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This course introduces into classic non-cooperative game theory and its applications in economics. The course develops the game-theoretical toolkit and teaches how to use it in various contexts, especially in modeling of competition (price and quantity competition, labor market competition, promotions, innovations, tournaments, rent-seeking), contracting and bargaining (organizational economics) and policy-making (monetary and fiscal policies, capital taxation, public policies and corporate policies).
In this undergraduate course, we will cover only games with complete information. Therefore, we will focus on problems in which rational agents have identical knowledge about fundamentals of the economy and their interactions, but cope with uncertainty over the actions of their opponents (strategic uncertainty). In contrast, the graduate course JEM013 covers games with incomplete information in which rational agents address both fundamental and strategic uncertainty. Last update: Gregor Martin, doc. PhDr., Ph.D. (15.02.2023)
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Course requirements: 4 homeworks 50%, a written (three-hour) final exam 50% Exam 1: May 19, 9-12, Room 206 Grades ETCS
Last update: Gregor Martin, doc. PhDr., Ph.D. (19.06.2023)
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Tadelis, S. (2013) Game Theory: An Introduction. Princeton University Press. For each class, I will assign reading that will cover applications relevant to the concept covered in the class. Last update: Gregor Martin, doc. PhDr., Ph.D. (02.02.2021)
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Course requirements: 4 homeworks 50%, a written (three-hour) final exam 50% Grades ETCS
Last update: Gregor Martin, doc. PhDr., Ph.D. (15.02.2023)
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Classes We will be meeting on Wednesdays, 11-14, in Room 206. Content 1. The Single-Person Decision Problem
Aumann, R. J. (2019) Tadelis (2013) Chapters 1-2
Blavatskyy et al. (2022) 2. Normal-Form Games with Pure Strategies
Belleflamme and Peitz (2015) Chapter 3.3 Tadelis (2013) Chapters 3-5
Asker, Fershtman, and Pakes (2021) Dave et al. (2020) Hindriks and Myles (2013) Chapter 20.2 Hortaçsu et al. (2019) 3. Normal-Form Games with Mixed Strategies
Konrad (2009) Chapters 1-2 Tadelis (2013) Chapter 6
Gregor (2021) 4. Extensive-Form Games
Belleflamme and Peitz (2015) Chapter 16.3.2 Tadelis (2013) Chapters 7-9
Kim, Lan and Dobson (2021) Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010) 5. Multistage and Repeated Games
Tadelis (2013) Chapter 10
6. Bargaining
Tadelis (2013) Chapter 11
Last update: Gregor Martin, doc. PhDr., Ph.D. (15.02.2023)
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