Truth and Meaning: The Dialectics of Theory and Practice

• Název práce v češtině: Pravda a význam: dialektika teorie a praxe
• Název v anglickém jazyce: Truth and Meaning: The Dialectics of Theory and Practice
• Klíčová slova: pravda; význam; Tarski; sémantika
• Klíčová slova anglicky: truth; meaning; Tarski; semantics
• Akademický rok vypsání: 2004/2005
• Typ práce: disertační práce
• Jazyk práce: angličtina
• Ústav: Ústav filosofie a religionistiky (21-UFAR)
• Vedoucí / školitel: prof. RNDr. Jaroslav Peregrin, CSc.
• Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno a potvrzeno stud. odd.
• Datum přihlášení: 04.08.2005
• Datum zadání: 04.08.2005
• Schválení administrátorem: zatím neschvalováno
• Datum a čas obhajoby: 22.09.2011 00:00
• Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: 08.03.2011
• Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 22.09.2011
• Odevzdaná/finalizovaná: odevzdaná studentem a finalizovaná
• Oponenti: prof. PhDr. Vojtěch Kolman, Ph.D.

Zásady pro vypracování

Abstract
Tarski’s semantic conception of truth is arguably the most influential – certainly, most discussed - modern conception of truth. It has provoked many different interpretations and reactions, some thinkers celebrating it for successfully explicating the notion of truth, whereas others have argued that it is no good as a philosophical account of truth. The aim of the thesis is to offer a systematic and critical investigation of its nature and significance, based on the thorough explanation of its conceptual, technical as well as historical underpinnings. The methodological strategy adopted in the thesis reflects the author’s belief that in order to evaluate the import of Tarski’s conception we need to understand what logical, mathematical and philosophical aspects it has, what role they play in his project of theoretical semantics, which of them hang in together, and which should be kept separate. Chapter 2 therefore starts with a detailed exposition of the conceptual and historical background of Tarski’s semantic conception of truth and his method of truth definition for formalized languages, situating it within his project of theoretical semantics, and Chapter 3 explains the formal machinery of Tarski’s truth definitions for increasingly more complex languages. Chapters 4-7 form the core of the thesis, all being concerned with the problem of significance of Tarski’s conception. Chapter 4 explains its logico-mathematical import, connecting it to the related works of Gödel and Carnap. Having explained the seminal ideas of the model-theoretic approach to semantics, Chapter 5 tackles the question to what extent Tarski’s path-breaking article ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’ (and related articles from the 1930s) anticipates this approach, and what elements might be missing from it. Chapter 6 then deals with the vexed question of its philosophical import and value as a theory of truth, reviewing a number of objections and arguments that purport to show that the method fails as an explanation (explication) of the ordinary notion of truth, and, in particular, that it is a confusion to think that Tarski’s truth definitions have semantic import. Chapter 7 is devoted to the question whether Tarski’s theory of truth is a robust or rather a deflationary theory of truth.
On the basis of a careful analysis, the thesis aims to substantiate the following view. [A] Tarski’s theory with its associated method of truth definition was primarily designed to serve logico-mathematical purposes. [B] It can be regarded a deflationary theory of a sort, since it completely abstracts from meta-semantical issues concerning the metaphysical or epistemological basis or status of semantic properties. Indeed, [C] this can be interpreted as its laudable feature, since by separating formal (or logico-mathematical) from meta-semantical (or foundational) aspects it usefully divides the theoretical labour to be done in the area of meaning and semantic properties in general. [D] In spite of the fact that Tarski’s conception of truth has this deflationary flavour, the formal structure of its method of truth-definition is quite neutral in that it can be interpreted and employed in several different ways, some of them deflationary, others more robust.

Abstrakt
Tarského sémantická koncepce pravdy je patrně nevlivnější – určitě nejdiskutovanější – moderní koncepce pravdy, která vzbudila nespočet různých interpretací a reakcí. Zatímco někteří filosofové ji oslavovali jako úspěšnou explikaci pojmu pravdy, jiní argumentovali, že nám neposkytuje adekvátní filosofický výklad tohoto pojmu. Cílem dizertace je podat systematické a kritické prozkoumání povahy a signifikance Tarského koncepce, založené na pečlivé expozici jejich konceptuálních, technických I historických předpokladů. Metodologická strategie aplikována v práci obráží autorovo přesvědčení, že nelze patřičně zhodnotit přínos Tarského koncepce bez pochopení jejich logických, matematických a filosofických aspektů, a toho jakou roli hraji v jeho širším projektu teoretické sémantiky, jak spolu souvisí (případně nesouvisí). Kapitola 2 je detailní expozicí konceptuálního i historického pozadí Tarského koncepce pravdy a metody definovaní pojmu pravdy pro formalizované jazyky, a v kapitole 3 se vysvětluje formální aparát pravdivostních definicí pro 3 typy jazyků různé komplexity. Kapitoly 4-7, které tvoří jádro celé práce, jsou věnovány ústřední otázce signifikance Tarského koncepce. V kapitole 4 se vysvětlují její logicko-matematické aspekty a přínos pro matematickou logiku, v souvislosti s výsledky Kurta Gödela a Rudolfa Carnapa. V kapitole 5 jsou pak vyloženy základní předpoklady modelové-teoretického přístupu k sémantice, a diskutuje se v ní otázka do jaké míry Tarského průkopnicky článek (1933a) „Pojem pravdy ve formalizovaných jazycích“ (a související práce z období 30 let) anticipuje tento moderní přístup. Kapitola 6 pojednává kontroverzní otázku filosofického přínosu a hodnoty Tarského koncepce, a probírá různé námitky a argumenty, který se snaží ukázat, že Tarského koncepce není filosoficky adekvátní explikací pojmu pravdy, konkrétně že sama o sobě nám neříká nic podstatného o sémantice jazyka. Kapitola 7 si klade otázku, jestli je Tarského koncepce „robustní“ teorií pravdy nebo jde spíše o „deflační“ teorii pravdy.
Na základě pečlivé analýzy se v práci pokusím motivovat a podložit následující interpretaci. [A] Tarského koncepce a na ní založena metoda definování pojmu pravdy pro daný jazyk byla primárně určena pro logicko-matematické účely. [B]] Může být považována za deflační koncepci pravdy, a sice v tom smyslu, že úplně abstrahuje od meta-sémantických otázek týkajících se metafyzické či epistemologické báze a statutu sémantických vlastností. [C] To lze ovšem vidět spíše jako její pozitivní rys, protože tím, že odděluje formální (logicko-matematické) od meta-sémantických aspektů, poukazuje na užitečnou dělbu teoretické práce v oblasti významu a sémantických vlastností obecně. Nicméně, [D] i když má Tarského koncepce pravdy tento deflační charakter, formální struktura pravdivostní definice je sama o sobě neutrální a může být interpretována a použita různými způsobami, z nichž některé jsou deflační, jiné však mohou být robustnější povahy.

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