EU´s Competition Policy v. USA´s Antitrust : Antitrust in Payoff Matrix

• Thesis title in Czech: Ochrana hospodářské soutěže - politika Evropské unie v. politika ; Spojených států amerických : antitrust pohledem výplatní matice
• Thesis title in English: EU´s Competition Policy v. USA´s Antitrust ; Antitrust in Payoff Matrix
• Key words: antitrust, hospodářská soutěž, vertikální fúze, teorie her, výplatní matice, článek 101 a 102 Smlouvy o fungování EU, Shermanův antitrustový zákon
• English key words: antitrust, competition policy, vertical mergers, game theory, payoff matrix, Article 101 and 102 of the TFEU, Sherman Act
• Academic year of topic announcement: 2010/2011
• Thesis type: rigorosum thesis
• Thesis language: angličtina
• Department: Institute of Economic Studies (23-IES)
• Supervisor: Ing. Zdeněk Hrubý, CSc.
• Author: hidden - assigned by the advisor
• Date of registration: 07.02.2011
• Date of assignment: 07.02.2011
• Date and time of defence: 30.03.2011 15:00
• Venue of defence: IES
• Date of electronic submission: 14.02.2011
• Date of proceeded defence: 30.03.2011
• Opponents: PhDr. Mgr. Jana Gutiérrez Chvalkovská

References

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Preliminary scope of work

Práce se skládá ze dvou částí, první tvoří komparativní analýza druhou pak model rozhodovaní v rámci ochrany hospodářské soutěže. Komparativní analýza porovnává politiku na ochranu hospodářské soutěže v Evropské unii s politikou Spojených států amerických. Představuje přístupy obou států k této problematice, ale zaměřuje se především na zásadní rozdíly mezi nimi tj. různý postoj k vertikálním dohodám mezi firmami a monopolní cenu. Ekonomická teorie nedává jasné závěry o vlivu vertikálních dohod na hospodářskou soutěž. Evropská unie je často považuje za protizákonné, naopak podle Spojených států mají vertikální dohody většinou kladný nebo neutrální dopad.
Druhá část představuje model, který popisuje proces ochrany hospodářské soutěže, a ukazuje jeho možné řešení. Model využívá teorii her, konkrétně výplatní matice, a rozdíly z první části práce a navrhuje teoretické optimální chování v případě Evropské unie i Spojených států, které dále srovnává s neutrální variantou modelu. Případová studie, která práci uzavírá, potvrzuje rozdíly v politice na ochranu hospodářské soutěže.

Preliminary scope of work in English

The thesis consists of two parts – comparative study and antitrust model. First part is dedicated to the comparison of European competition policy and American antitrust. It introduces both policies and focuses mostly on key differences between them, especially on the non-price vertical restraints and monopoly pricing. The economic theory is indecisive about the effects of vertical agreements on competition. The EU finds them often anticompetitive compared to the U.S. that believes in their procompetitive or neutral impact.
Second part presents an antitrust model which describes the process of protecting competition and suggests optimal behavior for both enforcement officials and firms. In the game theory framework the payoff matrixes show the difference discussed in the first part and offer theoretical solution. Optimal strategies are derived for American, European and neutral policies and compared afterwards. The case study concludes the thesis and gives a real example of the difference between antitrust and competition policy.