 | On Thursday, September 4, 2025, from 8:00 PM to 10:00 PM, there will be an outage of WhoIs system. This will limit work in IS studium. For example, you will not be able to submit thesis. Subscription to courses should remain unaffected by the outage. We apologize for any inconveniece and we thank you for understanding. |
Benefits and costs of strategic delegation
| Thesis title in Czech: | Přínosy a náklady strategické delegace |
|---|---|
| Thesis title in English: | Benefits and costs of strategic delegation |
| Key words: | negotiations, commitment, delegation, management |
| Academic year of topic announcement: | 2016/2017 |
| Thesis type: | diploma thesis |
| Thesis language: | angličtina |
| Department: | Institute of Economic Studies (23-IES) |
| Supervisor: | doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D. |
| Author: |
| Guidelines |
| Strategic delegation is a situation when a principal appoints an agent with strategically different preferences to carry out tasks on behalf of the principal and the agent's actions are incontractible. The analysis shows that in spite of agency issues (the conflict of interests in the presence of incontractible actions), delegations may bring about benefits. Delegation works as if the principal commits to 'non-sincere' behavior, and there are many settings in which commitment is a strategic advantage. A typical example is when a manager nominates a tough subordinate to lead negotiations; the nomination serves to extract a larger bargaining surplus above the surplus that would be seized when the manager would be involved himself. |
| References |
| Baik, K. H.; Kim, I. G. (1997). Delegation in contests. European Journal of Political Economy, 13(2), 281-298.
Lai, E. K.; Lim, W. (2012). Authority and communication in the laboratory. Games and Economic Behavior, 74(2), 541-560. Ray, T. (1999). Share tenancy as strategic delegation. Journal of Development Economics, 58(1), 45-60. Roelfsema, H. (2007). Strategic delegation of environmental policy making. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 53(2), 270-275. Segendorff, B. (1998). Delegation and threat in bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior, 23(2), 266-283. Sengul, M., Gimeno, J.,; Dial, J. (2012). Strategic delegation a review, theoretical integration, and research agenda. Journal of Management, 38(1), 375-414. Vickers, J. (1985). Delegation and the Theory of the Firm. The Economic Journal, 138-147. |
| Preliminary scope of work |
| The thesis should analyze and extend models of strategic delegation that are employed in the theory of the firm, management, corporate governance, political economy and international economics. The main topic is how exactly delegation is strategically used in different contexts, and how delegations parallels to pure (or contingent) commitments. More detailed hypotheses will be proposed based on the interests of the author. |
| Preliminary scope of work in English |
| The thesis should analyze and extend models of strategic delegation that are employed in the theory of the firm, management, corporate governance, political economy and international economics. The main topic is how exactly delegation is strategically used in different contexts, and how delegations parallels to pure (or contingent) commitments. More detailed hypotheses will be proposed based on the interests of the author. |