The Impact of Electoral Cycles on Monetary Policies in Advanced and Developing Economies

• Thesis title in English: The Impact of Electoral Cycles on Monetary Policies in Advanced and Developing Economies
• Key words: Monetary Policy, Central Bank Reaction Function, Political Monetary Cycles, Dynamic Inconsistency Problem, Inflation Bias, OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS.
• English key words: Monetary Policy, Central Bank Reaction Function, Political Monetary Cycles, Dynamic Inconsistency Problem, Inflation Bias, OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS.
• Academic year of topic announcement: 2010/2011
• Thesis type: diploma thesis
• Thesis language: angličtina
• Department: Institute of Economic Studies (23-IES)
• Supervisor: prof. Roman Horváth, Ph.D.
• Author: hidden - assigned by the advisor
• Date of registration: 03.06.2011
• Date of assignment: 03.06.2011
• Date and time of defence: 28.06.2012 00:00
• Venue of defence: IES
• Date of electronic submission: 18.05.2012
• Date of proceeded defence: 28.06.2012
• Opponents: prof. PhDr. Tomáš Havránek, Ph.D.

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