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Borderline duties and fuzzy values: An analysis of vagueness in ethics

Název práce v češtině:	Hraniční povinnosti a neostré hodnoty: Analýza vágnosti v etice
Název v anglickém jazyce:	Borderline duties and fuzzy values: An analysis of vagueness in ethics
Klíčová slova:	Overdemandingness, satisficing consequentialism, scalar consequentialism, vagueness, sorites paradox
Klíčová slova anglicky:	Overdemandingness, satisficing consequentialism, scalar consequentialism, vagueness, sorites paradox
Akademický rok vypsání:	2021/2022
Typ práce:	diplomová práce
Jazyk práce:	angličtina
Ústav:	Katedra politologie (23-KP)
Vedoucí / školitel:	Dr. phil. Vuko Andrić
Řešitel:	skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
Datum přihlášení:	18.02.2022
Datum zadání:	18.02.2022
Datum a čas obhajoby:	15.09.2023 07:00
Místo konání obhajoby:	Jinonice - U Kříže 8, Praha 5
Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby:	01.08.2023
Datum proběhlé obhajoby:	15.09.2023
Oponenti:	Janusz Salamon, Ph.D.

Seznam odborné literatury

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Předběžná náplň práce

The aim of this thesis is to argue that the problem of overdemanding obligation in consequentialism within normative ethics is fundamentally a problem of vagueness in the specific sense in which the issue is treated within the philosophy of logic and language. This realisation leads to a substantial reframing of the question with two main takeaways: the first is an undermining of the plausibility of maximising consequentialism, and the second is that certain fairly intricate positions taken on issues of the philosophy of logic bear heavily on commitments we may adopt at the level of normative ethics.

Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce