Minding the Gap: Moral Disagreement and the Limits of Moral Reasoning

• Thesis title in Czech: Mezery v rozumění: Morální neshoda a meze morálního zdůvodňování
• Thesis title in English: Minding the Gap: Moral Disagreement and the Limits of Moral Reasoning
• Key words: Morální neshoda|Morální zdůvodňování|Racionální souhlas|Morální nesouhlas|Argument z neshody|Epistemické odůvodnění|Morální realismus|Empirická filosofie|Morální psychologie
• English key words: Moral disagreement|Moral reasoning|Rational convergence|The Argument from Disagreement|Epistemic justification|Sceptical challenge|Moral realism|Empirical philosophy|Moral psychology
• Academic year of topic announcement: 2021/2022
• Thesis type: diploma thesis
• Thesis language: angličtina
• Department: Institute of Philosophy and Religious Studies (21-UFAR)
• Supervisor: doc. Jakub Jirsa, Ph.D.
• Author: hidden - assigned and confirmed by the Study Dept.
• Date of registration: 22.07.2022
• Date of assignment: 22.07.2022
• Administrator's approval: not processed yet
• Confirmed by Study dept. on: 22.08.2022
• Date and time of defence: 11.09.2023 09:00
• Date of electronic submission: 21.08.2023
• Date of proceeded defence: 11.09.2023
• Submitted/finalized: committed by student and finalized
• Opponents: prof. James Hill, Ph.D.

Guidelines

One of the distinct experiences of human interaction is being in disagreement with other people. People’s disagreement may concern various subjects ranging from personal beliefs to empirical facts abouts the world. It seems that different types of disagreement may be perceived differently. Those associated with subjective, personal views and preferences are commonly treated as less significant than those concerning putatively objective truths. In such cases, the awareness of disagreement seems to undermine one’s certainty that their view is evident and unequivocal, as the disagreement provides a reason to reconsider own position and treat one’s belief as potentially false.
It seems that various attempts of resolving moral disagreement by the means of reason and logical arguments have repeatedly ended in a deadlock. It does not matter whether a potential solution or explanatory account of the disagreement was put forward by the advocates of moral realism, moral relativism, or the Error theory – in is rarely the case that a particular account of moral disagreement – no matter how thorough analysis and elaborate arguments in involves – is found universally compelling across the philosophical community.
Can such widespread disagreement be overcome rationally, that is, by the means of interpersonal reasoning? In this essay, I explore this question and analyse possible solutions, which leads me to argue that the hopes of ultimate resolution to the problem of disagreement are likely utopistic. However, I also try to show that it does not have to be such a major challenge to the concept of human morality as some philosophers claim – on the contrary, it might be even beneficial, from a certain point of view.

References

Blackburn, Simon. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
Greene, Joshua D. Moral Tribes. Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them. London: Atlantic Books, 2015.
Haidt, Jonathan. The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. New York: Penguin Books, 2013.
Harman, Gilbert, Kelby Mason, and Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong. “Moral Reasoning.” In The Moral Psychology Handbook, edited by John M. Doris and The Moral Psychology Research Group, 207-245. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Joyce, Richard. The myth of morality. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Mackie, John L. Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Pelican Books, 1977.
Parfit, Derek, and Samuel Scheffler. On what matters. Volume two. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Parfit, Derek, and John Broome. “Reasons and motivation.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian society, supplementary volumes 71 (1997): 99-146.
Ross, William D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Moral intuitionism meets empirical psychology.” In Moral psychology: Historical and contemporary readings, edited by Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddie Nahmias, and Shaun Nichols, 373-387. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
Stevenson, Charles L. “The Nature of Ethical Disagreement.” In Facts and Values, 70-75. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963.
Williams, Bernard A. O. Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.
Wong, David B. Natural moralities: A defense of pluralistic relativism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.