Deterrence, Credibility & Learning: Lessons from Three Enduring Rivalries

• Název práce v češtině: Deterrence, Credibility & Learning: Lessons from Three Enduring Rivalries
• Název v anglickém jazyce: Deterrence, Credibility & Learning: Lessons from Three Enduring Rivalries
• Klíčová slova: Odstrašování, Důvěryhodnost, Studená válka, Izraelsko-Arabský konflikt, Konflikt Indie-Pákistán
• Klíčová slova anglicky: Deterrence, Credibility, Cold War, Israeli-Arab conflict, Indo-Pakistani Conflict
• Akademický rok vypsání: 2014/2015
• Typ práce: diplomová práce
• Jazyk práce: angličtina
• Ústav: Katedra mezinárodních vztahů (23-KMV)
• Vedoucí / školitel: Mgr. Jan Ludvík, Ph.D.
• Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
• Datum přihlášení: 30.06.2015
• Datum zadání: 30.06.2015
• Datum a čas obhajoby: 23.06.2017 00:00
• Místo konání obhajoby: Jinonice, U Kříže 8
• Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: 19.05.2017
• Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 23.06.2017
• Oponenti: doc. PhDr. Michal Smetana, Ph.D.

Seznam odborné literatury

Almog, Doron. "Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism." Parameters: U.S. Army War College 34.4 (2005): 16. Strategic Studies Institute. Web. 23 Mar. 2014.

Bar-on, Mordechai. A never-ending conflict a guide to Israeli military history. Westport, Ct.: Praeger, 2004. Print.

Bickerton, Ian J., and Carla L. Klausner. A history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 6th ed. Boston: Prentice Hall, 2010. Print.

Betts, Richard. "Conventional Deterrence." World Politics 37.2 (1986): 153-179. Print.

Danilovic, Vesna. When The Stakes are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers, University of Michigan Press, 2012. Print.

Hynek, Nik. Missile Defence Discourses and Practices in Relevant Modalities of 21st-Century Deterrence. Security Dialogue, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 435-459. (2010) ISSN 0967-0106

George Alexander; Smoke Richard. Deterrence in American. Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (1974). New York. Print

Jervis Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Relations, 1976, Print

Knopf, Jeffrey. The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.31, No. 1 (2010) ISSN 1352-3260

Maoz, Zeev. Paradoxes of war: on the art of national self-entrapment. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990. Print.

Maoz, Zeev. Defending the Holy Land: a critical analysis of Israel's security & foreign policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006. Print.

Mearsheimer, John J. Conventional deterrence. 1. publ. ed. Ithaca u.a.: Cornell Univ. Pr., 1983. Print.

Morgan, Patrick M. Deterrence: a conceptual analysis. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977. Print.

Paul, T. V., Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz. Complex deterrence strategy in the global age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. Print.

Předběžná náplň práce

Introduction

Recently there has been renewed interest in deterrence theory in its various forms. In the 90s, the main realm of deterrence was aimed primarily on rogue states represented by North Korea´s nuclear saber-rattling and possible Islamic republic of Iran´s struggle to acquire nuclear weapons (Hynek, 2010, 443). The Ukraine Crisis, China´s rampage in the South-East Asia or enduring Indo-Pakistani rivalry indicate that deterrence of rogue states probably won´t become deterrence theory´s sole puzzle to address in years to come. Consequently, with the dramatic shift towards multipolar world, unlike in the 90s, general theory of deterrence deserves further examination.

Deterrence, in general, is a use of threat which discourages others from attacking. It can be described as a strategy which main purpose is to maintain status quo between two hostile entities. Deterred country which has an incentive in attacking is discouraged from doing so by a threat of punishment/denial that outweighs all possible gains.

Glenn Snyder, famous American professor of political science, defines deterrence as a negative aspect of power. While wielding power means the same as having the capacity to induce others to do the things, which they would not otherwise do or refrain from doing, deterrence is just the negative aspect of the same thing. (Snyder, 1966) Patrick Morgan says “deterrence is the use of threats of harm to prevent someone from doing something you don´t want him to do.” (Morgan, 1977,17) Zeev Moaz, in addition, defines deterrence as “policy through which one attempts to scare-off a would-be attacker by holding out a drawn sword. It works as long as the sword is not being used. When the sword becomes covered with blood, deterrence is said to have failed, no matter whose blood was spilled.“ (Moaz, 1990, 65)

Deterrence in general operates with two kinds of requirements, capability and credibility. In order for deterrence relationship to be stable, potential attacker has to be either convinced that the defender has enough power or military assets to prevent him from achieving swift and easy victory, or it has to believe that its adversary has enough retaliatory capability to minimize attacker’s potential gains by inflicting unacceptable damage. Concerning the question of credibility, defender must also prove his willingness to execute his threats. Analysis of two different schools of thoughts subsequently emerged from this concern with threat credibility:

1) Commitment Theory

2) Theory of Inherent Credibility

Commitment theory was defined by Thomas Schelling in 1960s, who believed both commitments and events are horizontally coupled, implying that a failure to react even to a single regional challenge could undermine others´ belief in defenders willingness to act in other areas as well.

Schelling in fact explained the rationale behind the US Doctrine of Containment. Schelling´s theory second dimension concerns the issue of past behavior and the consistency of strong resolve over time. Under this logic, should deterrence be maintained, deterring country should communicate its commitment through threats and the entire range of techniques signaling strong resolve regardless of the involved inherent stakes. (Danilovic, 2010)

Inherent Credibility, stressed the importance of issues at stake and the subjectivity of perception. Pioneers of this approach such as Kaufmann or Maxwell raised the valid question of one´s willingness to engage in a nuclear war should relatively unimportant pawn/ally be attacked by a hostile power (Danilovic, 2010). George and Smoke therefore pointed out: “that the task of achieving credibility is secondary to and dependent upon the more fundamental question regarding the nature and valuation of interests.”(Danilovic, 2010, 18) Therefore, the problem with Commitment Theory is the following; Deterring country might not be able to effectively signal its commitment to the deterred who might eventually interpret threat signals as bluffing. Hence, the approach of great powers might be rather context-dependent. This resulted in an assumption that honoring commitments plays a secondary role in great powers behavior.

Methodology

This paper aims to analyze possible connection between deterrence and credibility through empirical analysis of three different but long-lasting conflicts in the 20th century. Primary purpose of this research paper is to answer the following question:

“Does deterrence failure caused by a lack of credibility influence future behavior?”

This research question might prove itself extremely valuable in the light of recent conflicts especially due to its emphasis of credibility. If the answer on the former research question is yes, then potential attacker can be clearly deterred if convinced the defender would react at all costs. For instance Israel can deter its adversaries by regular preventive use of force, and Russia´s and China´s potential expansion can be stopped by early decisive US response.

The notion of credibility is difficult to grasp mainly due to its subjectivity. Therefore, author assumes that terms of credibility and capability are intertwined and are both related to deterrence failure. This rationale is described in capability-credibility matrix below:

Credibility

Capability 0;1 (Deterrence failure) 1;1 (Deterrence success) 0;0 (Deterrence failure) 1;0 (Deterrence failure)

Each deterrence failure will be gauged with the respect to capability-credibility matrix. Author assumes there was no credibility each time a particular country failed to deter its opponent even though the capacity to do so.

In order to answer the research question, the author analyses the relationship between credibility and deterrence using case studies of three famous conflicts. Three independent examples of complex deterrence relationship between two hostile entities are the following:

(1946 – 1986) Cold War

(1948 - ) Arab-Israeli conflict

(1947 - ) Indo-Pakistani rivalry

Each of the conflicts above provide valuable data for the critical analysis of deterrence theory. All of the rivalries lasted almost over half a century and all of them spiraled either into direct military confrontation or proxy wars. In addition, every subject consists of both conventional and nuclear level of deterrence.

Each standoff between two adversaries will be analyzed with the use of qualitative methods with the special emphasis on credibility. Main task will be to conduct qualitative analysis of decision making processes through the study of relevant historical literature in order to find out how interaction in a particular crisis influenced future events. Deterrence relationship at the time of every crisis will be marked as either success or failure. Based on presumptions of this paper defined in capability-credibility matrix, every failure of deterrence was caused by lack of capability or credibility. Therefore, military strength of each side will be compared with an aim to find out what was the reason behind deterrence failure in each crisis. If a country has enough military capability at its disposal but fails to deter its adversary, it obviously lacked credibility.

Upon detailed qualitative analysis of every selected crisis, statistical methods will be used in an attempt to find a correlation, if there is any, among various military-political crises. Every conflict will be analyzed with the use of time series. For each conflict, a two dimensions chart will be constructed. Author will measure intervals between crises and their intensity with an aim to find a relationship between them with the respect to credibility and deterrence success/failure. Quantitative methods as described above will help to trace a possible link between results of various crises.

It is quite possible that deterrence between to powers is reset once a head of state is replaced, thus it might be linked to a particular person which represents the country at the moment. Hence emphasis will be put on changes of deterrence caused by rotation of both countries leaders. Each time series will also include changes of political leadership. Under this logic, every newly elected head of state needs to reassure its foreign counterparts of his intentions.

Thesis Outline

This research paper will be divided into four main parts.

First part of the paper will be devoted to theoretical background of the paper. It will concentrate on credibility and its relation to previous behavior of a particular actor with an aim to trace evolution of its interpretation throughout the second half of the 20th century.

In the second part, the period of Cold War will be analyzed. Author will concentrate on various crises of the US-USSR competition in the 20th century with an aim to gauge frequency of each crisis and its intensity. Author emphasizes especially comparison of relative military strength between each pair of hostile actors. 1948 Berlin Crisis, 1962 Berlin Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, Korean War, Vietnam War and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan will be main subjects of deterrence analysis. A study by B. Russet “The Calculus of Deterrence” will be used in order to analyze pre-1962 crises. (Russet, 1963). Additional information will be taken from book by George and Smoke “Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice”. (George, Smoke, 1974) This paper´s Cold War part will also reflect the credibility of various US presidents and Soviet General Secretaries of the USSR´s communist party.

The third part of this paper will be devoted to infamous Israeli-Arab rivalry which escalated into war quite a few times since 1948. Conflicts of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and other Israeli military campaigns will be researched. Special emphasis is put on the events of 1956 Sinai War and 1967 Six-Days wars, which serve as a basis for the research of deterrence and its eventual failure. Primary source of interpretation of Arab-Israeli conflict will provide books by Bickerton and Klausner “A History of Arab-Israeli Conflict”. (Bickerton, Klausner, 2010) Credibility status examination will be based on “A never-ending conflict a guide to Israeli military history” by Mordechai Bar On. (Bar on, 2004)

In addition, Israeli air strikes on Iraq and Syria serve as an empirical evidence for how can Israel conventionally deter its adversaries from obtaining nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the author’s main motivation is to critically examine the existence of general belief that every military actions is caused means failure of deterrence. Author´s is going to confront this paradigm with theory of cumulative deterrence by Israeli scholar Doron Almog presented in his article “Cumulative Deterrence and War on Terrorism”. (Almog, 2005) Author tests Almog´s hypothesis which claims that Israeli offensive campaigns reduce the likelihood of potential Arab attack due to gradual erosion of Arab military power and Israeli decisiveness which leads to increase of its credibility.

Indo-Pakistani conflicts will be analyzed in paper´s fourth part due to its very specific nature.

Wars of 1947-1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 will provide a background for deterrence´s analysis. Author will compare relative military power both sides of the conflict and their behavior in order to find out what was the reason of deterrence failure, a lack of credibility or a lack of capability?

The fifth part will synthesize all the data with the use of charts. Intervals and intensity of each conflict will be gauged in order to formulate the conclusion. By analyzing each conflict, author will use the method of induction in order to test three presumed hypotheses.