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Detail práce
  
State capture as market distortion: Effect of political connections in the Czech Republic
Název práce v češtině: Ovládnutí státu jako deformace trhu: Dopady politických konexí v České republice
Název v anglickém jazyce: State capture as market distortion: Effect of political connections in the Czech Republic
Klíčová slova: ovládnutí státu, politické konexe, výkonnost firem, dobývání renty, střet zájmů, ekonomické dopady
Klíčová slova anglicky: state capture, political connections, firms performance, rent-seeking, conflict of interests, economic effects
Akademický rok vypsání: 2015/2016
Typ práce: diplomová práce
Jazyk práce: angličtina
Ústav: Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES)
Vedoucí / školitel: PhDr. Pavel Vacek, Ph.D.
Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
Datum přihlášení: 13.06.2016
Datum zadání: 13.06.2016
Datum a čas obhajoby: 21.06.2017 08:30
Místo konání obhajoby: IES
Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby:18.05.2017
Datum odevzdání tištěné podoby:19.05.2017
Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 21.06.2017
Oponenti: PhDr. Jiří Kameníček, CSc.
 
 
 
Kontrola URKUND:
Seznam odborné literatury
Fisman, Raymond. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections." The American Economic Review 91, no. 4 (2001): 1095-102. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677829.

Skuhrovec, J., Titl, V., and Palanský, M. 2015. Analysis of Political Donations in the Czech Republic. In Financování politického života. Munipress,
Masaryk University in Brno. ISBN 978-80-210-7994-6.

Palanský, M., 2016. The Value of Political Connections: Evidence from the Czech Republic. Master Thesis. Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University in Prague.

Bliss, M. A., & Gul, F. A. (2012). Political connection and cost of debt: Some Malaysian evidence. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(5), 1520–1527. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.12.011

Boubakri, N., Cosset, J.-C., & Saffar, W. (2012). THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS ON FIRMS’ OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND FINANCING DECISIONS. Journal of Financial Research, 35(3), 397–423. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6803.2012.01322.x

Boubakri, N., Guedhami, O., Mishra, D., & Saffar, W. (2012). Political connections and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(3), 541–559. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.02.005

Cingano, F., & Pinotti, P. (2013). POLITICIANS AT WORK: THE PRIVATE RETURNS AND SOCIAL COSTS OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(2), 433–465. doi:10.1111/jeea.12001

Dombrovsky, V. (2011). Do Political Connections Matter? Firm-Level Evidence from Latvia. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1168702

Evanson, R. K. (2008). Economic interest groups and the consolidation of democracy in the Czech Republic. Journal of Public Affairs, 8(1-2), 33–49. doi:10.1002/pa.283

Faccio, M. (2006). Politically Connected Firms. American Economic Review, 96(1), 369–386. doi:10.1257/000282806776157704

Gallina, N. (2013). Anti-corruption revisited: the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 7(S1), 183–218. doi:10.1007/s12286-013-0155-8

Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J. (2009). Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value? Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2331–2360. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn088

Grzymala-Busse, A. (2008). Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation. Comparative Political Studies, 41(4-5), 638–673. doi:10.1177/0010414007313118

Hellman, J., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2000). Seize the State, Seize the Day: An Empirical Analysis of State Capture and Corruption in Transition Economies. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (2444), 1–41. Retrieved from papers2://publication/uuid/B15B06FA-4346-4788-A9CB-C07431F4B63A

Hellman, J., & Schankerman, M. (2000). Intervention, Corruption and Capture: The Nexus between Enterprises and the State. The Economics of Transition, 8(3), 545–576. doi:10.1111/1468-0351.00055

Innes, A. (2014). The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(1), 88–104. doi:10.1111/jcms.12079

Koudelková, P., Strielkowski, W., & Hejlová, D. (2015). Corruption and system change in the Czech Republic: Firm-level evidence. Danube, 6(1), 25–46. doi:10.1515/danb-2015-0002

Niessen, A., & Ruenzi, S. (2009). Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany. German Economic Review, 11(4), 441–464. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0475.2009.00482.x

Palguta, J. (2014). Concealed Ownership of Contractors, Manipulation of Tenders and the Allocation of Public Procurement Contracts. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2398120
 
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