Can Club Model Explain the Rise of the Islamic State?
| Název práce v češtině: | Může model klubu vysvětlit vzestup Islámského státu? |
|---|---|
| Název v anglickém jazyce: | Can Club Model Explain the Rise of the Islamic State? |
| Klíčová slova: | ISIL, model klubu, sociální služby, zákazy, oběti, násilí |
| Klíčová slova anglicky: | ISIL, club model, social services, prohibitions, sacrifices, violence |
| Akademický rok vypsání: | 2014/2015 |
| Typ práce: | bakalářská práce |
| Jazyk práce: | angličtina |
| Ústav: | Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES) |
| Vedoucí / školitel: | doc. PhDr. Lubomír Cingl, Ph.D. |
| Řešitel: | skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem |
| Datum přihlášení: | 31.05.2015 |
| Datum zadání: | 31.05.2015 |
| Datum a čas obhajoby: | 15.06.2016 08:00 |
| Místo konání obhajoby: | IES, m 314 |
| Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: | 13.05.2016 |
| Datum proběhlé obhajoby: | 15.06.2016 |
| Oponenti: | PhDr. Václav Korbel, Ph.D. |
| Kontrola URKUND: | |
| Seznam odborné literatury |
| Iannaccone, L.R. (1992): "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives." Journal of Political Economy 100(2):271-291.
Berman, E. (2000): "Sect, subsidy, and sacrifice: an economist's view of ultra-orthodox Jews." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3):905-953 Berman, E. & D.D.Laitin (2008): "Religion, terrorism and public goods: Testing the club model." Journal of Public Economics 92(10): 1942–1967. Berman, E. (2009): "Radical, religious, and violent: the new economics of terrorism." Cambridge MA: MIT press. Borum, R. (2010): "Understanding terrorist psychology." In A. Silke (Ed.), The psychology of counter-terrorism, 19-33. Oxon, UK: Routlege |
| Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce |
| The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has become a major threat of the contemporary period. Understanding what is behind its success and unusual brutality is essential for successful counter-terrorism measures. Besides political, social and psychological approaches to the topic, there is also the club model in economics of religion that can surprisingly well model behaviour of radical extremist groups. It implies that terrorist organizations that provide social services can act as a club. They introduce prohibitions such as dress code or dietary restrictions to ensure active participation and use sacrifices to screen out free-riders. Berman and Laitin (2008) successfully applied the club model on Hamas, Taliban and Hezbollah. My intention is to follow their example and to test whether the model can explain the rise of ISIL, too. Firstly, I would like to analyse if the group has necessary attributes to fit into the club model framework: a social service provision in places where state governments fail, prohibitions and sacrifices, a well thought-out funding system and an efficient defection deterring strategy. Secondly, I am going to find out whether my assumption based on the club logic is valid: the more wealth ISIL has, the more people want to join it, on which the group reacts by a higher level of violence. Finally, I am going to conclude with possible policy implications on the problematic of the Islamic State using the knowledge I gained during the research. |