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# Sovereign Individuals and Organic Networks: Political Cultures in Conflict During the Progressive Era

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NO COMPARABLE PERIOD IN UNITED STATES HISTORY PRODUCED AS MANY SIGNIFICANT alterations in the nation's political system as did the Progressive Era. Chief among these were woman suffrage, the direct election of U.S. Senators, the Australian ballot, primary elections, the initiative, referendum, and recall, the city manager and commission forms of municipal government, the short ballot, and nonpartisan, at-large local elections. These alterations collectively inaugurated the transition from the ethnocultural, partisan, hierarchical politics of the late nineteenth century to the issue-oriented, candidate-focused, weak party politics of the recent past.<sup>1</sup> This transition was advocated by "reformers" as one that would facilitate the triumph of "the people" over "the interests" by severing the sinews that bound together professional politicians, corrupt businessmen, vice merchants, and ignorant, acquisitive lower-class voters in an organizational structure popularly referred to as a "political machine."<sup>2</sup>

Rejecting this simplistic typology, modern scholars have amply documented the often narrow-minded and self-interested motives of "reformers," the significant support given to many "reforms" by machine politicians and their followers, the seeming contradiction between measures designed to democratize the system and those calculated to promote government by experts, and the frequently "undemocratic" results of devices designed to enhance popular influence. In place of the "reformer-machine" dichotomy, political historians have substituted other typologies to explain the deep and frequently bitter conflict over the adoption of this new political order: modernizers versus traditionalists, cosmopolitans versus locals, structural versus social reformers, militarists versus mercantilists, and the "old politics" versus the "new politics."<sup>3</sup> Each of these formulations has provided us with valuable perspective on the nature of Progressive Era political conflict and, taken together, they underscore the complexity and diversity of motives, goals, methods, and results of that struggle. Yet we still lack a larger context that links these various conceptualizations together and that explains the strong allegiance

that the old and new political orders inspired in their respective adherents.

This conflict over the contours of the political order can be most fully understood if viewed as a struggle between two competing political cultures, each firmly rooted in different perceptions concerning the relationship of the individual to society. The first, endemic to mainstream, modernizing America, viewed society as an atomistic aggregation of sovereign individuals who were enjoined to transcend their origins in a competitive quest for success, fulfillment, and liberation. Its proponents, according to Rowland Berthoff, saw themselves as “congeries of social atoms.”<sup>4</sup> The other, central to ethnic identification, comprehended society as a seamless web of organic networks in which each individual was unique and integral but interdependent and constrained by ascribed roles and by relationships to ancestors, kin, and progeny. This line of argument was first suggested by Richard Hofstadter in *The Age of Reform* (1955). Hofstadter “singled out, as a phenomenon of the Progressive Era, the antipathy between the ethos of the boss-immigrant-machine complex and that of the reformer-individualist-Anglo-Saxon complex” and insisted that “we need more studies of the type of political organizations that have flourished in the United States and of the codes of loyalties they have developed to sustain them.”<sup>5</sup>

The members of the reformer-individualist-Anglo-Saxon complex, in Hofstadter’s view, “assumed a popular democracy with widespread participation and eager civic interest” and saw politics as “an arena for the realization of moral principles of broad application—for the correction of private habits.” The adherents of the “boss-immigrant-machine complex,” on the other hand, “looked to politics—for concrete and personal gains,” and “sought these gains through personal relationships.”<sup>6</sup> The vast body of literature that has emerged during the intervening three decades concerning the world view of the native-stock middle class, the adaptation of ethnic minorities, and the values and operations of political machines has provided us with a wealth of insights that, when fully synthesized, elevate Hofstadter’s antagonistic “ethoses” into two full-blown political cultures, each of which was the logical and legitimate product of its adherents’ historical experience.<sup>7</sup> Comprehending the major tenets of those two cultures provides us with a context capable of subsuming nearly all of the existing conceptual frameworks concerning Progressive Era political conflict and of explaining the appeal that each had to its constituents.

To put it another way, the common assumption of modernizers, cosmopolitans, structural reformers, mercantilists, and advocates of the “new politics” was a universe of independent, rational, “modern” individuals, while that of traditionalists, parochials, social reformers, militants, and proponents of the “old politics” was a world of interdependent families, neighborhoods, and socioethnic groups. Such a perspective also helps to explain how good

government reformers could advocate democratization and structural reform in the same breath and how members of Hofstadter's two complexes could often cooperate effectively on proposals to democratize the political system while vigorously opposing one another on structural reform. Finally, recognition of these two political cultures establishes a close connection between the political transformation of the Progressive Era and two of the period's most central processes—the modernization of society and the “Americanization” of immigrants.

Although modernization is a Eurocentric concept with varying definitions, it is commonly used by American historians and social scientists to connote a process whereby institutions, relationships, and values based upon ethnicity, religion, and locale give way to those based upon function and achievement.<sup>8</sup> Although this process results in the creation of large-scale, bureaucratic institutions operated by standardized, impersonal procedures, its advocates contend that modernization frees individuals from the constraints imposed by primary group affiliations, allowing them to compete equally for success, wealth, status, power, and personal fulfillment. Such an orientation is clearly most attractive to those who view themselves as sovereign individuals and most repugnant to those who value their immersion in an organic network. The emerging political order was similarly predicated upon the vision of individual voters, freed from the constraints of ethnocultural partisan politics, making rational choices among sovereign candidates on the basis of their abilities and issue orientation.<sup>9</sup>

By the same token, accommodation to the sovereign individualist world view and abandonment of one's involvement in the organic networks of one's origins was the ultimate goal of “Americanization,” while the conflict between the two world views constituted the essence of the adaptive crisis faced by every ethnic minority. The choice between ethnocultural partisan politics and the new political order was a similar test of Americanization for native-stock reformers and a similar trauma for millions of ethnic Americans.<sup>10</sup>

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that in all three cases—political culture, modernization, or Americanization—the choice made by individuals was not a dichotomous one between the sovereign individualist or organic network world views. Rather, the two views functioned as antipodes on a continuum or as the rows and columns of a matrix on which each person found his or her own identity out of a bewildering variety of permutations that changed over the life cycle. The process has been cogently captured by sociologist Lydio Tomasi:

Every individual has to find the supporting measure of self-acceptance and pride-in-self from somewhere to lead a tolerable existence. Some people passing into majority society can derive sufficient self esteem out of the stuff of their individual personalities above, beyond, or despite the character and situation of their group. Others have to

depend heavily upon group identities to supply what their own individual lives may too often deny them. And most people need all they can get from both sources.<sup>11</sup>

On the individual level, as Robert Bellah and his colleagues have effectively argued in *Habits of the Heart*, most Americans confront daily the “ambiguities of individualism” and speak both a “first language of modern individualism” that celebrates freedom, mobility, achievement, and fulfillment, and a “second language of community solidarity” that expresses very different definitions of a “good person” and a “good life” based upon “practices of commitment.” This second language reveals a sense of self rooted in a perception of long-term commitments to ancestors, kin, and progeny, a conception of virtues that are admirable and that have been transmitted and modeled by others who have shared their tradition, and a sense of community solidarity based upon a responsibility to care for others of their own kind. Ambivalence, as Arthur Mann has astutely observed, “is the condition of being American.” On a macrocosmic level, however, proposals to transform the political universe or Americanization crusades, by their very nature, have a pronounced tendency to reduce the number of options to a handful and to aggregate large numbers of people around each position. The former, however, usually leave much room for accommodation and compromise.<sup>12</sup>

The sovereign individualist political culture was the product of historical and cultural forces that were peculiarly British-American and Protestant. The Renaissance, the Reformation, the colonial/frontier experience, the Enlightenment, and the British and American Revolutions constituted the shared historical sense and provided the myths and symbols that linked British-Americans together as an ethnocultural entity. The assumptions and values that informed their sense of identity were so internalized and pervasive that most mainstream Americans regarded them as absolutes of the human condition rather than as culturally and historically bound preferences. The fish, as Milton Gordon has observed, never discovers that water is an environment peculiar to his species. In Europe, the tenets of Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment were, at most, filtered through older, time-honored traditions and absorbed into existing cultural syntheses, but Americans imbibed them in a largely undiluted fashion, in keeping with their sense of being “born free” in “the first new nation,” the “New Eden.” The United States was also, as sociologist Edward Tiryakian perceptively argues, “the first, and perhaps the only, truly Protestant nation,” the only one in which the doctrines of the Reformation were taken whole and not synthesized with the powerful heritage of medieval Christianity. These perspectives, combined with the unparalleled abundance and opportunity that existed for those of northwestern European antecedents, created a pervasive belief that the chief purpose of American society was to permit the fullest possible realization of individual human

potential. Despite value conflicts that ultimately resulted in Civil War, New England Yankees and Southern uplanders, as Frank R. Kramer has argued in his study of midwestern culture, shared “an outlook no less individualistic or socially atomistic.” American cultural trends, Bellah and his associates have asserted, “define personality, achievement, the purpose of human life in ways that leave the individual suspended in glorious, but terrifying isolation.” This was true despite the fact that nearly every foreign observer from Crèvecoeur and Tocqueville on has attributed much of America’s success to its veritable genius at voluntary association. Because such associations were voluntary and because Americans believed that the general welfare was the sum total of each individual pursuing enlightened self-interest, any apparent conflict between the self-perception of individualism and the reality of associationalism was readily resolvable. Voluntary associations, Don H. Doyle has astutely observed, “were formed not in reaction against the forces of mobility and laissez-faire individualism; rather they adapted to and complemented these forces as they shaped American society in the nineteenth century.” The apparent discordance between the perception of individualism and the reality of associationalism led Charles and Mary Beard to observe that in “a democracy which professes equality, the individual without special titles, riches, distinctions, or gifts feels an oppressive sense of weakness alone in a vast mass of general averages and thus bewildered he seeks strength and confidence in an affiliation with kindred spirits.” Their sentiments are echoed by Bellah and his associates, who have concluded that “Americans are more engaged in voluntary associations and civic organizations than are the citizens of most other industrial nations.”<sup>13</sup> It is highly significant that while native American reformers were working to establish a “sense of community” through voluntary association, ethnic Americans were born into a preexisting community defined by primary relationships, a condition built upon and reinforced by urban political machines.

Regardless of their apparent associationalist behavior, sovereign individualists regarded politics as another arena for the realization of individual potential—provided that the system could be made as rational, efficient, and modern as they were seeking to make the socioeconomic order. The key again lay in the conception of all political actors as free individuals making rational choices that added up to the general welfare. Individual voters should be given the maximum impact upon the nomination, election, and legislative processes. Individual candidates should be judged only upon their qualifications and their ideological persuasions. Individual office-holders should be free agents who voted or acted according to the dictates of their own consciences and who were responsible only to the aggregation of individual voters who elected them. To achieve this end, the political system had to be “modernized”—made rational, efficient, and functional. This meant purging the

political order of the interrelated evils of partisanship and ethnoculturalism, both of which relegated the individual to a subordinate role by placing a premium on group action, loyalty, hierarchy, discipline, bloc voting, and emotional appeals.<sup>14</sup>

The organic network world view emerged from significantly different historical-cultural experiences, beginning in countries of Europe whose traditions were Celtic, Judaic, Teutonic, Slavic, or Italic and where the tenets of the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment and modernization were filtered through and diluted by ethnic and medieval traditions. It is, of course, very difficult to generalize about the backgrounds of European immigrants since they varied so significantly in class, origins, culture, locale, and time period. Moreover, American students of immigration generally lack the credentials or the opportunities to investigate those origins in any systematic fashion. Still it seems fair to say that both the realities of the socioeconomic order and the values that justified its existence generally emphasized a view of life that was hierarchical, ascriptive, deferential, and corporatist.<sup>15</sup>

If anything, the organic network orientation of most European immigrants was reinforced by the processes of migration and resettlement. Immigration to America, as John Bodnar has persuasively argued, was essentially one of several responses made by millions of Europeans to the worldwide processes of modernization, urbanization, and industrialization. Their primary goal in this adaptation was the preservation of the family household, either in the original locale or in a new environment. Their major strategy was to use industrial wages gained in other parts of Europe—or in North or South America or Australia—to improve their status in their village of origin. The earliest arrivals of any nationality in America were frequently “sojourners,” “swallows,” or “birds of passage,” who fashioned “networks of migration” using remittance money, prepaid ship tickets, “America letters,” and return visits. Eventually, as John and Leatrice MacDonald have perceptively demonstrated, vast numbers of sojourners decided to settle in America, where they forged “migration chains” that facilitated the movement of family members and fellow villagers to the New World over decades and generations. These same networks or chains also provided later arrivals with their initial housing and employment, accounting for the patterns of “occupational concentrations” and residential clustering. In the MacDonalds’ words, chain migration was “a movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment arranged by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants.” Other scholars have sought to convey this same sense of a “chain” or a “network” by resorting to other metaphors. Thus, Robert F. Harney has described the process as an “electric arc over the Atlantic” linking Italian villages and American cities along which moved millions of “particles”

(immigrants) who collectively constituted “a single economy and an enclosed world.” Isabel Kaprelian has suggested that Armenian immigrants “moved not only as private individuals making solitary decisions, and as members of kinships or clan groups, but also as parts of a village and regional *migration caravan* [emphasis mine] which stretched halfway around the world.” Other scholars of the same phenomenon have coined such phrases as “interactive networks,” the “totality of netlike connections,” and the “natural interdependence” of immigrants. Whatever the metaphorical device, however, all clearly emphasize the sense of interdependence engendered by the process of migration and resettlement.<sup>16</sup>

The process by which immigrants integrated themselves into American society was extremely complex and subject to many variables, but two points seem both salient and beyond reasonable dispute. Although it had millions of individual variations, this process of adjustment was a group one, in which families, kinship networks, fraternal and benevolent societies, churches, ethnic newspapers, literary and cultural organizations, union locals, political clubs, and similar institutions functioned as intermediaries and integrative mechanisms between the individual and mainstream society. Second, these institutions were uniquely hyphenated American, an ingenious response to the double-edged mandate of surviving and prospering in an alien environment while maintaining a sense of ethnic identity and culture. Thus the process of adaptation both reflected and reinforced time-honored Old World proclivities toward an outlook that was group-centered, organic and hierarchical.<sup>17</sup>

In the organic network world view, the individual was not atomistic or sovereign, but a unique and vital piece in a mosaic formed by reinforcing ties of ancestry, history, a sense of place, culture, religion, and socioeconomic status. He or she was firmly immersed in “communities of memory” and “communities of hope” reinforced by “patterns of loyalty and obligation” that kept those communities alive. Fulfillment lay not in individual achievement, mobility, and liberation, but in living up to the obligations and enjoying the prerogatives that their involvement in this network prescribed. Primary groups formed by these ties were not regarded as barriers to individual fulfillment and social progress, but as social organisms that sustained, nurtured, and protected the individual against the harshness of modern life and formed a context in which to absorb and interpret change.<sup>18</sup>

This organic world view also permeated conceptions of justice and religion. While the mainstream Anglo-American system of justice was concerned primarily with the protection of individual rights and liberties and with guaranteeing due process, organic network cultures viewed justice as more a matter of outcome than of procedure and conceived of it in distributive, rather than individual terms. “For friends justice, for enemies the law,” and “I have tried the law, now I want justice” were common attitudes. It was not necessary

that rights be equal, only that they be consonant with responsibilities imposed by social status. Laws were not expressions of the customs and mores of an enlightened citizenry, but universal rules promulgated by those at the apex of the hierarchy. Because they were intended to cover all possible situations, laws needed to be constantly adapted to specific cases; exceptions, exemptions, absolutions, and amnesties were necessary correctives. Government, even in America, was primarily the prerogative of those qualified by their intermediate positions in the network. Their exalted position in the hierarchy mandated that they be given a virtual free hand. Their involvement in the sinews of the organic network was the best guarantee that they would not use power maliciously or capriciously. All of these elements combined to form a distinct preference for a “government of men”—personal, discretionary, interventionist, and integrative—over a “government of laws”—impersonal, universalist, legalistic, and compartmentalized. Each sought, as Wilson Carey McWilliams has observed, “a ‘government of men’ who will understand the problems of the individual and who can be safely allowed to act for him.” Similarly, sovereign individualists, embracing primarily a variety of Protestant denominations, regarded religion essentially as an intensely personal search for God and salvation, while organic network adherents, largely Roman Catholic or Eastern/Orthodox Christians, viewed it as a communitarian enterprise governed by a divine covenant in which dogma, liturgy, ritual and hierarchy linked together co-religionists, aggregated their puny efforts at prayer and good works, and created an inclusive social fabric.<sup>19</sup>

For many ethnic Americans, ethnocultural partisan politics was a vital segment in the organic network that defined their vision of life, while the party organization was a crucial intermediate institution. Ethnocultural partisan politics was group politics in which people united by ties of “blood, land, and belief” used collective voting to reap otherwise unobtainable benefits. Jobs, rent, food, and fuel were distributed on the basis of need, loyalty, and group clout. As long-time Boston ward boss Martin “Mahatma” Lomasney put it: “I think that there’s got to be in every ward a guy that any bloke can go to when he’s in trouble and get help—not justice and the law, but help, no matter what he’s done.” Recognition politics conveyed a sense of self-esteem and group prestige for people who were the victims of prejudice and discrimination. Political hierarchies provided a career ladder for thousands of ethnic Americans who functioned as brokers between their groups of origin and the wider society. Politics, as James Reichley has noted, was a status-conferring occupation, and success, gained largely through mobilizing the support of fellow ethnics, allowed both office holders and constituents to demand greater “deference from the greatest capitalists, the toughest union leaders, the oldest of the old families.” Group political action was also the best way to defend cultural heritage from attacks by Americanizers and

modernizers. Political clubs joined with churches and ethnic lodges to provide a good portion of the fellowship, recreation, and entertainment that existed in ethnic neighborhoods.<sup>20</sup>

Ethnic-oriented, ward-based politicians served as interpreters and intermediaries between their constituents and mainstream institutions. On the one hand, they functioned as *ombudsmen* for constituents who experienced difficulties with landlords, police, courts, or government agencies. On the other, the fraternal and benevolent societies, churches, and union locals to which they had ties provided them with campaign funds, workers, and votes. Within these organizations, as Edgar Litt has observed, "the ethnic leader's influence depended upon his ability to personify and represent collective group sentiments." He was a "co-ethnic, united by common blood or belief, with the power to secure political favors." Although frequently a source of discord and divisiveness, ethnocultural partisan politics was also the means by which millions of people of diverse backgrounds were integrated and socialized into the American political process. It allowed them to function as loyal citizens, without denying their sense of ethnic identification and "peoplehood." Ethnicity, as Litt has concluded, "is a marginal device for imposing rationality, congruity, and consistency on political choices made by ordinary citizens who have relatively low investments in normal political activity." In a universe of organic networks, voting for a candidate because of his ethnocultural background and/or partisan affiliation was eminently rational and logical. It held forth the promise of increased accessibility to the levers of power for his fellows and to an office-holder whose vision of life would be substantially congruent with their own.<sup>21</sup>

In a similar vein, political parties, organized in a hierarchy with precinct and ward structures at the base, were significant intermediate institutions facilitating group adjustment. Like other intermediate institutions, they were hyphenated and transitional, and served as conduits between ethnic voters and the American political process. They explained the system to voters, interpreted the issues, certified the candidates, fostered naturalization, handled voter registration, and conveyed voters to the polls on election day. Through the balanced ticket and slate-making, party leadership granted recognition to any group with sufficient clout. Despite the undeniable corruption that attended their ministrations, party politicians played a role that was integrative, interpretive, and mediative and without which millions of people would have found the system incomprehensible and unresponsive. Even such a generally unfriendly observer as political scientist Henry Jones Ford observed that the ward-based politician was "probably the secret of the powerful solvent influence which American civilization exerts upon the enormous deposits of alien populations thrown upon this country by the torrent of immigration."<sup>22</sup>

It was this amalgamation of ethnocultural and partisan group politics that

constituted the highly effective organizations that good government reformers stigmatized as urban political machines. Everything about the machine's organization, operation, and orientation violated the canons of sovereign individualism. Hierarchy, personal loyalty, bloc voting, recognition politics, the exchange of votes for benefits, and emotional appeals for support were anathema to a world view founded upon individualism, personal moral responsibility, rationality, and modernity. Although most machines were shifting coalitions of ethnic and social groups who frequently warred among themselves over the distribution of material and psychic benefits, they generally closed ranks when "reformers" sought to destroy the organization's base of power. The latter were most successful when they sought to build their movements upon the very connections that linked ethnic, working-class people to the machine—the need for material benefits, the desire for recognition and acceptance, and the defense of their identities and cultures.<sup>23</sup>

Sovereign individualist reformers resorted to a combination of structural change and participatory democracy to eradicate ethnocultural, partisan politics. Structural change involved devising an electoral process that was non-partisan, standardized and centralized, and a governmental system in which executives and experts exercised hegemony over elected representatives. In such a system voters would have to choose among candidates on the basis of their individual qualities and on their ideological stances. Lawmakers would have to build issue-by-issue coalitions free of party discipline, and individual petitioners and interest groups would deal directly with legislators and government agencies without the intervening party mechanism, allowing issues to be resolved on their merits and on the canons of professional expertise. Officeholders would either be appointed experts or, if elected, responsible only to their own sovereign consciences and to their aggregation of individual constituents. This rationale sustained such structural reforms as at-large, non-partisan elections, the secret ballot printed and distributed by the state rather than the party, the separation of local elections from state and national, the short ballot, civil service extension, and the city manager and commission forms of municipal government. In large cities and in state governments, it meant transferring power from elected representatives, who presumably represented parochial, geographical, ethnocultural, and socioeconomic interests, to strong executives who represented "the public interest."<sup>24</sup>

Any misgivings about the compatibility of such a modernized system with participatory democracy were offset by a corresponding commitment to subject the nomination, electoral, legislative, and administrative processes to maximum popular control through such devices as primaries, the popular election of senators, initiative, referendum, and recall, and the removal of sexual and racial barriers to voting. As Martin Schiesl has noted, some proponents, embarrassed by the seeming contradiction between structural reform and

democracy, insisted that any loss of control or access on the part of the lower social orders would be more than offset by a modernized system of municipal services and by honest, efficient, and economical government. Others, such as Wisconsin's Charles McCarthy, contended that expert, apolitical administration was democratic as long as legislators and executive policymakers were subject to popular control. But intelligent, responsible, and effective voting in this modernized system required that voters be literate, rational, and "modern," leading many reformers to advocate the disfranchisement of southern blacks and suffrage limitations on recent immigrants. The majority of northern reformers, however, retained their faith in the educative power of American institutions, particularly if these were bolstered by Americanization drives. Perhaps many also realized that millions of such voters, once deprived of the explanatory framework provided by ethnocultural partisan politics, would find the system incomprehensible, unresponsive and inaccessible, and "voluntarily" disfranchise themselves. With the professional politician no longer functioning as broker, those capable of being sovereign voters would presumably exercise maximum influence in elections that were participatory, issue oriented, and based upon the precepts of "one man, one vote," and of voting for "the man and not the party." Such a system, as Schiesl has perceptively argued, augmented the political power of upper income groups and, ironically, made "apolitical" municipal bureaucrats into a potent political force.<sup>25</sup>

But while the sovereign individualist reformer saw no necessary conflict between a modernized political structure and greater democratization, the devotees of the organic network political culture were generally hostile to the former and welcomed the latter only in so far as it could be absorbed within the familiar and nurturing context of ethnocultural partisan politics. The hostility of the "boss-immigrant-machine complex," of parochials, militants, social reformers, traditionalists and devotees of the old politics to structural reform in a variety of locales has been so thoroughly documented as to require little rehearsal here. Suffice it to say that such proposals polarized adherents of the two political cultures to an extent exceeded only by such overtly ethnocultural issues as prohibition, Sunday blue laws, immigration restriction, the banning of foreign languages, or compulsory public education—and for the same reason. Both forced acculturation, and structural political reform divided people with antagonistic visions of life rooted in the relationship of the individual to society. Such reforms affected people profoundly in such intimate areas as identity, self-concept, and group esteem. They threatened the right to live life according to one's own lights, to inherit a way of life from one's ancestors, to practice it with one's kinsmen, to transmit it to one's offspring, and to be represented and protected by those who shared that same vision of life.<sup>26</sup>

Even so, the two conflicting sides did find some areas of accommodation on structural reform, more than they did over matters of legislated acculturation. In the human calculus, political matters are never as intimate as those involving family, religion, personal habits, or the inculcation of children. City manager and commission forms of government with at-large, nonpartisan elections were almost never adopted in large cities with heterogeneous populations and effective political machines. There structural reformers usually had to settle for strong mayors with the power to appoint "apolitical experts" and a bureaucracy protected by civil service to counteract the power of city councils, many of whose members still adhered to the organic network political culture. Although they generally opposed civil service and government reorganization, machine politicians often adapted their methods to the new reality, riddled the system with exemptions, allowed for sizeable numbers of "temporary" employees, appointed under patronage, and used civil service to create sinecures for their followers. In several locales, machine politicians unsuccessfully fought structural reform and then used their organizational strength and techniques to gain control of the government. Despite these real instances of concession and adaptation, however, adherents of the sovereign individualist and organic network political cultures generally confronted one another in the arena of structural reform with a ferocity that bespoke an understanding that not only their self-interest but their vision of life hung in the balance.<sup>27</sup>

By contrast, adherents of the two political cultures generally found broad areas of agreement on measures to democratize the system because each believed that such reforms, if adopted within their respective structural context, would redound to their ultimate advantage. Primary elections and initiative, referendum, and recall campaigns could be won as well by regular party organizations as by independent voters mobilized by issue-oriented political action committees. Electing senators by popular vote freed both sovereign individualists and organic network adherents from the grip of malapportioned, rural-dominated legislatures. Despite the sovereign individualist assumptions of the direct primary and initiative, referendum, and recall, organic network adherents were usually willing to accept such measures, provided that the intermediate role of the party organization was preserved. Consequently the latter insisted upon closed rather than open primaries, the holding of national, state, and local elections at the same time, and a relatively high number of signatures required on petitions. Proposals for legislative reapportionment and municipal home rule were similarly attractive to adherents of both political cultures, because each believed that these alterations would augment their forces. Typically, organic network adherents wanted to lodge newly acquired powers of municipal governance in ward-based city councils representative of parochial interests while sovereign individualists were generally only willing

to entrust home rule to modernized, restructured city governments. Consensus was most difficult to achieve on women's suffrage because enfranchisement seemed to pose a direct threat to the role that females traditionally played within the family network. Eventually, though, the recognition that most women shared the political culture of their fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons convinced many organic network adherents to support enfranchisement.<sup>28</sup>

Although the adherents of the organic network political culture have not been without their significant victories, both during the Progressive Era and since, there can be little doubt that the sovereign individualists have generally carried the day. But their victory has been a mixed blessing at best. The electoral and legislative processes have seemingly been purged of their most overt and blatant forms of corruption and the calibre of candidates appears to be higher, at least by the measures employed by modern society. The educated and organized have gained greater access to the political system and much constructive and socially responsible legislation has been enacted. Political action committees of various orientations have largely displaced parties as arbiters of the system.<sup>29</sup>

But the dropout rate, especially among the unorganized and the undereducated, has reached such proportions that elections threaten to become contests between corporate and information elites. The results of atomizing the political system seem to bear out Tocqueville's warning that conformism and authoritarian manipulation are much more likely to afflict the isolated than they are the socially involved. Political parties have lost much of their emotional hold on the electorate and their tendency to be "without program and without discipline," to quote political scientist Morton Grodzins, has accelerated significantly. Indeed, the criticisms of the modern political system made by several prominent political scientists sound hauntingly like the defense of the "old politics" made by boss-immigrant-machine politicians. Insisting that the politics of the sovereign individual has produced "a class-oriented skewing of participation," Walter Dean Burnham has charged that reformers have destroyed "the only devices thus far invented by the wit of western man which, with some effectiveness, can generate collective countervailing power on behalf of the many individually powerless against the relative few who are individually or organizationally powerful." In his cogent little volume *Where Have All The Voters Gone?*, Everett Carl Ladd insists that the electoral innovations of the Progressive Era and since have caused parties to fail the three critical tests of effectiveness: to structure and regularize political competition; to represent the various subdivisions of society; and to integrate and coordinate the activities of officeholders in the different branches and levels of government and to synthesize the plethora of opinions into reasonably coherent policy options. These functions are best performed, Ladd concludes, when candidates "are arranged as parties and not as individual candidates,"

and when parties can “make elected officials in some sense collectively—rather than individually—responsible to the electorate.”<sup>30</sup>

### NOTES

1. See especially the discussions in Daniel T. Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism” in *The Promise of American History: Progress and Prospects*, ed. Stanley I. Kutler and Stanley N. Katz (Baltimore, 1982), 113–32; John Whiteclay Chambers, *The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1900–1917* (New York, 1980), 105–39; Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick, *Progressivism* (Arlington Heights, Ill., 1983), 26–66; David P. Thelen, *The New Citizenship: Origins of Progressivism in Wisconsin, 1885–1900* (Columbia, 1972), 130–308; David Paul Nord, *Newspapers and the New Politics: Midwestern Municipal Reform, 1890–1900* (Ann Arbor, 1981); Richard Jensen, *Grass Roots Politics: Parties, Issues, and Voters, 1954–1983* (Westport, Conn., 1983), 29–58; and Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York, 1970).

2. For classic statements of this view see James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, 3 vols. (New York, 1973); Charles H. Parkhurst, *Our Fight With Tammany* (1895; reprint, New York, 1970); Samuel P. Orth, *The Boss and the Machine* (New Haven, 1919); Mosei Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Party System in the United States* (New York, 1974); and John J. Hamilton, *The Dethronement of the City Boss* (Freeport, N.Y., 1971).

3. For critiques of the machine-reformer typology, see Howard P. Chudacoff, *The Evolution of American Urban Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975), 148–78; Jon C. Teaford, “Finis for Tweed and Steffens: Rewriting the History of Urban Rule” in Kutler and Katz, *Promise of American History*, 133–49; Charles Glaab and A. Theodore Brown, *A History of Urban America* (New York, 1976), 206–28; David R. Colburn and George E. Pozzetta, “Bosses and Machines: Changing Interpretations in American History,” *History Teacher* 9 (1976): 445–63; Michael McCarthy, “On Bosses, Reformers and Urban Growth: Some Suggestions for a Political Typology of American Cities,” *Journal of Urban History* 4 (1977): 29–38; Lyle Dorsett, “The City Boss and the Reformer,” *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 63 (1972): 150–54. See also the diverse viewpoints presented in Blaine A. Brownell and Warren E. Stickel, eds., *Bosses and Reformers: Urban Politics in America, 1882–1920* (Boston, 1973); Alexander B. Callow, Jr., ed., *The City Boss in America: An Interpretive Reader* (New York, 1976); Lee S. Greene, ed., *City Bosses and Political Machines* (Philadelphia, 1964); and Bruce M. Stave, ed., *Urban Bosses, Machines, and Progressive Reformers* (Lexington, 1972). For the alternative formulations see Melvin G. Holli, “Urban Reform in the Progressive Era” in *The Progressive Era*, ed. Lewis L. Gould (Syracuse, 1974), 132–52; Samuel P. Hays, “Political Parties and the Community Society Continuum,” *American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development*, eds. William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York, 1967), 152–81; Jensen, *Grass Roots Politics*, 19–58; and Nord, *Newspapers and New Politics*, 3–31.

4. Rowland Berthoff, *An Unsettled People: Social Order and Disorder in American History* (New York, 1971), 359–456. Political culture has been defined as “a set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system, and thus is rooted equally in public events and private experiences.” See Lucian C. Pye, “Political Culture” in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David L. Sills (New York, 1968), 12:218–25.

5. Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R.* (New York, 1955), 186n.

6. *Ibid.*, 182–83.

7. This attempt to formulate two political cultures is the result of synthesizing the body of literature that the author and his collaborators consulted in producing three annotated bibliographies: John D. Buenker and Nicholas C. Burckel, eds., *Immigration and Ethnicity: A Guide to Information Sources* (Detroit, 1977), 173–226; idem, *Progressive Reform: A Guide to Information Sources* (Detroit, 1980), 95–193, 181–206; and John D. Buenker, Gerald M. Greenfield, and William J. Murin, *Urban History: A Guide to Information Sources* (Detroit, 1981), 223–72, 305–48. For an attempt to synthesize these materials into a somewhat broader model of ethnocultural adaptation, see John D. Buenker, “Mainstream America and the Immigrant Experience,” in *The Development of an American Culture*, ed. Stanley Coben and Lorman A. Rathner (New York, 1983), 312–41.

8. For a discussion of the biases inherent in the concept of modernization see Richard D. Brown, *Modernization: The Transformation of American Life, 1600–1865* (New York, 1976), 3–22. For treatments of modernization by historians, see Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York, 1967); Chambers, *Tyranny of Change*, 1–105, 229–50; Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism,” 117–21; Louis Galombos, “The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History,” *Business History Review* 44 (1970): 279–90; Richard Jensen, *Illinois: A Bicentennial History* (New York, 1978); and Samuel P. Hayes, “The Development of Pittsburgh as a Social Order,” *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* 57 (1974): 431–48. For treatment by sociologists see Alex Inkeles and David M. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974); Peter L. Berger, *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness* (New York, 1973); and Robert Nisbet, *The Social Bond: An Introduction to the Study of Society* (New York, 1970).

9. See especially the discussion in Wiebe, *Search for Order*, 111–63; Chambers, *Tyranny of Change*, 73–104; Inkeles and Smith, *Becoming Modern*, 73–132; and Berger, *Homeless Mind*, 21–118.

10. Buenker, “Mainstream America,” 325–40; Philip Gleason, “American Identity and Americanization,” in *The Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, ed. Stephan Thernstrom (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), 31–58; David A. Hollinger, “Ethnic Diversity, Cosmopolitanism and the Emergence of the American Liberal Intelligentsia,” *American Quarterly* 27 (1975): 133–51; Daniel Weinberg, “The Ethnic Technician and the Foreign Born: Another Look at Americanization, Ideology, and Goals,” *Societas* 7 (1977): 209–28; and John F. McClymer, “The Federal Government and the Americanization Movement: 1915–1925,” *Prologue* 13 (1978): 23–41.

11. Lydio F. Tomasi, *The Ethnic Factor in the Future of Inequality* (New York, 1972), 33.

12. An appreciation of the complexities of adaptation can be gained from Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, National Origins* (New York, 1964) and his *Human Nature, Class and Ethnicity* (New York, 1978); E. K. Francis, *Interethnic Relations: An Essay in Sociological Theory* (New York, 1976); and David Hogan, “Education and the Making of the Chicago Working Class, 1800–1930,” *History of Education Quarterly* 19 (1978): 227–70. See also Arthur Mann, *Immigrants in American Life: Selected Readings* (Boston, 1974), 245–48; and Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley, 1985), 142–65.

13. There is obviously a great deal of difficulty, and not a *souçon* of irony, in trying to delineate the world view shared by a “group” of “sovereign individuals.” I have attempted to discern the common assumptions and values that pervade mainstream American economic, political, social, and religious outlook from the work of a variety of scholars. Chief among these are Berthoff, *An Unsettled People* (New York, 1971); Howard Mumford Jones, *O Strange New World* (New York, 1964); Carl N. Degler, *Out of Our Past: The Forces that Shaped Modern America* (New York, 1959); David M. Potter, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character* (Chicago, 1954); Martin E. Marty, *Righteous Empire: The Protestant Experience in Legacy: Essays in American European Cultural History* (New York, 1948); Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution*; Max Savelle, *Seeds of Liberty: The Genesis of American* (New York, 1948); Irvin G. Wyllie, *The Self-Made Man in America: The Myth of Rags to Riches* (New York, 1954); and Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial*

Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, Mass., 1981). On America as a "new Nation," see Hartz, *Liberal Tradition*, 35–88; Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York, 1963); and Edward A. Tiryakian, "Neither Marx Nor Durkheim—Perhaps Weber," *American Journal of Sociology* 81 (1975): 32. The quote from Charles and Mary Beard is from *The Rise of American Civilization* (New York, 1933), 763. See also the discussions in Michael Kammen, *People of Paradox: An Inquiry Concerning the Origins of American Civilization* (New York, 1973) and Lynn Dumenil, *Freemasonry and American Culture, 1880–1930* (Princeton, 1984), 72–114, 185–217. See also Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart*, 6, 142–63, and Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York, 1890), 2: 99–128. See also Frank Kramer, *Voices in the Valley: Myth-Making and Folk Belief in the Shaping of the Middle West* (Madison, 1964), 68, and Don H. Doyle, "The Social Functions of Voluntary Associations in a Nineteenth Century American Town," *Social Science History* (1977): 333–55.

15. The most well-known attempts are William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (New York, 1958), 87–202; and Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migration That Made the American People* (Boston, 1951), 7–36. Useful studies by Europeanists include Peter N. Stearns, *European Society in Upheaval* (New York, 1967), 1–194; Vincent J. Knapp, *Europe in the Era of Social Transformation* (Englewood Cliff, N.J., 1976), 1–182; Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society* (Chicago, 1962), 123–311, 332–58, 441–52; Alfons Dopsch, *The Economic and Social Foundations of European Civilization* (New York, 1969), 165–367; and Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944* (New York, 1981), xi–xvi, 139–68, 184–220. Kramer, *Voices in the Valley*, observes that the most typical and expressive myth to emerge from the medieval experience was "the famous analogy between society and the human organism, each of whose organs or members play its own peculiar role" (189).

16. John Bodnar, *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America* (Bloomington, 1985), 1–84, 169–216; John S. and Leatrice D. MacDonald, "Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighborhood Formation, and Social Networks," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 17 (1964): 82–97; Robert F. Harnney, "The Italian-American Experience in America" in *Handbook for Teachers of Italian*, ed. Anthony Mallica (Don Mills, Ontario, 1976), 219–41; Isabel Kaprelian, "Migratory Caravans: Armenian Sojourners in Canada," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 6 (1987): 33–34; Dennis Clark, "The Irish-Americans: A Group for All Theories," unpublished paper; Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley, 1982), 11–25; Richard Jules Oestricher, *Solidarity and Fragmentation: Working People and Class Consciousness in Detroit, 1875–1900* (Urbana, 1983), 61–65.

17. The emphasis on a group-centered experience that resulted in an open-ended, hyphenated ethnicity has moved the debate forward from the three-sided dispute over pluralism versus Anglo-conformity versus the melting pot. See especially Rudolph Vecoli, "European-Americans: From Immigrants to Ethnic" in *The Reinterpretation of American History and Culture*, ed. William H. Cartwright and Richard T. Watson, Jr. (Washington, D.C., 1973), 81–112; Maxine Sellers, *To Seek America: A History of Ethnic Life in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977), 97–181; Humbert Nelli, "Italians in Urban America: A Study in Ethnic Adjustment," *International Migration Review* 2 (1967): 38–55; Richard Gambino, *Blood of my Blood: The Dilemma of Italian-Americans* (New York, 1974), 1–38, 285–342; Andrew M. Greele, *Ethnicity in the United States: A Preliminary Reconnaissance* (New York, 1974), 9–109, 156–76; John Higham, *Send These to Me: Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America* (New York, 1974), 3–28, 196–246; Victor Greene, "Becoming American: The Role of Ethnic Leaders—Swedes, Poles, Italians, and Jews," in *The Ethnic Frontier: Group Survival in Chicago and the Midwest*, ed. Melvin G. Holli and Peter d'A. Jones (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1977), 143–78; and Josef J. Barton, *Peasants and Strangers: Italians, Rumanians and Slovaks in an American City, 1890–1950* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975). See his *Immigrants in American Life: Selected Readings* (Boston, 1974), 248.

18. The most cogent statements of ethnic group formation are Francis, *Interethnic Relations*, 209–32 and Gordon, *Human Nature*, 148–210. See also Sellers, *To Seek America*, 104–97; Nelli, "Italians in Urban America," 38–55; Greene, "Becoming American," 143–78; Leonard Dinnerstein and David Reimers, *Ethnic Americans: A History of Immigration and Assimilation* (New York, 1975), 10–55, 136–56, and Vecoli, "European Immigrants," 97–181. Despite the sometimes strident tone and occasional lack of balance, Michael Novak's *The Rise of the Unmeltable*

*Ethnicity: The New Political Force of the Seventies* (New York, 1972), does a good job of capturing the network orientation. See especially 22–50, 167–95, 196–236. See also the essays in Thomas C. Wheeler, ed., *The Immigrant Experience: The Anguish of Becoming American* (New York, 1972); Kathleen Niels Conzen, *Immigrant Milwaukee: Accommodation and Community in a Frontier City* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), 44–224; and two publications by William S. Bernard: “New Directions in Integration and Ethnicity,” *International Migration Review* 5 (1971): 464–73; and *Migration and Ethnicity: Ten Years of Changing Thought* (New York, 1972). The “communities of memory” reference is from Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart*, 152–54.

19. On the contrasting orientations of English common law and European civil law see Dennis Lloyd, *The Idea of Law* (Baltimore, 1968), 70–226; Rene David and John E. C. Brierly, *Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law* (New York, 1968), 1–24, 93–180. On religion, see especially Ernest Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World* (Boston, 1958), 9–57, 171–207; and Karl Holl, *The Cultural Significance of the Reformation* (Cleveland and New York, 1966), 23–108. The quote from Wilson Carey McWilliams is found in his *The Idea of Fraternity in America* (Berkeley, 1973), 498–99.

20. This view is supported by most of the sources found in note 3. The best syntheses are Edgar Litt, *Beyond Pluralism: Ethnic Politics in America* (Chicago, 1970), 4–74; Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., “Bosses, Machines, and Ethnic Groups,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 353 (1964): 24–30; and Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York, 1968), 71–82. There is also a perceptive discussion of ethnic politics in Handlin, *The Uprooted* (201–226), to which the Lomsoy observation is central. See also James Reichley, *The Art of Government* (New York, 1959), 104; and Michael Parenti, “Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification,” *American Political Science Quarterly* 61 (1967): 717–26.

21. Litt, *Beyond Pluralism*, 17–37.

22. Henry Ford Jones, *Rise and Growth of American Politics* (New York, 1911), 306. On the role of political parties see Keith I. Polakoff, *Political Parties in American History* (New York, 1981), 267–96 and Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., *Where Have All the Voters Gone?: The Fracturing of America's Political Parties* (New York, 1978), xiii–xxiv. See also Everett Carl Ladd, Jr. and Charles D. Hadley, *Transformation of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s* (New York, 1978) and Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge, 1979).

23. See, for example, Charles Garrett, *The La Guardia Years* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1961), 3–44 and Edward C. Banfield, *The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis* (Boston, 1969), 45–66. See also Hofstadter, *Age of Reform*, 174–86, and Handlin, *Uprooted*, 217–26. On the relative success of some urban reformers, see Jane Addams, “Why the Ward Boss Rules,” *The Outlook* 58 (1898): 879–82; and Allen F. Davis, *Spearheads For Reform: The Social Settlements And The Progressive Movement, 1890–1914* (New York, 1967), 148–63.

24. Schiesl, *Politics of Efficiency*, 46–67, 133–88; Holli, *Urban Reform*, 132–52; Rice, *Progressive Cities*, 52–99; Burnham, *Critical Elections*, 74–96.

25. Burnham, *Critical Elections*, 6–24, 68–87, 91–133; Schiesl, *Politics of Efficiency*, 189–98; Nord, *Newspapers and New Politics*, 3–36, 113–30; Rice, *Progressive Cities*, 52–83. See also Walter Dean Burnham, “The End of American Party Politics,” in *The Liberal Tradition in Crisis*, ed. Jerome M. Mileur (Lexington, Mass., 1974), 312–30. For an informative discussion of the tension between expert government and democracy by a prominent theorist and activist, see Charles McCarthy, *The Wisconsin Idea* (New York, 1912), 172–87.

26. The influence of ethnocultural and societal factors on identity and personality formation is dealt with in George Herbert Mead, *On Social Psychology* (Chicago, 1964), 199–284; Erik H. Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (New York, 1968), 91–141; Gordon W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York, 1937), 101–234; Charles M. Harsch and H. G. Schrickel, *Personality: Development and Assessment* (New York, 1959), 27–310; Charles Cooley, *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), 3–60, 107–20; and Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray, and David M. Schneider, *Personality: In Nature, Society, and Culture* (New York, 1953), 3–70, 226–41, 246–59, 577–94. For a perspective synthesis of sociological, anthropological, and psychological perspectives see Gordon, *Human*

*Nature*, 3–210. See also Gleason, “American Identity and Americanization,” 31–58.

27. For a more thorough discussion of the adjustments made by the boss-immigrant-machine complex to structural reform, see John D. Buenker, *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform* (New York, 1973), 121–33; and Glaab and Brown, *History of Urban America*, 206–28; and Chudacoff, *Evolution of American Urban Society*, 148–78. For specific adaptations, see Mark Foster, “Frank Hague of Jersey City: The Boss as Reformer,” *New Jersey History* 85 (1968): 106–17; and James Michael Curley, *I’d Do It Again* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1957), 110–201.

28. Buenker, *Urban Liberalism*, 133–62. See also John D. Buenker, “The Urban Political Machine and the Seventeenth Amendment,” *Journal of American History* 56 (1969): 305–22, and idem, “The Urban Political Machine and Woman Suffrage: A Study in Political Adaptability,” *The Historian* 33 (1971): 264–79, and Murray S. and Susan W. Stedman, “The Rise of the Democratic Party of Rhode Island,” *New England Quarterly* 24 (1951): 329–41.

29. Schiesl, *Politics of Efficiency*, 6–25, 171–88; Nord, *Newspapers and New Politics*, 3–36, 113–30; Rice, 100–12. Even most critics of the “new politics” are willing to concede these points.

30. Burnham, *Critical Elections*, 91–133; Burnham, “End of American Party Politics,” 312–30; Ladd, *Where Have The Voters Gone?*, xii, xxiv, 50–74; Ladd and Hadley, *Transformation of Party System*, 302–74. See also Brendon Sexton, “Middle-Class Workers and the New Politics,” in Mileur, *Liberal Tradition in Crisis*, 203–42. Tocqueville’s discussion is found in *Democracy in America*, 4: 336–55.