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Can Club Model Explain the Rise of the Islamic State?
Název práce v češtině: Může model klubu vysvětlit vzestup Islámského státu?
Název v anglickém jazyce: Can Club Model Explain the Rise of the Islamic State?
Klíčová slova: ISIL, model klubu, sociální služby, zákazy, oběti, násilí
Klíčová slova anglicky: ISIL, club model, social services, prohibitions, sacrifices, violence
Akademický rok vypsání: 2014/2015
Typ práce: bakalářská práce
Jazyk práce: angličtina
Ústav: Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES)
Vedoucí / školitel: doc. PhDr. Lubomír Cingl, Ph.D.
Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
Datum přihlášení: 31.05.2015
Datum zadání: 31.05.2015
Datum a čas obhajoby: 15.06.2016 08:00
Místo konání obhajoby: IES, m 314
Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby:13.05.2016
Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 15.06.2016
Oponenti: PhDr. Václav Korbel, Ph.D.
 
 
 
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Seznam odborné literatury
Iannaccone, L.R. (1992): "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives." Journal of Political Economy 100(2):271-291.
Berman, E. (2000): "Sect, subsidy, and sacrifice: an economist's view of ultra-orthodox Jews." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3):905-953
Berman, E. & D.D.Laitin (2008): "Religion, terrorism and public goods: Testing the club model." Journal of Public Economics 92(10): 1942–1967.
Berman, E. (2009): "Radical, religious, and violent: the new economics of terrorism." Cambridge MA: MIT press.
Borum, R. (2010): "Understanding terrorist psychology." In A. Silke (Ed.), The psychology of counter-terrorism, 19-33. Oxon, UK: Routlege

Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has become a major threat of the contemporary period. Understanding what is behind its success and unusual brutality is essential for successful counter-terrorism measures. Besides political, social and psychological approaches to the topic, there is also the club model in economics of religion that can surprisingly well model behaviour of radical extremist groups. It implies that terrorist organizations that provide social services can act as a club. They introduce prohibitions such as dress code or dietary restrictions to ensure active participation and use sacrifices to screen out free-riders. Berman and Laitin (2008) successfully applied the club model on Hamas, Taliban and Hezbollah. My intention is to follow their example and to test whether the model can explain the rise of ISIL, too. Firstly, I would like to analyse if the group has necessary attributes to fit into the club model framework: a social service provision in places where state governments fail, prohibitions and sacrifices, a well thought-out funding system and an efficient defection deterring strategy. Secondly, I am going to find out whether my assumption based on the club logic is valid: the more wealth ISIL has, the more people want to join it, on which the group reacts by a higher level of violence. Finally, I am going to conclude with possible policy implications on the problematic of the Islamic State using the knowledge I gained during the research.
 
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