Numerical fiscal rules and fiscal institutions in an economy with a dynamic common pool problem
| Název práce v češtině: | Numerická fiskální pravidla a fiskální instituce v ekonomice s dynamickým common pool |
|---|---|
| Název v anglickém jazyce: | Numerical fiscal rules and fiscal institutions in an economy with a dynamic common pool problem |
| Klíčová slova: | Fiskální politika, Common pool problem, Fiskální instituce, Numerická fiskální pravidla |
| Klíčová slova anglicky: | Fiscal policy, Common pool problem, Fiscal institutions, Numerical fiscal rules |
| Akademický rok vypsání: | 2017/2018 |
| Typ práce: | bakalářská práce |
| Jazyk práce: | angličtina |
| Ústav: | Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES) |
| Vedoucí / školitel: | doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D. |
| Řešitel: | skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem |
| Datum přihlášení: | 21.05.2018 |
| Datum zadání: | 21.05.2018 |
| Datum a čas obhajoby: | 10.06.2019 09:00 |
| Místo konání obhajoby: | Opletalova - Opletalova 26, O314, Opletalova - místn. č. 314 |
| Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: | 09.05.2019 |
| Datum proběhlé obhajoby: | 10.06.2019 |
| Oponenti: | PhDr. Hana Hejlová, Ph.D. |
| Kontrola URKUND: | |
| Zásady pro vypracování |
| Research question and motivation: There is a consensus among economists that the government should tighten public spending in good times and use accumulated reserves in bad times. However, counter-cyclical fiscal policy is rarely observable in practice. Also, there is a recent trend to constrain fiscal policy-making through numerical fiscal rules or fiscal institutions. But is it possible to mitigate the debt bias and avoid cyclical fiscal policy in the presence of fragmented decision-making (a common pool problem)? Which fiscal rules have to be used to do so? Is it better to use fiscal numerical rules or financial institutions to mitigate the debt bias and make fiscal policy more counter-cyclical?
Contribution: A game-theoretic analysis of fiscal numerical rules and financial institutions using the canonical model of a dynamic common pool in Persson and Tabellini (2002) and a model of fiscal rules as in Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2010) and the closely related literature. Methodology: In seminal political economy models of fiscal policy (e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2002), counter-cyclicality is attributed to a dynamic common pool problem. In the thesis, I will analyze two remedies to the deficit bias and the counter-cyclicality: fiscal numerical rules and fiscal institutions, assuming that the deficits are the result of a dynamic common pool problem. |
| Seznam odborné literatury |
| Calmfors, L. and Wren-Lewis, S. (2011). What should fiscal councils do?. Economic Policy, 26(68), pp.649-695.
Krogstrup, S. and Wyplosz, C. (2009). Dealing with the Deficit Bias: Principles and Policies. In: Ayuso-i-Casals J., Deroose S., Flores E., Moulin L. (eds) Policy Instruments for Sound Fiscal Policies. Finance and Capital Markets Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. Krogstrup, S. and Wyplosz, C. (2010). A common pool theory of supranational deficit ceilings. European Economic Review, 54(2), pp.269-278. Persson, T., and Tabellini, G. E. (2002). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. MIT Press. Portes, J. and Wren-Lewis, S. (2015). Issues in the Design of Fiscal Policy Rules. The Manchester School, 83, pp.56-86. Wyplosz, C. (2005). Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules. National Institute Economic Review, 191(1), pp.64-78. Wyplosz, C. (2011). Fiscal Discipline: Rules Rather than Institutions. National Institute Economic Review, 217(1), pp.R19-R30. Wyplosz, Ch. (2012). Fiscal Rules: Theoretical Issues and Historical Experiences. In: Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, National Bureau of Economic Research. |
| Předběžná náplň práce |
| Outline
1. Introduction 2. Literature review 3. Model of a dynamic common pool a) key elements b) robustness to modelling assumptions 4. Analysis a) numerical fiscal rules b) fiscal institutions 5. Comparing numerical rules and fiscal institutions 6. Conclusions |
| Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce |
| Outline
1. Introduction 2. Literature review 3. Model of a dynamic common pool a) key elements b) robustness to modelling assumptions 4. Analysis a) numerical fiscal rules b) fiscal institutions 5. Comparing numerical rules and fiscal institutions 6. Conclusions |