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Rethinking Corruption in the Czech Republic: A Mixed-Methods Approach to a Systemic Problem
Název práce v češtině: .
Název v anglickém jazyce: Rethinking Corruption in the Czech Republic: A Mixed-Methods Approach to a Systemic Problem
Klíčová slova: systemicka korupce, verejne zakazky, systemova teorie, smisene metody
Klíčová slova anglicky: systemic corruption, public procurement, systems theory, mixed-methods
Akademický rok vypsání: 2012/2013
Typ práce: disertační práce
Jazyk práce: angličtina
Ústav: Katedra veřejné a sociální politiky (23-KVSP)
Vedoucí / školitel: doc. PhDr. Pavol Frič, Ph.D.
Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
Datum přihlášení: 10.12.2012
Datum zadání: 10.12.2012
Datum a čas obhajoby: 22.01.2018 00:00
Místo konání obhajoby: U Kříže 8, 158 00 Praha 5
Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby:27.11.2017
Datum odevzdání tištěné podoby:27.11.2017
Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 22.01.2018
Oponenti: doc. Ing. Emília Sičáková Beblavá
  prof. Ing. Jan Pavel, Ph.D.
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Předběžná náplň práce
Systemická korupce je běžný vědecký pojem, nicméně chybí shoda ohledně významu tohoto termínu stejně jako důsledná analýza tohoto tématu. Tento nedostatek ve výzkumu představuje prostor pro analýzu tohoto tématu systemické korupce, jež stojí proti směru, který se zaměřuje na jednotlivce. Cílem této práce je rozšíření koncepčního rozsahu výzkumu systemické korupce s využitím “pattern-to-process” smíšených metod. Jádrem metodologie tohoto výzkumu je kombinování empirických dat ze sektoru veřejných zakázek umožňujících analýzu tzv. „spatio-temporal“ vzorů síťového chování s popisem procesu díky hloubkovým pohovorům. Výsledky empirického výzkumu dokazují statisticky významný rozdíl mezi výhrami ve veřejných zakázkách firem, které vykazují znaky politického vlivu od těch, jež nikoliv. Tato práce operacionalizuje termín politického vlivu jako korupci, kdy by veřejní úředníci nevykonali stejné rozhodnutí bez speciálního zvážení politického přičlenění, příspěvku nebo síťového napojení. Po izolování vysvětlujících faktorů firemní kompetence data odhalují, že firmy s charakteristikami vlivu vyhrávají významně častěji, stejně tak tyto firmy častěji shodují v typu vykonávané produkce. Užití “geospatial cluster” analýzy ve spojení s výsledky šetření odhaluje vlivové skupiny jako takové, jež upevňují přednostní výhody skrz politické úředníky a zajišťují opakované vyhrávání napojováním se na menší vládní úřady mimo hustě obydlené regiony. Opakující se vzory v analýze nezávislé na specifickém čase či místě poukazují na existenci charakteristik, které jsou vice vhodné pro koncept systemické korupce. Výsledky tohoto výzkumu mohou sloužit k tvořbě udržitelné intervenční strategie a být využitelné pro politiky, kteří se snaží správně pochopit typ současné korupce nad rámec řešení jednotlivých případů.
Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce
Systemic corruption is a common term amongst scholars and practitioners, yet there is sparse conceptual agreement and substantive analysis within the discourse. Regardless of the current deficit, there is considerable pioneering space and advantages to contrast against the overwhelming emphasis on individuals. This paper aims to broaden the conceptual scope of systemic corruption research through a pattern-to-process mixed-methods design. The design combines empirical data from the public procurement sector analyzing the spatiotemporal patterns of network behavior with a descriptive account of processes from in-depth interviews. The empirical approach statistically distinguishes the performance differentials of public procurement awards amongst firms that exhibit the characteristics of political influence from those that do not. This paper operationalizes that political influence is corruption when a public official would not have made the same decision without the special consideration of political affiliation, contribution, or network connection. After stripping away explanatory factors for firm competence, the data reveals that firms with influence characteristics win substantially more and more often performing similar work. The usage of geospatial cluster analysis, in conjunction with field interviews, reveals that influence networks forge preferential advantages through political officials and secure repeat wins by engaging with smaller government office sizes outside of densely populated regions. The reoccurring patterns, independent of one specific time or place, suggests characteristics more suitable for the concept of systemic corruption. This framework will be of utility for policymakers to improve their vantage point perspective beyond case-by-case individual instances for sustainable intervention strategies.
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