Conflict Between Declared and Manifested Environmental Friendliness of Companies as a Factor of Their Perceived Greenwashing

• Název práce v češtině: Rozpor mezi deklarovanou a projevovanou šetrností podniků k životnímu prostředí jako faktor jejich vnímaného greenwashingu
• Název v anglickém jazyce: Conflict Between Declared and Manifested Environmental Friendliness of Companies as a Factor of Their Perceived Greenwashing
• Klíčová slova: Teorie nákladné signalizace, greenwashing, vnímání spotřebitelů, chování a tvrzení firem, environmentální udržitelnost
• Klíčová slova anglicky: Costly signaling theory, greenwashing, consumers' perception, companys’ behavior and claim, environmental friendliness
• Akademický rok vypsání: 2023/2024
• Typ práce: bakalářská práce
• Jazyk práce: angličtina
• Ústav: Katedra sociologie (23-KS)
• Vedoucí / školitel: doc. Mgr. Jan Urban, Ph.D.
• Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
• Datum přihlášení: 30.09.2024
• Datum zadání: 30.09.2024
• Datum a čas obhajoby: 10.09.2025 09:00
• Místo konání obhajoby: Areál Jinonice, B228, 228, seminární místnost ISS
• Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: 23.07.2025
• Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 10.09.2025
• Oponenti: Ewa Małgorzata Duda

Seznam odborné literatury

1. DE JONG, Menno D. T.; HARKINK, Karen M. a BARTH, Susanne. Making Green Stuff? Effects of Corporate Greenwashing on Consumers. Online. Journal of Business and Technical Communication. 2018, roč. 32, č. 1, s. 77-112. ISSN 1050-6519. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1177/1050651917729863. [cit. 2024 06-07].
2. DE VRIES, Gerdien; TERWEL, Bart W.; ELLEMERS, Naomi a DAAMEN, Dancker D. L. Sustainability or Profitability? How Communicated Motives for Environmental Policy Affect Public Perceptions of Corporate Greenwashing. Online. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management. 2015, roč. 22, č. 3, s. 142-154. ISSN https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1327. [cit. 2024-06-07].
3. KIANPOUR, Kamyar; JUSOH, Ahmad; ASGHARI, Maryam a DAAMEN, Dancker D. L. Environmentally friendly as a new dimension of product quality. Online. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management. 2014, roč. 31, č. 5, s. 547-565. ISSN 0265-671X. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1108/IJQRM-06-2012-0079. [cit. 2024-06-07].
4. Tinne, W. S. (2013). Green Washing: An Alarming Issue. ASA University Review, 7(1).
5. Motavalli, J. (2011). A history of greenwashing: how dirty towels impacted the green movement. Daily Finance, 12, 02-11.
6. ROME, Adam a UL HAQUE, Adnan. "Give Earth a Chance": The Environmental Movement and the Sixties. Online. Journal of American History. 2019, roč. 90, č. 2, s. 1-8. ISBN 978-3-319-16999-6. ISSN 00218723. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.2307/3659443. [cit. 2024-06-07].
7. URBAŃSKI, Mariusz a UL HAQUE, Adnan. Are You Environmentally Conscious Enough to Differentiate between Greenwashed and Sustainable Items? A Global Consumers Perspective. Online. Sustainability. 2019, roč. 12, č. 5, s. 1 8. ISBN 978-3-319-16999-6. ISSN 2071-1050. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12051786. [cit. 2024-06-07].
8. BERGER, Joël. Signaling can increase consumers' willingness to pay for green products. Theoretical model and experimental evidence. Online. Journal of Consumer Behaviour. 2019, roč. 18, č. 3, s. 233-246. ISSN 1472-0817. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1002/cb.1760. [cit. 2024-06-07].
9. MCANDREW, Francis T. Costly Signaling Theory. Online. Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science. 2019, s. 1-8. ISBN 978-3-319-16999-6. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3483-1. [cit. 2024-06 07].

Předběžná náplň práce

Greenwashing is a contemporary term invented by journalist Jay Westerfeld in the 1980s (Tinne, 2013), describing a manipulative technique that has appeared in the market since the 1950s (Motavalli, 2013). The trend in recent decades has been the issue of climate change and its solution, leading to requirements about the product’s ecological aspect, which has become an influential factor (Kianpour et. al, 2014). These factors have come into conflict with the growing trend of a consumer society (Rome, 2003). To make sustainable profits, companies had to choose either to rebuild their business plan to be truly environmentally friendly or to lie about the unsustainability of their services/products (Tinne, 2013), which is the concept of greenwashing.
The success of greenwashing depends on the perception of customers, who either can recognize a deceptional claim or not. For example, Urbański and Haque's (2020) paper concludes that consumers with high sustainability concerns are more likely to fail to recognize greenwashing practices. This introduces a whole new factor of consumer values and attitudes that further shape their perception of greenwashing. In their study De Vries et al. (2015) demonstrated a link between the way a company presents itself and how it is viewed by society. If an energy company tries to explain its pro-environmental efforts through concern for the environment, society will perceive its behavior as greenwashing. This poses a problem for communicating environmental attributes and services, linked to a company’s purpose. In this study, limits of this correlation will be explored, beyond the boundaries of energy companies, where company behavior takes many forms. The main interest is in how consumers make judgments about a company’s greenwashing based on the observed behavior of the company and its environmental claims.
In this research project, we aim to use the theory of costly signaling (Zahavi, 1977; for an overview of the applications in social sciences, see, e.g., McAndrew, 2019). This theory, derived from evolutionary theory, suggests that for a company to communicate its environmental friendliness, it has to use a costly signal of environmentally friendly activity. A "cheap" signal of environmental friendliness will be interpreted by receivers as an attempt at strategic manipulation of the consumers. Based on this theory, we predict that (H1) upon observing a conflict between the environmentally unfriendly activity of the company and "cheap" signaling of environmental friendliness, the observers will infer that the company has engaged in greenwashing. We also predict that (H2) the importance of costly signalization of environmental friendliness will be highest in areas where participants suspect the highest level of strategic manipulation of the signal. Finally, we predict that (H3) consumers will punish the company for sending a false signal of environmental friendliness by rejecting the company's products and services.