World, Body and Perception in Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty

• Thesis title in Czech: Tělo, svět a vnímání ve filosofii Merleau-Pontyho
• Thesis title in English: World, Body and Perception in Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty
• Key words: Merleau-Ponty|Hubert Dreyfus|Fenomenologie vnímání|tělesné schéma|fenomenální pole|chiasmus|tělesnost
• English key words: Merleau-Ponty|Hubert Dreyfus|Phenomenology of Perception|body schema|phenomenal field|chiasm|flesh
• Academic year of topic announcement: 2019/2020
• Thesis type: Bachelor's thesis
• Thesis language: angličtina
• Department: Institute of Philosophy and Religious Studies (21-UFAR)
• Supervisor: Daniele De Santis, Dott. Ric.
• Author: hidden - assigned and confirmed by the Study Dept.
• Date of registration: 22.10.2019
• Date of assignment: 22.10.2019
• Administrator's approval: not processed yet
• Confirmed by Study dept. on: 08.11.2019
• Date and time of defence: 19.06.2020 10:00
• Date of electronic submission: 18.04.2020
• Date of proceeded defence: 19.06.2020
• Submitted/finalized: committed by student and finalized
• Opponents: Mgr. Ondřej Švec, Ph.D.

Guidelines

The purpose of my undergraduate dissertation, if approved, will be to give a comprehensive overview of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology as it is presented in the Phenomenology of Perception (with occasional excursions to two of his other books, Sense and Nonsense and The Visible and the Invisible), which will result in the exposition of the complicated relation of body, world and perception in his philosophy. The paper will take the following structure:
In the first place, I would like to explore Merleau-Ponty’s place in the phenomenological project, his reaction to Husserl and Heidegger, the issues he takes with traditional theories of perception (critique of empiricists and intellectualists), incorporation of Gestalt psychology into phenomenology, untenability of atomistic theories and the need for a holistic view. This part will end with Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the subject-object ontology and rough outline of his own alternative view.
In the second part, I’ll start filling in these outlines with concrete views Merleau-Ponty developed on various subjects ranging from Gestalt, figure and background, depth and motion (and their existential dimension), the real size, shape and color of an object as the normative elements in the background that are never actually perceived, lighting and other atmospheric background elements and their role in my experience of objects, spatiality and temporality, etc. In the process I will introduce Merleau-Ponty’s idiosyncratic vocabulary that the reader needs to adopt if he is to understand him correctly (concepts like motor intentionality, maximum grip, phenomenal field, intentional arc, body schema, and so on). I’d also like to take few paragraphs to look at Merleau-Ponty’s views on psychoanalysis and how he is able to restate it in terms of his own system, effectively turning depth psychology into breadth psychology.
In the third part, I’m going to discuss the relationship between the body and the world (and perception), turning to Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of ek-stase and, moving beyond the Phenomenology of Perception, flesh and chiasm. This part will probably also tackle tacit cogito and the crucial role temporality plays in the picture.
In the last (and the shortest) part, I will be interested in how other authors took Merleau-Ponty’s ideas and moved beyond his original conception.

References

Primární zdroje:
Merleau-Ponty, M. and Smith, C. (1978). Phenomenology of perception. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Merleau-Ponty, M. and Lingis, A. (1968). The Visible and the Invisible. Northwestern University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. Dreyfus, H. and Dreyfus, P.A. (1964). Sense and Nonsense. Northwestern University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). The Primacy of Perception. Northwestern University Press.
Sekundární zdroje:
Carman, T. and Hansen, M. (2005). The Cambridge companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Melle, U. Das Wahrnehmungsproblem und seine Verwandlung in phänomenologischer Einstellung_ Untersuchungen zu den phänomenologischen Wahrnehmungstheorien von Husserl. Phaenomenologica Vol. 91.
Plato.stanford.edu. (n.d.). Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). [online] Available at:https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/merleau-ponty/.
Také budu hojně využívat sérii přednášek Huberta Dreyfuse o Fenomenologii vnímání (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WwIpF-eNKwU&list=PLO1PGfOvgnmr85iKUhFetfpf9xG6U3LSG)