Serpent in the Water: Debating the Chinese Maritime Strategy

• Název v anglickém jazyce: Serpent in the Water: Debating the Chinese Maritime Strategy
• Klíčová slova: ČLR, námořní strategie, Realismus, Geostrategie, Geopolitika moří, Jihočínské moře, Čínská pobřežní ekonomika, Námořní komunikace, "Anti-access" (zamítnutí přístupu)
• Klíčová slova anglicky: People’s Republic of China, Maritime Strategy, Realism, Geostrategy, Geopolitics of the Sea, South China Sea, Chinese Coastal Economy, Sea Lanes of Communication, Commerce Raiding, Anti-Access
• Akademický rok vypsání: 2014/2015
• Typ práce: diplomová práce
• Jazyk práce: angličtina
• Ústav: Katedra politologie (23-KP)
• Vedoucí / školitel: RNDr. Jan Kofroň, Ph.D.
• Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
• Datum přihlášení: 05.01.2015
• Datum zadání: 05.01.2015
• Datum a čas obhajoby: 30.01.2015 00:00
• Místo konání obhajoby: IPS FSV UK, U kříže 8/661 158 00 Praha 5 – Jinonice
• Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: 07.01.2015
• Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 30.01.2015
• Oponenti: doc. Martin Riegl, Ph.D.

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Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce

Over the last ten years the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly identified that the current situation of world affairs has created a “New Period” of potential in which the Chinese state can quickly develop and advance its interests. In 2004 the President of China, Hu Jintao, increased the military’s role in this period by establishing a new mission statement for the Chinese armed forces entitled “Historic Missions of the Armed Forces in the New Period of the New Century”. This document explains that the Chinese armed forces must now provide “a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of Strategic opportunity for national development” and “a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests”. The decision to amend these goals to the Chinese Constitution in 2007 was later followed by the Chinese government openly acknowledging its desire for the acquisition of increased naval capabilities. Since this time, the Chinese Communist Party has put a considerable amount of effort into developing a Chinese power-projection fleet with the ultimate goal of increasing China’s maritime capabilities. Power-projection is a concept in International Relations that is understood as a state's ability to deploy and sustain an expeditionary force away from its immediate territory. The increasing importance placed upon the development of China’s maritime capabilities have initiated a series of academic inquires over whether or not the CCP decision to pursue a power-projection fleet represents an offensive or defensive strategy. Scholars have also begun to question whether the development of such a power-projection fleet is logical for the Chinese state given its extensive continental territory. These inquiries have renewed a century-old debate over the importance of land forces and sea forces on the world stage and whether China should be attempting to become a strong land power or a strong sea power.
The new literature written about the military buildup of the People’s Republic of China over the last decade assumes that China will be a regional power. However, this same literature – which also presumes in many cases that a state cannot actively pursue a land strategy and a sea strategy – is uncertain of the fate of this power because of the growing desire within China for increased maritime capabilities. As a result, a series of questions are now being asked, such as whether China's pursuit of a power-projection fleet is a logical strategy, given the historically unstable nature of its continental frontiers, and if the Chinese state must pursue increased naval capabilities, what is the optimal naval strategy that it should follow?
The academics attempting to address these questions are doing so from phenomenally liberal-minded points of view. Academics such as Robert Ross attribute the Chinese desire for the creation of a power-projection fleet to nationalistic forces within the country, while former American naval officers such as Sam Tangredi explain that states like China are destined to pursue anti-access strategies because they are ruled by authoritarian regimes which are inherently undemocratic and thus possessed by a predisposition toward such strategies. These views have been contrasted by authors such as John Mearshimer and others writing from a neorealist/ offensive-realist perspective, who suggest that the decision to pursue a power-projection fleet is a consequence of great power politics. With few exceptions, each of these authors offers a very limited geopolitical assessment of the Chinese geography and naval strategy while simultaneously using theories of international relations in an attempt to reach conclusions about the intentions behind China’s maritime activity.
Upon examination of the positions taken by these authors, it becomes apparent that at their root, all of these assessments share a common fundamental question, which also serves as the primary thesis question for this paper: Is the Chinese desire for increased naval capabilities an innately offensive or defensive action? My approach to answering this question is unique and different because I place an emphasis on an understanding of maritime strategies and how they are different from the land strategies upon which most balance of power theories are rooted.
Proposed Thesis Argument: The military actions being taken by the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Liberation Army Navy in and around the South China Sea and East China Sea are the result of an intention to use a limited hard-power which has been designed with the goal of deterring the use of naval forces by other countries in the region. These actions are a continuation of the previous Chinese anti-access and military strategies that are designed to protect Chinese economic interests from a possible attack. Based upon an understanding of Realism, Geostrategy and the strategic logic of Sir Julian Corbett on the principles of maritime strategies it would seem that is possible to reason from an evaluation of the Chinese maritime strategy that the Chinese may be behaving defensively in their regional waters as opposed to offensively. This is because they appear to be pursuing access to seaports that are along their Sea Lanes of Communication and are developing maritime capabilities that are analogous to a defensive maritime strategy given the economic needs of the Chinese state.
My approach to answering the primary thesis question relies heavily on the strategic disciplines of realism, geo-strategy, and the concept of maritime strategy as presented in the writings of Sir Julian Corbett, and includes three major components:
1. Assess the optimal maritime strategy for China: By focusing heavily on Chinese geography, resource distribution within the country, the contribution of the coastal provinces towards the Chinese GDP and the impact of inter-regional and global trade upon the Chinese economy, I conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the current Chinese threat environment and the places that it feels vulnerable. This information is instructive in attempting to understand why the Chinese leadership might pursue military development on either the land or sea, and which type of military development they are likely to pursue.
2. Evaluate contemporary developments in China’s maritime strategy: Using Chinese defense reports, the current composition of the Chinese naval fleet, published accounts of Chinese naval strategy, strategic assessments offered by the United States’ Department of Defense, and think tanks from different corners of the world, I attempt to construct an accurate account of contemporary strategic thinking within China. From this foundation, one can determine the implied Chinese foreign policy goals which likely underpin this strategy, and thereby project possible actions of the Chinese state into the future.
3. Compare optimal Chinese maritime strategy with the actual Chinese maritime strategy: By comparing the congruency of China's optimal maritime strategy with their actual strategy, it is possible to determine whether this strategy is offensive (as most authors suggest) or defensive in nature, thus answering the thesis question of this paper. This conclusion is supplemented by an overview of the current capabilities of the Chinese Navy, in order to demonstrate whether or not an offensive position is even practical given the current abilities of the Chinese fleet.
In order to address each of these components in detail, I intend to segment my thesis argument into the following five chapters:
Chapter I: The Foundations of the Thesis:
The first chapter begins with an examination of the foundations of my paper. In order to do this I will begin with a more extensive review of the current literature debating China’s maritime actions and then addresses the common themes found in this literature, as well as the gaps in the current debate. In addition to this, I intend to explain the scope of my own research, and how I hope to augment the debate. I will focus on an evaluation of the strategic disciplines of realism, geo-strategy, and the concept of maritime strategy as presented in the writings of Sir Julian Corbett. I intend to complement this evaluation with explanations of how these theories have impacted my answer to the primary thesis question.
1.1 Examine the Current Debates on Chinese Power-Projection
• Robert Kaplan, Robert Ross, Michael Glosny, John Mearsheimer, Sam J. Tangredi, Nan Li, Bernard D. Cole, Peter A. Dutton, Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson.
1.2 The importance of Maritime Strategy as a new factor of analysis
• Why study maritime strategies?
• How are maritime strategies different from land strategies?
• What are its benefits of studying a maritime strategy?
1.3 Theoretical Foundation
1.3.1: Realism
• Rational actors
• Security Dilemma
• Behavioral trends that can be examined and predicted
1.3.2: Geo-strategy
• Focus on geography and resources available to a state.
• Predicts that states have limited resources that prevent them from pursuing all possible courses of action open to them at any one time. When compared with realism, this suggests that states will choose the best and most rational course of action that is available to them.
1.3.3: Introduction to Maritime Strategy
• What is a maritime state?
• Why are maritime strategies important in the modern age?
• Is there a connection between the Sea and the Life of the State?
• What impact do Trade Routes and Sea Lines of Communication have on a state?
• What is the "Command of the Sea" and why is it important?
• Are there sound reasons for securing the Command of the Sea?
• How would a maritime state secure the Command of the Sea?
• What are the “Distinguishing Characteristics” of Naval Conflicts as outlined by Sir Julian Corbett and why are they important for understanding how China has and will behave?
•
1.4 Why Focus on the South China Sea and East China Sea?
• Ongoing Island disputes over Spratly Islands.
• Proximity of US and Chinese naval forces.
1.5 Why evaluate the People’s Republic of China?
Mostly because of the increased likelihood of Chinese maritime operations in the area. Following the end of the Second World War, the new government of the People’s Republic of China adopted a coastal defense strategy for the country that was designed to prevent insurgency into the country. Following the opening of the country with US trade in the 1970s, the PLAN began to peruse a ship building campaign that would increase the abilities of the PLAN to operate within the regional waters. Thus, the People’s Republic of China is the new and uprising power with an interest in the region and they possess the largest economy in the region which is largely dependent upon maritime trade.
Chapter II: The Research Process
2.1 Methodology: As a consequence of the differences between land strategies and naval strategies there is a difficulty in determining what an offensive and defensive action looks like at sea. The reason for this has to do with the fact that maritime states naturally develop power-projection capabilities due to the need to protect their own maritime commerce and Sea Lanes of Communication. Thus, it is not only possible, but very likely that a maritime state will develop power-projection capabilities as a natural process in order to protect its trade. Since all maritime states share roughly equal trade routes then the development of these forces will likely be interpreted as an offensive action on the part of other maritime states that also share the same routes. The need to develop bases and naval ports along the trade routes to resupply and protect this trade could be further seen as a result of an aggressive expansion policy that would appear offensive, although it is actually defensive under naval thought. As a result of these drastic differences between Maritime Strategies and land based strategies it is necessary to use a methodology that will allow for the differences between the two to be examined and compared. Since no such methodology would appear to exist, I propose that I develop my own which would be based upon the previously outlined components of this proposal and would be structured in the following way:
2.1.1: Optimal Maritime Strategy for a State
As realism suggests that every state is a rational actor, and Geostrategy says that states have limited resources with which they can pursue their foreign policies, it seems that it would be possible to assume that every state behaves in a manner reflective of its desires and needs. In other words, it is possible to think of states as living organisms in two important ways: the concept of self-preservation, and its logical conclusion, that certain fundamental needs must be met before an organism is capable of pursuing other interests. This would thus imply that states behave with the international community in a way that is similar to the way that individuals behave within society. It would further imply that states are, in effect, bound to the international community in a way that is similar to how individuals are bound to society as described by Abraham Maslow in his paper “A Theory of Human Motivation.”
When Maslow’s examination of motivation theory is applied to a state’s foreign policy it is possible to assume that states will focus on a state equivalent of what Maslow described as physiological need and fundamental deficiency needs, such as security and friendship, before moving onto the higher level needs of love, esteem and self-actualization. When applied to international relations, this revision of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs would imply that states are likely to focus on security, good relations with other states and physical needs – such as access to resources – before moving onto the secondary needs such as prestige strategies and nationalistic adventures. Under such a methodological foundation, it can be assumed that a state will maintain a defensive strategy unless its government and infrastructure are pressured to adequately address its internal needs by means of an outward expression, such as the use of military force. It thus becomes necessary to not only presume a defensive strategy under such a theory, but to conclude that an optimal strategy can thus be considered in the terms of a sound defensive strategy. This would imply that the development of an offensive strategy is a secondary objective. In order to determine what a state’s archetypal defensive strategy would look like it will be important to consider the following:
• Where is the heart of the state?
• Where are its resources located?
• Where is the geographic heart of the state's economy?
• Does the state depend upon maritime commerce?
• What would be a sound defensive strategy for the state to take?
• Under realism is it safe to presume that a sound defensive strategy would be an optimal strategy?
2.1.2: Evaluate Developments in a State’s Maritime Strategy
Determining the state’s actual strategy will be necessary in order to evaluate the congruency of its optimal strategy with the actions that it’s actually pursuing in its regional waters.
• Does the state in question have an established maritime strategy?
• Examine the state's strategic documents and the development of its strategy.
• What is the state's land strategy?
• What is the states naval strategy?
• Is there a connection between the state's land and naval strategies?
• What expenditures is the state making available to its maritime assets and forces?
2.1.3: Compare a State’s Optimal Maritime Strategy with its Actual Maritime Strategy
• Does the state's actual maritime strategy match its optimal maritime strategy?
• Is there a degree of departure between the state’s optimal strategy and actual strategy that suggest that the state is behaving offensively under the principles of maritime strategy as outlined by Sir Julian Corbett and his successors?
2.2 Limitations of the Research
• Need to primarily use English sources as I cannot read mandarin and/or Cantonese.
• Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) rarely releases information about it expenditures.
• I possess an American cultural bias.
2.2.1 Ways of countering the limitations of my Research
• Use as many English sources from both official and third party sources as available. Since the Chinese government rarely publishing texts, my inability to read mandarin or Cantonese will not prevent me from researching this topic to that significant of a degree.
• The Chinese state office known as the Ministry of National Defense does publish White Papers that outline the Chinese defense expenditures and maritime objectives and can be used to gauge the desires of the Chinese government.
• The use of Realism and Geostrategy for my theoretical foundation carry with it an understanding that rational individuals that possess the same information could arrive at similar assessments of a situation. By using maritime strategies to evaluate the development of the Chinese power-projection forces I am further removed from my cultural bias. This means that I should be able to understand the Chinese maritime activity in their regional waters irrespective of my cultural bias so long as I am well read and informed on the topic in debate. Furthermore, most strategic evaluations are conducted of other countries by individuals of a different country, thus my situation will not be any different from that of other defense analysts.
2.3 Literature Review
• Acknowledge the authors that most influenced my work and findings. This is likely to be one of the last sections of the paper to be written in order that I might fully address the intellectual contributions that other authors and academics have paid to my own thought.
Chapter III: The Optimal Chinese Maritime Strategy
The second chapter addresses the research process that I used to construct my argument. It begins with an examination of my methodology and ends with an evaluation of the limitations of my research, while in the third chapter, I add to the research of other academics, such as Robert Ross and Michael Glosny, in an attempt to conclude what the optimal naval strategy for the Chinese state should look like based upon the criteria outlined above.
3.1: An Evaluation of the Geography of China
• What resources is the Chinese mainland territory have an abundance of?
• What resources is the Chinese mainland territory lacking in?
• What resources are in the regional seas around the Chinese mainland?
• What resources are the regional seas around the Chinese mainland lacking in?
3.2: Resources, Pipelines and Sea Lines
3.2.2: Overland Energy Imports
• Oil Pipelines
• Natural Gas Pipelines
• Benefits and Problems with Chinese overland Pipelines
3.2.3: Seaborne Energy Imports
• Oil? And from where is it coming?
• Natural Gas? And from where is it coming?
• Raw minerals? And from where is it coming?
3.3: Industrialization within China
• Is there a dichotomy between the economy of the Chinese coastal and inland provinces?
• What impact, if any, does Seaborne trade have on the Chinese economy?
• What impact, if any, does interregional trade on the Chinese economy?
• What impact, if any, does global trade have on the Chinese economy?
3.4: Chapter III General Conclusions
Chapter IV: The Actual Chinese Maritime Strategy
The fourth chapter seeks to explain the development of Chinese military strategy by focusing on three key areas: the foundations of China's land-based strategy, the evolution of their naval strategy prior to 1990, and the adoption of their current maritime strategy as a result of perceived changes to the Chinese security environment following 1990. In order to test the validity of this strategy I propose to end this chapter with a review of the current construction of the Chinese surface fleet, summarize the abilities of their submarine fleet, and evaluate China's actual maritime capabilities. I also propose that it might be necessary to examine the current allocations of Chinese defense expenditures and to discuss how this impacts the ability of the People's Republic of China to implement its maritime strategy. I intend to end the fourth chapter with a list of general implications of this strategy.
4.1 Developments in the Chinese Land Based Military Strategy during the 20th Century
4.1.1: The Advent of the People’s War Doctrine
• I idea of “drawing the enemy in deep.”
• Interior and Exterior Lines of Battle
• Establishment of a policy of not attacking first
4.1.2: Evolution of the People’s War Doctrine for use against another State
• The Creation of the “Third Front.”
• What impact did the Third Front have on the Chinese economy?
• Was the Third Front a viable defensive strategy?
• What were the changed that resulted in the abandonment of the Third Front?
4.1.3: Reforms made to the People’s War Doctrine
• People’s War under Modern Conditions.
• “Informationalization” of the Chinese military.
• What is Information Warfare and how are the Chinese using it?
• What is Counter-Intervention Warfare and how are the Chinese using it?
4.2: Development of the early Chinese Maritime Strategy
4.2.1: Coastal Defense
• What did the early Chinese naval strategies look like?
• Could it be argued that they were People’s War at Sea?
4.2.2: Development of the Near-Coast Defense Strategy
• What prompted a redevelopment of the Chinese naval strategy?
4.2.3: Near-Seas Active Defense
• What prompted a further redevelopment of the Chinese naval strategy?
4.2: The Modern Chinese Maritime Strategy
4.2.1: Impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
• Secure northern border
4.2.2: Impact of the American victory in the Gulf War on Chinese perception of their defense.
• Smaller more technologically focused forces can defeat a larger force.
• Is the idea of a “People’s War” dead?
4.2.3: Third Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1996
• Can the Chinese secure their own regional waters?
• What impact did the U.S. fleets have on the ability of the Chinese to project their power to the Island of Formosa?
4.2.4 Developments in the Chinese Maritime Strategy since 2006
• Is the strategy directed towards Taiwan or towards a conquest of the regional seas around the Chinese mainland?
• What does the Chinese White Papers published by the National Ministry of Defense tell us about the current Chinese maritime strategy?
• What do the publications of Chinese academics and news outlets tell us about the Chinese maritime strategy?
• What do Chinese reports to the UN tells us about the Chinese intentions?
• What do Chinese statements at ASEAN Conferences tell us about Chinese intentions?
4.3: Impact of the passing of UNCLOS and Chinese Lawfare on regional security
• How have the Chinese used UNCLOS to advance their regional claims?
• How does the Chinese regional maritime claims impact their maritime strategy?
• Are there elements of the Chinese maritime strategy that has been based upon UNCLOS?
• What is lawfare? Does it impact the Chinese use of maritime forces?
4.4: Maritime Allocations
4.4.1: Construction of the Chinese Maritime Force
4.4.2: Defense Allocations and Capabilities of the Chinese Fleets
4.4.2-A: Chinese Surface Force
o What are the capabilities of the Chinese Aircraft carrier?
o What are the capabilities of the Chinese cruiser force?
o What are the capabilities of the Chinese destroyers?
o What are the capabilities of the Chinese Littoral Combat Ships?
o What are the capabilities of the Chinese amphibious assault craft?
4.4.2-B: Chinese Submarine Force
o What are the capabilities of the Chinese attack Submarines?
o What are the capabilities of the Chinese Ballistic Missile Submarines?
o Are the Chinese developing any further developments?
4.4.3: Research and Development
• Are the Chinese working on any new technological developments that could be “game changers” for regional maritime security concerns?
• What is the impact of the Deng-Feng 21D missile?
• What is the impact of new R&D projects such as the J-20 Stealth Fighter?
4.5: Chinese Defense Budget
4.5.1: Difficulties in Determining the Chinese Defense Expenditures
4.5.2: Third Party Assessments of the Chinese Defense Budget
4.6: The U.S. Response to Chinese Actions
4.6.1: The U.S. perception of an anti-access strategy.
4.6.2: The development of a regional alliances with the United States
• Revisions made to regional security pacts.
4.6.3: Air-Sea Battle Concept
• What is the U.S. Air-Sea Battle Concept?
• Why has the U.S. adopted this approach?
• What does this approach tell us about a possible Sino-American conflict?
4.7: Chapter IV General Conclusions

Chapter V: Conclusions
In the fifth chapter I will compare the general conclusions offered at the end of the third and fourth chapters in order to answer the primary thesis question of whether China’s maritime strategy and actions in the South China Sea should be considered offensive or defensive. Based upon my current understanding of the theoretical foundation I have established and my understanding of the Chinese actions in the South and East China Seas, it would appear that the development of the Chinese power-projection forces are an innately defensive action. This makes sense since the Chinese have developed a trend of access-denial warfare. Thus, it could be possible that the recent Chinese naval build up is a continuation of the previous anti-access policies. While it would appear that the Chinese are behaving offensively, it is possible that they are actually behaving defensively and that the Chinese are just simply continuing their previous policies of an active-defense strategy. The reason that this new policy appears to be directed towards an offensive use of power-projection forces is that the development of the Chinese economy (in conjunction with advanced technology that allows for faster and more devastating offensive actions) has created a new threat environment in which a limited blue water navy is now required for regional security and so that the Chinese can defend their SLOCs – a situation that is very common to up and coming maritime states. As the primary goal of anti-access warfare is to deny entry to a strategic area that is important for a state’s maritime interest (the most notable of which under naval strategies is commercial shipping lanes), the pursuit of an aircraft carrier and a more advanced naval force would appear to be the continuation of the Chinese desire to protect their over sea interests and access to out of region markets and resources. In the same light, the seemingly erratic use of Chinese surface ships would appear to be a continuation of this desire; further research on this last point will be required.