and is done by women in their spare time."[17]

Yet as hard as the weavers worked, they did not reap the financial rewards. Per capita income on the reservation remained at 20 percent of the national average.[18] The acceleration of textile production, combined with the usurpation of the market by Pendleton and other trade blanket manufacturers, oversaturated the market.[19] As a consequence, weavers' workloads tripled after 1890, with twenty-five to forty hours of labor embedded in every pound

of weaving they produced. For decades, women averaged two cents per hour in book credit. Traders treated saddle blankets and rugs like other renewable resources such as goatskins and sheep pelts: they graded, bundled, and sold them wholesale by weight.[20] Textiles and hides were shipped to jobbers on a weekly basis and were credited against traders' monthly balances with regional wholesalers.[21]

This means Navajo women faced a dilemma, at least in the eyes of Indian Office personnel. According to a 1916 report prepared by Agent Stephen Janus of the Leupp Jurisdiction:

> The Indians weave blankets and this is the only industry outside of their stock. It is rather a slavery for the women and they cannot do the domestic work constantly urged by the [Indian] Office and weave but no one has apparently sensed this inconsistency. A better wool that would produce more revenue per animal and free the women from this exacting toil might be better.[22]

Thus Janus acknowledged that low wool values necessitated women's weaving. Navajo women failed to become accomplished housewives, since they were constantly at their looms.[23]

Information about weaving extracted from the statistical section of Janus's report reveals an estimated 400 weavers produced 8,000 rugs for a total amount of $80,000, or $10 each. Out of a population of 622 women and girls, 275 adult women and 125 girls under age seventeen were weaving; those figures represent almost 65 percent of the entire female population. Each weaver could expect to earn $200 per year. Janus estimated that 100 silversmiths in the Leupp Jurisdiction produced $4,500 worth of jewelry that year, or an average of $45 per smith. Therefore, four times as many weavers produced eighteen times the income of smithing. Diné located within that jurisdiction sold only 2 percent of their sheep and goats that year. The total value of all stock sold, including horses and cattle, amounted to $20,800, or just 25 percent of the value of weaving. Unfortunately, Janus's report does not document the value of wool sales.

The superintendent's reports and accompanying statistics demonstrate great industry, especially in the realm of textile production. However, the Bureau of Indian Affairs did not see it as productive activity. In his 1917 report to the Board of Indian Commissioners, board member Edward A. Ayer of Chicago adamantly supported a mass hiring of Indians to alleviate the shortage of cotton pickers because "what our Indians need most is to be taught to work. There are nearly 50,000 Indians in Arizona and a very small percentage of

them do any useful work."[24] Only nonsubsistence labor performed outside the home counted as work. Although thousands of Navajo women and girls were weaving at this time, with few exceptions textile production within the household remained absent from the published record, thus hidden from history. Participation in the informal economy translated into invisibility.[25]

Yet weaving produced a sizable percentage of household income. According to Robert McPherson, "In 1922 in the [Navajo] Western Agency, 23,080 pounds of rugs sold for $41,000; raw wool for $22,000, comprising 78% of all the commerce for that year to include the sale of sheep, cattle, pelts, silver and miscellaneous items."[26]

W. O. Roberts, who had replaced Janus as superintendent at Leupp by 1926, also remarked on the importance of the blanket weaving industry:

> There is a particular demand for the Navajo product at the present time, particularly if the standard of the product is good. The work is suffering to some extent by the influence of outsiders who try to influence the I[ndian] to make various designs which, of course, are not the native Ind[ian] Patterns. Also due to the fact that the length of time required to weave a rug makes the economic value of weaving questionable. All the traders appear to be doing a heavy business in the N[avajo] rug and this industry will doubtless continue for some years.[27]

THE HUBBELL PAPERS

Evidence that outlines the link between the wool market and Navajo poverty remains buried in underresearched reservation trading post records. Don Lorenzo Hubbell, deemed the "czar" of Navajo trade and the "father" of the Navajo rug, and his family actively influenced the growth and development of reservation commerce from 1883 to 1950.[28] My analysis of a portion of their business records reveals that textiles were acquired from weavers by weight. The treatment of a fully finished product as a renewable resource contributed to the sustained impoverishment of Navajo weavers. Available for study since 1977, these rich archival resources have been woefully underutilized in substantively assessing the importance of textile production to traders' financial success.[29]

I discovered that Navajo livelihood was undermined in a manner not readily apparent from official documents utilized by other researchers. My analysis challenges several assumptions that have dominated the literature for nearly a century: (1) traders "saved" Navajo weaving by developing off-reservation markets;[30] (2) acquiring blankets by weight was a short-lived phe-

nomenon;[31] (3) weavers benefited financially by trading their own blankets/rugs for machine-made trade blankets;[32] (4) rug weaving decreased when wool prices were high and increased when wool prices dropped;[33] and (5) traders' greatest profits lay in wool.[34]

The Hubbell archives provide a barometer of the regional economy, as the family controlled a significant portion of Navajo trade for decades. My analysis of a portion of their ledger books reveals that textiles, skins, and wool were the "currency" with which the Hubbells paid creditors, and for decades their annual profits in blanket sales averaged twelve times their wool profits. The sale of the wool clip paid down the Hubbells' accounts with wholesalers every spring, but blanket sales occurred continually. After 1900 the Hubbells typically shipped more pounds of weaving annually than sheep pelts and goatskins combined.[35]

A vignette provides an example of the higher profits traders realized selling blankets and rugs directly to other wholesalers rather than to merchants to whom they were indebted. S. J. Nicolas of Santa Barbara and Los Angeles purchased both Navajo blankets and piñon nuts.[36] During 1920 he purchased at least nineteen bales of rugs from the Hubbells:

Date	*Bales*	*Weight (#s)*	*Cost*	*Average/#*
3/3/1920	7	912	$2,133.20	$2.34
5/7/1920	4	500	$1,250.50	$2.50
5/23/1920	4	686	$1,328.80	$1.94
5/26/1920	4	553	$1,252.55	$2.26
Totals	19	2,651	$5,965.05	$2.26

In 1920 the price of wool had plummeted to ten cents per pound. Had the weavers sold raw wool instead of rugs, the Hubbells would have earned a mere $530 rather than grossing $5,965.05.[37] The Hubbells, however, had to extend an average $1.25 per pound in credit.[38] Thus credit extended to weavers amounted to $3,313.75, and the Hubbells netted $2,651.30, or five times the value of the raw wool. That was not a bad return, amounting to 44 percent of the gross earned by just shipping the rugs. Moreover, traders were not burdened with the expenses associated with marketing the annual wool crop and earned profits on all goods bartered to weavers.

According to the Hubbells' business records, more than 415,000 pounds of hand-spun, handwoven blankets and rugs had been shipped from their trading posts between 1891 and 1909 to regional wholesalers and other non-Indian

consumer markets. By 1909 the Hubbells' profits in textiles were nearly fourteen times higher than their wool profits and greater than the total amount of wool sold. Because of a shortage of Moroccan kidskin at the end of World War I, unprocessed goatskins sold for more per pound ($1.25) than hand-spun and -woven Navajo fancy-patterned saddle blankets (90 cents) and rugs ($1.20). How is it possible that such productivity could result in sustained impoverishment? For by World War I, 85 percent of the Navajo population was "poor, average or destitute."[39] I searched for clues in an attempt to explain the paradox that had emerged from my analysis, that is, "the more they wove, the poorer they became."

Although I had appropriately linked traders' financial success to their co-opting the marketing of Navajo textiles, I lacked macro-level evidence concerning fluctuating values of wool internationally. What I had traced (unknowingly) in the Hubbells' business records were the fingerprints of free trade. Remarkably, the terms *wool tariff* and *free trade* remain absent from the vast literature on the Diné.[40] Frustrated by the lack of information in extant literature, I turned to U.S. Congressional Records and tariff regulations and discovered that wool was one of the most volatile commodities traded internationally.[41] The first inkling that something was amiss concerns the discrepancies between the amounts traders were receiving for Navajo wool and the annual average price per pound as reported in the national record.[42] At the back of their book *A History of the Navajo: The Reservation Years,* Garrick and Roberta Bailey incorporate a table highlighting the average annual value of domestic wool and livestock between 1869 and 1970.[43] Navajo wools typically sold for 50–70 percent less than other domestic wool. Initially, I thought the Hubbells were cheating the Navajos, but their wool profits were almost nonexistent. Why was Navajo wool devalued?

THE WILD WOOL MARKETS

The information in this section provides the context to initiate a repositioning of Diné weavers within the globalization and free trade literature. The National Association of Wool Manufacturers' bulletins (1865–1940) provide the most fulsome context to understand the workings of the U.S. wool market in relation to international movements in the prices and amounts of wool. For much of the nineteenth century, the production of wool and cotton for textile manufacturing in the United States was the third-most-important U.S. industry, following agriculture and steel production.[44] Next to Great Britain, the United States was the greatest consumer of wool in the world, and although

domestic wool growers clipped over 300 million pounds annually after the Civil War, manufacturers required nearly half a billion pounds a year. Unwilling to risk dependence on foreign sources for a vital resource, Congress legislated high duties to protect domestic growers. In fact, the wool tariff was referred to as "the keystone of the arch of protection" and served as a model for other tariffs.[45]

By 1890, domestic growers had upbred their flocks to produce clothing-quality wool (Classes I and II). These fine wools, when imported from abroad, were subject to much higher duties and ad valorem fees. The livestock issued to the Diné after Bosque Redondo (1868–1869) were *churros.*[46] The hardy little *churro* was a lightweight in both meat and fleece,[47] yet it was well adapted to the Navajo range, and it produced an excellent coarse wool for rug weaving. Since Anglo and Hispanic growers desired "more bang for their buck," they shifted to heavier breeds for meat and weightier fine-wool fleeces and were happy to divest themselves of the lowly *churros.* (Although they constituted only 0.003 of the U.S. population, Navajos owned 2 percent of U.S. sheep.)

The power looms invented by Erastus Bigelow during the 1850s had revolutionized carpet manufacturing, and the United States shifted from importing carpets to becoming the largest carpet manufacturer in the world. Prior to 1900, 75 percent of the wool imported into the United States was carpet-quality wool. Class III carpet wools were inexpensively raised in China, Argentina, Russia, Turkey, and Asia—primarily by nomadic peoples—and were imported as "raw material."[48] The only wool produced in the United States that was classified as carpet grade (Class III, the lowest category) was produced by *churros.* But Diné growers produced less than 5 percent of the more than 100 million pounds necessary to service the carpet industry annually. By 1890 the well-organized and powerful carpet manufacturers had successfully lobbied Congress to allow Class III wools into the country duty-free or with a small ad valorem. In 1894, when Democrat Grover Cleveland was elected president, he placed all classes of wool on the duty-free list. Over a four-year period, nearly half a billion pounds of carpet-quality wool was imported into the United States. Is it a coincidence that the Navajo blanket was transformed into a rug during that decade? After 1898 the tariff was reinstated, exempting Class III wools valued at less than 13 cents per pound. Although the cost of living quadrupled for Navajos between 1900 and the Great Depression, the value of their textiles stalled at 1902 levels,[49] suggesting that *the price of weaving was pegged to the price of wool.* Without the weavers' productivity, the U.S. government may have

needed to step in and subsidize the purchase of Diné wool. Price supports did not materialize, however, as government policies instilled self-sufficiency and industry within Navajos and other Native American populations.[50] Thus thousands of "dark-skinned housewives" effectively subsidized the trading post system on the reservation for decades.

However, *churro* wool was ideal for hand spinning, hence the dilemma of whether to upbreed the flocks and destroy desirable characteristics necessary for hand weaving or continue with the *churros* and risk low returns.[51] Although Indian agents had periodically introduced "new blood" into Navajo flocks, selective breeding had produced mixed results.[52] The unstandardized nature of Navajo herds produced a less desirable product for the national market and decreased the value of their wools in competition with foreign carpet wools. Cross-breeding for beneficial characteristics requires scientific management. It may take ten years for desirable characteristics to become "fixed," during which time flocks must be carefully monitored or genetic recidivism may occur. The wool from introduced breeds was kinky and oily, difficult for women to process by hand. Since women wove more than 25 percent of the annual wool crop into rugs after 1900, altering its positive characteristics posed a real threat to traders. Having women weave fleece into textiles provided a more secure means of diversification for traders faced with continual oscillations in the international wool markets. Consequently, the seeds of Diné impoverishment lay with the genesis of free trade policies instigated by the United States government more than a century ago.

My analysis of Lorenzo Hubbell Jr.'s wool records during the 1930s reveals that up to 80 percent of the wool he bought from the Navajos was still graded carpet quality. During that decade the trader typically lost 15 to 30 percent of the value of the crop to processing charges. Regardless of its value—whether a nickel or a quarter per pound—traders had to absorb the costs associated with shipping and handling, sorting, scouring, and paying brokers' commissions. Thus the negative consequences of free trade began for Navajo wool growers and weavers more than a century ago, and the primary means to ameliorate the most pernicious effects of free trade involved marketing carpet-grade wool in the form of rugs. This correlation suggests reformatting Navajo weavers' productivity within the geopolitics of the period. Situating the Hubbells and their business contemporaries within the economic history of the Southwest, which incorporates price oscillations of the international wool market, illuminates an important problem that has not been investigated to date. Traders' business records in tandem with pertinent evidence extracted

from U.S. tariff history and wool commission houses demonstrate that pauperization was sustained in a manner not revealed in other publications on the Navajo economy.[53]

This "hidden" history, based on analysis of information contained in the underutilized Hubbell Papers and regional wholesalers' records, may be the North American equivalent to the *Lace Makers of Narsupur.*[54] Maria Mies describes how the production of crocheted lace by over 100,000 Indian housewives in the state of Andhra Pradesh not only provided much of their household income but became the most valuable handicraft export from that region in the mid-twentieth century.[55] Yet the lace makers were missing from the census records. Mies's research demonstrates that women's provisioning does not depend on a separation between home and workplace. Recontextualizing Navajo weavers in this manner differs substantially from recent publications highlighting the way weavers and other Indian craft makers became exotic pawns in the escalating Southwest tourism market.[56]

WEAVING AS RECURSIVE MANIFESTATIONS OF *K'E*

Given the magnitude and extent of the appropriation of surplus labor for decades, I question why women would continue to weave. Ethnographer Gladys Reichard sanctioned the categorization of functional textiles as "nonsacred" craft commodities because commercialization not only submerged any sacred associations but also obliterated a distinctly Navajo "aesthetic."[57] Museologists' statements support Reichard's thesis,[58] and, in particular, Kate Peck Kent maintained that

> rugs woven in this [the twentieth] century will not tell us anything about Navajo personality or values because Anglo traders and markets have influenced Navajo weavers so much that any meanings or aesthetic styles which may have existed in early weavings were extinguished. . . . The search for a distinctive Navajo aesthetic ends with the onset of the Rug period. When weavers ceased to manufacture blankets for their own use and turned to the production of rugs for sale to whites, they accepted Anglo American standards of taste.[59]

Labeling weaving as "nonsacred" not only covertly justified museologists writing for the investment market but opened the doors to wholesale appropriation of Navajo patterns by entrepreneurs anxious to cash in on the "Southwest look."[60] In the remainder of this section I provide an alternative interpretation based on weavers' statements and reconceptualize weaving as cosmological performance.

In Diné Bahané, weaving plays an important role in the origin and maintenance of the Diné. The Navajo Creation Story comprises a rich, extensive, and complex belief system that reveals the order and character of the world and the relationships of people with one another and with all living creatures. It provides a charter for behavior and defines meaningful social relationships both among members of the community and between the community and the entire cosmos. The order inherent in the cosmos was meant to serve as a pattern for proper behavior in both general and specific ways.[61] Such harmony epitomizes the pattern of *hózhó* (beauty, harmony, local order), manifest everywhere in the universe. It governs male-female relations and cosmic relationships such as earth and sky, night and day, mortals and supernaturals.[62] Major mythical figures set examples for the personal growth and maturation of Navajo men and women. The ideal pattern for Diné relationships is summed up in the word *K'e.* The pattern for *K'e,* or "right and respectful relations with others and [with] nature," is not an abstract ideal but provides a model for concrete human behaviors encompassing kindness, helpfulness, peace, cooperation, and generosity.[63]

Acknowledging the centrality of *K'e* in relation to Navajo culture may provide the key to understanding the escalation in textile production despite conditions of extreme impoverishment. Here it is important to consider forms of reciprocation that remain absent from models in economic anthropology.[64] For example, *K'e* does not exhibit the concepts of reciprocity, redistribution, consumption, or householding, as depicted in generic models of economic relations.[65] Most political economists would consign *K'e* to the symbolic sphere. However, to exclude the concept of *K'e* from economic models suggests that political economy models may be excessively androcentric and Eurocentric. This is related to gender bias, but it also relates to the fact that the nonhuman world is perceived as passive rather than as an active partner/participant in the perpetuation of Navajo lifeways.[66] Grace McNeley writes:

> The Navajo term *ketl'ool*—derived from *ke,* meaning "feet," and *tl'ool,* meaning "root system"—expresses the concept of having a foundation for one's life in the earth, much as a plant is rooted in the earth. . . . Let us visualize the central root as extending all the way back to Asdzààn Nàdleehi, "Changing Woman"—who is Earth Mother herself. Developing from this main root is the complex web of kinship relations extending back even to ancestors and including clan relations, the extended family and the immediate family. Tied to this system are material goods, familiar surroundings and livestock. This webbing of earth, of ancestors, of clan and familiar surroundings all constitute a Navajo home, enabling those within it to flourish, to thrive.[67]

The *K'e* that exists between mother and child provides the foundational concept and form for all relationships in Navajo social life. Motherhood in Navajo culture is identified and defined in terms of life, particularly its source, reproduction, and sustenance. Mother and child are bound together by the most intense, diffuse, and enduring solidarity found in Navajo culture. The relationship of Changing Woman (as Earth Mother) to her children provides the major conceptual framework for the Navajo cultural definition of motherhood, as life is created in and sustained by mothers.[68] As Mother Earth provides sustenance for her children, human mothers nurture their children. Changing Woman taught Navajo women to weave so they would not suffer from the cold because they would have clothing. Through weaving, women reflect many Navajo values including that of industriousness by the mother, who works hard taking care of her family. Navajo weavers unite the two fields of ritual and work through songs, stories, and prayers. Weavers' mapping of the domain of textile production includes a cosmological realm:

> When you weave you don't go by the hour, by time . . . you weave your rug in your mind. . . . Even to feel the touch of the rug is sacred. . . . There's a song to go over the weaving after it's finished, but one cannot talk about it. . . . The thoughts and ideas of the original weaver are in the rug . . . it must not be touched [i.e., repaired], nor should one copy another's pattern.[69]

During my reservation fieldwork in 1992 and in recent conversations, when women spoke about weaving they frequently referenced plants, animals, the land, their kin, and the importance of provisioning—thereby revealing sets of relationships marginalized in current publications highlighting the "aesthetics" embedded in gallery-displayed textiles. Much of the current literature on Navajo weaving fits more comfortably within an art historical framework. Pre-1950 textiles sell for thousands of dollars at international auctions, depressing the demand for textiles created by more than 25,000 reservation weavers.[70] Only by reformulating formalist concepts of aesthetics (i.e., beauty and quality reside in the object divorced from its context) can readers surmise the threat to Diné lifeways.[71] Although the Indian Arts and Crafts Board mandates stringent fines for retailers falsely advertising "Indian-made" goods, communal property rights remain unprotected in the United States.[72] The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (1990) allows for repatriation of funerary goods and sacred artifacts from museums, and government regulations provide stringent fines against looters of archaeological sites.[73] But because patterned rugs were designated nonsacred commodities

by previous generations of scholars, they remain vulnerable to various forms of appropriation.[74]

Complex patterns of Navajo relations were occluded through the epistemological lens of the colonizers and, later, the ethnographers. The narrative of the origin of the loom and weaving tools as revealed in the Creation Story is frequently referenced at the beginning of texts on Navajo weaving. Authors then describe the "facts" and relate that everything was borrowed: the loom from the Pueblos, sheep from the Spaniards, dyes and patterns from the traders. Because none of the ingredients is deemed indigenous, most authors disclaim any symbolism or sacred associations attached to the woven textiles. What is suppressed, overtly or covertly, is the acknowledgment of women's provisioning as a core component of *K'e*.[75] Utilizing an epistemology more reflective of Diné values has the potential to reveal how the patterns of relations that brought Navajo rugs into existence are fractured when cultural pattern is split from commodity.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have argued that Navajos were affected by the first major wave of globalization.[76] Trade liberalization during the 1890s, initiated by removal of the wool tariff during Cleveland's administration (1894–1897), dramatically affected returns to domestic wool growers. Relentless competition, both domestic and international, marginalized Navajo wool growers in a manner not investigated by other scholars. Thus Navajos underwent a unique kind of structural adjustment not experienced by other domestic growers subject to tariff protection for clothing wools after 1898.

At this time, culturally salient craft production provides a sustainable remedy to alleviate poverty among aboriginal populations. Yet as a result of deficient narratives constantly recycled on the "history" of weaving, in tandem with the lack of a marketing infrastructure on the reservation, weavers increasingly face formidable odds in today's competitive global marketplace. Yet Navajo weavers remain active participants in their own histories, as they continue to endure difficult conditions to ensure cultural survival.

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PART TWO

Wage Work

CHAPTER SEVEN

"All We Needed Was Our Gardens": Women's Work and Welfare Reform in the Reservation Economy

TRESSA BERMAN

Tressa Berman provides a contemporary example of how federal policy continues to structure dependency while affording new economic strategies. Women's networks on the Fort Berthold reservation provide their communities with a buffer against the economic instability wrought by ever-changing federal Indian policy. Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara women piece together various sources of subsistence—including commodity food and other welfare programs—to craft an informal network through which they redistribute resources and ensure community cohesion.

The ethnographic literature of the Northern Plains is rich with descriptions and images of the settled village life of the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara along the Upper Missouri River. In the nineteenth century the artist George

Much of the material for this chapter is drawn from Tressa Berman, *Circle of Goods: Women, Work, and Welfare in a Reservation Community* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).

Catlin painted realist landscapes and portraits of a people at peace and at work. From the top of earth-lodge dwellings, men scouted for game and intruders, and women worked their garden plots, tending to their fragile rows of corn, beans, and squash—the symbols and mainstay of intertribal trade and cultural continuity. Women's gardens were not merely subsistence plots but gendered and ritualized spaces where women sang planting songs and honed their gardening skills as their claims to land, livelihood, and identity.

Before I lived on the Fort Berthold reservation in North Dakota, I had read Buffalo Bird Woman's accounts recorded by Gilbert Wilson and expected to see no trace of that earlier way of life in the late twentieth century.[1] I took to heart my Hidatsa language teacher's comment when she said, "Today our garden is the Super Value™ store." I observed the familiar effects of more than a century of colonization and resettlement; I attributed the high rates of diabetes to poor diet, lack of healthy foods to the government commodity programs, and the general decline in quality of life to irreversible changes in subsistence economy. It was with surprise and assurance that I began to notice small sprouts of gardens growing in unexpected places. Off-reservation families transplanted to trailer parks in Bismarck and Minot grew stalks of corn that were the envy of crows, in stark contrast to their non-Indian neighbors who tried to replicate green lawn suburban settlements in the western outback. Elders who lived on their own land often cleared a parcel of rugged badlands to give way to cultivated patches of native crops. A young Mandan woman was given the responsibility of harvesting a hybrid of traditional Mandan corn, passed down for countless generations from the seed of Mother Corn. And on the edge of New Town, the population center of the reservation, a group of Arikara women led me to their secret garden plot, where squashes of several varieties grew alongside empty beer cans amid the windswept brush of the prairie. These are some of the images that replace those of Catlin's and Wilson's days. Through these individual and collective acts of resistance, women continue to hold together a social fabric that has been systematically ripped into by the disruptions of federal interventions. Native women resist these disruptions every time they plant a garden and otherwise work for the benefit of family and community.

My subsequent work at Fort Berthold has come to stress the ways informal economies (such as gardening, barter, and artistic production) intertwine with the formal economy of wages and welfare.[2] This is the premise upon which I draw here. First, I emphasize how treaties established a unique set of rights that govern the federal trust relationships between Tribes[3] and the U.S. government. I suggest that welfare reform potentially violates federal trust

and show how it was designed to do so.[4] Second, I describe the effects of these violations by examining the daily lives of Fort Berthold women. Their stories demonstrate how welfare reform disrupts the balance struck between formal and informal economies, leaving an already fragile reservation economy at greater risk of economic harm. By focusing on women's activities within one reservation economy, we can better extrapolate to other communities that share similar outcomes in relation to federal policies through time. In these ways, welfare reform can be better understood as the same old wolf grafted onto new sheep's skin. This point is better understood within the historical framework of federal Indian policy shifts.

FEDERAL TRUST AND WELFARE REFORM

To illustrate how new legislative reforms such as welfare reform may have the broadest impact on Tribes, I consider only those Tribes that currently exercise federal trust relations with the U.S. government while acknowledging the backlog of petitions by Tribes still seeking the legal standing of federal recognition.[5] I consider welfare reform in this context by stressing the need to interpret policies of one era (those of termination) into another (those of self-determination). The history of interpreting statute into American Indian policy forms the basis of federal Indian law.[6] In other words, contemporary legal interpretations rest with legal doctrines laid down long ago in treaties and Supreme Court opinions that govern issues of jurisdiction (federal, state, or tribal) and outline the plenary power of congressional oversight over Tribes.[7]

In matters of land, natural resources, housing, health care, and economic development, the federal trust relationship sets American Indians apart from other U.S. ethnic minorities by holding responsibilities administered by federal agencies to federally recognized Tribes. Until the passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (P.L. 104-193; hereafter, welfare reform act), responsible agencies included the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) as the federal arbitrator between the U.S. government and American Indian Tribes; Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which administers block grants to Tribes for reservation housing; the Indian Health Service (IHS); and a host of federal welfare programs not unique to American Indians, such as General Assistance (GA) (now Temporary Assistance for Needy Families [TANF]), Social Security Income (SSI), food stamps, and commodity food programs.

According to the terms of the welfare reform act, *states* have new authority to request and administer federal welfare funds and, "at their option," may

include tribal family assistance programs in their counts for requesting block grants. What this means with respect to dispensation of funds to Tribes has begun to come to light through independent longitudinal studies in Arizona and South Dakota.[8] The most direct effect on American Indian communities—both on and off the reservation—lies with new caps on spending in TANF, SSI, and HUD and the consolidation of nutrition programs, such as food stamps; the Women, Infant, and Children program (WIC); and school lunch programs.[9] These cuts strike into the heart of the reservation economy, where policy effects have forced a delicate balance between formal and informal economies. Program caps and time limits that reduce the welfare roll without eliminating conditions of poverty undercut the ways American Indians have come to combine household resource strategies with various forays into wage work. By highlighting key policy turns of the past, I show that welfare reform in Indian country is an extension of federal policies that have always served to uphold or dismantle federal trust responsibilities. The overall trend in American Indian policy has been to isolate and then assimilate American Indians, first by dispossessing them of their lands and then by converting them to a variety of Christian religions that reinforced the values of the colonizers. The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) reconstituted tribal landholdings and reorganized consensus-oriented polities into federally chartered constitutional governments. A direct effect of these policy changes manifested in a decline in women's public status, especially in matrilineal societies such as among the Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras. This decline throughout Indian country was directly related to the selection of male leaders by U.S. agents and to the increase in wage labor, particularly for men.[10] Despite these effects at Fort Berthold, as in many other reservation communities, women's roles remained centered on kinship relations.

As in other reservation communities, the loss of traditional sources of livelihood, in which women's roles had been equal to men's, was not compensated. These structural changes in social organization, fostered by early-twentieth-century Victorian family norms of the nuclear family, further eroded women's collective status and security. At Fort Berthold, missionaries and government officials worked together to convert a horticultural people to a ranching economy, thereby devaluing the work of women who controlled their families' garden plots. Where women maintained control over their subsistence activities or developed new strategies based on modified modes of subsistence, they retained a relatively higher status in relation to men.

The most direct and egregious policies aimed at eradicating tribal stewardship came about through termination policies initiated by the 1953 Termination Act, which defined the Termination era. Termination policies of the 1950s took aim at tribal sovereignty by attempting to dismantle political structures that uphold the federal trust relationship—a relationship that historically signifies treaty responsibilities. The question before Tribes, states, and the federal welfare system is not merely economic. In a legislative sense, one might ask: To what extent do the consent clauses in welfare reform represent treaty abrogations, and what might the socio-legal consequences be with respect to cultural harm? Precisely how reservation communities intend to cope with deep cuts to their economies forces a critical examination into the ways in which community members—especially women who receive the bulk of welfare for dependent children—strategize to make ends meet.

CASELOAD: FORT BERTHOLD

Fort Berthold is situated along the upper confluences of the Missouri River, which prior to its damming was the life vein of a horticultural, fishing, and hunting economy among matrilineal Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara peoples. Today the Garrison Dam rises up to meet the jagged buttes that jut up from rugged badlands and spill out onto eastern farmlands, split up over decades of western land grabs and consolidations of Indian and non-Indian lands. Industries boom and bust, especially in oil, shale, and other natural resources where Tribes and individual tribal members retain mineral rights through treaties, including on lands leased by white ranchers. The main on-reservation employers are the Tribal Administration, the Northrop assembly plant, and the Four Bears Casino. Yet even with these industries, the unemployment rate hovers at 50 percent.[11]

The reservation shares some features with its rural counterparts in western North Dakota, Montana, and the Southern Plains of Canada. However, the circumscription created by the reservation boundary, as one both geographic and political, offsets these similarities through institutionalized racism against Indians and the results of federal subsumption of culture and economy, symbolized by the reservation itself. In these respects, the Indians of Fort Berthold share more in common with the Kalahari !Kung of South Africa than they do with neighboring non-Indian wheat farmers of North Dakota. For example, some ethnographic work has compared the ranching economies of reservation and nonreservation communities,[12] but little comparative work beyond the anecdotal has focused on American Indian and white women on the Northern

Plains. Rather than setting the reservation economy within the frame of other rural economies, my purpose here is to set welfare reform within the context of federal policies that have long treated reservations as an internal colonial artifact, within which federal assistance programs have been administered. These programs range from agrarian reform and ranching (as specified through the terms of the 1887 Dawes Allotment Act and the 1934 IRA) to new clauses in welfare reform legislation aimed specifically at Tribes.

American Indian Tribes are the only distinct population given special consideration in the welfare reform act. The reason for this lies with the unique political and legal status Tribes hold with respect to the U.S. government. Therefore, scrutinizing welfare reform from the standpoint of U.S. and tribal relations allows a more comprehensive understanding of the long-term effects of policy on tribal communities.

The first cession of Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara lands by treaty was accomplished by the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty, which designated 12.5 million acres of reservation lands between the Yellowstone and Missouri Rivers of what is now Montana, Wyoming, and North Dakota. The 1887 General Allotment Act opened up previously collectively held lands to fee patent, whereby individual "allottees" were frequently coerced into selling their land to white shareholders. The 1910 Homestead Act further opened up western land sales, resulting in what is referred to as a "checkerboard" effect of many reservations, including Fort Berthold (although the result looks more like a "patchwork" of Indian-white landholdings). The historian Robert Merrill noted that the original land set aside by the Fort Laramie Treaty was reduced to 640,000 acres by 1910.[13] Ben Reifel, an American Indian anthropologist, stated that "since their first treaty at Fort Laramie . . . they [the Three Affiliated Tribes] have relinquished title to an area greater than that of the states of Massachusetts and New Hampshire combined."[14]

It was at a point of remarkable demographic and economic recovery from disease, dispossession of land, and social reorganization that plans for damming the Missouri River were introduced along reservation lands throughout North and South Dakota,[15] lands that had been protected by treaty since the 1800s.[16] The removal and relocation of 90 percent of the Fort Berthold population came about at the height of termination policy nationwide. The 1955 American Indian Relocation and Vocational Assistance Act (referred to by Indians and policy makers simply as "Relocation") coincided with the push to end federal services to reservation-based tribal members. In short, the Termination era at Fort Berthold was marked by two kinds of relocation: one the

result of a dam, the other the result of urban job training programs that sent migrants as far east as Philadelphia and as far west as Los Angeles.[17]

The maintenance of kin-based networks—both on and off the reservation—serves as an important determinant in individual well-being and women's collective action. Whether in reservation or urban contexts, American Indian women have always upheld their kinship networks to resist the alienating effects of government policies. Urban relocation lay at the heart of Termination-era policies, a theme now recurring in the wake of welfare reform as reservation residents do what they have always done when few job opportunities exist in rural reservation communities: move to cities to look for work. Except this time there are no federal subsidies or outreach to follow them there.[18]

Since the allotment of native lands in the nineteenth century, the philosophical problem with outside interventions in the reservation economy has rested with economic ideology of private property and privatization, concepts that run counter to tribal values of collective land use and kinship.[19] Given the national trend toward privatization of health and human services in the United States (from health care to private food banks), the trend will likely continue in this twenty-first century. Implementation and incorporation of new policies into the reservation economy depend on balancing family and community resources. In the daily rounds of making a living, what gets to count as "work" takes on culturally specific meanings that affirm cultural identity as flexible and not subject to the vagaries of economic development schemes. Women are particularly positioned to shape economic interventions, as they mediate between family life and welfare policy.

The inaugural days of the self-determination era drew increasing attention to women's claims and the movements that grew out of them.[20] Landmark legislation of this policy era related to social welfare issues included the 1978 American Indian Child Welfare Act (AICWA)[21] and its subsequent amendments in the 1990s that coincided with welfare reform movements nationwide.

WOMEN'S WORK AND THE WELFARE STATE

Within the reservation economy, American Indians continue to live within the most bureaucratic communities in the United States—beginning at birth upon receipt of a tribal enrollment number, the symbol of the federal trust subsumption of sovereignty that validates entitlement to government programs,[22] including annuities, housing subsidies, and commodity foods. Since the end of treaty making, federal policy has guided social rearrangements of native communities—from reservations to relocation and job training programs. In particular,

American Indian women continue to shoulder the responsibilities of balancing work and family life as a result of the structural effects of increases in female-headed households and the interhousehold exchange cycles that radiate out from women-centered kin networks.[23]

We can analyze female-headed households in one of two ways. On the one hand, matrifocal residences in reservation housing communities can be understood as an extension of "traditional" matrilineal family structures. On the other hand, this kind of cultural explanation is not wholly accurate and distracts from understanding the structural constraints of the daily realities that force women to keep up with demands for rent and pressures to sell family allotments and move into HUD communities (furthering dislocations from the land) to make ends meet across housing communities.[24] As I discuss in the next section, Fort Berthold women do this through a variety of mixed economic strategies that combine formal and informal incomes, such as beading, sewing, cooking, assisting with child care and transportation, and shuffling welfare-based incomes among household members and extended kin. In these ways, Fort Berthold women's strategies look more like the African American women described by Carol Stack in the urban "Flats," where women stand at the center of redistributive networks, than like the matriarchs of popular literature.[25]

American Indian social welfare policies have had differential effects on men and women through time, especially where top-down policies operate with little knowledge or regard for kinship and gender relations. Since the earliest days of dispossession, American Indian women were targeted for small-scale commodity production that reified their roles as domestic workers and seamstresses, whereas men were assigned the agricultural roles that in some cases had previously been the domain of women. Among Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras, missionaries and government officials worked together to convert a horticultural people to a ranching economy—thereby devaluing the work of women who controlled their families' garden plots.

At Fort Berthold, social welfare policies that began with the final and forced resettlement of renegade Hidatsas in the late 1800s stipulated the terms of surrender and "reservationization."[26] This description of early reservation life, recollected by an elderly Hidatsa woman, forms part of a cycle of stories about the transition from self-sufficiency to dependency that stand in contrast to the master narratives of welfare dependency.

> [A]t that time, the government gave stoves and furniture to these . . . people. . . . [T]hey make a fire outside and cook and they [settled Indians] always laughed at them, [they'd say] "they're poor, and us, we got a lot

> money," like that . . . and after the government told them to come back [to the reservation] and the police were after them . . . they go on horseback and they bring them just like they're chasing them back. . . . And when they have a house, a log house, after that . . . they get some stoves. When they got that per cap [per capita payment], they took some money back to pay for the commodities to pay for the stove, the ax . . . so they [the government] didn't give it to them [the Indians], they paid for it![27]

This Hidatsa woman's narrative shows how dependency on government goods was enforced: first by punishing Indians who refused to comply with ration programs (by forcing resettlement onto reservation encampments), then by taking away compensation for tribal lands (per capita payments) to pay for the rationed goods. Finally, government coercion tactics exacerbated tribal factions by playing "settled" Indians against their "unsettled" cousins. Later, when renegade Hidatsas refused to send their children to government and church schools, the government outposts withheld their rations as a forced measure of compliance. In short, the cycle of dependency emerges as structurally inherent, designed to confuse and control its subjects. Subsequent policies of social welfare reform tactics followed federal Indian policy through its vacillations between isolation on the one hand and assimilation on the other. In either case, the alienation of native lands has always been the cornerstone of federal interventions. The first legislative attempt at privatization of tribal holdings came about through the implementation of the 1887 Dawes Allotment Act, which ceded fee-simple property rights to individual Indians deemed "competent" by a U.S. court of law. Competency clauses continue to shape federal policy. For example, the 1996 welfare reform act allows some Tribes to manage their own welfare rolls providing they are "qualified" to do so (as stipulated by the 1997 Balanced Budget Act). The ideology of "competency" embedded in paternalistic policies that grant sovereignty with federal aplomb and take it away with state sanction mirrors the requirements laid down by termination policies of the 1950s. These policies ended federal trust responsibility to Tribes deemed "qualified" to manage their own affairs. This echoes the themes brought out in the test cases for termination, most notably the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, which lost its federal status after achieving economic self-sufficiency.[28] Early reservation-era policy applied this same reasoning to American Indian families through the implementation of social welfare policies that determined what family forms and social arrangements qualified American Indians as "fit" parents.[29]

In many ways this unwritten policy of removal was an extension of earlier assimilation policies that established Indian boarding schools at the turn of the twentieth century in an attempt to resocialize Indian children to non-Indian

ways of life.[30] Whereas the 1978 AICWA was passed to redress more than a century of upheaval and social dislocations, the 1996 welfare reform act, by cutting welfare benefits to women and children, is a policy shift that requires new safeguards in Indian country—where high unemployment, low mortality, and shifting economic structures (gaming industries notwithstanding) have always indicated that the stakes are higher than elsewhere.[31]

Women-centered kin networks provide a buffer against the harsh effects of policy shifts and budget cuts, often by straddling the formal and informal economies to spread the risks of survival across households. Fort Berthold women combine a variety of paid jobs (working for tribal governments, the BIA, the IHS, or the occasional start-up enterprises) with unpaid household labor, such as artistic production. Artistic production commonly involves beading and sewing, especially sewing quilts for an unending cycle of ceremonial activities. Despite the constant demand on women's productive labor, most of the work women do remains unremunerated. Since the 1970s, some reservation women have also secured wage labor through the Northrop assembly plant situated on the edge of the reservation hub of New Town. Others have found similar work in distant cities. "Carol," a Mandan woman, spoke to me about her work in a microelectronics factory in California: "[that work] . . . with all those copper wires and tiny things . . . was just like beadwork, and [so] that had something to do with me."

Carol's statement illustrates key points—mainly, that it is not the work itself (e.g., beadwork) that is inherently "Indian" but rather the perceptions women bring to the work they do and the social relations that continue to govern production. The reservation assembly plant employs non-Indians and Indians, many of whom find entry-level work through relatives already working in the plant. These work-based networks[32] continue the chain of relationships within and outside the workplace.[33]

Economic development strategies since the 1930s have approached problems of employment as a social welfare issue with programs designed to address the loss of a land-based economy by replacing it, for women, with handicraft production. The American Indian Arts and Crafts Board Act of 1935 implemented one of the first programs to target women's skills as beadworkers and quilters to bring them into wage labor.[34] Production for use and production for exchange have since become enmeshed with ceremonial activities, so that market relations and kin-based ceremonial relations have grown interdependent and form the basis for what I call *ceremonial relations of production*.[35] These structural interdependencies between market relations and kin-based relations

are a consequence of both the increasing need for cash contributions for ceremonial events and the wealth differentials that require more prosperous families to act on their redistributive obligations. Less advantaged families rely as much as possible on their immediate kin, but with fewer resources to exchange, even the generalized reciprocity of former times becomes tenuous as family and community members vie for scarce resources, especially cash.

CEREMONIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

To make sense of the different sets of social relationships required for participating in contemporary ceremonial life, Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara women engage in forms of *ceremonial relations of production.* I develop this concept as a way to account for the contradictions American Indian women face in their daily lives by integrating state-level sanctions while at the same time resisting hegemonic domination. In both their structural adaptation and their community-based resistance, the core of cultural life remains intact, such that new strategies emerge from the maintenance of traditional practices. The early reservation-era introduction of cash economies to community life created new ways of dealing with outside interventions. The contradictory effects of capitalism within the reservation economy reflect its market penetration but also result in ceremonial intensification within the spatial webworks of social relations that straddle more than one "site," for example, household to household.

Ceremonial relations of production distribute power by stretching webs of social relations across households and through time. Where local economies intersect with state-level prerogatives, women negotiate between kinship and cultural values balanced against economic imperatives.[36] The principle of ceremonial relations of production allows us to conceptualize women as a link between those domains and the household as a "mediator" between the political economy and subsistence activities.[37] This approach allows us to connect the household and community to human welfare rather than to a given process of growth and accumulation.[38] It also introduces a way to theorize a network of social and symbolic relations that crosscut formal and informal exchange[39] and ideology.[40] Applying this conceptual frame to American Indian women's work leads to an examination of the *kinds* of work women do and the social matrices through which they view it, as highlighted earlier by Carol's reflections on her work in the microelectronics plant.

Since the turn of the twentieth century, American Indians have been recruited to build railroads,[41] mine coal,[42] clean houses, and assemble the machinery of war. As a result, the reservation economy exports capital in the forms of both

labor power and economic resources. In pre-reservation days, mixed economic strategies on the Upper Missouri included horticulture, hunting, and fishing, with the Mandan and Hidatsa at the center of a Plains-wide trade network in which their agricultural goods were highly sought. Although the "old way" of life was disrupted by white encroachment and forced resettlement, today many Hidatsa women continue to garden, and household economic activities—such as sewing and cooking—proliferate within almost every household as supplements to household income and as contributions to social and ceremonial life. Similar to other rural reservation communities, Fort Berthold holds few options for wage work, except within the recurring cycle of job corps programs and boom-and-bust enterprises, usually aimed at natural resource extraction.[43]

Opportunities for formal wage work remain tied to land consolidation programs in the cattle business and to the development of tribal enterprises, such as Department of Defense subcontracts in microelectronics, the Indian Health Service, and the Four Bears Casino. Mixed household income strategies combine wages from work in the formal sector with those of nonearned income from government-sponsored assistance programs, such as food commodities and WIC. In addition, informal economic activities (such as artistic production and babysitting among women, ground work and cattle roundup among men) provide a buffer to abject poverty conditions while they sustain kin-based spheres of production. Since the casino opened in 1993, reservation unemployment figures have come down from the 75 percent in 1990 but still do not account for chronically "unemployed" individuals and the seasonal and temporary nature of many wage work opportunities, including work at the casino.[44] Casino employment, like other "temporary" wage sectors, also serves as a means for accumulating cash for family occasions that require huge feasts and gifting during seasonal ceremonial cycles.

In addition to or in lieu of formal employment opportunities, many Fort Berthold Indians receive government assistance. Up until the implementation of welfare reform, programs such as WIC, Food Stamps, GA, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Commodity Food Programs, and the services provided by the IHS and HUD were largely programs developed during historic periods of federal welfare expansion, with one major difference in Indian country: health care, food, housing, and education remain basic living criteria guaranteed to American Indians by treaty in exchange for their native lands. Treaties became the contracts by which native peoples signed into agreement their reduced land base as reservations. The government thereby contracted to uphold certain agreements often spelled out in terms of annuities,

goods, and future obligations to Tribes. This fact bears repeating if we are ever to understand the complexity of the rural poverty and community initiative that mark treaty Indians in distinct relationship to government agencies and programs, including welfare-to-work.

Bureaucratic welfare programs become income options that Fort Berthold women integrate into and manage in their household and community activities. The ways in which they do this are governed by their specific needs of maintaining their households and "helping out" kin. For example, although commodity program regulations specify that it is illegal to "use someone else's commodity food," "trade or sell commodity food," or receive commodities *and* food stamps, economic realities that limit relief income by household size make compliance with state measures impracticable and unjust. For example, the income limit in 1990 for a family of five was U.S.$1,488/month combined allowable income.[45] At Fort Berthold, commodity food distribution services combine warehouse and "tailgate" distribution (i.e., from the back of a truck) for remote rural residents, a service welfare cuts abolished in some reservation communities.[46]

In addition to commodity food programs, households with incomes below the poverty line are eligible for WIC services for children up to four years old. Fort Berthold (in 1992) had 509 WIC clients (roughly 10 percent of the reservation population), with seven reservation-based clinics administering WIC services. In keeping with commodity regulations that stipulate that commodities cannot be distributed to Food Stamp Program recipients, one WIC official summarized the policy as indicating that "the whole household has to receive the same benefits." Because of this, income averages become a way of resource pooling, but only in formal reporting strategies (wages, TANF, unemployment, SSI). In other words, family members who may or may not reside within the same household use their eligibility for specific programs to contribute to the needs of kin. Taken together, swapping, pooling, and exchanging benefits form a collective income base that can mean the difference between getting by and going hungry. Furthermore, given the fluctuating nature of households and household members' mixed economic strategies (such as combining food stamps and commodities), "fixed" income bracketing required for formal reporting to social welfare agencies and restrictions against mixing economic "income" set unreasonable expectations.

System "abuses" in the context of distribution programs can be read as survival strategies that frequently combine economic and cultural incentives. For example, black market commodity trade serves as part of an incorporative

exchange system whereby large quantities of food can be amassed and prepared for ceremonial occasions (such as wakes and funerals) by drawing on "savings accounts" of commodity products, such as flour for fry bread. In the informal exchange networks of everyday life, food has commodity value in both social economic and bureaucratic contexts. For example, gifts of food are received as "payment" for assistance and are given away as "surplus" and as a display of generosity in private and public forms of exchange. Refusals of gifts, in these and most any contexts, are not only insulting but mark the refuser as a noncooperative (socially useless) community member. Bureaucratic dispensation programs commodify food as "rations," which in turn can be traded, stored, or expended.

Women who are the most sought after for their ceremonial and community knowledge—those I call *focalwomen*—generally have a reserve supply of commodities on hand for occasions that call on their ability to prepare huge feasts at a moment's notice. When I asked one interviewee what women do that holds the community together, she replied, "Women cook." Whereas cooking rightly reflects community wisdom about the main activities of women, "stockpiling" (not food preparation per se) contributes in greater significance to informal exchange systems.

Many Fort Berthold women participate in diversified ventures, working for a wage while actively participating in daily social and ceremonial life. Many elders lament the loss of "traditional ways," yet sewing, beading, cooking, and preparing for ceremonies and feasts remain integral to the reproduction of cultural life. Although the specific forms of ritual tasks and items may vary from former times (e.g., synthetic fabrics used for ceremonial outfits to ceremonies conducted in a living room instead of an earth lodge), the *intention* and transformative nature of ritual present a view of a culture still very much practiced. Women's formal constructs of work in their responses to work histories I elicited tend to reflect structural definitions that relate "work" to a wage. Yet when women describe their daily rounds of gathering ceremonial donations, sewing quilts, preparing for feasts, and making dance outfits, their sentiments reveal what one tribal member remarked in comparing these tasks with the skills of her foremothers: "It's hard *work*!" "Sue's" mixed strategy, described in the next paragraphs, illustrates how women combine income and skills.

"Sue" lives in a HUD rental house for which she pays $185 a month, not including utilities.[47] She receives no income or welfare income, but she has received meager revenue from grazing leases on land she holds on another part of the reservation. She has two daughters who live off the reservation in

two separate households, although they have lived together in the past and retain the option for doing so in the future. She stays with one daughter on a semipermanent basis, "commuting" to her rental house, and sometimes trades residences with one of her daughters or maintains a residence by herself with an infant grandchild. After returning to her rental house on one occasion and finding the electricity had been turned off, she threatened in despair to abandon the house and move permanently off the reservation. Instead, one of her daughters offered to move back to the reservation and assist with living costs. "Sue" had come back to the reservation to pick up her commodity foods, since "they were all out of food" at her daughter's house. She picked up food (for a household of three), which she used to combine with welfare payments she had been receiving for her granddaughter but which she no longer receives. She searched her house for food and goods to take to her daughter's off-reservation residence and was glad to have found a package of new sheets she used for batting down quilt tops, so now at least she could make some quilts and sell them for cash.

Later I accompanied Sue on a morning round in which she made several attempts to peddle, then eventually sold, a star quilt. Her rush to sell the quilt was in an effort to raise $200 for a bus ticket for her son who was stuck in Michigan and needed to get to California. Her efforts reveal the wide net cast by women's kin networks to assist relatives both on and off the reservation yet that still have an impact on the reservation economy. Through her decisions about whom to ask to buy the quilt, Sue revealed preferences for kin over nonkin in the ranking and informal marketing of cultural goods. Her survival strategies are typical of the way in which women combine income sources and link households to provision their families. In situations such as these, women rely on cultural items, such as star quilts, as a way to raise money on an "as-needed" basis while they combine sales with other mixed income strategies.

Outside observers, such as economic development personnel contracted through federal programs, see informal activities, such as peddling star quilts, as potentially successful income-generating activities. These activities then become the target for generating microenterprises on the reservation. However, multipronged programs that target welfare recipients to convert informal to formal activities generally leave little improvement in overall conditions in their wake. As "Tracy" discusses,

> [I worked with that] EARN project, Employment Assistance Readiness Net. That was to address the eighteen-year-old who said, "Eh, I'm gonna be on GA" [and] people on welfare. EARN evolved around this captive group of

> people. . . . The principle or goal was to address the dependency that the people have grown used to. The hand out . . . to turn that around and enhance the work ethic. The socioeconomic conditions are not conducive to that goal . . . there are no jobs here. . . . It was just a band-aid. The [tribal] college had a subcontract with the Tribe. They hired two psychologists from [the city] to come in and interview people. From there they were recommended to go to counseling. We set up the schooling part on adult employability. These people were totally resistant because the system was batting them around again. One of the largest disagreements I faced every day was with the people themselves . . . they were withdrawn, they were dealing with the manipulation, the oppression. No way could I introduce new thoughts. They were caught in the system; they were told what to do . . . they had no choice. They [project personnel] even threatened if this person did not go to counseling, did not go to class, they were going to take their checks away! It was so degrading. They didn't even give any real thought to AFDC, to young mothers. I'm glad it failed.[48]

Some of the issues Tracy raised relate to participants' experiences in programs that seek to bring welfare recipients into wage work but fail to analyze the structures of opportunity and cultural strategies that sometimes run counter to job training programs. Women's networks can form a type of "culturally defensive" approach, serving as a pooling and redistributive mechanism. The failure of the EARN project, billed as an economic development project to move people from welfare to wage work, is symptomatic of the kinds of "work fare" designed to replace relief through cottage-based industries. But the notion of a "captive" target group eliminated choices of self-selection and imposed a system of economic incentive without regard for the *process* of work and the social networks that surround work activities. For example, the social relations of women's networks influence their choices about making requests or purchases and about those with whom they feel they can work best. Furthermore, the degrading aspects that threaten participants with cuts in benefits are reminiscent of early reservation policies that threatened noncompliant Indians with ration (welfare) cutoffs. Given the history of social welfare programs on Indian reservations, resistance to state-sponsored programs, such as lack of participation, reads as a form of self-protection against further encroachment on tribal sovereignty and as subjects' unwillingness to be agents in the reproduction of their own economic marginality.

IMPLICATIONS OF WELFARE REFORM FOR THE RESERVATION ECONOMY

The delicate balance struck by combining household resource strategies described earlier could be undercut over time by the welfare reform legislation

implemented in the 1990s and thereby could disrupt the ways in which formal and informal economies intertwine. With every new policy era, American Indians adjust to structural changes, but not without cost. Although American Indians have always been asked to pay the price for shifts in national policies, at the same time they manage to imbue new ways of making a living with cultural meanings that reconceptualize ideologies of "work" away from its association with a wage in the formal sector. The informal economy has been understood to serve this purpose in other communities whose members subsist on the margins of the political economy,[49] especially in kin-based communities that stand outside the macrostructures of power.

Ceremonial relations of production provide a mechanism for reinforcing and coming to terms with economic and social interrelationships. Moreover, I suggest that urban residents subject to two-year time limits for TANF, unlike their reservation relatives, find themselves relying increasingly on extended kin for assistance, thus straining already scarce resources. By describing how kin networks operate within and beyond reservation boundaries, I show how these structural interdependencies extend across cultural geographies—where urban and rural remittances flow between primary and subsidiary households. Although these flows can be said to mirror the strategies of other migrant populations, the twist in Indian country remains that cultural commitments to life-cycle events (from funerals to public honoring ceremonies) reinforce community values as signifiers of cultural identity and of a way of life that remains continually practiced. It is in the space "betwixt and between" economic and ceremonial, public and private, formal and informal, reservation and city that ceremonial relations of production allow simultaneously for economic adjustments to the macroeconomy while at the same time reinforcing kinship relations, which lie at the heart of cultural membership and continuity. As Marjane Ambler has pointed out with respect to American Indians and welfare reform,[50] the idea of *community* responsibility lies closer to the core of tribal values than to the implied values of the *Personal* Responsibility Act (PRA).

In the overview of federal Indian policies, "welfare reform" reads as a policy of state contraction consistent with historical trends to isolate, assimilate, remove, and disband tribal control over tribal resources, including labor power. Tribal control over block grants may be one mitigating clause in the welfare reform act. However, social factors may mitigate even more strongly, as I have attempted to show by pointing out the strengths and flexible nature of women's kin networks. Although ceremonial and social networks may protect against culture loss, the fragility of the reservation economy is not impervious

to economic and cultural harm. Globalization of production—from Northrop's expansion at Fort Berthold to the international export trade in American Indian goods—conscripts Indian labor in new forms while cutting economic assistance programs and violating the federal trust relationship. The result is renewed confusion with respect to the "sovereign dependency" of Tribes by allowing for neither.

Development enterprises that intervene in the reservation economy by attempting to formalize informal activities will continue to have limited success, especially where cultural conceptions of "work"—as both a process and an objective—clash with profit incentives that target individuals without regard for the family economy. Moreover, the stereotype of the "welfare queen" as a woman (usually a woman of color) who "just sits around" doing nothing defies the American cultural ethos of rugged individualism.[51] Welfare-to-work programs are therefore not new or unique in their approach to target individuals for meager economic incentives. Further, the welfare reform act is not without precedent in its inadequate measures to protect Indian child welfare. During a 1996 address to the national governors' conference, former president Bill Clinton commented: "[I believe] the biggest shortcoming . . . of the bill I helped write, the Family Support Act of 1988 . . . was that we did not do enough in the child welfare area." Despite this statement, neither 1990s amendments to the 1978 American Indian Child Welfare Act nor the renewal of the 1996 welfare reform act in 2002 mentioned this important piece of child protective legislation.

The rhetoric of welfare reform continues to reproduce an ideology of "self-sufficiency" while doing little to tackle the material conditions that reinforce economic and racial inequalities.[52] In this way, "self-sufficiency" stands in for "self-determination" in policy terms, but only in the limited sense of compliance with federal guidelines. Furthermore, federal job training programs do not keep pace with industry demands, and where they do it is only to offset the cost of labor production. In other words, welfare-to-work workers join the workforce as a source of cheap labor, where they often remain.[53]

In part, what "welfare-to-work" rhetoric demands is a critical examination of what gets to count as "work" and how race, class, and gender assumptions are built into welfare reform tactics and economic development schemes. Furthermore, privatization of social services (such as the transition to privatized food banks in the United States[54]) will see parallel effects in Indian country, as cuts in commodity distribution programs and other subsidies that provide food to the elderly have created a crisis in social service administration in some reservation communities. As White Mountain Apache tribal chairman Ronnie Lupe stated

in an editorial in the tribal newspaper the *Fort Apache Scout*: "The White Mountain Apache Tribe did not create welfare, the federal government did. So if it's the federal government's intent to dismantle welfare, then it should provide opportunities for welfare recipients rather than throwing them out on the street."[55]

Some Fort Berthold women have described recent cutbacks to Indian programs as a backlash against sovereignty movements and punishment for the perceived success, however uneven, of Indian gaming as a component of economic self-sufficiency. In this spirit, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act reads as a new kind of "treaty," one that reaffirms power relations between policy makers and their subjects. As provisioners of mixed economic strategies, Fort Berthold women and their counterparts nationwide will continue to strategize against targeted cutbacks, no doubt by insisting that "personal responsibility" resides with collective efforts toward self-determination. For American Indians, the swiftness of federal reform by the stroke of a pen is not new. Whereas some social welfare researchers suggest that the new options give some Tribes more control over distribution of welfare benefits, what the changes echo according to women I asked is " 'Termination' all over again." In part, this sentiment suggests that welfare reform, constructed in a political mood of ruthless cuts to subsistence benefits, delivers a direct blow to American Indian women, who have chiseled a fine line of survival through a package of benefits outlined by treaties and legally protected by the federal trust relationship.

SUMMARY

The federal trust relationship, as an artifact of treaties, is only one legislative measure for ascribing economic relations in Indian country. Through this macrolens, everyday life continues to unfold in visiting, ceremonies, gatherings, conversations, and ongoing cycles of production and exchange. Welfare—from commodities to government subsidies—ramifies through the reservation economy with distinctive force as an aspect of state-level economy designed to overtake sovereign rights to land and livelihood. Women's gardens are but one site of contestation to the overlay and interplay of welfare structures. Yet they remain particularly powerful reminders that "Indian ways" have not given way to money market economies without a serious accounting for how those economies create a goodness of fit with extant forms of social life.

What studies of the informal economy have revealed is the ways in which those economies intertwine and adapt to formal or "official" economies. The

emphasis on wage labor as a TANF requirement under welfare reform reflects the ideology that only wage work, no matter how meager, counts as *real* work.[56] Whereas some reservation activists will lobby for greater tribal control and devolution of federal block grants and some welfare recipients will simply fall off the rolls into off-reservation employment or disappear into the unreported ranks of the chronically unemployed, a few women will continue to plant their gardens and sow the seeds. As federal policies move through reservation economies with the predictability of a North Dakota snowstorm, what remains when they pass is what matters.

NOTES

1. Gilbert Wilson, *The Horse and Dog in Hidatsa Culture* (New York: American Museum Press, 1924).

2. Tressa Berman, *Circle of Goods: Women, Work and Welfare in a Reservation Community* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003); cf. Kathleen Pickering, "Alternative Economic Strategies in Low-Income Rural Communities: TANF, Labor Migration, and the Case of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation," *Rural Sociology* 65, 1 (2001): 148–167.

3. I capitalize the word *Tribe* when referring to political entities with their own constitutionally chartered governments.

4. Sharon O'Brien, "Traditional Values and the Administration of Welfare Reform," Paper presented at the symposium "Empowering American Indian Families: New Perspectives on Welfare Reform," May 5–6, 2000, Washington University, St. Louis, MO.

5. Peter Beinart, "Lost Tribes," *Lingua Franca* 9, 4 (May–June 1999): 32–41.

6. Carol Goldberg, with Timothy Carr Seward, *Planting Tail Feathers: Tribal Survival and Public Law 280,* Contemporary American Indian Issues Series no. 6 (Los Angeles: American Indian Studies Center, University of California, 1997), 127.

7. David Wilkins, *American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997); David Wilkins, "Convoluted Essence: Indian Rights and the Federal Trust Doctrine," *Native Americas* (Spring 1997): 24–31.

8. Thomas Biolsi, Rose Cordier, Marvine Douville Two Eagle, and Milinda Weil, "Welfare Reform on Rosebud Reservation: Challenges for Tribal Policy," Working paper, 2001; Eddie F. Brown, Shata Pandey, and Leslie Scheuler-Whitaker, "Implementation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) on American Indian Reservations: Early Evidence from Arizona," Kathryn M. Buder Center for American Indian Studies, George Warren Brown School of Social Work (St. Louis: Washington University, 1999).

9. The new TANF guidelines replace AFDC with time limits and caps on cash assistance. The 1997 Balanced Budget Act allowed for exemptions for Indian Tribes with unemployment rates higher than 50 percent, but these exemptions only extend time limits from two years to five years and do not include tribal members who reside off the reservation.

10. Patricia Albers, "Sioux Women in Transition: A Study of Their Changing Status in a Domestic and Capitalist Sector of Production," in *The Hidden Half: Studies of*

Plains Indian Women, ed. Patricia Albers and Beatrice Medicine (New York: University Press of America, 1983), 175–234; Tressa Berman, "The Community as Worksite: American Indian Women's Artistic Production," in *More Than Class: Study of Power in U.S. Work Places,* ed. A. Kingsolver (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 73–95.

11. Average BIA Aberdeen Area Office figures for 1990–2000.

12. Irene Castle McLaughlin, "Colonialism, Cattle and Class: A Century of Ranching on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1993).

13. Robert Merrill, *Indians of the Upper Missouri* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1977), 47–51.

14. Ben Reifel, "Relocation on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1952), 4.

15. Michael L. Lawson, *Dammed Indians: The Pick-Sloan Plan and the Missouri River Sioux* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982).

16. Tressa Berman, "For the Taking: The Garrison Dam and the Tribal Taking Area," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 12 (1988): 5–8.

17. Joan Weibel-Orlando, *Indian Country, L.A.: Maintaining Ethnic Community in a Complex Society* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999 [1991]).

18. Leland Leonard, personal communication. Leonard is director of the Phoenix Indian Center, one of the first urban Indian centers established in the United States.

19. Carol Ward and Matthew Snipp, "American Indian Economic Development," in *Research in Human Capital and Development,* ed. Carol Ward and Matthew Snipp, series ed. Alan Sorkin (Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1996); Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt, eds., *What Can Tribes Do? Strategies and Institutions in American Indian Economic Development,* American Indian Manual and Handbook Series, no. 4 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992); Stephen Cornell, "We gotta get somethin' *goin'* around here!" Paper presented at Welfare Reform, Job Creation, and American Indian Economies—Empowering American Indian Families: New Perspectives on Welfare Reform symposium, Washington University, St. Louis, May 5–6, 1999.

20. See my discussion of women's claims to kinship rights (e.g., *Maria Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo)* and their relationship to land rights and social welfare in "The Impact of Federal Indian Policy on American Indian Women and Families," *Family Perspective* 27, 4 (1993): 471–484.

21. John Red Horse, "Cultural Evolution of American Indian Families," in *Ethnicity and Race,* ed. C. Jacobs and D. Bowles (Silver Springs, MD: National Association of Social Workers, 1988); Troy Johnson, ed., *American Indian Child Welfare Conference Proceedings* (Los Angeles: American Indian Research Center, University of California, 1991).

22. Cf. Annette Jaimes, "Federal Indian Identification Policy: A Usurpation of Indigenous Sovereignty in North America," *Policy Studies Journal* 16, 4 (Summer 1988).

23. Louise Lamphere, Helene Ragone, and Patricia Zavella, *Situated Lives: Gender and Culture in Everyday Life* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

24. In addition, many young men join temporary or off-reservation work crews, thus rendering themselves absent household members for periodic or extended stays.

25. Cf. Carol Stack, *All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); Carol Stack, *Call to Home: African Americans Reclaim the Rural South* (New York: Bison, 1996); Paula Gunn Allen, *The Sacred Hoop: Recovering the Feminine in American Indian Traditions* (Boston: Beacon, 1987).

26. Barbara Buttes, *Mdewankanton Dakota Women 1860–1900: Oral Histories of the Early Reservation Period,* unpublished manuscript. The concept of reservationization as

put forth by Buttes embodies the *processes* of dispossession, removal, relocation, and the construction of reservations as communities of containment. I use it here to signal that this process is, by definition, ongoing.

27. Quoted in Berman, *Circle of Goods.*

28. Deborah Shames, ed., *Freedom with Reservation: The Menominee Struggle to Save Their Land and People. National Committee to Save the Menominee People and Forests* (Madison: Wisconsin Indian Legal Services, 1972); Eddie F. Brown, Shata Pandey, and Leslie Scheuler-Whitaker, "Promise of Welfare Reform: Development Through Devolution on Indian Reservations," Kathryn M. Buder Center for American Indian Studies, George Warren Brown School of Social Work (St. Louis: Washington University, 1998).

29. For example, Victorian models of stem family forms (nuclear families) were the measure against which parenting was judged, thereby devaluing the role of grandparents and other extended kin.

30. Tsianina Lomanwaima, *They Called It Prairie Light: The Story of Chilocco Indian School* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994).

31. Barbara Buttes, "The 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Should Have Ended Decades of Imposters Masquerading as Mdewakantonwan Sioux in Minnesota," Paper delivered at the American Anthropological Association meetings, Philadelphia, PA, 1998.

32. Cf. Patricia Zavella, "Abnormal Intimacy: The Varying Work Networks of Chicana Cannery Workers," *Feminist Studies* 11, 3 (1987): 541–558.

33. The Mohawk ironworkers present a classic case of skilled laborers who have, through generations, branded a particular form of wage labor as distinctly "Mohawk." See the special issue of the *National Museum of American Indian* magazine, "Mohawk Ironworkers: A Tradition of Courage" (Winter 2002).

34. Robert Fay Schraeder, *American Indian Arts and Crafts Board: An Aspect of New Deal Policy* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983); Gail Scheffield, *The Arbitrary Indian: The Indian Arts and Craft Art of 1990* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997).

35. Berman, "The Community as Worksite"; Berman, *Circle of Goods.*

36. Randy Albelda and Chris Tilly, *Glass Ceilings and Bottomless Pits* (Boston: South End, 1997).

37. Cf. Robert McC. Netting, Richard R. Wilk, and Erik J. Arnould, *Households: Comparative and Historical Studies of the Domestic Group* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

38. Lourdes Beneria and Gita Sen, "Accumulation, Reproduction and Women's Role in Economic Development: Boserup Revisited," *Signs* 7, 2 (1981): 279–298; Michael Tanner, "The End of Welfare: Fighting Poverty in Civil Society" (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 1996).

39. Nicholas Thomas, *Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacific* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

40. Michael Taussig, *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).

41. Kurt Peters, "Watering the Flower: Laguna Pueblo and the Santa Fe Railroad, 1880–1943," in *Native Americans and Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical Perspectives,* ed. Alice Littlefield and Martha Knack (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 177–197.

42. Lawrence David Weiss, *The Development of Capitalism in the Navajo Nation* (Minneapolis: Marxist Educational Press, 1984).

43. Marjane Ambler, *Breaking the Iron Bonds: Indian Control of Energy Development* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1990).

44. Viz. Bartlett and Steele 2002.

45. See Berman 2003 for a more detailed account of eligibility requirements.

46. Yolanda Harvey, personal communication. In discussion with Yolanda Harvey, Elderly Services, White Mountain Apache Tribe, AZ (1998).

47. 1992 figure.

48. Oral interview.

49. Paul Stoller, "Meanings of Welfare Reform," *Anthropology Newsletter* 40 (May 1996): 5; June Nash, *Crafts in the World Market* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993).

50. Mary Jane Ambler, "Community Responsibility for Welfare Reform," Special issue of *Tribal College* (1997).

51. Cf. David Zucchino, *The Myth of the Welfare Queen* (New York: Touchstone, 1999).

52. Theresa Funiciello, *Tyranny of Kindness: Dismantling the Welfare System to End Poverty in America* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993); Jill Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

53. Barbara Ehrenreich, *Nickeled and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America* (New York: Metropolitan, 2001).

54. Stanley Aronowitz and William DiFazio, *The Jobless Future: Sci-Tech and the Dogma of Work* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

55. Cited in Layne K. Stromwell, Stephanie Brzuzy, Polly Sharp, and Celina Anderson, *The Implications of "Welfare Reform" for American Indian Families and Communities: Pressing Issues of Inequality and American Indian Communities,* ed. Elizabeth Segal and Keith M. Kilty (Binghamton, NY: Haworth, 1998), 7.

56. Cf. Pickering, "Alternative Economic Strategies," 155.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Work and Culture in Southeastern Alaska: Tlingits and the Salmon Fisheries

DAVID ARNOLD

David Arnold's case study of Tlingits in Alaska brings American Indians to the center of U.S. capitalist development, as active participants in the early-twentieth-century Alaskan fishing industry. His chapter examines how the Tlingits adapted to market conditions, employing "modern" strategies—such as organizing trade unions and producers' associations and engaging in litigation—to protect the rights of Indian workers as well as "traditional" rights to subsistence fishing. The cannery workers and fishermen fought for their rights within a white-dominated salmon-fishing industry and in the process strengthened Tlingit cultural identity and fostered intertribal cooperation.

The commissioner of Indian affairs under Theodore Roosevelt, Francis E. Leupp, observed that "the notion that the Indian is by nature indolent and by habit an idler has been so impressed upon the minds of [the] American people that it is hard to shake loose."[1] The notion of the Indian as idler rather than worker began with the first colonists, who "were struck by what seemed to them the

poverty of Indians who lived in the midst of a landscape endowed so astonishingly with abundance." Those first Europeans in America constructed a myth of the idle savage living within a "virgin wilderness." Despite the fact that native peoples had supported large populations and effectively utilized their natural resources for thousands of years, Europeans chose to believe that Indians had been blessed with the bounty of nature but chose instead to live, as one settler put it, "like to our Beggers in England."[2] By the nineteenth century this notion of the "lazy savage" had become ossified in the American mind. Nineteenth-century writers often alluded to the fact that Indian culture had rendered native peoples unable or unwilling to embrace the Protestant work ethic and compete in the marketplace.[3]

Nowhere is the stereotype of the "lazy" Indian more misguided than on the northern Northwest Coast. There, during the nineteenth century, native peoples adapted readily to commercial markets created first by the fur trade and then by the salmon-canning industry. Tlingit Indians, who inhabited a vast territory of islands and coastline constituting present-day southeastern Alaska, participated in the region's economic growth as trappers, miners, loggers, and, most significant, as commercial fishermen and cannery workers. And although such participation was accompanied by cultural assimilation, Tlingits continued to practice traditional ways—such as maintaining their subsistence economy—and to maintain unique cultural identities as Indian peoples, even as they redefined and renegotiated those identities.

The incorporation of Alaska into the global capitalist economy unquestionably limited the freedom and autonomy of native peoples. This did not mean, however, that Indian people moved ineluctably toward complete economic dependency and social marginalization, as is the common story line. The ability of Tlingits to resist such a fate was largely the result of three factors, the first two environmental and the last cultural. First, southeastern Alaska's remote, northern environment prohibited the development of agriculture and thereby discouraged white settlement and the rapid dispossession of Indian lands. Second, the emergence of salmon canning as the region's leading industry allowed Tlingits to continue traditional occupations—fishing and fish processing—in a new economic context. The fishing industry brought economic opportunity, whereas subsistence fishing provided native peoples with a hedge against total market domination and a connection to their cultural heritage. Finally, a resilient cultural outlook allowed Tlingits to adapt collectively and as individuals to market capitalism while still maintaining important indigenous values. In Tlingit society, acquisitiveness and individual achievement—

so important in encouraging market participation in the modern era—were (and are) balanced against notions of social responsibility and reciprocity, allowing change and adaptation as well as cultural persistence.

This chapter focuses on the "traditional" and the modern salmon economies, both of which served as primary activities for Tlingit people. Salmon was not and is not the only important resource for Tlingit people. In the precontact period many other subsistence resources were important to Tlingit culture, and in the modern period many other occupations and economic avenues have been open to Tlingit people, especially since the mid-1970s. But salmon fishing and processing offer a special view of cultural continuity and change through a relationship—between Tlingits and salmon—that has existed for thousands of years and persists to this day. Salmon was vitally important to Tlingits in the precontact period, became an important source of economic participation and market incorporation from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, and remains important to this day as both an economic and a cultural resource.

THE PRECONTACT FISHING ECONOMY AND THE FUR TRADE ERA TO 1867

Salmon were the backbone of Tlingit culture. In practical terms, the predictability and abundance of salmon runs, combined with native technologies for catching and preserving salmon, sustained dense coastal populations long before European contact. Salmon also provided the surplus that allowed for economic specialization, social stratification, and cultural elaboration—characteristics usually associated only with agricultural peoples.[4] However, fishing was far more than the material process of transforming animals into calories for human consumption. It was, in anthropological terms, a "lifeway," a comprehensive system of production, distribution, and exchange that operated within a web of social relationships and cultural values.

Salmon fishing—as with all types of economic production—reflected the hierarchical nature of Tlingit social relations. The primary unit of production was the household, an extended kinship group of clan members who lived and worked together. Tlingit society was organized hierarchically, with houses forming the basic unit of economic and social interaction and clans (composed of a number of different households) forming the primary unit of ceremonial and ritual life. Household labors were divided on the basis of gender as well as social ranking. As was common in many hunter-gatherer societies, Tlingit men fished and hunted while women gathered and cultivated numerous wild

plants, roots, and berries. Labor was also organized according to social ranking. Tlingit society was composed of aristocrats, who gained and maintained their status through heredity as well as achievement; commoners, who held no hereditary titles but were full members of Tlingit society; and slaves, who were chattel property, most often acquired in war or by trade and who did not participate as full persons in Tlingit social or ceremonial life.[5] Although all members of the household participated in day-to-day subsistence activities, commoners and slaves more often provided the labor, whereas Tlingit elites mobilized, directed, and regulated such activities.

Fishing required extensive knowledge of fish, tides, and technology; it also required tremendous collective effort and social organization. The largest projects entailed damming salmon streams with latticework weirs that diverted migrating salmon into wooden baskets. Such methods could be brutally efficient. Whereas conventional wisdom holds that native peoples did not overexploit salmon runs because they had only small populations and inferior technology, ample evidence suggests that Northwest Coast Indians could put extreme pressure on salmon populations with technologies, such as fish weirs, that were as efficient as those later used by Euro-American commercial fishers and with social systems that could effectively mobilize the labor of entire households.[6] That native peoples did not overexploit salmon populations speaks to the numerous social and spiritual constraints placed on the catching and consumption of salmon. Most of these constraints flowed from the special relationship that existed between Indian peoples and the natural world, which required that humans treat animals (of which salmon were the most highly valued) with proper respect or risk starvation.[7] Numerous social prescriptions, such as those prohibiting fishing during periods of special ceremony or mourning, constituted a very effective system of conservation that, according to Tlingit elder Lydia George, Indian people took very seriously: "Since fish was our main food, we were very careful; the fish were treated well. If a man broke any of our laws, his fishing equipment was taken from him; sometimes his spear was broken up."[8] Or, in the words of another Tlingit elder, "Subsistence living was not only a way of life, but also a life-enriching process. Conservation and perpetuation of subsistence resources was a part of that way of life, and was mandated by traditional law and custom."[9]

The distribution of salmon, like the catching of it, was also carried out within a complex web of social customs, also overseen by house and clan leaders. Systems of reciprocity and exchange, social stratification, and the obligations of leadership were clearly expressed in the distribution of salmon. Foods

obtained through collective effort were distributed throughout the household on the basis of need. The house leader's first responsibility was to his immediate kinsmen. When surplus exceeded need, other types of exchanges circulated subsistence goods outside the household, reaffirming extended networks of reciprocity. A successful fishing season therefore provided sustenance for the house and clan group throughout the year and increased the status and legitimacy of house leaders, whose primary responsibility was to oversee the collection, production, and distribution of salmon. It also created surplus, which increased the prestige and status of individuals, houses, and clans. Surplus enabled leaders of the richest clans to employ artists and craftsmen whose efforts (in carving totem poles or ceremonial canoes, for instance) raised their own status as well as that of their entire clan. Dried salmon, fish oil, and other subsistence products could also be traded for prestige items. Such items, as well as salmon itself, were exchanged in feasts and potlatches—ceremonies that both asserted the prestige of the hosts and cemented reciprocities and mutual obligations between hosts and recipients.[10]

In sum, salmon fishing not only sustained Tlingit individuals, households, and clans, it also served as a microcosm of Tlingit culture, expressing the social relationships and values that knit the society together. As noted earlier, the rituals of the salmon economy conveyed the spiritual bond that connected humans and animals. Fishing also supported the individual and collective acquisition of wealth even as it promoted reciprocity and cooperation in its production and distribution. Bountiful harvests bestowed wealth and prestige upon individuals, houses, and clans—but, as with positions of rank within Tlingit society, such wealth and prestige were never a given. They were earned through the individual and collective efforts of clan members and were expressed primarily through deeds of social responsibility and reciprocity. Salmon was more than just subsistence—it was a social and cultural lifeway.

During the maritime fur trade (1785–1825) and the Russian occupation (1795–1867), the aboriginal salmon economy and Tlingit culture itself remained intact. Maritime traders had neither the desire nor the ability to destroy native cultures or the natural environments that sustained them. They simply wanted "soft gold," and the quickest route was to exploit existing systems of exchange. Indians, for their part, were eager to oblige European profiteers in a trade that was most often mutually beneficial—Europeans received furs that could be traded in Canton for healthy profits, and Tlingit traders received practical items that made life easier (iron implements and guns, for instance), as well as prestige items (beads, cloth, and clothing) that enhanced the status and prestige of

Tlingit elites and fueled the social economy of the potlatch. The proliferation of totem poles and potlatches in the first part of the nineteenth century is one indication that the maritime trade may have enriched rather than weakened Tlingit culture, as new wealth was channeled into traditional patterns of status-enhancing reciprocity and exchange.

But that new wealth also increased social stratification within Tlingit society, as opportunistic individuals and clans dramatically increased their wealth and power, measured not only in trade goods but also in slaves. Clearly, the fur trade was not without negative consequences: the sea otter was depleted; native warfare increased, as did competition between individuals and clans; and outbreaks of European diseases took their toll on native populations.[11] At the same time, Tlingits were able to maintain their cultural autonomy primarily because they retained control of their subsistence lifeways. Before the advent of industrial canning methods, Europeans did not have the means to commodify salmon on a large scale. Even if salmon were salted and transported in barrels, they were not, until the rise of the canned salmon industry, easily stored or highly profitable. This did not mean Tlingits refused to sell fish to Europeans. They traded surplus salmon and other foods with Europeans, just as they traded such items with other native peoples. However, salmon and salmon-fishing sites were not overexploited by Europeans or Indians as sea otter populations were. This was the case not just because salmon lacked market value but also because native peoples realized they needed salmon to survive and therefore exercised a degree of restraint. English trader George Dixon noted that Tlingits were willing to barter their summer surpluses of fish with Europeans but that dried salmon, cured for winter consumption, remained primarily outside the realm of exchange. He observed that "large quantities of salmon [were] frequently hung up on shore to dry," but the Indians "were not very willing to sell." Tlingit unwillingness to barter their winter stores of salmon, as Dixon concluded, showed "that fish is a principal and favourite article of food here."[12] Such reluctance also demonstrated that Tlingits could engage in new economic relationships while controlling their subsistence activities.

Russian settlement in southeastern Alaska, beginning in 1795, constituted a greater threat to Tlingit subsistence patterns and cultural autonomy than did the maritime trade. Although Tlingits never passed over an opportunity for profitable exchange, the establishment of "permanent" settlements in Yakutat (1795) and Sitka (1799) transformed Russians from potential trading partners into unwarranted trespassers on Tlingit lands and uninvited users of Tlingit

resources. This transition from trader to intruder increased conflicts between Tlingits and Russians, most originating from Russian incursions on tribal territories. Yakutat tribal histories invariably cite Russian encroachments on tribal fishing streams as among the primary reasons leading to the 1805 destruction of the Yakutat fort by Tlingit warriors. According to most accounts, the Russians "put a gate up across the creek" that prevented the salmon from ascending to their spawning grounds. "The only time the Russians opened the gate was when the chief came by. [Clan leader] Tanux said they would all starve together because the fish couldn't go up past the gate."[13] Despite increased violence and encroachment, the Russian presence in Tlingit country was still tenuous and did not extend much beyond the palisaded walls of their settlement at Sitka, numbering only about 500 Russians by 1863.[14] Although smallpox epidemics in 1836 and 1862 reduced the Tlingit from a precontact population of nearly 10,000 to approximately 7,500, this tragic loss of population was not yet accompanied by the destruction of traditional subsistence economies, the massive influx of white settlement, or the loss of cultural confidence, as was the case on the Great Plains and in the far West.[15] The gravest threat to Tlingit culture was still on the horizon.

TLINGITS AND THE SALMON-CANNING INDUSTRY, 1870s–1910s

After the United States purchased Alaska in 1867, American industrialists arrived in the far North Pacific with the technology and the desire to make salmon into a commercial commodity sold on a world market. Very quickly, the fluid frontier of the fur trade hardened into a more rigid frontier of industry and settlement, leaving Indian peoples with less autonomy and fewer choices. Once an independent nation that had confronted European traders on equal footing, Tlingits became a conquered people—subject, according to the terms of the purchase treaty, "to such laws and regulations as the United States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country."[16] Not only were Tlingits incorporated into the American political state as subjects rather than citizens, but with the arrival of the salmon-canning industry their land and labor were pulled into the churning gears of industrial capitalism.

According to standard narratives of Indian history, in the late nineteenth century, Native Americans in the West became the unwitting victims of American progress, as the twin engines of westward expansion and industrial development forced Indian peoples from their traditional lifeways and relegated them to the margins of U.S. society. Unable or unwilling to assimilate, Indian communities became pockets of abject poverty, underdevelopment, depen-

dence, and isolation as Indian land was incorporated into the system of global capitalism, providing the growing nation with abundant land and resources for industrial exploitation while Indians themselves remained at the margins of these economic developments. Although true in its general outline, this narrative misses other story lines, such as the way native peoples participated in and adapted to market capitalism in culturally distinctive ways. The case of the Tlingits in the commercial salmon fisheries provides just one example of Indian peoples engaging in market capitalism while maintaining and renegotiating distinctive cultural identities.

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, few obstacles stood in the way of the Alaska salmon-canning industry's remarkable growth. Salmon were abundant. Settlement and overfishing had already decimated salmon stocks on the Sacramento River and were in the process of destroying those on the Columbia, but Alaska's salmon habitat was still pristine. Government regulators, who could scarcely cover the region's vast territory, offered little challenge to laissez-faire capitalism. Alaska's only drawback, besides its distance from markets, was the seeming absence of a large resident workforce. In southeastern Alaska, canning industrialists solved this problem in two ways—by importing Euro-American and Asian laborers and hiring Tlingit fishermen and laborers. From the beginning, Tlingit labor proved indispensable to the commercial fisheries, the dominant industry in Alaska well into the twentieth century. In 1869, Tlingit and Russian labor had been employed at a salmon saltery operation in Sitka. Superintendent O. B. Carlton found that whereas Russians were "too indolent to employ to advantage," Indian workers were "willing and industrious."[17] Sheldon Jackson, a Presbyterian missionary who later administered federal education programs for Alaska natives (and who also founded the Sitka Industrial Training School for Indians), observed a Sitka cannery in 1879 where "all the operations, from the catching of salmon to the boxing of the cans ready for market, were carried on by Indians under the supervision of white men." "It was a new sight to see over a hundred Indian men working as steadily and intelligently as the workmen in an Eastern factory," marveled Jackson, who saw such labor as "a partial solution of the problem [of] how to elevate and civilize the Indians."[18]

By the 1880s, Tlingits had proved themselves efficient laborers in transporting freight, longshoring, construction, logging, working in shops and other businesses, and, of course, in salmon fishing, where their abilities were self-evident.[19] Tlingit fishermen outnumbered their white counterparts until the 1920s. "The fish are caught almost entirely by the natives," observed a government

official at Klawack in 1890; "they constitute the principal help employed on the launches, and, aside from a dozen white men employed, native men, women, and children do the entire work."[20] A survey of southeastern Alaska salmon canneries by the U.S. census office in 1890 revealed that Chinese laborers usually predominated inside the plants, whereas Tlingit fishermen dominated the extractive end of the industry.[21] By 1897, Tlingits comprised 80 percent of the fishing fleet in southeastern Alaska and 53 percent of the total workforce, including cannery workers.[22] In 1909, Tlingits still made up 58 percent of the salmon fishermen and 46 percent of the total cannery labor force in southeastern Alaska.[23] As late as 1939, Tlingit workers constituted nearly 30 percent of the fisheries' workforce.[24] In southeastern Alaska, Indian labor proved instrumental to industrial development and would remain so until the mid-twentieth century.

Not only were Tlingits important to the fisheries industry, but fishing and processing fish—much more than mining or logging—remained an important source of wealth to native people, just as they had in the precontact period. Although salmon became a commodity sold on a world market and native fishermen could no longer ensure that fish were treated properly or protected, commercial salmon fishing did not constitute an irreconcilable break from the precontact fishing economy. The gendered division of labor in commercial fishing and cannery work echoed that of the traditional fishing economy, with men fishing and women "processing" the salmon. Of course, selling fish or working on the processing line for dollars was different from putting up fish for household consumption, but most Indian workers chose to balance commercial and subsistence activities.

The seasonal nature of the industry allowed native people to participate on flexible terms, taking time off to catch and prepare fish for personal consumption or to intertwine commercial and subsistence fishing, as many Tlingit fishermen did—much to the chagrin of cannery operators whose insatiable demand for salmon conflicted with the native subsistence ethic. While conducting fieldwork at Tlingit fish camps during the summers of 1885–1887, Albert P. Niblack witnessed an abundance of "salmon suspended in the smoke of the dwelling houses, or drying in the open air on frames erected for the purpose."[25] In the mid-1880s traveler Horace Briggs noticed the inactivity that characterized Tlingit villages during the summer, "for the males are away at work in mills and canneries, or *catching and drying fish for their food supply*."[26] A decade later another visitor made the same observation: "The permanent Indian villages during the spring and summer months are practically deserted

except by a few old people, the young men and women being away, living in camps and *curing their winter supply* during the spring, and when the canneries open, fishing for them or doing work about them."[27] Although participation in the commercial fisheries carried numerous conflicts for native peoples, as discussed later, it also offered them an opportunity to engage in new economic activities alongside, rather than in lieu of, traditional subsistence practices.[28] It moreover provided them with seasonal wages upwards of $100 for women and $200 for men in the late 1890s.[29] These earnings, along with participation in a still profitable fur trade and an expanding commercial and tourist economy, allowed many Tlingits to engage quite successfully in Alaska's industrial economy.[30]

Salmon had always been an item of exchange, traded with other tribes and later with Europeans for other kinds of wealth; and commercial fishing, from the viewpoint of the native fisherman, was not necessarily incompatible with traditional relationships—both economic and spiritual—between humans and salmon. Even though precontact salmon fishing was strictly controlled through ritual, in the words of Richard White the fishery "in actual practice was about doing everything that the taboos prohibited; it was about shedding blood; it was about taking what was inside living things—blood, bone, and organs—and putting it outside. It was about the death necessary to sustain life."[31] In this sense native salmon fishing, for commercial or subsistence purposes, changed little in the twentieth century, even if the technologies employed and the rituals required did; it was still about (and still is about) taking salmon to sustain life—in this case a life adapted to the market economy.

However, non-Indian observers generally saw native participation in Alaska's economic life as an indication that Tlingits, unlike Native Americans of the lower American West, were readily assimilating into American society without government assistance. To travelers, missionaries, and government officials, Tlingits appeared to be eager converts to both Christianity and capitalism, and, by all accounts, they were rapidly shedding the garb of "savagery" in favor of a more elevated style. Eliza Ruhamah Scidmore, who contributed to the federal census of Alaska in 1890 and also wrote one of the most influential tourist guides to the territory, reported glowingly on the rapid advance of "civilization" among the Indians of southeastern Alaska. Skidmore remarked that Tlingits were "almost too quick to lay aside their old ways":

> These intelligent and industrious Thlingits [sic] were never to be confounded with the plains Indians, and are far from being a savage or uncivilized people. . . . It is the Thlingit's [sic] aim to dress and live as the

> white man, and he fills his home with beds, tables, chairs, clocks, lamps, stoves, and kitchen utensils, and even buys silk gowns for his wife . . . and he occasionally hoards silver in sums ranging from $8,000 to $10,000.[32]

In her estimation, Native Americans in southeastern Alaska were no longer "picturesque, distinctive, or aboriginal."[33] An article in the Sitka *Alaskan* praised Alaskan natives as "intelligent, honest and good workers; an accumulative, thrifty people, quick and anxious to improve their condition." The author applauded them for having "established themselves as an independent, self-supporting population . . . [w]holly through their own exertions and industry, [and] without any material assistance from the general government." Other whites were just as effusive, extolling the natives' "wish and ability to imitate white men."[34]

Such adaptations, contrary to the views of non-Indian observers, did not necessarily mean Tlingits were uncritically embracing American "civilization"; nor were they casting aside their entire culture in favor of a new one. In his exhaustive study of Tlingit culture and Russian Orthodox Christianity, Sergei Kan shows that Tlingit Christianity often reflected indigenous cultural values and that, in Tlingit hands, it was often used to protect, rather than destroy, Tlingit civilization. "The sudden rise in Tlingit interest in Christianity and education," Kan argues, "was essentially an *indigenous* movement aimed at helping the Native people adjust to and benefit from the presence of the powerful newcomers."[35] The same could be said of capitalism. Many Tlingits sought to accumulate wealth not just because they needed to survive (which was true) or because they wanted to become successful American capitalists (which was also true, as some Tlingits came to own commercial fishing operations) but because money obtained through such relations could be funneled into ceremonial activities, such as potlatches and feasts, which conveyed the traditional values of individual achievement and prestige balanced by social responsibility and reciprocity.[36]

Just as new wealth acquired during the fur trade had been incorporated into Tlingit social and ceremonial life, money acquired in canneries or mines allowed many Tlingits to continue to participate in a social economy of their own design. White observers interpreted the Tlingit penchant for acquiring and "hoarding" silver dollars as evidence that Indians had fully accepted acquisitive capitalist values, but by the late 1880s, silver dollars represented more than just American currency to Tlingit peoples; they had also become a popular item of exchange in potlatch ceremonies.[37] The traditional social economy and the modern commercial economy were not mutually exclusive, even if

their underlying motives were different: traditional Tlingit attitudes toward wealth acquisition, individual achievement, and social responsibility steered even "traditionalists" toward market participation. Potlatches continued well into the 1900s, much to the consternation of white settlers and missionaries, and such ceremonies elevated the status of "wealthy" clan leaders, as they always had.[38] Therefore, commercial fishing and cannery work offered the possibility of continuity with traditional values and practices. But the market was a double-edged sword, for it also challenged the traditional Tlingit social hierarchy by offering economic opportunity to lower-status members of Tlingit society and eroding the power of older clan leaders to control the production and distribution of salmon.

Tlingits could make choices, but it would be a mistake to assume that they could control the powerful new economy. For instance, they were powerless to prevent commercial fishing operations from invading tribal fishing grounds. In the precontact fishery, Tlingit house and clan groups had controlled access to ancestral fishing sites. Outsiders could use such resources only by obtaining permission from clan leaders. If they were caught trespassing, punishment usually consisted of monetary restitution or, in some extreme cases, corporal punishment.[39] In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Tlingits sought to impose those same patterns of resource use on non-Indian fishers, asking them to pay clan "owners" for the rights to use ancestral fishing sites or sometimes refusing outsiders the right to fish or erect commercial traps in salmon streams. In a few instances such requests were honored, at least with promises, but most often non-Indian fishers had little concern for native customs or "property rights," which conflicted with their own doctrine of waterways as "common property" resources open to common exploitation by all "citizens," which did not yet include Indian peoples. Moreover, U.S. military power firmly backed non-Indian rights to an open-access fishery. American troops and gunboats used their firepower to disperse Tlingits who resisted interventions by non-Indian commercial fishers.[40]

Just as canneries refused to acknowledge Indian rights to their ancestral fisheries, they also paid little attention to the idea or practice of conservation. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, industrialists insisted that the natural supply of fish in Alaskan waters was "beyond all calculation."[41] One booster claimed the "prolific waters of Alaska" would "supply the nations of the world for centuries to come."[42] Even so, fears of salmon depletion encouraged Congress in 1889 to legislate against the "erection of dams, barricades, and other obstructions" in streams and rivers.[43] As it turned out, the

1889 law was used primarily to stop natives from fishing with traditional traps and weirs rather than to prevent canneries from using commercial fish traps.[44] Tlingits increasingly viewed industrial fish traps—which caught millions of salmon in their labyrinth of wood and webbing—as the prime symbol of greedy industrial exploitation. But with little threat of government interference, canneries carried on their operations as if the salmon were indestructible—fishing during the weekly closed period, closing off stream entrances with nets and traps, and taking the fish directly from spawning grounds.[45]

Waste abounded. In southeastern Alaska, "tens of thousands" of pink salmon, in the words of one observer, "were hauled on the banks and left to decay."[46] Roy Bean, a Tlingit who began commercial fishing with his uncle in 1909, later recalled that "[i]n them years, the . . . canneryman [didn't] care much about the pinks and the dogs, or most kind of species of fish, their care was for red salmon, sockeyes they call[ed] them, that was valuable to them."[47] George Dalton, another Tlingit who worked for the Superior cannery in Tenakee from 1914 to 1916, remembered that "often they would throw away everything but the Reds. . . . The whole bay Tenakee Inlet was just full of sour fish. . . . That's the beginning of the dying off of the salmon. . . . They just threw [them] away, and Fish and Wildlife never looked for it."[48]

Such environmental exploitation aroused resistance even from Tlingits who embraced the commercial economy because it clashed with traditional practices and threatened their livelihoods as commercial fishers. Near Petersburg in the early 1900s, a clan leader tried to stop cannery fishermen from using "his fishing grounds" in Pillar Bay, reminding them of the importance of the salmon for his people's survival: "That is what we live by, and when the fish go up the stream we dry them for our food."[49] In this case the chief allowed the interlopers to fish for two days for a fee, but other Indians refused to compromise with non-Indian fishers. In 1890, Tlingits from Klukwan and Haines objected to a fish trap erected by the Alaska Packers Association (APA) cannery at Pyramid Harbor. The obstruction blocked traditional fishing sites in Lynn Canal used by clans from both villages. When the cannery refused to remove the trap, Tlingits armed with guns destroyed it.[50] Such confrontations not only increased tensions between Indians and whites, they also put those Indians who worked for the canneries in the untenable position of either challenging commercial fishing operations and thereby jeopardizing their employment or acquiescing to the destruction of the salmon. In 1894 the Klawack cannery superintendent fired a Tlingit fisherman who demanded that the company remove a fish trap that prevented salmon from migrating upstream. "We are

catching the fish for you," he protested. "Now you are going to block the creek. That creek is not going to last."[51]

The transformation of southeastern Alaska's marine environment from an aboriginal fishing grounds to the site of a powerful extractive industry offered Tlingits economic opportunity but also posed a supreme threat to Tlingit society. Invasion of Tlingit property undermined the ability of clan house leaders to control household property. Industrial practices also undercut the spiritual and ethical dimensions of the aboriginal fishery, which for centuries had enforced an indigenous conservation ethic. Commercial fishing transformed salmon from an animal of invaluable spiritual, social, and economic significance to a mere commodity. Once fish were sold, Tlingits could no longer ensure proper handling or disposal of fish remains; further, they could not prevent canneries from wasting large amounts of fish. Beyond these changes, the cash economy restructured Tlingit social organization. Tlingits migrated from traditional village sites to commercial centers to take jobs in canneries, mines, and logging operations. The focus of Tlingit life, the clan house, began to give way to nuclear family units as younger Tlingit increasingly moved into more "comfortable" and "prestigious" single-family homes.[52] Most significant, the accumulation of material wealth, which in precontact times had served as a means to increase one's status through ritualized giveaways, was becoming for some Tlingits an end in itself, as acquisitive and individualistic values were coming to dominate those of community responsibility and generosity.

TLINGIT RESPONSES: THE ALASKA NATIVE BROTHERHOOD, 1920s–1940s

In the first decades of the twentieth century, Tlingit society was at a crisis point. Although many Tlingits were enjoying remarkable success in the marketplace, economic development—especially in the commercial fisheries—had its costs, both social and environmental. Not only were salmon runs declining under intensive pressure from commercial fishing, but powerful corporations and distant bureaucracies were coming to dominate the lives of Tlingits, as they were those of all Americans. The use of large-scale commercial fish traps by canning corporations, which overexploited salmon runs and diminished the need to employ individual fishermen, threatened the livelihoods of native peoples, who survived by combining commercial fishing with subsistence harvesting. Tlingits responded to these economic and environmental challenges by asserting their economic rights as marketplace producers while struggling to protect fisheries resources. In the process, Tlingits renegotiated their cul-

tural identities to flexibly incorporate change and modernization while remaining distinctly Tlingit.

In the 1920s, intertribal organizations such as the Alaska Native Brotherhood (ANB) led the way in promoting Indian economic participation and cultural survival. The ANB, which was founded in 1912 by a group of educated, Christian Indians under the influence of Presbyterian missionaries at the Sitka Industrial Training School, initially sought to eradicate all vestiges of Tlingit culture. The founding members wanted to assimilate their fellow clansmen fully into American society by eliminating tribal practices—including the potlatch—and cultivating a new breed of Indians who were educated, Christian, and patriotic. Under the influence of William Paul, who became the first in a line of influential Tlingit politicians, the ANB evolved into a powerful lobby for Indian political, social, and economic equality. The organization used its political power within the territory to demand that the U.S. government extend to Alaskan Indians full citizenship, equal educational opportunities (which meant the dissolution of Alaska's segregated school system in which whites attended territorial schools while Indians went to poorly funded institutions subsidized by the U.S. government), and economic equality (which to Paul and other Tlingits meant abolishing fish traps and granting Indians the economic benefits of citizenship).[53] Under the leadership of William Paul and his brother Louis, the ANB still emphasized Americanization and integration, but, more important, it sought to place in Tlingit hands "control over the circumstances and direction of Indian life"—which included reasserting native control over the maritime environment by reining in the economic and environmental exploitation of large salmon-canning corporations.[54]

By the 1920s the ANB's primary focus was no longer "abolishing aboriginal culture" (although it still served as a stronghold for cultural modernizers) but rather was "abolishing fish traps" and advancing the interests of the small Indian fisherman against the powerful "fish trust."[55] This shift represented an emergent cultural nationalism that was taking root among younger, educated, more progressive Tlingits who encouraged assimilation but also wanted native peoples to be able to exercise a degree of control over their own destinies. Toward that end the ANB founded a newspaper, *The Alaska Fisherman,* which promoted Tlingit interests in the fisheries (as well as in other areas of life), and Paul and other ANB leaders pressured territorial and national politicians to consider the economic needs of Indian peoples when they regulated the fisheries. The ANB gave Indians in Alaska a powerful voice in territorial politics. Their ability to publicize the fish trap issue, for instance, helped make the de-

vices a symbol of greedy "outside" corporate domination and eventually culminated in their 1958 prohibition.

In the 1930s the ANB, and Tlingits in general, also became involved in the maritime labor movement. Frank Peratrovich, who was involved in a struggle with William Paul for leadership of the ANB, led the first major effort to unionize Tlingit fishermen and cannery workers. In 1936 Peratrovich founded the Alaska Salmon Purse Seiners Union (ASPSU) and the Cannery Workers Auxiliary Union under an American Federation of Labor (AFL) charter. The union consisted of Indian and white residents of Alaska and was meant to challenge the power of "outside" unions that relied primarily on Asian and white workers hired in Seattle and San Francisco. Rather than uniting Tlingits and whites, however, the formation of the ASPSU initiated a struggle that pitted Indians and whites against each other and divided the Tlingit community into factions led by Peratrovich and the Pauls. These factions did not divide along "progressive" and "traditionalist" lines, as was the case in other Native American communities. Neither faction was antagonistic to market participation; rather, they split over issues of political leadership and economic strategy.[56] Peratrovich wanted to bring whites and Indians together in a national labor organization such as the AFL, and the Pauls, once advocates of assimilation, wanted a racially separate and independent ANB union to represent Tlingits and their distinctive interests. William Paul argued that a non-Indian union would never make sacrifices for its Indian members or carry out the unique social functions of the ANB. In arguing for an ANB bargaining agency, Paul appealed to Tlingit ethnic identity: "We are the only union bound together by ties of blood, tradition, history, and a real spirit of sacrifice and love for each other," he told ANB members.[57] He excoriated ASPSU supporters for listening to "white leaders whom you would never admit as full members of the BROTHERHOOD," and he urged them to embrace the ANB out of ethnic solidarity: "Indians constitute 7/9 of the Union membership and no matter what some Indians might say, down underneath we are all related and . . . none of us can hold out against fathers and brothers."[58]

The ANB and the ASPSU eventually merged but lost their bid to represent fishermen and cannery workers throughout southeastern Alaska when they lost a National Labor Relations Board representation election to the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1946.[59] Even though it was not successful, the union movement expressed Tlingit workers' desire to assert their economic rights in the fisheries industry. The failure to create a Tlingit bargaining agency also forced the ANB to look in other directions in its continuing effort to

strengthen Indian peoples' economic hand. Increasingly, its focus would revolve around the issue of aboriginal rights. William Paul, among others, believed that taking up the legal struggle to assert Tlingit aboriginal title to ancestral lands and waterways (which had never been ceded to the United States in a treaty with Indian peoples) was the only avenue open for asserting Tlingit economic power. If acknowledged, aboriginal title might allow Tlingits rather than canning corporations to monopolize prime fishing areas and trap sites. At the very least, it would result in Tlingits receiving monetary restitution for extinguishing their rights to such areas. Such a course reflected the ANB's gradual migration from purely integrationist economic strategies to ones based on acknowledgment of their Indian cultural heritage. Paul, for one, thought Tlingits had no choice:

> We tried to get fair fishery laws and failed. What then? What would you do if you knew (as the cannery lawyers very well know) that you were still the legal owners [of the land] . . . and yet you saw your government closing your fishing grounds for the express purpose of breeding fish for foreign-owned fish traps? You know we fought for over 20 years only for fair fishery laws where there would be no special privileges for anyone. Did any help come from [the non-Indian community]?[60]

In the 1920s the ANB had stood firmly against pursuing policies based solely on Indian cultural identity because they savored of "special privileges." By the 1930s, however, some leaders, including William Paul, were changing their tune as they considered the potential benefits of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)—the centerpiece of John Collier's "Indian New Deal," which sought to encourage cooperative economic activity and self-government on Native American reservations.[61] Since Alaskan natives had not experienced conventional reservations or allotments, certain IRA provisions, such as those ending allotments and consolidating or expanding reservation lands, did not apply to Alaska. However, the IRA did allow Indians to adopt charters of incorporation, organize businesses, and take loans from a revolving credit fund. Ideally, these credit provisions would allow Tlingit fishermen to purchase commercial fishing gear and canneries, thereby achieving economic independence and regaining control over the fishing grounds and the workplace.

Some members of the ANB, such as Frank Peratrovich, rejected the IRA in part because it broke with the ANB's tradition of rejecting "special privileges" and race-based policies. Louis and William Paul, on the other hand, viewed the IRA as a panacea that would help Indians "secure employment by organizing industries and business."[62] William Paul recognized the taint of "spe-

cial privilege" carried by the IRA, but by 1936 he had also come to realize that U.S. society was "founded on special privileges," and he, for one, was ready to begin "fighting privilege with privilege."[63] Paul did not deny that his position represented a change of mind on his part. In a confessional tone, he told one white Alaskan unionist that when whites had "deserted [Tlingits] for immediate gain" in the battle against fish traps, he had begun his "movement to benefit Indians primarily[,] even at the cost of the white people." His goal was now "saving" Indian workers through "economic freedom"—in other words, using the IRA to create Indian capitalists by "lending [Tlingits] the money so that [they could] become the owners of the (fish) business."[64]

Paul was instrumental in getting the provisions of the IRA extended to Alaska as part of the Alaska Reorganization Act (ARA) of 1936. The program financed 383 individual loans worth over $600,000, most of which went to Tlingits and Haidas in southeastern Alaska who used the funds to buy new boats, upgrade their fishing gear, and even establish a native-owned cannery in the village of Hydaburg.[65] Besides providing Indian peoples with loans, the ARA opened another avenue for Tlingit economic development and environmental control—namely, that of securing aboriginal fishing rights by creating reservations. Beginning in the late 1930s, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes wanted to use the ARA as a means of setting aside traditional hunting and fishing grounds for Alaskan natives. He acted out of a genuine concern for Alaska's indigenous peoples and also out of a desire to assert federal control over the salmon-canning industry, which he believed was ruthlessly exploiting salmon populations as well as native rights.[66] With Tlingit reservations extending throughout southeastern Alaska's waterways, Ickes reasoned that corporate fish traps could be eliminated (or at least curtailed), fishing intensity reduced, and the region's rapidly depleting salmon runs saved. Most Tlingits vigorously opposed reservations, believing they would permanently mark them as second-class members of U.S. society. The Pauls, like other Tlingits who were strongly influenced by the early assimilationist ideals of the ANB, had opposed reservations as antithetical to the "principles of sound Americanism."[67] But William Paul changed his mind when he realized that the legal principle of "aboriginal rights" offered a means for increasing the power of the ANB and improving the lot of Tlingit fishermen. Promoting aboriginal rights, like the ARA's revolving loan program, would not only further the ANB's unionization efforts but would also help "our fishermen catch more fish."[68]

In the end, neither provision of the ARA really helped Tlingit fishermen. The loans, as mentioned earlier, helped some Tlingits purchase fishing equipment.

However, such investments yielded little profit because of poor market conditions and environmental declines that were affecting the entire fisheries industry, especially in the postwar period. Moreover, many purchases made by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) on behalf of native peoples consisted of substandard equipment, much of it already cast off by canneries but now sold to the BIA for profit. In one instance non-Indian fishermen sold the BIA condemned, unseaworthy vessels that were then given to native fishermen. In the words of one Tlingit fisherman, the boats "were just too old for . . . our type of fishing."[69] Moreover, Ickes's plan to enforce reservations that would allow Tlingits to eliminate corporate fish traps was rejected by Congress, which was persuaded by the salmon-canning lobby to reject Indian fishing rights. Such failures little changed the situation of Tlingit workers, who remained an important component of the commercial fisheries industry. The interventions of the Interior Department did, however, encourage Tlingit peoples to pursue aboriginal claims through the Department of Justice, a path pioneered by the Alaska Native Brotherhood and that eventually led to the controversial Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.

Although they were not always successful, Tlingits, through the Alaska Native Brotherhood, sought to promote the power of Indian fishermen and cannery workers and prevent industrial exploitation of the salmon fisheries. Along the way they forged new identities that were both Indian and Western. In some ways the ANB departed dramatically from Tlingit "tradition." Historically, Tlingit politics had operated at the local level. In contrast, the ANB introduced into Tlingit life a centralized political structure (known as the "grand camp") composed of locally elected delegates (from the villages, or "local camps"). With its executive council, constitution, and bylaws, the ANB also injected Western protocol into Tlingit politics. Meetings did not follow customary ceremonial patterns but rather used parliamentary procedure.[70] However, such Western rituals did not signal the triumph of "modernization" over "tradition" in Tlingit life. Clan rivalries endured, the clan system that undergirded Tlingit social relations still remained, and the qualities associated with high rank and status continued to inform the character of Tlingit leadership. Further, because "traditional" Tlingit values did not preclude (and, in fact, even encouraged) participation in the market, both commercial-oriented and traditionalist clan members could support the ANB's program of Indian economic advocacy.

ANB leadership in the villages (the local camps), more than in the grand camp, reflected the importance of Tlingit values. Most local leaders were "men

who held ranking titles in their respective clans, or were in the line of succession to such titles."[71] Tradition, custom, and proper behavior were extremely important to these clan leaders, but many also embraced economic change and therefore encouraged the growth of the ANB. Although elderly and unable to speak English, Charlie Jones, inheritor of the "Chief Shakes" title, enthusiastically supported the ANB among the Stikine Tlingit. He organized the Stikine Camp and encouraged young Tlingit men (most notably William Paul) to participate in the new organization. Jimmy Young, chief of the Tcukunedi Clan of Hoonah, was another village clan leader who supported the ANB. There were many others, including Charles Newton of Kake and Sam Johnson of Angoon. Why did traditionalists support the ANB's modernizing efforts? In the words of Philip Drucker, they were carrying out the responsibilities of the chief to "exercise whatever powers he had, for the welfare of his people . . . in return for the support his social unit gave him." A program that had as its goal the betterment of Tlingit people had to be considered seriously even by "traditional" leaders.[72]

The ANB's support for Tlingit fishermen and cannery workers also explained why traditionalists supported the organization. Many clan leaders and their families were fully immersed in commercial fishing, owning "large well fitted-out seine boats."[73] They realized that the ANB's economic advocacy would smooth the way for them and their offspring to survive in a competitive, capitalist environment. Support for the organization reflected Tlingit desires for economic and environmental control as much as a yearning for social integration and cultural assimilation. Even local camp traditionalists realized that the ANB's quest for Tlingit economic and political rights represented a viable alternative to environmental, cultural, and economic destruction.[74] The conventional dichotomy of "traditionalist" versus "progressive" does not adequately express the complexity of Tlingit responses to modernization and commerce. Characteristics usually associated with capitalism—innovation, individualism, ambition, and competitiveness—were also traits revered by Tlingit society, as long as they were balanced by ethics of cooperation and social responsibility. Thus, Tlingit progressives in the Alaska Native Brotherhood, because they desired not only to help themselves but also to advance the interests of their people, were in many ways acting in the best spirit of Tlingit tradition.

Aboriginal Tlingit society had balanced individualism with social solidarity, wealth accumulation with reciprocity, localism with intervillage kinship, and competitiveness with cooperation. Industrialization and American settle-

ment threatened to destroy this delicate balance by disrupting the harmony of the native fishing economy, overemphasizing individualism and competitiveness, altering Tlingit settlement patterns, and disrupting village power relations. However, at least two consequences of the new industrial landscape—the decline of traditional village life and the rise of new settlements nearer to commercial centers and canneries—also had the unforeseen effect of encouraging more intervillage and interclan cooperation than had previously existed. In aboriginal society large potlatches had brought distant clans and villages together in a loose unity, whereas status striving and competition for rank (carried out at those same celebrations) held them apart. Organizations like the ANB sought to build a new tribal solidarity over this diffused system of clan reciprocity and rivalry. The ANB embraced modernization and, at times, cultural assimilation—but, ironically, such survival strategies often conformed with Indians' own customs and helped them advance their economic and political rights and strengthen their hand in dealing with the dominant society.

EPILOGUE

From the 1940s until the present, Tlingits have continued to fish for commercial and subsistence purposes, and such activity has continued to nourish Tlingit economic and cultural survival. However, the postwar period offered new obstacles as well as new opportunities. In the salmon fisheries, increased competition, advanced technology, declining fish runs, and more onerous fisheries regulations made it harder for Tlingits to make a living from fishing and cannery work alone. Limited entry regulations, beginning in 1971, restricted the number of commercial fishing permits and disrupted cultural continuity in the native fishery by making it harder for younger Tlingits to take up commercial fishing as an occupation.[75] That same year the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act gave Alaska natives nearly a billion dollars and title to over 40 million acres of land, but, at the same time, it extinguished their aboriginal rights to subsistence hunting and fishing. Moreover, the settlement encouraged newly formed native corporations to move beyond traditional enterprises, such as fishing and fish processing, as a means of economic development. Although this opened new possibilities for native economic empowerment, it threatened to sever the link between native peoples and the natural environment and aggravated divisions within tribes over economic development on the one hand and traditional, subsistence-based activities on the other. Today Sealaska, the regional corporation of the Tlingits, is investing less in the fisheries, which are in decline, and more in other types of enterprises—including

logging—which pose more harm to salmon populations. Such transformations have entailed diminishing control by Tlingits over the salmon fisheries, with cultural consequences that are not yet clear.

At the same time, the struggle by Tlingit and other native peoples to control their culture, environment, and economic destiny continues. Tlingits continue to participate in the commercial fisheries and to assert their rights to fish for subsistence purposes, an activity that connects them with their distinctive cultural heritage. The salmon is still revered as an important cultural symbol, and Tlingit identity is still inextricably linked to salmon fishing. The struggle for subsistence rights especially has constituted a major challenge to both corporate and state control over the marine environment and promises to be an important issue in Tlingits' continuing struggle for self-determination. In a series of oral interviews conducted with Tlingit fishermen in the late 1970s, native elders spoke eloquently about the persistence of fishing—commercial and subsistence—in Tlingit life. Roy Bean, who began seining with his tribal uncle in 1909, declared that Tlingits would "continue on fishing just as long as there is fish to be caught, just as long as the cannerymen wants fish." "Fishing is in these people's blood," explained Ronald Bean Sr., who began seining in the late 1920s. "If they can make 50-60-80 dollars a day [in] wages, they'll go right out every chance they get to go fishing. And they're at it right now. They got small rigs, you know. And after work, or when they're not working, they go right out and fish salmon and coho and halibut, hand-lining, [and] some of them do good. That's why I say they'll still be at it, even if they have a job." Albert Davis, who also began commercial fishing in the late 1920s, noted that "[a] lot of our people still rely on trolling for a living and also subsistence. We go out in the winter months. We catch one or two king salmon and that will last us for a couple weeks. So this [fishing] still contributes to our livelihood."[76]

NOTES

1. Francis E. Leupp, *The Indian and His Problem* (New York: Arno, 1971), 151.

2. William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 33.

3. As one New England essayist declared in 1838, "[The Indian] is unchanged and unchangeable in his nature, his habits, his physical condition, and distinctive traits of intellect." Quoted from *New England Journal* in Harald Prins, posting to H-AmIndian, June 16, 1999, on "Native Americans and Genocide." To white Americans the Indians' inability to change themselves explained their demise and, within the social Darwinian context of the nineteenth century, proved their inherent inferiority.

4. The predictability of the salmon harvest allowed for large coastal populations, estimated at 10,000 for the precontact period. For more thorough discussion of the

aquatic, climatic, and biotic characteristics of southeastern Alaska, as well as more detail concerning the life cycles of the Pacific salmon, see Stephen John Langdon, "Technology, Ecology, and Economy: Fishing Systems in Southeast Alaska" (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1977), 19–62. Also see Anthony Netboy, *The Salmon: Their Fight for Survival* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974). For recent native population estimates for the Northwest Coast, see Robert Boyd, *The Coming of the Spirit of Pestilence: Introduced Infectious Diseases and Population Decline Among Northwest Coast Indians, 1774–1874* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999).

5. The issue of slave labor is a controversial subject in Northwest Coast ethnography. Most scholars have contended that slaves contributed little benefit to the subsistence economy of coastal Indians. Their main importance was not to produce wealth by their labors, as in a slave-based economy, but rather to serve as an item of prestige and display for their owners, whose status was raised through the ownership, exchange, and ritual sacrifice of slaves. This view holds, in Phillip Drucker's words, that "slaves' economic utility was negligible," and, because they needed to be clothed and fed, slaves actually constituted a drain on tribal resources. See Phillip Drucker, *Cultures of the North Pacific Coast* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), 52. Recently, Leland Donald, in *Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), has challenged this prevailing scholarly interpretation of Northwest Coast slavery, arguing persuasively that slaves were integral to the native subsistence economy even while they served as "prestige objects" for their owners. For a concise overview of the slavery debate on the Northwest Coast, see Brian Hosmer, *American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence and Innovation Among the Menominees and Metlakatlans, 1870s–1920* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 118–119. Leland Donald, cited earlier in this note, also provides a good, albeit opinionated, overview of the ethnography on Northwest Coast slavery. For the more traditional view, see Sergei Kan, *Memory Eternal: Tlingit Culture and Russian Orthodox Christianity Through Two Centuries* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999).

6. As late as 1880, U.S. census agent Ivan Petroff estimated that each Tlingit (who, according to Petroff, consumed half his salmon in a dried state, "very much reduced in bulk and weight") consumed the equivalent of between 3,000 and 4,000 pounds of fresh fish a year. See Ivan Petroff, *Report of the Population, Industries and Resources of Alaska,* in *Tenth Census of the United States, 1880, Special Reports on Newspaper Periodicals, Alaska, Fur-Seal Islands, and Shipbuilding,* U.S. Bureau of the Census (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1884), 69–71. Gordon Hewes gives a much lower estimate of 500 pounds per year, which would still be equivalent to the later industrial fishery. See Gordon Hewes, "Aboriginal Use of Fishery Resources in Northwestern North America" (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1947), 226–227. See also Arthur F. McEvoy, *The Fisherman's Problem: Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries, 1850–1980* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 19; Joseph E. Taylor III, *Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest Fisheries Crisis* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), 22–23. On methods of Tlingit food storage, preparation, and consumption, see Frederica de Laguna, *Under Mount Saint Elias: The History and Culture of the Yakutat Tlingit,* Smithsonian Contributions to Anthropology, vol. 7, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1972), 391–410; Richard Newton and Madonna Moss, *The Subsistence Lifeway of the Tlingit People: Excerpts of Oral Interviews* (Juneau: U.S. Forest Service, 1984); Hilary Stewart, *Indian Fishing: Early Meth-*

ods of the Northwest Coast (Vancouver: J. J. Douglas, 1977); Randall F. Schalk, "The Structure of an Anadromous Fish Resource," in *For Theory Building in Archaeology: Essays on Faunal Remains, Aquatic Resources, Spatial Analysis, and Systemic Modeling,* ed. Lewis R. Binford (New York: Academic, 1977), 207–249.

7. See, for instance, "Legend of an Orphan Boy," told by John C. Jackson, interviewed by Richard Newton, Kake, Alaska, September 17, 1979. Transcript available at U.S. Forest Service in Juneau. See also Newton and Moss, *Subsistence Lifeway,* 30, for a brief analysis of this myth. On the numerous social and spiritual codes that regulated the salmon economy, see also Laguna, *Under Mount Saint Elias,* 399–403; "Raven," in *Tlingit Myths and Texts,* ed. John R. Swanton, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 39 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909), 3–21; "The Salmon Chief," in *Tlingit Myths and Texts,* ed. John R. Swanton, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 39 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909), 196–198; William Reid, *The Raven Steals the Light* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988).

8. Newton and Moss, *Subsistence Lifeway,* 4. For a general discussion of how social and spiritual codes constrained fishing, see Taylor, *Making Salmon,* ch. 1.

9. Nelson Frank quoted in Thomas R. Berger, *Village Journey: The Report of the Alaska Native Review Commission* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 54.

10. The best discussion of the Tlingit potlatch can be found in Sergei Kan, *Symbolic Immortality: The Tlingit Potlatch of the Nineteenth Century* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989).

11. The best overall treatment of the Northwest Coast trade is James R. Gibson's *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1785–1841* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992). Gibson argues that the Northwest Coast trade "was neither destructive ('looting') nor just constructive ('enriching')[,] but both" (269). A helpful synthesis of scholarship on the Northwest Coast fur trade is Douglas Cole and David Darling, "History of the Early Period," in *Handbook of North American Indians: Northwest Coast,* ed. Wayne Suttles, vol. 7 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1990), 119–134.

12. George Dixon, in *Early Visitors to Southeastern Alaska: Nine Accounts,* ed. R. N. De Armond (Anchorage: Alaska Northwest Publishing, 1978), 25.

13. Laguna, *Under Mount Saint Elias,* 234, 260. Three oral accounts in Laguna give much the same story. See also William S. Hanable, "New Russia," *Alaska Journal* 3 (Spring 1973): 79. Hanable notes that "[u]nsuccessful demands for free access to traditional fishing grounds seem to have precipitated a climax in the series of encounters between Native and non-Native."

14. For New Archangel and Ozerskoi redoubt in southeast Alaska, Tikhmenev gives the number of 530 males and females as of January 1, 1863. This category included "Russians, Finlanders, and foreigners" but not Creoles, which numbered 510 in southeastern Alaska. See P. A. Tikhmenev, *A History of the Russian-American Company,* trans. Richard A. Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly (1888; reprinted, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), 372. Golovin gives a total number of 595 Russians in all the colonies, including western Alaska, in 1862. This makes sense if Golovin was not counting "Finlanders" and other European workers. See P. N. Golovin, *The End of Russian America: Captain P. N. Golovin's Last Report, 1862,* trans. Basil Dmytryshyn and E.A.P. Crownhart-Vaughan (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1979), 16. Even using the lowest estimates for the Indian population, the Tlingit still greatly outnumbered their white invaders. This numbers advantage, along with geographical location and

climate that deterred easy settlement, ensured that Tlingit resources would not be overexploited by outsiders.

15. See Boyd, *The Coming of the Spirit of Pestilence.*

16. Alaska purchase treaty, as quoted in David Case, *Alaska Natives and American Law* (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 1984), 6.

17. He also noted that "[t]hey will work for less pay than Americans or Russians." See Donald Mitchell, *Sold American: The Story of Alaska Natives and Their Land, 1867–1959* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1997), 105.

18. Ibid.

19. Stanley Ray Remsberg, "United States Administration of Alaska: The Army Phase, 1867–1877; A Study in Federal Governance of an Overseas Possession" (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1975), 289. See also Bobby Dave Lain, "North of Fifty-Three: Army, Treasury Department, and Navy Administration of Alaska, 1867–1884" (PhD diss., University of Texas, Austin, 1974), 297; William Gouverneur Morris, *Report upon the Customs District, Public Service, and Resources of Alaska Territory,* U.S. Treasury Department (Washington, DC: Government Printing Press, 1879), 36.

20. Miner Bruce in Robert Porter, *Report on the Population and Resources of Alaska at the Eleventh Census: 1890* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1893), 32, 70. The Klawack cannery relied almost solely on native labor from 1878 to 1896, employing as many as 160 Tlingits by 1880.

21. Ibid., 22–32.

22. Jefferson F. Moser, *The Salmon and Salmon Fisheries of Alaska: Report of the Operations of the United States Fish Commission Steamer "Albatross" for the Year Ending June 30, 1899* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1900), 51–58.

23. John Nathan Cobb, *The Salmon Fisheries of the Pacific Coast,* Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Fisheries Doc. no. 751 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1911), 114–115.

24. George W. Rogers, *Alaska in Transition: The Southeast Region* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 149.

25. Albert P. Niblack, "The Coast Indians of Southern Alaska and Northern British Columbia," in *Report of the U.S. National Museum for the Year Ending June 30, 1888* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Press, 1890), 277.

26. Horace Briggs, *Letters from Alaska and the Pacific Coast* (Buffalo: E. H. Hutchinson, 1889), 51; emphasis added.

27. Moser, *The Salmon and Salmon Fisheries,* 43; emphasis added.

28. As late as 1893, one fisheries agent painted a picture of everyday native life that might have held true a century previous: "[W]hile the native male population is engaged in hunting and fishing . . . the women gather various kinds of roots, berries, and barks, which are preserved in seal grease, and eaten during the winter." See *Salmon Fisheries of Alaska: Reports of Special Agents Pracht, Luttrell, and Murray for the Years 1892, 1893, 1894, 1895.* 55th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1898), 398. On the continued importance of the traditional Tlingit subsistence economy, see also *The Alaskan,* April 30, 1887, 3; December 1, 1900, 1; May 26, 1900, 1.

29. Moser, *The Salmon and Salmon Fisheries,* 25.

30. Native women especially became important participants in marketing Indian crafts for a growing tourist economy during the 1890s. See Victoria Wyatt, "Alaskan Indian Wage Earners in the 19th Century: Economic Choices and Ethnic Identity on Southeast Alaska's Frontier," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 78 (April 1987): 43–49.

31. Richard White, *The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 20.

32. Eliza Ruhamah Scidmore, "The First District of Alaska from Prince Frederick Sound to Yakutat Bay," in Porter, *Report on the Population,* 44. See also Scidmore, *Alaska, Its Southern Coast and Sitkan Archipelago* (Boston: D. Lathrop & Company, 1885).

33. Ibid.

34. "Justice for Alaskan Natives," *The Alaskan,* April 7, 1906, 2. The final quotation is from an early government report by Vincent Coyler that, in the words of Stephen Haycox, characterized Alaska natives as "more intelligent, more adaptable, and more industrious than other North American Natives." See Stephen Haycox, " 'Races of a Questionable Type': Origins of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Bureau of Education in Alaska, 1867–1885," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 75 (October 1984): 158.

35. Kan, *Memory Eternal*, 202.

36. See especially Kan, *Symbolic Immortality*; Duane Champagne, "Culture, Differentiation, and Environment: Social Change in Tlingit Society," in *Differentiation Theory and Social Change: Comparative and Historical Perspectives,* ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander and Paul Colomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Frederica de Laguna, "Tlingit Ideas About the Individual," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 10 (Summer 1954): 172–191.

37. See *The Alaskan,* September 14, 1889, 1, where the author describes one commercially oriented Tlingit hoarding a "pile of silver." See also Scidmore, "The First District."

38. For descriptions of various potlatches given in the late nineteenth century, see Morris, *Report upon the Customs District,* 15; Porter, *Report on the Population,* 33; Special Agent Luttrell in *Reports of Special Agents,* 399–400.

39. Kalerro Oberg, "Crime and Punishment in Tlingit Society," in *Indians of the North Pacific Coast,* ed. Tom McFeat (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), 215. In other instances of encroachment, property owners forced resolution by inviting the poachers to a feast and literally shaming the unwanted visitors from their territory; see Kalerro Oberg, *The Social Economy of the Tlingit Indians* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), 99.

40. See David Francis Arnold, "s'Putting up Fish': Environment, Work and Culture in Tlingit Society, 1780s–1940s" (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1997), 83–133.

41. *The Alaskan,* March 2, 1889, 1.

42. *The Alaskan,* August 6, 1887, 2.

43. *Reports of Special Agents,* 391.

44. Rosita Worl, "History of Southeastern Alaska Since 1867," in *Handbook of North American Indians,* ed. William C. Sturtevant, vol. 7 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990), 153.

45. See examples of these violations in *Reports of Special Agents,* 13, 31, 64–65, 68–69. Indians could be "violators," as they often broke federal law in their subsistence fishing practices.

46. Moser, *The Salmon and Salmon Fisheries,* 32. For other examples see ibid., 24, 71, 113; see also "Salmon Is Wasted," *Daily Alaska Dispatch,* November 3, 1903, 1.

47. Interview with Roy Bean in "The Southeast Alaska Salmon Fishery: Interviews with Men and Women Engaged in Commercial Fishing, 1913–1978." Interviewed by Stephan B. Levy and George Figdor. Available at the Alaska Historical Library, Juneau.

48. Interview with George Dalton in ibid.

49. Fred Friday in U.S. Department of the Interior, *Hearings upon Claims of Natives of Alaska Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 201.21b of the Regulations for Protection of the Commercial Fisheries in Alaska,* vol. 7 (1944), 1193–1194. These transcripts are available at the Alaska Historical Library, Juneau.

50. Statement of Gus Klagney in Walter R. Goldschmidt and Theodore H. Haas, "Possessory Rights of the Natives of Southeastern Alaska," in *Report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs* (October 3, 1946), 41. This document is also available at the Alaska Historical Library, Juneau.

51. Charles Webster Demmert, in *Hearings upon Claims of Natives of Alaska,* vol. 4, 610. See also vol. 7, 1183–1184, for a similar confrontation over a cannery trap near the village of Kake.

52. See Champagne, "Culture, Differentiation, and Environment," 70.

53. On the ANB, see also *Haa Kusteeyí, Our Culture: Tlingit Life Stories,* ed. Nora Marks Dauenhauer and Richard Dauenhauer (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994); Phillip Drucker, *The Native Brotherhoods: Modern Intertribal Organizations on the Northwest Coast,* Smithsonian Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 168 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1958); Mitchell, *Sold American,* 191–251.

54. *Haa Kusteeyí,* 90.

55. On Paul as well as this shift, see Drucker, *Native Brotherhoods*, 44; ibid., 3–6.

56. This was also the case among the Metlakatla Indians on Annette Island in southeastern Alaska. In his work on the Menominee and Metlakatlans, Brian Hosmer similarly argues that conflicts over modernization "cannot be understood simply as a clash between those old adversaries: 'progressives' and 'traditionalists.' Although cultural orientation was indeed a critical issue, comparatively few Menominees opposed lumbering outright and absolutely. Rather, disputes centered around the distribution of profits from industry, and indeed legitimate leadership." See Hosmer, *American Indians in the Marketplace,* 219.

57. ANB circular [no date], vol. 34, box 2, accession 4246, William Lackey Paul Papers, Manuscript and University Archives, University of Washington, Seattle [hereafter cited as WLPP].

58. ANB circular, June 2, 1939, vol. 34, box 2, accession 4246, WLPP; ANB circular, May 20, 1939, vol. 34, box 2, accession 4246, WLPP.

59. See Chris Friday, "Competing Communities at Work: Asian Americans, Euro-Americans, and Native Alaskans in the Pacific Northwest, 1938–1947," in *Over the Edge: Remapping the American West,* ed. Valerie J. Matsumoto and Blake Allmendinger (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 307–320; Arnold, "Putting up Fish," ch. 5.

60. From an editorial by William Lewis Paul, originally published in *Alaska Fishing News,* November 20, 1944, in WLPP, folder 26, box 1, WLPP.

61. See Kenneth R. Philp, "The New Deal and Alaskan Natives, 1936–1945," *Pacific Historical Review* 50 (August 1981): 309–327.

62. Louis Paul to Kake Camp, ANB, October 6, 1936, folder 4, box 3, accession 1885, William Lewis Paul Papers, Manuscript and University Archives, University of Washington, Seattle [hereafter referred to as WPP]. On the debate among Tlingits over the Indian Reorganization Act in Alaska and on criticism of William Paul by ANB members, see especially William Paul to ANB, March 4, 1935; William Paul to Louis Paul, March 2, March 6, March 10, 1936; May 17, 1936; William Paul to Don Miller,

December 11, 1936; Louis Paul to Elton Engstrom, June 1, 1936; William Paul to no addressee, undated, all in folder 30, box 3, accession 1885, WPP. William L. Paul to Frank Johnson, February 3, 1937, in folder 4, box 3, accession 1885, WPP; William L. Paul to Louis Paul, October 11, 1937, folder 17, box 1, accession 1885, WPP.

63. William Paul to Frank Johnson, February 3, 1937, folder 4, box 3, accession 1885, WPP. On Paul's embrace of the "special privileges" concept, see also ANB circular, June 14, 1939, vol. 34, box 2, accession 4246, WLPP.

64. William L. Paul to Karl Brunstad, July 8, 1939, folder 17, box 1, accession 1885, WWP.

65. Philp, "The New Deal and Alaskan Natives," 315.

66. Ibid., 316–327.

67. Ibid., 313.

68. Minutes of the 1943 ANB/ANS Convention, November 10, 1943, reel 1, accession 2076-2, WPP.

69. Albert Davis in "The Southeast Alaska Salmon Fishery."

70. See Champagne, "Culture, Differentiation, and Environment," 72–75; Drucker, *Native Brotherhoods.*

71. Drucker, *Native Brotherhoods,* 35.

72. Ibid., 36.

73. Ibid.

74. Some scholars suggest that the Alaska Native Brotherhood uncritically embraced modern American society. Historian Ted C. Hinckley, for instance, stresses the degree to which Tlingits, through the ANB, remade and redirected their lives in a determined effort to "discard the old way for the new." In the 1910s and 1920s, he argues, Tlingits throughout southeastern Alaska "publicly renounced the beliefs of their grandparents, while embracing those of Christian Euramericans [sic]." See Ted C. Hinckley, *The Canoe Rocks: Tlingits and the Euramerican Frontier, 1800–1912* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996), 385–386.

75. See interview with Archie Brown Sr. in "The Southeast Alaska Salmon Fishery."

76. Interviews with Roy Bean, Ronald Bean Sr., and Albert Davis in ibid.

CHAPTER NINE

Five Dollars a Week to Be "Regular Indians": Shows, Exhibitions, and the Economics of Indian Dancing, 1880–1930

CLYDE ELLIS

This chapter explores the experience of American Indian dancers who earned wages performing in "Wild West" shows at the turn of the twentieth century. Clyde Ellis provides important insight into the performers' motivations and the strategies they used to cope with the devastating impact of incorporation. Faced with a diminishing land base and few opportunities for making a living on reservations, dancing for "five dollars a day" seemed like an attractive alternative for many performers. As wage earners they were engaging the growing capitalist economy in ways that sometimes contradicted the assimilationist policy objectives advanced by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the early twentieth century.

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"THAT IS THE WAY I GET MONEY"

On November 18, 1890, seventy-nine Lakota Indians employed by William F. Cody's Wild West show gathered in Washington, D.C., to meet with Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs Robert V. Belt. They were there to challenge Belt's recent opinion that shows featuring Indian dances were, among other things, "ruinous evils" and that Indians ought to "remain at home and engage in more civilizing avocations." At the heart of the matter was Belt's opinion—shared by official Washington—that earning a living by dancing in the shows was not only unseemly, it contradicted federal Indian policy. Speaking for the troupe, a Lakota man named Black Heart reminded Belt that the Indians had been "raised on horseback; that is the way we had to work. These men furnished us the same kind of work we were raised to do; that is the reason we want to work for these kind of men. . . . If [an] Indian wants to work at any place and earn money, he wants to do so; white man got privilege to do the same—any kind of work he wants." Echoing his fellow performer, Rocky Bear said that if such employment "did not suit me, I would not remain any longer," adding that "if the great father wants me to stop, I would do it." There was no doubt that the great father wanted Indians to stop dancing, but in a comment that was cold comfort to federal officials who demanded that Indians become self-sufficient wage earners, Rocky Bear reminded them that he already was a wage earner; dancing in the Indian shows, he stated, "is the way I get money."[1]

Between 1880 and 1930, thousands of Indians joined dozens of shows, exhibitions, and fairs to earn a living dancing, singing, and giving other performances. This work put money in their pockets, allowed them to escape the reservation, and rewarded them for portraying what they knew best—their traditional cultures. Yet although scholars have shown increasing interest in the changing contours and meanings of dance culture, few have taken notice of Rocky Bear's words and examined the economic side of dance shows and exhibitions, especially during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when such shows were at their height.[2]

This chapter argues that show dancing during that era was an economically significant venture for performers and promoters alike. It is tempting to dismiss show Indians as props in some inane native minstrel show tradition, hopping around for the benefit of white audiences, paid a pauper's wage to prostitute themselves. Indeed, contemporaries were often (and correctly) appalled by what they perceived to be the callous objectification of performers. Were some Indians forced into performing by the horrendous conditions on reservations? Yes, of this there can be little doubt. As Rocky Bear put it, on the

reservation "I am getting poor." Did promoters and owners sometimes use performers crudely and insensitively? Again, there is no doubt that some did. As Michael Wallis notes, for example, the Miller Brothers' 101 Ranch Real Wild West Show used Indian performers as "exotic lures to attract large crowds . . . the Poncas would be put on display—just like prize livestock, award-winning pies and jams, and such freaks of nature as two-headed snakes and miniature ponies. The payoff was promising."[3] And was the payoff equitable? In most cases, no.

Yet the cultural, political, and economic factors Indians weighed as they contemplated joining the shows suggest that the decision to become a performer was complicated. If some shows were grossly exploitative, it is also true that dancing for pay was an attractive alternative to the chronic poverty and chaos that plagued many reservations. According to the performers themselves, show dancing could be financially and emotionally rewarding. As Kills Enemy Alone, a Lakota who joined Cody's 1887 European tour, pointedly remarked, "I came over here to see if I can make some money." Sitting Bull—who in Robert Utley's opinion saw the shows as a way to "relieve the tedium of the reservation and to earn money"—knew that giving his earnings away according to Lakota values of generosity would affirm his status as a leader. And for a generation of students who know Nicholas Black Elk only as the ultratraditional icon in John Neihardt's books, it might come as a surprise to learn that as a young man Black Elk "got disgusted with the wrong road that my people were doing now . . . so I made up my mind I was going away from them to see the white man's ways. If the white man's ways were better, why[,] I would like to see my people live that way." Black Elk seems to have had solidly practical motives, and as L. G. Moses noted, "[p]erhaps his enjoyment came . . . in the adventure of it all, in re-creating brave deeds, and in getting paid for it."[4]

Moreover, performers were not powerless. The Miller Brothers learned this lesson the hard way in 1914, for example, when their refusal to pay wages for extra performances in England prompted a walkout by their dancers. Moreover, dancing for pay was hardly a fatal corruption of Indianness. As Joy Kassen notes, Indians exerted some control over the context and substance of their performances; Frank Fools Crow (Black Elk's nephew) remembered that "[i]n our Wild West shows we Indians rode, sang, and danced. The dances were social performances, though, and never sacred ones." His uncle reaped even greater rewards, saying that "as I traveled to competitions and toured with the Wild West shows, word of my healing and prophetic powers would spread. Then people who were doubters would ask me to prove what I could do by

telling them my visions and performing my ceremonies for them."[5] Indeed, Vine Deloria argues that the shows not only gave performers a measure of financial independence, they also helped them make informed decisions about living in a world dominated by whites. "As a transitional educational device wherein Indians were able to observe American society and draw their own conclusions," he writes, "the Wild West was worth more than every school house built by the government on any of the reservations." Rita Napier observes that "Indians who toured with the Wild West could enjoy the best bitter in a London pub, mingle with royalty in a dignified and courteous fashion, and yet retain their own values as the basis for their 'vision' of life." Moses echoes these sentiments: "Ethnic identity need not be preserved through isolation, it may also be promoted through contact . . . [which] strengthened rather than weakened culture. . . . It would be wrong therefore to see the Show Indians as simply dupes, or pawns, or even victims. It would be better to approach them as persons who earned a fairly good living between the era of the Dawes Act and the Indian New Deal."[6] Dancing for pay revealed that the relationship between victimization and agency rested on complex negotiations and mediations in which an either/or paradigm had little meaning.

"RAW, UNADULTERATED WHORE HOUSE ENTERTAINMENT": THE CAMPAIGN TO SUPPRESS DANCING

That Indians danced at all—much less for money—had already prompted an intense debate by the 1880s. More than a decade before Belt's meeting with Cody's Indians, official alarm about dances and rituals perceived to be morally and spiritually objectionable had spurred a fifty-year campaign to suppress dance culture, including theatrical performances. If performing with the shows provided some Indians with the means to become self-supporting, it also encouraged behavior that reformers deemed uncivilized and antithetical to the Indians' best interests. Official policy encouraged economic self-sufficiency based on a variety of pursuits, none of which included portraying what the Miller Brothers publicized in 1912 as "pure blooded people of the wild old days . . . [who] remain strangers to work." In 1903 the Osage agent reinforced widely held negative opinions of dancing when he informed the government's director of Indian exhibits for the St. Louis World's Fair that if he wanted "an exhibit of great big fat juicy Indians in their native costumes doing nothing I can supply you with as many as you may want, or if you want a dancing party in native costume I can supply you with them . . . but to supply the natives engaged in any constructive work will be an impossibility." In 1929 a writer

lampooned one Ponca woman's work in the Wild West shows by observing that because she weighed 450 pounds, "all she has to do is sit on a platform and let people gaze in admiration, mixed with awe."[7]

As these examples suggest, the debate was driven by more than the fact that some Indians made money from performing. Officials wanted Indians to earn their own keep, but a livelihood earned in the shows contradicted the government's assimilation agenda, a point Commissioner of Indian Affairs Hiram Price emphasized in 1884 when he wrote that "one Indian farmer will do more to civilize and elevate the race . . . than one hundred Indians parading through the country for exhibition." This opinion was standard fare among his successors, including Cato Sells, who wrote in 1914 that he considered anything (especially dancing) that disrupted farming "an economic and social crime." In 1922 Commissioner Charles Burke excoriated Indians who "sacrifice real necessities to obtain money [by dancing] in the middle of a short growing season." Still others appealed to moral urgency, as when Charles Shell declared in 1909 that dances at Oklahoma's Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation were "accompanied by drunkenness, gambling, and other immoral practices." Audiences were thrilled by the Miller Brothers' 101 Ranch Real Wild West, but many policy makers agreed with one man's 1932 assessment of the show as "raw, unadulterated whore house entertainment" that deserved to be (and was by then) out of business. And it wasn't only traditional dancing that left policy makers fuming. When a representative of the 1919 Revue of Hitchy Koo recruited young Indian women as chorus line dancers at thirty-five dollars a week plus transportation to and from New York City, the Cheyenne and Arapaho agent turned him down cold. There were no girls at his agency who met the requirements (sixteen to eighteen years old, pretty, and with some knowledge of music), but even if there were, he was "not . . . willing that they should accept employment of this character."[8]

According to the mood of the day, it was unthinkable that dancing—either for Cody or for the Revue of Hitchy Koo—would become a substitute for livelihoods in the officially mandated agricultural, mechanical, or domestic arts. Besides, as Commissioner of Indian Affairs Robert Valentine wrote in 1912, not only had he "seen little good come of dancing for gate receipts," but dancing for pay was the wrong way to make a living. When a Cheyenne man named Little Snake attempted to join a Wild West show in 1924, L. S. Bonnin reminded him, "it is the desire of the Department at Washington and this office that all able-bodied Indians support themselves by their own labor." Those who earned their living by show dancing, wrote Bonnin, were "hurting themselves and

retarding their own progress, and assisting the white people in commercializing the Indians for profits. Personally, I would like to see every Indian refuse to act as a curiosity for people to look at and to earn money for someone else." When a group of Cheyennes and Arapahos put on a show in 1902 in Elk City, Oklahoma, John Whitewell tried to convince the dancers that they "were being duped. That they were being used as an advertisement for the merchants, that the populace, not the merchants[,] paid the money . . . and that what was received naturally went to the stores," not to the Indians.[9]

Criticism also came from native people, as in 1914 when Chauncey Yellow Robe, a Sioux, published a scathing indictment entitled "The Menace of the Wild West Show" in the *Quarterly Journal of the Society of American Indians.* Lamenting the "evil and degrading influence of commercializing the Indian," Yellow Robe charged that the shows did little more than "depict lawlessness and hatred" and were "the greatest hindrance, injustice, and detriment to the present progress of the American Indian toward civilization." Show Indians had not merely been taken advantage of, he continued, they had been led to "the white man's poison cup and have become drunkards." Yellow Robe poured out a stream of invective against people who "think they cannot do without wild-west Indian shows, consequently certain citizens have the Indian show craze. . . . We can see from this state of affairs that the white man is persistently perpetuating . . . tribal habits and customs. We see that the showman is manufacturing the Indian plays intended to amuse and instruct young children, and is teaching them that the Indian is only a savage being." "How can we save the American Indian," he asked, "if the Indian Bureau is permitting special privileges in favor of the wild-west Indian shows, moving-picture concerns, and fair associations for commercializing the Indian?" What Indians needed, he concluded, were not more opportunities to earn a living by dancing in the shows but "cleaner civilization" and, it is safe to say, jobs that did not include dancing for pay.[10]

In "The Effect of Wild Westing," an article in the same issue of the same journal as Yellow Robe's piece, E. H. Gohl (a white who claimed to be "an adopted clansman of the Onondaga") blasted "the morbid curiosity to see the red man as a savage in war-paint." In the Wild West shows, "[M]anagers compel the red man to act the white man's idea of a war dance. All is burlesque. The whole thing is deception." Gohl called for a "determined stand . . . to discourage and prevent whenever possible Indians making arrangements with wild-west shows, theatrical troups [sic], circuses, and most of the motion picture firms." "Touring the country with shows is demoralizing and a menace to the

Indian," he wrote. "And all for a '*dollar a day and feed*,' with a good deal of the white man's 'rough house' thrown in. A wild-west show's contract is simply a sheet of 'guaranteed-to-catch fly-paper.'" Like Yellow Robe, Gohl believed the Wild West shows destroyed the "pathway to self-help and progress," and he called on "all true friends of our American Indians" to support only those plays and pageants devoted to "historical or ethnological facts when under the auspices of colleges and historical societies."[11] The message was clear: dancing was morally repugnant, and dance money was dirty money.

Federal Indian policy was unambiguous. Secretary of the Interior Henry Teller made the case for the anti-dance movement in 1883 when he bluntly observed that "the continuance of the old heathenish dances" was single-handedly responsible for much of the "debauchery, diabolism, and savagery of the worst state of the Indian race."[12] A decade later Superintendent of Indian Schools Daniel Dorchester witnessed a dance demonstration that seemed to confirm Teller's dreary commentary. Invited to visit the government's "educational" Indian exhibit at Chicago's 1893 Columbian Exposition, Dorchester declared it "a celebration of the most degraded phases of the old Indian life." Most appalling was a dance demonstration, a "disgraceful affair" fueled by whiskey, arranged by avaricious whites of questionable taste, and featuring Indians who, with their "paint, feathers, buckskin, bells, breechclout, and other toggery, revive and exhibit the quondam degradation of the tribes."[13]

Dancing for pay, wrote Dorchester, was "diametrically opposed to all efforts to their education and true elevation. . . . [It] disinclines them to settle down to labor, and dooms them to the life of vagabonds." That white people paid to see all of this was a sin only slightly less serious, but Dorchester reminded readers that more was at stake than the nickels and dimes ignorant spectators gave to the Indians. Taking the moral high ground, he observed that such fare was not only detrimental to Indians, but it corrupted whites as well. Women were reported to have fainted at the sight of the "Indian torture dance," at which others—gasp—had applauded. It was bad enough in many officials' minds that Buffalo Bill had set up shop right next door to the fair with his daily shows featuring all manner of wild Indians. But Dorchester had seen an officially sanctioned government exhibit that was no better, in his opinion, than Cody's blood and thunder. What sort of message, he pleaded, was all of this sending? Perhaps dances carefully staged "within proper limitations could be reasonably tolerated . . . in the interest of historical and ethnological inquiries," Dorchester wrote. But "naked, painted, bedecked Indians in scalp and war dances" were too much. "And this at the end of the nineteenth Christian

century," he thundered, "in a Christian America, in a Christian city, with a full corps of strong policemen, as an entertainment at our great Columbian Exposition, for 5,000 at least nominally Christian people. . . . [W]as not the city of Chicago able to prevent so diabolical a spectacle? . . . [W]as not the management of the World's Fair able to prevent such an infamy?"[14]

"THE BEST DRAWING CARD WE HAVE": POPULARIZING INDIAN DANCING

How did things get to the point where official policy could be comfortably ignored, crowds would pay good money to see dancing, and some Indians could make a living by being, well, Indians? One of the most important factors was the ambivalence of official policy. On the one hand, policy makers insisted that Indians earn their living by the sweat of their brow—preferably as agriculturalists. On the other hand, those same officials regularly permitted dances for scientific or ethnologic purposes or in what they believed were sanitized, meaningless versions. Moreover, because the dance bans were never enacted as federal or state laws, officials lacked statutory authority to prevent Indians from hiring themselves out as performers. As a result, officials routinely allowed dances and approved employment in shows and exhibitions as long as promoters agreed to take care of their employees and participants promised to forswear torture, sexually explicit behavior, and the wanton giving away of property.

Policy makers sent a mixed message, moreover, when they endorsed shows and displays associated with official exhibits. In 1875, for example, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Edward P. Smith requested displays for the nation's centennial celebration that would illustrate "the native condition and habits, recent or past, of the American Aborigines." It was the "intention of the Government to have everything peculiarly American represented," he wrote, and "a marked deficiency would exist were the characteristic features in the life, habits, and history of the North American Indian omitted." In 1893 the dancing Indians at the Columbian Exposition who had sent Daniel Dorchester into paroxysms were part of the government's own "educational" exhibit. Five years later an official memo for the Omaha Exposition noted, "it is desirable, of course, that the primitive habits and customs of the tribes should be faithfully and fully portrayed." And in 1905, Theodore Roosevelt's inauguration committee invited the Comanche Quanah Parker to ride in the inaugural parade, but only if he came "fully equipped with Indian clothing as gorgeous as possible in its make-up and complete in its representation of the old Indian dress."[15]

By supplying Indian performers to these exhibits, government officials were helping to whet the public's appetite for Indian shows. Of course, promoters like Cody had already seen the promise of such things and aggressively capitalized on it. The appeal of Plains imagery was especially strong, and promoters paid top dollar for performers who could act the part of western Indians who were by then synonymous with the nation's frontier history. An early 1880s handbill for a show calling itself "Great Extra Attractions," for example, promised "forty wild Indians dressed in buckskin suits, with war paint and feathers just as they are seen on the Western Plains, under a strong military guard." The show featured a lacrosse game "almost as exciting as a battle: the frantic leap, the whoop, the agile bound, the savage assault, the screaming of the squaws, the blows, the painted and bleeding players, and the wild, desperate and savage fight for the ball is a scene that savage life alone can furnish. These Indians (40 in all including Squaws and Papooses) are genuine Western Indians." In a letter to the Quapaw agent seeking permission to hire Indians from that agency, the show's proprietor wrote, "I can get all of the Indians I want in Canada but I had rather have them from the *West*."[16]

The perceived primitivism of Indians was especially provocative, and never more so than when they donned dance clothes. In a 1905 letter to the Kiowa and Comanche agent, H. A. Hall from Comanche, Indian Territory, requested a group of dancers for that town's annual carnival because such dancers would be "the best drawing card we have." Fifteen years later, promoters for the Hudson's Bay Company's 250th anniversary celebration expressed a similar hope by telling the Canadian public that "in a few short years the opportunities for . . . a reconstruction of the costumes, manners and customs of former days will have passed away." As one official put it: "What an opportunity for films! As an object lesson, and an attraction for the public, it would be a superb show."[17]

In the United States the growing interest in Indians was apparent in everything from national parks to the Boy Scouts to mass culture. Park officials at Yosemite, for example, created "Indian Field Days" in 1916, ostensibly to "revive and maintain [the] interest of Indians in their own games and industries." In reality, it was a carefully choreographed tourist show that Mark David Spence says "often degenerated into little more than an excuse for tourists and park officials to pose in buckskin and feathered headdress." In a rare reversal of standards, women were better paid than men ($2.50 for women, $1.00 for men per show), and there were $25 prizes for the "Best Indian Warrior Costume" and "Best Indian Squaw Costume." At Mesa Verde, visitors in the 1920s flocked to exhibitions of Navajos who sang and danced, and Glacier and

Yellowstone eagerly hired "some good type Indians . . . [who] have good costumes, put on a good show, and live in peace and harmony." And in an enterprise worthy of Cody himself, the Eastern Band of the Cherokees and the Great Smoky Mountains National Park collaborated in the early 1930s on a short-lived show called *Spirit of the Great Smokies*.[18] In 1916 two Boy Scout leaders from Philadelphia created the Order of the Arrow to recognize outstanding service by youth and adult scouts. Within a decade it had spread across the country and was introducing generations of young boys to a highly stylized and exoticized Indian imagery. The Order of the Arrow continues to flourish today, and rituals rooted in the romantic appeal of Indians are its stock-in-trade. Tellingly, "authentic" Indian dances remain one of its most cherished traditions, and scouting groups like the Koshare Indian Dancers of Pueblo, Colorado, continue to spread its version of the gospel to groups across the country every year.

The general public could also expect to have its taste for the dramatic indulged when professional anthropologists and ethnologists proved willing to pay for the same displays that thrilled audiences. A case in point occurred in 1903 when George Dorsey, the curator of anthropology at Chicago's Field-Columbian Museum, and James Mooney of the Bureau of American Ethnology were accused of paying Cheyennes to perform a Sun Dance complete with the "torture" that simultaneously titillated and appalled audiences. John Seger, an outspoken opponent of dancing, reported that he had encountered Dorsey, Mooney, and a photographer at a Cheyenne encampment where they photographed dancers engaged in old-time rituals. A man named Red Leggings obliged them, but Seger condemned the Indian for play-acting, derided the scientists as fools, and declared, "[i]t was very plain to me that the torture had been paid for." Seger, who had attended the Cheyennne Sun Dance two decades earlier, wrote, "there is as much difference then and now . . . as between day and night. The old way . . . was the real thing. The torture I saw was a fake . . . and I think on the whole he had well earned his fifteen dollars that was reported to have been paid."[19] If respectable scientists paid Indians to dance, why shouldn't audiences do the same?

"WE EXPECT TO MAKE SOME MONEY"

As Black Elk, Kills Enemy Alone, Rocky Bear, and Black Heart affirmed, making a living by dancing seemed a legitimate enterprise to them and to their appreciative audiences as well. If it contradicted the government's notion of proper living, it nonetheless provided gainful employment and experience in

the wider world—something reformers, entrepreneurs, and Indians alike valued. Moreover, as most observers knew, the government's reservation-based assimilation program was collapsing into a smoking ruin. Because they were hard-pressed and cash starved, dancing for money made complete sense to Indians like those at the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation in western Oklahoma who bitterly reminded William Freer in 1912 that their lease monies had not been paid in months. Young Bear told Freer, "I come like a person carrying two crying babies. It is six months since I have had money. . . . We understand that the Government wants us to follow the white man's way. We must have money to work with." A man named Hail observed that "we try to do what the Commissioner wants us to do in the direction of farming, and we ought to have our money." Another man named Ute tersely noted that "a man without a horse cannot plow."[20]

Indeed, economic opportunities for Indians steadily eroded after the 1890s when federal officials closed schools, scaled back treaty-mandated annuities, and repeatedly amended the 1887 Dawes Act to leave a majority of Indians landless. The results were catastrophic, and in 1928 the Meriam Report revealed that Indians' per capita annual income was $100–$200, compared with a national average of nearly $1,350. With fewer and fewer alternatives, it is not surprising that some Indians regarded the shows as a way out of their dilemma. "Some may have been attracted by the decent wages Buffalo Bill paid," wrote Napier, "that could be sent home or used to purchase luxuries—even necessities—no reservation Indian could afford." Moreover, as Moses noted, once the Bureau of Indian Affairs required contracts, bonds, and "fair and reasonable" wages, dancers in the larger shows could command salaries of between $25 and $90 a month—about two-thirds of an agent's salary. "Few Indians who took out allotments and farmed the land or ran livestock," wrote Moses, "could boast of comparable incomes."[21] Reformers routinely denounced show Indians as the lowest sort, but was that really worse than sitting out another South Dakota winter eating spoiled beef?

Many of the promoters who ran shows did so because they could simultaneously make money, entertain the public, and—they solemnly promised—expose Indians to a new way of life as assimilated citizens. Cody, for example, assured government officials that Indians in his shows were well treated, fairly paid, and introduced to civilized life. During their stay in New York City in the winter of 1886–1887, he informed federal authorities that his Indian employees had attended church twice each Sunday for two months and had visited city hall, a newspaper office, Central Park, Bellevue Hospital, and "all the

principal places of legitimate public entertainment in New York. . . . I know from personal knowledge that these Indians are acquiring benefits in their Eastern life." And as Cody liked to remind his detractors, Indians with his show were earning good money, paying their own way, and learning to live like whites. To critics who charged that Indian performers were being duped by whites who shortchanged them, Nate Salisbury—Cody's right-hand man—pointedly noted in 1891 that "an Indian knows the value of a dollar quite as well as a white man."[22]

At the local level especially, in the small fairs and town celebrations where most performers found their work, dancing for pay offered the promise of wages, however modest; the chance to travel; an opportunity temporarily to escape the confines of reservation life; and for some the opportunity to present their cultures in ways they found satisfying. Typical of the promoters was a man named Thornburg who recruited Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches in 1894 for a show that would tour the "smaller places and public in general [that] have not had the opportunity of studying the Red Man as he was." Thornburg promised happy results for Indians and audiences alike; performers would get a taste of life outside the reservations, and whites "would be both interested and instructed." Tellingly, Thornburg added, "[O]f course we don't claim to be impelled wholly by motives of philanthropy actuated by a desire to perpetuate the history of the West. . . . We expect to make some money."[23]

The payoff for working in many of the shows and government-sponsored exhibits was a combination of room, board, and expenses, something that appealed to many performers given the chronically unreliable distribution of annuities and rations at the nation's Indian agencies. In 1899, for example, Will Pyeatt—proprietor of the White Sulphur Inn in Sulphur, Indian Territory—wrote to the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation to recruit "the wildest blanket Indians to be had. . . . [W]e want Indians that will eat raw meat and give the war and goast [sic] dance." In return for their services, Pyeatt promised the dancers all the barbecue they could eat.[24] A typical offer reached the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation in 1905 from the Cedar Point Pleasure Resort Company of Sandusky, Ohio, seeking Cheyennes and Comanches as "an educational exhibit." Their letter made no mention of pay, but the Ohioans promised "excellent quarters for the Indians . . . the best of care . . . expenses to and from their home . . . and board and lodging." The agent turned them down on the grounds that there were "no Indians who could be spared without detriment to their interests." Two years later showman Zack Mulhall offered expense

money and transportation to Comanches willing to join a bizarre combination of automobile races and Wild West shows (horses and autos to be supplied at no extra cost to the performers!).[25]

Some communities planned ahead, as when W. B. Garnett informed the Kiowa and Comanche agent in 1901 that Tonkawa's citizens had "subscribed . . . quite a little fund" to sponsor an all-Indian "entertainment." Hoping for "quite a company of the Apache Indians," the town's Fair Association promised "to care for them, to feed them well, and [to] furnish pasture for their ponies." Moreover, wrote G. C. Brewer, "the Indians are to receive the gate receipts that will be divided between those that take part." Other communities and promoters wrote to ascertain the going rates, as when M. F. Wren inquired in 1905 as to the chances of hiring Cheyenne and Arapaho dancers for his town's fair: "What would it cost us if they can come? We are willing to do the best we can by them." A 1910 request from Thomas, Oklahoma, promised both a "high moreal [sic] tone" and plans to "advertise this extensively and make it a paying proposition to both the Indians and ourselves." That same year the Weatherford Commercial Club guaranteed $750 for expenses and premiums for Indian performers at the town's fair, "it being understood that the agent will take proceeds of the sale of tickets to Indians." Moreover, in return for a "free Indian moon dance in front of the Grandstand . . . with camp fires," the dancers could charge and keep an admission fee of fifteen cents for all other dance demonstrations.[26]

Government exhibits typically did not include outright payment on the grounds that dancing for wages sent the wrong kind of message. Instead, policy makers believed expenses and the chance to see the world were ample rewards. When Commissioner of Indian Affairs William A. Jones recruited performers in 1898 for the Trans-Mississippi and International Exposition in Omaha, for example, he declined to offer wages and pointed out that in addition to the thrill of being "a most interesting part" of the government's exhibit, performers would be "well cared for" by virtue of having their transportation and living costs covered. Samuel McCowan took the same position when he solicited artisans, craftworkers, and performers for the government exhibit at the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair. Strapped for expenses, McCowan confidently predicted to one correspondent that "after I bring them here [Chilocco School in north-central Oklahoma], pay their expenses, take them to St. Louis and return them, it ought to be compensation enough." Not everyone agreed with that sentiment, and at least one group negotiated for wages as well as expenses. Writing from Florida, the Reverend Henry Gibbs informed McCowan that al-

though it might be "a grand thing" indeed for a group of Seminoles to join the exhibit, "nothing but large financial inducements would get them to go so far as St. Louis. And whether their part of the attraction would be a paying one . . . is hard for me to tell." McCowan stood his ground, agreeing to pay only travel expenses plus room and board for sixty days. Interestingly, he did pay cash wages to Indian carpenters, who "have families . . . and derive their support largely from their trade." Could the same not be said of the dancers?[27]

Although they sanctioned participation in all kinds of shows and exhibits, authorities tried to be mindful of what they deemed inappropriate demonstrations, and on occasion they drew the line. It was one thing to let Cody or the Miller Brothers hire Indians, but it was another thing altogether to give every would-be performer or promoter free rein. When one Cheyenne man produced a contract for 500 Indians to perform at a 1923 Fourth of July show in Fort Reno, Oklahoma, for example, officials refused to sanction the deal despite promises by the townspeople of "a good feed and half the gate receipts, providing they give a dance in their native costume." The agent's reply was brief and to the point: "Nothing doing."[28] Yet as every agent knew, because the federal dance bans lacked statutory authority, officials could not always prevent Indians from dancing for money. As long as they did not break the law, Indians could not be stopped from dancing. This is not to say that agents could not or did not forcibly prevent dances. They could and did withhold rations and annuities from dancers, hold sponsors on one charge or another, or impose arbitrary ground rules that they hoped would make dancing more trouble than it was worth.[29]

When the Comanche County Fair Association entered into negotiations with a group of Arapaho performers in 1909, Agent Charles Shell expressed his disappointment that "dissolute Indians will persist in attending the gatherings . . . and that white people of questionable character will encourage them to do those things which retard their advancement and ruin them physically." But he also admitted that because they were "free and independent citizens, they cannot be prevented from going if they so desire," a fact underscored by the 1879 Standing Bear decision that left Indians free from "the arbitrary control of the Indian Bureau and allowed all the rights and immunities of a free man." And as Cody reminded government officials in 1887, "I claim that these Indians, as Americans, have a perfect right to hire their services where they please. They earn a good salary here."[30]

A less problematic way to discourage dancing for pay was to encourage attractive substitutes. This was a typical tactic at the annual agency fairs designed

to introduce Indians to commerce, industry, and individualism and to discourage dancing and other traditional pursuits. Because he believed "Indians and the public should be made to realize that these old customs retard the onward march of civilization," Commissioner Cato Sells in 1914 prohibited "Old-time dances" at the fairs. Yet even as officials made such pronouncements, they also permitted some dancing as long as participants observed restrictions that limited when dances could be held, which dances could be performed, and who could attend. How they could realistically hope to end dancing by embracing contradictory positions is unclear. Officials also discouraged dancing by making sure it didn't pay as well as other fair events. At the 1900 Cheyenne and Arapaho fair, for example, premiums for horse races, foot races, and athletic games ($558.00), band concert expenses ($244.57), and contests ($843.75—which included prizes for the fattest baby, best-behaved baby, and fattest baby under one year of age) came to $1,646.32. The premiums paid to Indians who put on dances came to $68.00. Of the fair's total disbursements of $3,834.04, money for dancing constituted only 1.75 percent. A decade later, premiums at the same fair showed a similar trend against traditional crafts and dances. First place in the tug-of-war brought $20.00, and the winner of the mule race pocketed $10.00. The best pen of ducks was worth $3.00, the winning pound of country lard was good for $1.00, and the best loaf cake earned its baker a coffeepot. The oldest Indian woman took home a $5.00 gold piece, and the prettiest baby received an "Indian robe" valued at $6.00. Meanwhile, the best pair of moccasins brought $1.00, the best pipe $2.00.[31]

The lure of a payoff for the best jelly and tastiest light bread notwithstanding, dancing remained as popular as ever, and white audiences flocked to see the shows. In 1902 the *Wichita Eagle* reported a performance by 200 Cheyennes with a headline announcing "White Men Participated: Indian War Dance at Elk City Was a New Feature." The newspaper began its story by declaring that "a war dance wherein the white man steps the light fantastic is a new one. A large crowd paid their two-bits admission and were well entertained. . . . The performance closed with a dance in which the white man had the privilege of dancing with a squaw by paying a dime. Several tried the game."[32] This event was subsequently denounced by agency officials as an advertising scheme concocted by local merchants. Daniel Dorchester would have been mortified; in 1893 at Chicago the audience had merely observed the dances, but now they were actually participating and paying for the privilege to boot.

It also didn't help matters that well-known Indians joined shows, for their presence proved a public relations and advertising bonanza that promoters

eagerly exploited. As Cody confided to William F. "Doc" Carver in 1883, "I am going to try hard to get old 'Sitting Bull' . . . if we can manage to get him our ever lasting fortune is made." One year later an agent wrote to a friend that where Sitting Bull's show career was concerned, "there is money to be made from this if properly managed." In fact, Sitting Bull signed on with Cody in June 1885 and quickly became one of the show's most notable attractions and best-paid Indian performers. Joy Kasson notes that Sitting Bull was guaranteed a salary of $50 a week with two weeks' wages in advance, a $125 bonus, and free transportation to and from the show. He also demanded a retinue of five men at $25 a month each, three women at $15 a month apiece, plus an interpreter of his choosing to be paid $60. Sitting Bull also amassed a considerable pile of cash by controlling the rights to his autograph and photo, mementos for which Robert Utley reports he was receiving $1.50 to $2.00 apiece by 1883. In all, Sitting Bull did remarkably well. "Within only four months," writes Kasson, "Sitting Bull would earn nearly half the annual salary of an Indian agent and two-thirds the annual salary of an agency physician."[33]

Other notables followed suit, including Geronimo, who informed his agent that he would be happy to go to the St. Louis World's Fair in 1903 as part of the government's Indian exhibition but not for the $15.00 per month Samuel McCowan was offering. "He was paid $45.00 per month at the Buffalo Exposition (Pan American)," wrote his representative, and he expected to receive at least that much to go to St. Louis.[34]

Hoping to capitalize on an association with America's best-known warrior, the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company of Baltimore, Maryland, offered to sponsor Geronimo's appearances at St. Louis. The firm's representative in Lawton, Oklahoma Territory, commented somewhat breathlessly that the Apache had "between eighty-five and one hundred white scalps to the credit of his savagery; also a vest made of the hair of the whites whom he has killed." This was absolute nonsense, of course, but who wouldn't pay to see Geronimo? (The firm made a pitch to sponsor the Comanche Quanah Parker as well, calling him "unquestionably the finest specimen of the red men in the great Southwest. . . . [He] embodies all that we saw pictured in the history read in our school days.") Promoters knew a good thing when they saw it, and Geronimo was in high demand for even the most absurd spectacles. In 1905, for example, the Miller Brothers offered $1,000 in cash to anyone willing to be scalped by Geronimo as part of "The Buffalo Chase," a gala celebration on the 101 ranch grounds that the Millers hoped would draw several thousand spectators. Rumor had it that one man agreed to try it, but he was nowhere in sight

at the appointed moment. Geronimo's opinion of the stunt (and his compensation) went unrecorded.[35]

FIVE DOLLARS A WEEK TO BE "REGULAR INDIANS"

The most lucrative opportunities came from the larger shows and combinations that flourished between 1880 and World War I. With nearly 100 shows on the road every year, opportunities for employment were generally good, and shows had little trouble filling their needs. The giants of the business—Cody and the Miller Brothers' 101, for example—held auditions on reservations that attracted large numbers of aspiring performers in search of a contract and cash bonuses for the best dancers with the fanciest outfits. Pay for performers varied widely, even after the Bureau of Indian Affairs required individual contracts and scrutinized pay scales. On the lower end were promoters like W. A. Husted, who offered $12.50 a month plus room and board in 1896 for Indians willing to join a "regular series of dancing and ball playing." Generally speaking, full-time adult employees could expect to earn roughly a dollar a day, plus food, lodging, and rudimentary medical care. In 1903, D. Bigman reported that Indian performers with the Kennedy Brothers Indian Congress, Wild West, and Hippodrome were earning $5 a week. Bigman received $7 a week as interpreter, and he approvingly reported that the show's owners "give us anything we need." In 1906, salaries for Indians with the 101 ranged from $5 cash per week for men to $4 cash per week for women. Three years later the rates went from $1 a week for children to $7 a week for grown men.[36]

Federal regulations obliged owners to cover travel, food, and medical costs, but most shows also required dancers to provide their own show clothes. During most of its history, for example, the 101 required performers to provide "one set of Indian clothes, head dress, moccasins, etc." And in 1910, Joe Miller specified that Indian men were to be "as nearly as possible long-haired or have good wigs and good costumes." Those who could meet the requirements, he promised, would earn "five dollars a week as 'regular Indians.'" In some cases the pay was prorated according to the work schedule. In 1914, for example, the proprietors of the Days of '49 Wild West Show had a sliding pay scale—$2 a day while the show was being organized, and $5 a day plus transportation and meals when the show was in production.[37]

Comments from Indians working in the shows suggest a wide variety of experiences—many of them positive, some positively glowing. Luther Standing Bear wrote that Cody's show provided him, his wife, and newborn daughter with a standard of living they could never have earned at home on the

reservation. Standing Bear, a Carlisle graduate, later remembered that the decision to put his newborn daughter on display during a 1902 tour in England "was a great drawing card for the show. . . . The work was very light for my wife, and as for the baby, before she was twenty-four hours old she was making more money than my wife and I together." Others expressed similar appreciation for the chance to work in the shows. "I know if I was at home I would not do anything," wrote D. Bigman in 1903, "because there is no work for me to do." Life with the Kennedy Brothers Indian Congress, Wild West and Hippodrome ("the most reliable combination on earth" stated its letterhead), he reported, was just fine. They were dancing twice a day, he wrote, adding "[we] are doing well and making money." Julia Roy, a Ponca working for the 101 in 1914, wrote that "[e]verything is . . . as pleasant as it needs to be or can be. Only the climate is a little bit colder than in Okla. [she was in New York City], but at the same time it is very nice to get out and travel a little bit and see something of the world." Richard Davis, a Cheyenne (and Carlisle graduate) who also worked for the 101, wrote Joe Miller in 1911 to tell him, "I have 8 farms, a good city home, and money in [the] Bank and we care for no one else only yourself and the other Miller boys and we would like to patronize your show this summer just for pleasure." Noting that he and his friend Walter Battice—another longtime 101 employee—were anxious to get back into the shows, Davis informed Miller, "if you want two of your old boys that will stay with you write at once." Miller hired them right away, but as Moses notes, because the two were so overweight they couldn't sit on their ponies very well, Miller reduced their pay from $40 to $30 a month. James Pulliam, an Oglala with the 101, informed Pine Ridge agent Ernest Jermark in 1929 that "I like it fine here" (he was in Ogdensburg, New York). Pulliam added, "If I had to pay for what I have seen so far, I would be broke for the rest of my life." Along with four associates from Pine Ridge, Pulliam saved enough money from the show to buy a new Model A Ford, which they drove home to South Dakota once the tour ended.[38]

Although the money was better than what many Indians could have earned leasing land or farming, it was much less than what the show's non-Indian performers received. Whereas regular arena performers—including some of the more experienced Indians—typically earned between $35 and $50 a month, non-Indian headliners like Buck Taylor could expect to get as much as $200 a month. Superstars could count on much more, as when prize fighter and "Great White Hope" Jess Willard signed with the Miller brothers in 1915 to put on boxing shows for five months for a staggering $100,000. (The deal also in-

cluded a private railcar, chauffeur, automobile, chef, and porter.) If white cowboys didn't do as well as Willard, they nonetheless earned better wages than their Indian counterparts. When Indian dancers were taking home $5 a week in 1915, for example, experienced horsemen could earn $7.50 a day breaking horses. The gap between pay for men and women was also striking. Writing of Cody's show, Moses notes that well into the 1890s, Indian women "received the same considerations for medical care, food, and clothing as their husbands" but on average earned "ten, and occasionally fifteen, dollars a month (a little less than half the pay of an arena performer)." Wages did not rise significantly during the three or four decades in which the shows were popular. Indeed, one recruiter was paying wages in 1906 that Cody had offered in the 1880s.[39]

It was also true that government regulations could not always protect performers from the predatory actions of promoters like W. H. Barten, a self-styled talent agent for Wild West shows with a boundless penchant for self-reward. From 1906 to 1908 Barten secured dancers for the Miller Brothers with contracts that required Indians to surrender most of their pay to him as a crude rebate. One man signed on for $5 a week, for example, but by the terms of his contract had to return $4 to Barten. The performer's wife received $2.50 a week but had to return $1.50. Moreover, Barten demanded payment for his services before the shows paid the Indians, a tactic that led owners to deduct 10 percent of their Indian performers' wages as a service charge to settle their agreement with Barten. Performers and their families also suffered other unanticipated financial setbacks, as when the Miller Brothers pressed a claim for expenses associated with the death of one of their Indian employees (a young boy) during a 1907 tour. "We had his body embalmed and paid his expressage back to the Agency . . . which was $180. As he no doubt leaves an estate I presume this amount can be reimbursed to us." (It is interesting to note that the 101's 1909 show profits were $47,000; by 1915 they were $200,000. Cody took in $1 million in 1885.) Not all performers suffered this sort of abuse. When one of Cody's Indian performers died of tetanus in 1891, the showman promptly sent the widow $500 plus the deceased man's back wages of $120 and agreed to pay the woman $25 a month for the rest of her life. After 1885, Cody also enforced a provision known as the "hold back" whereby his performers were paid as much as a third of their wages after they returned home. The practice muted criticisms that performers were wasting their money and ignoring their relatives' needs.[40]

Just how high a standard of living the dancers enjoyed is difficult to assess. One enthusiastic writer reported in 1929 that performers with the 101

"are just like ball players in spring training. Sleeps and eats are to be had for light work. No pay until they play the schedule. But if admission is charged they split the gate. . . . [A]t a recent rehearsal the gate provided 26 performers with $5 each and left $20." Other accounts suggest that it was hardly "light work" and that the money wasn't always as good as $5 a day. Some performers lived hand-to-mouth on wages that kept them barely afloat. In 1907 a performer named High Chief implored Charles Shell at the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation to forward lease payments as soon as possible. "I get $8 per week," he noted, "my wife $3 and children $2 to $1 per week," but it wasn't enough to provide for his family's needs. Lillard High Chief, a performer with the 101 on tour in Suffolk, Virginia, during 1914 (apparently not the same High Chief mentioned earlier), pleaded for assistance on the grounds that "I am sick awful bad and I would like to get my mother's leace [sic] money so that I could go back their [sic] right away. The wild horse throw me of [sic] and [I] got hurt bad and [the show] didn't pay me for it, please send me the money, I need it bad." The agent wired $50 immediately. Others were not so lucky. In 1915, officials at the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation refused a request for lease funds because they did not believe the couple requesting the payment actually needed it. "He is getting $25 a month . . . and his wife $12.50 and all their expenses," went the explanation from the agency farmer, "so I see no reason why he should need this money and I think it would be a good idea . . . to save this twenty dollars a month until he comes home as he would probably spend it all if it was sent to him."[41]

And all too often performers were abandoned without pay. A group of fifteen was stranded in San Antonio in 1910 when their show's proprietor "left the whole bunch of us Indians here. . . . If we had [a] little money it would not be so bad, but the trouble of it is he still owes us for more than a month's wages." In an urgent appeal to the Cheyenne and Arapaho agent, the writer closed by noting that "the majority of these . . . are women folks[;] that is what makes it impossible to work our way home." Despite a letter from a San Antonian describing the group as "destitute," the agent replied that because more than half of the group had been given the privilege of managing their affairs some years prior, they "should go to work and earn sufficient money to bring themselves home." Apparently, San Antonio was a poor place indeed for performers to visit. Thirteen years later to the month and day, the city's International Fair Association informed the same agency that it had "sixteen Indians left on our hands . . . what will be done with them?"[42]

"WE BEEN HAVING A GOOD TIME"

Between 1880 and 1930, show dancing was an economically significant enterprise for many Indian people. Complicated by the tensions that arose between dancers who took pay as performers and audiences who thought of shows as merely entertainment to be purchased, working as a performer was not simply good or bad, not entirely enjoyable or entirely distasteful. Obviously, life as a show Indian was not always what aspiring performers had hoped for. They were racially marginalized, the overwhelming majority of the dancers were paid less than their non-Indian coworkers, and, as with the groups abandoned in San Antonio, they followed an avocation in which the gap between security and desperation was often narrow indeed. Their wages stagnated over time, and as Anne Butler and L. G. Moses observe, twentieth-century capitalism did little to broaden their economic opportunities. Still, many of them earned a living in which they took pride and by which they could achieve a measure of financial gain, often according to the only avenue open to them—as entertainers.[43]

The shows put money in performers' pockets when alternatives were limited and the chances of making it on their own at the reservations were stark. This is not to minimize the risks and problems, only to suggest that we should seek to understand both the economic incentives and the drawbacks of show dancing as complicated negotiations and decisions in which Indians and whites alike played pivotal roles. In the end, we are left with owners like the Millers, who pinched an Indian family for burial expenses, and Cody, who promised to do as well by his Indian performers as he could and did so in at least one case by providing for the needs of a widow. The hand-to-mouth life of Lillard High Chief, the young man whose injuries from being thrown off a horse forced him to plead for $50 of his mother's lease money, was set against the bounty Richard David reaped as a Wild West performer. And Indians who went on strike because they objected to manual labor were joined by those like Henry Pahocscut, who wrote to tell the Kiowa and Comanche agent in 1906 that "we are getting along very nicely with this show," adding that with the exception of three Comanches who left because the owner barred them from visiting the saloons, "we been having a good time."[44]

NOTES

1. This paragraph is based on L. G. Moses, *Wild West Shows and the Images of American Indians, 1883–1933* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), 101–103.

2. Moses addresses this issue, but his concern is with a larger story. John H. Moore, "How Giveaways and Pow-wows Redistribute the Means of Subsistence," in *The Po-*

litical Economy of North American Indians, ed. Moore (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 240–269, and Kenneth Ashworth, "The Contemporary Oklahoma Powwow" (PhD diss., University of Oklahoma, 1986), discuss economic issues, but neither addresses the formative era of shows and exhibitions, and Ashworth badly overstates the economic imperatives at work in contemporary Oklahoma powwows. The classic interpretation of how dance culture changed in the first half of the twentieth century remains James H. Howard, "Pan-Indian Culture of Oklahoma," *Scientific Monthly* 18 (1955): 215–220. For more recent accounts, see Clyde Ellis, "'We Don't Want Your Rations, We Want This Dance': The Changing Use of Song and Dance on the Southern Plains," *Western Historical Quarterly* 30, 2 (1999): 133–154; Clyde Ellis, "'There Is No Doubt . . . the Dances Should Be Curtailed': Indian Dances and Federal Policy on the Southern Plains, 1880–1930," *Pacific Historical Review* 70, 4 (November 2001): 543–569; Chris Goertzen, "Powwows and Identity on the Piedmont and Coastal Plains of North Carolina," *Ethnomusicology* 45, 1 (2000): 59–88; William K. Powers, *War Dance: Plains Indian Musical Performance* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1990); Charlotte Heth, ed., *Native American Dance: Ceremonies and Social Traditions* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992); William C. Meadows, *Kiowa, Apache, and Comanche Military Societies: Enduring Veterans, 1800 to the Present* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000); Luke Eric Lassiter, *The Power of Kiowa Song: A Collaborative Ethnography* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998); Luke Eric Lassiter, "'Charlie Brown': Not Just Another Essay on the Gourd Dance," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 21 (1997): 75–103; R. D. Theisz, "Song Texts and Their Performers: The Centerpiece of Contemporary Lakota Identity Formulation," *Great Plains Quarterly* 7 (Spring 1987): 116–124.

3. Moses, *Wild West Shows,* 101; Michael Wallis, *The Real Wild West: The 101 Ranch and the Creation of the American West* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), 141.

4. Rita G. Napier, "Across the Big Water: American Indians' Perceptions of Europe and Europeans, 1887–1906," in *Indians and Europe: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays,* ed. Christian F. Feest (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 385; Joy S. Kasson, *Buffalo Bill's Wild West: Celebrity, Memory, and Popular History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 174, 181; Robert M. Utley, *The Lance and the Shield: The Life and Times of Sitting Bull* (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), 260; Raymond J. DeMallie, ed., *The Sixth Grandfather: Black Elk's Teachings Given to John G. Neihardt* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 245–246; Moses, *Wild West Shows,* 44–46.

5. Wallis, *The Real Wild West,* 425; Kasson, *Buffalo Bill's Wild West,* 190–191.

6. Deloria quoted in Kasson, *Buffalo Bill's Wild West,* 163–164; Napier, "Across the Big Water," 400; Moses, *Wild West Shows,* 188, 279.

7. Wallis, *The Real Wild West,* 390–391; U.S. Indian Agent, Osage Indian Agency, to Samuel McCowan, June 24, 1903, Records of Chilocco School, "Fairs, June 1895–June 1903," Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City, hereafter cited as OHS; Ned P. DeWitt, "Behind the Scenes of the Old '101,'" March 24, 1929, Pawneee Agency Files, Section X, Miller Brothers 101 Ranch, OHS. On the dance bans, especially for the Southern Plains agencies, see Ellis, "There Is No Doubt."

8. Hiram Price to P. B. Hunt, October 24, 1884, Records of the Kiowa Agency, File Folder 49-1, "Kiowa Fairs, February 1, 1875–November 22, 1923" (hereafter cited as KA 49-1, "Kiowa Fairs"), OHS; Cato Sells to Superintendents, September 2, 1914, Circular 896, KA 49-1, "Kiowa Fairs"; Charles Burke to Superintendents, June 12, 1922, Records of the Pawnee Agency, Microfilm PA 45, "Indian Celebrations and Dances"

(hereafter cited as PA 45, "Indian Celebrations and Dances"), OHS; Charles Shell to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 25, 1909, Records of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency, Microfilm CAA 45, "Indian Dances" (hereafter cited as CAA 45, "Indian Dances"), OHS; Hubert E. Collins to Joseph Thoburn, August 8, 1932, Records of the Pawnee Agency, Section X, "Miller Brothers 101 Ranch," OHS; Edgar Barnett to U.S. Indian Agent, February 13, 1919, Records of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency, CAA 46, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions" (hereafter CAA 46, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions"), OHS. On federal policy and dancing see Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians,* 2 vols. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984): II, 646–647, 800–805.

9. R. G. Valentine to Indian School, Ponca, Oklahoma, August 2, 1912, PA 45, "Indian Celebrations and Dances"; L. S. Bonnin to Little Snake, June 13, 1924, Records of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency, Microfilm CAA 45, "Acculturation" (hereafter cited as CAA 45, "Acculturation"), OHS; John Whitewell to U.S. Indian Agent, September 3, 1902, CAA 45, "Indian Dances."

10. Chauncey Yellow Robe, "The Menace of the Wild West Show," *Quarterly Journal of the Society of American Indians* 2, 3 (September 1914): 223–224. It is worth noting the irony that Yellow Robe appeared in the kind of films he charged were misrepresenting Indians. He appeared in buckskins and a wig, for example, to introduce *Silent Enemy,* a 1930 film starring the Indian imposter Long Lance that relied on virtually every stereotype associated with Indians and nature.

11. E. H. Gohl, "The Effect of Wild Westing," *Quarterly Journal of the Society of American Indians* 2, 3 (September 1914): 226–228; emphasis in the original.

12. *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1883,* House Executive Document no. 1, 48th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1883), xi–xii.

13. *Annual Report of the Superintendent of Indian Schools, 1893,* in the *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1893* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1893), 395–396.

14. Ibid.

15. Edward P. Smith to Agents, Circular 3, February 1, 1875, KA 49-1, "Kiowa Fairs"; W. A. Mercer to U.S. Indian Agent, July 19, 1898, KA 49-1, "Kiowa Fairs"; *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1892* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1892), 61; W. A. Mercer to James Randlett, January 18, 1905, Records of the Kiowa Agency, Microfilm KA 47, "Quanah Parker," OHS.

16. Handbill for "Great Extra Attractions," in Ed Basye to Quapaw Agent, February 14, 1882, Records of the Quapaw Agency, Microfilm QA 17, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions" (hereafter QA 17, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions"), OHS; emphasis in the original.

17. H. A. Hall to Colonel James Randlett, August 3, 1905, Records of the Kiowa Agency, Microfilm KA 47, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions, July 30, 1875–May 13, 1924" (hereafter cited as KA 47, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions"), OHS; Peter Geller, "'Hudson's Bay Company Indians': Images of Native People and the Red River Pageant, 1920," in *Dressing in Feathers: The Construction of the Indian in American Popular Culture,* ed. S. Elizabeth Bird (Boulder: Westview, 1996), 67. On the era's fascination with native peoples, see Moses, *Wild West Shows,* chap. 1, "Before the Wild West Show"; Frederick Hoxie, *A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880–1920* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), especially chap. 3, "The Transformation of the Indian Question"; Nancy J. Parezo and John W. Troutman, "The 'Shy' Cocopa Go

to the Fair," in *Selling the Indian: Commercializing and Appropriating American Indian Cultures,* ed. Carter Jones Meyer and Diana Royer (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2001), 3–43.

18. Mark David Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of the National Parks* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 116–120; Robert Keller and Michael Turek, *American Indians and National Parks* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998), 39, 56–59; John Finger, *Cherokee Americans: The Eastern Band of the Cherokee Indians in the Twentieth Century* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 98–100. The idea of an outdoor drama was revived in 1950 as *Unto These Hills,* which remains a staple of the summer tourist season at the Eastern Cherokee Reservation in western North Carolina.

19. John Seger to Byron White, July 20, 1903, CAA 45, "Indian Dances."

20. William Freer to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 5, 1912, Records of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Agency, Microfilm CAA 46, "Indian Councils," OHS.

21. Napier, "Across the Big Water," 385; Moses, *Wild West Shows,* 8. For the Meriam Report statistics, see Arrell M. Gibson, *The American Indian: Prehistory to the Present* (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company, 1980), 536.

22. L. G. Moses, "Interpreting the Wild West, 1883–1914," in *Between Indian and White Worlds: The Cultural Broker,* ed. Margaret Connell Szasz (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), 165–166; Moses, *Wild West Shows,* 116.

23. C. Thornburg to Unknown, November 16, 1894, KA 47, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions."

24. Will Pyeatt to Comander [sic] in Chief, August 2, 1899, Records of the Kiowa Agency, KA 47, "Indian Celebrations and Dances, May 8, 1874–June 22, 1917" (hereafter KA 47, "Indian Celebrations and Dances"), OHS.

25. C. F. Larrabee to Lt. Colonel G.W.H. Stouch, March 29 and May 20, 1905, CAA 46, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions"; Zack Mulhall to John Blackmon, June 9, 1907, KA 47, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions," OHS.

26. W. B. Garnett to Major James Randlett, September 28, 1901, KA 49-1, "Kiowa Fairs"; G. C. Brewer to Major James Randlett, September 29, 1901, KA 49-1, "Kiowa Fairs"; M. F. Wren to Principal of Cantonment Schools, June 6, 1905, CAA 46, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions"; Charles Grant to William B. Freer, July 5, 1910, and S. W. Morris to Walter Dickins, March 23, 1910, Records for the Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency, Microfilm CAA 46, "Indian Fairs, September 19, 1906–December 31, 1910" (hereafter cited as CAA 46, "Indian Fairs"), OHS.

27. William A. Jones to Lee Patrick, March 22, 1898, Records of the Sac and Fox and Shawnee Agency, Microfilm SF 36, "Indian Fairs" (hereafter SF 36, "Indian Fairs"), OHS; Samuel McCowan to T. W. Potter, January 25, 1904, Records of the Chilocco School, "Fairs, January 16, 1904–January 31, 1904," OHS; Frank A. Thackery to S. M. McCowen [sic], November 11, 1903, Records of the Chilocco School, "Fairs, November 1903," OHS; Reverend Henry Gibbs to S. M. McCowan, July 21, 1903, and S. M. McCowan to Reverend Henry Gibbs, December 11, 1903, Records of the Chilocco School, "Fairs, July 1903," OHS.

28. B. F. Bennett to L. S. Bonnin, June 27, 1923, Records of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency, Microfilm CAA 45, "Indian Celebrations, July 4, 1882–October 15, 1932" (hereafter cited as CAA 45, "Indian Celebrations"), OHS.

29. For a discussion of how officials and Indians alike negotiated the dance bans and various other regulations, see Ellis, "There Is No Doubt."

30. Newspaper clipping, "Indian Features," 1909, and Charles Shell to L. L. Legtees, August 17, 1909, both in CAA 46, "Indian Fairs"; Hoxie, *A Final Promise,* 5; Moses, *Wild West Shows,* 39.

31. Cato Sells to Superintendents, March 18, 1914, KA 49-1, "Kiowa Fairs"; "Statement of Expenditures Under Various Heads," ca. 1900, and "Program and Premium List for the Indian Fair at Weatherford, October 18–20, 1910," CAA 46, "Indian Fairs."

32. *Wichita Eagle,* August 28, 1902, CAA 45, "Indian Dances."

33. Kasson, *Buffalo Bill's Wild West,* 170, 174; Utley, *The Lance and the Shield,* 261, 264.

34. Farrand Sayre to S. M. McCowan, September 20, 1903, Records of the Chilocco School, "Fairs, October 1903," OHS.

35. N. F. Shabert and W. R. Haynes to Commissioners of the Louisiana Exposition, April 25, 1903, Records of the Chilocco School, "Fairs, June 1895–June 1903," OHS; Wallis, *The Real Wild West,* 247–248.

36. See Sarah J. Blackstone, *Buckskins, Bullets, and Business: A History of Buffalo Bill's Wild West* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986); W. A. Husted to Frank Baldwin, May 8, 1896, KA 47, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions"; D. Bigman to Byron White, September 7, 1903, CAA 46, "Indian Fairs"; Wallis, *The Real Wild West,* 273, 341.

37. Moses, *Wild West Shows,* 181–182; J. G. Collins to R. P. Stamon, March 7, 1914, Records of the Pawnee Agency, Microfilm PA 45, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions" (hereafter cited as PA 45, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions"), OHS"; L. G. Moses, personal communication with the author, August 28, 2001.

38. Kasson, *Buffalo Bill's Wild West,* 188–189; D. Bigman to Byron White, September 3, 1903, CAA 46, "Indian Fairs"; Julia Roy to Unknown, May 1, 1914, PA 45, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions"; Moses, *Wild West Shows,* 182–183, 265.

39. Wallis, *The Real Wild West,* 431–432, 444; Moses, *Wild West Shows,* 85.

40. Moses, *Wild West Shows,* 122, 173–176, 256; Miller Brothers to Cheyenne and Arapaho Agent, February 2, 1908, CAA 46, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions."

41. DeWitt, "Behind the Scenes of the Old '101'"; High Chief to Charles Shell, March 12, 1907, and Lillard High Chief to Unknown, September 30, 1914; Agency Farmer to W. W. Scott, March 1, 1915, all in CAA 46, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions."

42. Mack Hagg, Coyote, Red Cloud et al. to Agent, November 23, 1910; Sam Grayson to Agent, November 25, 1910; William Freer to Sam Grayson, December 7, 1910, all in CAA 46, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions"; Telegram from San Antonio International Fair Association to United States Indian Agent, November 22, 1923, KA 49-1, "Kiowa Fairs." Although included in the Kiowa Agency files, this letter was addressed to the Cheyenne and Arapaho agent.

43. Anne M. Butler, "Selling the Popular Myth," in *The Oxford History of the American West,* ed. Clyde A. Milner II, Carol A. O'Connor, and Martha Sandweiss (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 780; Moses, *Wild West Shows,* 277.

44. Henry Pahocscut to John Blackmon, April 14, 1906, KA 47, "Indians with Shows and Exhibitions."

CHAPTER TEN

Land, Labor, and Leadership: The Political Economy of Hualapai Community Building, 1910–1940

JEFFREY P. SHEPHERD

Increasingly, scholars are exploring the complex interplay between economic change and cultural identity, in which native communities and individuals respond creatively to the challenges posed by capitalism and wage labor. Utilizing political economy as his interpretive framework, Jeffrey Shepherd explores the ways Hualapais incorporated changes around them into their individual and collective worldviews and agendas. In doing so he moves beyond agency and adaptation, persistence and innovation, and suggests that scholars consider how "incorporation," frequently seen as a unidi-

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rectional, not to mention wholly destructive, phenomenon, can in fact be multifaceted and constructive.

When Hualapais irrigated their crops from rivers and streams in northwest Arizona, long before non-Indians migrated to the region, they engaged in economic development. When Hualapais participated in extensive trade networks that connected people from present-day southern California to northern New Mexico, they became a vital link in an intricate chain of diverse cultures seeking mutual economic gain and community security. And as local and not-so-local political alliances shifted, Hualapais adapted to these changes and sought new alliances with different people, much like they adjusted to environmental conditions such as drought, flood, erosion, or overuse of hunting grounds. Their responses to these economic, political, cultural, and environmental fluctuations provided them with a rich array of individual and community values that persisted into a new era of their history best represented by wage labor, nonnative migrants, cattle ranching, mining companies, and, of course, American capitalism.

For several decades after Hualapais' first interactions with these newcomers, they had to adapt to changes in federal policy that ranged from the forced assimilation of their land and identity into the American body politic to the tentative support for a reservation-based culture and society. Hualapais, much like other American Indians, now had to decide how they would react to capitalist industrialization and the impact of railroads, demographic growth, wage labor, and other manifestations of marketplace economics. They also had to respond to the imposition of nonnative forms of political representation and new conceptualizations of humans' relationship with the natural world. But rather than simply react, they incorporated the changes around them into their individual and collective worldviews and agendas. Their history reflected a now familiar combination of adaptation and resistance, continuity and change.

Between 1910 and World War II, the Hualapai economy rested on wage labor in regional industries and a tribal cattle business on the reservation. These developments represented two competing tendencies: increased integration into regional and national markets and a tenuous preservation of tribal self-determination. More specifically, Hualapais had to embrace wage labor to survive the demands of a cash economy, but they tried to do so in ways that made sense to them as a distinct group of people with important beliefs and values. As Hualapais engaged the marketplace, they confronted several crucial issues at the nexus of economic change and cultural identity. How did Hualapais

perceive these new systems? To what extent could they truly control the nature and scope of interactions with capitalist development? Why did they adopt particular patterns and strategies in response to development, and what were the implications for Hualapai culture?[1] Answers to these questions rest in larger patterns seen throughout Indian history whereby communities relied on kinship networks, band structure, and knowledge of the regional environment to selectively incorporate elements of capitalist development into their cultural identity. Capitalism undoubtedly demanded that Hualapais confront new institutional and social arrangements, but individuals challenged and modified many of the assumptions underlying this new economic regime.

A growing chorus of authors has investigated this interplay between cultural identity and economic change in American Indian communities, and this chapter seeks to contribute to that discourse. Yet this chapter attempts to investigate the nuances and particularities of some of the important topics, eras, and themes illuminated by leading scholars in the field.[2] For instance, when scholars discuss labor specifically, they often focus on experiences in the Civilian Conservation Corps, war industries, and relocation programs without critically analyzing how Indian labor relates to band and tribal identity, how wage work becomes part of "new tribal traditions," or how individuals might find wage labor attractive and useful. At worst, Indian people appear as hopeless victims forced to work for wages rather than as creative and flexible individuals choosing wage labor as an economic strategy that might also maintain cultural institutions. This does not mean, however, that native individuals have enjoyed the same options and opportunities granted non-Indians, and it should not imply that American Indians happily or easily embraced these changes. The complex web of relations between economics and identity produced a collage of responses and competing agendas shaped by human emotion, tradition, and pragmatism. Tracing these relationships requires us to avoid dichotomies that polarize or distort the lives and identities of Indians in relation to economic change.[3] Older traditions persisted, new ones emerged, and both helped tribes cope with the impact of "progress and modernization" on the cultural and economic practices of non-European peoples.[4]

These themes require numerous methodologies and interpretive perspectives, but I embrace political-economy generally to illustrate how Hualapais experienced these regional changes. Political-economy is a useful framework because it links the political decisions of Pai bands to the economic structures surrounding them. These political decisions, in turn, were intertwined with cultural ideals that shape kinship networks, social obligations, and ties to the

land. Political structures within Pai society were rooted in the allocation of resources such as food, thus linking them back to economy, but the structures also reflected symbolic cultural representations of leadership and legitimacy. The degree to which Pai bands served as social organizing principles depended on the internal commitments to them as viable, familiar, and useful versus the competing external factors—particularly capitalism—pressuring them to splinter.

Pais valued the nature of their society, but by 1900 many Pai leaders speculated that political, ethnic, and economic unity was preferable to total resistance even if it meant coalescing under the term, category, or symbol *tribe.* Charting such a moderate course ultimately enabled them to maintain some of their "old ways" within economic structures that appeared inimical to their values and beliefs. Negotiations like this also provided them with political skills to protest against local, regional, and federal demands on their tribal sovereignty. Political-economy is not the only interpretive stance, but it nonetheless helps demonstrate how these thirteen Pai bands negotiated wage labor regimes and evolved into the "Hualapai Tribe," which, in turn, struggled to build a viable community on the reservation. Their decision to hold on to a distinct homeland and forge a common identity should prove that Hualapais were not powerless victims, one-dimensional relics of the past, or monochromatic economic beings. Their decisions should, however, demonstrate the vitality of Hualapai identity in the twentieth century.

HISTORY, PLACE, AND IDENTITY

The Hualapai, Yavapai, and Havasupai are members of the Pai branch of the Upland Yuman language group in what are now Arizona, California, Nevada, and southern Utah. The name *Hualapai* translates to "People of the Ponderosa Pines" and refers specifically to one of thirteen Pai bands that occupied nearly 5 million acres in northwest Arizona. Oral histories locate Pai origins in Spirit Mountain, on the Colorado River near present-day Davis Dam.[5] Pais migrated from Spirit Mountain and populated the region where they developed distinct social structures knit together by origin stories, sense of place, and language. Anthropological and ethnographic work spanning nearly a century roughly echoes this assessment. Scholars have debated pre- and early contact Pai history for nearly a century, but although they often disagree on historical and methodological grounds, most generally agree that bands of families formed the foundation of Pai society. Bands congregated in specific camps, where they maintained small irrigated farms and seasonally migrated around the region in search of game and plants.[6] Political alliances and interband re-

lationships shifted depending on a variety of environmental, economic, and social factors—often coalescing into what some scholars termed *subtribes,* led by "headmen" chosen largely on the basis of familial status, diplomatic skill, and intelligence.[7] Linguistic similarities and interband marriages cemented relationships and fostered the appearance of "tribal" cohesion noted by non-Indian observers in the nineteenth century.[8] Finally, interaction with non-Indians and administrative structures imposed by the Indian Bureau contributed to the coalescing of Pai bands into the "Hualapai" Nation.[9]

Hualapais' experiences with non-Indians during the 1860s and 1870s profoundly affected their social, cultural, and political organization. In 1863, mining enterprises in the middle of Hualapai territory convinced Schrum, the principal leader of the Middle Mountain Band, to trade Pai buckskins for blankets and blankets for guns and horses in preparation for conflict.[10] The unprovoked murder of Pai leader Wauba Yuma sparked the "Walapai Wars" from 1865 to 1869, which brought death and destruction to Pai communities. In 1874 the U.S. Army relocated and interned most of the people 100 miles south to La Paz, Arizona, on the Colorado River Reservation.[11] A year later Hualapais escaped and returned north to their homelands, only to find cattle ranchers, mining companies, and frontier towns dotting the landscape. Cattle companies used traditional water sources, settlers shot animals essential for Pai dietary needs, and Anglo attempts at agriculture ruined important native plants. These intrusions necessitated significant adaptation if Pais hoped to survive the new world they now inhabited.

WAGE LABOR AS A CULTURAL SURVIVAL MECHANISM

Although the Hualapai Reservation became the central location for Hualapais in the mid-twentieth century, its creation in 1883 did not tangibly change their condition. The 1 million acres constituted only a fifth of Pai aboriginal territory that stretched westward from Seligman to the present Arizona-California border and southward to the Bill Williams River. The rugged terrain and rolling high desert country that became the home to several Pai bands were unfamiliar to others who lived further to the west and south. Moreover, the executive order reservation encompassed only a portion of Pai hunting grounds. So when Pais returned from La Paz, they had to decide how they would live with new towns, industries, laws, political structures, and economic relationships. Making a living and preserving their families became the first and most immediate goal for the people, and many looked toward the new economic system to achieve this.

Arizona Indians were familiar with the new economic realities, and many chose wage labor as a potential pathway for cultural and economic survival. To a considerable degree, many had little choice. Native workers found employment in cattle ranching, mining, agriculture, railroads, and tourism, as well as in several budding towns.[12] Apaches, Tohono O'odham, Maricopas, Yaquis, Navajos, Hualapais, Mohaves, and others had worked in copper mines, in cotton fields, and on railroads in eastern and south-central Arizona territory for decades. By 1915, Indians in the Salt River Valley worked in the 36,000 acres of long staple cotton. Growers' associations advertised good working conditions and promised a future for the nearly 50,000 Indians in the state "wanting to work."[13] The vice president of the Santa Fe Railroad wanted to hire more Indians on its line, west of the Navajo and Hopi Reservations, and hoped the recently built houses for laborers would encourage "more consistent" work patterns.[14]

However erratic and whimsical their work habits appeared to employers, Hualapais strove to incorporate wage labor into the social context and economies of their camps and kinship networks.[15] Hualapais grappled with the meaning of the markets, and their motivations for work reflected cultural beliefs partially at odds with the expectations of capitalists. Whereas managers viewed employees as resources to integrate into the larger process of industrial capitalism, Hualapais perceived employment as a "resource" to integrate into their larger cultural and environmental landscape. Instead of becoming part of a rural proletariat, Hualapais traded jobs between family or band members to lessen the toll taken by manual labor. The monotony of the work and a tradition of rotating hunting excursions also compelled Hualapais to change jobs frequently so that several band members shared a single position in an industry.[16] Trading work also diffused the physical effects of labor exploitation common to industries of the era.

Eventually, Hualapais and managers created a continuum of labor relationships rooted in two divergent value systems. At the extreme embraced by capital, Hualapais represented a local labor pool managers could exploit by paying them low wages, relegating them to the most difficult work, and firing them before they fired non-Indians. Conversely, cultural and economic self-determination represented the opposite extreme embraced by Hualapais. Most interactions between Hualapai workers and regional industries fluctuated between the two poles of this value system. For instance, employers could not simply exploit Hualapais when they depended on Indian labor for seasonal agricultural harvests or in remote regions Anglos avoided. Hualapais

could also avoid dependency by relying on economic support provided by kinship ties. Men avoided wage labor by hunting in the mountains, whereas women gathered piñon nuts to sell in town. Yet Hualapais needed wages to buy cloth, food, and other necessities they could not acquire as easily since cattle ranchers, farmers, and other new arrivals had occupied historic Hualapai homelands. Although employers and managers benefited more from economic inequalities, tribal members did retain some control over their choices and actions. Indeed, if Hualapais wanted to survive, they had to embrace some aspects of the new economy.[17]

Geographic settlement patterns of Hualapai families illustrate how communities and individuals integrated wage labor into their cultural landscape. Like Linkinyoga and the 26 members of his small camp near Hackberry, most Hualapais worked on the railroad and packed hay for ranchers who paid them wages and treated them moderately well. Women and young Hualapai girls washed clothes for residents to supplement male hunting-and-gathering activities. Five families totaling nearly 60 people lived in or near Kingman and worked on the railroad and at a stamp mill as well as herding cattle and sheep for wages. Many of these families occupied public or private lands and built small but rickety houses. A group of 23 people led by Leve-Leve resided in the Hualapai Mountains east of Kingman where they grew vegetables until the city relocated them in the 1920s. Hualapai Charley lived near Canyon Station, along the Santa Fe Railroad, with 14 people, stock, and a fenced garden. Thus, Hualapais combined wage labor with traditional subsistence patterns to support their families in traditional places and locations.[18]

These labor trends continued into the following decades. One report noted over 100 Hualapais working in mines, for cattlemen, or for the Santa Fe, and at least 6 people joined the Barnum and Bailey Circus. An agency census reported that most Hualapais lived without rations and most earned $1.50 a day, whereas some of the best Hualapai cowboys received a monthly salary of $35.00. In 1925, 12 Hualapais worked in the mines in the immediate vicinity, earning $5 a day, whereas others in Kingman worked as chauffeurs, in a saloon, and in a barbershop. The railroad continued employing some Hualapais in the baggage department at $160 a month, and a utility company employed 2 Hualapais as general laborers. Even a slaughterhouse employed 1 Hualapai, who the manager claimed was "as good a beef skinner as any white man," and he earned $7.50 a week to support his family. Hualapais also worked in a Kingman department store and hotel, where they cleaned rooms and waited on customers.[19]

Hualapai women played an important role in the ways bands and families adapted to economic change in northwest Arizona, but it has been difficult to find documentary evidence of this, most likely because of biases of observers and agency employees. Although many scholars have investigated the intersection of labor and gender regarding women of other races and ethnicities, only a few have seriously analyzed the role of Indian women as wage laborers in the United States during the early twentieth century. This omission is disconcerting, since thousands of native women worked in their own homes and farms, as well as in the houses and fields of Anglo and African Americans. Many women worked in schools, for the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and in various service-sector jobs. Insightful studies by Beatrice Medicine, Patricia Albers, Theda Perdue, Martha Knack, Gretchen Bataille, Katherine Osburne, and others have begun to address native women's labor and its cultural implications, and it is hoped scholars will continue this path of research.[20]

Native women indisputably worked and labored for wages in new industries across the United States before World War II. In particular, Hualapai women played a crucial role in providing income to their families by working in the homes of Anglo women as domestics in towns such as Kingman, Seligman, and Hackberry. Women also tended the gardens of Anglos and frequently worked on farms alongside their husbands, brothers, fathers, and sons. Indeed, Hualapai women often worked twice as hard as and frequently earned more than men since they worked in the camps at home and for wages in town. In 1905, Superintendent Gates observed this and noted in his records that women made the most money in some families because of their work as domestics and their efforts selling baskets to tourists.[21] When jobs proved scarce a few women took their craftwork into grocery stores and markets and tried to trade for goods or clothing, whereas others obtained credit from merchants and repaid them when they could. This infusion of cash generally provided women with new opportunities, such as increased mobility, greater personal independence, and increased contributions to the family economy. Although Hualapai women relied on the wages to purchase food and other household items, they also used the cash to visit nearby camps and to attend social gatherings and ceremonies held by Mohaves, Chemehuevies, and other tribes in northwest Arizona.[22]

As men and women adapted to the gendered dimensions of capitalist penetration, Hualapais continued to grapple with the cultural implications of wage labor and the larger structural context behind it. For instance, regional demo-

graphic changes sparked by the categorization of land as private property altered many native subsistence activities. Local industrialization also attenuated many of the hunting parties that had enabled men to establish themselves as leaders and providers for their people. New laws and the imposition of foreign political boundaries, in turn, threatened to undermine the multitribal trade networks that for years had generated material wealth for Pai communities across the region. As a result, band and family leaders had to find new ways of maintaining authority and prestige among their people, not to mention providing them with food and shelter. Many Hualapais adapted to these changes by engaging the invasive economic regime as "labor contractors," "jobbers," or "crew leaders" who coordinated relationships between band members and employers.[23] Many astute Hualapais understood that employers preferred to rely on a single person to help recruit workers for seasonal or temporary labor so they did not have to search the region for people. By situating themselves between band members and potential employers, Pai leaders could re-create their positions of authority by providing band members with jobs and economic stability.

As crew leaders in a new economic regime, these individuals frequently gathered men and women from outside their own band or family structure. Membership in these labor gangs was more fluid than membership in bands defined by kinship and geography. Labor gangs helped dissolve distinctions between bands by increasing "interband" relations and unintentionally reinforcing a more overarching "tribal" identity. This phenomenon bears out with the lives of several Hualapais. In the early 1880s, Major Julius Wilson noted that Schrum, Hualapai Charley, Sookwana, Mocohone, and Wathutama had responsibility for several dozen workers who were from other bands, as well as their own.[24] Officials noted that Schrum had one of the largest followings, "with a [large] band of Wallapais whose services he farms out to the mine owners."[25] As the Santa Fe Railroad moved into Hualapai country, Schrum and others contracted men for the numerous stations to work as baggage handlers, cleaners, and maintenance men.[26] Hualapais began a similar relationship with the Grand Canyon Lime and Cement Corporation in the 1890s. Hualapai "contractors" recruited band members from the region to cut cedar and pine from local forests and sell it to the company to fuel its blast furnaces. Individuals received $2.75 per cord and reduced rates for supplies from the company, but the BIA ended the activities after World War I because they interfered with the superintendent's efforts to encourage more Hualapais to live on the reservation.[27]

Whereas many Pais responded to capitalist development by solidifying ties across band identities, others had more individualistic reactions. Indian Grover was from the Big Sandy Band of Pais, approximately sixty miles south of the reservation. He and his family had a garden and cattle, and they worked sporadically for nearby whites. In 1919 he submitted an application for title to land on the Big Sandy, and in his testimony to the Department of the Interior he stated, "I have resided on this land practically all my life; since 1905 I have had possession of it and had lived continuously on the land, and have cultivated about eight acres of it." Additionally, he had "a frame house upon the land . . . about fourteen [square] feet this house, and I have lived there since 1905." Grover still had to work for ranchers and farmers to supplement his income, but he believed title to the land would assure him of a stable life.[28] He wanted the land "as an Indian allotment," declaring that he was an "Indian of full blood, and a member of the Walapai tribe."[29] On his land he hoped to use occasional temporary wage labor to supplement his long-term goal of farming.[30]

CATTLE RANCHING: FROM WAGE LABOR TO TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Cattle ranching as a native development strategy drew upon Hualapais' experiences with wage work, and it eventually became the most important industry on the reservation. Despite its ambiguous effect on Hualapai society, it created economic opportunities for many tribes across the West, especially in arid regions.[31] Hualapai experiences with ranching dated back to the 1860s when thousands of cattle grazed on the open range. In those early decades Hualapais "stole" cattle, worked for the better-paying ranchers, and eventually lobbied state and national authorities to remove ranchers from their land.[32] Ranchers' experiences with Hualapais proved equally ambivalent, since they depended on Hualapais to maintain their farms and assist with roundups; but they found some Hualapais difficult to deal with, "undependable," and inscrutable. Moreover, many ranchers wanted to open the Hualapai Reservation for allotment and relocate the "difficult" Hualapais to the Colorado River Reservation several hundred miles to the south.[33]

After several decades of working in the cattle industry, many Hualapais wanted to begin their own livestock operation on the reservation. Lack of capital, economic competition, hostility from non-Indians, and BIA restrictions complicated Hualapais' attempts at organizing a cattle association. Previously, Hualapais had confronted the new cash economy with marginal success, but accumulating the resources to start a herd proved more difficult. Banks re-

fused them loans, and merchants overcharged them for supplies. Few Hualapais fully understood the technical aspects of range management, and those who did had difficulty hydrating their cattle.[34] Hualapais confronted more obstacles, since Anglo ranchers had run thousands of cattle on the reservation decades before tribal members had the opportunity to start their own operations.[35] Additionally, Hualapais spent considerable energy combating the local movement to allot their reservation by ranchers who never thought the tribe deserved the land in the first place.[36]

Fortunately, several factors merged between 1910 and 1920 to facilitate a reservation cattle operation. Whereas the BIA, through the Dawes Act and related measures, promoted individualized agriculture on private property as the highest form of assimilation, when applied to the arid Southwest this agrarian ideal collided with environmental conditions.[37] Dry farming and the well-known romance with giant dams on the Columbia and Colorado would alleviate some of the problems in arid lands, but most reservations still lacked the water they needed to develop significant farms. Cattle ranching provided an alternative to agriculture on the Hualapai Reservation, so in 1914, Superintendent Charles E. Shell assigned fifteen families ten head of cattle each, charged them for the stock, and informed them that they had to repay the debt within five years.[38] In addition to cattle assigned to individual tribal members, in 1915 Shell began a tribal cattle herd for the benefit of the entire community. In doing so, he planned to transform the Hualapais into capitalist entrepreneurs who embraced individual accumulation of private property. For Shell and the BIA, the cattle industry was as much an economic endeavor as it was an instrument of social control and cultural change. Indeed, families resented this assault on their culture, and a few people eventually seceded from raising cattle.[39] Cattle sales slowly generated additional income, which the agent invested in reservation infrastructure and, in 1916, in an expanded tribal herd of 900 cattle and 100 horses.[40] Ranching, according to Peter Iverson, did indeed enable "Native communities to build a local economy and rebuild a society."[41]

Despite these efforts, agents' ambivalence toward the cattle industry proved frustrating. Hualapais wanted the ranchers off the reservation, but agents countered that grazing fees generated income when he could collect them. In approving lease applications submitted by Anglo ranchers, Shell acknowledged that "no applicant has been denied a permit except where it was thought that more stock would over-graze and injure the range."[42] So although Shell provided more cattle to individual tribal members, he also approved grazing permits for 10,000 head of white-owned cattle, which might provide an annual

income of $15,540.[43] To complicate the matter, in a letter to the commissioner, Shell said, "As a matter of truth, the reservation is not fit for an Indian reservation but it belongs to the Indians," an ironic point since individual Hualapais avoided the reservation because Anglo ranchers monopolized already scarce water supplies.[44]

Hualapais reacted to this complex economic and environmental condition by protesting the situation on and off the reservation. Many of these protests highlighted the fact that tribal leadership had evolved into a hybrid mixture of older cultural characteristics indicative of Hualapais' decentralized band structure and "modern" institutions influenced by the new political and economic landscape. Despite inevitable internal differences, Hualapais seemed to present a somewhat unified voice in the region's affairs, as leaders of a few bands now tentatively represented more than a dozen increasingly interconnected ones. Reports from the Board of Indian Commissioners stated that Hualapais questioned the practices of Superintendent Shell and several employees in charge of the tribal herd. Hualapais also complained that Shell treated them poorly and refused to listen to their thoughts on running the herd. The commissioner reprimanded the superintendent and replaced the other employees in an effort to address the contested situation on the reservation. At the end of 1918 the association's report stated that the tribe had cooperated with the new plans for the cattle industry.[45]

POLITICAL RESPONSES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Continuing difficulties with the cattle industry prompted leaders to demand an investigation into conditions on the reservation. In 1923, tribal members signed petitions to the BIA protesting the leasing situation, and Fred Mahone echoed that discontent in a letter to the commissioner: "For forty years, 1883 to 1923, our government collected thousands of dollars per year from lease holders upon the Wallapai Indian Reservation and such sums are held in the U.S. Treasury at Washington D.C. to be released to all Wallapai Indians in equal shares." He also addressed the cattle-leasing issue:

> We want the use of these reserve funds for the purpose of developing the reservation in approved businesslike enterprises, employing our own people under a competent manager [and] we want freedom from the "restrictions or wardships" under which Indians exist. We want all reservation land leases cancelled and leasees removed in our favor so that we may occupy the grazing land and use the waters upon it.[46]

Mahone elaborated on the relationship between the community, land, and even the United States: "We want to be as AMERICANS are, free to develop our resources, as a community, and to hold as community property, our reservation land for . . . future generations. No separate allotments do we desire, but urge that the Executive Order of January 4, 1883 be enforced."[47] This was a particularly powerful statement, since Mahone defined Americanism in terms of property held collectively rather than individually.

Mahone's comments highlighted the interaction among Hualapai land, leadership, and community in the midst of rapid economic change. And just as Hualapai culture tried to absorb the impact of the new economy by altering the meaning and duration of work, Hualapai leadership channeled the new political currents to the long-term benefit of the tribe. Yet Hualapais' twentieth-century political structure, although influenced by new ideologies, still retained elements of "the old ways." Leadership during this era depended on the characteristics of precontact Pai identity that enabled Hualapais to formalize older leadership organizations to address contemporary concerns.[48] Leaders still acted independently, but they also formed multiband institutions and a pre–Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) Tribal Council to present their grievances. These hybrid bodies spanned generations, nurtured traditional patterns, knitted bands together, and reflected individual achievement as well as community concerns.

Traditional Hualapai leadership grew out of the broad basis of extended family relations constituting thirteen regional bands. These bands occasionally met under the representation of three "subtribes" to voice the perspectives of individual bands and families.[49] The leaders of these bands and subtribes had to possess these qualities: *Tokumet,* which meant "generally respected"; *Akinami,* which recognized the individual's accomplishments; and *pakawhat,* or talker, which referred to an individual's oratorical abilities. Marriage across bands provided a limited but nonetheless important indicator of leadership, and reciprocity and kinship also bound the bands together.[50] Hereditary lineage conferred some legitimacy on individuals but did not preclude intelligence and diplomacy. Finally, leadership required good judgment, care for the general welfare of the tribe, and an overall sense of justice.[51]

These qualities remained important during the early twentieth century, when Hualapai politics centered on the efforts of the "Welfare Committee" and the pre–Indian Reorganization Act Tribal Council, which coalesced in the 1920s.[52] In 1919 the Tribal Council protested the renewing of grazing leases on the reservation and requested control of the tribal herd from the agents running

it.[53] In 1925, Hualapais living in and near Kingman created a Welfare Committee, with a speaker and a chairman, to address individual civil rights off the reservation and tribal land rights on the reservation. The committee met with Kingman leaders to discuss education, treatment of tribal workers, and the status of Hualapai camps on the outskirts of town. The committee provided Hualapais with an important venue for developing leadership skills and concentrating band identity into a more centralized institution that professed to represent the interests of many individuals.[54] Yet although these new institutions helped people adapt to changing political and economic conditions, they also undermined band identities by shifting decision making from band leaders to the leaders of the new institutions, which increasingly represented "the Hualapai" as a politically and ethnically distinct group of people.

A series of events in the 1920s illustrates the concerns of the Welfare Committee and the pre-IRA Tribal Council. Since 1920, tribal members had complained about Superintendent William Light and his management of economic affairs for the Hualapai, and their concerns culminated in an inspection by a federal investigator, John T. Atwater. Council members protested leases to Anglo cattlemen and miners, the arrangement of grazing units, the handling of cattle monies, and Light's general attitude toward the tribe. Jim and Fred Mahone, Steve Leve Leve, Ray Parker, Edith Wellington, and others signed petitions and offered testimony against Light.[55] A 1922 investigation exonerated Light, but Hualapais remained frustrated with the policies imposed upon them, and many wanted direct control of the cattle industry. This desire to engage capitalist institutions with a tribally run business venture provided a focal point for Hualapai energies throughout the decade. For instance, in 1927 Bob Schrum advocated an end to leasing tribal land: "We are much disturbed about our land leased to cattlemen. We asked [sic] that it shall not be renewed. We want to use our reservation from now on." Schrum argued that the leasing system kept the tribe off the land, and he addressed the assumption that Hualapais did not want to live on the reservation: "There are Indians who wish to establish a home. But the agent objected, that we must stay out of the land that [is] leased to cattlemen. Why?"[56]

Correspondence in 1928 echoed similar concerns and illustrated the role of the committee. Responding to a meeting with BIA officials, the members of the "executive committee of the Walapai Tribe" expressed their grievances to Arizona senator Lynn K. Frazier and requested "the President of the United States and the Attorney General to assign attorneys for the Walapai Tribe on

the Peach Springs water case." The case involved a growing debate over conflicting claims to natural springs on the reservation. Philip Quasala, Chief Bob Schrum, and Jim Fielding signed the letter and reminded the officials of the tribe's service in the "Great War" and its participation in the nineteenth-century Apache campaigns. The committee even told Senator Frazier that he could find maps in the U.S. Surveyor General's Office in Phoenix proving that the land belonged to the tribe.[57]

Drought in the late 1920s and early 1930s hurt the cattle industry and exacerbated preexisting tensions with the BIA. Agency workers slaughtered cattle to reduce the impact of grazing on the range but failed to consult Hualapai cattle owners, even though decades of underregulated grazing caused much of the original erosion. The BIA denied culpability, although it contributed to the situation by allowing white ranchers to graze their cattle. Forecasting programs of the 1930s on other reservations in the Southwest, the decision to reduce range capacity in the late 1920s penalized the Hualapai just when the tribal cattle industry began to succeed.[58] In 1931 several Hualapai cattlemen contacted the Indian Rights Association to protest previous stock reduction and Superintendent D. H. Watson's management of the herd. Writing on behalf of "all Walapai Cattle Men," Fred Mahone said he and the others wanted to "move all our cattle at our own time and expense" on the reservation.[59] He noted a meeting in which "a heavy argument developed . . . between Watson and the Cattlemen" over Watson's decision to withhold money from sales to force Hualapais to follow his directions. Mahone requested assistance from S. M. Brosius of the Indian Rights Association who contacted Commissioner Rhoads.[60] In response, D. H. Watson wrote, "With reference to the letter of October 3rd written to Mr. Brosius by Fred Mahone and complaining of the cattle situation, this is just another effusion from an inveterate trouble maker and has little foundation in fact."[61]

Testimony from another round of hearings highlighted debates over cattle ranching, labor, land rights, and identity. In May 1930, representatives from Congress, Arizona, and the Department of the Interior held meetings at the agency in Valentine to clarify the legal ownership of nearly half the reservation. Nearly thirty Hualapais sat behind prominent Hualapais Kate Crozier and Bob Schrum, son of Chief Schrum. Both answered questions posed by Special Commissioner H. J. Hagerman and BIA officials. In an effort to deflect the discussion away from the land debate with the Santa Fe Railway, Hagerman implied that the tribe did not deserve the land because it had failed to utilize the range, but Bob Schrum returned to the original issue: "We once had this

whole country to ourselves, but were put on a small reservation by the Government, and the Railroad is now after this reservation. We lived here before the white men came into this country, therefore it is ours."[62] District Supervisor Farris responded, "[W]hat we would like to see is all the men and women of the Walapai Tribe say, 'We are going to work and do something.' "[63] This typified the divergent concerns held by the tribe and the BIA: Hualapais focused on land rights and identity, whereas authorities stressed work and industry.

In 1931, members of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs convened on May 22, with Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs J. Henry Scattergood, Senator Burton K. Wheeler, and Arizona senator Carl Hayden. After Hayden's opening remarks, the committee heard the testimony of Fred Mahone, a central figure in the tribe's campaign to protect the reservation. Mahone, who lived in Peach Springs, went to the heart of the matter: "To begin with, this land belongs to the Walapai Indians in Arizona. I protested against the leasing of the land or appraisal of this land because this land as our reservation itself was set aside by the United States Army officials in the early days." When Wheeler requested evidence, Mahone brought in the elder Jim Mahone, who had served in the military on its excursions against the Apache. Jim Mahone claimed President Arthur had established the reservation to reward Hualapai scouts for their services and to protect the tribe because "there were a lot of people all over the world, just like a bunch of worms, and . . . they [were] coming to crowd out the Indians."[64] The leaders had established an interesting method of response in the hearings: the middle-aged, boarding school generation opened up the testimony and then brought in elders to legitimize their claims. Fred Mahone followed this pattern later in the day when he addressed the issue of original occupancy and introduced Chief Schrum. Schrum argued: "We are people who have lived in this country far back. It is way back. [I am] one of the descendants from the early chief. [My] father was chief."[65] He went on to say that the tribe opposed the division of the reservation, claiming it would "prevent us from going into civilization." He said the descendants of the old chiefs would testify that the tribe deserved exclusive use of the reservation. Indeed, Philip Quasala was the grandson of a prominent headman, as were Jim Fielding, descendant of Suwim Fielding, and Butch Clark, another descendant of Chief Hualapai Charlie. All would testify.[66]

After listening to Mahone the committee returned to the tribe's apparent failure in the cattle business. Charles McGee, one of the few successful Hualapai cattlemen, provided a compelling example of the challenges facing the tribe.

McGee had lived off the reservation in Trout Creek until he and his family moved onto the reservation. They relocated to Pine Springs and began building a small farm for their cattle, but Superintendent Light ordered them to leave since whites allegedly leased the land. Eventually, McGee found land below Peach Springs Wash where he and his father grazed 135 head of cattle. Scattergood commended him and asked what was the matter, since he had done well. McGee protested that he "could not make a living off that bunch of cattle. You know that. It is the same way with a lot of these younger fellows. They would say the same thing." Scattergood seemed surprised, but Senator Hayden asked McGee to go on. "To support ourselves we have to have more range and more cattle. This is the point I want to get at, and I think that is what the rest of these younger fellows would say."[67] McGee must have smiled when the stockman for the agency informed Hayden that a white family needed 200 to 250 head of cattle to survive.[68]

THE EMERGENCE OF A RESERVATION COMMUNITY

The onset of the Great Depression and the implementation of President Roosevelt's "Indian New Deal" brought significant changes to American Indian communities.[69] The Indian New Deal generally, and the Indian Reorganization Act specifically, centralized political power in the hands of tribal councils, incorporated tribal business ventures, developed reservation lands, initiated work relief programs, and attempted to conserve tribal ranges. These programs were part and parcel of a larger confluence of forces that made the million acres economically viable and culturally attractive for the tribe.[70] Yet the Depression seriously crippled the cattle industry, and the superintendent forced the tribe to cull more stock and encouraged its members to simply consume their beef. By the mid-1930s, white ranchers had terminated their leases or pulled their remaining cattle off the tribal range, thereby opening up grazing lands to Hualapai families. Open access to rangeland was helpful, but the tribe struggled to use those lands in light of ongoing stock reductions and lack of revenue. Additionally, tribal unemployment rates rose as local employers fired Hualapai workers. As more Hualapais lacked work off the reservation, they turned to government labor projects and conservation programs located on the reservation.

Federal programs did not dictate Hualapais' responses to economic development, nor did they wholly re-create Native American cultural landscapes. Rather, wage labor, political leadership, geographic dispersal, band identities, ecological conditions, education, and cultural "conservatism" or "progressiv-

ism" all influenced Hualapais' responses to programs such as the Indian Emergency Conservation Work (IECW) and the Civilian Conservation Corps–Indian Division (CCC-ID). Initiated in the spring of 1933 under the oversight of the BIA, the IECW adjusted many of its programs to benefit tribal communities. For instance, it allowed married men to join conservation programs despite regulations reserving work for single males.[71] IECW supervisors also opened many of their work camps to families so that conservation work did not sever bonds between family and tribal culture.[72] The IECW and the CCC-ID had an important impact on the social organization and geographic dispersal of Hualapai bands because they helped transform the reservation into a geographic locus for the community. Before the 1930s, people across the region had lived on the outskirts of towns, searching for employment, but the Depression forced them from their jobs, so they were now dispersed and unemployed.

Many CCC-ID programs drew upon skills Hualapais had acquired from previous experience with wage labor. Erosion control projects such as the one headed by Philip Quasala and Jack Jones utilized their experience working for ranchers and tending to small farms owned by non-Indians. Some Hualapais honed their leadership abilities by delegating responsibilities to workers in projects across the reservation. Hualapais such as Rupert Parker brought unique skills. As a carpenter he built furniture and houses for Anglos, and he used this expertise to construct "fireboxes" in trees to monitor reservation range fires.[73] Other projects relied on Hualapai experience derived from previous labor and provided them with opportunities to obtain new work and leadership skills. Suwim Fielding, for instance, was an older foreman in charge of a crew working with a bulldozer and explosives on the Horse Flat Truck Trail in the southeastern portion of the reservation. By late September 1935 the trail provided the community with a road to ease transportation of goods and stock. The crew also helped the reservation erosion project fortify walls on the washes and faces of several check dams that were part of a small irrigation system.[74] Mike Matuthanya also headed several projects and provided leadership to those working with him. He and his crew developed Sunrise Springs and Horse Trough Springs into watering holes for cattle on the western side of the reservation. They also erected large water tanks as part of the range and water management program.[75] These programs improved infrastructure and made the reservation a more viable location for economic activities such as ranching, but Hualapais' labor left a new set of cultural footprints on land that represented their real and symbolic future.

THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: LIMITS TO CULTURAL AND POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION

The lingering impact of previous political developments combined with new events during the 1930s to alter the economic and cultural landscape of the reservation. The efforts of traditional headmen from the nineteenth century and the decisions of the Welfare Committee and the pre–Indian Reorganization Act Tribal Council left Hualapai leaders with a mixture of approaches reflecting their adaptation to life in the twentieth century. Leaders who had attended boarding school worked beside elders who had served as scouts in the 1870s and remembered internment in La Paz. Both groups had at one point in their lives resided off the reservation, and many congregated alongside the railroad. Most of them, young and old, worked for wages in regional industries. Elder leaders spoke Hualapai fluently, whereas the younger generation was frequently bilingual. This multigenerational coalition built upon previous decisions and dedicated itself to confronting new political and economic changes presented by the Indian Reorganization Act.

The institutionalization of the Tribal Council under the Indian Reorganization Act marked a watershed in pre–World War II Hualapai history. The legislation highlighted an important shift in Indian policy and reflected a greater awareness of Indian cultures within the BIA, but greater attention to Indian perspectives has refined our understanding of the scope of the reforms. The IRA impacted Indian political structures and status, offered economic opportunities, loosened religious restrictions, altered education policy, and eliminated some elements of colonialism. Yet in many respects the reforms remained painfully limited. Roughly half the tribes rejected the IRA, and the voting turnout rarely reflected tribal members' true feelings, since many expressed their opposition by simply refusing to participate in elections.[76]

Hualapais approved this mixed bag of reforms in 1938, perceiving it as a limited improvement on the political and legal limbo they inhabited. A group of older leaders argued that the IRA represented the only mechanism available for the tribe to hold on to the reservation in the face of poverty and unemployment. To many, the IRA linked Hualapais with the federal government through its own, somewhat modified form of government. A different group remained suspicious of the new policies and structures and either opposed it outright or withheld support from the boilerplate constitution. On the other hand, younger members with experience in boarding schools perceived the legislation as a systematic improvement upon previous informal methods of self-government. Representative institutions that embraced tribal collective

values appealed to them, and the economic opportunities embodied in the corporate charter attracted them as well. However, population figures for 1938 indicate that of approximately 200 eligible voters, only 62 supported the IRA, and 34 actively rejected it.[77] Fifty percent of tribal members did not vote, although that did not necessarily mean they disagreed with the legislation. Some surely opposed the IRA, but many members may not have understood its implications, and a few may not have been able to travel to the voting site. Regardless of the reasons for the low turnout, the marginal support for the IRA government foreshadowed future problems for the legitimacy and authority of the council.

Familiar leaders nonetheless participated in a new form of government on the reservation, and pre-IRA Tribal Chairman Charles McGee presided over the vote and the writing of the constitution. He and others addressed the dispersed settlement of the tribe by conferring membership to everyone on the tribal rolls with one-half or more Hualapai ancestry.[78] The charter created a nine-member Tribal Council that would represent multiple band loyalties and the interests of members in nearby towns. Eligible adults elected council members for staggered three-year terms by secret ballot and chose a chairman and vice chairman for one-year terms. The council retained the hereditary chief to provide cultural continuity, and initial elections linked the leaders of the previous generation with the new political structures of the current era.[79] Council members were older, prominent men who had experienced the struggles in the late nineteenth century, and the younger members were frequently descended from them. The first tribal chairman elected under the new government, Philip Quasala, was the grandson of the preeminent Chief Waba Yuma, and he best represented the tradition of established political leadership. Quasala participated in the Santa Fe land claims cases and freely spoke his mind. The following year the tribe elected Charles McGee as chairman. McGee also played a prominent role in congressional hearings and directly critiqued government cattle policy, increasingly a badge of leadership.[80]

For the remainder of the 1930s, Hualapai government focused on cattle as the basis for a tribal economy. In this sense politics and economics converged and made self-determination a more realistic goal. Range management programs expanded in the late 1930s, and leasing to non-Indians ended in 1936. During the 1938–1939 winter, the Tribal Council established the Indian Livestock and Protective Association to oversee roundups, movement of cattle, branding, and sales. By 1946 it had established the maximum number of cattle allowed on the reservation—7,800, all of which the tribe owned.[81] By 1941 nearly

200 adults, approximately half of the tribe, had moved to the reservation and congregated in Peach Springs near the new reservation day school. Indian traders increased their business on the reservation, and two stores provided food and groceries for the budding community. Traditional dwellings cropped up alongside new frame houses, and cars traveled along dirt roads still frequented by horses and cattle.

CONCLUSIONS

The congressional hearings and ensuing court cases, as well as the Indian Reorganization Act, remain important aspects of the broader changes in Hualapai society between 1910 and 1940. These developments represented part of a complicated and larger whole that comprised Hualapai tribalism and national identity. Although community life defies easy compartmentalization, these decades witnessed important changes in Hualapai political-economy that affected and relied upon continuity in cultural and social identity. The ability of Pai bands to adapt to forced economic and political change by merging into a more cohesive "tribe" enabled them to survive as a people. Although band distinctions and differences decreased, they remained important components of Hualapai identity by reminding people of older family lineages that often played important political roles. Band identities remained strong, but intermarriage, for instance, made them more fluid. Economic ventures such as the Livestock and Cattle Association also strengthened the sense of Hualapai nationhood. Interaction with state and federal officials, as well, institutionalized the growing sense of a community tribal identity.

But the evolving cultural identity that many tribal and nontribal members labeled "Hualapai" also had its roots in earlier interactions between Pai bands and the new economic regimes they encountered. Rather than work full-time all year, Hualapais alternated jobs among tribal members and shared wages between families. During work they followed their own conceptions of time and place. Hualapai crew leaders and labor contractors served as a new form of leadership that combined sociopolitical functions that focused band members in a culturally familiar way, even as they also disrupted band distinctions by distributing jobs among many people regardless of band affiliation. The fact that women worked as much as men reflected and reinforced Hualapai notions of gender relations just as much as it signified women's important economic status. Additionally, Hualapais continued their yearly migrations and celebrations. Finally, they supplemented wages with small gardens, proceeds from baskets and beadwork, and occasional "taking" of cattle owned by

Anglo ranchers. These decisions enabled Hualapais to use wage labor within larger structures beyond their control.

Political developments carried this same mixture of change and continuity that integrated new processes into familiar contexts as leaders appealed to traditions (and created new ones) in the early twentieth century. The Welfare Committee and the pre-IRA Tribal Council united a geographically dispersed people and provided a site for intergenerational transferal of leadership. The council also served as a focal point for bands to coalesce around, and it formed a nucleus for the evolving layer of Hualapai tribal identity. New leaders respected cultural traditions by preserving the position of hereditary chief even after the tribe adopted an IRA government. And although BIA authorities claimed that yearly appointments of presidents destabilized the Hualapais' government, the terms reflected their lingering suspicion of the position of president and their reliance on the hereditary leader and the more palatable Tribal Council.

As World War II eclipsed the Depression, Hualapais continued struggling to gain control of their future. With an economic base, more families could return to the reservation, and with a new tribal government they bridged past traditions with modern political structures. Many Hualapais remained off the reservation for part of the year, but they knew they had a protected space to return to. The changes they had faced—wage labor, political restructuring, marginal economic dependency, and limited autonomy—simultaneously undermined some traditions and strengthened tribal identity. Ultimately, individuals and the tribe as a whole sought to build upon the events of the nineteenth century and add meaning to the Hualapai Nation.

NOTES

1. For compelling and insightful discussions of similar issues, see Brian Hosmer, *American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence and Innovation Among the Menominees and Metlakatlans, 1870–1920* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999), 5–15; Rolf Knight, *Indians at Work: An Informal History of Native Indian Labour in British Columbia, 1858–1930* (Vancouver: New Star, 1978); Paul C. Rosier, *Rebirth of the Blackfeet Nation, 1912–1954* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001).

2. Sylvia Van Kirk, *Many Tender Ties: Women in Fur-Trade Society, 1670–1870* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983); Jennifer S. Brown, *Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996); H. Craig Miner, *The Corporation and the Indian: Tribal Sovereignty and Industrial Civilization in Indian Territory, 1865–1907* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976); Donald Fixico, *Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945–1966* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986). Fixico provides an excellent discussion of Indian life in the midst of these policies, but his more recent study provides an excellent discussion of urbanism, labor, and tribal identities; see *The Urban Indian Experience in*

America (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000). Finally, he provides a creative and insightful conceptual framework for analyzing Indian identities and economic forces in *The Invasion of Indian Country in the Twentieth Century: American Capitalism and Tribal Natural Resources* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1998). Also see Laurence M. Hauptman, *The Iroquois Struggle for Survival: World War Two to Red Power* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986); Native American Research Group, *American Indian Socialization to Urban Life Final Report* (San Francisco: Institute for Scientific Analysis, rev., 1975); Russel Thorton and Gary G. Grasmick, eds., *The Urbanization of American Indians: A Critical Bibliography* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1982); Diana Bahr, *From Mission to Metropolis: Cupeno Indian Women in Los Angeles* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

3. Alice Littlefield and Martha Knack, eds., *Native Americans and Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical Perspectives* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 4; Richard White, *The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change Among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).

4. Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); James Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic, 1974).

5. Leanne Hinton and Lucille Watahomigie, eds., *Spirit Mountain: An Anthology of Yuman Story and Song* (Tucson: Sun Tracks and University of Arizona Press, 1984), 11; Lucille Watahomogie, "Origins of the People," *Plateau* 53 (June 1981): 24–27. A note on spelling: today the official spelling accepted by the Tribal Council is "Hualapai," although scholars and tribal members have previously used spellings such as Wallapai, Walapai, and Huallapai. When directly quoting historical documents I will follow the spelling in the documents, but in my own narrative I will use the contemporary official spelling "Hualapai."

6. See Alfred L. Kroeber, ed., *Walapai Ethnography,* Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association, no. 42 (Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint Corp., 1964 [1935]); *The Walapai Papers: Historical Reports, Documents, and Extracts from Publications Relating to the Walapai Indians of Arizona.* Congress, U.S. Senate, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., Document no. 273 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1936); Robert Manners, "Tribe and Tribal Boundaries: The Walapai," *Ethnohistory* 4 (Winter 1957): 1–26; Alan D. Coult, "Conflict and Stability in a Hualapai Community" (PhD diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1961); Edward Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533–1960* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962); Henry F. Dobyns and Robert C. Euler, *The Ghost Dance of 1889: The Pai Indians of Northwestern Arizona* (Prescott: Prescott College Press, 1967); Henry F. Dobyns and Robert C. Euler, *The Walapai People* (Phoenix: Indian Tribal Series, 1976); Henry F. Dobyns and Robert C. Euler, *Wauba Yuma's People: The Comparative Socio-Political Structure of the Pai Indians of Arizona* (Prescott: Prescott College Press, 1970); Thomas McGuire, "Walapai," in *Handbook of North American Indians,* vol. 10, *Southwest,* ed. Alfonso Ortiz (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983), 25–37; John Martin, "Pre and Ethnohistory," *Ethnohistory* 32, 2 (1985): 135–153. This chapter will neither attempt a definitive explanation of the debate nor provide the final word on Pai identity before contact with non-Indians. Rather, it will summarize salient points that bear upon the immediate themes of this chapter.

7. Henry F. Dobyns and Robert C. Euler have worked with the Hualapai since the 1950s, when they began research for the Indian Claims Commission. Their work has proven useful and insightful, although tribal members and other researchers have not always agreed with their analyses of Pai history and culture. Timothy Braatz, in particular, has assailed their conclusions on Pai identity in a series of articles contained in the *American Indian Quarterly* 22, 3 (Summer 1998). Braatz has done work with the Yavapai, and one of his points of contention is that Pai bands and "subtribes" were not as formal as Dobyns and Euler claim. I cannot make definitive arguments on these points in this chapter, but I thought it necessary to illuminate one of many scholarly debates over precontact Hualapai culture and identity.

8. Lucille Watahomigie, "Hualapai," in *Native America in the Twentieth Century: An Encyclopedia,* ed. Mary B. Davis (New York: Garland, 1994), 246–248; Hinton and Watahomigie, *Spirit Mountain,* 11.

9. Thomas D. Hall, *Social Change in the Southwest, 1350–1880* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989), 25–30. Hall discusses different types of social organization in the Southwest, and Pais seem to fit within his category of "band" or rancheria peoples commonly associated with indigenous communities in southern California. He notes (as do other scholars) how small bands coalesce into "tribes" as they increasingly interact with larger societies, usually in an attempt to survive the hegemonic forces of incorporation. He also casts doubt upon the term *tribe,* as he feels it is more of an anthropological convention than a "real" unit of social organization. Over time, however, many natives and nonnatives have embraced the term *tribe*, although they often use it more for expediency than sociopolitical accuracy.

10. Henry F. Dobyns and Robert C. Euler, "The Nine Lives of Cherum, the Pai Tokumet," *American Indian Quarterly* 22 (Summer 1998): 365. Cherum is an important figure in Hualapai history, but his name is often written as Schrum, a spelling frequently used by descendants.

11. Dobyns and Euler, *The Walapai People*; Stephen Trimble, *The People: Indians of the American Southwest* (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press , 1993), 192.

12. Thomas E. Sheridan, *Arizona: A History* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996).

13. 46th Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners to the Secretary of the Interior for Fiscal Year Ending June 25, 1915.

14. Edward E. Ayer to Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior, 49th Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners to the Secretary of the Interior for Fiscal Year June 30, 1918, 15–16.

15. These responses to wage labor regimes are discussed repeatedly in the chapters in Littlefield and Knack, *Native Americans and Wage Labor*, 10.

16. Lewis Merriam, Technical Director, *The Problem of Indian Administration,* Institute for Government Research (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1928), 686.

17. *59th Annual Report of Board of Indian Commissioners to the Secretary of the Interior for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1928).

18. H. L. Haskell to the Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Arizona, August 20, 1878, in *Walapai Papers,* 119.

19. Merriam, *The Problem of Indian Administration*, 690.

20. Although not all of these works address wage labor directly, they each make valuable contributions to understanding how native women work and labor in various contexts and situations: Gretchen Bataille and Kathleen Sands, *American Indian Women: Telling Their Lives* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); Laura Klein

and Lillian Ackerman, eds., *Women and Power in Native North America* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996); Patricia Albers and Beatrice Medicine, eds., *The Hidden Half: Studies of Plains Indians Women* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983); Theda Perdue, *Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700–1835* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); Nancy Shoemaker, ed., *Negotiators of Change: Historical Perspectives on Native American Women* (New York: Routledge, 1995); Katherine Osburn, *Southern Ute Women: Autonomy and Assimilation on the Reservation, 1887–1934* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998).

21. Dobyns and Euler, *The Walapai People,* 65. Women (and to some extent men) made baskets, beadwork, and other "crafts" in native communities throughout the Western Hemisphere before contact with Europeans. Arguably, these objects served utilitarian functions such as storing food and carrying supplies, although they also served ceremonial purposes. As interactions with Europeans and Americans increased, these objects gained an aesthetic value projected upon them by middle- and upper-class tourists. This crossroads of native talent, tourism, and Anglo wealth transformed Indian baskets into commodities and cultural artifacts of considerable monetary value. Native women quickly realized the economic value of their baskets and related "artwork" and began selling them along railroad lines such as the Santa Fe.

22. *Merriam Report,* 686; Letter from Malcolm McDowell, Member of the Board of Indian Commissioners, to the Truxton Canyon Agency, Arizona, September 23, 1923. Folder 81372–23, Truxton Canyon Agency, Box 7, Central Classified Files, Record Group 75, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC; hereafter F-TCA, B, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

23. For trenchant discussions on the roles of Indian "crew leaders" or "labor contractors," see Robert Carrico, Florence Shipek, and Harold Prins, in Littlefield and Knack, *Native Americans and Wage Labor,* 45, 200, 204, 212.

24. *Walapai Papers,* 140–142.

25. George W. James, *In and Around the Grand Canyon* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1900), 173.

26. Dobyns and Euler, "The Nine Lives of Cherum," 375.

27. Letter from J. S. Schirm, President of the Grand Canyon Lime and Cement Company, to Oliver Gates, Superintendent, Truxton Canyon Agency, September 13, 1907. F-71159-07 TCA, 32, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC; Letter from C. F. Larrabee, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Oliver Gates, Superintendent, Truxton Canyon Agency, November 18, 1907. F-71159-07, TCA, 32, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC; *Merriam Report,* 691.

28. Testimony of George B. Davis in the Matter of the Application of Indian Grover, November 1, 1919. F-52970-17 TCA 308.2, 25, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

29. Testimony of Nama, or, Indian Grover in His Application for Allotment of Land, September 28, 1919. F-52970-17 TCA 308.2, 25, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

30. Letter from Superintendent William Light to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Regarding the Application of Indian Grover for Allotment on Lands Outside the Reservation, Valentine, Arizona, November 13, 1919. F-52970-17 TCA 308.2, 25, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

31. Peter Iverson, *When Indians Became Cowboys: Native Peoples and Cattle Ranching in the American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994); Winston P. Erickson, *Sharing the Desert: The Tohono O'odham in History* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994); Lucille Watahomigie, Malinda Powsky, Jorgine Bender, Josie Uqualla, and Philbert

Watahomigie Jr., *Waksi: Wich, Hualapai Cattle Ranching* (Peach Springs, AZ: Hualapai Bilingual Program, 1983).

32. *Walapai Papers,* 176. Unfortunately, the sources used in this study did not specify particular ranchers by name or company affiliation.

33. Letter in Report to Commissioner of Indian Affairs from the Mohave County Board of Supervisors to H. S. Welton, Special Indian Agent, January 23, 1888, in *Walapai Papers,* 157.

34. Oliver Gates, Report of the Superintendent in Charge of Walapai, Truxton Canyon Agency, Arizona, August 22, 1905, in *Walapai Papers,* 201.

35. Earl Y. Henderson, Assistant Secretary of the Board of Indian Commissioners, "Report on the Condition of the Hualapai Indians, Arizona," to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, February 1, 1928. F-14531 TCA 150, 7, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

36. Dobyns and Euler, *The Walapai People,* 74.

37. David Rich Lewis, *Neither Wolf nor Dog: American Indians, Environment, and Agrarian Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986); Leonard Carlson, *Indians, Bureaucrats, and the Land: The Dawes Act and the Decline of Indian Farming* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1981).

38. J. A. Gutches, District Forester, "General Report on Care and Protection of Timber Within the Walapai Indian Reservation," August 6, 1910. United States Indian Service, Department of the Interior, F-65077-1910 TCA 339, 33, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC. For general discussions of agriculture, dams, and aridity in the American West, see Richard White, *"It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A New History of the American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Donald Worster, *Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Donald J. Pisani, *To Reclaim a Divided West: Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848–1902* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992).

39. 46th Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners to the Secretary of the Interior, June 30, 1915, 25.

40. Dobyns and Euler, *The Walapai People,* 75.

41. Iverson, *When Indians Became Cowboys,* 84.

42. Letter from Superintendent Charles E. Shell to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 30, 1912. F-43448-1911 TCA 301, 23, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

43. 49th Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners, *Report on the Walapai Indian Reservation, Arizona,* May 9, 1917, 42–43.

44. The Indian Service and Superintendents Ewing, Light, and Shell in particular often threatened or withheld rations to force Hualapais to work in conditions or circumstances unfavorable to the tribe; see Dobyns and Euler, *Walapai People,* 74; American Indian Technical Services, Inc., *Hualapai Plateau: Forest, Woodlands, and Range. A Forest Study of the Hualapai Indian Reservation of Northwest Arizona.* Prepared for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Phoenix Area Office, Contract no. H50-C1420-6087 (Broomfield, CO: American Indian Technical Services, Inc., 1987), 47.

45. 36th Annual Report of the Board of Directors, Indian Rights Association, December 12, 1918, 49–50.

46. Petition by the Wallapai Indian Tribe, Sheet #13, Written by Fred W. Mahone, April 6, 1923. F-30310-23 TCA 174.1, 4, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

47. Ibid.

48. Dobyns and Euler, *Wauba Yuma's People,* 4–10.

49. Ibid., 12.

50. Leslie Spier, "Problems Arising from the Cultural Position of the Havasupai," *American Anthropologist* 31 (1929): 2.

51. Kroeber, *Walapai Ethnography,* 155; Dobyns and Euler, *Wauba Yuma's People,* 44, 45.

52. *Walapai Papers,* 220.

53. Ibid., 251.

54. Merriam, *The Problem of Indian Administration,* 698.

55. Inspection Report of John W. Atwater Regarding Charges Against Superintendent William Light of Truxton Canyon Agency and School, October 4–24, 1922. F-79173-1922 TCA, 9, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

56. Peach Springs, Arizona, July 31, 1927, in *Walapai Papers,* 269.

57. Ibid., 268.

58. For discussions of cattle reduction, see Ruth Roessel and Broderick H. Jackson, *Navajo Livestock Reduction: A National Disgrace* (Chinle: Navajo Community College Press, 1974); Peter Blaine Sr. and Michael S. Adams, *Papagos and Politics* (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1981); George A. Boyce, *When Navajos Had Too Many Sheep: The 1940s* (San Francisco: Indian Historian Press, 1974); Iverson, *When Indians Became Cowboys.*

59. Letter from Fred Mahone and Walapai Cattle Men, Peach Springs, to S. M. Brosius, Indian Rights Association, Washington, DC, October 3, 1931. F-56172-31 TCA, 9, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC. Fred Mahone was an outspoken individual who raised the ire of tribal members as well as several superintendents. In 1934, for instance, Jim Fielding, another prominent Hualapai cattle owner, wrote to John Collier and complained about Mahone and a dozen tribal members who supposedly liked to "get together and cause trouble." Fielding thought Collier "shouldn't even pay attention" to Mahone. The point illustrates diverse perspectives among Hualapais interested in land use, cattle ranching, and leadership. Letter from Jim Fielding, Peach Springs, to John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, DC. F-26880-34 TCA, 9, CCF, RG 75, NARA, D.C.

60. Letter from S. M. Brosius, Indian Rights Association, to Commissioner Charles Rhoads, October 6, 1931. F-56172-31 TCA, 9, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC; Letter from Commissioner Charles Rhoads to S. M. Brosius, Indian Rights Association, October 13, 1931. F-56172-31 TCA, 9, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

61. Letter from Superintendent D. H. Watson, Truxton Canyon Agency, to Commissioner Charles Rhoads, October 15, 1931. F-56172-31 TCA, 9, CCF, RG 75, NARA, DC.

62. "Notes of Meeting Held in the Truxton Canon Indian School Auditorium," Valentine, AZ, May 22, 1930, in *Walapai Papers,* 226.

63. Ibid., 227.

64. Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs, United States Senate, 71st Cong. 3rd sess. pursuant to S. Res. 79, 308 (70th Cong.), and S. Res 263 (71st Cong.); Hearings at Valentine (Walapai), AZ, United States Senate, Subcommittee of Committee on Indian Affairs, Valentine, AZ, Friday, May 22, 1931.

65. Hearings at Valentine (Walapai), AZ, United States Senate, Subcommittee of Committee on Indian Affairs, Valentine, AZ, Friday, May 22, 1931, 250.

66. Ibid., 251.

67. Ibid., 275.

68. Ibid., 282.

69. Carlson, *Indians, Bureaucrats, and the Land*; Thomas Biolsi, *The Political Economy of the New Deal on the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservation* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1993); Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford Lytle, *The Nations Within: The Past and Present of American Indian Sovereignty* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998); Laurence Hauptman, *The Iroquois and the New Deal* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981); Lawrence C. Kelley, *The Assault on Assimilation: John Collier and the Origins of Indian Policy Reform* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983); Kenneth Philp, *John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 1920–1954* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977); Graham Taylor, *The New Deal and American Indian Tribalism: The Administration of the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934–45* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980).

70. John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Great Crash, 1929* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988); William E. Luechtenberg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); Anthony Badger, *The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933–40* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989); Robert S. McElvane, *The Great Depression: America, 1929–1941* (New York: Times Books, 1993); Theodore Salutos, *The American Farmer and the New Deal* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1982); Donald Worster, *Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

71. For various perspectives on New Deal programs and their relationships with marginalized peoples, see, among others, Harvard Sitkoff, *A New Deal for Blacks* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); Susan Ware, *Beyond Suffrage: Women in the New Deal* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). For useful standard treatments of the CCC, see John A. Salmond, *The Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933–1942: A New Deal Case Study* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967); Leslie Alexander Lacy, *The Soil Soldiers: The Civilian Conservation Corps in the Great Depression* (Radnor: Chilton, 1976); Perry H. Merrill, *Roosevelt's Forest Army: A History of the Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933–1942* (Montpelier: P. H. Merrill, 1981); Richard Melzer, *Coming of Age in the Great Depression: The Civilian Conservation Corps Experience in New Mexico, 1933–1942* (Las Cruces: Yucca Tree, 2000).

72. Donald Parman, "The Indian and the Civilian Conservation Corps," *Pacific Historical Review* 40 (1971): 39–56; Calvin Grower, "The CCC Indian Division: Aid for Depressed Americans," *Minnesota History* 43 (1972): 3–13. Although federally funded, the IECW committed itself to local economic development and to meeting the unique needs and conditions of several regions. Projects in the Northwest focused on timber resources and farming, whereas those in the Great Plains and the Southwest centered on range management, cattle raising, erosion control, and water resources. After Congress passed the CCC Act in 1937, the IECW became the Indian CCC and added job training and education to its list of functions. It facilitated 120 different types of work, spent nearly $72 million, and employed over 85,000 Indians. After 1940, thousands of individuals benefited from vocational training in war-related industries that facilitated entrance into urban industrial wage labor during and after the war. In July 1942, Congress ended the CCC program.

73. May 1, 1935, Knight, *Indians at Work,* 35.

74. June 15, 1935, Knight, *Indians at Work,* 49; William S. Collins, *The New Deal in Arizona* (Phoenix: Arizona State Parks Board, 1999).

75. October 15, 1935, Knight, *Indians at Work,* n.p.

76. Philp, *John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform,* 160; Taylor, *The New Deal and American Indian Tribalism,* 32.

77. Dobyns and Euler, *The Walapai People,* 82.
78. American Indian Technical Services, *Hualapai Plateau,* 54.
79. Dobyns and Euler, *The Walapai People,* 82.
80. Ibid., 84.
81. Ibid., 86.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Working for Identity: Race, Ethnicity, and the Market Economy in Northern California, 1875–1936

WILLIAM BAUER

In this chapter William Bauer examines the complicated dialogue between race and ethnicity in the wage labor market. According to Bauer, the segregated labor market created a specific, racialized status for residents of the Round Valley Reservation. Yet for the Pomo, Concow, and other American Indian workers, the wages they earned enabled them to re-create tribal institutions and reclaim land in their indigenous homelands. They became a racialized class of workers in the northern California labor market. But at the same time, working for wages provided the means for Round Valley residents to resist the dehumanizing aspects of that historical process and reclaim their American Indian identities.

In August 1884, Senator Henry Dawes led an investigation into the conditions of Indians living in California. The investigators interviewed Philo Handy, the agency farmer at the Round Valley Reservation, who told the Dawes Commission, "Some of [the Indians] are very good laborers and some of them are not, but I think they will average very well with the floating white population."[1]

Handy's comments and others like it illustrate the creation of racial categories for Indians within the labor market. White ranchers, government officials, and Round Valley Indians used the market economy to invent and occupy racial and ethnic categories in northern California.

In the years leading up to the Gold Rush, whites viewed Indian workers as an asset. Cheap and compliant, they would be the perfect workers to develop California's growing agricultural industry. But as Euro-American migrants flooded the region after 1848, Indians became unwelcome interlopers in a highly competitive labor market. The scramble for the precious metal that ensued escalated into a class and racial melee, with the struggle between large landowners and small-scale gold miners nearly exterminating California's indigenous population. The archetypal forty-niner resented wealthy landowners like John Sutter, who employed scores of Indians to mine for gold. And with images of the Overland Trail filling their minds and feeding their imaginations, the migrants set out on a genocidal rampage of Indian communities.[2]

Despite the violence and terror, Indians survived and continued to work in California. The erratic racial hierarchy that had shifted from one extreme to the next in the nineteenth century had by the twentieth century settled into a pattern whereby whites occupied the top of the racial ladder, Indians struggled at the bottom, and ethnic European and Asian immigrants inhabited a fluid space between the two groups.[3]

Studies of race and American Indians in California tend to focus primarily on Indian-white relations, neglecting the context of "racial formation"—in this case the labor market—whereby Indians found themselves racialized in relation to working-class whites and other migrants who competed with them for jobs. Race is a historical construct that assigns social meaning to groups of people that may shift according to specific historical conditions. Where people stand in this hierarchy has changed over time. Throughout history, dominant groups in the United States changed racial categories to assuage a variety of anxieties and fears, as well as to subjugate people of color.[4]

The construction of race is not a one-way discourse; it is a dialogue between those with power and those with little. Solely examining how whites in Round Valley defined Indians racially, to use the words of historian Nancy Shoemaker, "consigns American Indians and other non-white peoples to a passive role in the construction of knowledge."[5] Round Valley Indians responded by preserving their cultures, a process that involved both acknowledging the external limitations of racism and affirming their cultural heritage.

Uncovering tribal identities on a multitribal reservation is a difficult endeavor.[6] In the twentieth century, tribal intermarriage, similar lifestyles, and federal Indian policy seemed to homogenize Round Valley Indians and erase tribal boundaries. Anthropologist Virginia Miller contends that the Yuki had lost their tribal identity by the turn of the twentieth century and had "blended into anonymity with the remnants of seven other tribes."[7] However, the historical record shows that racial and ethnic relations were, and continue to be, more complicated than these scholars have argued. Certainly, there exists an overarching identity of "Round Valley Indian." However, ethnic identity, like race, is not a concrete category. People, especially Native Americans, have multiple identities that vary according to social setting. Further, ethnic identities are formed by an exchange of ideas between outside forces and oneself. Outside observers saw the Round Valley Indians as a homogeneous group, minimizing their unique tribal affiliations. In the labor market, Round Valley Indians faced further attacks on their distinctiveness as ranchers, and other non-Indian employers assigned them a specific place in the racialized labor market. Yet Indians were not simply onlookers in the construction of racial and ethnic categories. Wage labor offered material resources and physical space for Round Valley Indians to reinforce their tribal identities—identities that countered racialized notions of themselves. In this way, Round Valley Indians created alternatives to the racialized experience of the labor market.[8]

Until recently, scholars have ignored both the importance of Native American labor and the working-class dimensions of racial thought. Although some studies now demonstrate that Indian labor contributed to the development and growth of white settlements as well as to the survival of Indian communities, they tend not to examine the intersection of race, labor, and Indians. This study broadens our understanding of the construction of racial categories and Indians to include labor as a key component in this process.[9]

RACE AND AMERICAN INDIAN LABOR

In 1854, Superintendent of Indian Affairs in California Thomas J. Henley established the Nome Cult Indian Farm, later known as the Round Valley Reservation, in the northern California territory of the Yuki people. Surrounded by rivers and mountains and isolated from white settlements, the area was ideal for teaching Indians "civilized" ways. Subsequently, state and federal officials relocated at least seven other tribes—including the Concow, Wailacki, Nomlacki, Pit River, and Pomo—to Round Valley.[10] Removal decisions failed to consider ancient hostilities and alliances between northern California peoples,

and as a result tribal tensions created a volatile situation and often pitted tribe against tribe. In 1861, Concows assisted white settlers in hunting down and killing Wailackis at Horse Canyon for stealing and killing horses. Relations between Indians and whites were also less than amicable. Indians resisted the reservation and white settlement by fleeing from the reservation and killing livestock and white settlers.[11]

After the Civil War the slaughter of California Indians subsided, and Indians and whites forged economic relationships through labor. White ranchers recognized that the displaced and local Indian population represented a potential labor source. They praised the habits of Indian workers, describing them as dutiful and hardworking. Rancher Saunders Hornbroke stated, "Some one said [the Indians] were better than the Chinamen. I never saw a Chinaman picking [hops], but they are better than the white people who pick hops."[12] Hornbroke created a racial hierarchy based on work. Indian hop pickers performed the job better than poor whites and possibly the Chinese. Barclay Henley, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives and the son of Thomas J. Henley, concurred: "[S]ome of them are as good as white farm hands. Their progress in the last fifteen years has been such that if anyone told me that such would be the case, I would have received it with a great deal of skepticism." Henley claimed he paid his workers a monthly wage of twenty to twenty-five dollars, in addition to rations, because they worked so well. "If you keep liquor from these Indians," Henley added, "they are very good workers and are very trustworthy."[13]

The racial categories Hornbroke and Henley created were fluid and suited their needs. They praised the abilities of Indian workers but did not agree on where they ranked in Mendocino County. Sometimes Indians performed better than itinerant white and Chinese agricultural workers. The flexibility of racial categories did not mean whites attempted to include Indians in California's social order. Rather, white ranchers determined the place in which Indians entered white society by comparing Round Valley Indians with poor, itinerant white farmworkers and Chinese immigrants. Creating racial categories, as Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue, is not mutually exclusive of other social categories. Rather, Omi and Winant note, "it is crucial to emphasize that race, class, and gender are not fixed and discrete categories, and that such 'regions' are by no means autonomous. They overlap, intersect, and fuse with each other in countless ways."[14] California's agricultural economy provided templates for white ranchers to compare Indians. The fact that minorities and poor whites were farmworkers meant they were racially inferior to those who had acquired land and wealth.[15] Round Valley Indians entered

Mendocino County's tiered labor system below poor whites in terms of class and above the Chinese in terms of race.[16]

The ranchers thought employment provided Indians with a great service because native workers learned to work harder and more efficiently on their ranches. Hornbroke commented, "There has been a general improvement all the time. All of them were blanket Indians when I first knew them, and the first crop they made they worked with butcher knives and dug it out with sticks. . . . [T]hey were no better than brutes when they first came here."[17] Henley praised his family's efforts in domesticating Indians: "I think that the most successful attempt ever made in California to civilize the Indians has been made in Round Valley, on our ranch." As far as Henley was concerned, the Indians who lived on his ranch represented the civilizing impact of hard work. They had "beds, fireplaces, and you will find chickens running around the house, and also fruit trees in front of the house."[18] Hornbroke supported Henley's assessment of the Indians' progress: "They lived by hunting and fishing, and digging roots [before whites arrived], and when you killed a beef there was a perfect scramble for it. Now they want the best pieces of it only. They are pretty high toned."[19] By the 1880s, working for white ranchers, not the reservation system, had "civilized" the Round Valley Indians, or so the ranchers claimed. Indians no longer farmed with antiquated tools; they had adopted the rudiments of American society in the form of material possessions; and they had developed sophisticated palates. Nevertheless, the ranchers masked their exploitation of the Indians behind a veil of reform and concern. Much like slaveholders during the antebellum era, ranchers claimed that people of color laboring under whites was the most efficient and benevolent way to organize society.[20]

Even though white ranchers in northern California preferred Indian workers to the Chinese and (sometimes) to white workers and believed they had civilized the Indians, discrimination, not inclusion, defined race relations in northern California. Poor whites, Indians, and Chinese farmworkers did not receive equal pay for equal work. In the 1890s, Indian hop pickers received $1.00 per hundred pounds of hops picked. In contrast, white pickers received $1.10, and Chinese workers earned only $0.90.[21] Indians and whites worked separately in the fields. Edna Guerrero, a Pomo who lived in the Ukiah Valley, remembered working in the hop fields in the early twentieth century: "The Indians would start on one side of the fields and the white people on the opposite side, and they would all work toward each other."[22] Whites' compliments of Indians went only so far in leveling race relations.

Indian workers experienced segregation in surrounding communities in northern California. Ukiah store owners simultaneously found a way to make money from Indian workers, keep hop ranchers happy, and maintain the status quo in race relations. They only allowed Indians into their stores on Sundays, when hop ranchers gave their workers the day off and the respectable white population attended church. For the remainder of the week, Indians stayed in the fields and out of the stores.[23] When Al Want and a friend traveled from Round Valley to Ukiah, they attempted to find a meal at a local restaurant, but the owner kicked them out because they were Indians.[24] One Pomo man described the demeaning situation in Ukiah: "They treat us mean around here. In Ukiah, the Indians are lower than a dog. Because a dog can go into hotel and restaurant but an Indian can't."[25]

Whites also segregated Mendocino County schools. Between 1880 and 1935, several schools existed in Round Valley. Indian children attended a day school, a boarding school, and a public school on the reservation, whereas white students went to a public elementary and high school in Covelo. In the early twentieth century, white Covelo residents adamantly maintained the color line. In 1920 agency school superintendent W. W. McConihe attempted to enroll Indian children in the Covelo elementary school, but white parents blocked his efforts. Parents told McConihe, "Indian children are unclean." McConihe naively offered to wash the children before enrolling them, but parents rebuffed his offer, telling him there was no room for the Indians in the Covelo school district.[26] The idea that California Indians represented a "dirty" race predated the parents' complaints and resonated with the populace in Covelo. Historian James Rawls writes, "According to long-standing Anglo-American tradition, cleanliness as a virtue was practically coequal with godliness; by definition things clean were superior to things unclean." Whites in California saturated their observations about the California Indians' diet, homes, and religious practices with references to dirt. "The Indians of California," Rawls concludes, "were thus ranked not only among the most primitive of people but also among the dirtiest."[27] Such racist ideas supported the extermination of the California Indians in the 1850s and their segregation in the twentieth century.

Some Indian parents continued their attempt to enroll Indian children in the Covelo schools but met the same response McConihe had encountered. School board trustee Mr. Tuttle told Mary Clark that white parents had threatened to withdraw their children if her daughter, Ernestine, enrolled. Nevertheless, Mary Clark was adamant in her decision, and Ernestine graduated from the eighth grade in 1933.[28] When Indian children crossed the color barrier,

they faced reprisals from white students who attempted to enforce the artificial lines of race. Al Want remembered that white children did not want him or his brothers to attend school because they were Indian: "[W]hen we first started it was a fight . . . every day. There used to be a guy there by the name of Emmett Spurlock. He used to whip me every day, anytime he wanted to, but I'd fight him. So finally the tables turned—I whipped him. . . . I whipped him twice every day. Finally [we] turned out to be best friends."[29]

Other Indians did not attain the social acceptance Want achieved with Spurlock. Ernestine recalled constant fights between Indian and white students and noticed that whites selectively ostracized Indians: "[W]hen it come to like a baseball game or basketball or volleyball, [white students] always wanted the Indian on their side. . . . But when the game was over, we went to the corner. That was our deal, we'd go to the corner."[30] Jim Crow ideology reinforced the barriers between whites and Indians in Round Valley even when Indian children attended the public schools. Whites dictated how and when they interacted with Indians. Segregation and violence influenced many Indian children to prefer reservation schools to the Covelo school. Filbert Anderson recalled, "That was bad in them days. I know I was sure against going to high school—white school. I did everything in my power to get out of it."[31] The treatment of Indians in public places demonstrated the white ranchers' true intentions. Although they described them as dutiful workers, Indians neither "cleaned up" enough to attend schools with white children nor shopped with white patrons.

Standing in contrast to ranch owners' views, federal agents and inspectors argued that wage labor actually demeaned Indians. Agent J. L. Burchard remarked that Indians working and living with white ranchers were "used, kept, and held, much in the same way as slaves were in the former-slave states, except that the condition of the Indians is not as good as it was [for] the slaves." Burchard complained that white ranchers did not provide the necessary institutions of civilization for Indians, such as churches and schools. Furthermore, Burchard believed white employers did not watch after their Indian workers. "In fact," he wrote, "[the Indians'] morals [are] not being cared for, [Indian workers] are very *immoral* and exercise a bad influence on the Reservation Indians."[32] The debate between government officials and white ranchers echoed the arguments abolitionists and anti-abolitionists had hurled against one another before the Civil War. Rather than the dutiful, civilized workers white ranchers believed wage labor produced, agents found degenerate and oppressed Indians.

Agents alleged that the labor system in Round Valley made Indians lazy and dependent on the federal government. They blamed reservation policies and off-reservation labor for the Indians' condition. In 1887 Inspector Frank Armstrong suggested that reservation work was "making peons out of [the Indians]" because the agent paid the Indians in rations.[33] Later that year Inspector Robert Gardner agreed. He thought the Indians were "inclined to be industrious but [they] lack economy and thrift."[34] Reservation labor did not promote the essential values associated with upward mobility in American society: "frugality, diligent work, and sobriety of the Protestant ethnic."[35] Agents also made off-reservation labor—the same labor white ranchers praised—culpable for the Indians' condition. Gardner argued that off-reservation labor—traveling to the Ukiah Valley to pick hops or working on the ranches in Round Valley—should be the exception and not the rule of Indian work. Instead, Indians needed to strive for independence from white ranchers and, more important, from the federal government. He concluded that circumstances in Round Valley "depress [the Indians] and cause some of them to lead lives of comparative idleness and dependency."[36] Reservations were supposed to prepare Indians to enter white society, but wage labor undermined that system. It kept Indians in a state of dependency and did not promote the values and cultivate the aspirations necessary to advance in American life.

Working conditions were only part of the problem. Agents also worried about the Indians' "reckless" spending habits. Inspector T. D. Marcum complained that Indians used their money to purchase whiskey in the border town of Covelo. On this point settlers and inspectors agreed. Hornbroke stated, "Most of them spend their wages extravagantly." He admitted, though, that Indians imbibed alcohol "about like the average white laboring people."[37] Class distinctions again played a role in creating racial categories for Round Valley Indians. Indians and poor whites failed to climb the agricultural ladder because they fell prey to the evils of alcohol.[38] Stereotypes of Native Americans as heavy drinkers exacerbated perceptions of their spending habits while simultaneously underscoring their dependent status. Rather than saving their money, Indians spent their wages on alcohol. Instead of inculcating the values of free labor, wage work had created dependent and degraded Indians.

Federal officials opposed the creation of a working class in Round Valley. According to prevailing attitudes among Indian Office personnel and reformers, Indians were not supposed to be wage workers; they should have been yeoman farmers. However, working conditions on and off the reservation impeded agricultural development in Round Valley and kept Indians mired in a

state of dependence. Their solution was allotment, which would transform Round Valley Indians from workers into farmers and undermine tribal identities. Individual landownership would provide the necessary tools for American Indians to progress along the path of civilization. They would evolve from hunters and gatherers to wage workers and finally to independent farmers. At the same time that individual allotments would improve the social and economic condition of Indians, they would break up reservations and tribal ethnicities.[39]

Allotment did not provide the moral reform federal agents had hoped for because it did not end agricultural labor for the Round Valley Indians. As many scholars have suggested, allotment did exactly the opposite, further entrenching Native Americans as wage laborers.[40] For most of the early twentieth century, federal agents worried about the effect of wage labor on the morality of the Round Valley Indians. In 1916, agents complained that hop picking was a time of "indulgence and depravity."[41] As the agents saw it, on long trips away from both the reservation and the agent's kind and guiding hand, Indians imbibed copious amounts of alcohol and gambled away their meager earnings.

Although whites disagreed on the status of Indian workers, Indians worked to support themselves and to maintain their respective ethnic identities. They preserved their tribal distinctions even after the federal government relocated them from their homelands to Round Valley. By 1880 about 1,000 Indians, representing eight tribal and band groups, lived in Round Valley. Agent J. L. Burchard remarked that all were "distinct in habits, language and appearance."[42] Round Valley Indians preserved these distinctions by establishing tribal settlements and marrying members of their same tribe. A special government census conducted in 1880 indicated that only nineteen intermarried couples were living on the reservation, with the majority of intermarriages between members of the large tribes on the reservation (Yuki, Concow, and Little Lake Pomo) and those of smaller tribes (Wailacki, Pit River, Redwood, and Potter Valley).[43] Settlement patterns preserved and reflected these divisions. More than half of Yuki families lived at the Lowerquarters, and they outnumbered other Indian families there by more than two to one (Map 11.1). The rest of the Yuki lived at various places on the reservation. Little Lake and Concow families concentrated their settlements more than the Yuki did. Fifty-two of fifty-seven Concow families and fifty-five of sixty Little Lake families lived at the headquarters. The remainder of the families were scattered across the reservation (see Table 11.1).[44] The composition and placement of Indian households sustained tribal boundaries.



Map 11.1. Drawn by Jorge Lizárraga.

Indians reinforced these distinctions through wage labor. In 1879, Calpella Pomos fled to protest reservation working conditions, in particular the poor wages. Agent Henry Sheldon had promised to pay Indians $1.50 per day of work, half in rations and the other half in cash. However, Charlie Brown (Pomo) stated, "We were worked there too hard, and [Sheldon] didn't give us enough to eat. . . . I killed 100 hogs myself, and scalded and cleaned them, but the Indians didn't get any of them." Agent Sheldon also made onerous demands on his workers. Brown complained that he forced Indians to work while they were sick; "when we were not able to work he forced us to work, and when we would not work he said he would put us in the smoke house. He put some of us in the smoke house pretty nearly everyday."[45] When refusing to work failed, Brown and the Pomos fled the reservation south to Ukiah and worked for white farmers. Back in Ukiah the Pomo found better wage and working conditions than they had experienced in Round Valley. During the summer, for

Table 11.1—Location of Round Valley Indian Households, 1880

Location	*Yuki*	*Redwood*	*Wailacki*	*Concow*	*Potter Valley*	*Pit River*	*Nomlacki*	*Little Lake*
Lowerquarters, 1 mile east of agency	35	1	—	—	4	6	1	—
Gravel Ridge	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Gate	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1½ miles east of agency	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Agency	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	—
Gristmill	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1½ miles west of agency	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2¼ miles west of agency	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2½ miles northwest of agency	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2¼ miles northwest of agency	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1 mile east-northeast of headquarters	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
Headquarters	—	14	—	32	1	—	1	55
1 mile north of headquarters	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
8 miles northwest of headquarters	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
2 miles southeast of headquarters	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2 miles west of headquarters	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	5
Totals	56	16	2	36	5	6	2	60

Compiled from: Schedules of Special Census of Indians, 1880, National Archives and Records Administration Microfilm 1791, Roll 5, Washington, DC.

example, Pomo workers made $600 picking hops. They then obtained a loan and used the money to purchase land and lumber for houses. Brown explained, "We all live in a bunch, but I don't know but five who have land."[46] Wage labor reinforced the communal values of the Calpella Pomo. They engaged in wage labor but pooled their wages to advance community and tribal goals.

Those Pomos who fled the reservation in the 1880s pioneered the use of agricultural labor to sustain ethnic boundaries in the twentieth century. Some Pomos remained in Round Valley but maintained ties with their homelands through seasonal labor. While traveling to and working in the hop fields, Pomos from Round Valley met friends and relatives who had absconded from the reservation or were not removed from the Ukiah Valley.[47] Agricultural labor created a regional ethnic community in Mendocino County.[48]

Other tribes purchased land and preserved their tribal identity as well. In 1907 a group of Concows formed the Concow Cemetery Association and approached school superintendent Horace Johnson with a proposition to buy an allotment for a cemetery.[49] Oral tradition reveals the impetus behind this request. From the time of their removal to Round Valley until the early twentieth century, the Concow buried their dead at Pinegrove cemetery; however, on one occasion "a Wailaki man and a Konkow man got in a fight and the Wailaki killed the Konkow. After a while, the Wailaki man died and was buried at Pine Grove. The Konkow people got mad and no longer buried [their dead] there."[50] On April 19, 1909, the Concow Cemetery Association purchased Eva Brown's allotment and used it for a cemetery site, now known as the Headquarters cemetery.[51] Burying one's dead became a marker of tribal affiliation in the twentieth century, linking tribal identity with the market economy through the purchase of land.

Whereas wages and land contributed to tribal identities, the workplace provided other areas for Indians to establish their tribal identity. In the 1880s, agents hired Indians to serve on a police force. Indian reformers supported the formation of Indian police forces because they brought American ideas of law and order to the reservation and enforced these codes without the aid of the U.S. Army.[52] Reservation officials attempted to hire men who were leaders of their respective tribes. Thus the Indian police opened avenues to leadership positions at the same time it provided an opportunity for agents to manipulate tribal politics and undermine established leadership structures.[53] In 1887, agent C. H. Yates hired James Sherwood, Jim Henley, Dan Wright, Dick Wesley, Mike Hunter, and Peter Hudson as tribal police officers and called each one the chief or headman of his respective tribe.[54] This created potential for conflict, as Indian police officers found it difficult to balance the demands of the agent and those of their tribe. Agents expected Native American police officers to conform to the wishes of the agent, not to those of the Indian community.

Although agents hoped Indian police officers would be effective tools in controlling the reservations, Indian police officers often responded to the pressures of their tribal constituents rather than to the agent. In 1888, Yates complained that the Indian police only arrested members of other tribes and thus seemed to have resisted pressure to act as agents of assimilation.[55] They administered justice selectively on this multitribal reservation, thereby garnering public support by sanctioning tribal feuds while also protecting members of their own tribes. Policemen resisted assimilation in other ways. In 1903, agency clerk Elmer Kightlinger fired Smith Card, John Duncan, and Alfred

Brown because they refused to bring Indian children to the boarding school. They sided with parents and students who resisted the school's harsh punishments and interference in their daily lives. Students demonstrated these feelings by setting fire to school buildings in 1883, 1910, and 1914. In response, Indian police officers acceded to the wishes of the community and refused to enforce school attendance.[56] As at many workplaces, the demands of the employer and those of the employee did not always mesh. Indian police officers understood that their jobs depended on appeasing both agents and their ethnic community. In the examples cited earlier, Indian police officers used their positions to promote ethnic and tribal identities, in the process countermanding the orders of agents who expected them to promote assimilation.

Even though reservation workers resisted reservation labor and vexed Indian agents, off-reservation labor irritated both federal officials and reservation agents even more. Primarily, they complained about the Indians' freedom and their ability to hold on to traditional practices. At many job sites throughout Mendocino County, Indian workers established cultural and tribal institutions. Roundhouses, for instance, remained a vibrant part of the community's religious and social life. Before American contact, California Indians held dances and sweats in roundhouses. As early as 1874, agents complained about the location of Indian roundhouses. Agent John L. Burchard remarked, "Indians [living on white ranchers' lands] are allowed to have sweat houses and in most cases, [to] gamble, dance, etc."[57] In this way, Indians combined wage labor with an early form of ethnic renewal.[58] In fact, Indians discovered that wage labor might insulate them from the pressure to assimilate. White ranchers did not suppress cultural expressions, largely because they did not want to alienate their cheap workers. As a result, Indians found space to establish cultural institutions and practices, like the sweat house, for gambling and dances.

Roundhouses continued to house Indian cultural and social activities in the early twentieth century. Adeline Figueroa remembered, "[We] didn't have no games in the roundhouses. Mostly it was like sacred dances, songs. And they didn't do too much in the roundhouses. . . . Not everybody's allowed in there."[59] Similarly, tribal spiritual leaders used off-reservation workplaces to construct tribal institutions. When he worked on the Hop Ranch in Covelo, Ralph Moore led the Yuki "Devil Society" and taught people to concoct poisons and to perform magic. Moore used the workplace to pass on tribal spiritual knowledge. Yuki workers at the Hop Ranch also kept their own roundhouse on the grounds of the ranch so they could dance when the day's work was done.[60]

Indian doctors and shamans kept roundhouses on their allotments. Moore built a roundhouse on his allotment after fire destroyed one at the Hop Ranch. Acie Hoaglen recalled the importance of the Concow roundhouse and medicine men. "Henry Clay, he used to put [dances] on," he said. "He must have been Concow. . . . There's an old guy used to be, Austin McLean, they called him, he was Concow. He used to learn most of the people how to dance and sing, too. . . . They'd have a big Indian dance. . . . The people used to come from all over to dance. Not only just these people, they'd be Indians from Chico, Paskenta, all around." Men like Henry Clay, Austin McLane, and Ralph Moore taught tribal culture to younger members, thereby underscoring ethnic demarcations in Round Valley and perpetuating the survival of each tribal group in the twentieth century. Shamans and roundhouses connected Indians of the same ethnicity to a common past. Each tribe in Round Valley had a different history, worldview, and way of life. Ceremonial spaces linked these Indians to that past, and these places were connected to the market economy. Whether at the Hop Ranch or on an allotment, Indians innovatively used the commodification of land to enhance tribal and Indian ethnicities.[61] Allotment transformed Indian land into a commodity, but it retained its communal character both in its cultural significance and in practice.

In 1936 the Office of Indian Affairs declared that tribal distinctions had disappeared and designated Native Americans living in Round Valley the "Round Valley Confederated Tribes."[62] Anthropologist Amelia Susman, who conducted fieldwork in Round Valley in 1937, cited intermarriage as the reason for this change.[63] Other investigators also noticed the preponderance of intermarried Indians and the lack of informed consultants. Most contemporary Indians claim descent from at least two tribes and sometimes more. Some Round Valley residents joke that it might be easier to find out which tribes people are not members of than to determine those to which they do belong. In addition to increasing rates of tribal intermarriage, Round Valley Indians practiced similar economic, recreation, and religious lifestyles by the time of the Great Depression.[64] Certainly, evidence supported the idea that tribal divisions had disappeared in Round Valley by the beginning of World War II.

Yet the efforts of Indians in the early twentieth century to maintain tribal divisions still resonate in Round Valley. For instance, there are at least five cemeteries in the valley. One, the Valley View cemetery, is for the area's white population and is a lingering reminder of segregation in Round Valley. The other four still possess their tribal connections. One reservation resident explained that the Pinegrove cemetery is for the Wailacki, the Headquarters cemetery is

for the Concow, the Yuki had a cemetery near Shore Creek, and the Nomlacki cemetery is for the Nomlacki.[65] Indeed, the name of the Nomlacki cemetery carries its original tribal association. Round Valley Indians may practice Christian burials, but they do so in a way that articulates tribal cultures. This history of tribal ethnicity also affects tribal politics. Wayne Cox (Pomo) observed, "The Nomlakis don't like the Wailakis and the Wailakis don't like the Yukis and the Yukis don't like the Pomos and the Pomos don't like the Pitt Rivers and the Pitt Rivers don't like the Concows."[66] Pointing to a sign reading "Round Valley Unified Tribes," Kathy Cook stated, "People around here need to remember that. We are unified."[67] Even though Cook emphasized reservation unity, the fractiousness of tribal politics, of which Cook is a fifty-year veteran, demonstrates the inherent divisions in Round Valley.

Labor was central to racial and ethnic relations on northern California's Round Valley Reservation. White ranchers believed they had paved the path toward civilization by hiring Indians, but they segregated them instead. Government officials, on the other hand, found that wage labor impeded the path toward progress by creating a class of lazy, dependent, and improvident Indians. They believed allotment would solve these problems in the twentieth century. Examining the intersection of race, labor, and California Indians also allows us to see ethnic relations from the Indians' viewpoint. In the twentieth century, Round Valley Indians found that wage labor and the market economy provided opportunities to preserve tribal identities. Pomos purchased land in the Ukiah Valley with wages earned from picking hops, Concows used their wages to buy land for a tribal cemetery, and Yukis renewed cultural traditions and institutions while picking hops. The market economy and tribal intermarriage did not erase tribal identities, and Round Valley did not represent a melting pot of races and ethnicities.[68] Rather, the Pomo, Concow, and Yuki all worked to maintain their individual identities in northern California.

NOTES

1. "Conditions of Certain Indians in California," *Senate: Reports,* 48th Cong., 2nd sess. (1884–1885), serial no. 1522, 54.

2. On race, labor, and Indians in California, see Albert Hurtado, *Indian Survival on the California Frontier* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); James Rawls, *Indians of California: The Changing Image* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984).

3. See Linda Pitelka, "Mendocino: Race Relations in a Northern California County, 1850–1949" (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1994).

4. Michael Omi and Howard Winant define racial formation as "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed." *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s,* 2nd ed. (New York:

Routledge, 1994 [1986]), 55–56. In addition, I found these studies of race and ethnicity in America particularly helpful: Peter Kolchin, "Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America," *Journal of American History* 89 (June 2002): 154–173; Alexandra Harmon, *Indians in the Making: Ethnic Relations and Indian Identities Around Puget Sound* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Neil Foley, *The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Peggy Pascoe, "Race, Gender, and Intercultural Relations: The Case of Interracial Marriage," in *Writing the Range: Race, Class, and Culture in the Women's West,* ed. Elizabeth Jameson and Susan Armitage (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 69–80; Winthop Jordan, *White over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550–1812* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1973 [1968]).

5. Nancy Shoemaker, "How Indians Got to Be Red," *American Historical Review* 102 (June 1997): 625.

6. Anthropologist Loretta Fowler argues that multitribal reservations need not lead to homogeneity. She notes that despite the formation of an "Indian community" on the Fort Belknap Reservation, Gros Ventre and Assiniboine cultures persisted. See Fowler, *Shared Symbols, Contested Meanings: Gros Ventre Culture and History, 1778–1984* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Anthropologist Morris Foster argues in *Being Comanche: A Social History of an Indian Group* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991) that despite similar experiences in Indian country, Indians have imbued similar traditions, places, and actions with contrasting meanings, thereby perpetuating tribal identities. James Merrell describes a similar process in the southern piedmont in *The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact Through the Era of Removal* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 18–29. Finally, recent studies of the interaction between Indians and the market economy have suggested that economic change was not always inimical to Indians and their identities. For one example, see Brian Hosmer, *American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence and Innovation Among the Menominees and the Metlakatlans, 1870–1920* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).

7. Virginia Miller, "The Changing Role of the Chief on a California Indian Reservation," *American Indian Quarterly* 13 (Fall 1989): 447. This claim persists in scholarly research. Sociologist Joane Nagel echoes the work of Miller, writing, "The Yuki tribe was absorbed into the composite 'Covelo Indian Community' of the Round Valley Reservation," in *American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity and Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 188. See also Russell Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population History Since 1492* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 200–204; Victoria Patterson, Deanna Barney, Skip Willits, and Les Lincoln, eds., *The Singing Feather: Tribal Remembrances from Round Valley* (Ukiah: Mendocino County Library, 1990); Todd Benson, "The Consequences of Reservation Life: Native Californians on the Round Valley Reservation, 1871–1884," *Pacific Historical Review* 60 (May 1991): 221–244; Wendy Wall, "Gender and the 'Citizen Indian,'" in Jameson and Armitage, *Writing the Range,* 202–229.

8. Nagel, *American Indian Ethnic Renewal,* 19–42; Raymond D. Fogelson, "Perspectives on Native American Identity," in *Studying Native America: Problems and Prospects,* ed. Russell Thornton (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), 40–59.

9. Robert B. Campbell, "New Lands, Old Lands: Native American Labor, Agrarian Ideology, and the Progressive-Era State in the Making of the Newlands Reclamation Project, 1902–1926," *Pacific Historical Review* 72 (May 2002): 203–238; Colleen O'Neill,

"The 'Making' of the Navajo Worker: Navajo Households, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Off-Reservation Wage Work, 1948–1960," *New Mexico Historical Review* 74 (October 1999): 375–405; Alice Littlefield and Martha Knack, eds., *Native Americans and Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical Perspectives* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), especially Knack, "Nineteenth Century Great Basin Indian Wage Labor," 144–176, and Richard Carrico and Florence Shipek, "Indian Labor in San Diego County, California, 1850–1900," 198–217.

10. The government probably removed other tribes to Round Valley, but the federal government does not recognize them. In March 2002, Round Valley Indians and political groups in Mendocino County successfully lobbied to change the historical marker overlooking Round Valley. The new marker at Inspiration Point lists these tribes represented in Round Valley: Yuki, Nomlacki, Wailacki, Lassik, Sinkyone, eight Pomo bands, Wappo, Concow Maidu, Colusa, and Achumawi. Kim Hogeland, "Big Times/Little Times," *News from Native America* 15 (Summer 2002): 40–41.

11. For a history of the Round Valley Reservation, see Estle Beard and Lynwood Carranco, *Genocide and Vendetta: The Round Valley Wars of Northern California* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981). My understanding of the reservation system in California comes from Hurtado, *Indian Survival on the California Frontier.* On conflicts between the Yuki and the Nomlacki, see Walter Goldschmidt, George Foster, and Frank Essene, "War Stories from Two Enemy Tribes," in *The California Indians: A Source Book,* ed. R. F. Heizer and M. A. Whipple (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 383–396. For a description of the Horse Creek massacre, see A. G. Tassin, "The Con-Cow Indians," *Overland Monthly* 4, 19 (July 1884): 7–14.

12. "Conditions of Certain Indians in California," 57.

13. Ibid., 98.

14. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States,* 68.

15. Foley, *White Scourge,* 5–7, 64–91. On the concept of the agricultural ladder, see p. 10.

16. For a discussion of the dual labor system in the West, see Richard White, *"It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A New History of the American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 282–284. For a dual labor system in Mendocino County, see Pitelka, "Mendocino." Dual labor systems existed in industrial labor, too. See John Bodnar, *Immigration and Industrialization: Ethnicity in an American Mill Town, 1870–1940* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).

17. "Conditions of Certain Indians in California," 57. It is interesting that Hornbroke's thoughts reflected ideas of social evolution so prevalent in the 1880s. Round Valley Indians had progressed from backward and inefficient farmers to a more civilized manner of working the land.

18. Ibid., 98.

19. Ibid., 57.

20. On antebellum defenses of slavery, see Peter Kolchin, *Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), 178–191; Eugene D. Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York: Vintage, 1976), 49–70.

21. Whit Ham, *Mendocino County Remembered: An Oral History,* 2 vols., ed. Bruce Levene (Ukiah: Mendocino County Historical Society, 1976), vol. 1, 194; Al Want, *Mendocino Country Remembered,* vol. 2, 258; Michael Tomlan, *Tinged with Gold: Hop Culture in the United States* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 127.

22. Quoted in Alice Holmes, *Mendocino County Hop Industry,* Heald-Poage Museum, Ukiah, CA, folder: hops, n.p.

23. See, for instance, "Hop Picking in Full Blast," *Mendocino Daily Dispatch,* September 6, 1901. On the treatment of Pomos in Ukiah, see Charles Roberts, "The Pomo Indian Women's Club, 1940–1957: Cultural Retention and Political Activism in Mendocino County," Paper presented at the 42nd Annual Western History Association Conference, Colorado Springs, CO, October 16–19, 2002.

24. Want, *Mendocino County Remembered,* vol. 2, 257.

25. Quoted in Victoria Patterson, "Indian Life in the City: A Glimpse of the Urban Experience of Pomo Women in the 1930s," *California History* 71 (1992): 403.

26. Round Valley Narrative, 1920, *Superintendents' Annual, 1907–1938.* National Archives Microfilm 1011, roll 119, Washington, DC.

27. Rawls, *Indians of California,* 190–195, quotes on p. 195.

28. Ernestine Ray, interview by Les Lincoln, April 1990, Covelo, CA. Round Valley Oral History Project (hereafter RVOHP), Round Valley Public Library, Covelo, CA.

29. Want, *Mendocino County Remembered,* vol. 2, 257.

30. Ray, interview by Lincoln.

31. Filbert Anderson, interview by Les Lincoln, n.d., Covelo, CA, RVOHP, Round Valley Public Library, Covelo, CA.

32. J. L. Burchard to E. P. Smith, December 4, 1874. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 75, Special Cases, SC 43, Box 58, Washington, DC.

33. Inspection of Round Valley Agency by Frank Armstrong, March 29, 1887, *Reports of Inspection by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1873–1900.* National Archives and Records Administration, Microfilm Publications 1070, roll 43, Washington, DC; hereafter *Reports, 1873–1900,* mf 1070, roll 43.

34. Inspection of Round Valley Agency by Robert Gardner, December 24, 1887, in ibid.

35. Quoted in Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995 [1970]), 23.

36. Inspection of Round Valley Agency by Robert Gardner, December 24, 1887, *Reports, 1873–1900,* mf 1070, roll 43; Inspection of Round Valley Agency by Robert Gardner, March 30, 1892. *Reports, 1873–1900,* mf 1070, roll 43. For similar statements see Inspection of Round Valley Agency by Henry Ward, October 26, 1883, *Reports, 1873–1900,* mf 1070, roll 43; Inspection of Round Valley Agency by E. A. Bannister, November 27, 1885, *Reports, 1873–1900,* mf 1070, roll 43.

37. Report on Round Valley Agency by T. D. Marcum, January 21, 1889, *Reports, 1873–1900,* mf 1070, roll 43; "Conditions of Certain Indians in California," 58.

38. On the agricultural ladder, see Foley, *White Scourge,* 10.

39. My understanding of nineteenth-century federal Indian policy relies on Hoxie, *A Final Promise*; David Rich Lewis, *Neither Wolf nor Dog: American Indians, Environment, and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Bernard Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973). For agent support of allotment, see Inspection of Round Valley Agency by Frank Armstrong, March 29, 1887, *Reports, 1873–1900,* mf 1070, roll 43; Inspection of Round Valley Agency by Robert Gardner, December 24, 1887, *Reports, 1873–1900,* mf 1070, roll 43; Inspection of Round Valley Agency by Robert Gardner, March 30, 1892, *Reports, 1873–1900,* mf 1070, roll 43; *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1884* (hereafter *ARCIA*), (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 16; *ARCIA for 1889,*

126. To be fair, Indians supported allotment as well; see Indians of Round Valley to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, July 19, 1885, in "Lands in Severalty to the Indians on the Round Valley Indian Reservation in California," *House of Representatives: Executive Documents.* 49th Cong., 1st sess., serial no. 21, 8–9, and Speeches Made by Indians at Round Valley Indian Agency, February 21, 1891, Relative to the Quantity of Land Which They Desire for Grazing and Timber Purposes, National Archival Records Administration Record Group (hereafter NARA RG) 75, Special Cases, SC 43, Box 59.

40. Alice Littlefield, "Native American Labor and Public Policy in the United States," in *Marxist Approaches in Economic Anthropology,* ed. Alice Littlefield and Hill Gates (New York: Landham, 1988), 219–232.

41. Round Valley Narrative, 1916, *Superintendents' Annual Narrative, 1907–1938,* mf 1011, roll 119.

42. "Round Valley Reservation Indians," C. Hart Merriam Papers, BANC FILM 1022, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, roll 14, 495.

43. Schedules of a Special Census of Indians, 1880. National Archives and Records Administration microfilm publications, microfilm 1791, roll 5, Washington, DC.

44. A Yuki family, Concow family, Little Lake family or the like is one in which the head of household is a tribal member. This does not mean all members of the family were of that tribe. However, it is significant that census takers recognized the ethnicity of one of the marriage partners. This suggests that the census takers were aware of tribal intermarriage, and the spouse (usually a woman) asserted her tribal identity.

45. "Conditions of Certain Indians in California," 76, 78.

46. Ibid., 74–75, 77, quotes on p. 74. The Potter Valley Pomo had a similar story. In 1879 they left the Round Valley Reservation because of the poor working conditions and Agent Sheldon's failure to provide a school in Round Valley. Once back in the Ukiah Valley, the Potter Valley Pomo made $800 picking hops. With the money the Pomos purchased 56½ acres of land and lived there in common. See ibid., 78–80.

47. Myrtle Shively, *Voices and Dreams: A Mendocino County Native American Oral History,* ed. Sally Russell and Bruce Levene (Ukiah: Mendocino County Library, 1990), 265.

48. On the idea of the "regional community," see Sarah Deutsch, *No Separate Refuge: Culture, Class, and Gender on an Anglo-Hispanic Frontier in the American Southwest, 1880–1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

49. *ARCIA for 1907,* 19.

50. Suzanne Stewart and David Fredrickson, *A Cultural Resources Survey of the Round Valley Indian Reservation: Mendocino and Trinity Counties, California* (Rohnert Park, CA: Sonoma State University Academic Foundation, 1979), 79–80.

51. Report on Application for Patent in Fee for Eva Vallely (Brown), January 1922, National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Region (San Francisco), Record Group 75, Sacramento Area Office, Realty Office, Case Records of Land Transactions, 1909–1956, Box 15, Folder RV-224, BROWN, Eva.

52. *ARCIA for 1887,* 13; *ARCIA for 1888,* 22; *ARCIA for 1889,* 126; "Report on Round Valley Agency, California, by T. D. Marcum, January 21, 1889," *Reports, 1873–1900,* mf 1070, roll 43; "Report on Round Valley Agency, Cal., by Arthur Tinker, July 3, 1890," *Reports, 1873–1900,* mf 1070, roll 43; "Letter to the Indian Office from C. C. Duncan, September 25, 1894," *Reports, 1873–1900,* mf 1070, roll 44. On Native American police forces, see William Hagan, *Indian Police and Judges: Experiments in Acculturation and Control* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

53. On the implications of Indian police and leadership, see Hagan, *Indian Police and Judges*; Robert Utley, *The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846–1890* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984). For changes in Indian leadership on the Round Valley Reservation, see Miller, "Changing Role of the Chief," 447–455.

54. Descriptive Statement of Proposed Changes in the Indian Police Force at Round Valley Agency, California, Submitted July 1, 1887, by C. H. Yates, Indian Agent. National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Branch (San Francisco), Record Group 75, Round Valley Agency, 1858–1930, Agency Reports, 1872–1913, Box 35, Folder: Reports: Change in Indian Police Service.

55. *ARCIA for 1888,* 22.

56. Descriptive Statement of Proposed Changes in the Indian Police Force, July 27, 1903. National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Branch (San Bruno), Round Valley Agency, 1858–1930, Agency Reports, 1872–1913, Box 35, Folder: Reports: Change in Indian Police Service. For incidents of school vandalism, see Wall, "Gender and the 'Citizen Indian,'" 202–203, 209; Stewart and Fredrickson, *Cultural Resources Survey,* 64.

57. Burchard to Smith, December 4, 1874.

58. On ethnic renewal, see Nagel, *American Indian Ethnic Renewal.*

59. Adeline Figueroa, interview by Les Lincoln, April 18, 1990, Covelo, CA, RVOHP, Round Valley Public Library, Covelo, CA.

60. Stewart and Fredrickson, *Cultural Resources Survey,* 77; ibid.; Leland Fulwider Jr., interview by Acklan Willits, April 23, 1990, Covelo, CA, RVOHP, Round Valley Public Library, Covelo, Ca.

61. Acie Hoaglen, *Voices and Dreams: A Mendocino County Oral History,* ed. Sally Russell and Bruce Levene (Ukiah: Mendocino County Library, 1990), 89; Figueroa, interview by Lincoln; Fulwider, interview by Willits. R. Warren Metcalf argues for searching for the connections between social connectedness and common history and identity. See Metcalf, "Lambs of Sacrifice: Termination, the Mixed-Blood Utes, and the Problem of Indian Identity," *Utah Historical Quarterly* 64 (Fall 1996): 342.

62. Office of Indian Affairs, *Human Dependency and Economic Survey: Sacramento, California Jurisdiction* (Denver: Office of Indian Affairs, 1939), 54–55.

63. Amelia Susman, "The Round Valley Indians of California: An Unpublished Chapter in the Acculturation of Seven [or Eight] American Indian Tribes," *Contributions to the University of California Archaeological Research Facility* 31 (Berkeley: University of California, Department of Anthropology, 1976), 55–56.

64. William J. Bauer Jr., "Life and Land on the Round Valley Reservation, 1880–1929" (M.A. thesis, University of Oklahoma, 2000).

65. Anita Rome, interview by author, June 21, 2002. Manuscript in author's possession.

66. Wayne Cox, *Voices and Dreams,* 82.

67. Katherine Cook, interview with author, March 11, 2002. Manuscript in author's possession.

68. Lisa Emmerich, "Comment: Creating and Crossing Ethnic Borders in Northern California," Paper presented at the American Historical Association Pacific Coast Branch 95th Annual Meeting, Tucson, AZ, August 3, 2002.

PART THREE

Methodology and Theoretical Implications

CHAPTER TWELVE

Local Knowledge as Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Definition and Ownership

C. D. JAMES PACI AND LISA KREBS

Whereas in past decades questions of unequal power, uneven development, and colonialism frequently centered on the ownership and control of natural resources and human labor, discussions about decolonization now turn on the use, definition, and ownership of knowledge. In their consideration of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), Chris Paci and Lisa Krebs explore the complex convergence of indigenous, local knowledge and the interests of the academic community. Implicit in their discussion is a critical dilemma: Can TEK be a force for decolonization, of knowledge and power, or will it be appropriated and then serve only as an engine for neocolonization?

The fact that indigenous peoples have always generated distinctive bodies of local knowledge sounds like a simple idea; however, this point has often been lost in quests to subdue or understand the "indigene." Within the academy and in aboriginal communities, local knowledge serves a variety of masters and fulfills different and sometimes opposing ideas and uses of local environments. Colonization certainly interfered with the production of indigenous

knowledge by altering the integrity of local aboriginal cultures in a number of ways, in particular in the erosion of aboriginal languages by use of the dominating language of commerce—English. Colonization, as it remains in government policy, seeks to assimilate and acculturate Aborigines into the body politic. Despite the weakening of aboriginal cultures, natives have continued to generate local knowledge.[1] This chapter seeks to understand local knowledge, its potential to reform what is known about local environments, and in particular how local knowledge relates to indigenous peoples. A growing use of the concept of traditional ecological knowledge, often used interchangeably with local and indigenous knowledge, forces us to reflect on just what these ideas mean, in particular on what they mean to two general groups: aboriginal people and academics.

As Alfred Young Man observed, "[T]he history of interaction between indigenous populations of North America and the invading Europeans has been an uneasy truce on almost every front for over five hundred years. Economically, socially, religiously, politically, and artistically[,] European values and philosophies have had to deal with the very different worldview of the North American Indian."[2] If one can forgive a crude revisionism, it has become apparent that the products of colonization—Canadians and Americans—have continued to trade with, borrow from, influence, and usurp indigenous peoples, mediated by a continuum of adaptation and change at one end and acculturation and extermination at the extreme. Local and indigenous knowledge has attracted a number of outsiders to speculate on both its specific and general characteristics. Historically, such explorations have been driven by "the expedient usurping of the human rights, land, and natural resources of the North American Indian."[3]

Among indigenous peoples, local knowledge is defined and perpetuated by a community of individuals who share a geographic and cultural sameness. To what extent the views of local knowledge holders have been appropriated by outsiders who study this knowledge and by its application outside local contexts is a pressing question. Ward Churchill describes the state of American education as "a paradigm of Eurocentrism, not only in terms of its focus, but also its discernable heritage, methodologies, and conceptual structure."[4] By now most students are aware of the plurality of art, literature, science, social structures, governance, and languages manifested by indigenous cultures. And yet the academy has responded slowly and unevenly to assertions of indigenous rights and title, in particular when they concern the nature and form of research and representation available to scholars and students. We posit

that the decolonization of Western environmental education is a growing force and that the inversion of Western constructs by the colonized, and by products of colonization, challenges the legitimacy of colonial institutions and worldviews.[5] In part, our discussion is offered as a critique to continue to deconstruct modernity and decolonize the West. Modernity, in terms of Western thought and development, reflects an enduring belief in human achievement, in particular in humans' superiority over nature. Hugh Brody argues that injustice is a feature of modernity:

> Colonial change ensures that everyone's economic and social lives are interdependent. And colonial beliefs assert that the colonised are inferior. Their supposed place in the past, as an example of some earlier stage of evolution, is used to justify extreme inequality. All hunter-gatherer peoples are aware of the European (or Asian or African) colonists' perception of them. They have heard, over and over again, the colonists' notions; they have experienced the colonists' attitudes and behaviour.[6]

For colonials, modernity is reflected by the Industrial Revolution, in the mechanistic, in the splitting of the atom, in mathematical rational discourse. Architecturally, modernity is advanced as clean and simple, functional and free from the cleavage of past eras—for example, Victorian romanticism. To deconstruct modernity is to accept that environmental perspectives are diverse, articulated in a variety of languages. Hearing all of them is to accept the pluralistic and situated nature of knowledge. Such learning has the potential to displace the exclusive position of the universal expert.

Frédérique Appfel-Marglin argues that local knowledge sits in contrast to perspectives of the experts (engineers, technicians, economists, anthropologists, and many others), for whom

> universality is the privilege of this modern mode of thought. It is the privilege, which has enabled this mode of knowing to confidently override local ways of knowing and doing, secure in its ability to deliver superior results. The First World is "developed" and the Third World is "developing" or "underdeveloped." In the phrases the *telos* of development stands revealed and the superior results are there already, luring everyone "forward." Simultaneously, this logic transmutes all alternative visions rooted in local knowledge as going "backwards," a charge that acquires its clout wholly from a progress-oriented notion of development.[7]

Western academic institutions have sought and perpetuated a universal knowledge in which discrete disciplines have sampled and studied a variety of geographies and cultures, shedding the embedded nature of knowledge. By shedding the embedded, Western academics reject specific context-endorsing

metatheories, universal theory, and concepts that transcend the local and specific; ideas were seen to be of great value if they could answer questions beyond the local. As such, academic disciplines have sometimes disregarded, sometimes ignored, sometimes stripped away, and sometimes transcended the context of local knowledge—the forces that lead to knowledge production—for its general and universal value.

Julie Thompson Klein notes that in the late twentieth century, "new divisions of intellectual labor, collaborative research, team teaching, hybrid fields, comparative studies, increased borrowing across disciplines, and a variety of 'unified,' 'holistic' perspectives" challenged traditional divisions of knowledge.[8] Universal and classical disciplinary knowledge has lost its claim to be the exclusive arbiter to answer all questions. For example, on issues of gender and power, the core critique of feminism has shown that science and the humanities afford the male view a greater advantage, ignoring and erasing female perspectives. Counterhegemonic discourse has moved cautiously toward research and representation of situated knowledge. Some scholars have changed their research perspectives on indigenous and local knowledges, and those concepts have gained academic currency, as paradigms inevitably do. Even with increasing value in some parts of the academy, indigenous and local knowledge continues to be rendered as universal (pan-Indianism) or as anecdotal, and it is discarded and ignored in other parts. The uneven and sometimes uncritical application and attention scholars pay to indigenous and local knowledge can be no excuse for continued colonization and appropriation. In Canada, First Nations and Native Studies programs and departments have developed since the late 1960s, a manifestation of this restructuring and development of hybrid fields.[9] This movement includes discussion and criticism, often directed toward issues of voice and power.[10]

Robert Warrior has argued that "to inject critical discourse with this ethical dimension [on the configuration of power] is to foreground the morality that has all too often been dismissed from Native studies as being 'political' or cheapened in a simplistically defined 'radicalism.'"[11] Although the academy cannot claim to have exclusive dominion over knowledge production and distribution, it is nonetheless antithetical to universities to operate beyond considerations of local knowledge. In this regard, scholars, particularly those in area studies, have constructed definitions, and for whatever reasons—whether to improve knowledge, to challenge dominant paradigms, or to reflect the diversity of knowledge—this has resulted in the hybridization of Western knowledge systems. One example of this hybridization is the merging of local knowledge

with ecology, producing a power lens of understanding: traditional ecological knowledge.

The first challenge in describing local knowledge as traditional ecological knowledge lies in terminology. This chapter uses *indigenous people* as a general term and indigenous environmental knowledge as a general theory (or idiom). However, such broad terms create problems, not the least being that they obscure the plurality of indigenous peoples and their environmental knowledge. What is needed is a framework to accommodate differences, one that can address power issues. Such a framework is suggested by the writings of a number of native and some nonnative scholars.[12] This chapter endorses a transparent degree of generalization; in other words, we seek to recognize environmental knowledge from specific contexts for broader discussions without rendering the knowledge void of location, history, and culture.

Knowledge that is specific to a linguistic or cultural group, situated in a specific geography or ecological system, must not be taken to apply more broadly than is appropriate. Most of what is discussed in this chapter is drawn from an understanding of the current political, social, economic, geographic, and historical realities of First Nations in Canada, particularly in northern British Columbia. However, specific knowledge is not claimed; that is, we do not claim to interpret or represent what specific local First Nations in northern British Columbia know. The point here, and the key we wish to convey in our discussion, is that research should always be situated within specific historical, cultural, and environmental contexts. Our framework will therefore reflect an awkward admission as a general theory with specific knowledge not suitably generalized.

Local knowledge, theorized as it is here as traditional ecological knowledge, is in this respect of a particular cultural, historical, and environmental quality that requires in each application particular consideration of the specific. Furthermore, traditional ecological knowledge is part of First Nations' socio-environmental identities. As used by nonnatives, traditional ecological knowledge needs to become a hybrid of the recognition of these identities and the diffusion of its components to serve specific and general research questions. This dual recognition would support indigenous peoples' resistance, best expressed in challenging the legitimacy of being viewed exclusively as subjects of law and research. In Canada, aboriginal peoples are effectively challenging Canadian legal and legislative curtailment of aboriginal rights and title, in part as a result of the inclusion of S. 35(1) in the Canadian Constitution (1982) and of several significant Supreme Court decisions, including *Sparrow*

(1990) and *Delgamuukw* (1997). In international arenas, aboriginal peoples continue to press for recognition of their rights and title by nation-states—for example, the Maori use of the Treaty of Watangi in New Zealand—and in international forums, such as Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity.

For the most part, the stranglehold of anthropology has been loosened on the study of indigenous peoples and all things indigenous, allowing more diverse scholarship to develop. Just as indigenous people have challenged the authority of universal knowledge, the academy has fostered the growth of different areas of scholarship, including hybrid or subdisciplinary scholarship. One area receiving considerable attention has been the environmental practices and knowledge of indigenous peoples. These advances do not dismiss continued inequalities and appropriations of knowledge by nonnatives, especially by those who ignore native definition and ownership of knowledge. These changes also do not necessarily lead to the potential decolonization of scholarship.

Indigenous resource management, use, and rights are topics of considerable interest across Canada and internationally. The diversity of indigenous traditional and evolving economies reveals a diversity of resource/land-use and management practices. Although the successes derived from legal actions taken by aboriginal litigants to advance their rights—established in Canada, for example, through various Supreme Court decisions—create an appearance of a general body of laws, such changes also mask the diverse environmental histories of natural resource crises. If there is a blind side to aboriginal rights litigation, it is in how the environment is conceptualized by the courts. For the most part, the courts continue to rely on Western concepts of land and environment as property, even when listening to aboriginal people who explain their cosmologies of traditional territories. Judges mostly understand ownership rights, use rights, and possible sui generis (some other new) rights. The adversarial nature of the courts is effective in establishing responsibility, but it provides little guidance on implementing changes suggested by their decisions, which is why management is a more effective arena for investigation. The problem with development and universality, as with anything anthropogenic and distinctively Western, is that in the wake of all development there remain varying degrees of local knowledge that either transmute the universal or adapt and accommodate change.

Traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and its application in co-management can be seen as an alternative to the discourse of development. Whereas classic development is characterized by imposition from outside, regardless of

local knowledge and environments, TEK in co-management seeks to include and engage local communities in decisions, to alter the questions that are asked, and to change the ways questions are answered. Although there is no single definition, co-management is widely understood as constituting the collaboration between state agencies and public groups that participate at various levels, from mere advisory bodies to joint decision making.[13] A search for alternatives to the discourses, processes, and institutions of development constitutes a response to the rise of globalized capitalism and the absence, since the demise of communism, of a legitimate competing political/knowledge system or a counterdiscourse. Collapsing or accelerated ecosystems, loss of local management systems and institutions, cultural instability, and economic dependency have produced significant counterdiscourses but not a united single voice. Indigenous peoples have not responded with a united single voice. We may have grown so accustomed to listening for a united single voice that we cannot hear the multitude.

Local knowledge, according to Fikret Berkes, "is the term of choice of some scholars. . . . [I]ndigenous ecological knowledge is a subset of local ecological knowledge. . . . But the term local knowledge conveys neither the ecological aspect of the concept, nor a sense of the temporal dimension and cumulative cultural transmission."[14] Berkes goes on to distinguish local knowledge as "recent knowledge." The point is that local knowledge is not necessarily passed down from multiple generations; it may not be as old as the world. This distinction supports recent parallel advances in ethnoscience. According to Virginia Nazarea, "[T]he situated nature of knowledge, the constraining as well as liberating effect of this locatedness, and the importance of history, power and stake in shaping environmental perception, management and negotiation all contribute to our understanding of this concept."[15] Local knowledge is contingent on locatedness and does not necessarily have much to do with shared culture. For example, local Cree knowledge in Moosonee (Ontario) may or may not be shared by local Cree in Fort Chipeweyan (Alberta). Indigenous knowledge of fishing may share commonalities or be considerably different in Ristagoche (Quebec) as compared with Saskatoon (Saskatchewan); in other words, there is something uniquely local about each of these indigenous knowledges.

Local knowledge is exclusively defined and perpetuated by individuals, by communities of individuals, and within a public context. Local knowledge is held by those who share (cohabit) a geographic (spatial and temporal) area without necessarily sharing a cultural sameness. Various levels of local knowledge



Figure 12.1. Conceptual levels of local knowledge. Access to research this knowledge is negotiated.

can be understood to exist at the public, community, and private levels (Figure 12.1). Not everyone in a community will share equally in what is termed *local knowledge,* and some private knowledge may not even be shared among family members. Depending on the nature of research, particularly participatory action research, and the degree of sharing, researchers will seek to tap into these various realms. It is prudent to understand that the validity and authority derived from research to gather local knowledge come from a combination of methodology, community and individual participation, research rigor, and the extent to which this knowledge fills gaps in current knowledge.

Definitions of local knowledge are also advanced by natives and nonnatives from regional, national, and international perspectives. The tensions among these levels play themselves out in discussions over the legitimacy of knowledge in terms of setting priorities and establishing institutions and processes with reference to government and development. Internationalist perspectives often evoke terms such as *common origins* and *for the benefit of humankind* to justify negation or assert local control. Negation enables the assimilation of local knowledge into mainstream global and often commercial institutions. Assertions affirm the role of local knowledge and can form the basis of resistance to globalization. It is important to acknowledge that nothing is really as straightforward as this, and there have been instances in which assertions of local knowledge have actually been used to negate local knowledge, in particu-

lar when scientific standards are used to judge the accuracy or legitimacy of local knowledge.[16]

In some ways the term *local* is inserted for *indigenous* to reflect a broader community whose identity is not necessarily derived from a single culture but is indicative of knowledge from long-term origins. General definitions of traditional and local are no longer acceptable without explanation. The use of indigenous as synonymous with traditional and local limits future development of research, methodologies, and studies. With a paradigm taking root in traditional ecological knowledge, researchers need to differentiate among indigenous, local, and traditional knowledge systems. Indigenous knowledge is as much a political statement as a descriptive label in that it outlines a body of knowledge derived from people who claim, and self-identify with, origins in a set space and time. Very often indigenous knowledge is set in opposition to settlers' (invaders'/colonizers') knowledge. Tom Griffiths writes, "[F]rom the very beginnings of the British occupation [of Australia], colonists have questioned the depth and narrative potential of the indigenous past."[17]

As with colonialism elsewhere, the struggle by colonialism's progeny to gain historical legitimacy, whether a scenic claim to "wilderness" or a genetic claim to "indigenous," is reflected in narratives by "experts."[18] The silencing and liberating power of history, the assimilation or recognition of science, the critique and the rise and legitimacy of the nation-state, and the commodification of metaphysical knowledge are all continually and perhaps increasingly negotiated by the colonized and the products of colonization. The search for the Northwest Passage, the historiography surrounding the search, is instructive in this regard. Arctic explorers such as Sir John Franklin were long heralded as valiant and heroic, whereas recognition of the aboriginal assistance they received on the land has greatly diminished, serving as the paper on which the narrative is written.[19] Northerners are now rewriting the story, telling their accounts of such disastrous historic actions as the search and noting successes that depended a great deal on the local knowledge of aboriginal peoples. The use and definition of local knowledge are a form of resistance that must not be used as an escape from a discussion of origins and rights to claim land and resources, social as well as natural resources.

Indigenous knowledge is embedded within a cultural context, expressed through language, ceremony, artifacts, cosmology, and social relationships. Such knowledge is always within the context of a larger cultural paradigm, part of which is the understanding that "[i]mperialism frames the indigenous experience."[20] Lester Rigney promotes an indigenist methodology "as a step toward



Figure 12.2. Conceptual model of Traditional Ecological Knowledge as a hybrid intersection of both Indigenous Knowledges and researcher.

assisting Indigenous theorists and practitioners to determine what might be an appropriate response to delegitimate racist oppression in research and shift to a more empowering and self-determining outcome."[21] The growing interest in the economy of indigenous knowledge has resulted in its hybridization with Western knowledge systems. TEK is one derivative of this intersection between researcher and indigenous knowledge (Figure 12.2).

The hybrid nature of TEK has taken two paths. The neocolonial path models TEK as taxonomy, categories, and facts that are anecdotal descriptions used to legitimize Western management systems.[22] The decolonial path posits TEK as a negotiated event and process; just what TEK means is not assumed.This path does presuppose a framework, but it does not preassign categories, taxonomies, or facts. For most aboriginal scholars the only path is the decolonial one. This is a cultural reality that is poorly understood or erased by most non-native scientists whose allegiances are to their disciplines, as if disciplines were outside of cultures. James Sheurich and Michelle Young note that disciplines are not free from epistemological racism, a racism that is

> drawn from a more fundamental level than societal racism; epistemological racism comes from or emerges out of what we have labeled the civilizational level—the deepest, most primary level of a culture of people. The civilization level is the level that encompasses the deepest, most

> primary assumptions about the nature of reality (ontology), the ways of knowing that reality (epistemology), and the disputational contours of right and wrong or morality and values (axiology).[23]

Different academics have emphasized those parts of local knowledge that are relevant to the kinds of questions they have to ask. For example, a resource manager interested in local institutions will form local knowledge as a body of knowledge embedded in those institutions, thereby expressing traditional resource management approaches, whereas a cultural ecologist interested in the diffusion of technology will form local knowledge as a means of adapting and assimilating new technologies. In each case the use of local knowledge, as opposed to indigenous knowledge, enables outsiders to define and delineate just what knowledge they are speaking about. Local community members, indigenous peoples, may or may not be involved. Furthermore, in communities where *indigenous* becomes a disputed term, when the question of how indigenous I am becomes questionable, the term *local knowledge* acts as an escape from entanglements of identity politics.

Many definitions of indigenous knowledge include local knowledge and come from the study of indigenous peoples through anthropology and cultural ecology. Paul Sillitoe defines indigenous knowledge as "rural people's knowledge, indigenous technical knowledge, traditional environmental knowledge, local knowledge."[24] Sillitoe's complex definition means in part that the narrow focus on rural people's knowledge negates possibilities for its transmission in an urban context. What Sillitoe reinforces is the development of an expert perspective on indigenous knowledge as development, or antidevelopment, staged by "action anthropologists." This is an improvement over earlier ethnographies and yet retains the colonial authority of expert trained observers. In a commentary on Sillitoe, Carmen Ferradas notes that "indigenous knowledge is a contested concept. 'Indigenous knowledge' here is the knowledge of an other who becomes defined in opposition to an authoritative 'we,' vaguely presented as scientists from the West (experts in hard, natural 'systems,' gender-neutral privileged enlightened revealers of truth)."[25]

Sillitoe's definition of indigenous knowledge becomes an umbrella term that encompasses the local biophysical over both temporal and spiritual planes. Such a distinction partially supports and is in turn supported by earlier definitions, such as that of D. M. Warren who defined indigenous knowledge as synonymous with

> "traditional" and "local" knowledge to differentiate the knowledge developed by a given community from the international knowledge

> system[,] sometimes also called [the] "Western" system, generated through universities, government research centers and private industry. IK [indigenous knowledge] refers to the knowledge of indigenous peoples as well as other defined communities.[26]

The separation of traditional and local knowledge as "community" knowledge, separate and distinct from the "international" or Western system, is instructive.

TEK is framed in this chapter as a critique of neocolonialism; we see things from the postmodern decolonial by examining a combination of historical, cultural, spiritual, and environmental beliefs and practices.[27] Holism characterizes a traditional knowledge worldview, which Oscar Kawagley describes as consisting of the "principles we acquire to make sense of the world around us."[28] This cosmology supports the "ability to use resources in a sustainable manner," which stems from "the possession of appropriate local ecological knowledge and suitable methods/technologies to exploit the resources . . . philosophy and environmental ethic to keep exploitative abilities in check and to provide ground rules by which the relation among humans and animals may be regulated."[29] Given that in most indigenous communities knowledge is customarily transferred orally, environmental knowledge is often embedded in language, storytelling, ceremonies, and rituals.[30] To generalize about the nature of TEK, researchers often refer to the holistic dynamism and the oral communication that create a traditional knowledge worldview.

Donald Grinde and Bruce Johansen write that the "capitalist mode of production [has] commoditized goods and people."[31] This illustrates the implications involved in regarding local or indigenous knowledge as a commodity. By severing the inextricable link between local knowledge and natural or social capital, commodification renders the value of a "thing" contingent on several factors. *Natural capital* and *social capital* are terms used in ecological economics to describe classes of resources and capital that are inherent in ecological systems, that need to be accounted for in development. The factors that establish the value of things include the translation and transformation of knowledge into capital and, in that sense, concepts resemble natural resources. Commodification is a process of separation that breaks down knowledge to exacting parts, which can then be valued and used by commercial and industrial interests. For example, biomedical and botanical research involving aboriginal peoples has a long history of exploiting local and indigenous knowledge to the benefit of researchers and to the disadvantage of aboriginal and local informants. This is the underlying process of colonization that has been at play

since two different cultures—native and newcomer—came into contact in North America.

Biologist Leonard Tsuji illustrates this neocolonial perspective in his attempt to measure TEK using native perspectives on the sharp-tailed grouse as a test case. Tsuji focuses on quantifying traditional ecological knowledge so it can be considered more applicable to co-management structures developed by Western scientists.[32] Furthermore, he attempts to quantify the loss of traditional ecological knowledge among members of the Fort Albany First Nation in northern Ontario.[33] This is an example of neocolonialism, of scholars translating TEK into terms that can be exploited by Western scientists. In general, Tsuji reflects only the quantitative nature of TEK and thereby sees it as a commodity for scientific research.[34] Like Berkes, Tsuji argues that TEK "cannot replace Western science," but he believes it can add to the existing scientific approaches to the "resource management problem."[35] After all, TEK is of "particular importance with respect to resource management in the Canadian Arctic."[36]

To his credit, Tsuji cites the loss of TEK at Fort Albany as a cultural loss to the community, but he undermines the impact of this statement by considering TEK to be "worth preserving" solely in terms of Western social and economic values.[37] In this way Tsuji quantifies TEK in order to empower it within the Western scientific model, yet he simultaneously undermines its value by considering "loss" solely in "measurable" terms. This "measuring" demonstrates the neocolonist paradigm Pam Colorado critiques: namely, the validation of indigenous knowledge only through the reductionist Western academic model.[38] In this case TEK is subjected to scientific inquiry designed to understand complex phenomena by isolating specific component details.[39]

Pam Colorado warns that "considering Western science as the central object of legitimate, important or serious intellectual endeavor is quite simply part and parcel of the total European colonial structure—intellectual imperialism."[40] Colorado represents intellectual imperialism as a neocolonial structure manifested through Western academic research and exploitation. Specifically, Colorado refers to the problem of using Western scientific knowledge as the basis for the validation of all kinds of knowledge.

By contrast, Arthur J. Ray has argued that "many of Canada's Indigenous people define themselves in terms of the homelands that sustained their ancestors."[41] Acknowledging that the forces of landscape and environment define aboriginal identity leads to the conclusion that a good deal can be read from the practices and knowledge generated by these different cultures.

Decolonized environmental studies, then, must focus on the meaning of land and subsistence as expressed in aboriginal resource use. From aboriginal rights discourse come illustrations of practices and resource use that may compel the state to recognize prolonged and preexisting land tenures and systems of governance. Although state jurisdiction and regulation have undermined aboriginal identity, they have not dislodged deeply embedded notions of homeland.

In several key legal decisions Canadian courts have begun to articulate this reality as it supports various rights and title to the land. For example, in *Delgamuukw* (1997), the Supreme Court of Canada overturned a lower court decision in British Columbia, supporting Gitxsan and Witsu'wit'en claims to aboriginal title to their traditional territory. *Delgamuukw* was also significant because of the support the federal court gave to oral history as evidence, giving it equal weight with documentary evidence. The Gitxsan have now established their rights to traditional territory—unextinguished by contact with Canadians—through existing use. Use has been acknowledged to be expressed in traditional *adawaks* (Gitksan oral tradition), songs, and dances used in traditional governance—in particular in the potlatch hall, in the hereditary house system, and through matrilineal clan descent. Despite these advances, little has been accomplished in affirming traditional Gitxsan practices over the provincial regulations of British Columbia and other Canadian laws. The courts offer a double-edged sword. For example, in *Sparrow* (1990) the Supreme Court of Canada delineated the formula under which aboriginal rights and title could be curtailed. Ostensibly viewed as a victory for aboriginal rights, Sparrow acknowledged that these rights, in this case the right to fish, could be suspended if the Crown could demonstrate a need to do so to conserve resources. Because scientific environmental knowledge continues to evolve out of a narrow scientific view of the world, aboriginal conceptions will continue to be curtailed and negated.

A critical issue for aboriginal and non-aboriginal scholars is whether local knowledge can be gathered as traditional ecological knowledge and to what degree it should be taken from its original context. In the remainder of the chapter we will ask several questions: Whose ends are served by the integration of traditional ecological knowledge in co-management? Can co-management empower local knowledge and lead to the decolonization of aboriginal communities, or will it continue the subjugation and assimilation of aboriginal people?

Berkes has noted that "the fundamental challenge for successful co-management is the willingness of aboriginal peoples and government agencies

to work together, and the mutual recognition of the strengths of the two systems and the extent to which they are complementary."[42] The process will work only if both scientific and First Nations' values and constructs are made complementary in co-management. Natural resource managers must understand and accept traditional management and trespass laws.[43] Since the 1930 Natural Resources Transfer Act, natural resource management in Canada has been the exclusive domain of provincial governments, even as federal legislation like the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act sets national standards. Federal and provincial responsibilities overlap, but both negate traditional aboriginal systems. The jurisdictional wrangling is compounded when one considers that First Nations' reserve lands, mostly federal areas, lie within provincial natural resource management regimes. This historical and political context makes it difficult to institutionalize joint decision making with governments and First Nations as equal partners. Two recent examples of such an approach are Bill C-49 and the Lands Trust and Services joint initiative between the Assembly of First Nations and the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada.

The integration of TEK in co-management rests squarely on power sharing and on shifting the knowledge used in management. This integration is of considerable importance in improving natural resource management and plays a vital role in empowering First Nations. The movement to empower the local is mirrored clearly in environmental discussions at the international level. According to the World Commission on Environment and Development's "Bruntland Report":

> [I]ndigenous peoples will need special attention as the forces of economic development disrupt their traditional life-styles—life-styles that can offer modern societies many lessons in the management of resources in the complex forest, mountain, and dry land ecosystems. Some are threatened by virtual extinction, by insensitive development over which they have no control. Their traditional rights should be recognized and they should be given a decisive voice in formulating policies about resource development in their areas.[44]

The World Commission on Environment and Development did not explicitly state that co-management was the means by which "traditional rights should be recognized," but it did suggest that indigenous populations could be given "a decisive voice" with co-management, which would satisfy the spirit of the goals accepted by the United Nations.

Indigenous resource management is not a distinct feature; instead, it is the set of institutions and processes that mediate community behavior in relation to the natural environment. According to Claudia Notzke, the "indigenous

system of management is a core feature of all northern Native cultures, and therefore is intimately linked with their value, ethics, and cosmology, which are generally based on an integrated, non-compartmentalized view of the environment."[45] Classical resource management attempts to predict and control the natural environment by way of segmented knowledge. Not surprisingly, these two systems are often in direct conflict. Since 1982, several legal decisions in Canada have established an incentive for co-management. In the *Sparrow* decision (1990) involving the Musqueam, the Supreme Court "has given the government a directive to include Aboriginal people in co-operative management of natural resources. The Supreme Court's ruling has a direct impact on management."[46]

Co-management is one of several responses to ease conflicts between state and local communities. If neocolonialism is to persist, co-management will continue to be an appropriation of aboriginal lands and resources, with local communities acting as advisers over decisions ultimately made outside their territories and to the ultimate detriment of the local community. Many observers of and researchers on resource crises argue that without local users' knowledge being a part of the decision-making process, the management of resources is doomed to fail.[47] In *Restructuring the Relationship,* the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples reflected that "across Canada provincial and territorial governments have been adopting a number of strategies to increase community involvement in land and resource management decisions."[48] Co-management is evolving in response to the failure of government management, promising improvement. But as a relatively new approach it does not necessarily mean a shift from scientific management. Inclusion of TEK has the potential to decenter the primacy of scientific and economic values in management decisions. Scientific and economic values are currently dominant in decision making, so the inclusion of TEK has the potential to open a space for aboriginal values and local knowledge. When TEK is integrated to decolonize resource management, the values and goals of management are negotiated in place of knowledge exclusively drawn from outside the area.

Berkes,[49] adapting Sherry Arnstein's[50] ladder of citizen participation, describes co-management on a continuum in which citizen participation and control are reconceived for First Nations and are viewed in degrees rather than absolutes. The lowest degree of participation in co-management is "informing." At this level the dominant knowledge systems suppress other knowledge and TEK is used in a supportive or descriptive role. The greatest degree of participation in co-management would be full community input into man-

agement (planning and decisions) with TEK jointly shaping the character and the direction of resource management. The application of TEK on this co-management continuum reveals different levels of participation.

According to Evelyn Pinkerton, the use of "decentralized management decisions permits more appropriate, efficient, and equitable management."[51] This optimism regarding decentralized decision making is based on the assumption that local decisions would not be superseded by environmental changes and development elsewhere, a problematic assumption when it comes to the environment. There is also some confusion around co-management, in part because it tends to be applied in areas beyond the scope of government control. The impetus to include local communities in management tends to occur in the wake of a resource crisis or after courts force opposing parties to recognize joint or usurped rights. Government resource agencies tend to take an *ahistoric* approach to aboriginal rights and environmental problems. Natural resource management tends to be reactive to conditions many years in the making. Courts are left to delineate the rights to traditional lands and resources, but the courts make poor natural resource managers. After all, courts consider jurisprudence and precedence, whereas managers consider a wider range of information—including ecological dynamics, life history characteristics of species, and, in the rare case, the historical and cultural evolution of resource conflicts and crisis.

Tracey Campbell found First Nations were routinely ignored by provincial authorities and therefore were without "an enforceable position, ideally established in law and policy, which can then be formally institutionalized in the co-management process."[52] Since co-management is a distinctively non-aboriginal concept, the process does not guarantee their full and equal participation. In the gap between provincial regulation and enforcement and First Nations' control, resource-use anarchy reigns.[53] Co-management is hindered by disagreements about what is to be shared.

When it comes to negotiating an agreement, even after all interests have been heard, provincial governments are distanced from local groups and maintain ministerial prerogative—a situation that inevitably promotes negotiation with decision-making powers invested in the government. The result is public interest brokerage politics, with competing interests jockeying for some say over how resources are used. This process can quickly diminish the trust needed to establish a formal agreement. Decision-making power and money to implement co-management flow from outside aboriginal communities. Since institutional support is essential for the resolution of conflicts, these conditions

seriously weaken decision-making partnerships. First Nations and provinces must forge relationships of trust and mutual respect. Campbell warns that "co-management agreements now appearing on the provincial natural resource scene should be looked at for what they *don't* include, such as substantial transfer of decision-making power, or even a share of royalties for resources harvested from traditional territories."[54] Many First Nations resist co-management because they see the process as subverting their claims (and resources) to settle outstanding issues of aboriginal title and rights. For example, for participating First Nations the British Columbia Treaty process has circumvented co-management of natural resources with the province; however, recent support for interim agreements may remedy this. Such specific analysis of natural resource co-management would require a separate chapter. The entire area of co-management needs to be studied further before it can be agreed that collaboration between Western and indigenous ways of knowing in the management process is being accomplished to the satisfaction and benefit of all those involved.

CONCLUSION

In the process of becoming "legitimized," local knowledge as TEK follows one of two possible avenues: neocolonial or decolonial. Indigenous knowledge utilized to support Western knowledge and development is always neocolonial. What is necessary for decolonization is a questioning of who is served by the conversion and who pays for such transformations. As is exemplified by the work of Leonard Tsuji, we need to understand why it is important to quantify the presence or loss of traditional ecological knowledge. Are our efforts not put to better use working for the community in recording knowledge the community wants preserved for future generations? Documenting local knowledge for a community does not lessen the scholarly currency of research or resolve the issue of advocacy.

Decolonization is not an exclusively solitary act. It functions at both individual and collective levels. It progresses through emancipation of both the colonized and the colonizers. Pam Colorado refers to a bicultural research model built on the infrastructure of Participatory Action Research (PAR), which acts as a vehicle for the interchange of Western and native science.[55] Participatory research focuses on relationships and on "developing the strengths that already exist."[56] PAR works on the basis of a symbiosis between the researcher and the participating community. Essentially, the research conducted will empower the community while at the same time giving the academic the knowledge needed to pursue research.

Deconstructing modernity, including neocolonialism, is central to the discussion of local knowledge as traditional ecological knowledge.[57] It is no surprise that definitions of knowledge and their legitimacy are under attack. Is local knowledge defined by indigenous peoples, is it environmental determinism, or is it a building block to deconstruct modernity, and, if so, who is to profit from it? These are questions swept aside in a rush to develop, exploit, dominate, and control, but they remain important to the public, as well as to policy makers, scholars, and professionals who are searching for what Berkes calls "*alternatives* to a materialist tradition in ecology and environmental science."[58]

The present generation of TEK researchers, those of us who are trained interdisciplinarians, is taking a keen interest in advancing the paradigm(s). James Frideries advanced a powerful theory to discuss colonization that enabled the examination of First Nation reserves in Canada as internal colonies.[59] Such analysis energizes research by including political and environmental concerns, multiple viewpoints, marginalized perspectives, and perhaps a postmodernist approach to understanding the situated nature of knowledge.[60] As is apparent in Pam Colorado and in Erin Sherry and the Vuntut Gwichin First Nation, both bicultural research and PAR are implicit.[61] The audience for this generation of research is not readily broken down into separate spheres of public, academic, and First Nations. Furthermore, many would reject the expert status normally subscribed to the study of indigenous knowledge, instead subverting and affirming expert status at the level of community. As Notzke argues, "[T]he documentation of traditional environmental knowledge is a burgeoning field of research which is primarily controlled and directed by aboriginal people with outside agencies providing technical advice and administrative support."[62] The application of decolonization methodologies is equally important to matters of both culture and the academic disciplines that perpetuate or negate them.[63]

NOTES

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2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

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5. By *Western* we mean a generalized construct characterized by Cartesian rationalism, capitalism, science, and all things that claim to transcend culture, history, and geography.

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13. See Fikret Berkes, *Sacred Ecology: Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Resource Management* (Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1999).

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15. Virginia Nazarea, "A View from a Point: Ethnoecology as Situated Knowledge," in *Ethnoecology: Situated Knowledge/Located Lives,* ed. Virginia Nazarea (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999), 19.

16. Leonard J. Tsuji, "Cree Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Science: A Case Study of Sharp-Tailed Grouse, *Tympanuchus phasianellus phasianellus,*" *Canadian Journal of Native Studies* 17, 1 (1996): 67–79; Leonard J. Tsuji, "Loss of Cree Traditional Ecological Knowledge in the Western James Bay Region of Northern Ontario, Canada: A Case Study of Sharp-Tailed Grouse, *Tympanuchus phasianellus phasianellus,*" *Canadian Journal of Native Studies* 16, 2 (1996): 283–292; Leonard J. Tsuji, and E. Nieboer, "A Question of Sustainability in Cree Harvesting Practices: The Seasons, Technological and Cultural Changes in the Western James Bay Region of Northern Ontario, Canada," *Canadian Journal of Native Studies* 19, 1 (1999): 169–192.

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21. Rigney, "Internationalization of an Indigenous Anticolonial Cultural Critique of Research Methodologies," 110.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

"Dollar a Day and Glad to Have It": Work Relief on the Wind River Indian Reservation as Memory

BRIAN HOSMER

Researchers exploring topics rooted in the twentieth century have the opportunity to foreground native perspectives and therefore to produce "native-centered" accounts in ways unavailable to scholars studying earlier eras. Community members' rich memories also allow for presentation of an ever wider range of stories. Yet in his account of New Deal–era work relief projects on the Wind River Indian Reservation, Brian Hosmer

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urges ethnohistorians to listen carefully to how a story is remembered. Drawing upon ruminations of labor historians and advice provided by contemporary ethnographers, Hosmer explores the complexity of oral narrative and suggests that ethnohistorians consult anew the work of labor historians who grappled with analogous questions a generation ago.

From 1933 to 1942, several hundred members of the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho tribes from the Wind River Reservation in Wyoming labored on a variety of projects sponsored by the Indian Emergency Conservation Work (IECW) program, later the Civilian Conservation Corps–Indian Division (CCC-ID). Wind River residents thus joined the ranks of the more than 60,000 natives from twenty-four western reservations who participated in the "Indian New Deal" version of this Depression-era work relief program.[1] Hundreds more found work through the Works Progress Administration (WPA), other public works programs, and the Soil Conservation Service (SCS). Still others worked on the few tribally run ventures that were linked, sometimes tangentially, to federal and state work relief programs. Like CCC workers across the nation, Indian as well as non-Indian, Wind River participants built roads and trails, fought fires, engaged in forestry work, constructed buildings, and altered their home landscapes through what were known as "conservation" projects. The WPA also sponsored road work, but its diverse reservation activities included school construction and repair, development of community gardens, and—interestingly—ventures like mattress making and hide tanning that were oriented mainly toward women. For its part, the Arapaho Tribe, with assistance from the CCC and the WPA, operated a vegetable-canning plant that employed mostly young women to process the produce of local farmers, Indian and non-Indian.[2]

For some Shoshones and Arapahos, the CCC-ID and the WPA represented an introduction to wage work, perhaps the first time they earned a paycheck. For others, relief work followed other forms of labor, whether on ranches and farms or at missions, in government, and at boarding schools. Some left the CCC for military service, others did not; for some, these work experiences drew them into a lifetime of wage labor, yet for others work relief constituted little more than a brief interlude in the rhythms of work that had characterized their lives and indeed those of their parents' generation.

This chapter explores New Deal–era work relief projects on the Wind River Indian Reservation of west-central Wyoming. More precisely, it foregrounds the memories and perspective of former participants and thus explores the

Figure 13.1. "'Look Pretty, Boys': Telephone Crew, Shoshone Indian Reservation," ca. 1936. NARA RG 75, CCC-ID, Box 205, File 58886-36-Shoshone 346.

meaning of work relief as much as the work itself. For ethnohistorians, both the work itself *and* the ways Indians understand it are important. As we begin to examine Indians *as workers* and the "world of work" as experienced by individuals or in native communities, scholars labor to construct a variety of native pasts that do not fit neatly into dominant narratives of dispossession and dependency, culture loss and persistence, marginalization and "regions of refuge." Instead, as research begins to situate Indians in local, regional, and national economies and as wage earners in salmon canneries, lumber mills, mines, and railroads; as intimately acquainted with heavy and light industry such as the production of crafts for sale or for performances for public consumption, we see Indian interactions with the marketplace as deeply rooted in history. This realization, of course, complicates the traditional picture of Indians as somehow operating outside the world of work, subject more to pressures on their political and cultural autonomy than to the demands of broader labor markets.[3]

Although Wyoming Indians were familiar with a cash economy and wage labor prior to the Great Depression,[4] it is reasonable to suggest that the introduction of programs designed in part to organize labor for production challenged

Eastern Shoshones and Northern Arapahos to develop techniques for managing economic change. From the standpoint of scholarly inquiry, examination of their experiences furthers our efforts to move beyond the familiar "change versus continuity" dichotomy and instead to balance notions of native "agency" with very real manifestations of differential power. Anthropologist Patricia Albers has described effectively the tension between competing analytical frameworks. On the one hand lie "materialist" interpretations that give priority to externals, such as the operations of power, the significance of "class" as a general interpretive category, and the consequences associated with the global spread of the capitalist "world system." Such interpretations contrast with those oriented more toward situating economic change (and reactions to it) within specific cultural frameworks, therefore producing a more particularistic, relativistic set of conclusions. My purpose here is less to engage this debate directly than to identify the scholarly landscape shaping that conversation and to suggest, as Albers does in a chapter published in 2002, that "construction and condition, agency and object, the subject and its object [can] dance together without overstepping the movement of the other." Like Albers, I favor a blending of theoretical perspectives and see room for "weapons of the weak" and the operations of differential power, wherein evidence of native agency stands alongside an appreciation of cultural hegemony and structural limitations on freedom of action.[5]

A second challenge lies in constructing a native-centered narrative, one that attempts to represent the perspectives of participants but also seeks to move beyond description and toward meaning. Here oral history offers an opportunity to broaden, deepen, and perhaps complicate our explorations of Indians "managing" economic change. Verbal testimony provides an avenue for producing native-centered interpretations. But it also has been seen to counter the tendency for documentary evidence to reflect the hegemonic values of the dominant culture. Consequently, ethnohistorians, particularly those who consider topics rooted in the twentieth century, now realize productive results when employing oral history to examine the boarding school experience, the importance and significance of place, and the role of traditional stories in integrating change with continuity, to name just a few examples. With this in mind, it seems reasonable to predict constructive results from creative combinations of ethnohistory and labor historians' use of oral history to reorient studies toward the experiences and perspectives of Indian workers.[6]

But if ethnohistorians are to rely more heavily on native testimony and if we desire to produce something other than ethnography, we would be well

advised to consider the rich literature on oral history—its methods, challenges, and techniques. As Michael Frisch has observed, oral narrative is neither "more history," in the sense that interviews can "swing the flashlight of history into a significant, much neglected, and previously unknowable corner of the attic," nor "no history," whereby testimony subverts traditional historical interpretation by "provid[ing] a way to communicate with the past more directly."[7] Instead, oral history is increasingly understood to be a highly complex phenomenon, a process as much as a result, whose critical characteristics include subjectivity as much as objectivity, a shifting and creative orality as opposed to a fixed and written text, and the active interplay of interviewer and interviewed.[8]

Still more, oral histories are understood to be "about" the construction of memory. In the introduction to *Hard Times,* Studs Terkel observed that his "is a memory book, rather than one of hard fact and precise statistic."[9] Accordingly, Frisch urges oral historians to consider context when interpreting narratives. "What happens to experience on the way to becoming memory," he writes, "[w]hat happens to experiences on the way to becoming history?" For Linda Passerini what "happens" is a transformation in our understanding of oral narrative itself. Her observation that "the raw material of oral history consists not just in factual statements but is pre-eminently an expression and representation of culture" corresponds with the poststructural critique of ethnography, which asks whether we can truly analyze the substance of recollections, as opposed to the process of collecting and creating what Ronald Grele has identified as "conversational narratives," whose meaning can be derived from all that participants—on both sides of the interview—bring to the interaction.[10]

The literature on oral history methods is varied, complex, and worthy of lengthy discussion in its own right. Here my purposes are more modest. If we begin with Alessandro Portelli's observation that "oral sources tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did," then understanding how work relief participants remember their experiences may shed considerable light on issues not always apparent when considering the documentary record alone. For instance, personal recollections can address questions of race, gender, and class, to name just a few, and in ways that help us get at not just how native people manage economic change but also what they now make of those experiences. As ethnohistorian Julie Cruikshank observes, memory, as an active construction of meaning produced through the telling of life stories, can integrate past with present, producing continuities that in turn shape memory and, indeed, personal identity.[11]

THE INTERVIEWS

During the summers of 2000 and 2001 I conducted nearly two dozen interviews with Shoshones and Arapahos who had direct experience with work relief in one way or another. Of these, fifteen are particularly useful for this phase of my project (the others may prove so in later stages). Interviewees ranged in age from their late seventies to mid-eighties, and two-thirds were men. All fifteen provided considerable information concerning the "nuts and bolts" of work relief—in other words, the location of camps, types of work conducted, descriptions of camp life, length of time spent on projects, and in some cases the names of supervisors and compatriots.[12] These descriptions were often similar from person to person and corresponded with evidence obtained through archival research. For the most part, consultants were quite forthcoming, if a bit uncertain at first. Many presumed I wanted to discuss "old times," meaning details of "traditional life." This suggested that, at least on Wind River but probably elsewhere, Indians could be rather experienced "interviewees" who came to the interviews with their own preconceptions.

Listening to tapes and reading transcripts revealed the rich and complex nature of narratives. Conversations that began with memories of road projects or forestry often detoured to other issues and other times, and they presented methodological challenges. Coherent historical analysis requires sifting and organizing, of course, but how to accomplish this without doing violence to the organic flow and internal integrity of the narratives themselves? Absent a comprehensively satisfying solution and determined to produce a work of history rather than of ethnography, I decided to organize components of narratives topically. This admittedly artificial approach (which demonstrates the central role played by the interviewer) nevertheless allows common themes to emerge. It also offers a glimpse (however filtered) into the flow of conversations, those places where consultants communicate meaning as much as detail.

FINDING A JOB, WHAT WE DID

As a general rule, recollections about enrolling in work relief programs tended to be brief and not particularly detailed.[13] "[A]ll you had to do," said one Shoshone enrollee, "was sign up for it, that's all it took," a sentiment echoed by his brother who remembered "just walk[ing] over to where they was running them, you know, they had guys there that handled the paper work and all that."[14] Two men, who—significantly—went on to assume leadership positions, offered a bit more. According to one Arapaho man, "[W]ord gets around and I was probably in my tenth or eleventh grade . . . [when] these jobs

became available through the agency at Fort Washakie and that was when I . . . went to work. I mean, you know, there [was a] depression."[15] Word of relief jobs evidently traveled widely, as a Shoshone man (who later became a camp supervisor) drove to Wyoming from the Chemawa school in Oregon because, he said, it was "during the [D]epression and there was nothing, the mills were shut down."[16]

Interestingly, archival research reveals periodic labor shortages on the Shoshone (later Wind River) Reservation, and superintendents responded by requesting authority to "import" laborers from other reservations and thus preserve project allocations. This proved controversial, as members of the Arapaho-Shoshone Joint Business Council regularly grilled Superintendent Forrest R. Stone and sought to ensure that "foreign" workers not take jobs from qualified tribal members. They were equally determined that the Indian Office act swiftly to remove "troublesome" outsiders—of which there were several, at least according to Joint Business Council records.[17] Yet although a number of interviewees made reference to these outside workers, only one recalled any "trouble."[18] Most others mentioned names of Lakota and Ojibwe laborers but principally, it seems, because some of these men married into Wind River families. "They got married and stayed," one woman recalled, "and that was good."[19]

There also seems to have been no screening or evaluation of skills; probably, as several participants suggested, work relief favored low-overhead, labor-intensive projects over those that relied on mechanized machinery.[20] Even so, "skilled" laborers or those with certain material possessions received additional attention. The IECW needed blacksmiths, and according to one woman, "when the CC camp started, they placed him [her husband] there to work because he was the only blacksmith at the time." An agency employee who learned his trade at the Fort Washakie government school, this man shod horses and "used to sharpen all the shovels and the blades on the tractors that they had there."[21] He also supplemented his income by placing his team of horses in the service of work relief projects, a not uncommon practice for Wind River IECW projects. By contrast, "There weren't many heavy equipment operators among the people, local people," one Arapaho man remembered, "so they had [white] people come in that knew something about operating cats and road graders."[22]

Although the same man conceded that "we learned [how to operate heavy machinery] along the way," this pattern—of non-Indians in skilled positions, Indians holding the unskilled jobs—prevailed in administration, at least to a

point. Project managers tended to be nonnatives (some, like merchant Paul Hines, were longtime reservation residents), whereas Shoshones or Arapahos served as "camp managers," the individuals responsible for day-to-day operations in the field. Some camp managers, like Bruce Groesbeck (Arapaho), held important positions in tribal government, but the Carlisle-educated Groesbeck was also a skilled surveyor. But the more common pattern seems to have been to hire younger men, in their late twenties at the time, and even to dispatch some to training "seminars," held in wintertime and, for Wind River natives at least, at a CCC-ID camp in New Mexico.[23] Whether this reflected an Indian Office determination to produce a new generation of "modern" leaders is unclear, but it is certainly possible given the overall thrust of Collier-era Indian policies.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the type of labor performed and their level of responsibility or authority seemed to influence the way interviewees evaluated their experience. As a general proposition, the most consistently positive recollections of work relief came from the boarding school graduate who returned home from Chemawa and attended a training seminar after his first year on the job. By contrast, manual laborers tended to view work relief rather differently. When I asked general laborers to describe the work, one responded "[p]ick and shovels and all that," whereas Indian laborers "done the hard work and I mean the hard work." Another man said simply "we just worked," then added the telling comment, "the only thing I know is work."[24]

One interpretive question has to do with whether—or to what extent—possessing marketable skills rendered the labor itself more rewarding and therefore produced what seemed to be more positive memories. It is possible to imagine that prospects for advancement, the existence of occupational differentiation, and concomitant distinctions between oneself and one's peers all generated a degree of satisfaction that influenced the way one recalled work relief. At the same time, it is probably facile to suggest that work relief promoted "class" distinctions, in the sense that divergence in conditions somehow translated to the internalization of a sense of class consciousness. As Portelli observed, "[W]hile behavior may be imposed and controlled from above, ideas can only be validated from within."[25] Still, when recalling the value or significance of work relief, Indian supervisors tended to reference what we might identify as hegemonic American cultural values—such as a work ethic or the notion of "progress"—more overtly than did wielders of picks and shovels. Clearly, the condition of labor and the ways laborers construct meaning from those experiences are not the same thing, as Albers argued. Yet it is also pos-

sible to suggest that just as the character of labor markets influences the way Indians come to manage economic change, one's relative position within those emerging relationships affects the ways of identifying with the values that support, and are supported by, that system.[26]

Camps for Young Workers

Naturally, work camps remain a distinguishing component, an enduring image, of the CCC. In some measure, camps, and not insignificantly the discipline they imply, separated the CCC from other work relief programs and seem to have insulated it—then and now—from the type of criticism leveled at the WPA, by contrast. Like the national CCC, the Indian Office assigned many laborers to "single men's camps," which were, as the name suggests, populated by unmarried, generally young (18–25 on average) men. However, the CCC-ID also sponsored "family camps" that were unique to the Indian version of work relief. Designed to adapt work relief programs to reservation social conditions (in other words, the fundamental importance of extended families) and thus to adjust work relief to reservation conditions, family camps were also a way to economize. According to one historian, the cost-saving motivation was more important, but since already impoverished families bore responsibility for housing and subsistence, the result was poor, even squalid, conditions.[27]

This may have been the case generally, but individuals who spoke with me typically offered generally positive recollections, enlivened with stories of relatives, warm interactions, and affirmations of community. By contrast, most of those in single men's camps offered scant detail. Only a few assigned to single men's camps described recreational opportunities, like boxing, basketball, baseball, and card playing; and most of those were former supervisors. Many offered little of camp life beyond the layout of tents and the fact that they "had a place to eat and a place to sleep." It "was alright," one man said, and others echoed his viewpoint.[28] Others commented on the absence of bathing facilities (many described once-weekly trips to the hot springs near Fort Washakie), and a number professed to have no memories at all of recreational opportunities.[29]

The interesting question is not whether family camps were better or worse than single men's camps, since at the very least conditions could vary from place to place and year to year. Rather, it is possible to consider the extent to which single men's camps either acted as surrogate "communities" or, conversely, tended to isolate young men from family and community. To illustrate, consider the testimony of one man who remembered single men's camps

as "pretty interesting[,] actually. . . . A lot of kids, we had a lot of recreational things . . . boxing and that kind of stuff. It was lively, it was [where] we learned how to shoot the dice and cards, and losing your paycheck [*laughter*] playing for cigarettes." Asked if he made friends, the individual responded enthusiastically in the affirmative, whereas, by contrast, many others implied that they generally associated with those they already knew.[30]

This recollection comes from a native of another western reservation who married an Eastern Shoshone woman and has resided on Wind River for much of his adult life. His boyhood was marked by adventure but also loneliness. Sent to the government Indian school in Riverside, California, before age ten, he periodically ran away to find work on railroads, in hop fields, and as a ranch hand, returning to school time and again but for shorter and shorter periods. A soldier in World War II, he was also a CCC-ID "veteran," with experience in several reservation work relief programs. Interestingly, although he was reluctant to claim that he learned any useful skills from work relief projects—"Damn right I learned how to dig a hole," he laughed. "I was never more than just a hole digger [except that] I did learn how to drive a truck"—he remembered work relief as extraordinarily beneficial. "It saved a lot of us," he said. So what was it? Away from home at an early age ("when I was a kid, a little fellow, I remember being lonesome . . . homesick, but I got over it because I had my little brother there"), disconnected from friends and family ("when we go over there [to the family home, after five years away] we don't know a lot of them people"), he made friends in the single men's camps and perhaps realized a measure of security and belonging that may have been absent in other settings.[31] By contrast, those who remembered camps as little more than a place to eat and sleep may have felt less of a connection to work and work location, since home and community were both away from the camp and close enough to visit on weekends. In this sense we may find parallels with experiences of boarding school students, who sometimes found a sense of belonging in created families far from home and expressed those connections quite forcefully, not at the moment but in hindsight.[32]

WOMEN AND MEN, WORK AND CAMPS

According to oral historian Joan Sangster, "The exploration of oral history must incorporate gender as a defining category of analysis, for women often remember the past in different ways in comparison with men." Women, Sangster observes, tend to downplay their own activities while emphasizing those of other family members, and this "embeddedness in familial life" may

shape their view of the world and lead them to reconstruct the past by "using benchmarks of their family's life-cycle." In short and probably obviously, women may remember the past differently than men do, and differing memories also translate into divergent ways of constructing meaning.[33]

Women's reflections on work relief support Sangster's general observations. To an extent, this is because their CCC-ID experiences were located less *on* the projects than *in* the camps. Consequently, women's recollections often focused on camp life, and in the process they seem to suggest that family camps provided opportunity to spend time with extended family, friends, people one knew, and in places—up in the mountains—where they had long spent happy times in the summer. Women spoke about cooking meals, older people telling stories at night, kids playing, and some measure of material security. Others contrasted CCC family camps with conditions during the late 1920s and early 1930s when, as one woman commented, "nobody would even know how bad it was, just terrible."[34]

The "gendered" contrast—insofar as it can be identified or represented simply—seems to exist between women, who typically described the context of work, and men, who focused on the labor itself. One woman's recollections are particularly insightful in this regard. She spoke at some length of the activities of elderly people and in doing so seemingly linked camp life with traditions, values, and cultural continuities. "We all stayed and camped there," she remembered. "[W]e had our own car but the ones that . . . wouldn't have no cars, [those who did would] take them to the stores to get their groceries and things like that. . . . It was nice staying there, all the people knew one another." Later, this same narrator recalled evenings when elders would "tell stories [and] some of the young people, you know, they used to like to listen to those old men tell stories [about things] that they used to do when they were young." Cherishing memories of listening to the wisdom of elderly men and women, she also quickly emphasized the parallel activities of elderly women. "We used to get together with the older women and they used to tell us stories about their young days and what they did," she remembered.[35] Suggesting again that camp life supported social arrangements wherein women and men lived in separate—although certainly intersecting and complementary—worlds, one woman added that after work "the men used to have card games . . . they had a tent there for the men, you know, where they could play poker and different games. But the women, they had their own tent."[36]

Some women participated in work relief more directly, mostly through the Works Progress Administration or tribal enterprises that had some connection

with work relief. Of these, the most vivid memories reference the Arapaho vegetable cannery, the WPA mattress factory at Ethete, and a hide-tanning project located at Fort Washakie. Generally schoolgirls, cannery laborers remembered hard work and low pay. As one remembered, "We had to go out in the field . . . and pick all the vegetables and . . . load them up and bring them back and clean them" before beginning work at the machines. "It was long hours, it was hard work," she recalled, and "then they never paid hardly anything."[37] Another cannery veteran recalled having sore hands at the end of the day, "bleached," she said, by the acid from tomato juice that ran inside their rubber gloves. "Oh gosh," she told me, "it was just real pitiful . . . seven cents for a huge pan of tomatoes."[38]

By contrast, women associated with the mattress factory and the hide-tanning project offered distinctive memories, in part, it seems, because they were engaged in projects that benefited community members (often older people) more directly. "Before I got married," one woman remembered, "they had a project . . . WPA, and that one was kind of interesting because the older ladies[,] they were hired and they used to tan hides. Then they would sew beadwork . . . and I would work with them, we made quilts." Although she was "too young" to sew buckskin dresses or gloves, this woman obviously valued the experience, both because it provided income for older people and because the project transmitted traditional skills to the young. "There was Arapaho ladies too [in addition to Shoshones], and they would all work together. . . . I'd go down and see what they were doing once in a while."[39] Similarly, a woman who made mattresses in Ethete "had a lot of fun" and expressed satisfaction at contributing to the welfare of older people who, she said, received the beds free of charge. She also spoke movingly of discovering—years later—one of those mattresses still in use. "Oh, those beds, they looked nice," she remembered.[40]

Placed in combination with memories of camp life, women's recollections of hide tanning and mattress making reveal tantalizing hints into distinctive ways these women and men constructed meaning from their work experiences. Women tended to emphasize the community and multigenerational dimensions of work relief projects. By contrast, men seemed oriented more to individual experiences; they focused more directly on the importance of work for them and comparatively less on the impact of work relief on community life generally. Still, the presence of women in camps, by helping to approximate "community life" in the midst of wage laboring, may have had a profound effect on work experiences. More directly, family camps may have softened the potentially disruptive and alienating effects of laboring by emphasizing

community—indeed, continuity. But interrelated questions of memory and gender are also germane to this conversation. In any event, just as we observe distinctions between the types of work women and men did (with reference to work relief as well as other activities), our analysis must also consider the importance of gender to memory. In this context, the presence of women in camps may have affected both camp life and the ways women and men remember those experiences.

Building Bridges, Constructing Meaning

In a 1997 article, historian James LaGrange called for more attention to be given to the experiences of twentieth-century American Indians and suggested that oral history provided one avenue for broadening and complicating our narrative. Drawing heavily on the work of oral historians operating in the fields of labor and immigrant history, LaGrange suggested that ethnohistorians move away from concentrating on the supposed "authoritative" voices enshrined in studies of either "oral tradition" or literary works and move toward the experiences of lesser-known individuals. Such an approach, he argued, would demonstrate the diversity of native reactions to economic change and thus complicate a narrative that tends to cast Indian history in terms of continuity and homogeneity while also placing individuality and communalism in artificial opposition to one another. As labor historians learned some time ago, people react to change in diverse ways, and not always in concert with what are assumed to be "fundamental" cultural values. Oral histories can provide room for divergent perspectives while also offering insights into the ways individuals conceive of and reconstruct their own sense of identity.[41]

LaGrange's observations correspond with those of oral historians working both within and outside the field of American Indian ethnohistory. In observing that oral narratives, often didactic and moralistic, frequently draw our attention to the ways individuals create meaning from the past by organizing events into patterns or plots that serve present-day needs, he echoes Alessandro Portelli who suggests that the structure of narratives "reveal[s] the narrator's effort to make sense of the past and give form to [his/her subjects'] lives."[42] Similarly, and in reflecting on her experiences in collecting and interpreting oral testimony, anthropologist Julie Cruikshank writes that the stories she collected "were not merely about the past, [but] also provided guidelines for understanding change."[43]

As I listened to work relief participants and reflected on what was said and how it was said, I also observed that, in numerous and varied ways, con-

sultants were engaged in a process of drawing connections between work relief and other aspects of their lived experiences. These connections, as LaGrange, Portelli, and Cruikshank suggest, were less "random" than essentially interpretive. By this I mean that as consultants responded to questions about work relief by referencing other experiences (sometimes explicitly work related, sometimes not so apparently), they both ascribed meaning to events and offered hints into ways contemporary American Indians have come to make sense of economic change. In this fashion narrators built bridges between change and continuity, explored the complex interplay between individuality and communal values, and delved into the multiple and complex ways memories of work experiences shaped notions of personal and cultural identity.

Not surprisingly, many men linked work relief with military service during World War II. What is interesting is that references were similar and in a sense "patterned." When I asked about "benefits" (to him) of the work relief experience, a former camp manager immediately referenced military service. "You know," he said, "I found that some of the best soldiers that we had were people who worked in the CCC." In contrast to army mates who had "been raised by their families, never away [from] home, so they had to get toughened up in one way or the other," the transition to army life "was a lot easier for the guys that had lived in these camps." The CCC, he continued, "was a school that taught you how to live, work, and compete in private life."[44] According to one "laborer," when he volunteered for the army in 1942, "there was a lot of kids that were in the CC[C]s . . . and they were quite a bit further ahead than everybody else as far as training went." They "didn't get that homesickness that a lot of the other guys got."[45]

If men tended to link work relief with military service, they also drew school experiences into the mix. Most interviewees, men and women alike, attended either off-reservation boarding schools or the on-reservation St. Michael's Episcopal in Ethete, the Catholic St. Stephen's near Arapahoe, or the government school at Fort Washakie. At boarding school, one man remembered, "we wore uniforms, packed a few rifles, wooden rifles, and manual arms, learned a short order drill and that kind of stuff."[46] Such recollections correspond with what we know about work and Indian schools, residential or not. What is interesting is that former students remembered military-style training as one link in one chain of memories that helped organize life experiences, and in this way they integrated work experiences into a framework that highlighted regimentation and paternalism as much as labor or wages.

Women were even more likely to reference schooling in response to questions about work relief. Like men, some women also placed work relief within a broader framework of school, farm, and labor. But unlike men, they tended to draw home and family into the equation, as one conversation illustrates:

> BH: "What kinds of projects were you familiar with or [did you] work on during the 1930s?"
> HS: "Stayed at home . . . on the ranch with my mother and family."
> BH: "And what kinds of things did the ranch produce?"
> HS: "Just vegetables; we didn't have no big crops."
> BH: "So, tell me a little about life on the ranch and on the farm."
> HS: "Well, we'd all get up in the morning and we had our chores. . . . We'd help fix breakfast and then in the summertime, when it was cool like this morning, why we'd go out and work in the garden and we all had our jobs washing and we didn't have a washing machine, no electricity, we had to go to the river and heat the water and wash on the washboard at the river. And then when the clothes got dry we'd hang them on the trees, small trees you know, and then when they got dried we'd bring them all home. We worked hard, we had a great big long table then with vegetables, strangers came, they were always welcome, my folks had a big family and lots of friends."[47]

At this point the conversation turned, fairly naturally, to schooling: one year at St. Stephen's ("it was terrible, we done all the boys' laundry . . . we worked, we'd only go to school half a day") and then on to St. Michael's (where she worked but also played basketball). And then she brought up work in the vegetable cannery and revealed fairly detailed knowledge of work relief programs despite earlier protestations to the contrary. Indeed, one of her cousins was a camp supervisor and manager of the cannery warehouse.[48]

At the very least, this exchange suggests something of the way women, as contrasted with men, think about work experiences. Whereas men tended to move fairly directly from one work experience, one "job," to another and to construct meaning through work (or the regimentation it implied), women first separated themselves from the (presumably) "male" sector of wage work and then reframed the discussion in ways that corresponded with their own sense of what work means. In this sense we are reminded of Sangster's observation that "perceptions of what was proper work for young women are revealed as women explain the images, ideas and examples upon which they constructed their ambition and work choices," wherein "[i]deals of female domesticity and motherhood, reproduced in early homelife, the school and the workforce," all influenced women's sense of opportunities, limitations, and context.[49]

In virtually all conversations, I asked a number of questions designed to elicit "interpretive" responses. Some interviewees, like a man who left the CCC to become a policeman, said simply that "men were out of work, you know, and they took all the slack up, they got jobs, and they went ahead and took care of their families and stuff."[50] A telephone line stringer was similarly direct when he said, "You know, [CCC-ID] was where we learned how to work." "It was a lifesaver for a lot of us kids," he added.[51] Others focused on material changes: trips taken, clothes purchased, a little spending money. These conversations tended to draw associations between wages and acquisitions, between participation in the dominant culture and the broadening experience that travel, for instance, afforded. But what do such connections between labor performed and outcomes observed tell us about ways in which Arapaho and Shoshone workers encountered and then interpreted economic change and its consequent implications?

As Loretta Fowler observes in her recent work on the Cheyennes and Arapahos of Oklahoma, opportunities to earn wages not only appealed to those seeking means to care for their families but tended to encourage the development of individualistic behaviors that, in turn, contributed to social distinctions and fragmentation. Since wage labor rewarded certain sets of values and since those values corresponded with the expectations and practices of the dominant society, we might predict some correspondence between participation in wage work—during and after work relief—and memories that frame those experiences in ways that emphasize the struggle of the individual to "rise above" the group. And there is something to this. But Fowler also argues that social transformation in Indian communities or among individuals is not so complete and that hegemony, although powerful, is contested. Fowler writes,

> While it is the case that external forces have worked to limit the options of subordinated peoples, constraint is but one dimension of colonization. Subordinated peoples do not accept dominant economic, political, and religious structures passively. They may accommodate imposed institutions and absorb them into a reinvented tradition. They also may reconstruct dominant social institutions in ways that are locally meaningful and that serve local ends. And they may overtly resist dominant structures.[52]

Interviews illustrate this complex interplay of external and internal influences, the creative ways individuals maneuver through the complex array of what seem to outsiders to be competing cultural values. When I asked a former camp manager, mission school graduate, veteran, and husband of a vegetable cannery worker to evaluate the significance of work relief, he replied, "a lot of

people work[ed] for that dollar a day and were happy to get it" and added that "instead of giving them money like the dole, they furnished jobs."[53] This can be interpreted as referring to government assistance programs as well as to "welfare" more generally. But it also contrasts with the equally cogent comment that "nowadays everybody just worships money," uttered by a man who—significantly, I think—wielded picks and shovels in those days but is a respected "elder" here and now.[54]

Taken together and organized thus by me, these comments illustrate what we might take as "poles" at ends of an artificially constructed (but still useful) continuum in ways individuals remember and interpret the significance of work relief specifically and wage work generally. At the same time, others help to flesh out the contours of "contested" meaning associated with economic change. In one example the camp manager referenced in the previous paragraph recalled an incident in which a CCC-ID man broke his arm while working on a fence project. Come to find out, the man had actually injured himself while climbing a tree to chase a squirrel—entertaining his friends, it seems. The camp manager was not amused, either then or now. "Goofing off is not work," he said, "and working is work." The fence workers, he concluded, had "finished their lunch and got everything done and so they figured they'd . . . wander off down, you know, and the longer they'd goof off, why, they wouldn't have to work."[55]

This incident, or at least the way the camp manager remembered it, offended a strongly held work ethic. You showed up for work and did as you were told, and this, he added, was good for Indians because "it taught them to compete." And our conversation about fences and squirrels then turned to an evaluation of contemporary reservation conditions. "I've had trouble trying to impress . . . on these younger kids, my relations, that when you're starting out you do things that [you] might not want or like to do but there['s] nothing that's permanent. If you get a job loading rock or making concrete . . . why someday you might get a home of your own and you might want to do concrete work."[56]

An interesting commentary, certainly, but it is hardly surprising to hear older individuals, of whatever background, decry youthful values or lament the passing of "the good old days." But what the man said a few moments later still reveals something of the way he linked work ethic with identity, either cultural or personal. Referring again to CCC-ID times, he said: "There were a couple of kids that had grown up away from me and . . . I told these kids to do something. . . . They said something about an ornery old man, you

know [*laughing*], trying to make us work too hard and other people not doing what they're supposed to and on and on, but they did this in Arapaho." But, he continued, "I understood what they were saying. . . . I didn't say [anything]; I let them get all through and when they got all through . . . I said all right, here's your chores."[57]

I took this passage to be autobiographical, the "old man" to be the narrator. Only later did it occur to me that the subject may have been referring to a white supervisor. This ambiguity is important, but perhaps not overly so. In either case, close listening reveals a sense of isolation, alienation, from workers or from those who considered themselves—as Paul Rosier observes elsewhere—"real Indians." And the source of that isolation, as Fowler notes, can be seen as evidence of an internalization of mainstream cultural values, a critique of those who hold other perspectives, and in the end a demonstration of the dilemmas inherent in managing economic change when personal aspirations seemingly conflict with community cohesion.[58]

From another man came an equally interesting combination of stories. Also a mission school graduate, an army veteran, and someone who spent a lifetime working at one job or another (both on and off the reservation), he offered contrasting evaluations of the significance of work relief. Focusing on the preponderance of whites or "half-breeds" in positions of authority, on the military-like discipline in the camps, on the absence of meaningful recreation, and even on the poor quality of clothing supplied to the workers (he remembered having trouble finding two shoes the same size), the man concluded: "Well, I would say it was just a job, there was no incentive of any kind . . . there was no way you could learn more than what they had there but with the exception of the few that did . . . learn how to run their crappy equipment. Some people . . . adapted . . . pretty easily and some of us didn't."[59]

What are we to make of this? Is it an expression of contrasting memories between supervisors and "regular workers"? Possibly. But this man also spoke quite eloquently of other things, and in ways that caused me to think about questions of race and class, paternalism and autonomy.

After leaving the CCC, the man went on to a long career at the Arapaho Ranch, a tribal venture designed to promote self-sustaining reservation business but with a cooperative, communal, educational orientation.[60] But getting there was a struggle and in the remembering became a story of empowerment. Combating non-Indian managers who "were the worst kind of people to discriminate against Indians" and a situation in which "[a]ll the most important work was always in the hands of non-Indians and the Indians was doing the

hard labor," this man also claimed that "I could see what would happen if the Arapaho took over and they could do that [work] themselves, which they eventually did. . . . I could see the opportunity at that time." And so, after becoming manager himself, "I got more and more people, you know, more Indian people on the ranch, then I pushed for it; every chance I got I spoke for the Indian, got to have more Indians, this is their ranch. . . . I said you don't hire any more Indians that's not good, that's you're being prejudiced."[61]

The fact that the ranch manager chose to reference the Arapaho Ranch when responding to a question about work relief is just as telling as the substance of the memories themselves. Was he, for instance, suggesting that, in contrast with the more "native-centered" ranch, work relief stands—in light of memory—as a residue of the old paternalistic way of doing things? Was he speaking to a particular vision he has of the tribe's progress to date or maybe to the direction he thought it should take? Was he speaking of values—contrasting communal and individualistic ethos?

SUMMARY

When I began this project, I expected interviewees to remember work relief as a particularly significant moment in their lives, a time when the rhythms of work and life changed. Although the interviews did lend some support to this notion, the far more interesting process involved a creative dialogue—between interviewer and interviewed, certainly, but also between past and present—that placed work relief in contexts different from those I had expected. And the contexts created had much to do with work relief, of course, but even more to do with broader ideas about the significance of work. By extension, these conversations add depth to our understanding of ways Indian peoples came to manage economic change during the twentieth century. For these people, work relief was a memorable time but hardly a dramatic change in circumstances.

The fact that interviewees placed their experiences within a broader context of "work" suggests at least three things. First, scholars thinking about wage labor and its significance would be well advised to consider, as have Kathleen Pickering and others, the broad range of activities—from wage-generating jobs to informal means of exchange—that together comprise and define contemporary reservation economic activity. This range of activities is significant in and of itself, but it also helps frame the contours of memories of earlier times and experiences. Second, the richness and complexity of what is communicated during interviews lend additional support to the necessity both

of engaging Indian people in creative discussions about things other than "oral tradition" and of exploring the possibilities oral history holds for ethnohistories of topics situated in the twentieth century. Finally, the sense that the interviews tended, as I suggested earlier, to place work relief within a broader range of experiences can lend support to Cruikshank's astute observation that stories—even those not seen as "traditional"—can perform integrative functions, creating continuities as much as identifying them, and can thus be "useful" to both historian and informant. This process does not mitigate, and should not draw attention away from, the disruptive effects of economic change or simply elevate agency over the realities of differential power. But it should remind us that adjusting to economic change is central to Indian experiences and that seeing economic change simply as operating against presumed Indian values is to miss the intriguing complexity of these stories.

NOTES

1. To date, the only comprehensive study of Indian New Deal–era work relief projects on Indian reservations is Donald Parman, "The Indian Civilian Conservation Corps" (PhD diss., University of Oklahoma, 1967). Still, several shorter treatments offer useful insights. See Parman, "The Indian and the Civilian Conservation Corps," *Pacific Historical Review* 40 (1971): 39–56; Calvin W. Gower, "The CCC Indian Division: Aid for Depressed Americans, 1933–1942," *Minnesota History* 43 (1972): 3–13; Roger Bromert, "The Sioux and the Indian-CCC," *South Dakota History* 8 (Fall 1978): 340–356. See also Paul C. Rosier, "The Real Indians, Who Constitute the Real Tribe: Class, Ethnicity, and IRA Politics on the Blackfeet Reservation," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 18 (Summer 1999): 3–39; Steven J. Crum, *The Road on Which We Came: A History of the Western Shoshone* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1994), 86–89. Scholars interested in work relief will find John Collier's Bureau of Indian Affairs publication, *Indians at Work* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1933–1945), an invaluable resource. Like many New Deal–era initiatives, the "Indian CCC" was documented very completely. The bulk of the archival collection is located at the National Archives, Washington, DC. See, in particular, Civilian Conservation Corps–Indian Division, General Records, 1933–1944, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Record Group 75, Washington, DC. Records are organized by jurisdiction and, for this study, Shoshone Reservation, 1933–1937; Wind River Reservation, 1937–1942. Other materials are located in Central Classified Files, also at the National Archives, Washington, DC. See Shoshone Indian Reservation, Central Classified Files (CCF), Record Group 75, 1933–1937; Wind River Indian Reservation, CCF, Record Group (RG) 75.

2. For mention of mattress making, hide tanning, and vegetable canning, see "Superintendent's Annual Narrative Report for 1936," RG 75, CCF, Shoshone Agency, 1937, 031; "Monthly Reports, Extension Service, Soil Conservation Service," RG 75, CCF, Shoshone Agency, 1937, 031. It is important to draw distinctions among the CCC-ID, the WPA, and other relief agencies, namely the SCS. The CCC-ID was a branch of the national CCC but was administered by the Indian Office. The reservation superintendent was the local supervisor, responsible first to CCC-ID director Daniel Murphy

who, in turn, reported to CCC director Robert Fechner. Superintendents were responsible for suggesting, managing, and reporting on projects that corresponded with that program's "conservation" mission; and although they enjoyed some administrative latitude, Murphy and Fechner held ultimate authority. The superintendent was also the local agent in charge of WPA projects, but in this case he worked through county and state work relief agencies—suggesting projects, managing the work, and reporting on results. Falling under the Department of Agriculture, the SCS had its own mission, which was oriented toward reclamation, farming, and range-use activities. But since it also operated on reservation land, the Indian Office and the U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded "cooperative agreements" designed to coordinate activities and share resources. On Wind River the relationship between the superintendent and the SCS could be testy and was characterized by competition for labor and funds. In practical terms, Indians found work through all relief agencies, often moving back and forth between agencies as jobs, wages, and interests dictated. It is important to note, however, that federal law prohibited Indians from collecting wages from more than one agency at any single time, and WPA funds were adjusted according to the reservation's average per capita income. More specifically, on those occasions when reservation residents received "per capita" payments from oil leases or settlements, they became ineligible for WPA work. For descriptions of administrative structures and practices, see Parman, "The Indian Civilian Conservation Corps"; *Indians at Work* 1, 1 (Summer 1933): 1–4.

3. Once fairly limited, studies on Indians and wage labor are multiplying. My work, and that of many others, is influence by Rolf Knight, *Indians at Work: An Informal History of Native Labour in British Columbia, 1858–1930* (Vancouver: New Star, 1996 [1978]). More recently, Alice Littlefield and Martha Knack's edited volume, *Native Americans and Wage Labor* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), stands as an important sampling of work on the topic. Among others, see Tracy J. Andrews and Castle McLaughlin, eds., "Reservation Economies," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 22, 3 (1998), 1–214; Kathleen Pickering, *Lakota Culture, World Economy* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000); Colleen O'Neill, "The 'Making' of the Navajo Wage Worker: Navajo Households, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Off-Reservation Wage Work, 1948–1960," *New Mexico Historical Review* 74 (October 1999): 307–405; Brian Hosmer, *American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence and Innovation Among the Menominees and Metlakatlans* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999). For a particularly insightful discussion, see Patricia C. Albers, "Marxism and Historical Materialism in American Indian History," in *Clearing a Path: Theorizing About the Past in Native American Studies,* ed. Nancy Shoemaker (New York: Routledge, 2002), 107–113.

4. Loretta Fowler, in *Arapaho Politics: Symbols in Crises of Authority* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), addresses the evolution of the Wind River "reservation economy." Although her main objective is to describe interactions between Arapaho cultural values and changing economic circumstances, she does address wage labor in a few places; see especially pp. 85–86, 131, 193, 233–236, 245, 250. On the Eastern Shoshones, Henry Stamm IV's *People of Wind River: The Eastern Shoshones, 1825–1900* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999) provides an overview of the allotment-era reservation economy and is particularly useful with respect to the introduction of cattle ranching and the demise of prior economic arrangements; see pp. 168, 231, 236–243. For a creative study of the Northern Arapaho worldview and adjustments to changing times, see Jeffrey D. Anderson, *The Four Hills of Life: Northern Arapaho Knowledge*

and Life Movement (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001). Older studies on Northern Arapahos and Eastern Shoshones include Virginia Cole Trenholm, *The Arapahoes, Our People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970); Virginia Trenholm and Maurine Carley, *The Shoshonis, Sentinels of the Rockies* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967).

5. Albers, "Marxism and Historical Materialism in American Indian History," 107–108.

6. Histories of the boarding school experience provide especially rich examples of the use of personal narrative. See particularly K. Tsianina Lomawaima, *They Called It Prairie Light: The Story of Chilocco Indian School* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); Brenda Child, *Boarding School Seasons* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000); Scott Riney, *The Rapid City Indian School, 1898–1933* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); Clyde Ellis, *To Change Them Forever: Indian Education at the Rainy Mountain Boarding School, 1893–1920* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996). On orality and explorations of identity, place, change, and continuity, see Keith Basso, *Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language Among the Western Apache* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996); Julie Cruikshank, *The Social Life of Stories: Narrative and Knowledge in the Yukon Territory* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); Greg Sarris, *Keeping Slug Woman Alive: A Holistic Approach to American Indian Texts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Andrea LaForet and Annie York, *Spuzzum: Fraser Canyon Histories, 1808–1939* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1998). Increasingly, "tribal histories" are enlivened (some would say revived) through the use of oral narrative. Paul Rosier's *Rebirth of the Blackfeet Nation, 1912–1954* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001) and Loretta Fowler's *Tribal Sovereignty and the Historical Imagination: Cheyenne-Arapaho Politics* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002) provide two examples of this welcome development.

7. Michael Frisch, "Oral History and *Hard Times*: A Review Essay," in *The Oral History Reader,* ed. Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (New York: Routledge, 1998 [1972]), 32–33.

8. A number of oral historians have addressed these topics, so readings are many and varied. I found two edited volumes to be particularly useful. The first is Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, *The Oral History Reader* (New York: Routledge, 1998), particularly Paul Thompson, "The Voice of the Past: Oral History," 21–28; Frisch, "Oral History and *Hard Times,*" 29–37; Ronald J. Grele, "Movement Without Aim: Methodological and Theoretical Problems in Oral History," 38–52; Linda Passerini, "Work Ideology and Consensus Under Italian Fascism," 53–62; Alessandro Portelli, "What Makes Oral History Different," 63–74; Joan Sangster, "Telling Our Stories: Feminist Debates and the Use of Oral History," 87–100. In David K. Dunaway and Wilma K. Baum, eds., *Oral History: An Interdisciplinary Anthology* (Walnut Creek: Alta Mira, 1996), see particularly Ronald J. Grele, "Directions for Oral History in the United States," 62–83; Jan Vansina, "Oral Tradition and Historical Methodology," 121–125; Ruth Finnegan, "A Note on Oral Tradition as Historical Evidence," 126–134; Peter Friedlander, "Theory, Method, and Oral History," 150–160.

9. Quoted in Frisch, "Oral History and *Hard Times,*" 33.

10. Ibid.; Passerini, "Work Ideology and Consensus," 54; Grele, "Movement Without Aim," 43–45.

11. Alessandro Portelli, *The Death of Luigi Trastulli, and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), 50; Cruikshank,

Social Life of Stories, 1–3, 40–41; also Julie Cruikshank, "Oral History, Narrative Strategies, and Native American Historiography: Perspectives from the Yukon Territory, Canada," in *Clearing a Path: Theorizing About the Past in Native American Studies,* ed. Nancy Shoemaker (New York: Routledge, 2002), 2–28.

12. I used a standard list of questions but tended to allow conversations to flow fairly naturally.

13. Commissioner John Collier announced the Indian Emergency Conservation Work (IECW, later the Civilian Conservation Corps–Indian Division) program in March 1933. With an initial budget of $5.8 million, the IECW was designed to extend New Deal–era work relief programs to Indian country, and Collier scored a bureaucratic triumph when he secured for the Indian Office the authority to manage programs located on reservations. Although the mainstream CCC funded reservation conservation work and Collier was answerable to CCC director Robert Fechner, the IECW enjoyed considerable autonomy for much of its lifespan. Reservation superintendents designed projects, managed budgets, secured a workforce, and were encouraged to consult with community leaders. Even so, superintendents' first responsibilities were to the Indian Office, which approved or rejected projects, authorized budgets, set wages, and required adherence to general guidelines. Of the various regulations, some of the most important linked project budgets to labor actually performed. In other words, funding basically "followed" labor in that superintendents calculated "man-hours" required to complete a particular project. If the project required fewer man-hours than originally thought, the IECW reduced the overall project budget accordingly. Consequently, superintendents were not permitted to "bank" surplus funds or to transfer them from one project to another (without specific approval), and they were strongly encouraged to minimize administrative, or overhead, costs. See *Indians at Work* 1, 1 (Summer 1933): 1–8; Parman, "The Indian Civilian Conservation Corps," 22–52. In December 1933 the Interior Department conducted an investigation of the first month's work on the Shoshone (later Wind River) Indian Reservation. Included is discussion of project priorities and labor shortages. See E. M. Daniel, Special Agent, to Louis R. Glavis, Director of Investigations, Department of the Interior, December 11, 1933. NARA RG 75, CCC-ID (Indian Division), 50086-A-1936-Shoshone-250. For a representative discussion of labor shortages and importation of "foreign workers," see Forrest M. Stone, Superintendent, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 11, 1936. NARA RG 75, CCC-ID, 50886-1936-Shoshone-220.

14. Interviews with H.S. (Shoshone, M), and S.W. (Shoshone, M).

15. Interview with S.P. (Arapaho, M). General note on citations: since some (although certainly not all) interviewees requested that I protect their anonymity, I have chosen not to identify interviewees by name. Instead, I use sets of initials that may or may not correspond with actual names. I have also identified gender and tribal affiliation, as both are relevant to analysis. Tapes and transcripts are in the possession of the author, but I have agreed to supply copies of both to tribal cultural centers.

16. Interview with L.C. (Shoshone, M).

17. Labor shortages and so-termed foreign workers were consistently an agenda item at meetings of the Joint Business Council. For a representative example, see "Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Business Council, 13 July 1938." RG 75, Central Classified Files, Shoshone, 054, File 37345-35-054. Formed in the 1920s to oversee matters of mutual concern (like the disposition of tribally held lands or mineral rights), the Joint Business Council (JBC) occasionally functioned as a governing body for the reservation.

Officially empowered to negotiate with the Indian Office Superintendent, the JBC enjoyed some autonomy in the 1930s, but it was limited. Moreover, the JBC was less a "joint" council of Shoshones and Arapahos and more a "joint meeting" of two separate tribal business councils. The result often was (and is) that many decisions were made at the tribal level, and the "joint" meetings (when they occurred) tended to be oriented toward the exchange of information. For a discussion of the Joint Business Council, see Janet Flynn, *Tribal Government, Wind River Reservation* (Riverton, WY: Big Bend, 1991). Fowler, in *Arapaho Politics,* offers a comprehensive analysis of the JBC.

18. Interview with L.D. (Arapaho, M).

19. Interview with M.T. (Shoshone, F).

20. *Indians at Work* 1, 1 (Summer 1933): 4.

21. Interview with H.C.T. (Arapaho, F).

22. Interview with L.D. (Arapaho, M).

23. On "leader camps," including one located at San Carlos, New Mexico, see *Indians at Work* 1, 5 (October 15, 1933): 4.

24. Interviews with S.W. (Shoshone, M), J.S. (Arapaho, M), L.C. (Shoshone, M).

25. Portelli, *The Death of Luigi Trastulli,* 157.

26. Albers, "Marxism and Historical Materialism in American Indian History," 122–123. My argument here should not be understood as taking issue with the conclusions of scholars who see class consciousness emerging on reservations. As Paul Rosier points out in *Rebirth of the Blackfeet Nation,* a class consciousness that is based on a broader range of factors—not solely economic conditions but (real or perceived) cultural differences—can be understood as a fundamentally different situation. See Rosier, *Rebirth of the Blackfeet Nation,* 17–18, 168–169. See also Castle McLaughlin, "Nation, Tribe, and Class: The Dynamics of Agrarian Transformation on the Fort Berthold Reservation," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 22, 2 (1998): 125–126; O'Neill, "The 'Making' of the Navajo Wage Worker."

27. Parman, "The Indian Civilian Conservation Corps," 73–75.

28. Interview with L.M. (Arapaho, M).

29. RG 75, CCC-ID, Shoshone.

30. Interview with R.K. (Western Shoshone, M).

31. Ibid.

32. See Lomawaima, *They Called It Prairie Light,* 129–130, 140–141, for a discussion of this phenomenon.

33. Sangster, "Telling Our Stories," 88–89.

34. Interview with H.S. (Arapaho, F).

35. Interview with H.C. (Arapaho, F).

36. Ibid.

37. Interview with H.S. (Arapaho, F).

38. Interview with A.P. (Arapaho, F).

39. Interview with M.T. (Shoshone, F).

40. Interview with H.C. (Arapaho, F).

41. James B. LaGrange, "Whose Voices Count? Oral Sources and Twentieth-Century American Indian History," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 21, 1 (1997): 74–76, 80–82.

42. Portelli, *The Death of Luigi Trastulli,* 52, 117–118.

43. Cruikshank, "Oral History, Narrative Strategies, and Native American Historiography," 9, 13.

44. Interview with S.P. (Arapaho, M).
45. Interview with R.K. (Shoshone, M).
46. Ibid.
47. Interview with H.S. (Arapaho, F).
48. Ibid.
49. Sangster, "Telling Our Stories," 91.
50. Interview with L.M. (Arapaho, M).
51. Interview with R.K. (Shoshone, M).
52. Fowler, *Tribal Sovereignty,* xviii. For more on individuality and hegemony, see Fowler, *Tribal Sovereignty,* 123–125, 141–144, 245–251.
53. Interview with S.P. (Arapaho, M).
54. Interview with S.W. (Shoshone, M).
55. Interview with S.P. (Arapaho, M).
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Paul C. Rosier, "The Real Indians"; Fowler, *Tribal Sovereignty.*
59. Interview with L.D. (Arapaho, M).
60. Fowler, "The Arapaho Ranch: An Experiment in Cultural Change and Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 21, 3 (1973): 446–464.
61. Interview with L.D. (Arapaho, M).

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Tribal Capitalism and Native Capitalists: Multiple Pathways of Native Economy

DUANE CHAMPAGNE

Are Native values compatible with capitalism? Can indigenous worldviews and communities survive globalization? In a sharply focused critique of globalism and its impact on Native communities, Duane Champagne suggests that although Indian peoples have historically adapted to, and in some cases participated in, capitalism, they typically have done so in ways that affirm indigenous worldviews. This argument, which links Indian experiences with the fur trade and market-oriented agriculture in the antebellum U.S. South with contemporary economic activities, distinguishes between individual entrepreneurship and tribal capitalism and sees both as Indian responses to the spread of capitalism.

The twenty-first century and beyond promises to extend the world capitalist market economy deeper into the lives of individuals and communities. Its origins traced variously to Europe as early as the eleventh century and to multiple local and regional "world economies" from various locations and historical eras, the emerging world market promises to be more inclusive and

far-reaching than any observed heretofore. Since 1990 the major socialist nations have struggled with the transition to capitalism and market production. As the case of Russia shows, such transitions are difficult, especially when a nation's culture and institutions are not compatible with capitalist market ethics, norms, and values. Many non-Western cultures have values and institutions that are incompatible with capitalist enterprise. To preserve their cultural autonomy, these communities will engage in internal dialogue that, within limits, will reinterpret capitalist market activity to suit their local cultures and institutions.

The Japanese have developed a large-scale capitalist society, yet their social and political institutions nevertheless remain recognizable as Japanese. Similarly, China has experienced colonialism and socialism during its long history and is now moving slowly toward capitalist enterprise and production. The changes are significant and are not without political and cultural costs. Socialist and Third World societies are struggling to gain profitable access to markets. Like those societies, indigenous peoples are confronted with deeper penetration of markets into their communities.

U.S. Natives, or American Indians, are facing these same dilemmas within the largest national economy in the world. Will Native communities survive incorporation into the world capitalist market system? Will Native communities and individuals accept change? Will they still be Indians if they are capitalists? According to Max Weber and, for that matter, Karl Marx, the emergence of capitalism forms an "Iron Cage" whereby, once its forces are unleashed, other economic actors must follow suit or be forced "out of business."[1] Capitalism, therefore, threatens to envelop the world and transform all the cultures of the world into capitalist communities. This argument assumes that individuals and communities will readily choose more income and productivity associated with a capitalist market incorporation. Individuals and communities will cast off their "traditional fetishes" and join the relatively secular, modern, and production-oriented market system. Anyone who fails to meet the challenges of capitalist competition will be marginalized. These conditions predicted by Marx and Weber appear to be unfolding in the contemporary world, assuming that it proceeds in the same manner over the next century or so.

Echoing Marx and Weber, many contemporary economists continue to argue that "modernization," or capitalist culture, will sweep the globe and transform its social and cultural institutions. Since the fall of the major socialist economies in the 1990s, conditions for realization of the Iron Cage argument have never seemed more favorable. Will the nations of the world converge

toward a relatively similar capitalist culture based on a world market? Or will the nations and communities of the world retain identifiable social, political, and cultural institutions and values within a world capitalist system?[2]

Ultimately, I do not believe all nations and communities will converge toward a common market-based institutional order. The rationalist and materialist Iron Cage argument leaves little room for cultural values or institutional relations, since they are assumed to be predetermined by economic relations. An alternative view suggests that institutional relations and cultures are autonomous to an extent and are not determined entirely by broader economic conditions. This argument suggests that communities can take on capitalist elements and participate in capitalist markets and still retain core aspects of identity, tradition, institutional relations—the close interconnectedness of polity, culture, economy, and community—and cultural values. Perhaps the distinct cultures of Japan and China exemplify this line of reasoning, even as proponents of the Iron Cage viewpoint might argue that since the world capitalist market has only recently extended to those nations, time will prove them correct.

ECONOMIC ORIENTATIONS IN INDIAN COUNTRY

U.S. Native communities are facing the same expanding world capitalist market and are confronted with issues of retaining and enhancing their political economy and cultural heritage. Can Native groups retain their specific community, institutional relations, and cultural values while participating in the world economic market? These issues confront many contemporary Native communities. Some Native leaders argue that the only way to uphold cultural and political sovereignty is through capitalist economic development. The rapid movement toward gaming enterprises since 1990 illustrates this point. Gaming enterprises have become a means for some Native communities to quickly accumulate economic capital. This wealth is often used to rebuild tribal social and economic enterprises and preserve tribal cultures and institutions. Many tribes provide resources to members for education, develop cultural centers, promote large cultural events such as powwows, and provide jobs and social service support to elders and other members.[3] Yet relatively few Native communities realize sufficient revenue from gaming to develop sustaining economies, and most cannot rely on that revenue for economic support. Gaming, however, has introduced more capital into Indian country than any other economic enterprise and has greatly enhanced the economic, and sometimes political, opportunities of Native communities.

For most Native communities, economic development is a means to an end. Even the most strongly market-oriented tribal economic planners see economic development as a way to support the reservation community, to retain tribal members on the reservation, and to promote viable and self-supporting Native communities. The gaming agreements under the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) require that at least 70 percent of the profits be used for tribal community benefit.[4] This measure ensures that Native communities will reinvest their profits in social, economic, and cultural infrastructure. These provisions are generally compatible with Native values and inclinations.

If we apply the Iron Cage argument directly to Native American communities, past and present, it still does not work very well. Few Native individuals and communities have been strongly attracted to capitalist enterprise. In most cases there has not been rapid acceptance of capitalist enterprise, either at present or historically. Both cultural and institutional reasons account for the relative absence of interest in capitalist enterprise. To illustrate, it helps to follow Max Weber, who defined capitalism as the entrepreneurial allocation of labor and capital for production of goods according to the demands of the marketplace.[5] By Weber's definition, capitalism did not exist in North America before the time of Columbus. Certainly, Native communities traded. There is evidence of extensive trading networks throughout the Mississippi Valley during the period A.D. 800–1600. Pipestone found mainly in present-day Minnesota evidently was widely traded. During the same period an extensive network of trade and cultural exchange linked the present-day Southwest with the Indian nations and empires of Mexico and Latin America. Whereas Indians exchanged skins as well as corn and other foods, much of the trade was in goods used for crafts manufacture, often for sacred purposes. Furthermore, giveaways, gift giving, and gambling were common forms of exchange and material redistribution throughout the Northwest Coast and beyond. However, none of these extensive ceremonial and economic exchanges constituted capitalism as defined earlier. No one lived by organizing the factors of production, maximizing technological innovation and wage labor, to meet the demands of a market. Few Native persons worked for others as wage laborers because most had access to land and sustenance. Redistribution occurred not to gain a profit but according to ceremonial needs and to maintain social-political relations. Even the well-known giveaways of the Northwest Coast cultures were oriented mostly toward redistribution, ceremonial purposes, and accumulation (and confirmation) of status. Tlingits of southeast Alaska redistributed goods in potlatches but believed they were honoring

and feeding their clan ancestors and fulfilling moral obligations to clan and ancestors.[6]

The values of Native communities also mitigated against capitalist activity. Generosity and redistribution of gifts to kin and strategic allies were the rule. Those who were materially well-off through trade, farming, hunting, or warfare were expected to share their assets. Those who did not do so were bitterly criticized as stingy. Wealth was a means to consolidate social and political relations through redistribution, not the means to create more wealth by investment in greater production.[7]

The overlapping of economic, political, kinship, community, and ceremonial relations in most Native communities created multiple demands and patterns of distribution over material goods.[8] Objects occupied a place in the cosmos through their relationship to the community as a whole; they assumed social and sacred meaning and value. Most Native nations believe in maintaining respectful relations among humans and other entities of the universe such as places, water, air, fire, earth, animals, birds, heavenly bodies, and the rest of the cosmos.[9] Humans are only one of many spirit beings on earth and have no exceptional role to play in the cosmic community. All beings should be respected and their roles within the cosmos comprehended. Since many beings have power and are to be respected, humans must show them respect or be subject to supernatural retribution. If animals that give themselves to humans for food are not properly prayed to and shown ceremonial respect, they will no longer sacrifice themselves to humans for their needs and nutrition.[10]

In contrast, in Western and capitalist worldviews the cosmos lacks particular spiritual powers, and only humans have souls. The earth is spiritually inert and is a place and resource for the comfort and needs of humans, who are obligated to scatter about the earth and use its resources to transform the world. The earth is not seen as a spiritual and sacred part of the cosmos, as it is in many Native religions, but rather is viewed as a place of suffering and travail whose resources are needed for human comfort and needs. There is little need to respect the animals, plants, and other beings of the universe, since they are spiritually inert and were created to serve human needs. Capitalist philosophies see the earth as a natural resource wherein exploitation of raw materials through labor transforms raw materials into useful objects for further economic production or consumption and the creation of additional wealth.[11]

In Native worldviews, disrupting the powerful spirits of the cosmos will cause disorder and harmful retaliation. Only by respecting and honoring the beings of the cosmos will humans sustain harmony and well-being. For many

Native communities the earth and the cosmos are a gift from the Creator, or Great Spirit. The Great Spirit is the central force and direction of the cosmos and all the beings in it, including humans. Humans do not know the direction or purpose of the universe, but they play a part in the sacred cosmic plan. Individuals may seek visions or develop life tasks or sacred duties to perform within the grand sacred path of the Great Spirit. The resulting economic ethic is one in which plants and animals must be honored for their life-giving powers. This kind of labor ethic leads to a subsistence economic orientation, whereby only limited goods are taken from the environment and then only those that are necessary for life and spiritual purposes.

INDIANS AND MARKETS

The introduction of European markets did not change the basic worldviews and economic orientations of many Native communities. Natives accepted various trade goods: metal hatchets, traps, knives, guns, balls, textiles, beads, jewelry, and other commodities. Natives, generally the eastern half of North America, soon became dependent on European trade goods and were producing fewer of their own goods.[12] This resulted in economically dependent relations so Natives could obtain European goods, and Natives were sometimes forced to hunt and bring in furs for goods, which had become necessities.

There are arguments that the Native worldview broke down as Indians began to hunt animal skins for the fur trade. Some scholars say the Natives' worldview changed to one of greater exploitation of animals and their skins or furs to sell to Europeans. Nevertheless, most Indians did not abandon their worldview espousing respect for the beings of the cosmos. European traders went to great lengths to ensure that Native hunters brought in enough furs to satisfy demand. The Native hunters generally needed only a limited collection of goods and hunted only enough to trade for the supplies needed. If the European traders gave more goods per fur to induce more trade, the Indian hunters generally brought in fewer goods. They were not looking to make a profit but were trading only to obtain necessities. This orientation fit their worldview.[13]

Many Native individuals and communities retain traditional non-Western economic values to the present day. When many Native communities and individuals were engaged in the fur trade from about 1600 to 1840, no Native capitalists or entrepreneurs emerged in that trade. Natives usually hunted and trapped, often in roles akin to labor.[14] Some became middlemen in the trade, but even here Natives accumulated only enough furs to purchase annual or

semiannual requirements at the trading post. An Indian middleman trader often traveled into the interior to trade, since the value of European goods was higher there. Native middlemen engaged in a form of barter but not in the organization of production for a capitalist market. Exposure to the fur trade did not develop capitalism among Natives but rather encapsulated Native nonmarket economic orientations within fur trade market relations.[15]

EARLY NATIVE CAPITALISTS

Native capitalists emerged during the nineteenth century under very special conditions. In the American South during the early 1800s, a class of plantation and slave owners arose among the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek. These plantation owners fit our definition of capitalists, since they organized black slave labor, land, and management to produce cotton, corn, cattle, and other agricultural products for export to markets. Southern Indian entrepreneurs were generally mixed-bloods of Native and Scottish, English, or Irish descent. During the seventeenth century many European traders had traveled into the southern interior. They often found companionship among Native women of important clans. Most southern Indian nations had matrilineal clans in which the child's heritage was reckoned through the kin of the mother. The traders cohabited with Indian women, sometimes married them, and often had children. A European trader thus had a ready set of kinship ties for trading partners; often, the female conducted much of the trade with her female kin. Since the children were born into matrilineal clans, their social and kinship status gave them automatic membership in the tribe. Consequently, many mixed-blood children were born into prominent clans with considerable political support and strong social and economic ties.

Sometimes a European trader would bring his male children into the fur trade business. In this way the values of trade, business, and market participation were taught to some mixed-blood children. Trader families composed only a small portion of families among the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek. A few full-blood families also took up capitalist farming and other business activities, such as managing inns. Following the decline of the fur trade in the South by the first decades of the 1800s, mixed-blood Indian families in that region turned to cotton production. Cotton demand was spurred by the Industrial Revolution in Britain during the early nineteenth century, and with the resumption of trade following the War of 1812, mixed-blood trading families turned their few slaves and land to the cultivation of cotton. Soon, many mixed-blood families owned several plantations on tribal lands. Many became

relatively wealthy, and they built mansions and lived in the style of the American southern plantation class.[16]

Yet most mixed-bloods could not easily move into southern society. The government awarded some of them small "reservations" of land near American settler communities, but when they tried to live on them most were harassed and soon moved away. Around 1819, John Ross, the future Principal Chief of the Cherokee and a successful merchant and plantation owner, tried to move onto a 640-acre plot of land set aside for him by U.S. government agents, only to be forced to return to the Cherokee Nation. Many Native entrepreneurs then cast their lots with their tribal communities, where they were welcomed even with their unusual market orientations. At least 95 percent of southern Indian families in the 1820s continued to live within their traditional economic orientations and lifestyles. When the fur trade declined in the 1820s, many conservatives among the southern tribes turned to small-scale cotton farming and raising cattle and hogs for trade. The conservatives continued to work their own crops and to raise cattle for their own use, whereas trading limited agricultural products and cattle in exchange for the manufactured goods to which they had become accustomed.[17]

During much of the nineteenth century, southern Indian planters and conservatives struggled against American intrusions into their land and political sovereignty. The major southern Native nations formed constitutional governments in an effort to increase their ability to resist U.S. legal and political demands. But following removal, differences in worldviews and ultimately in political orientation increasingly divided communities. Whereas Indian planters adopted the values of the American South, most conservatives were reluctant to take up capitalist or entrepreneurial activities but remained on small farms and followed a subsistence economic strategy of limited production for consumption and trade. The planters among the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek generally sided with the South during the American Civil War. Cherokee and Creek conservatives sided with the North, believing it would preserve their treaty agreements. Choctaw and Chickasaw conservatives, however, sided with the South and their planter compatriots. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations were geographically closer to the southern Confederate states of Arkansas and Texas and had fewer options to side with the Union than did the Cherokee and Creek conservatives.

After the Civil War the planters lost their slaves and started to employ white U.S. citizen tenant farmers to work their land. Many planters also turned to cattle raising on a large scale after 1870 when railroads made markets more

accessible. Conservatives opposed the introduction of tenant farmers, fearing the increased presence of non-Indians on their lands. The railroads brought new markets into Indian Territory and with them a deluge of U.S. settlers and workers. Soon the settlers overwhelmed Indian Territory, and the U.S. government moved to abolish the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole governments. Generally, by the 1890s many of the more entrepreneurial Native leaders had reconciled themselves to carry out the abolition of Native governments, and they took allotted land, thus opening surplus Indian land to U.S. settlers. The more assimilated entrepreneurs were willing to join the United States and to pursue their economic interests within the American national market. Most conservatives among the so-called Five Civilized Tribes were reluctant to join the United States, and they protested the abolition of their governments. Although Indian entrepreneurs generally had the economic advantage of easy access to land within their nations, many Native farmers and cattlemen saw that their future economic interests lay with joining the United States instead of with preserving their Indian governments. The U.S. government provided few alternatives, and many probably tried to make the best of a bad situation. In 1906 the Indian Territory governments of the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole were abolished. Thereafter, many Native entrepreneurs became a part of the Oklahoma power structure and, for the most part, did not return to participate in tribal politics.

The southern Indian agrarian capitalists were very unusual in American Indian history. The unusual formation of Native entrepreneurship in the American South resulted from a combination of cotton market opportunities and the emergence of mixed-blood tribal members who had internalized entrepreneurial values and skills from their fur trader fathers. Since for much of the nineteenth century, mixed-bloods' social and economic interests lay with their particular Indian nations, most retained Native identities and were active in tribal political and economic life. But by the end of the nineteenth century many had accepted the offer to assimilate economically and politically into Oklahoma society and politics.[18] Many continued to identify as Native, and many individuals were successful in their business and professional lives. Indian conservatives resisted allotment and the abolishment of their governments through protest organizations, as well as legal and legislative lobbying, but in the end they were not successful. One must wait until the end of the twentieth century to find another significant group of Native capitalist entrepreneurs.[19]

CONTEMPORARY INDIVIDUAL NATIVE CAPITALIST ENTREPENEURSHIP

Throughout much of the twentieth century relatively little Native American capitalist entrepreneurship was found in Indian country. Some individuals moved to cities early and became businesspeople or worked as wage laborers. At the beginning of the twentieth century most lived on reservations or in Native communities where capitalism was culturally and socially discouraged. During the economic boom of the 1920s, a wave of Indian migrants moved to cities. Most were seeking work, as reservations were very poor economically. Reservations were almost totally controlled by Indian Department officials, who were instructed to help Indians become economically self-sufficient. Irrigation, cattle raising, and farming enjoyed fair success on reservations during the 1920s, but most of these efforts fell victim to the Great Depression and the climatic "dust bowl" conditions of the 1930s, which made small-scale farming and cattle raising very difficult. Indian Department policies focused on assimilating young Native Americans and providing them with workman-like skills. Basic education skills and training were emphasized, and few were trained for college or for capitalist entrepreneurship.[20] Although many Native individuals became successful businesspeople, as a group few Natives were engaged in capitalist entrepreneurship.

Two major patterns of contemporary Native entrepreneurship had emerged by the middle of the twentieth century: tribal enterprise and individual capitalist entrepreneurship. Individual Indian entrepreneurship was developed largely by Natives who had migrated to urban areas and worked mostly within the mainstream U.S. economy. After the first major wave during the 1920s, migration to cities resumed during World War II and accelerated from the 1950s through the end of the century. Most migrants sought employment opportunities not available on the majority of Indian reservations. Many Indian migrants who preferred to live on the reservation returned if economic opportunities became available. Some made frequent visits to their home reservations and maintained ties with their relatives, tribal ceremonies, and communities. Others arrived in the cities and never went back. They married non-Indians and often prospered. They found that it was possible to maintain a tribal identity in the city, and they developed pan-Indian organizations and powwows. Christian Indians who migrated to urban areas might not have attended powwows, but they preserved their Indian identity through their faith and at gatherings like picnics and churches. Indians began to attend college in significant numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, and many who graduated found employment in urban

areas. The brain drain of trained and professional Indians to urban areas was a reflection of continued weak economic conditions on Indian reservations, where unemployment rates remained high throughout the entire twentieth century.[21]

The 2000 census indicates that over 70 percent of Indians are living in urban areas. Although many Indians who first migrated to urban areas found the transition difficult, others made comfortable transitions to urban life. Now second-, third-, and sometimes fourth-generation Indian people are living in urban areas. Many long-term urban Indians have not maintained strong ties to a Native community, but they retain some sense of an Indian identity.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the number of economic development plans for Indian reservations and within Indian communities greatly increased. Individual Indian capitalist entrepreneurs appeared in significant numbers during those decades, but few invested their assets on Indian reservations, preferring to start businesses in urban areas conducive to business entrepreneurship and economic opportunities. As Indian people became more familiar with the urban setting, they increasingly found jobs in small businesses. Many learned from their work experience and developed their own small businesses, mostly mom-and-pop family enterprises. At first, many Indian-owned businesses were small grocery stores, gas stations, small shops, mechanical repair stations, arts and crafts stores, and similar operations. As time went on, more urban Indians began to look into larger and more innovative businesses. National organizations for promoting Indian capitalist entrepreneurship started to emerge, such as the National Center for American Indian Enterprise Development. Indian Chambers of Commerce were formed in large cities like Los Angeles. Indians started businesses on the Internet, producing and delivering computer supplies and support, as well as doing graphic design.[22]

In the 1980s and 1990s, individual Indian entrepreneurship increased at a high rate. The number of U.S. businesses owned by American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts increased 93 percent from 1987 to 1992, from 52,980 to 102,271. By contrast, the rate of increase for all U.S. firms was 26 percent, from 13.7 million in 1987 to 17.3 million in 1992.[23] In 1992 the United States had 95,040 American Indian–owned, 2,738 Aleut-owned, and 4,493 Eskimo-owned firms.[24] The total estimated revenue for the nation's American Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut businesses increased 115 percent from 1987 to 1992, from $3.7 billion to $8.1 billion, whereas receipts for all U.S. firms during the same period grew by 67 percent, from $2 trillion to $3.3 trillion.[25]

More recent Census Bureau information indicates that the number of Native businesses continues to expand at a fast pace. In 1997 there were 197,300

Native-owned firms, of which 4,982 (2 percent) had more than $1 million in receipts, whereas 26 percent, or 50,433, had receipts of less than $5,000. The number of Native businesses grew 84 percent from 1992 to 1997, whereas the number of all U.S. firms increased by 7 percent. The receipts for Native businesses during that period increased by 179 percent, compared with 40 percent for all U.S. firms during the same period. Total receipts for Native businesses in 1997 were $34,343,907,000, over $34 billion. Native businesses in 1997 were concentrated in industries not classified (45 percent); services (17 percent); construction (14 percent); retail trade (8 percent); agricultural services (5 percent); manufacturing (3 percent); transportation (3 percent); finance, insurance, and real estate (2 percent); and wholesale trade (2 percent). Compared with all U.S. businesses, Native businesses are overrepresented in industries not classified, construction, and agricultural services. Native businesses are underrepresented in services, finance, retail trade, wholesale trade, and transportation, whereas they are equally represented in manufacturing. Except for industries not classified, Native businesses have lower revenues than the average for all U.S. firms in the same industry. In the category of industries not classified, Native firms averaged receipts of $109,000, whereas all U.S. firms averaged $42,000. The five states with the largest number of Native firms in 1997 were California (26,603), Texas (15,668), Oklahoma (15,066), Florida (10,546), and North Carolina (7,148). The five metropolitan areas with the most Native-owned businesses were Los Angeles–Long Beach, California (8,541); Tulsa, Oklahoma (3,822); Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (3,295); Houston, Texas (3,128); and New York, New York (2,801).[26]

These figures show that the numbers of Native businesses are growing more than three times as fast as, and receipts are increasing at more than double the rate of, those of the U.S. business community as a whole. Census data over the past two decades indicate continued growth and diversification of Native business enterprises. This suggests that Native capitalism and businesses will become an increasingly active part of the U.S. economy and will play stronger and more visible roles in Native social and political issues in the future.

The Native business community has arisen largely within the urban environment where entrepreneurial values and opportunities are relatively unaffected by the poverty, culture, and social community of Indian reservations. Exposed to business values and opportunities within cities, individual Natives have formed over 197,000 businesses and continue to create enterprises at a high rate. Many Native business leaders continue to maintain ties to urban and reservation Indian communities, although their businesses may have little

to do with reservation cultures or community life. Business ownership has not obliterated Native identity, but most Native businesses are not located on reservations, which reflects the relatively poor business opportunities present on Indian reservations. It also reflects the continuity of Native cultural values, political relations, and values, which tend to remain less than conducive to capitalist market values.

TRIBAL CAPITALISM

Most government economic development plans focus on reservation economies. Yet they ignore a central problem: the general absence of individual capitalist entrepreneurs on Indian reservations. Although tribal members own many small businesses such as bars, gas stations, and grocery stores, most are owned by non-Indians. As discussed in the previous section, most reservation communities have not fostered individual business entrepreneurship. Most Indian entrepreneurs have moved off the reservation into urban markets, where opportunities are greater and businesses are supported and encouraged by law, government, and culture.

On most reservations the presence of multiple worldviews—many the products of assimilation through government education programs, individual experience, and the introduction of the Christian religion—influences the business climate. Most Native communities include groups and individuals with considerable experience with and knowledge of American culture, values, and institutions and many who have internalized such views. Most Native reservation communities, however, explicitly honor Native traditions and philosophies about the cosmos. Even well-educated and Christian tribal members who have lived in the community for many years continue to uphold the values and normative rules of the reservation community. This is not to argue that decision making and community action on a reservation simply reflect traditional orientations but rather to convey that traditional values tend to prevail throughout the community's social and political relations.

As stated previously, the general absence of a significant private entrepreneurial sector on most reservation communities is not an accident. Most Native reservation communities do not support individual capitalist activity, accumulation of wealth, and a central focus on production and market enterprise. Values of generosity, redistribution, and egalitarianism continue to prevail among many community members. Tribal governments, which are often alien forms of representative democracy, also discourage private capitalism. Few tribal governments actively support individual business enterprise with legal

and political protection. Private businesses need predictable, stable legal and political environments, and few reservations have expended the effort to create the legal, economic, or political infrastructure to foster a stable capitalist business climate. Many Native entrepreneurs find reservation business environments unsupportive and often move off the reservation to establish their companies. Most tribal communities do not see private enterprise as a primary value or goal. Native culture and worldviews do not support the values of capitalist accumulation and market participation.

Tribal governments continue to operate within the holistic orientation of Native community life. Unlike U.S. society, institutional relations among economy, community, kinship, and politics are not separated. Consequently, many tribal leaders are reluctant to promote a private capitalist sector outside the political guidance and control of the tribal community. Most Native communities and their political leadership see an autonomous private sector as a possible social and political threat to the community. They feel more comfortable with community and political guidance and control over economic enterprise. The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) allows tribal governments to create relatively independent economic corporations to foster economic development on Indian reservations. However, although more than 100 tribes eventually adopted a representative form of government, only one tribe adopted the corporate model as originally proposed by the IRA. In this early IRA corporate model, an economic development corporation would be created for the tribal community, and each tribal member held a share and voting rights in that entity. A board of directors would be elected to manage and guide the corporation. The tribal government would not manage or control the economic corporation. Except for the Seminole of Florida, Indian communities rejected the IRA's reservation corporate plan. Many tribal communities have adopted a revised version of the IRA plan, placing the corporation under the control of the elected tribal government. Even with the prodding of the U.S. government, the increasing demands of market globalization, and more diverse values within reservation communities, most reservation communities prefer relatively holistic institutional relations among economy, community, polity, and culture.[27] Some private Native businesses operate on many reservations, but they are not strongly supported culturally or politically and as a result have limited opportunities.

Tribal governments and communities, however, are cognizant of the demands of and need for economic development. Tribal leadership often argues that sovereignty is not possible without freedom from economic dependence

on government programs and funding. High rates of poverty and unemployment on reservations, with their attendant problems and issues, are a major stimulus for tribal governments to promote economic development, although they still prefer to manage reservation economic development and enterprise. The mode of capitalism that has emerged within reservation communities is one in which the tribal government is the main owner and manager of major economic development projects. Tribal leaders make important decisions about investment and management. This overlapping management of political and economic leadership is discouraged within mainstream American political and economic life but is the preferred mode of economic development on Indian reservations.

Natives are opting for a form of collective capitalism rather than individual capitalism. Some, like the Winnebago of Nebraska, are experimenting with American-style corporate models whereby economic decisions are insulated from the politics of tribal government. In Alaska, thirteen Native for-profit corporations are mandated by congressional act and are separate institutions from tribal governments. But throughout Indian country the preferred way of proceeding with economic development is for political, community, and cultural values to guide economic decision making and institutions.[28] Native communities are greatly concerned about economic issues, but they do not wish to sacrifice culture, preferred forms of institutional relations, and internal social relations in favor of economic development. If there is a choice between economic gain and the sacrifice of central cultural and institutional relations, many Native communities prefer to refrain from becoming involved in economic development projects they believe will endanger or change their communities in unwanted ways.[29]

Native capitalism has taken a different path from U.S. or Western capitalism. Tribal governments are expected to preserve the political sovereignty of the Native communities, as well as to protect and promote cultural values and community survival. Economic development is seen as a means to enhance tribal sovereignty, empower the community through independent resources, and mitigate the harsh effects of poverty.[30] Economic development and enterprise are not seen either as ends in themselves or as responses to market demands or comparative advantages. Many tribal communities will accept a lower standard of living in comparison with the overall U.S. standard, since material interests and values are less central to their lives.[31] Tribal leaders must manage the trade-offs between community culture and the need for economic development. A private sector whose main interest is capitalist accumulation could potentially threaten and disrupt the community's social and cultural relations.[32]

The Mississippi Choctaw, a tribe in which the tribal government makes the investment and executive personnel decisions, offers an example of Native capitalism at work. Highly successful in creating manufacturing plants, sustaining economic initiatives, and hiring tribal members as workers and managers, Mississippi Choctaw enterprises are market-oriented and profitable concerns but with a tribal or collective purpose. The tribal government accumulates profits not for private purposes but for the good and future investment of the tribal community. Individual workers are motivated to take pride and care in their work because they are working for tribal enterprises that represent and support the entire community.[33] This model of tribal capitalism enshrines the tribal government as manager of economic enterprises for the well-being of the tribal community. Jobs and wealth are managed for the collective well-being, at least in theory, and therefore individuals participate wholeheartedly because they, too, are contributing to the collective and future economic well-being of the community. Since the tribal government is in control of economic enterprises, community goals and values are protected, and accumulated wealth from capitalist enterprises is reinvested or redistributed with the well-being of the community in mind.

Other successful examples of tribal capitalism are found in the rapid growth of gaming enterprises on Indian reservations. Gaming emerged because of the great need for economic development on reservations and because tribal sovereignty provided a legal opening to take advantage of gaming. In the aftermath of several legal cases and the IGRA, Indian gaming has become more established. Some tribes make considerable money from gaming, although most see small profits. The more isolated tribes have less success than those located near large populations. With the exception of the Florida Seminoles, gaming operations are managed by tribal governments, with most gaming profits redistributed for community benefit according to the IGRA. This provision fits well with collective or community-oriented Native values and helps to justify gaming enterprises in that it promotes development and helps alleviate poverty. In the late 1990s the Proposition 5 and Proposition 1A campaigns to gain gaming compacts for California Indian tribes relied heavily on themes of self-reliance, payment of taxes, and alleviation of poverty and government dependence.[34] The campaigns not only reverberated very well with the California electorate, which approved both propositions with over 60 percent of the vote, but also underscored Native values and goals for gaming and redistributive economic development.[35]

Tribal capitalism does not put accumulation of wealth as its central goal. Community and cultural protection and enhancement of tribal sovereignty

are major values. Tribal capitalism discourages individual capitalism because it will introduce new values and new power centers, as well as unwanted concentrations of wealth, within the community. Historically, Native communities have not been class-based societies, and tribal culture and holistic institutional order mitigate against the formation of a capitalist class as an explicit feature of Native reservation communities. Because of government employment, farming, cattle raising, and other occupations and businesses, economic class differences do emerge within reservation communities. Class formation and interests are often explicitly noted by tribal community members and leaders and are opposed within tribal communities as nontraditional viewpoints and social formations.[36] Nevertheless, most tribal communities currently contain mixed class and cultural orientations, with many members adhering to multiple worldviews and situational identities.

Tribal governments are seen as protectors of the long-term cultural and political interests of the Native reservation communities. Economic development is desirable as long as it supports the goals of preserving and enhancing community culture and prospects. Tribal governments, when they work properly, are the stewards of the tribal community estate and must preserve community, culture, and the reservation environment. Economic development is desirable when it serves community values and interests and is threatening when market or capitalist institutions threaten to disrupt community organization.[37]

The model of tribal capitalism is widely distributed in various forms throughout Indian country. It embodies the values and interests of Native reservation communities. Efforts by economic planners to impose Western capitalist models on Native communities generally meet with opposition and have great difficulty establishing enduring economic innovations. Although the specific features, ceremonies, and stories of Native religions and worldviews vary considerably, Native communities tend to share similar holistic understandings of the cosmos; thus tribal capitalism rather than individual entrepreneurship embodies Native cultural understandings and preferences.[38] The continued cultural and institutional foundations of contemporary Native reservation communities support the tribal capitalist model and discourage individual entrepreneurship. It is true, however, that such issues are discussed and even challenged by various groups, classes, and individuals. Many Native communities vigorously debate the role of tradition and institutional order—the tight interrelations of culture, community, polity, and economy—in the contemporary world. These political, cultural, and economic debates will con-

tinue and will form the basis of developing consensus on what types of change will be acceptable to the communities.

Tribal capitalism faces great challenges in the twenty-first century and beyond. Global markets make gaining a foothold within the capitalist system even more important than it was in the past. The penalty for not participating in that system is continued economic and political marginalization of Native reservation communities. Some degree of economic viability will be necessary to ensure tribal sovereignty and provide resources to preserve and extend Native cultures and traditions. Tribal governments also face continued challenges to tribal sovereignty from local, state, and federal governments and their constituent group interests. Most tribal governments lack the resources and the organization to defend their sovereignty against local, state, and federal encroachment. Economic successes will need to be accompanied by strengthening of tribal governments to meet the globalized economic, political, and cultural challenges of the future. Tribal governments and tribal communities will need to negotiate and decide for themselves how to preserve their cultural and holistic institutional relations and worldviews and at the same time promote the innovations that will allow them to meet those future challenges.

THE IRON CAGE IN INDIAN COUNTRY

If we return to Marx and Weber's Iron Cage argument as manifested in Indian country, we see Native participation in the increasingly globalized market system as moving in two major directions. Some American Indians have embraced capitalism. Over 197,000 Natives currently own businesses in the United States. Natives are relatively new to business entrepreneurship and ownership. During the last several decades of the twentieth century, Native individual capitalism made significant strides and outpaced growth rates of the U.S. economy as a whole. One can expect that Native individual capitalist entrepreneurship will continue to be largely urban and that entrepreneurs will gain greater influence over Native issues and national policies. Since more than 197,000 business owners retain Native identities and many have strong tribal identifications, they may significantly influence economic development and policy in Indian country.

Reservation economic development has not followed the Iron Cage model entirely. Tribal capitalism is the result of market competition, which forces Native people to engage in the market for economic self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, motivations for tribal capitalism are not based solely on maximizing profits in the market but rather they emphasize preserving community, culture,

and tribal sovereignty. Market competition forces Indian communities to consider and engage in market enterprise, but they wish to do so under their own terms and to subordinate capitalist accumulation to collective goals of community, cultural, and political enhancement and preservation. Tribal capitalism makes concessions to market competition, but only as a means to further its noneconomic goals of collective community values. The struggle between the powerful forces of market competition and preservation of Native communities will play out over the next century and will lead to many interesting social and cultural innovations as Native communities accommodate the new globalized cultural, economic, and political environment.

The effect of the capitalist Iron Cage in Indian country is mixed. Native communities and individuals have been forced to accommodate the forces of competitive market capitalism. Nevertheless, Native community and identity have survived and will likely continue to meet the challenges of the new globalized economy in diverse ways.

NOTES

1. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 182; Karl Marx, *Capital,* vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1967). See also the articles on India in Karl Marx, *Surveys from Exile,* ed. David Fernbach (New York: Random House, 1973); Max Weber, *General Economic History* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1981), 275–278.

2. See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Convergence and Divergence of Modern and Modernizing Societies: Indications from the Analysis of the Structuring of Social Hierarchies in Middle Eastern Societies," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (1977): 1–27; S. N. Eisenstadt, "Transformation of Social, Political, and Cultural Orders in Modernization," *American Sociological Review* 30, 5 (1965): 659–673; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1978).

3. Mary Ann Andreas, "Perspective of Mary Ann Andreas, Morongo Tribal Chairperson," in *Indian Gaming: Who Wins?* ed. Angela Mullis and David Kamper (Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center, 2000), 166–168; Priscilla Hunter, "Perspective of Priscilla Hunter, Chairwoman, Coyote Band of Pomo Mission Indians," in *Indian Gaming: Who Wins?* ed. Angela Mullis and David Kamper (Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center, 2000), 169–171.

4. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (25 USC, Chapter 29, SS2701–2721).

5. Max Weber, *Economy and Society,* vol. 1, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 160–166; Weber, *General Economic History*, 275–278, 352–369; Max Weber, *Max Weber on Capitalism, Bureaucracy and Religion,* ed. Stanislav Andreski (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), 21–29.

6. Duane Champagne, "Culture, Differentiation and Environment: Social Change in Tlingit Society," in *Differentiation Theory and Social Change: Comparative and Historical Perspectives,* ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander and Paul Colomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 77–84.

7. See Frank Speck, *The Iroquois: A Study in Cultural Evolution* (Bloomfield Hills, MI: Cranbrook Institute of Science, Bulletin 23, 1945), 33; Hope Isaacs, "Orenda and the Concept of Power Among the Tonawanda Seneca," in *The Anthropology of Power,* ed. Raymond Fogelson and Richard Adams (New York: Academic, 1977), 168–182; Raymond Fogelson, "Cherokee Notions of Power," in *The Anthropology of Power,* ed. Raymond Fogelson and Richard Adams (New York: Academic, 1977), 186–188; James Adair, *Adair's History of the American Indians,* ed. Samuel Williams (Johnson City, TN: Watauga, 1930), 7, 406, 465; Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (New York: Free Press, 1965), 222, chaps. 6, 7; Theda Perdue, *Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society 1540–1866* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1979), 13–15.

8. See the theory of differentiation in S. N. Eisenstadt, "Social Change, Differentiation, and Evolution," *American Sociological Review* 29 (1964): 375–386; Talcott Parsons, *Societies* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966); Duane Champagne, *Social Order and Political Change: Constitutional Governments Among the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw and Creek* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), chaps. 1–3.

9. Jean Chaudhuri and Joyotpaul Chaudhuri, *A Sacred Path: The Way of the Muscogee Creeks* (Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center, 2001), 5–14, 95–115.

10. Duane Champagne, "Renewing American Indian Nations: Cosmic Communities and Spiritual Autonomy," in *Diversity and Community: A Critical Reader,* ed. Philip Alperson (Oxford, UK, and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, forthcoming).

11. Duane Champagne, "The Cultural and Institutional Foundations of Native American Conservatism," Special Issue, "North American Indians: Cultures in Motion," ed. Elvira Stefania Tiberini, *L'Uomo, Societa, Tradizione, Sviluppo* 8, 1 (1995): 17–43.

12. William Steele, *The Cherokee Crown of Tanassy* (Winston Salem, NC: John Blair, 1977), xii; Adair, *Adair's History of the American Indians,* 456; C. A. Weslager, *The Delaware Indians* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1972), 216; Werner Crane, *The Southern Frontier 1670–1732* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1929), 177; George Hunt, *The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Intertribal Relations* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940), 19; Rennard Strickland, "Christian Gotelieb Priber: Utopian Precursor of the Cherokee Government," *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 48 (1970): 270.

13. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 59–60; E. E. Rich, "Trade Habits and Economic Motivation Among the Indians of North America," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 26 (1960): 53; Arthur Ray, *Indians and the Fur Trade* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 68; Adair, *Adair's History,* 394–396, 444; Thomas Norton, *The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686–1776* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 70; Roul Narrall, "The Causes of the Fourth Iroquois War," *Ethnohistory* 16 (1969): 58–59.

14. Paul Phillips, *The Fur Trade,* vol. 2 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 524; Sherman Uhler, *Pennsylvania Indian Relations to 1754* (Allentown, PA: Donecker, 1951), 61.

15. Dean Howard Smith, *Modern Tribal Development: Paths to Self-Sufficiency and Cultural Integrity in Indian Country* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira, 2000), 80–82; Phillips, *The Fur Trade,* vol. 2, 524; Uhler, *Pennsylvania Indian Relations,* 61.

16. Champagne, *Social Order,* 90–91, notes 4–8.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 208–240.

19. Many Native communities have made interesting efforts to cope with changing economic and market conditions set upon them in reservations and urban areas. Some of these innovative community and individual economic changes are presented in this volume. In this chapter I am concerned primarily with Native formations of capitalism, a term I am using very much in the Western or European sense. This is a somewhat narrow definition of economic entrepreneurship, perhaps better characterized as capitalist entrepreneurship to distinguish it from more general forms of economic entrepreneurship or even non-Western or Native forms of economic organization. Nevertheless, I believe it is critical to understand the patterns and processes of capitalist entrepreneurship and change in Native communities, and so I am focusing on these issues. The evidence of Native-owned businesses for the 1900 to 1950 period is very thin. The U.S. government survey for minority-owned businesses was not developed until 1972. These references indicate the general dearth, or at least the nonvisibility, of Native business ownership during much of the twentieth century. The Fifteenth Census of the United States: 1930, *The Indian Population of the United States and Alaska* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937), 202, indicates that in the 1910 U.S. Census, 1,116 Natives were classified as proprietors or managers of nonfarm businesses. Also in 1910, 21,947 Natives were classified as owners or tenants of farming businesses. In the 1920 Census, 643 Natives managed retail, wholesale, or other business establishments, and 22,181 Natives were engaged in farming businesses as owners or tenants. In 1930, 1,242 Natives managed nonfarm businesses, and 28,038 Natives were owners or tenants of farming businesses. The trends into the 1940s and later show a decline in the number of Natives engaged in farming and farm management. In 1940, 1.4 percent of the Native working population was engaged in nonfarm management or proprietorship. The percentage of working Native proprietors or managers increased to 2.8 percent in 1960 and to 5.0 percent in 1970. Farmers and (farm) managers represented 46.7 percent of the Native workforce in 1940, but that figure declined to 9.5 percent in 1960 and 2.3 percent in 1970. See J. Milton Yinger and George Eaton Simpson, eds., "American Indians Today," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 436 (March 1978): 3. See also Alan L. Sorkin, *American Indians and Federal Aid* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1971), 18–19; *American Indian Policy Review Commission: Final Report,* vol. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 349–350; Robert Bennett, "Economic Development as a Means of Overcoming Indian Poverty," in *Toward Economic Development for Native American Communities,* vol. 1, part I: *Development Prospects and Problems,* Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 108; "Foreword: Economic Development in the American Indian Community; Role of the Small Business Administration," in *Toward Economic Development for Native American Communities,* vol. 1, part I: *Development Prospects and Problems,* Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 400–402; Lewis Meriam, technical ed., *The Problem of Indian Administration* (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1971), 431, 469, 526, 652; Robert C. Cauthorn, "Programming for Entrepreneurship Among American Indians," *Arizona Review* 17 (May 1968): 11–15.

20. Alice Littlefield, "Indian Education and the World of Work in Michigan, 1893–1933," in *Native Americans and Wage Labor,* ed. Alice Littlefield and Martha Knack (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 100–120.

21. Smith, *Modern Tribal Development,* 135–144.

22. http://government.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncaied.org%2F is the Web site for the National Center for American Indian Entrepreneurship, which is funded by the Small Business Administration as part of its minority programs.

23. http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/cb96-127.html (U.S. Census Bureau).

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. http://www.census.gov/csd/mwb/AIAN/sld (U.S. Census Bureau).

27. Joseph S. Anderson and Dean Howard Smith, "Managing Tribal Assets: Developing Long-Term Strategic Plans," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 22 (Summer 1998): 139–149.

28. The thirteen corporations created by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1970 might appear to be exceptions to this rule, but they follow a similar pattern. In Alaska the Native communities, villages, and regional associations have long demanded that corporations focus on more than economic profit and also emphasize protection of land, culture, and community. See Thomas R. Berger, *Village Journey: The Report of the Alaska Native Review Commission* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985); Champagne, "Culture, Differentiation and Environment," 77–84.

29. Duane Champagne, "Socio-Cultural Responses to Coal Development: A Comparison of the Crow and Northern Cheyenne," in *Research in Capital and Development: Native American Economic Development,* vol. 10, ed. Carol Ward and Matthew Snipp (Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1996), 131–146.

30. Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt, "Sovereignty and Nation Building: The Development Challenge in Indian Country Today," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 22 (Summer 1998): 187–214.

31. Champagne, "Socio-Cultural Responses to Coal Development," 131–146.

32. Smith, *Modern Tribal Development,* 71–90.

33. Peter Ferrera, *The Choctaw Revolution: Lessons for Federal Indian Policy* (Washington, DC: Americans for Tax Reform Foundation, 1998).

34. Angela Mullis and David Kamper, eds., *Indian Gaming: Who Wins?* (Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center, 2000).

35. Andreas, "Perspective of Mary Ann Andreas," 166–168; Hunter, "Perspective of Priscilla Hunter," 169–171; Ernie L. Stevens Jr., "Perspective of Ernie L. Stevens Jr., Tribal Councilman, Oneida Nation," in *Indian Gaming: Who Wins?* ed. Angela Mullis and David Kamper (Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center, 2000), 172–175.

36. See Castle McLaughlin and Tracy J. Andrews, "Introduction," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 22 (Summer 1998): 1–12; also see the rest of the volume, guest eds. Tracy J. Andrews and Castle McLaughlin, Special Issue, "Farming and Ranching in Reservation Economies," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 22 (Summer 1998): 13–138.

37. Ronald Trosper, "Mind Sets and Economic Development on Indian Reservations," in *What Can Tribes Do? Strategies and Institutions in American Indian Economic Development,* ed. Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt (Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center, 1992), 303–333.

38. Kathleen Pickering and David Mushinski, "Making the Case for Culture in Economic Development: A Cross-Section Analysis of Western Tribes," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 25 (Winter 2001): 46, 58–59.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Conclusion

BRIAN HOSMER AND COLLEEN O'NEILL

Native Americans today face daunting challenges as they struggle to find solutions to problems anchored in centuries of colonialism. Sovereignty tops the list for many reservation communities, whether it involves asserting political independence and reclaiming control over natural resources and reinvigorating indigenous cultural practices or rebuilding effective tribal infrastructures. Although structures of power have varied historically, Europeans and Americans have generally operated as though controlling indigenous cultures and their economies were pivotal to establishing and maintaining colonial hegemony. But as contributors to this volume demonstrate and as many American Indians know from history and experience, indigenous communities resisted those efforts and crafted creative strategies to survive within the enveloping capitalist economy. American Indians are continuing to work out solutions whereby "decolonization" often means finding pathways or economic strategies that provide for a community's material needs, but in ways that respect and reinforce their own cultural values.

This anthology can be read as a response to a scholarly paradigm once quite explicit in writings on American Indians and economic change—today more implicit but still present. As Colleen O'Neill demonstrates in her introduction and as many of our essayists address in one way or another, world systems formulations and many variants thereof dominated thinking not only on the "development of underdevelopment" in Indian communities (historically and contemporarily) but also in considerations of American Indian history generally. Influenced by groundbreaking work in Latin American, subaltern, and Third World studies, world systems and dependency theories offered precise, workable, and commonsensical explanations for the persistence of poverty in many regions and the concomitant wealth and power in a few others. Accordingly, the relationship between wealth and poverty was simple and direct: as the global expansion of capitalist economic arrangements drew riches and resources to "core," generally industrialized economies, those societies located on the "periphery" gradually but inevitably lost their autonomy and their ability to provide for themselves and sunk deeper into poverty and dependency. In the process, indigenous forms of social organization, cultural values, and economic arrangements struggled under the weight of an increasingly powerful world political/economic/social system. Some societies were absorbed into the global system, others struggled to operate on its periphery, and all felt its immense weight.

Problems with the development of an underdevelopment paradigm are well-known and are addressed by most of our essayists, either directly or by implication. That paradigm tends toward determination, offers limited space for exploring agency, flattens local and cultural distinctions, and portrays Indian peoples as passive victims, forever buffeted about by forces beyond their control (perhaps, so the argument is sometimes framed, beyond their comprehension). Ironically, many of these same criticisms can also be leveled against older "modernization" theories that world systems formulations were designed to challenge. Critics have challenged materialist models from several directions, including emphasizing creative resistance (the deployment of "weapons of the weak") to the particularizing emphases of cultural studies and toward reconsiderations of (dynamic) relationships between local agency and the operations of differential power.

Read another way, chapters in *Native Pathways* counter the implication that Indian people are historically—perhaps temperamentally and culturally—resistant to change, particularly economic change. Although not overt in the most sophisticated treatments of uneven economic development, this notion

nevertheless is persistent. Indian people, so the reasoning goes, are unable to balance Indianness with adaptation and, by extension, are not permitted by scholars to explore, invent, and change. This fundamentally paternalistic notion, fixing natives in the past, as museum pieces to be observed in their "natural" state, ultimately denies them the full measure of their humanity.

The implication is also not supported by historical evidence, as chapters in *Native Pathways* amply demonstrate. From oil leasing as a "cultural enterprise" (Rosier) to the seemingly non-businesslike activities of tribal business councils (La Vere) to examinations of Indian gaming (Cattelino, Rosenthal), which help us see externals and internals, culture alongside politics, essayists offer a compelling sense of the breadth and diversity of Indian commercial activities. M'Closkey's compelling piece, which situates Navajo weaving within a global economic context while emphasizing its gendered meanings and implications, advances the discussion further still, offering a sense of the historical depth of "globalization" and its implications for native communities.

These chapters build upon a growing body of scholarship that, by uncovering native activities in lumberyards and fisheries, on dance grounds and in mines, on the farm and in the city, remind us that Indians have long experience with work and with managing economic change. As Ellis, Shepherd, and Bauer demonstrate, our reluctance to connect labor and laboring, as conventionally understood, with the Indian "world" as often described has as much to do with persistent images of Indians and Indianness as with the historical record and lived experience. Berman, like M'Closkey, demonstrates the crucial link between government policies and women's work patterns and opportunities, reminding us again that although Indian people are able to adapt to changed circumstances, operations of differential power (globalization, welfare reform) nevertheless constrict choices and outcomes.

It is also true that as scholars undertake research in and with native communities, they encounter questions of meaning, not to mention multidimensional relationships between researcher and community—what is collected and how it is to be used and understood. Paci and Krebs in one area and Hosmer in another reflect on intersections between economics and culture but also consider intellectual property and research ethics, voice and representation, which increasingly are intertwined with research methods and cultural sovereignty. Many of our essayists deal with emerging complexities of research in or about native communities, as well they should, for with globalization come other pathways through which power can be deployed, producing new challenges

for native peoples but also perhaps new opportunities for self-expression and self-determination.

For scholars and students, *Native Pathways* stands alongside those writings designed to document intersections between Indian history and economic change. Although we asked essayists to tell "new" stories, to engage anew methodological and theoretical considerations, to examine economics and culture in light of contemporary discussions of globalization, modernization, sovereignty, and cultural representations, we refrained from mandating or even suggesting a particular ideological perspective. To us, the *plural* in "pathways" is meaningful. Instead of one disciplinary perspective, this volume represents many. Rather than defining "economics" or "labor" with scientific precision, we gave the nod to art and encouraged flexible, creative thinking; and rather than taking a position on the implications of economic change over the course of the twentieth century (e.g., whether capitalism has been "good" or "bad" for native communities), we sought instead to represent multiple stories, multiple responses, the many and varied ways Indian peoples have encountered, adjusted to, accepted, and contested ever-shifting economic arrangements. And, as we hope you will agree, our essayists delivered.

This means that *Native Pathways* can be read as a whole, its chapters hanging together with constituent parts addressing core issues, albeit from distinct perspectives. Read beginning to end, with Fixico and O'Neill setting the stage and offering context and Champagne drawing us back to theoretical considerations, chapters move from the more empirically oriented to the more theoretical, each melding description with abstraction. But the chapters also stand on their own and can be understood as discrete examinations, rarely told stories, and inventive ways of uncovering and understanding the lived experiences of historical actors.

Read individually or considered as a whole, chapters in *Native Pathways* should also be understood in the context of struggle as well as survival. For whereas many of our authors rightly emphasize agency and adaptation and highlight demonstrations of ingenuity, fortitude, and perhaps triumph, we must remember that, historically and contemporarily, the latitude to adapt and respond is circumscribed by economic and political conditions and indeed by cultural expectations. As Eric Wolf pointed out in the final work of an illustrious career, power matters—or, more properly, what matters are those structures that frame the exercise of power. And so as scholars consider adaptation, adjustment, cultural persistence, and innovation—all of these—we need to appreciate the presence of that giant elephant in the room.

For native nations, what this may mean is that discussions of sovereignty amid economic change may matter less than the actual exercise of sovereignty, that success in these terms involves compromises, changes, but ultimately hard choices. So it is with this in mind that all of us who contributed to *Native Pathways* hope our efforts offer something of value, not just to the scholarly debate we reference time and again but to native communities. Contributors point to survival amid change and highlight stories not told before or tales in need of recasting. It would be more than a little presumptuous to suggest that those actually encountering these challenges on a continual basis should consult our efforts. But seeking to find ways in which scholarly discourse can contribute to the ongoing exercise of self-determination is, it seems, a worthwhile objective, particularly for a volume dedicated to examinations of agency and power. If it serves as a reminder to students and scholars that research involves responsibilities, then we've accomplished something and maybe found a pathway we can travel together.

About the Contributors

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JEFFREY P. SHEPHERD completed his Ph.D. in American Indian history at Arizona State University. He is an assistant professor of Native American and western history at the University of Texas at El Paso. Presently, he is working on a manuscript, *"We Are an Indian Nation": Indigenous Nationalism and Identity Among the Hualapai,* for publication. Shepherd is also working on an article discussing the relationship between Hualapais and the Colorado River. He has received grants from the American Philosophical Society and the Ft. McDowell Indian Nation. In addition to work in the Southwest, he is beginning a comparative study of indigenous communities along the U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-Canadian borders. He is also interested in the social and cultural relationships among American Indians, Anglos, and Chicanos in the West.

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