Nuclear latency and the problem of deterrence

• Název práce v češtině: Nukleární latence a otázka odstrašení
• Název v anglickém jazyce: Nuclear latency and the problem of deterrence
• Klíčová slova: nukleární latence, odstrašení, Pakistán, Indie, proliferace, krize, latentní nukleární odstrašení
• Klíčová slova anglicky: nuclear latency, deterrence, Pakistan, India, proliferation, crisis, latent nuclear deterrence
• Akademický rok vypsání: 2018/2019
• Typ práce: diplomová práce
• Jazyk práce: angličtina
• Ústav: Katedra bezpečnostních studií (23-KBS)
• Vedoucí / školitel: Mgr. Jan Ludvík, Ph.D.
• Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
• Datum přihlášení: 21.06.2019
• Datum zadání: 21.06.2019
• Datum a čas obhajoby: 25.06.2020 09:00
• Místo konání obhajoby: Jinonice - U Kříže 8, Praha 5, J4019, Jinonice - místn. č. 4019
• Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: 21.05.2020
• Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 25.06.2020
• Oponenti: Mgr. Vojtěch Bahenský, Ph.D.

Seznam odborné literatury

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3. Media and other online sources
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Předběžná náplň práce

Má diplomová práce se bude snažit zkoumat spojitost mezi nukleární latencí a schopností odvrátit konflikt. Potencionální vliv latentní nukleární kapacity na zabránění válce již byl studován, nejvýznamněji prací Matthewa Fuhrmanna představenou v článku The Logic of Latent Nuclear Deterrence z roku 2018. Nicméně, dle mého názoru, není způsob, který Fuhrmann zvolil k řešení tohoto problému ideální a závěry jeho práce nejsou dostatečně přesvědčivé. Fuhrmann se ve své práci dostatečně nevěnuje alternativním vysvětlením pro zabránění konfliktu a proměnné, které představuje jako faktoru ovlivňující jak nukleární latenci, tak konflikt, nejsou dle mého názoru vhodně zvoleny. Z toho důvodu se domnívám, že má diplomová práce může posloužit jako alternativní odpověď pro některé otázky, které vyvstaly z Fuhrmannova výzkumu.
Na rozdíl od jeho kvantitativního výzkumu věnovanému souvislostem mezi nukleární latencí a výskytem válek v historii jednotlivých států moje kvalitativní studie zkoumá srovnává konfliktní dvojice tvořené vyzyvatelem na jedné straně a latentním nukleárním státem na straně druhé. Diplomová práce, za využití bohatého teoretického základu, zkoumá podobnosti a rozdíly mezi historickými případovými studiemi konfliktních dvojic a hodnotí reálný vliv nukleární latence na zabránění konfliktu. Touto cestou nebudou v analýze opomenuty žádné důležité faktory.

Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce

My diploma thesis will attempt to examine the links between nuclear latency and the ability to avert the conflict. The potential impact of latent nuclear capacity on the prevention of the war has already been studied, most notably in work by Matthew Furhmann presented in the article The Logic of Latent Nuclear Deterrence from 2018. However, in my opinion, the way Fuhrmann approaches the problem is not ideal, and the conclusion of his work is not sufficiently convincing. He does pay a little attention to the alternative explanations of preventing the conflict, and the confounding variables that he distinguishes as factors that influence both nuclear latency and conflict are, in my opinion, not appropriately selected. Therefore, I believe that my diploma thesis can serve as an alternative explanation for specific questions that Fuhrmann has raised by his research.
Contrary to his quantitative study of the connection between nuclear latency and the occurrence of war in each state’s history, my qualitative research examines and compares hostile dyads composed of challenger and latent nuclear deterrer. Using a rich theoretical background, the diploma thesis looks for similarities and differences between the historical cases and evaluates the actual contribution of nuclear latency for the prevention of the conflict. This way, no other possible factors are omitted from the analysis.